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G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979

EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner vs.HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents.

David G. Nitafan for petitioner.

Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.

Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:

Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.

The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized as follows:

On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The race against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00

At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified that before the impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of the accident was adopted by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the other hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn left towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop position, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck driven by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep, which then swerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which was coming from the opposite direction.

On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria, rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to property thru reckless imprudence in Crime. Case No. SM-227,

and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of P972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine and indemnity, with costs.

Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs de oficio, and his bond is ordered canceled

SO ORDERED. 1

Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.

On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 80803 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum allegedly for the reason that petitioner was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to relief against both on only one of them.

On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 80803 on the grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.

In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the afore- mentioned Motion to Dismiss On September 30, 1970, petitioner sought before this Court the review of that dismissal, to which petition we gave due course.

On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent Judge also dismissed the case as against the former. Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action;

otherwise, the same would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 ... 2 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied in the order dated February 23, 1971, with respondent Judge suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more decisive interpretation of the rule. 3

On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition before us, also to review the last two mentioned Orders, to which we required jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.

The Complaint against

truck-owner Timbol

We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12, 1970, dismissing petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.

In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge sustained Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage suffered by his car.

Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of action.

It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is no Identity of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court had put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228. 4 And more importantly, in the criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case

No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. 5

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in. individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant- petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.

That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii the same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurred actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner's car, were alleged in the Complaint. 6

Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an independent civil action bars the institution of such separate civil action, invoking section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which says:

Section 2. — Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shau proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida 7 said:

As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso ... .

In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940."

We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.

The suit against

jeep-owner-driver Salazar

The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different picture altogether.

At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended party. 8

The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.

Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded by the trial Court in this wise:

In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused Freddie Montoya would be held able for having bumped and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar,

Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by

Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held able for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car. 9

Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner's car. In other words, "the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. " Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court 10 which provides:

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed:

xxx xxx xxx

c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil night arise did not exist. ...

And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted here under:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence ...

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore, we sustain respondent Judge's Order dated January 30, 1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on different grounds.

WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against private respondent Felino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803 against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19331 April 30, 1965

VICTORIA G. CAPUNO and JOSEPHINE G. CAPUNO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JON ELORDI, defendants-appellees.

Federico Andres for plaintiffs-appellants.Vicente J. Francisco for defendants-appellees.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This appeal (in forma pauperis), certified here by the Court of Appeals, is from the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac dismissing appellant's complaint in Civil Case No. 3315 for recovery of damages for the death of Cipriano Capuno.

The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred on January 3, 1953 in Apalit, Pampanga. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras.

On January 5, 1953 Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (criminal case No. 1591). The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims.

It is urged for the applicant that no opposition has been registered against his petition on the issues above-discussed. Absence of opposition, however, does not preclude the scanning of the whole record by the appellate court, with a view to preventing the conferment of citizenship to persons not fully qualified therefor (Lee Ng Len vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20151, March 31, 1965). The applicant's complaint of unfairness could have some weight if the objections on appeal had been on points not previously passed upon. But the deficiencies here in question are not new but well-known, having been ruled upon repeatedly by this Court, and we see no excuse for failing to take them into account.1äwphï1.ñët

On October 1, 1953, while the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action, also for damages, in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi (civil case No. 838). Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the

sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of Buan — the former being appellants herein — were represented by their respective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan. In view of the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case. Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned, they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed and received compensation for the death of their decedent; and (2) that on the part of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil action.

The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was disallowed by the Court in an order dated September 23, 1953, and that of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order dated October 23, 1954. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders.

On June 11, 1958 the parties in Civil Case No. 838 entered into a "Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act." The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case on the following June 17.

At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered only on April 15, 1959, wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however, herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February 29, 1960, from which order the present appeal has been taken.

The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and which the Court found to be "well taken" were; (1) that the action had already prescribed; and (2) that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation Act, which sum, in turn, was sought to be recovered by the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No. 838 but finally settled by them in their compromise.

The ruling of the court below on both points is now assailed by appellants as erroneous. In our opinion the question of prescription is decisive. There can be no

doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim ex-delicto, that is, under the provisions of the Penal Code, when they intervened in the criminal case against Jon Elordi. The information therein, it may be recalled, was amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being prosecuted. But appellants' intervention was subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order to the effect. And when they commenced the civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case.

In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which read:

ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death (Dyogi v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-9623, Jan. 22, 1957, 22 L.J. 175). In other words, the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent, Cipriano Capuno, on January 3, 1953 or thereabouts, and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of more than five years.

In the case of Diocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et al., G.R. No. L-10542, promulgated July 31, 1958, this Court held that an action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of when the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is, "from the day (the action) may be brought," which means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed.

The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such reservation was not then necessary; without having made it they could file — as in fact they did — a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case (Pacheco v. Tumangday, L-14500, May 25, 1960; Azucena v. Potenciano, L-14028, June 30, 1962); and consequently, as held in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict."

As to whether or not Rule 111, Section 2, of the Revised Rules of Court which requires the reservation of the right to institute a separate and independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the question of prescription, we do not now decide. The said rule does not apply in the present case.

Having found the action of appellants barred by the statute of limitations, we do not consider it necessary to pass upon the other issues raised in their brief.

The order appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 126746. November 29, 2000]

ARTHUR TE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971[1] and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178[2] and the Resolution dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her.[3]

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).[4]

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990.[5] This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.[6]

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.[7]

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent. With respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still single.[8]

After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case.

The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990 which stated that the same could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused.[9] The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis.[10]

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only “prima facie evidence” is sufficient for conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971.[11]

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City. [12] When the Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16, 1991,[13] petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could render nugatory petitioner’s right against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the same respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.[14]

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.

On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that

the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law.[15] The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of bigamy.[16]

Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil case.[17]

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the same was denied.[18]

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

I

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.[19]

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and rules.[20]

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.[21] The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.[22]

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.[23] Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza[24] and People vs. Aragon[25] cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.[26] In Landicho vs. Relova,[27] we held that:

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists.[28]

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.[29]

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case:

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage.[30] The existence of these other charges justified the continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him and private respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no showing that the requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of the marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by him ever took place.[31]

We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. [32] In this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court,

which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. [33] In view of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense.[34]

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case.[35] The RTC’s observation that there was a prima facie case against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion.[36] Said declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by both parties.

Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident and was not physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and required said counsel to produce a medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant of his motion to inhibit.

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case.[37]In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, [38] this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary

inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.[39]

Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial. [40] The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly.[41]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992

JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner, vs.MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato, respondents.

Mariano C. Alegarbes for petitioner.

Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

This is still another dispute between brother and sister over a piece of property they inherited from their parents. The case is complicated by the circumstance that the private respondent's counsel in this petition is the son of the judge, the other respondent, whose action is being questioned.

Petitioner Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private respondent Martin Paras.*

On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate estate for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.

When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City. 1 On the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. 2

After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.

On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge motu proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that:

. . . after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant, Juliana P. Yap and of the respondent Martin Paras and his witnesses, the Court holds and maintained (sic) that there is a prejudicial question to a civil action, which must be ventilated in the proper civil court. In the case of Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125, the Supreme Court had already made a pronouncement that "a criminal action for Estafa for alleged double sale of property is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged Deed of Sale and defense of the alleged vendors of forgeries of their signatures to the Deed." 3

The Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied on April 30, 1990. She then came to this Court for relief in this special civil action for certiorari.

The Court could have referred this petition to the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction under BP 129, but decided to resolve the case directly in view of the peculiar circumstances involved.

The petitioner's contention is that where there is a prejudicial question in a civil case, the criminal action may not be dismissed but only suspended. Moreover, this suspension may not be done motu proprio by the judge trying the criminal case but only upon petition of the defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is also stressed that a reversal of the order of dismissal would not bar the prosecution of the accused under the double jeopardy rule because he has not yet been arraigned.

