CMD 18-H6.62A
File / dossier: 6.01.07 Date: 2018-06-12
Edocs: 5559643
Supplementary Information Oral Presentation Submission from Greenpeace In the Matter of Ontario Power Generation Inc., Pickering Nuclear Generating Station
Renseignements supplémentaires Exposé oral Mémoire de Greenpeace À l’égard de Ontario Power Generation Inc., centrale nucléaire de Pickering
Request for a ten-year renewal of its Nuclear Power Reactor Operating Licence for the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station
Demande de renouvellement, pour une période de dix ans, de son permis d’exploitation d’un réacteur nucléaire de puissance à la centrale nucléaire de Pickering
Commission Public Hearing – Part 2 June 2018
Audience publique de la Commission – Partie 2 Juin 2018
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Supplementary Comments to18-H6.62 To:TheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommissionDate:June12,2018From:Shawn-PatrickStensil,SeniorEnergyAnalyst,GreenpeaceRe:SupplementarysubmissionsandadditionstoGreenpeacesubmission18-H6.62ThisdocumentprovidesadditionalbackgroundandevidencetosupportGreenpeace’ssubmission18-H6.62.Attachment1isGreenpeace’sreviewoftherecentlyreleasedImplementingPlanforthePickering
NuclearGeneratingStation.IthighlightswheretheprovincialgovernmenthasmadeinadequateprovisiontoprotectthesafetyofOntariansintheeventofanaccident.Itprovidesrecommendationsforimprovingpublicsafety,transparencyandverifyingtheadequacyofoffsitenuclearemergencyplanning.GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontointegratetheserecommendationsintosection10.1oftheLicenceControlHandbook(LCH).Attachment2isacopyofaletterGreenpeacehassenttotheDeputyMinisterofCommunitySafetyandCorrectionalServices.Itprovidesadditionalinformationrelatedtosection2.3ofGreenpeace’ssubmission.ItdetailsGreenpeace’sconcernsrelatedtotheapparentlackofseparationbetweentheMinistryandOPG.Thisraisesquestionsrelatedtotheintegrityofgovernmentoversightofnuclearemergencyplanning.InGreenpeace’sview,theprovincialgovernment’sineffectualoversightofnuclearemergencypreparednessshowsithasnotmadeadequateprovisionfortheprotectionofpublicsafetyandtheenvironment.Greenpeacefeelstheprovince’smishandlingofemergencymanagementisgroundsforrejectingOPG’sapplicationtocontinueoperatingPickering.Attachment3isacopyofGreenpeace’srecentsubmissiontotheMinistryoftheEnvironmentandClimateChangedetailingwhyreactordecommissioningshouldbeincludedontheprojectlistundertheproposedImpactAssessmentAct.Itprovidesadditionalinformationrelatedtosections1.2to1.2.3ofGreenpeace’soriginalsubmission.Notably,theRegionalMunicipalityofDurhamin18-H6.67hasalsorequestedanenvironmentalassessmentofOPG’splanstodecommissionthePickeringnuclearstation.Thetimelineforcarryingoutanenvironmentalreviewbeforethestationclosesistightconsideringthatthestationcouldcloseasearlyas2020.GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontoinstructstaffinitsrulingtocontacttheMinistryoftheEnvironmentandClimateChangetorequestdecommissioningbeincludedontheprojectlistundertheImpactAssessmentAct.Greenpeacealsorecommendsappropriatewordingbeincludedinsection11.2ofLCHtosetouttheexpectationthatanenvironmentalassessmentofdecommissioningwillbecarriedoutbeforethestationcloses.AdditionalAmendmentstotheLCHNeededInlinewithcommentsprovidedinsections2.1(OPG’sPeriodicSafetyReview–Insufficienttransparency)and1.1.1(TheNeedforcontingencyplanningandaclosureplan)Greenpeacerequestschangestosections15.1(PeriodicSafetyReviewIntegratedImplementationPlan)and15.4(EndofCommercialOperations)oftheLCH.ChangesareneededtomaintainCommissionauthorityoverthe
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regulatoryscopeofPickering’scontinuedoperationandimprovethetransparency.Forexample,ascurrentlywordedsection15.4wouldallowstafftoallowOPGtocontinueoperatingbeyond2024withoutCommissionapproval.InGreenpeace’sview,onlytheCommissionshouldhavetheauthoritytoapproveorrejectarequestfromOPGtooperatebeyond2024.IfOPGweretoapplytooperatePickeringlonger,itshouldtriggerapubliclicensingreviewingaswasrecentlycarriedoutforBrucePower(BrucePowerhadafive-yearlicencebutwasobligatedtoreturntotheCommissiontochangetheregulatoryscopeofitsoperationstoenablereactorrefurbishmentandlife-extension).AsnotedbyCNSCstaffduringPickering’s2014licencerenewal,proposalstofurtherextendPickering’slifespanwillimpactregulatoryrequirements.AsnotedintheCommission’s2014ruling“CNSCstafffurthernotedthat,incaseofsignificantlylongerlifeextension,beyond247000EFPH,someadditionalrequirementswouldlikelybeimposed,suchasan
independentandseparatefilteredventingsystemforbeyonddesign-basisaccidentsatthePickering
station.”1InGreenpeace’sview,aproposaltooperatePickeringbeyondwhatisproposedinthe
currentapplicationshouldtriggerareviewoftheregulatoryscopeofthestation’scontinuedoperations.GreenpeacerequeststhisbestatedexplicitlyintheLCH. ItshouldalsobenotedthatOPG’scurrentapplicationforeseesclosingthefirstunitin2022not2024.ThisisnotreflectedintheLCH.AdditionalamendmentsshouldbemadetotheLCHtoensureitisproperlyalignedwiththeplanconsideredduringthesehearings.ForfurtherInformation:
Shawn-PatrickStensil,SeniorEnergyAnalyst,GreenpeaceCanada416-884-7053,[email protected]
1RecordofDecision,includingReasonsforDecisioninthematterofOntarioPowerGenerationInc’sapplicationtorequesttoremovalofHoldPointforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation,May7,2014,pg6.
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CommentsontheImplementingPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation
PreparedbyShawn-PatrickStensilSeniorEnergyAnalystGreenpeaceCanada
June12,2018
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1.Introduction&RecommendationsThisdocumentprovidesGreenpeace’shigh-levelreviewoftheImplementingPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation,whichwaspublishedthelastweekofApril2018.Recommendationsareoutlinedbelowforimprovingpublicsafety,transparencyandverifyingtheadequacyofoffsitenuclearemergencyplanning.GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontocontinueusingitslicensingauthoritytoprovokeimprovementstooffsiteemergencyplanningandpublicsafety.GreenpeacecontinuestobeconcernedbythegovernmentofOntario’sineffectualoversightofnuclearemergencyresponse.ThegovernmentofOntarioisOntarioPowerGeneration’s(OPG)soleshareholderandapprovesitsbusinessplans.Giventheprovince’scombinedresponsibilityforoffsitesafetyandOPG’sbusinessplans,GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontoconsidernotonlyOPGasthelicenceeinitsdeliberations,butalsothegovernmentofOntario.Greenpeacemakesthefollowingrecommendations:
• TheCommissionshouldincludeaconditioninOPG’slicencerequiringanyfuturechangestotheImplementationPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationtoundergopublicconsultationpriortopublication.
• TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringthegovernmentofOntario
topublishthefindingsofthestudyithascommissionedtoconsidertheadequacyofcurrentemergencyplanningdistances.TheresultsofthisstudyshouldbepresentedtoameetingoftheCommissionin2019.
• TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGortheprovinceto
commissionandpublishindependentmodellingofamajoraccidentatPickering.ThismodellingshouldbepresentedtoameetingoftheCommissionin2019.
• TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoworkwiththe
provincetoensurethatpreparednessandplanningmeasuresareinplacetoidentifyandmonitor“hotspots”acrosstheentire50kmIngestionControlZone.
