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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner, vs.FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES,respondents.

Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.

Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

 

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.

It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebesadministratrix of the said estate.

In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate —

Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.

This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.

These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.

Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.

In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First — is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second — are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said widow?

Our answer to the first question is in the negative.

Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:

Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.

Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child.

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.

Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.

Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:

We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).

By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.

The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz —

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)

Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.

On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

 

Footnotes

1 III Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 461, 1979 ed.

2 Articles 978 to 1014.

3 Art.887 (3), Civil Code.

4 71 SCRA 262, 265 L-42257, June 14, 1976.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/feb1987/gr_l_40789_1987.html

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs.ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON,oppositors-appellants.

Punzalan, Yabut&Eusebio for executrix-appellee.

Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.

 

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition.  1

On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, BernarditaDizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.

The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, CayetanoDizon, Francisco Rivera, AgripinaAyson, Jolly Jimenez and LaureanoTiambon.

In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.

Testate proceedings were in due course commenced 2 and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.

After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr.Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties.

The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. 3 (¹/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants). 4 In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:

1. Estela Dizon .......................................P 98,474.80 2.Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.063.BernarditaDizon .................................. 51,968.17 4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39 5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41 6.Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47 7.Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71 8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................69,280.009. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia, CayetanoDizon, Francisco Rivera, AgripinaAyson, Dioli or Jolly Jimenez, LaureanoTiamzon .................  72,540.00   Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01

The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the estate as follows:

(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime;

(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;

(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain untouched. <äre||

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On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the following basis:

(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half (½) of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half (½) amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.

Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows:

1. Estela Dizon ...........................................P 49,485.56 2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42 3. BernarditaDizon ....................................... 26,115.04 4.Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38 5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04 6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13 7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82 8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50 9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al ..........  36,452.80

T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78

while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.

The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference

to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."

From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and raise anew the following issues: .

1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction;

2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and

3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;

which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.

The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will."5 In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico 6 for violation of these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise." 8

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.

1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the

right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:

ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.

ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.

This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their respective legitimes.

2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."

3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties, especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."

4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs. From this erroneous premise, they

proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16

Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17

Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)hedevisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.

Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.

5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.

Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs

are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any question — and none is presented — as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any way affect the adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. 21 That her co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

 

# Footnotes

1 Appeal was directed to this Court, as the value of the estate exceeded P200,000.00, in accordance with the then subsisting provisions of Sec. 17, third paragraph, subsec. 5, now eliminated by Rep. Act 5440 enacted on Sept. 9, 1968.

2 Sp. Proc. No. 1582 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

3 These figures are those of oppositors-appellants which are adopted for purposes of this decision. Per appellee's brief, p. 3, executrix-appellee sums up the value of the estate P1,809,569.55, and therefore the legitime of each of the seven (7) forced heirs at P129,254.96. While there is thus a slight difference in the valuation of the estate and legitime of the forced heirs (a difference of P2,126.05 for the whole estate and of P107.15 in each legitime), the same is of no importance... because the issue involved in this appeal is not the value of the estate but the manner it should be distributed among the heirs." (Notes in parentheses supplied)

4 Art.888, Civil Code.

5 Santos vs. Madarang, 27 Phil. 209.

6 L-15737, Feb. 28, 1962; 4 SCRA 550.

7 "SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. — In the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." (now Rule 130, sec. 9)

8 Citing in In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333.

9 Tribunal Supremo of Spain, sentencia of 20 Marzo 1918.

10 ART. 1079. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value. (n)

11 Romero vs. Villamor, 102 Phil. 641 (1957).

12 Legasto vs. Versoza, 54 Phil. 766 (1930); Fajardo vs. Fajardo, 54 Phil. 842 (1930).

13 Reyes and Puno, Vol. III, p. 216; Tolentino, Vol. III, pp. 538-540.

14 L-15598 and L-16726, March 31, 1964; 10 SCRA 471.

15 See Arts. 776 and 777 Phil. Civil Code. The latter article provides that "(T)he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."

16 Appellants' brief, pp. 15-16.

17 Rec. on Appeal, p. 20; emphasis supplied.

18 Icasiano vs. Icasiano, L-18979, June 30, 1964; 11 SCRA 422.

19 III Tolentino's Civil Code, 1961 ed., p. 518.

20 Record on Appeal, p. 107.

21 See Arts. 955, 1080 and 1104, Civil Code.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1970/jun1970/gr_24561_1970.html

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46903               July 23, 1987

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.1

The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious.

The two articles provide as follows:

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.