The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent Paras who filed the comment in his behalf is the son and namesake of Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. is employed in the Public Attorney's Office. He has made it of record that he was not the counsel of Paras at the time the questioned order of dismissal was issued by his father. He thus impliedly rejects the charge of bias against his father.

Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests there may have been a basis for the order in view of the alleged double sale of the property which was being litigated in the regional trial court. He concedes, however, that the order may have been premature and that it could not have been issued motu proprio. Agreeing that double jeopardy would not attach because of the lack of arraignment, he asks that his Comment be considered a motion for the suspension of the criminal action on the ground of prejudicial question.

The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that the respondent judge did indeed commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio issuing the order of dismissal.

Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by this Court on July 7, 1988, provides as follows:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say the least, in light of the clear provision of the above-quoted rule. The rule is not even new, being only a rewording of the original provision in the Rules of Court before they were amended. It plainly says that the suspension may be made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge alone, and it also says suspension, and not dismissal. One also wonders if the person who notarized the disputed second sale, Notary Public Alexander C. Barcelona, might be related to the respondent judge.

But more important than the preceding considerations is the trial judge's misapprehension of the concept of a prejudicial question.

Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended provides:

Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the congnizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. 4 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 5

We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused". 6

It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.

The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his Order does not appear anywhere in the decision of Ras v.Rasul. 7 Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision but also wrongly applied it. The facts of that case are not analogous to those in the case at bar.

In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land which he later also sold to Martin. Pichel brought a civil action for nullification of the second sale and asked that the sale made by Ras in his favor be declared valid. Ras's defense was that he never sold the property to Pichel and his purported signatures appearing in the first deed of sale were forgeries. Later, an information for estafa was filed against Ras based on the same double sale that was the subject of the civil action. Ras filed a "Motion for Suspension of Action" (that is, the criminal case), claiming that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would necessarily be determinative of his guilt or innocence.

Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this Court ruled that a suspension of the criminal action was in order because:

On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against petitioner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering that petitioner Alejandro Ras' defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witnesses in the criminal case) is based on the very same facts which would be necessarily determinative of petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and spurious.

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 73 that he had never sold the property in litigation to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in the alleged deed of sale and that of his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary that the truth or falsity of such claim be first determined because if his claim is true, then he did not sell his property twice and no estafa was committed. The question of nullity of the sale is distinct and separate from the crime of estafa (alleged double sale) but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner in the criminal action.

In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground that the defense in the civil case — forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale — had to be threshed out first. Resolution of that question would necessarily resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. By contrast, there was no motion for suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly, the respondent judge had not been informed of the defense Paras was raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil action would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the civil action will raise a prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution should determine whether or not the latter action may proceed.

The order dismissing the criminal action without a motion for suspension in accordance with Rule 111, Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended, and even without the accused indicating his defense in the civil case for the annulment of the second sale, suggests not only ignorance of the law but also bias on the part of the respondent judge.

Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that under the Code of Judicial Conduct, "a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence" and "should administer justice impartially." He is hereby reprimanded for his questionable conduct in the case at bar, with the warning that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order issued by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. dated April 17, 1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED

and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 162748-50 March 28, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN (1st Division), SEVERINO J. LAJARA, DENNIS LANZANAS, APOLONIO ELASIGUE, SENADOR C. ALCALDE, EMILIO C. RODRIGUEZ, EFREN M. GARCIA, FRISCO L. ONA, RENATO S. BUNYI, DIOSDADO J. LAJARA, CRISPIN M. CONTRERAS, JORGE M. JAVIER, and JESUS V. GARCIA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Challenged by the People of the Philippines via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are the Sandiganbayan Resolution1 of September 26, 2003 granting the Motion to Quash2 filed by private respondents and accordingly dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 23153-23155, and the Resolution3 of January 28, 2004 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution.

Private respondents then Calamba Mayor Severino J. Lajara and his fellow local public officials Dennis Lanzanas, Apolonio A. Elasigue, Senador C. Alcalde, Emilio C. Rodriguez, Efren M. Garcia, Frisco L. Ona, Renato A. Bunyi, Diosdado M. Lajara, Crispin M. Contreras, Jorge M. Javier were, together with Jesus V. Garcia, President of Australian Professional Realty (APRI), charged before the Sandiganbayan under three separate informations for violation of Sections 3(e), (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) which provisions read:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

x x x x

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

x x x x

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.

The charges arose from private respondents public officials’ entering, pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 497, into a Memorandum of Agreement4 (MOA) dated December 5, 1994 with APRI represented by respondent Garcia for the construction of the Calamba Shopping Center under the "Build-Operate-Transfer" scheme in Republic Act 6957,5 as amended by R.A. 7718.

The three separate Informations all dated January 18, 1996 read:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 23153

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses Severino Lajara, Dennis Lanzanas, Apolonio Elasigue, Senador Alcalde, Emilio C. Rodriguez, Efren M. Garcia, Frisco L. Ona, Renato A. Bunyi, Diosdado J. Lajara, Crispin M. Contreras, Jorge M. Javier and Jesus V. Garcia for violation of Section 3 (j) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That on December 5, 1994, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Calamba, Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Severino Lajara, as Municipal Mayor of Calamba Laguna, and while in the performance of his official function, conniving and confederating with the other public officers namely: Dennis Lanzanas, the Vice-Mayor, Apolinio Elasigue, Frisco Ona, Senador C. Alcalde, Renato A. Bunyi, Emilio C. Rodriguez, Diosdado J. Lajara, Efren Garcia, Jorge Javier and Crispin Contreras, all Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Calamba, Laguna, together with the private respondent, Jesus V. Garcia, President of the Australian Professional Realty, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally grant to Austalian Professional Realty, Inc., the privilege of constructing the shopping center located at Calamba, Laguna despite knowledge that the said construction firm is not qualified not being accredited by the Philippine

Contractor’s Accreditation Board (PCAB) as Class AAA contractor because it has only a paid-up capital of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P125,000.00), Philippine Currency, when the subject project would cost from P200 Million to P300 Million, to the prejudice of the government.

Contrary to law.6 (Underscoring supplied)

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 23154

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses Severino Lajara, Dennis Lanzanas, Apolonio Elasigue, Senador Alcalde, Emilio C. Rodriguez, Efren M. Garcia, Frisco L. Ona, Renato A. Bunyi, Diosdado J. Lajara, Crispin M. Contreras, Jorge M. Javier and Jesus V. Garcia for violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That on December 5, 1994, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Calamba, Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Severino Lajara, as Municipal Mayor of Calamba Laguna, and while in the performance of his official function, conniving and confederating with the other public officers namely: Dennis Lanzanas, the Vice-Mayor, Apolinio Elasigue, Frisco Ona, Senador C. Alcalde, Diosdado J. Lajara, Efren Garcia, Jorge Javier and Crispin Contreras, all Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Calamba, Laguna, together with the private respondent, Jesus V. Garcia, president of the Australian Professional Realty, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Memorandum of Agreement for and in behalf of the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna with contractor Australian Professional Realty, Inc. represented by its President, private respondent Jesus V. Garcia, regarding the construction of a shopping center in Calamba, Laguna, the terms and conditions being manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Municipality of Calamba such that the actual operation and management of the said shopping center and the income derived therefrom for a period of twenty five (25) years will be directly under the control and supervision of the Australian Professional Realty, Inc., thus causing undue injury to the Government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7 (Underscoring supplied)