• TheCommissionshouldinstructstafftoencouragetheprovincetoadoptanExtended
PlanningDistancealignedwiththelargerareasrecommendedbytheIAEA,real-worldexperienceandavailableaccidentmodelling.
• TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoprovide
informationonhowtoprepareforanuclearemergencytoallresidentsoftheContingencyPlanningZonebytheendof2019.
• TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoworkwithprovince
andmunicipalauthoritiestoidentifyallhospitalsandretirementhomeswithinthe50kmIngestionControlZone(IPZ)aswellasreceptionfacilitiesforspecialized-careevacueesoutsideoftheIPZ.
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• ToberesponsivetotheexpectationsofTorontoandDurhamRegionalcouncils,theCommissionshouldexpandrequirementsforKIdeliverytothe20kmareacurrentlyproposedfortheContingencyPlanningZone.
• TheCommissionshouldimposeanewlicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoworkwith
schoolboardstoensurethestockpilingofKIinallschoolswithinthecurrent50kmIngestionPlanningZonebeforetheendof2019.
• TheCommissionshouldincludeanadditionallicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoinform
residentsoftheIngestionPlanningZoneoftheirrighttoorderKItabletsfortheirfamilyorbusiness.
• TheCommissionshouldinstructstafftoupdateREGDOC-2.10.1torequirelicencees
facilitatethestockpilingofKIinschoolsanddaycareswithintheIngestionPlanningZoneandtoinformresidentsoftheIPZoftheirabilitytoorderKIfreeofcharge.
• TheCommissionshouldinstructstafftoincludeanewrequirementinthenextiteration
ofREGDOC-2.10.1obligatinglicenceestocarryoutKIDistributionTimeEstimatestudiestoverifythefeasibilityofpromptlydistributingKIintheIngestionPlanningZoneintheeventofasevereaccident.
2.Transparency&PublicConsultationDespiteongoingpublicinterestinnuclearemergencyresponse,therewasunfortunatelynopublicconsultationontheImplementingPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation.ThisshowstheMinistryofCommunitySafetyandCorrectionalServices(henceforthreferredtoasthe“MinistryofCommunitySafety”)stillhasworktodoinordertoinstilacultureofopennessandtransparencyinitsoperations.SincetheFukushimadisasterbeganin2011,theMinistryofCommunitySafetyandOPGhaveexhibitedasecretivepatternofbehaviourandhavebeenresistanttopublicscrutiny.TheMinistryofCommunitySafetyhaseffectivelyrefusedtorespondtoFreedomofInformationrequestssince2013.1Ithasalsorefusedtorespondtoinformalinformationrequests.2Notably,thepublicconsultationthattookplacein2017onlyoccurredbecauseofa2013politicalcommitmentmadebytheMinisterofCommunitySafetytoGreenpeace,theCanadianEnvironmentalLawAssociation(CELA)andDurhamNuclearAwareness(DNA).3DocumentssubsequentlyobtainedbyGreenpeacethroughFreedomofInformationlegislationindicatethatfouryearsafterthispoliticalcommitment,whatfinallyinitiatedthepublicconsultationwaslikelyOPG’sfearsthatadditionaldelayscouldputatriskthelicenceapplicationnowbeing
1Greenpeacefiledapproximately30requestsover2yearsthatOFMEMonlyrespondedtoonceacomplaintwasfiledwiththeOfficeoftheInformationCommissioner.WhenGreenpeacefiledsubsequentrequests,OFMEMfiledacomplaintwiththeOICallegingGreenpeacewasaveraciousrequestor.2DaveNodwell(MinistryofCommunitySafety)toS-PStensil(Greenpeace),“RE:PresentationandsubmissiontotheDurhamCommittee,”email,October21,20153MadeleineMeillieur(MinisterofCommunitySafetyandCorrectionalServices)toTheresaMcClenaghanetal.,letter,October21,2013.
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consideredbytheCommission.4Tomitigatetheserisks,OPGwentsofarastosecondstafftotheMinistryofCommunitySafetyexpeditethePNERPupdate.5ThishighlightsthelackofintegrityandindependenceintheoversightofOntario’snuclearemergencyresponseplans.InGreenpeace’sview,thisputsinquestiontheobjectivity,impartialityandcredibilityofthepublicconsultationcarriedoutbytheprovinceanditsconclusions.ThelackofeffectiveseparationbetweenOPGanditsshareholderalsosupportsconsideringtheOntariogovernmentasthede-factolicenseeinthisapplication.Commendably,theMinistryhasattemptedtoincludetheprincipleoftransparencyintherevisedPNERP,withtheadditionofclause1.2.12whichstates:
Apolicyoftruthandtransparencyshouldbefollowedinprovidinginformationtothepublicandmediapriortoandduringanuclearorradiologicalemergency.
Althoughthisisalaudablemodification,thebehaviouroftheMinistrysincethePNERP’spublicationshowsthatthispolicyhasyettobeintegratedintotheMinistry’splansortoinformdecisionmaking.Forinstance,theMinistry’spositiononthepublicreleaseoftheaccidentstudyithascommissionedtoverifytheadequacyofcurrentplanningdistancesshowsitsattemptstointegratetransparencyintoday-to-dayoperationshasbeenineffectual.WhenaskedbyAjaxRegionalCouncillorColleenJordanwhetherthisstudywouldbepubliclyreleased,DaveNodwell,theDeputyChiefforPlanningandProgramDevelopmentattheMinistry,statedithadnotbeenconsidered.6Thisresistancetochangeisunsurprising.In2015,DurhamRegion,whichhoststhePickeringandDarlingtonnuclearstations,askedthegovernmentofOntarioto“…provideallnon-confidentialdataandstudiesusedinconsideringchangestoOntario’soff-sitenuclearemergencyplans.”7Thismotionwaspassedinresponsetotheprovince’songoingreluctancetoreleaseinformation.Inspiteofthis,thegovernmentacknowledgedin2017thatnothinghasoccurredtostrengthenitsdisclosurepoliciesinresponsetoDurhamRegion’srequest.8ConsideringthatmuchofthecontroversyrelatedtotheadequacyofoffsiteemergencyresponsesinceFukushimahasfocusedonthelackofcredibleaccidentmodelling,itisdifficulttofathomthataMinistrytaskedwithapublicsafetyhasnotconsideredtheneedanddesirabilityofreleasingthisstudy.Indeed,informationshouldbepubliclyavailablebydefaultandonlyexemptifauthoritiescanprovidesufficientevidencedemonstratingthatdoingsowouldinfactbeasecurityrisk.
4OPG,RiskRegistry–PickeringRelicensing2018,May31,2017,FOI#17-048,pg.393.5JimColes,OPG’sDirectorofEmergencyManagementis“onloan”totheMinistryofCommunitySafety“tosupportdevelopmentofthenewProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan”.See:https://www.linkedin.com/in/jim-coles-97a35442/6DurhamRegionalCouncil,March21,2018.7DurhamRegionalCouncil–Minutes,November4,2015,pg.29.8MinisterMarie-FranceLalonde(MinisterofCommunitySafety),ResponsetoWrittenQuestionNo.248,2ndSession41stParliament,Tabled:May4,2017.
