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Civil War Christopher Bla0man and Edward Miguel Journal of Economic Literature (2010) Biruk Terrefe ||| Lorena Zapata |||Jonah Joffe
Distribu;on of Civil War
20% of na6ons have experienced 10 years of civil war
Number of Conflicts 1990 peak year
GDP and Civil War
Not causal symbio;c rela;onship
Paradox in the
Civil War is central to the
development of many na6ons. And yet, conflict stands at the periphery of economics research and teaching. Todaro’s (1999) textbook does not contain words “war”, ”conflict”, or “violence” in subject index!
study of conflict
Main Arguments
Exis6ng Theory on causes of conflict is incomplete and remains untested
Need for systema;c approach in
understanding war’s economic
impact
Christopher Bla;man and Edward Miguel (2010)
Single most promising fron6er
in research: applied
microeconomic analysis in conflict
Outline 1. Theore;cal Founda;ons 2. Empirical Evidence 3. Economic Consequences 4. Conclusion 5. Discussion
Theories of Armed C nflict
The Contest Model
Central Assump;on: Insurrec6on as a form of
compe66on for resources between two par6es (e.g. rebel group vs.
government)
The winning party consumes the
resources of both par6es
Decision: Produce or
appropriate ?
Both par6es behave ra6onal and aim to maximize their
wealth
A ra;onal Decision: Produc;on vs. Appropria;on
U;lity of own Produc;on
Input = Weaponry, Soldiers
Output = probability of winning and appropria6ng the other
party‘s produc6on
U;lity of Appropria;on
Input = Labor, Resources
Output = economic produc6on
Any produc6on func6on….
Limita;on of the Contest Model
If the compe6ng groups are ra6onal, both should prefer a bargained solu6on to destruc6ve conflict.
Why do wars ever occur at all?
War is generally costly, destruc6ve and risky
Failure of Bargaining
Asymmetric Informa;on e.g. Strategic incen6ve to misrepresent own strength
(scare other party to prevent insurrec6on)
Commitment Problems A future shi[ in power distribu6on gives an incen6ve to break a se\lement promise
Incomplete Contrac;ng Failure of the agreed
se\lement due to lack of a third party to enforce it (Countries with weak
ins6tu6ons)
Problems with Studying War
Non-‐violent alterna6ve not
existant
Ideological incen6ves
Material incen6ves
Psychological reasons:
Frustra6on and Grievances
Threat of Punishment
Feeling of belonging to an ethnical group
Complex individual
mo6va6ons to fight
Conduct and Organiza;on of Civil War
Models & Theories try to explain factors that influence
structure and dynamics of a group
Most understudied area in
theories of conflict!
Varying Roots of Civil War
Ra;onal War § Compe66on for
resources § Bargained solu6ons
occasionally fail
Irra;onal War § Ideosyncra6c factors § Single circumstances
Predictable Irra;onal War § Systema6c errors in
decision-‐making by leaders
§ Other determinants outside the ra6onal framework
Empirical Evidence
Empirical Causes of Conflict Fearon and Lai;n (2003) Factors that favor insurgency Significant § Rough terrain § Per capita income – (most robust
predictor) Insignificant § Proxies for poli6cal grievances
have li\le predic6ve power
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) Factors that impact conflict incidence Significant § Slow Current Economic Growth (+) § Natural Resources (+) § Secondary School Educa6on (-‐)
Insignificant § Ethnic frac6onaliza6on § Income inequality § Democracy
5 Key Differences between Studies
1. Threshold of violence required to be defined as civil war
2. Different defini6ons of war beginnings (onset of conflict varies)
3. Treatment of interna6onalized civil war (external involvement)
4. Treatment of related forms of conflict (communal violence & state repression)
5. Underlying data sources that they draw from are different
Differences support argument that micro-‐level data is likely to yield more convincing results
Empirical Advances
1. Search for exogeneity
2. Theore;cally Mo;vated Measurement
§ Existence of fixed effects § Rainfall growth rates as Instrumental
variable for per capita income (agricultural-‐based economies)
§ IV specifica6on allows finding of 5% drop in income growth increases the likelihood of a civil conflict in following year up to 10%
§ More research methods necessary to dis6nguish correla6on from causa6on
§ Findings should be more consistent with the contest model’s predic6on.