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 23155

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses Severino Lajara, Dennis Lanzanas, Apolonio Elasigue, Senador Alcalde, Emilio C. Rodriguez, Efren M. Garcia, Frisco L. Ona, Renato A. Bunyi, Diosdado J. Lajara, Crispin M. Contreras, Jorge M. Javier and Jesus V. Garcia for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That on December 5, 1994, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Calamba, Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Severino Lajara, as Municipal Mayor of Calamba Laguna, and while in the performance of his official function, conniving and confederating with the other public officers namely: Dennis Lanzanas, the Vice-Mayor, Apolinio Elasigue, Frisco Ona, Senador C. Alcalde, Renato A. Bunyi, Emilio C. Rodriguez, Diosdado J. Lajara, Efren Garcia, Jorge Javier and Crispin Contreras, Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Calamba, Laguna, together with the private respondent, Jesus V. Garcia, president of the Australian Professional Realty, Inc., and acting with evident bad faith did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Memorandum of Agreement on behalf of the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna with contractor Australian Professional Realty, Inc. represented by its President, private respondent Jesus V. Garcia, for the construction of the shopping center in Calamba, Laguna, under the Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) scheme, despite knowledge that the Municipal Ordinance No. 497 which gave authority to respondent Mayor to enter into the Memorandum of Agreement was still under study by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna; that Australian Realty, Inc. is not an accredited contractor; and that no pre-qualification, bidding and awarding of the project was conducted, thus, causing undue injury to the complainants and to the Government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8 (Underscoring supplied)

On February 6, 1996, private respondents filed a Petition for Reinvestigation9 and a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest 10 due to the pendency of two civil actions for the nullification of the MOA, Civil Case No. 2180-95-C, "Merlinda Paner, for herself and for the vendors of the Calamba Public Market v. Mayor Severino Lajara & Australian Professional Realty, Inc.," 11 and Civil Case No. 2186-95-C, "Calamba Vendors Credit Cooperative and its Members v. The Municipality of Calamba, Laguna, Mayor Sereriano Lajara and Australian Professional Realty, Inc.,"12 at Branch 92 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City (the trial court), they alleging that the said civil cases raised prejudicial questions which must first be resolved as they are determinative of their innocence or guilt.

By Order13 of February 16, 1996, the Sandiganbayan held in abeyance the issuance of orders of arrest pending further study by the prosecution on whether the informations, as worded, can "reasonably produce conviction."

After reinvestigation, the Office of the Special Prosecutor submitted to the Ombudsman a Memorandum14recommending the dismissal of the criminal cases upon finding that the Calamba Shopping Center was not listed as a priority project, hence, no bidding was required; APRI was a project initiator and not a contractor, hence, it did not have to register and be accredited by the Philippine Contractors

Accreditation Board (PCAB); and for the purpose of constructing the shopping center, APRI has, aside from its paid-up capital stock, credit line facilities of 150 million pesos.15

The Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, however, it holding that while "prejudicial question may be attendant, it does not warrant the dismissal of the criminal cases."16

Private respondents thereupon filed an Omnibus Motion for Re-investigation,17 contending that the Ombudsman’s disapproval of the Office of the Special Prosecutor’s memorandum-recommendation was anchored on an erroneous appreciation of the issues and facts discussed therein, and that the recommendation was based not on the existence of prejudicial questions but on a finding that there was no violation of RA No. 3019.

By Resolution18 of August 25, 1998, the Sandiganbayan found that no prejudicial question existed in the civil cases and that, at all events, the Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation was no longer proper since only one motion for reinvestigation may be filed under Section 27 of RA 6770.19

Private respondents subsequently filed a Motion to Quash 20 the informations, alleging that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offenses charged or over their persons; the three informations charging three different criminal offenses arising from one and the same act of entering into a MOA violate their constitutional rights against double jeopardy; the facts charged in each information do not constitute an offense, and there is no probable cause to hold them for trial.

In a separate move, private respondents filed on September 10, 1998 a Motion to Suspend Proceedings 21 reiterating that there are prejudicial questions involved in the pending civil actions.

In the meantime, for failure to prosecute, Civil Case No. 2186-95-C was dismissed on June 30, 1999.22 As for Civil Case No. 2180-95-C, the trial court, by Decision23 of September 8, 2000, dismissed it after it found that the MOA was not tainted with "marks of nullity." The decision was appealed by the plaintiffs to the appellate court but the appeal was withdrawn and later declared abandoned and dismissed by the said court by Resolution of January 15, 2003.24

The Sandiganbayan subsequently denied private respondents’ Motion to Quash, by Resolution25 of February 26, 2001, for lack of merit, and unaware that a decision had already been rendered in Civil Case No. 2180-95-C, granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings after finding that prejudicial questions exist which warrant the

suspension of the criminal proceedings. The suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases notwithstanding, private respondents Frisco L. Ona and Senador C. Alcalde were respectively arraigned on July 27, 200126 and October 11, 2002,27 it being necessary for the approval of their motions to travel. Both pleaded not guilty to each of the charges in the Informations.

Private respondents later filed another Motion to Quash 28 alleging that "[t]he DECISION of the Regional Trial Court in the Civil Cases [sic] raises no iota of doubt that in these three (3) INFORMATIONS [they] cannot be prosecuted after a clear and categorical pronouncement in the said decision declaring the elements of the crime under which they are being prosecuted do not exist."29

Treating the second Motion to Quash as a motion to dismiss, the Sandiganbayan, by Resolution30 of September 26, 2003, granted the same and accordingly dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 23153-23155.

The People’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution31 of January 28, 2004, the present petition for certiorari was filed, attributing to the Sandiganbayan the commission of grave abuse of discretion:

A.

. . . IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, BRANCH 92, FINDING THE VALIDITY OF THE QUESTIONED MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT HAS RENDERED CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 23153-23155 DEVOID OF ANY PROBABLE CAUSE.

B.

. . . IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUES PUT FORTH BY PETITIONER AGAINST THE MOTION TO QUASH FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THAT THERE IS [sic] NO IDENTITIES OF PARTIES BETWEEN CIVIL CASE NO. 2180-95-C AND CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 23153-23155, A CONDITION NEGATING THE EXISTENCE OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTION.32

This Court notes that instead of assailing the Sandiganbayan resolutions by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner availed of the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Under Rule 65, petitioner must show that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, an appeal from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan granting the motion to quash, which the Sandiganbayan treated as a motion to dismiss, being a final, not merely interlocutory33 order, was not only available but was also a speedy and adequate remedy.

Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 (Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating a Special Court to be Known as "Sandiganbayan" and For Other Purposes"), as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, provides that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Likewise, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or final order or resolution of the Sandiganbayan may be appealed to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.

While in the interest of justice, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be treated as having been filed under Rule 45, a liberal application of the rules does not herein lie for the present petition for certiorari was filed beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review. Parenthetically, petitioner did not even endeavor to explain why it failed to adopt the proper remedy.34

But even gratuitously resolving the petition on the issue of grave abuse of discretion,35 the petition just the same fails as no grave abuse of discretion can be appreciated from the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the informations.

While the filing of Criminal Case Nos. 23153-23155 was premised on the alleged violation by private respondents of Sections 3 (j), (g), and (e) of RA No. 3019 for entering, in behalf of the municipality, into a MOA with APRI, and the filing of Civil Case No. 2180-95-C was instituted to invalidate the MOA, the following issues, identified by the trial court in the said civil case as necessary to determine the validity or nullity of the MOA:

1. Whether or not SB Resolution No. 497 of the Municipality of Calamba is valid in that it was ratified or not ratified by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan;

2. Whether or not the questioned MOA is valid when APRI is not accredited with the Philippine Contractors Accredita[tion] Board (PCAB) and has an authorized capital stock of only 2 Million Pesos and a paid up capital stock of only P125,000.00;

3. Whether or not the questioned MOA is valid without public bidding of the project;

4. Whether or not the execution of the questioned MOA complies with the mandatory requirement of the Buil[d] [sic] Operate and Transfer (BOT) RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR);

5. Whether or not the questioned MOA is grossly disadvantageous to the Municipality of Calamba.,36

are logical antecedents of the following issues raised in the criminal cases, the resolution of which logical antecedents belongs to the trial court in the civil case: (1) whether private respondents granted in favor of APRI the privilege of constructing the Calamba Shopping Center despite knowledge that APRI was not qualified - not having been accredited by the PBAC as Class AAA contractor because its paid up capital only amounts toP125,000 [Information in Criminal Case No. 23153]; (2) whether the terms and conditions of the MOA entered into by private respondents for and in behalf of the municipality were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the municipality [Information in Criminal Case No. 23154]; and (3) whether private respondents through evident bad faith caused undue injury to the complainants and to the government for entering into a MOA, knowing that (a) Municipal Ordinance No. 497 which gave authority to the Mayor to enter into said agreement was still under study by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, (b) APRI was not an accredited contractor, and (c) no pre-qualification, bidding and awarding of the project was conducted.