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Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldincludeaconditioninOPG’slicencerequiringanyfuturechangestotheImplementationPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationtoundergopublicconsultationpriortopublication.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringthegovernmentofOntariotopublishthefindingsofthestudyithascommissionedtoconsidertheadequacyofcurrentemergencyplanningdistances.TheresultsofthisstudyshouldbepresentedtoameetingoftheCommissionin2019.3.ThePlanningBasis&DetailedPlanningGreenpeaceisconcernedthattheprovincehasweakenedthecriteriausedforselectingreactoraccidentsconsideredindetailedemergencyresponseplans.Section2.2oftheImplementingPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationstatesthataDesignBasisAccident(DBA)“…releaseprovidesthemainplatformfordetailedplanning.”DesignBasisAccidentreleasesarecomprisedofprincipallyshort-livednoblegaseswitheffectivelynoradioiodinesorlong-livedradioisotopes.ADBAwouldtypicallybealevel5accidentontheInternationalNuclearEventScale(INES).DBAsarealsolimitedtoeventswithanestimatedprobabilityof1E-5oronein100,000yearsofreactoroperation.However,thelasttimeOntario’snuclearemergencyresponseplanswerereviewedinthe1990s,theRoyalSocietyofCanada(RSC)recommended“…detailedemergencyplanningshouldbedoneforaccidentsresultingfromacredibleseriesofeventswhichcouldoccurwithaprobabilityofapproximately10-7/reactoryear.”9TheRSCmadethisrecommendationafterreviewingthe1995probabilisticriskassessmentforthePickeringAnuclearstation.Notably,the1995PickeringAriskassessmentfoundaccidentsleadingtosignificantreleaseshadextremelylowestimatedprobabilities,rangingfrom5E-9to4E-10.10TheRSCrecommendationinformedplanningbasisinthe2009PNERP.Sincethe2011Fukushimadisaster,GreenpeacehashighlightedthatmorerecentriskassessmentsforthePickering,DarlingtonandBrucenuclearstationshavefoundmajoraccidentstobemorelikelythanpreviouslythought.RisksassessmentspublishedsinceFukushimahaveidentifiedaccidentsequencesleadingtolargeoffsitereleasesmeetingtheRoyalSocietyofCanada’srecommendedcriteriafordetailedemergencyplanning.Greenpeace’ssubmissiontotheCommission’s2013hearingsonOPG’sapplicationtocontinueoperatingthePickeringnuclearstationobservedthatthemostrecentPickeringBriskassessmentfoundlargereleaseaccidentsatthestationtobecredible.11The2014PickeringAriskassessmentfoundlargereleaseaccidentstohaveanestimatedprobabilityof4.7E-612,showingtheestimatedlikelihood
9W.R.Bruceetal,ReporttotheMinistryoftheEnvironmentandEnergyconcerningtwotechnicalmattersintheProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan,RoyalSocietyofCanada&CanadianAcademyofEngineering,November1996,pg.33.10Ibid,pg.11.11Shawn-PatrickStensil(Greenpeace),IntolerableRisk:TheContinuedOperationofthePickeringNuclearStation,May2013,CMD13-H2.11912Greenpeacesubmission,CMD14-H2.47
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ofmajoraccidentsincreasedbyfourlevelsofmagnitudesincethe1995PickeringAriskassessment.Greenpeacehasfoundnoevidencethattheprovincehasindependentlyevaluatedthesignificanceoftheseriskassessments.Instead,itappearsthattheprovincehasreliedonOPG’sassurancesthatemergencypreparednessmeasuresremainadequate.Evidenceoftheprovince’soverrelianceonOPGforpolicyanalysisisapparentintheprovince’scommentsprovidedonthedraftenvironmentalassessmentreportofOPG’sproposaltorebuildthePickeringBreactors.ThisenvironmentalreviewrequiredOPGtoreviewtheimpactsofanaccidentwithaprobabilityof1E-6.EmergencyManagementOntario(EMO)-thepredecessortoOfficeoftheFireMarshalandEmergencyMamanage-wasalsosurprisedbythelandcontaminationcausedbytheaccident.EMOsubmittedthefollowingcommentonthedraftenvironmentalassessmentreport:
TherecognitionthatsignificantgroundcontaminationispossibleisalsoinconsistentwithpreviousstatementsmadebyOPGanditspredecessor,OntarioHydro(OH).Over20yearsago,whenthefirstversionsofthePNEPandthedoseprojectionprogramERPwereunderdevelopment,EMO(thenEPO)wasassuredbyOHthatanygroundcontaminationwouldbeminimalorimpossible,duetothepresenceofEFADShigh-efficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filters.Forthisreason,OPGdeemeditunnecessarytoincludeaGroundDepositionModule(GDM)withinERP.ERPwouldonlymodelthedosesanddoseratesresultingfromtheemissionofnoblegasesandradionuclides,andthisremainsthecasetothepresentday,evenafterseveralrevisionsandimprovementstotheERPcodes.EMOhas,fromtimetotime,expresseditsdisquietatthisstateofaffairs,butintheabsenceofanyevidencetothecontrary,hasrefrainedfrominsistingthataGDMbeincorporatedintoERP.13
Inshort,thegovernmentwassurprisedbythepotentialforgroundcontaminationbecauseOPGhadassureditrepeatedlyovertwentyyearsthatitneedonlyprepareforaccidentalreleasesinvolvingnoblegasesorDesignBasisAccidents.Notably,theaccidentscenarioassessedinthe2008PickeringBlife-extensionenvironmentalassessmentreportmetthecriteriafordetailedemergencyplanningrecommendedbytheRoyalSocietyofCanada.ThisshowsthatEMOwasnotindependentlyreviewingOPG’sprobabilisticriskassessments,butsimplyrelyingonassurancesfromthecompany.ItappearsthatOPG’sbeliefthatonlyDesignBasisAccidentsshouldbeconsideredindetailedemergencyplanninghadbecomedogmawithinthecompany.Forexample,whenOPGreviewedthebasisforstaffingrequirementsfornuclearaccidentsitcouldfindnostandardorrationaletosupporttheplanningassumptionsforon-siteemergencyplans.OPGcalledthetypeofaccidentusedtodetermineitsresourceandstaffingcapacityrequirements“anartefact.”14
13APPENDIX2,CommentsandResponseTable–PubliccommentsonDraftEAScreeningReportforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationBRefurbishmentandContinuedOperationsProject,CEAR#06-01-21226,pgs.48–4914“EmergencyResponseOrganizationStaffingBasisforRespondingtoDesignBasisAccidents:AnalysisSummaryReport,”May30,2012,PN208/RP/001R02.
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Unfortunately,thisdogmahasnowbeennowformalizedinthe2017PNERP.InGreenpeace’sview,thedecisiontoreducethecut-offprobabilityusedfordeterminingdetailedplanningfrom1E-7and1E-5showstheprovincehasbeenmotivatedmorebymaintainingthestatusquothanstrengtheningpublicsafety.ToprovidebackgroundonthehistoricdevelopmentofthePNERPplanningbasis,AnnexAprovidesatimelineofreportsanddecisionsthathaveinformedtheplanningbasisoverthepastfourdecades.15Italsodocumentsthefindingsofindustryprobabilisticriskassessmentsovertime.SincetheFukushimadisaster,GreenpeacehasurgedtheCNSCandthegovernmentofOntariotoverifytheadequacyofpublicsafetybyopenlymodellingaccidentsequencesleadingtolargeradioactivereleases.AsdocumentedinpastsubmissionstotheCommission,thereareknownaccidentsequencesleadingtoFukushima-scaleradiationreleasesatallofOntario’snuclearstations.AlthoughtheCNSCandHealthCanadahavecarriedoutaccidentmodellingtoestimatetheimpactsofanaccidentattheDarlingtonnuclearstationsinceFukushima,nosimilarmodellinghasbeenundertakenforPickering.Unlikethefour-unitDarlingtonnuclearstation,Pickeringisanolderdesignandhassixoperatingreactorsthatsharecommonsafetysystems.Amillionpeoplelivewithin20kmofPickering.Pickering’solderdesignmeansradioactivereleasescouldbelargerthanthosemodelledfortheDarlingtonnuclearstation.Pickering’slocationalsoincreasesthepotentialconsequencesofanaccidentcomparedtotheDarlingtonnuclearstation.InconsideringOPG’slicenceapplication,theCommissionshouldacknowledgethatthereisnopubliclyavailableaccidentanalysistoverifytheadequacyofoffsiteemergencymeasuresatPickering.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGortheprovincetocommissionandpublishindependentmodellingofamajoraccidentatPickering.ThismodellingshouldbepresentedtoameetingoftheCommissionin2019.4.AHalfMeasure-ContingencyZoneTheprovince’sproposedContingencyPlanningZone(CPZ)isasymbolichalfmeasurethatprovidesnoadditionalpublicsafetybenefitsandisunalignedwithinternationalguidance.AttheApril4thCommissionmeeting,theMinistryofCommunitySafetystatedthatthe20kmCPZdealswiththepotentialfor“severe,lowprobabilityaccidents“andthepossibilityof“hotspots”16beyondtheDetailedPlanningZone(DPZ).However,InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)standards,real-worldaccidentsaswellasCanadianandinternationalaccidentmodellingshowsthatthelimited20kmCPZisinsufficientforaddressingsuchevents.