§ Be\er measurement of poli6cal grievances, ins6tu6onal quality, and even poverty
§ The cost of organizing a rebellion is simply lower within ethnically homogenous groups.
Empirical Advances Pt. 2
3. Integra;on of Case Studies
4. Beyond Borders
§ Case-‐based studies provide insights into peace keeping mission effec6veness (Doyle, 2006)
§ Illustrates possible causal mechanisms, generate new hypotheses for tes6ng, and s6mulate innova6ve data collec6on.
§ Spillover effects of civil wars § Presence of trans-‐boundary ethnic
groups increases conflict risk § Ques6on of refugees – arms
smuggling § Diasporas § Effects of Cold War
Empirical Advances Pt. 3
5. Conflict Dura;on and Termina;on
6. Typology of Conflict
§ Short Wars – coup d'états, popular revolu6ons
§ Long –las;ng wars – autonomy-‐seeking peripheral region insurgencies
§ Ethnically fragmented and polarized countries experience longer conflicts (Sambanis, 2000)
§ .
§ Heterogeneity of types of civil war should be explicitly incorporated into empirical models § Iden6ty vs. non-‐iden6ty wars § Conven6onal wars § Symmetric nonconven6onal wars § Symmetric irregular wars § Urban wars
Remaining Challenges of Empirical Work
Insufficient a\en6on to measurement issues (research needs to be prepared in advance)
Micro-‐level results should test conflict theories (remains to be seen)
Causal Iden6fica6on via small number of exogenous instrumental variables is realis6c
General need for more data collec6on, con6nued searching for natural experiments
Econ mic Consequences
of War
Economic Legacy of Civil Conflict Output declines by 6% in immediate a[ermath of civil war (Cerra and Saxena, 2008)
In Rwanda, 20% of the popula;on moved into poverty following the genocide (Jus6no and Verwimp, 2006)
Technology
Ins6tu6ons
Physical Capital
Human Capital/ Labor
Neo-‐classical models of growth (with human capital)
Imbalance Effect -‐ Recovery is faster in asymmetric destruc6on. Rela6ve degree of physical and human capital destruc6on ma\ers. (Barro, 2003)
K H Iden;fica;on problem – war-‐torn countries are different than peaceful ones.
Physical Capital and Investment
Civil War causes steepest short-‐run fall in output (6%), but also has fastest recovery, compared to financial crisis, currency crisis, banking crisis (Cerra
and Saxena 2008).
The[ and Destruc6on
Capital Flight (Collier, 1999)
Physical Capital and Investment
Implica;on: rapid recovery to equilibrium levels (high returns and rates of investment)
Central Assump;on: Underlying ins6tu6ons and technology are largely unaffected Capital stock returns to steady state level once figh6ng stops
Limita;on: Poli6cal and economic uncertainty ignored
Source: Vance (2013)
Labour & Human Capital
Malnutri;on causes lack of height, which affects life6me produc6vity (Alderman 2006).
Human capital levels converged rapidly across regions a[er war in Vietnam (Miguel and Roland 2006)
Children whose home was destroyed are less likely to obtain secondary educa6on (Shemyakina 2006).
Subs6tute of figh6ng = less schooling, persistent Injuries, Psychological trauma and community rejec6on
War, Ins;tu;ons and Society
3. Work Ethics 2. Ra6onal Bureaucracy
1. Property Rights
Vic;miza;on during war increases poli6cal par6cipa6on (Bellows and Miguel, 2006) Internal
War
Use of force to protect authority
State-‐building (Tilly, 1982)
Illegi6macy of State
Ins6tu6onal disintegra6on
War, Ins;tu;ons and Society
civil war
Conclusi n
The Way Forward 1. Rebel organiza6on and decision making needs to be inves6gated
4. Ideally: Archive pre-‐war survey, track down sampled household and conduct of follow-‐up postwar survey (avoiding iden6fica6on problem through microeconomic approach )
2. Improve measures of poli6cal awtudes and grievances
3. Development of data on addi6onal forms of poli6cal instability and violence
5. Increase coopera6on and coordina6on with governments and interna6onal organiza6ons
Intellectual Entrepreneurship
“Once you start thinking about civil war, it’s hard to think about anything else.”
Discussion Ques;ons
Could the study of conflict be seen as the most trans-‐disciplinary field in social sciences?
Do you see a moral hazard or an “ethical concern” in the study of civil war?
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