While the resolution of Civil Case No. 2180-95-C by the trial court of the issues raised therein do not conclusively determine the guilt or innocence

of private respondents, still it puts to test the sufficiency of the allegations in the informations, particularly whether further prosecution of the criminal cases may be sustained.37 A challenge to the allegations in the informations on account of the issues posed for resolution in the trial court, which are deemed prejudicial questions, is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.38

Indeed, there would be no reason to proceed with the criminal cases in light of the trial court’s findings, which had become final and executory after the appellate court considered the appeal therefrom abandoned and dismissed, that the MOA was valid as APRI was qualified to enter into the same; APRI and the municipality through private respondents complied with all the procedural requirements necessary for

entering into the MOA; and the terms and conditions of the MOA were not grossly disadvantageous to the municipality.

. . . The fact that APRI is not accredited with the P[hilippine C[ontractors] A[djudication] B[oard] or has only a capital stock of only 2 Million Pesos and a paid-up capital of only P125,000.00 will not by itself nullify the MOA. A contractor may or may not be the project proponent (Sec. 2 (e) RA 7718). A project proponent is the private sector entity which shall have contractual responsibility for the project which shall have an adequate financial base to implement said project consisting of equity and firm commitments from reputable financial institutions to provide sufficient credit lines to cover the total estimate cost of the project (Sec. 2(k) RA 7718). APRI is a BOT project proponent and not a contractor to undertake actual construction for the project and thus, APRI need not register with and be accredited by the PCAB (p. 9, TSN of November 11, 1999). . . .

x x x x

The Court is convinced by the defendant’s evidence that APRI has sufficient financial base or capability to implement the project with a[n] estimated project cost of 150 Million Pesos (Exh. "16-A"). The initial authorized capital stock of APRI of 2 Million Pesos is supplemented by Brilliant Star Capital Lending in the amount of 150 Million Pesos (p. 10 TSN September 5, 1999 and Exh. "11"). On top of this, the initial authorized capital stock of 2 Million Pesos is in the process of being increased (pages 3 to 6 TSN of November 11, 1999).

x x x x

. . . The requirement of public bidding, as well as the process and procedures thereof, mandated by the BOT law do not apply to unsolicited proposals for projects.

Projects to be implemented under unsolicited proposals need not comply with the requirements, process and procedures of public bidding. Sec. 4 of amendatory RA 7718 provides as follows to wit:

"Unsolicited Proposals – Unsolicited proposals for projects may be accepted by any government agency or local government unit on a negotiated bases: Provided, that, all the following conditions are met: (1) such project involve[s] a new concept or technology and/or not part of the list of priority projects, (2) no direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity is required, and (3) the government agency or local government unit has invited by publication, or three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation, comparative or competitive proposals is [sic] received for a period of sixty (60) working days: Provided, further, that in the event

another proponent submits a lower price proposal, the original proponent shall have the right to match that price within thirty (30) working days" (Reiterated in Rule 10, Section 10.2 and Rule 11, Section 11.1 of the IRR).

x x x x

. . . Atty. Marciano likewise testified that the proposal for the construction of the Calamba Shopping Center is under the Unsolicited Proposal and that there is no need for bidding based on the letter dated August 17, 1995 to APRI by NEDA Regional Director Mr. Catalino Boquiren to the effect that the Calamba Shopping Center is not covered by ICC/NEDA review and approval (p. 9, TSN of September 2, 1999). NEDA Regional Director Mr. Catalino Boquiren was presented by the plaintiffs as their witness and he identified his August 17, 1995 letter to APRI marked as Exhs. "10" and "10-A" (pages 7 to 8, TSN of March 20, 1997). . . .39 (Underscoring supplied)

The qualification of APRI to enter into the MOA with the municipality having been duly established, private respondents could no longer be held accountable under Section 3 (j) which punishes the act of public officers of knowingly granting a license, permit, privilege or advantage to a person not qualified or legally entitled thereto.

The absence of the element under Section 3 (g) that the MOA was grossly or manifestly disadvantageous to the municipality reflected in the following findings of the trial court bears noting:

. . . The Calamba Shopping Center Project, as an Unsolicited Proposal, does not require government guarantee, subsidy or equity. Indeed the very provisions of the questioned MOA in its whereas show in unmistakable terms that no cost or expenses [sic] [o]n the part of the Municipality of Calamba shall be required in the construction of the project in this wise: WHEREAS, the first party (The Municipality of Calamba) desires to have a shopping center for the residents of Calamba, Laguna and the nearby towns and cities that would serve as one of the major trading point[s] in the Province of Laguna; WHEREAS, the second party (APRI) is willing and able to help the FIRST PARTY in achieving its aforementioned objectives by constructing and operating a shopping center with modern and sleek design without cost or expense on the part of the first party pursuant to Buil[d]-Operate-Transfer Scheme" under RA 6957, as amended by RA 7718; WHEREAS, the first party sees the benefits and economic advantages of such project of the second party…."

This very clear and unmistakable terms of the questioned MOA belie the claim of the plaintiffs that said MOA is grossly disadvantageous to the municipality. On the contrary, the Court sees the construction of the Calamba Shipping Center under the MOA [as] a rare happening with tremendous benefits to the citizenry not only of

Calamba but also of the neighboring towns of the province, and this without any cost or expense on the coffers of the municipality. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that at present, the Calamba Shopping Center, which is just about a stone-throw away from this Court, has been already in operation, albeit still incomplete, with buildings and infrastructures in modern design constructed without cost to the municipality to be enjoyed by the constituents now and in the years to come.

As matters stand now, the Municipality of Calamba is the beneficiary of all the improvements constructed by APRI on its former market site. The parties may differ as to how to recompense APRI for such improvements and what will guide them in view of the re[s]cission of the BOT Contract. Certainly, the parties did not sustain damage by such re[s]cission and they cannot be heard to complain about it.

To the mind of the Court, the BOT Contract did not work any damage to the municipality, much more placed the municipality in any kind of disadvantageous position. It did not either place the APRI in any disadvantageous situation, now that the contract [wa]s rescinded by the municipal council.40 (Underscoring supplied)

For the charge of Section 3 (e) to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) the accused is a public officer or private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) the public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his official duties or his relation to his public positions; (3) he causes undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

Assuming arguendo that an ordinance awarding a contract to an unqualified entity not having been ratified by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could result to prejudice to the government, the findings of the trial court that (1) the ordinance was indeed ratified, (2) no public bidding was required, (3) the MOA complied with the mandatory requirements under RA 6957, as amended by RA No.7718 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), and (4) there was no evident bad faith on the part of the parties in executing the MOA negate the existence of probable cause to justify haling private respondents into court for violation of above-said Section 3 (e). Pertinent portions of the trial court’s decision are reproduced hereunder:

. . . Plaintiffs contends (sic) that said SB No. 497 is not valid for the reason that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna disapproved or did not ratify the same. Plaintiffs offered Exh. "C" which defendants likewise marked and offered as Exh. "3" to prove that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved Resolution No. 497. The very Exh. "C"

and Exh. "3" recites [sic] the fact of the approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in this wise –

"January 13, 1995

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

This is to certify that Resolution No. 497 S. 1994 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Calamba, Laguna was received by this Office on November 07, 1994, and calendared in the agenda of December 14, 1994 and was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan on the same day.