15AnnexAisanextractfromGreenpeace’s2017commentsonthePNERPdiscussionpaper.16MeetingoftheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommission,Transcripts,April4,2018.pgs.29and55.Availableat:http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/the-commission/pdf/Transcript-CommissionMeeting-April4,2018.pdf
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TojustifytheCPZ,theMinistryofCommunitySafetyreliesuponCSAstandardN1600-14Generalrequirementsfornuclearemergencymanagementprograms.Greenpeacequestionstherelianceonstandard.CSAstandardsaredevelopedusingconsensus-basedprocessesamongindustrystakeholders.ThismeansthatOPGorBrucePowercanblocktheadoptionofanyproposedstandardsthatmayconflictwiththeirfinancialcosts.OPG’sthen-directorofemergencymanagementJimColes,chairedthecommitteethatdevelopedCSA-1600.Inshort,N1600isalowestcommondenominatorstandard.N1600reflectsneitherbestpracticesnorpublicexpectationsforsafety.Moreover,aclosereviewofN1600’ssupportingcitationsshowsthattheindustry-producedstandardisunalignedwiththeIAEA’spostFukushimaemergencyplanningguidance.TherationalefortheCPZinN1600isbasedontheguidancecontainedintheIAEA’s2013guideActionstoProtectthePublicinanEmergencyduetoSevereConditionsatLightWaterReactor.17Thisguiderecommendsaseriesofemergencyresponsezonessizesbasedonaradioactivereleasesequivalenttoalevel6accidentontheInternationalNuclearEventScale(INES).18Theprovince’sproposedCPZisbasedontheIAEA’s2013recommendationthatmemberstatesestablishanExtendedPlanningDistance(EPD).Thisguidedescribestheobjectiveofthiszoneasfollows:
Inthisareaarrangementsshouldbeinplacetoprovideinstructionstoreduceingestionofcontaminatedmaterialandcarryoutdosemonitoringtolocatehotspotsthatmayrequireevacuationwithinadayandrelocationwithinaweektoamonth.ItisalsorecommendedthatevacuationofthoserequiringspecializedcarebetoareasbeyondtheEPDtoavoidadditionalevacuations.19
Asnoted,apurposeoftheEPDistoidentifyandmonitorlocalizedcontamination–referredtoashotspots-beyondevacuationzones.TheneedforsuchplanningmeasureswasunderlinedbythecontaminationcausedbyChernobylandFukushima.Inbothcases,localizedcontaminationextendedwellbeyondtraditionalplanningzones–evenhundredsofkilometersfromthestations.Suchcontaminationmayevenrequirelocalizedevacuations.TheCNSChasobservedthatthelimited20kmCPZwouldbe“…inadequateforhotspotmonitoring.”20Notably,thesameIAEAguideusedtojustifytheContingencyPlanningZoneinCSAStandardN1600makesrecommendationsonthesizeofthosezones.ThisinformationwascuriouslyomittedfromCSAstandardN1600.Table1belowcontraststheIAEA’ssuggestedplanningdistanceswithzonesproposedintheImplementationPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation.
17Page18ofN1600citesthe2013IAEAguideasthebasisforitsExtendedplanningdistancerequirement.18V.A.Kutkovetal.,Basicstrategiesofpublicprotectioninanuclearpowerplantbeyond-DesignBasisAccident,NuclearEnergyandTechnology,2(2016),pg.17.19InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,ActionstoProtectthePublicinanEmergencyduetoSevereConditionsatLightWaterReactor,May2013,pg.21.20KathleenHeppell-Masys,(DirectorGeneral,CNSC),Ibid.pg.9.
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Table1.Suggestedplanningdistances(IAEAvs.PNERP2017)
Emergencyzonesanddistances
Suggestedmaximumradius(km)ProvincialNuclearEmergency
ResponsePlan2017>1000MW(th) 100to1000MW(th)
Precautionaryactionzone(PAZ) 3to5 3
(AutomaticActionZone)Urgentprotective
actionplanningzone(UPZ)
15to30 10(DetailedPlanningZone)
Extendedplanningdistance(EPD) 100 50 20
(ContingencyPlanningZone)Ingestionand
commoditiesplanningdistance(ICPD)
300 100 50(IngestionPlanningZone)
ThiscomparisonshowsthatOntario’sCPZissignificantlysmallerthanthatproposedbytheIAEA.TheCPZforPickeringis80%smallerthantheIAEA’srecommendedplanningzonesizeforstationsabove1000MWandeven40%thesizerecommendedforplantssmallerthan1000MW.Pickering’scapacityisover3000MW.Greenpeacedoesnotconsiderthe20kmCPZtobecredibleorsufficienttopreventradiationexposureintheeventofasevereaccident.TheprovincehasprovidednoevidentiarybasisforlimitingtheCPZto20km.IthasonlystatedthattheCPZsizewas“….determinedbydoublingthePrimaryZonedistanceinordertoprovideaconservativebufferfornuclearemergencyplanningandresponse.”21Incontrast,theIAEA’srecommendeddistanceswerebasedonmodellingofradioactivereleasesfromalevel6accidentontheINESscale.Notably,aftermodellingaFukushima-scaleradioactivereleasetheGermanCommissiononRadiologicalProtectionrecommendedarrangementsbeinplacetoassesstheradiologicalsituationwithin100kmofanuclearstationtodetermineifemergencymeasuresareneededbeyondthe20kmevacuationzone.22Alsoaftercarryingoutaccidentmodelling,Switzerland’saligneditsemergencyplanningrequirementswiththeIAEA’srecommendedEPDof100km.However,thereisCanadianaccidentmodellingshowingthattheIAEA’ssuggested100kmEPDismoreappropriatethantheprovince’s20kmCPZ.InMarch2017,HealthCanadaandEnvironmentCanadapublishedthereport,ARGOSModelingofAccidentAandAccidentB
21OfficeoftheFireMarshalandEmergencyManagement,DiscussionPaper:PlanningBasisReview&Recommendations,May2017,pg.5. 22GermanCommissiononRadiologicalProtection(SSK),Planningareasforemergencyresponsenearnuclearpowerplants,2014,pg.21.