The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court,* which held that the decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate.3

On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court** holding that the deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation and equally divided the net estate of the decedent, including the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda.4

The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:

IKALAWA. Na alang-alangsaakingpagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbisa akin ngakinganaknasi BUHAY DE ROMA, kasalkayArabella Castaneda, may karampatanggulang, mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din ditosaLunsodng San Pablo sapamamagitanngkasulatangito ay kusang-loobkongibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipatsanabanggitna BUHAY DE ROMA, sakanyangmgakahalili at tagapagmana, sapamamagitanngpagbibigayna di namababawingmuli, anglahatngmgalagaynglupanasinasabisaitaas, sailalimngkasunduannangayon pa ay siyanaangnagmamay-aringtunayngmgalupangito at kanyanangmaaringipalipatangmgahojadeclaratoriangmgalupangitosakanyangpangalan,

datapwa'tsamantalangako ay nabubuhay, ay akorinangmakikinabangsamgamapuputi at mamomosesionsamganasabinglupa;

IKATLO. Na pinagtibaykonaako ay marami pang ibangmgapag-aarisasapat pang akingikabuhay at sapagbibigaykongito ay hindimasisiraang legitimate ngmgataonadapatmagmanasa akin, sapagkatangmgalupangsinasabisaitaas ay bahaguingakingkabuhayannaako ay may layangipamigaykahitnakaninongtaona kung tawagin ay LibreDisposicion. 5

We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sapamamagitanngpagbibigayna di namababawingmuli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.

We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062. 1awphil The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.

There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.

It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Record on Appeal, pp. 14-23.

2 Ibid., pp. 69-73.

* Judge Manuel T. Reyes.

3 Rollo, pp. 16-25.

** San Diego, J., ponente, and Busran and Jimenez, JJ.

4 Ibid., pp. 31-35.

5 Id., pp. 15-16.

6 Tagalog Forms for Notaries Public, Rosendo Ignacio, 1967, 2nd.Ed., pp. 21, 23, 26, 28, 31.

7 121 SCRA 51; New Frontier Mines vs. NLRC, 129 SCRA 502; Federation of free farmers vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-41222, Nov. 13, 1985.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/jul1987/gr_l-46903_1987.html

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

 

G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992

MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN, MATILDE L. CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN, MERCEDES JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN, respondents.

Aytona Law Office and Siquia Law Offices for petitioners.

Mabella, Sangil& Associates for private respondents.

 

NARVASA, C.J.:

Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 — affirming with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an action for recovery of real property with damages — is sought. in these proceedings initiated by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was however reinstated upon a second motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the respondents were required to comment thereon. The petition was thereafter given due course and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums. These, together with the evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court now decides the case.

First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:

The late GetulioLocsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided among his three (3) children as follows:

(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to his daughter, Magdalena Locsin;

(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;

(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she had inherited from her parents, BalbinoJaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented by other properties acquired by the spouses in the course of their union, 1 which however was not blessed with children.

Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens System. Those that Mariano inherited from his father, GetulioLocsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2

Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e.,brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives." 4

Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doña Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceeding was Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's estate 5 which she submitted to the probate court for approval, 6 Catalina declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased and form part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7

Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doña Catalina was closest to her nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of all the titles of her properties; and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal documents and, more often than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house.

Don Mariano relied on Doña Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doña Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties which she had received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES

23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481favor of Mariano Locsin

1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000Jose R. Locsin

1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 HostilioCornelloJulian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian

1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509favorAureaLocsin,Matilde L. Corderoand Salvador Locsin

2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045favorAureaLocsin,Matilde L. Corderoand Salvador Locsin

3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)favorAureaLocsin,Matilde L. Corderoand Salvador Locsin

4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Corneliofavor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco

5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Corneliofavor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian

6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto -favor of Aurea B. Locsin

7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto -favor of Aurea B. Locsin

15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto -AureaLocsin

16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina AnsonAureaLocsin M. Acabado

17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor SatuitoAureaLocsin Mariano B. Locsin

19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto -favor of Mariano Locsin

1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Ansonin favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio IllegibleRosario whose maternalgrandfather was GetulioLocsin

2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegiblein favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador NicalRosario but the rentalsfrom bigger portion ofLot 2155 leased to FiloilRefinery were assigned toMaria JaucianLorayesCornelio

Of her own properties, Doña Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and nieces and others:

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE

2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)(6,825 sqm. whenresurveyed)

24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000in favor of Francisco M.Maquiniana

26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300favor of FranciscoMaquiniana

27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000favor of IreneoMamia

28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750favor of ZenaidaBuiza

29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500favor of FelisaMorjella

30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000favor of InocentesMotocinos

31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500favor of CasimiroMondevil

32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200favor of Juan Saballa

25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500of Rogelio Marticio

Doña Catalina died on July 6, 1977.

Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.

In 1989, or six (6) years after Doña Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doña Catalina did not join the action.

After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and against the defendants:

(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina JaucianVda. deLocsin, being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of Catalina;

(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange and all other instruments conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J. Vda. deLocsin including, but not limited to those in the inventory of known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-initio;

(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to cancel all certificates of title and other transfers of the real properties, subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and derivatives therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;

(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership and possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs, together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and delivered, and all the fruits and incomes received by the defendants from the estate of Catalina, with legal interest from the filing of this action;

and where reconveyance and delivery cannot be effected for reasons that might have intervened and prevent the same, defendants shall pay for the value of such properties, fruits and incomes received by them, also with legal interest from the filing, of this case

(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00 each as moral damages; and

(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.

Costs against the defendants. 9

The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's decision.

The petition has merit and should be granted.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents, nephews and nieces of Doña Catalina J. Vda. deLocsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession." 10 The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. 11 Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12

There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doña Catalina, in transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:

Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected. (634a)

The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doña Catalina was already 90 years old when she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by her husband's nephews and nieces (the

petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture.

For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doña Catalina had already begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed away, she also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 15

On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doña Catalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and AgapitoLorete. 17 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in this case, is estopped from assailing the genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and AgapitoLorete, and the partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.

Among Doña, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of property which she made in favor of AureaLocsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18

There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doña Catalina was mentally incompetent when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be made in light of the fact that even as she was transferring properties to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death) one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian Locsin. 19

From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives and other persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, IreneoMamia, ZenaidaBuiza, FelizaMorjella, InocentesMotocinos, CasimiroMondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio Marticio. 20 None of those transactions was impugned by the private respondents.

In 1975, or two years before her death, Doña Catalina sold some lots not only to Don Mariano's niece, AureaLocsin, and his nephew, Mariano LocsinII, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes JaucianArboleda. 22 If she was competent to make that conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II?

The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, from a "consciousness of its real origin" which carries the implication that said estate consisted of properties which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of Doña Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." She would have known better than anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal property so it is safe to assume that none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her under oath, and was approved by the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false inventory that would have been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to inherit from her eventually.

This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don Mariano died, he and his wife (Doña Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their respective properties should eventually revert to their respective lineal relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a

full-blood nephew of Doña Catalina, he would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.

Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doña Catalina's nephews and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property which she made in favor of the Locsins, although it would have been to their advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doña Catalina acted as a completely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact, considering their closeness to Doña Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or donate her properties to them. Doña Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her properties. The sales and donations which she signed in favor of the petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation dated November 19, 1974 23 in favor of AureaLocsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4, 1975 24 in favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September 9, 1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is married to Doña Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married to another niece, Maria Olbes. 26 The sales which she made in favor of AureaLocsin on July 15, 1974 27 were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions could not have been anything but free and voluntary acts on her part.

Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years after Doña Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of Property, 28 whether considered an action based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions because the registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them and the whole world. 29

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is DISMISSED, with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 

Footnotes

1 Exhibit S.

2 p. 3, Annex A, RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 7152.

3 Exhibit A.

4 p. 5, Ibid.

5 Exh. 20.

6 Exh.20-A.

7 p. 4, Ibid.

8 p. 4, Ibid.

9 pp. 83-84, Rollo.

10 Art. 781, Civil Code; emphasis supplied.

11 Art.777, Civil Code; Mijares vs. Nery, 3 Phil. 195; Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil. 530; -Edades vs. Edades, 99 Phil. 675.

12 Art.752, in relation to Arts.1061, et seq., Civil Code.

13 Exh. 23.

14 Exh.1-JRL.

15 Exh.1-JJL.

16 Exh.3-JJL.

17 Exhs.1-JJL and 2-JJL.

18 Exhs.16, 17 and 18.

19 Exh.1 JJL.

20 Exhs. 1, MVRJ, 2-MVRJ, 24-32.

21 Exhs.16, 17 & 19.

22 Exhs.S-9 and S-10.

23 Exh. 1.

24 Exh. 2.

25 Exh. 3.

26 pp. 35-38, Rollo.

27 Exhs.4 to 7.

28 Art.1146, Civil Code; Alarcon vs. Bidin, 120 SCRA 390; Esconde vs. Barlongay, 152 SCRA 613.

29 Heirs of Maria Marasigan vs. IAC, 152 SCRA 152; Board of Liquidators, et al. vs. Roxas, 179 SCRA 809 (1989).

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