It is further certified that the approval of said Resolution was with[he]ld by [the] Sangguniang Panlalawigan in its session on January 11, 1995, and was referred to the Committee on Laws and Rules for further study, in view of a letter-request filed by the Public Market Vendors Association of Calamba."

The approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Resolution No. 497 is not shrouded by any doubt. The fact [that] the resolution was later referred to the Committee on Laws and Rules (Exh. "C-1") was only made by the Provincial Board in order to appease the public vendors association of Calamba after the provincial board received a letter-request stating that Resolution No. 497 was implemented without public hearing.

Moreover, SB Resolution No. 497 having been received by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan on November 7, 1994, then on December 8, 1994 or after thirty (30) days from November 7, 1994, without the Sanggunian Panlalawigan’s action declaring SB Resolution No. 497 invalid, then said SB Resolution No. 497 shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid. (Sec. 56 (a) Local Government Code). Thus, it can be said that SB Resolution No. 497 was approved twice, first by the positive action of approval on December 14, 1994 and second, by inaction on December 8, 1994 upon the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt on November 7, 1994.The reliance by plaintiffs on Exh. "C-1" (the second par. of Exh. "C") stating that on [sic] January 11, 1995 session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the approval of the Resolution No. 497 was with[h]eld and referred to the Committee on Rules for study is of no moment nor of any significance because as stated hereinbefore, there was a positive approval on December 14, 1994 and approval by inaction on December 8, 1994.

Moreover, the establishment, construction and maintenance of municipal markets are undoubtedly pure proprietary function of the municipality (Mendoza vs. De Leon[,] 33 Phil[.] 508) with[in] the power of any municipality under the provision of Sec. 22 of the Local Government Code, thus:

"(d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their proprietary functions in the management if their economic enterprises . . ."

It is the opinion of this Court that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan may not restrict or frustrate the exercise of the proprietary function of the municipality because the power to review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is limited only to a finding that an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Pangbayan (Sec. 56 (c) Local Government Code).41

The . . . letter of NEDA Regional Director Boquiren should dispel any doubt that the proposed shopping center is under the unsolicited proposal and is in conformity with the IRR of the BOT law. At the very least, said letter the good faith (sic) on the part of APRI and of the municipality in entering into an agreement (the MOA) for the Calamba Shopping Center under the unsolicited proposal scheme. This witness Boquiren was presented by the plaintiffs as their witness and therefore plaintiffs are bound by his testimony. The attempt of the plaintiffs to impeach their own witness, Mr. Igancio Santos, Jr., cannot be allowed nor considered by the Court under the mandate of Rule 132, Sec. 12 of the Revised Rules of Court which proved (sic) provides that: "Party may not impeach his own witness – except to witnesses referred to in par. (d) and (e) of Sec. 10. the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility."

It is also observed that when the MOA was entered into between the Mayor and APRI, the full implementation of the BOT Law and the Amendatory Act (RA 7718) was not clearly defined, this Court was guided by Exh. "10", the official communication of Mr. Boqueren categorically stating that the construction of the Calamba Shopping Center falls under the Unsolicited Proposal of the BOT Law quoted herein before.

In addition to the citation in the letter of Mr. Boquiren, the ICC guidelines and procedures in Annex B-2 of IRR provides that project of the private sector under relending program vis special credit facilities are excluded from the ICC review/decision (III Scope of ICC Review).

The pretension of witness Ignacio Santos, Jr., for the plaintiffs that the Calamba Shopping Center should be endorsed to Regional Development Council for approval is not in accord with the provision of the BOT Law because such [e]ndorsement to and approval by the Regional Development Council is required only on priority projects (Sec. 4[,] RA 7718, Rule 27[,] IRR).42

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Contrary to the contention of petitioner, a prejudicial question is different from the concept of res judicata. That there is no identity of parties between the civil case and the criminal cases does not abate the application of a prejudicial question.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court of tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from "the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action,it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, petitioner, not having assailed the Sandiganbayan Resolution44 dated February 26, 2001 that "there exists a prejudicial question which warrants the suspension of the proceedings . . . [i]n view of the similarity or close relation of the facts and issues, the issues to be resolved herein [Criminal Case Nos. 23153-23155] may be rendered moot by a finding in the Civil cases that, under the circumstances, the award of the contract and/or execution of the Memorandum of Agreement was proper, legal, valid, and beyond question,"45 is now precluded from questioning the existence of a prejudicial question.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The September 26, 2003 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners, vs.MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorney’s fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.

At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.

Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.

By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage

to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.

In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:

1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venue and the identities of the vehicles involved;

2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;

3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;

4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of the medical certificate;

5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the bus;

6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into.3

When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)4of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.

Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought her husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She went to her husband’s hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go there.1awphil.net

The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the

testimonies of respondent Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said case, together with other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought.8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.

For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN9 of the testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.

Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs10 of the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.

The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?

Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in saying it was the former who caused the smash up.

The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:

The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place. According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which he was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in

front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.

Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.]11

Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.

On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to pay costs.12

Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.13

In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.14

Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. They assign as errors the following:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSN’s AND OTHER DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBL’s DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEE.

With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this Court, we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.15

In their Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision16 of the Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge17 of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.

On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.22

Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.23

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.

It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves.25

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.26Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.

We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI’s argument that it will be denied due process when the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando

Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.

In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,28 admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite therein petitioner’s assertion that he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right to object based on said ground.

Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled.29

On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how the accident occurred is more credible than respondent’s version. They anchor their contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.

To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclic’s acquittal in the civil case.

From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or based on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:

"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon Expressway heading South

towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the same;

"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-described motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had apparently lost control of his vehicle;

"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle was forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its driver’s side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;

"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which compounded plaintiff’s frail physical condition and required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;

"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules and regulations;

"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of its drivers; x x x"31

Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?

In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:

To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when the bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the jeep"; x x x

We do not agree.

The swerving of Calaunan’s jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond the control of accused-appellant.

x x x x

Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.32

From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.33

A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.34 It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on

a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.35

In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.

As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.36 An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case37 based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to disregard that of respondent’s. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking respondent’s jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.

As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless:

(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the

Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.39

After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:

x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicle.

In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision took place. The allegation that another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he should not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth was also apparent when it would be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his testimony before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how the collision between the jeep and the bus took place should be taken with caution. It might be true that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it was mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another jeep when the collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact, however, that his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement should not escape attention. The one-day difference between the giving of the two statements would be significant enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan having received legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his statement and the statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he did not mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to

overtake another jeep when the collision between the jeep in question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took place.

x x x x

If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was running very fast as testified to by Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.40

Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.41 Under Article 218042 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.43

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.44

In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that:

Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.

In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.

We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.

The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:

From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly the driver involved in this case.

We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the drivers?

For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.

We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his jeep.47 As regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages, same, under the circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be reduced to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.49 The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law.51

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 163597. July 29, 2005]

HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP., petitioner, vs. ASIA DYNAMIC ELECTRIX CORP. and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71467 and its resolution dated May 14, 2004. The assailed decision and resolution reversed the order dated December 10, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 210 in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 denying the motion to dismiss filed by herein respondent, Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation.