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Scenarios,whichmodeledasevereaccident23attheDarlingtonnuclearstationbasedontheweatherconditionsof7daysinJuneandJuly2016.24Althoughthestudywaslimitedbythenumberofdaysassessed,theresultssuggestthatcurrentproposedContingencyandIngestionPlanningZonesaretoosmall.Basedonitsanalysis,HealthCanadamadethefollowingobservationontheprovince’sproposedzonesizes:
ThecontingencyplanningzoneshouldconsiderpotentialscenariosforprotectiveactionsthatwouldavertbothaTotalEffectiveDoseandtheThyroidDose.MakingtheseconsiderationswouldindicatethatdistancesshouldbesomewhereintherangeoftheIAEArecommended50-100km.TheSecondaryZoneof50kmissignificantlylessthanthatrecommendedbytheIAEAandUScounterparts.HCmodelingofsevereaccidentsyieldsdistancessimilartothePNERPingestioncontrolzonefortheFermifacility.Acommoditiescontrolzone(SecondaryZone)distancebetween80-100kmmaybemoreappropriate.25
ItisworthnotingthatCNSCstaffrecommendedthat“…OFMEMusetheplanningdistance(EPD)usedbytheIAEA.TheCPZisaCSAN1600conceptandhasadifferentmeaning.ThespiritofCSAN1600CPZistoaccountforthoserelativelylessprobableaccidentsthatwouldnotwarrantextensivepreparednessandplanning.Theintentofthezonewillaffectitssize:theproposed20kmcouldbeareasonablesizeforcontingencyplanning,butitwouldlikelybeinadequateforhotspotmonitoring.”26Inconclusion,theproposedCPZisnotalignedwithIAEArecommendations,theimpactofrealworldaccidentsnorinformedbycredibleevidence.TheCPZissymbolicandprovidesnoclearadditionalsafetybenefitstoOntariansintheeventofasevereaccident.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoworkwiththeprovincetoensurethatpreparednessandplanningmeasuresareinplacetoidentifyandmonitor“hotspots”acrosstheentire50kmIngestionControlZone.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldinstructstafftoencouragetheprovincetoadoptanExtendedPlanningDistancealignedwiththelargerareasrecommendedbytheIAEA,real-worldexperienceandavailableaccidentmodelling.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoprovideinformationonhowtoprepareforanuclearemergencytoallresidentsoftheContingencyPlanningZonebytheendof2019.5.IncompleteOperationalObjectivesoftheContingencyZone
23Itshouldbenotedthesourceterm–theinventoryofradionuclidesreleasedtotheenvironment-usedforthisstudywassignificantlysmallerthanFukushimaorChernobyl.24L.Bergman,etal.,ARGOSModellingofAccidentAandAccidentBScenarios,HealthCanada&EnvironmentandClimateChangeCanada,May152017,ReportVersion525HealthCanada–RadiationProtectionBureau,EBRRegistry013-0560,CommentID210075,July11,2017.26KathleenHeppell-Masys,(DirectorGeneral,CNSC),Ibid.pg.9.
11
The2017ProvincialNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan(PNERP)andthe2018ImplementationPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationindicatetherearefewadditionalactionsrequiredbyprovincialandmunicipalauthoritiestoimplementtheCPZ.TheonlyuniquerequirementsfortheCPZarelistedinSection2.2.5(e)(iii)ofthePNERP.Thoseprovisionsarelimitedto:
• divisionintosub-zones• populationestimatesforeachsub-zone• developmentofmechanisms,processesandprocedurestoprovidefor
environmentalradiationmonitoringanddataanalysisbythePEOCScientificSection• familiarizationsessionswithimpactedmunicipalities,asrequired• identificationofexistingresponsecentresthatfallwithintheCPZanddevelopmentofa
listofpossiblealternateslocatedoutsidetheCPZThus,asidefromaclearerunderstandingofpopulationestimateswithin20kmofthePickeringnuclearstationtheCPZprovidesnoadditionalsafetybenefitcomparedtothe2009PNERP.However,asdiscussedIAEAstandardsrecommendresponsemeasuresbeputinplaceintheEPDtofacilitatethe“….evacuationofthoserequiringspecializedcarebetoareasbeyondtheEPDtoavoidadditionalevacuations.”GreenpeacehasbeenunabletoidentifywhetherpreparednessmeasureshavebeenincludedintheupdatedPNERPtoimplementthisobjectiveoftheEPD.ThelackofdetailedplanningintheCPZisalsoofparticularconcerntovulnerablecommunities,includinghospitalpatientsandtheelderly.In2015,GreenpeaceCanadasurveyedthenumberofhospitalswithin30kmofthePickering,finding22hospitalswith7,399beds.Thesameareaalsohad82retirementhomeswith9,368beds27(ideally,amoreappropriatesurveywouldincludeallhospitalsandretirementhomeswithinthe50kmIPZ).Incontrast,therewere7hospitalswith800patientswithin20kmoftheFukushimanuclearstation.28Itshouldalsobenotedthatin2017CNSCstaffrecommendedOFMEM“…identifymorepreparednessactivitiesfortheCPZ.”AdditionalmeasuresrecommendedbytheCNSCincluded“suchaspectsasevacuationplans,theavailabilityofKIbeforeorattimeofemergency,locationofcentresoutsidethiszone.”29Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoworkwithprovinceandmunicipalauthoritiestoidentifyallhospitalsandretirementhomeswithinthe50kmIngestionControlZone(IPZ)aswellasreceptionfacilitiesforspecialized-careevacueesoutsideoftheIPZ.6.KIDistribution
27ResearchcommissionedbyGreenpeacein2015.28TheNationalDietofJapan,TheofficialreportofTheFukushimaNuclearAccidentIndependentInvestigationCommission,2012.29KathleenHeppell-Masys,(DirectorGeneral,CNSC),pg.9.
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TherearebothpublicexpectationsandtechnicalevidencethatsupportexpandingthedistributionandaccessibilityofKIbeyondwhatisproposedintheImplementationPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation.TheMinistryofCommunitySafety’supdatedImplementationPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationsimplyadoptstherequirementsetbytheCNSCin2014.TheCommissionestablishedthesenewrequirementsduetopublicexpectationsforpublicsafety,internationalbestpractices,concernsrelatedtotheprovince’sslowresponsetoFukushima,andresultsfromthesevereaccidentstudyindicatinganincreasedoccurrenceofchildhoodthyroidcancerwouldoccurfollowinganuclearaccident.The2014requirements,whicharedetailedinREGDOC-2.10.1NuclearEmergencyPreparednessandResponse,obligateOPGtodeliverKItoallhomesandbusinesswithinthe10kmDPZandmakeKIreadilyavailablewithinthe50kmICZ.However,theCommissionrelieduponthesewithoutanyspecificanalysistojustifytheiruseforKIdistribution.FormerCNSCCommissionerSandyMcKeownreferredtothe10kmPrimaryZoneasa“minimum”30forKIpre-distribution.Notably,theprovincecontinuedtoresisttheCommission’sstrengthenedKIdistributionrequirements31whilemunicipalitiescalledforthemtobeexpanded.Forexample,evenaftertheCNSC’snewrequirementshadbeenimplemented,theprovince’s2017DiscussionPaperonproposedchangestothePNERPstatedthat“…nopolicyrecommendationsregardingstockinganddistributionofIodineThyroidBlocking(ITB)havebeenproposedgiventhatitdoesnotformacomponentofthePlanningBasis.”32Incontrast,bothDurhamRegion33andtheCityofToronto34haverequestedthedeliveryofKIbeyondthecurrent10kmdistributionarea.ThisshowsstrongpublicsupportforstrengtheningtheCNSC’s2014KIdistributionrequirements.AvailabletechnicalanalysisalsosupportsexpandedKIdistribution,inparticulartovulnerablecommunities.IntheCNSC’scommentsontheprovince’s2017DiscussionPaper,CNSCstaffacknowledgethatbothCNSCandHealthCanadamodellingindicatesthatchildrenbeyondthe10kmDPZmayneedreadyaccesstoKIintheeventofamajoraccident.CNSCstaffrecommendedthat:
…thePNERPaddresshowtoensurethatKIcanbepromptlydistributedasrequiredintheCPZorIngestion/SecondaryZoneatthetimeofemergency.FromtheHealthCanada(HC)data,itappearsKIcouldbepromptlyneededforchildrenbeyondcurrent10kmPZ/DPZ.ThisisconsistentwithCNSCStudyofConsequenceofaHypotheticalSevere
30CNSC,TranscriptsofPublicMeeting,August21st,2014,pg.82.31JohnSpears,“Therealquestionaboutnucleardisaster:Federalorprovincialissue?”,theTorontoStar,August23,2014.32OfficeoftheFireMarshalandEmergencyManagement,DiscussionPaper:PlanningBasisReview&Recommendations,May201733TheRegionalMunicipalityofDurham,“RegionalresponsetoProvincialDiscussionPaperentitled“ProvincialNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan(PNERP)PlanningBasisReviewandRecommendations”.EBRRegistryNumber013-0560,”#2017-COW-137[asamended,perCouncilJune14,2017]34TorontoCityCouncil,EX28.13-Toronto'sEmergencyManagementProgramandRevisionstotheTorontoMunicipalCodeNovember7,2017
13
NuclearAccidentandEffectivenessofMitigationMeasures,(SARP)studyandisalreadyaddressedinREGDOC2.10.1.CNSCstaffencourageOFMEMtoconsiderhowtheywillassurethatKIwouldbeprovidedtovulnerablepopulationsinatimelymanner(eitherpre-obtained,orpromptlyprovidedattimeofemergency).35
TheCommission’srecommendationisreasonableandtechnicalanalysisshowsthatKIwouldbeneededoutsideoftheDPZintheeventofasevereaccident.Meanwhilethereareseveralmillionpeople,overfivehundredschoolsandanunknownnumberofdaycareswithintheIPZthatdonothavereadyaccesstoKI.Inshort,thelargepopulationaroundthePickeringnuclearstationnecessitatesthattheMinistryofCommunitySafetyhaveplansandcapacityinplacetocarryoutamassKIdistributionprogramintheeventofanemergency.AlthoughlicenceesmustdemonstratethefeasibilityofevacuationplansthroughregularEvacuationTimeEstimate(ETE)studies,thereisnoequivalentinformationinthepublicdomaintoverifywhetherOFMEMcouldpromptlydistributeKIacrossthePickeringIPZintheeventofanemergency.Inlightoftheseuncertainties,GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontouseitslicensingauthoritytoincreasetheaccessibilityofKIthroughouttheIPZ.TherearethreesimpleoptionsavailabletomakeKImoreeasilyaccessibletocommunitiesnearthePickeringnuclearstation.ThefirstistosimplyexpandtheareainwhichKIisdeliveredtohomesandbusiness.ThisentailsexpandingKIpre-distributionbeyondthecurrent10DPZ.ThesecondoptioninvolvesmakingKImorereadilyaccessibleintheareabeyondthepre-distributionzonethroughstrategicstockpiling.Theplacementofsuchstockpilesshouldenablerapiddistributionintheeventofanemergency.AsrequiredinREGDOC-2.10.1,suchstockpilesshouldpayparticularattentiontovulnerablecommunities.IntheGTA,themostobviouschoiceforsuchstockpileswouldbeschoolsanddaycares.IncomplyingwithREGDOC-2.10.1,BrucePowerhascreatedKIstockpilesinallschoolswithinthe50kmIPZ.36OPGhasnotfacilitatedthestockpilingofKIinGTA-areaschools.Finally,KIcanbemademorereadilyaccessibleoutsideofthepre-distributionareabyencouraginghouseholdsandbusinessestorequestKIsupplies.AlthoughREGDOC-2.10.1requiresOPGtomakeKIavailabletoanyonewithintheIPZ,itdoesnotobligateOPGinformresidentsoftheIPZoftheavailabilityofKI.Notably,BrucePowersentaninformationpackagetoallresidentsintheIPZsurroundingtheBrucenuclearstationinformingthemoftheavailabilityofKI.37TherehasbeennoequivalentefforttoinformresidentswithinPickering’sIPZoftheavailabilityofKI.Insummary,theKIdistributionrequirementscontainedinthe2017PNERPandtheImplementationPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationareinsufficienttoadequatelyprotectthepublicintheevenofasevereaccident.InlightoftheMinistryofCommunitySafety’songoingresistancetoenhancingKIdistributionrequirements,GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontouseitslicensingauthoritytodrivecontinuousimprovementthroughadditionallicenceconditionsandupdatestoREGDOC-2.10.1.
35KathleenHeppell-Masys,(DirectorGeneral,CNSC),pg.5.36BrucePower,ApplicationforRenewalofProl.18/2020:SupplementalSubmission,February28,pg.27.37Ibid.
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Recommendation:ToberesponsivetotheexpectationsofTorontoandDurhamRegionalcouncils,theCommissionshouldexpandrequirementsforKIdeliverytothe20kmareacurrentlyproposedfortheContingencyPlanningZone. Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldimposeanewlicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoworkwithschoolboardstoensurethestockpilingofKIinallschoolswithinthecurrent50kmIngestionPlanningZonebeforetheendof2019.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldincludeanadditionallicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoinformresidentsoftheIngestionPlanningZoneoftheirrighttoorderKItabletsfortheirfamilyorbusiness.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldinstructstafftoupdateREGDOC-2.10.1torequirelicenceesfacilitatethestockpilingofKIinschoolsanddaycareswithintheIngestionPlanningZone(IPZ)andtoinformresidentsoftheIPZoftheirabilitytoorderKIfreeofcharge.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldinstructstafftoincludeanewrequirementinthenextiterationofREGDOC-2.10.1obligatinglicenceestocarryoutKIDistributionTimeEstimatestudiestoverifythefeasibilityofpromptlydistributingKIintheIPZintheeventofasevereaccident.
AnnexAThisisanextractfromthedocument“GreenpeaceCanada’sComments
ontheDiscussionPaper–PlanningBasisReviewandRecommendations”,July28,2017.Itsummarizesthehistoryoftheplanningbasisusedfornuclearemergencyplanningin
Ontario.Italsosummarizesthefindingsofpubliclyavailableindustry-producedprobabilisticriskstudiesfortheDarlington,PickeringandBrucenuclearstations.
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Section2ThissectionreviewsthehistoricdevelopmentofOntario’scurrentplanningbasisaswellasthe
reviewofoffsiteemergencyresponseinCanadasincetheFukushimadisaster.Itidentifiesanumberofpatterns:updatedriskstudiesindicatinganincreaseinthelikelihoodof
majoraccidentssincethe1990s,thefailureofgovernmentauthoritiestoconsidertheserisk
studies,thetendencyofOPGtomodifyriskassessmentsiffindingsareinconvenient,andthefailure
ofgovernmentauthoritiestoconsidertheimpactsofaFukushima-scaleaccident.
2.1TheEvolutionofOntario’sNuclearEmergencyPreparednessMay1980–Solicitor-GeneralRoyMcMurtrysetsupOntario’semergencyplanningofficein
responsetotheThreeMileIslandAccident.129
April1984–TheReportofWorkingGroup#3:TheprovincialgovernmentestablishedWorking
Group#3tomakerecommendationsonthe“technicalbasis”fornuclearemergencyplans,
includingreferenceaccidents,planningzonesandplanningtimes.Simplyput,thegroupwasasked
whataccidentstheprovinceshouldplanandpreparefor.Theyrecommendeddetailedplanningfor
allaccidentswithanestimatedlikelihoodbelow1E-6perreactoryearor1E-5forastationwithten
reactors.Theworkinggroupcharacterizedthehazardofsuchaccidentsashavinganeffectivedose
of250mSv(25rem)attheboundaryofanuclearstation.ThisremainsanassumptionofOntario’s
nuclearemergencyresponseplantothisday.
ThisdoseestimatewasbasedonthelicensinglimitrequirementsoftheAECB.Theaccidental
radiationreleasesusedforemergencyplanningaresimilarinscaletothoseresultingfromtheThree
MileIslandaccident.Releaseswouldbeprincipallynoblegaseswitheffectivelynoradioiodinesor
long-livedradioisotopes.ThiswouldprobablybecategorizedasanINES5accident.TheworkinggrouparrivedatthedistancesfortheContiguous,PrimaryandSecondaryZonesby
applyingtheinversesquarelawfromradiationprotectiontoa250mSvdoseatthefencelineofthe
nuclearstation.Thatis,doublingthedistancefromasourceofradiationwilldecreaseexposureby
aquarteroftheoriginaldose.Thus,250mSvatthesiteboundarywouldleadto100mSvwithin3
km.Thiswouldrequiremandatoryevacuation.TheWorkingGroupdesignatedthistheContiguous
Zonewhereenhancedemergencypreparednessisnecessary.Similarly,a250mSvdoseatthesite
boundarywouldresultinapproximately10mSv,whichistheminimumactionlevelforevacuation,
9kmfromtheplant.ThisbecamethePrimaryZone.