On April 4, 2001, petitioner Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation filed before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City a complaint for recovery of sum of money against respondent Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation. The complaint alleged that respondent purchased from petitioner various electrical conduits and fittings amounting P1,622,467.14. Respondent issued several checks in favor of petitioner as payment. The checks, however, were dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of insufficient funds/account closed. The complaint further alleged that respondent failed to pay despite demand. It prayed that respondent be ordered to pay the amount of purchase, plus interest and attorney’s fees.[1]

Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the civil action was deemed included in the criminal actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) previously filed by petitioner against the officers of respondent corporation; (2) Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits the filing of a separate civil action in B.P. 22 cases; and (3) respondent was guilty of forum shopping and unjust enrichment.[2]

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in its order dated December 10, 2001. It ruled that since the act complained of arose from the alleged non-payment of the petitioner of its contractual debt, and not the issuance of checks with insufficient funds, in accordance with Article 31 of the Civil Code, the civil action could proceed independently of the criminal actions. It said that Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not apply to the obligation in this case, it being ex-contractu and not ex-delicto.[3]

Respondent questioned said order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. The appellate court, in its decision dated October 8, 2003, reversed the order of the trial court. It held that the civil actions deemed instituted with the filing

of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 and Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 are of the same nature, i.e., for sum of money between the same parties for the same transaction. Considering that the courts where the two criminal cases were pending acquired jurisdiction over the civil actions, which were deemed instituted therein, the respondent court could no longer acquire jurisdiction over the same case.[4]

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated May 14, 2004.[5]

Hence, this petition raising the following arguments:

1. There is no identity of interests, causes of action, and reliefs in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City and the criminal complaints for violation of BP Blg. 22 filed against Gil Santillan and Juanito Pamatmat before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City docketed as I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300.

2. Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping.

3. Petitioner did not violate Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when it filed the complaint in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493. [6]

The petition is unmeritorious.

It appears that prior to the filing of the case for recovery of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, petitioner had already filed separate criminal complaints for violation of B.P. 22 against the officers of respondent corporation, Gil Santillan and Juanito Pamatmat. They were docketed as I.S. No. 00-01-00304[7] and I.S. No. 00-01-00300,[8] respectively, and were both pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. These cases involve the same checks which are the subjects of Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City.

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed.[9] The Rules provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —

(a) x x x

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. [10] The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming

for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners’ rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.[11] In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code [12] cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.

The pendency of the civil action before the court trying the criminal case bars the filing of another civil action in another court on the ground of litis pendentia. The elements of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissal of an action are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity, with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.[13]

We reject petitioner’s assertion that there is no identity of parties and causes of action between the civil case, Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, and the criminal cases, I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300.

First, the parties in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 represent the same interests as the parties in I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300. I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 were filed against the officers of respondent corporation who signed the checks as agents thereof. The records indicate that the checks were in fact drawn in the account of respondent corporation. It has not been alleged in the suit that said officers acted beyond their authority in signing the checks, hence, their acts may also be binding on respondent corporation, depending on the outcome of the proceedings.

Second, Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 and I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 seek to obtain the same relief. With the implied institution of the civil liability in the criminal actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform or rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The purpose, meanwhile, of the civil action is for the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. [14] Hence, the relief sought in the civil aspect of I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 is the same as that sought in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, that is, the recovery of the amount of the checks, which, according to petitioner, represents the amount to be paid by respondent for its purchases. To allow petitioner to proceed with Civil Case No. MC

01-1493 despite the filing of I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 might result to a double payment of its claim.

Petitioner contends that there is no identity of causes of action in the civil and criminal cases as the amount claimed in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 is greater than the total amount of the checks involved in I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300. We are not persuaded. We find that the inclusion of additional checks in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 is an attempt to circumvent the rule against forum shopping, to make it appear that the objects of the civil and criminal proceedings are different. It is clear from the records that the checks involved in I.S. No. 00-01-00304 [15] and I.S. No. 00-01-00300[16] are the same checks cited by petitioner in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493. [17] The Court will certainly not allow petitioner to recover a sum of money twice based on the same set of checks. Neither will the Court allow it to proceed with two actions based on the same set of checks to increase its chances of obtaining a favorable ruling. Such runs counter to the Court’s policy against forum shopping which is a deplorable practice of litigants in resorting to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the same relief to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. [18] It is a practice that ridicules the judicial process, plays havoc with the rules on orderly procedure, and is vexatious and unfair to the other parties of the case.[19]

Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in the assailed decision and resolution.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

 

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.

The petitioners were charged under the following information:

The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:

That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of

P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.

The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states that:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.

The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in the crime charged.

The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the

demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.

The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:

WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:

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... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on record established that complainants suffered actual damages, the imposition of actual damages is correct.

Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES.

The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.

Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.

The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:

For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be employed against the person, not against property as what happened in the case at bar. ...

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The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion?

From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, these offenses. The information under which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of either threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was

by means of threats', it does not allege the particular threat made. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information.

We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.

While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).

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Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).

The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.

As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed:

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(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability

is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:

... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal

case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203)

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.

The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the prosecution and the defense:

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(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods were taken out from the store, ordered

the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made known.

The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:

On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.

The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:

Cost of stall construction P1,300.00

Value of furniture and equipmentjudgment destroyed 300.00

Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00

P9,600.00

It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in law and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.

The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They state:

On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the municipal building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ...

The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common sense.

As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:

... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action, or one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.

... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil action based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any significance, and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate.

In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions, the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a separate civil action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).

We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.

There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by

side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.

A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he seeks.

We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the

aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).

A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.

With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.

WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio- Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concur in the result.

De Castro, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr. J., is on leave.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-37404 November 18, 1991

EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR. and GRETCHEN OPPENCOJUANGCO, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GEORGE F. SISON and LUIS R. MAURICIO, respondents.

Jalandoni, Cope & Suarez for private respondent.

Sison, Dominguez & Associates for respondents.

 

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

May a criminal case for libel and an independent civil action for damages arising therefrom, filed pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, be consolidated for joint trial?

The case which provoked this issue eighteen (18) years ago was then one of first impression. However, its early resolution did not seem to merit priority from the parties and so it became one of the many "move in the premises" cases of this Court.

Subsequent events had significantly dimmed the glow of the issue's novelty. In the 1982 case of Caños vs. Peralta, et al., 1 this Court enunciated a new doctrine which significantly touched upon and indirectly, albeit partly, resolved this issue. Then followed amendments to the Rules on Criminal Procedure, some of which allowed, in certain instances, the consolidation of the civil suit with

the criminal action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the latter. 2 In a later case, Naguiat vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 3 decided in 1988, this Court went further by allowing the consolidation with the criminal action for violation of a special law of a civil case for specific performance with damages arising from said law. Be that as it may, there is still the need to meet the issue squarely.

The parties do not dispute the following antecedents:

In the 14 June 1972 issue of the GRAPHIC, a weekly magazine of general circulation in the Philippines, under the column Social Climbing by one "Conde de Makati," later identified as George F. Sison, the following item appeared:

ONCE UPON A time a beautiful Blue Lady (GOC) used to frequent the office of the Honorable Sir.

Because of her well-known beauty and charm, the frequency of her visits did not pass unnoticed by our Lady of the House by Pasig. An investigation by her battery of personal "spies" revealed the beautiful Blue Lady was "following up" her three-million-peso to from one of our leading government-lending institutions.

"Ang mahal naman ng hanyang ...! exclaimed our Lady of the House.

Aba, floating rate yata tayo ngayon. Even my friend Marquessa de Culi-Culi has upped her price by 50 percent, "kasi ang mahal na bilihin ngayon, kahit bulak at alkohol."

Claiming that the publication alludes to petitioners-spouses and that it is false, malicious and constitutes a vicious attack on petitioner-wife's virtue, honor and character as it imputes her not only the corrupt and immoral act of "following up" a alleged loan, but also the commission of corrupt and immortal acts of adultery and/or prostitution, petitioners filed on 11 July 1972 with the then Court of First Instnce (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon City a civil action for Damages based on Libel against the Graphic

Publishing Co., Inc., as owner; J. Antoni Araneta, as publisher; Luis R. Mauricio, as general manager and editor; and Conde de Makati, as writer, of the GRAPHIC magazine. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-16725, wa raffled to Branch XVI of said court. The complaint was amended on 20 September 1972 4 to specifically Identity Conde de Makati herein private respondent George P. Sison.