TodeterminethesizeoftheSecondaryZonewherearrangementsaremadeingestioncontrol
measures,WorkingGroup#3assumeda2.5Sv(250rem)thyroiddoseatthesiteboundary.This
wouldbecausedbyareleaseof37terra-Becquerels(3.7E+13)ofIodine-131.Thiswouldleadtoa
thyroiddoseof1.5mSv(0.15rem)between20and40kmfromtheplantdependingonrelease
duration.TheworkinggroupthusrecommendedaSecondaryZoneof50km.130Inretrospect,itis
129
TheGlobeandMail,“Ontariosetsupemergencyplanningoffice,”27May1980.130
ReportofProvincialWorkingGroup#3,April1984,pg.24.
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noteworthythatOntario’sSecondaryZoneisbasedoniodinereleases1,000timessmallerthanFukushimaand10,000smallerthanChernobyl.Asdiscussedinsection1.11,aspartoftheCNSC’seffortstomodernizedesignstandardsitestablishedaSmallReleaseFrequency(SRF)in2008.TheSRFwasestablishedtoacknowledgeadesignvulnerabilityofCANDUreactors.Itlimitsreleasesofmorethan1E+15ofI-131tolessthan1E-5perreactoryear.Thisissignificantbecauseitmeetstheprobabilitycut-offfordetailedemergencyplanningrecommendedbyWorkingGroup#3.BasedontheunderstandingofCANDUaccidentpathwayin1984,however,WorkingGroup#3assumedsignificantlysmallerreleasesofradioiodine.April26,1986–TheChernobylaccidentbegins:Theaccidentpermanentlydisplacesover300,000peoplelivingwithin30kmareaaroundthestation.Otherareashundredsofkilometresfromthestationarecontaminatedandrequireevacuation.Theaccidenteventuallyleadstothousandsofthyroidcancers,particularlyinchildren.Ithighlightsthepotentialforreactoraccidentstocausedamageatgreatdistances.Humanerroralsocontributedtotriggeringtheaccident.June1986–ProvincialcabinetfinallyapprovesnuclearemergencypreparednessplansfollowingChernobyl.February1987–CabinetCommitteeonEmergencyPlanningdiscussionofChernobylAccidentReport:AyearaftertheChernobyldisasterbegan,cabinetdiscussedtheimplicationsforemergencyplanning.ThereportprovidedtocabinetstatedthatChernobylraisedthequestionof“…whethertheupperlimitpresentlyfixedfordetailedplanningandpreparationprovidesarealisticandadequatemarginofpublicsafety?”131ThereportobservedthatChernobyl“…highlightsanotherdangerinattachingundueimportancetothemathematicalprobabilitiesofvariousaccidentsequencescommonlycomputedinriskanalysisstudies:theimportanceofthehumanfactorintheequation,andthedifficultyofquantifyingit.”132Italsoacknowledgedthatforsevereaccidents,Ontario’semergencyplansenvisage“…theimprovisationofprotectiveactionforthepublicoutsidethe10kmPrimaryZone.”InlightofChernobyl,thereportquestionedwhetherthis10kmzoneprovidedanadequatemarginofsafetyand“…towhatextendimprovisationcanbedependedon”.133CabinetsupportedareviewoftheupperlimitfordetailedplanningandpreparationsinOntario,andthe10kmprimaryzonederivedfromit.134February1988–OntarioNuclearSafetyReview(ONSR)Recommendations:TheexpertpanelappointedbygovernmenttoreviewthesafetyofOntario’sreactorsfollowingtheChernobyldisasterrecommendedthat“…theProvinceofOntariobaseitsnuclearemergencyplanningonthemaximumcrediblereleasesofradioactivematerials.”135Thereviewalsoobservestheprovinceonlyhadtwostaffdedicatedtonuclearemergencyplanningandhadfailedtoallocatesufficientfundstoimplementingexistingnuclearemergencyresponseplans.136
131MinistryoftheSolicitorGeneral,CabinetSubmissiononEmergencyPlanning:ChernobylAccidentReport,February19,1987,Pg.12132Ibid,pg.13.133Ibid,pg.13.134Ibid,pg.1.135OntarioNuclearSafetyReview,TheSafetyofOntario’sNuclearPowerReactors:AScientificandTechnicalReview,Vol.1.February1988,pg.xv.136Ibid.
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AnexpertreviewbytheformerpresidentoftheAtomicEnergyControlBoard(AECB)commissionedbytheONSRpanelalsoobservedthat“…thequestionoftheimpactonwatersuppliesfromtheGreatLakesformanymillionsofpeoplehasbeenlargelyoverlooked.”137ThisreviewsuggestedtheOntariogovernmentmaywishtoinvestigatethepossiblecontaminationoftheGreatLakesandconsideralternativesourcesofdrinkingwater.138Suchananalysishasnotoccurred.June1988–ReportofProvincialWorkingGroup#8onTheUpperLimitforDetailedNuclearEmergencyPlanning–WorkingGroup#8recommendedexpandingtherangeofaccidentsconsideredinprovincialplanningandpreparednessfromwhatwasoriginallyproposedbyWorkingGroup#3.Itproposedatwo-tierapproachtoplanning:detailedplansandpreparednessforaMaximumPlanningAccident(MPA)andmoreconceptualplansforaWorstCredibleRadiationEmission(WCRE).TheMPAwasdefinedasall“accidentswhichcanbequantitativelydeterminedtobeaslowasoncein105station-years”139orapproximately10E-6perreactoryearforan8unitstationlikePickeringorBruce.ThisaccidentiseffectivelythesameasthedetailedplanningaccidentrecommendedbyWorkingGroup#3.Releasesoccuraftertwenty-fourhours,areprincipallynoblegases,withonly0.1%ofareactor’sradioiodineinventoryreleased.(SeeTable14inAppendixAforafulldescription).TheWCREreferstoaccidentsestimatedbyindustryestimatestobelow1E-6,ortobeunquantifiable,suchasthosecausedbyterroristattacksorhumanerror.Forplanningpurposes,theWorkingGroupsettheparametersofWCREaccidentsasareleaseoccurringwithinthefirsttwenty-fourhoursandwith1%ofiodinecoreinventoryreleasedwithinanhour.(SeeTable15inAppendixAforafulldescription).ForWCREaccidents,WorkingGroup#8recommendedemergencymeasuresbeinplacetoprotectagainstearlysicknessordeath.140Notably,thisaccidentisstillsmallerthanreleasesfromFukushimaorChernobyl.TheworkinggroupalsorecommendedthattheprimaryzonesatPickering,BruceandDarlingtonbeexpandedfrom10to13km,andthattheprovinceconsiderexpandingcertainemergencymeasures,includingdistributingpotassiumiodidepills,installingearlywarningsystemsforthepublicandrestrictingnewhousingconstructionnearnuclearfacilities.141Notably,OntarioHydro’srepresentativeonWorkingGroup#8filedadissentingopinion,statinghewasagainstexpandingprimaryzonesto13km.142AsdiscussedinSection1.1,WorkingGroup#8wasmandatedtoconsiderhostileaction,publicperceptionsofaccidentrisk,publicexpectationsforsafetyandsafetymarginstoaddressuncertainties.TheseissueswerenotconsideredintheDiscussionPaper.September1993–CabinetCommitteeonproposedchangestonuclearemergencyplanningandpreparedness:FiveyearsafterthepublicationoftheWorkingGroup#8report,acabinetcommitteediscussedcivilservicerecommendationsforstrengtheningnuclearemergencyresponse.The
137A.T.Prince,“ReviewofNuclearEmergencyMeasuresAffectingOntario,andOtherRelatedMatters,“foundinVol.2.AppendixVIofTheSafetyofOntario’sNuclearPowerReactors:AScientificandTechnicalReview,February1988.138Ibid,pg.51.139ReportofProvincialWorkingGroup#8–TheUpperLimitforDetailedNuclearEmergencyPlanning,June30,1988,pg.84.140Ibid.pg.85.141Ibid.,pg.iv.142G.Armitage,(OntarioHydro),DissentingMinute,June30,1988.