On 29 December 1972, the City Fiscal of Quezon City with the above court a criminal case for libel against defendants Sison, Mauricio and Araneta. 5 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-2713 and was raffled to Branch V thereof.

On 7 March 1973, after issues in Civil Case No. Q-16725 joined and the accused in Criminal Case No. Q-2713 arraigned, petitioners filed therein separate motions to consolidate the criminal case with the civil case in Branch XVI alleging that the evidence to be presented in both would be the same much valuable time and effort of the court as well as that of the parties would be saved by such consolidation; and, moreover Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides, inter alia, that in libel the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice-versa, provided, however, that the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.

Only defendants Mauricio and Araneta, now private respondents, filed their opposition to the motions. They claim tha petitioners, having filed a separate civil action, have no legal standing to intervene in the criminal case; there is no provision in the Rules of Court authorizing the consolidation of the criminal case with the separate civil action; the rule contemplate the consolidation of the hearing of two (2) or more cases pending before the same judge, and not when the cases are before different courts or different branches of the same court; different rules on the competency of witnesses and the weight o evidence necessary to make proper findings in the two (2 proceedings always exist; and consolidation would circumvent the rules giving the prosecution in the criminal

action, thru th fiscal, direction and control over the case, and granting the offended parties the right to intervene in the criminal prosecution once they opt to pursue a civil action.

On 13 October 1973, then Judge Pacifico de Castro of Brane V of the above court handed down an Order in Criminal Cas No. Q-2713 overruling the opposition, granting the motion to consolidate, and ordering the transfer of the records of said cas to Branch XVI for consolidation with Civil Case No. Q-16725. 6 In overruling the opposition, the judge held that the Court may in appropriate cases, order motu proprio the consolidation of cases as such power is inherent in the court. 7 The mere absene of any specific rule authorizing the consolidation of the trial of criminal and civil case does not necessarily deprive the court of its inherent power to do so as long as it does not prejudice th parties or place difficulties during trial, thereby defeating th avowed purpose of consolidation, which is to avoid unnecessary costs, delay and incovenience to the parties. The interpretation of the rule as urged in the opposition was clearly not meant exclude consolidation of cases pending in different courts or branches of the same court as long as such branches or courts agree to the consolidation. Generally, the rules on evidence are the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, whether civil or criminal, and the fact that there, nevertheless, would be different rules governing the competency of witnesses and weight of evidence necessary to make proper findings in the two (2) cases could not present special difficulties. Furthermore, it is not clear in what way the fiscal would be divested of his control and supervision over the criminal prosecution.

Mauricio filed a motion to reconsider the Order, which Sison adopted.

In the order of 10 April 1973, the trial court denied the motion. Mauricio and Sison went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to seek annulment of the aforesaid Orders of 13 March and 10 April

1973. The herein petitioners were among the respondents therein. The petition was docketed as C.A.G.R. SP-02026-R.

On 25 June 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision 8 granting the petition and setting aside the challenged Orders on the basis of the following grounds:

l st. — There is really no law nor (sic) rule that expressly permits consolidation even quasi-consolidation of joint trial, of a criminal and a civil case; ....

2nd — Not only this, in cases of defamation, fraud or physical injuries, pursuant to Art. 33 and Rule 111, Sec. 2, the civil can be filed independently of the criminal which is the case here, but in that situation, the law and the rules expressly dictate that such civil action,

"shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

going to show that the apparent intent of the Law and Rule Maker was to command that where offended party should choose to file an independent civil action, then said civil action should proceed entirely separate (sic), independent of and disconnected with, the criminal, and this can well be invoked to show that the law and the rules would and should be interpreted not to authorize consolidation;

3rd. — Since Fiscal controls criminal prosecution but complainan plaintiff in civil controls the civil complaint, it might well happen that Fiscal might insist on proving for prosecution of criminal, what complainant might refuse to prove for civil, or vice-versa, Fiscal might refuse to present evidence for criminal what complainant would wish to present for civil; and when it comes to turn (sic) of petitioners present their evidence, it might well happen that Fiscal might object and insist in objecting but complainants as plaintiffs, in civil might permit, and so on, — this Court can hardly see who should be obeyed captain in such emergencies; Therefore, a joint trial of the two case where filed independently but tried consolidatedly would be not (sic) clear and orderly trial; but a confusing and chaotic one;

4th. — Still worse, since petitioners as accused are entitled to be silent, but as defendants in civil, may be called upon as hosti witnesses, it might as well happen that complainants as plaintiffs might call them in that capacity, and perhaps petitioners would have valid ground to refuse to testify, but it being a joint trial, this Court can hardly see how in such a possibility, even probability, the Judge can divide his brain, but let it not be forgotten that the rest sufficiency of proof in both cases unfortunately is different, me preponderance in the civil, beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal and yet, in the final analysis, the determination must rest in t conscience of trial Judge as Filangiere has written, XXVI Enciclope Juridica Española 399, and conscience is indivisible;

5th. — There further is the point of elementary fair play; sin under law, Art. 33 and the Rules, Rule 111, complainants were free vindicate their rights by either just intervening in the criminal case offended parties, or by filing an independent civil cation, and since they cannot and are not permitted, to do both, having made the choice, it would not be very fair that they should be permitted retrace (sic) their steps and reap the benefit of a joint trial which they have opted to refuse at the beginning by filing an independent civil action ... 9

The motion for reconsideration of the decision by responde Judge de Castro having been denied by the Court of Appeal the petitioners filed on 15 September 1973 the instant petition for the review of the decision. In support thereof, petition interposed the following grounds:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ARTICLE 33 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND SECTION 2, RULE 111 OF THE NEW RULES OF COURT PROHIBIT THE CONSOLDATION, FOR JOINT TRIAL, OR (SIC) THESE CRIMINAL CASES.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE (SIC) A JOINT TRIAL OF TWO CASES WOULD ONLY CAUSE CONFUSION AND CHAOS.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT JOINT TRIAL OF THESE TWO CASES WOULD PUT THE TRIAL JUDGE IN A PREDICAMENT TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE. 10

In compliance with the Resolution of 20 September 1973, 11

private respondents Mauricio and Sison filed their Comment on 4 October 1973. 12 However, instead of opposing the petition, they manifested that considering the important question of law not yet resolved, it would be advisable for this Court to give due course to the petition to enable it to pass upon such a novel question and make an authoritative ruling for the guidance of the bench and the bar.

This Court gave due course to the petition in the Resolution of 10 October 1973. 13

On 1 December 1973, petitioners filed their Brief 14 reiterating, as assignments of errors, the aforementioned grounds. Private respondents filed their Brief on 29 January 1974. 15

As We stated in the opening paragraph, the core issue presented in this case is whether the criminal case and the separate and independent civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the former, filed pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, may be consolidated for joint trial. We also pointed that the issue had been partly resolved by the Caños and Naguiat cases and the subsequent amendments to the Rules Criminal Procedure.

In Caños, We affirmed the Order of respondent Judge Peralta of the then Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur ordering consolidation of Criminal Case No. 326 and Civil Case No. 5 The former was for violation of Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 602, amended, otherwise known as the Minimum Wage Law, alleged non-payment by Caños of the minimum wage to employee, Rolando Apas, filed by the fiscal against the fo on 23 December

1971. The latter was a civil action filed on August 1972 by Apas against Caños for collection of differential, overtime and termination pay, plus damages. Caños maitained that after the institution of Criminal Case No. 326, proceedings in Civil Case No. 558 should be suspended final judgment in the criminal action pursuant to paragraph (a) and (b), Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which read:

[a] Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;

[b] After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceedings has been rendered;

In affirming the challenged consolidation Order, this Court, per Justice Escolin held:

The argument fails to consider the provisions of Article 31 of the Civil Code. Civil Case No. 558 is a separate and distinct action from Criminal Case No. 326. The former is based upon a contract of services entered into by the parties, not upon the civil liability arising from the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 326, i.e., non-payment of the minimum wage, punishable under Section 3 (a) of Rep. Act 602, as amended, in relation to Section 15 (a) of the same Act. Being essentially an action for enforcement of an obligation ex-contractual, the civil case can proceed independently of the latter, in accordance with Article 31 of the Civil Code:

Art, 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

But did respondent judge abuse his discretion in ordering the consolidation and joint trial of the criminal and civil cases? A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the case to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties (citing 1 CJS, 1347). Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court:

Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants (citing 1 CJS 1342-1343).

Consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its action in consolidating will not be held in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. In the instant case, respondent iudge did not abuse his discretion in ordering the joint trial of the two cases. There is no showing that such joint trial would prejudice any substantial right of petitioner. Neither does the latter question the court's jurisdiction to try and decide the two cases.

In Naguiat, We set aside the 20 March 1985 decision of Intermediate Appellate Court annulling the Order of Branch LX of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City which decre the consolidation of Criminal Case No. 6727 for violation Section 25, P.D. No. 957 16 (on delivery of title of lot or unit up full payment thereof) which was filed, at Naguiat's instance, the fiscal on 13

September 1984 against Manuel Lazatin, president of the Timog-Silangan Development Corp. (TSDC), Civil Case No. 4224 in the same court, a complaint for specific performance with damages filed by Naguiat against TSDC a Lazatin; We then reinstated said Order. In the civil case, Naguiat prayed for judgment ordering, inter alia, said defendants deliver to him the transfer certificates of title to three (3) lots which he had allegedly paid in full. Both cases were raffled Branch LX of the above court. The Intermediate Appellate Court disagreed with the trial court and ordered instead suspension of the civil case until final determination of criminal case, in line with the spilit of Section 3, Rule 111 of Rules of Court. It further disallowed the intervention of Naguiat in the criminal case. In overruling the Intermediate Appell Court, We held:

In the cases at bar, the nature of the issues involved, at least, factual issues in the civil and criminal actions are almost Identical i.e., whether or not petitioner had fully paid for the lots he purchase from the private respondents, so as to entitle him to the delivery of certificates of title to said lots. The evidence in both cases, likewise would virtually be the same, which are, the Contract to Sell, the letter which contains the conditions for the purchase of the lots and which petitioner allegedly affixed his conformity, the official receipts for the alleged payments made by the petitioner, and other related documents.

Based on the foregoing, and considering that the criminal action filed is one for violation of a special law where, irrespective of motives, mere commission of the act prohibited by said special constitutes the offense, then the intervention of the petitioner's counsel, as private prosecutor in the criminal action, will not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.

The consolidation of the two (2) cases in question, where petitioner's counsel may act as counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case and private proseutor in the criminal case, will instead be conducive to the early termination of the two (2) cases, and will redound to the benefit and convenience of the parties; as well as to the speedy administration of justice.

The aforesaid Section 3 of Rule 111 was subsequently amended, and is now Section 2 thereof, and reads in full as follows:

SECTION 2. Institution of separate civil action. — Except in the cases provided for in Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.

(a) Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action as provided for in the first paragraph of Section 1 hereof before the filing of the criminal action and the criminal action is subsequently commenced, the pending civil action shall be suspended, in whatever stage before final judgment it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal action has been rendered. However, if no final judgment has been rendered by the trial court in the civil action, the same may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the criminal action. If the application is granted, the evidence presented and admitted in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action, without prejudice to the admission of additional evidence that any party may wish to present. In case of consolidation, both the criminal and the civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (3a)

Section 3 of said Rule referred to in the opening paragraph of Section 2 reads as follows:

SECTION 3. When civil action may proceed independently. — In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance evidence. (2a)

while the first paragraph of Section 1, referred to in subsection (a) of Section 2, reads:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action ...

From the foregoing, it is clear that the Civil action for recovery of damages arising from a crime, or ex delicto, may filed separately from the criminal case either before the institution of the latter, which may be done without reservation, after such institution, provided, however, that a reservation that effect has been made. If in the meantine the criminal action is instituted, the civil action which has been reserve cannot be commenced until final judgment has been render in the former. This restriction does not, however, apply to the cases provided for in the aforecited Section 3. Thus, in the case provided for in Articles 32, 33 (as in the instant case), 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil action may be filed even a the institution of the criminal case, provided that prior proper reservation had been made.

Subsection (a) of Section 2 refers to civil cases filed before the institution of the criminal cases. Since it makes reference to first paragraph of Section 1, and the latter necessarily include the cases under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 ofthe Civil Code expressly recognized in the second paragraph thereof which reads:

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnit under the Revsed Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

it follows without saying that an independent civil action for t recovery of civil liability, authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code, filed before the institution of the criminal case, may be consolidated with the latter, subject to the condition that no final judgment has been rendered in the criminal case. If this is permitted, there is neither rhyme nor reason why, given the

existence of the condition, an independent civil action under any of the said Articles, but filed after the institution of the criminal case, may not be consolidated with the latter. This second scenario is equally and logically addressed by the reasoning behind the provision for the first situation.

That these provisions were incorporated into the Rules after this petition was filed may not be interposed to deny their retroactive application since procedural laws may be given retroactive application. 17

Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court authorizes consolidation of actions involving common questions of law or fact pending before the court. The purpose or object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court, and save unnecessary costs or expense; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants. 18 This provision applies to both civil and criminal actions. Caños and Naguiat had removed any doubt on this point.

It is self-evident that Civil Case No. Q-16725 and Criminal Case No. Q-2713 involve common or Identical questions of fact and law, and that they would even have the same witnesses. These considerations alone justify the exercise by the court of its discretion to consolidate the cases for joint hearing to attain the salutary purpose of consolidation.

There is yet a further consideration why in the instant case consolidation of Civil Case No. Q-16725 and Criminal Case No. Q-2713 should be allowed. What is involved is the crime of libel. As correctly stated by petitioners, per the third paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the criminal case for libel and the civil action for damages arising therefrom must be filed in the same court. The pertinent portion there reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. ... Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action if filed and vice versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: ...

If the court referred to is a multi-sala court, it may happen, as in this case, that the criminal and civil actions are raffled or assigned to different salas. In this situation, consolidation one with another earlier filed would not only be practical and economical — it would subserve the very purpose of the law Consolidation of cases assigned to different branches of a court had earlier been recognized. In Raymundo, et al. vs. Felipe, et al., 19 We held:

[A]lthough consolidation of several cases involving the same parties and subject matter is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court, joint hearing becomes a matter of duty if two or more cases are tried before the same judge, or even if filed with the different branches of the same court of first instance, provided one of such case has not been partially tried.

This modified what this Court stated in PAL, et al., vs. Teodoro et al., 20 that the provision on consolidation 21 refers to the consolidation of hearings of two (2) or more cases which are before the same judge, and not when the cases are pending before different courts or different branches of the same court.

In view of the foregoing, it would no longer be necessary consider the other reasons adduced by respondent Court of Appeals in setting aside the Orders of the trial court. Suffice to say that the feared chaos or confusion in procedure is at be speculative and the possible difficulty the judge may face in light of the different tests of sufficiency of proof in each case unfounded for it fails to

consider the instances when the civil aspect is impliedly instituted with the criminal action.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenge Decision of 25 June 1973 and Resolution of 7 August 1973 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-02026-R are hereby SE ASIDE and the Order of the trial court of Quezon City of 13 March 1973 consolidating for joint trial Civil Case No. Q-16725 and Criminal Case No. Q-2713, and its Order of 10 April 1973 denying the motion to reconsider the former, are hereby REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.