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proposalrecommendedthegovernment“…expandthetechnicalbasisoftheProvincialNuclearEmergencyResponsePlantocoveraccidentsbeyondthecurrentdesignbasisandimplementconsequentialmeasuresforincreasingpublicsafety.”Itnotedtheprovince’scurrentplanningbasis“…assumesadelayintheemissionofradioactivityfromthestationtotheenvironment,andprecludesanyearlyhealtheffectsamongthepubliclivingaroundthestation.”143ItrecommendeddeliveringpotassiumiodidepillstoresidentsintheContiguousZone,expandingthePrimaryZonesaroundBruceandDarlingtonto13km,andimplementingearlywarningsystemsandpriorityevacuationzonesfortheContiguousZone.144Thesubmissionnotedthatthe“vastmajority”ofstakeholderssupportedtherecommendationsofWorkingGroup#8.145However,thecabinetsubmissionrejectedincludingtheworstcredibleemissionrecommendedbyWorkingGroup#8intheplanningbasisbecause,inpart,“OntarioHydrowouldincurtheseadditionalintendedcosts.”146ThecommitteevotedfortheMinisteroftheSolicitorGeneraltoreportbacktothethemwithintwelvemonthswithafullexaminationofimplementationcostssocabinetapprovalforanamendednuclearemergencyplancouldbesoughtwithintwenty-fourmonths.147TheNDPgovernment,however,losttotheProgressiveConservativesintheJune1995provincialelectionandcabinetneverapprovedtheproposedchanges.1995–MinistryofEnergyinitiatesreviewofrecommendationstoexpandOntario’splanningbasis:InresponsetoOntarioHydro’sconcerns,theMinistryofEnergycommissionedtheRoyalSocietyofCanadaandtheCanadianEnergyAcademy(heretoforereferredtoasRSC/CAE)toreviewWorkingGroup#8’srecommendationtoexpandplanningtoincludemoresevereaccidentsaswellasitsrecommendationstopre-distributepotassiumiodideandexpandthePrimaryZoneto13km.Notably,themanagementteamseekingadvicefromtheRSA/CAEincludedOntarioHydro,whichhadopposedWorkingGroup#8’srecommendations.148March1996–OntarioHydro’sSubmissiontoRSC/CAEReview–OntarioHydro,whichhadopposedWorkingGroup#8’srecommendationstoexpandtheprimaryzone,providedcommentstotheRSC/CAEinearly1996.Asdiscussed,OntarioHydrowasalsorepresentedonthemanagementteamthathadcommissiontheRSA/CAE.OntarioHydroarguedchemicalandphysicalrealitiesaswellaschangesinunderstandingrelatedtoradioiodinemeantthatreleaseswouldbesignificantlylessthantheWCREbyWorkingGroup#8.OntarioHydroalsoarguedthateveniflargereleasesdidoccur,theywoulddosoafter30hoursduetorecentupgradestocontainmentsystemsatPickering.149Thecompanyassertedthataccidents
143TheMinistryoftheSolicitorGeneralandCorrectionalServices,CabinetSubmission:NuclearEmergencyPlanningandPreparedness,September301993,pg.1144Ibid.,pg.3.145Ibid,pg.4.146Ibid.pg.9.147CabinetCommitteeonEnvironmentPolicy,ThursdayNovember18,1993,pg.4.148DeborahE.Farr,(ManagerElectricityOperationsandPlanningSection,MinistryofEnvironmentandEnergy)toLindaLiik(OntarioHydro)etal.,Letterwith“TermsofReferencefortheReviewbytheRoyalSocietyofCanada&CanadianEngineeringAcademyofOutstandingQuestionsrelatedtotheProposedProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan,”1995.149OntarioHydro,OntarioHydro’sSubmissionoftheReviewbytheRoyalSocietyofCanada&CanadianAcademyofEngineeringofOutstandingQuestionsRelatedtotheProposedProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan,January1996.
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causingearlyradiationeffectsclosetothesiteboundarywouldhavefrequenciesbelow1E-8andwouldthereforebewellbelowthethresholdof“credibility.”150OntarioHydroalsodismissedseveralinitiatingeventsthathavesincebecomeanacceptedconcern.Forexample,thecompanyarguedthat,despite50yearsofreactoroperationsworldwide,“noaccidentormajorupset”haseverarisendueto“external”causessuchasearthquakes.151InlightofFukushima,suchclaimswouldnolongerbeacceptedbythepublicorregulatoryauthorities.Notably,theDiscussionPaperdoesnotexplicitlyconsiderthecontributionofexternaleventstoaccidentrisk.OntarioHydroalsodismissedWorkingGroup#8’sconsiderationofhostileactionorterrorismeventhoughitwasmandatedtobythegovernment.Thecompanyarguedthatit“…ishardtoimaginehowanoperationofrequiredmagnitudeandexpertisecouldbecarriedoutwithoutmanyhoursofawarenessbycivilauthoritiespriortoanyrelease.”SinceSeptember11th,thisdismissalofterrorismriskswouldalsonotbeaccepted.AsdiscussedinSection1.6,OPGhasconsistentlyinvokedsecurityconcernstowithholdreactorrisk-relatedinformationsinceSeptember11th.TheDiscussionPaperdoesnotaddresstheriskfrommalevolentevents.OntarioHydroopposedrequiringthepre-distributionofKIwithinthe3kmContiguousZonebecause“RadioiodineisnotconsideredasignificantthreatinCANDUreactors.”ItalsoarguedKIdistributioncouldbe“dangerous”becauseKIdistributioncouldbeineffective.152AfterFukushima,ofcourse,theCNSCrequiredreactoroperatorstoensureKIispre-distributedinthe10kmprimaryzoneandavailabletoeveryonewithinthe50kmsecondaryzone.DurhamRegion,whichhostsOPG’sreactors,hassupportedandaskedforKIdistributiontobeexpandedbeyondthe10kmprimaryzone.TheDiscussionPaper,however,doesnotmakerecommendationsonKIdistribution.November1996–RSA/CAERecommendations:TheReporttotheMinistryofEnergyandEnvironmentconcerningtwoTechnicalMattersintheProvinceofOntario’sNuclearEmergencyResponsePlaneffectivelyadoptedOntarioHydro’srecommendations.Itrejectedthepre-distributionofKIinthe3kmContingencyZoneandtheexpansionofthePrimaryZoneto13km.Itrecommendedthat“…detailedemergencyplanningshouldbedoneforaccidentsresultingfromacredibleseriesofeventswhichcouldoccurwithaprobabilityofapproximately10-7/reactoryear.”153ThisisalevelofmagnitudebelowwhatwasrecommendedbyWorkingGroup#3and#8.AssessingaccidentscenariosfromOntarioHydro’s1995riskassessmentforthePickeringAnuclearstationagainstthe10E-7cutoffcriteria,theRSA/CAEfoundthatcurrentemergencymeasureswereadequate.The1995PickeringAriskassessmentfoundaccidentsleadingtosignificantreleaseshadextremelylowestimatedprobabilities,rangingfrom5E-9to4E-10.154(SeeTable4inAppendixA.)TheRSA/CAEidentifiedonescenariofromthe1995PickeringAriskassessmentthathadasimilarseveritytotheWCREaccidentproposedbyWorkingGroup#8.Thisscenario,referredtoasExPlantReleaseCategory-3(EPRC-3),hadanestimatedprobabilityof9.4E-8,whichisjustbelowthecut-off
150Ibid,pg15.151Ibid,pg15.152Ibid,pg25.153Ibid,pg33.154Ibid,pg.11.
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criteriarecommendedbyRSA/CAE.155EPRC-3wouldreleaseapproximately3.8E+15Becquerelsofradioiodine.156Itwouldmostlikelybecharacterizedasalevel6INESaccident.AsdiscussedinSection1.6,PRAspublishedsince1996havefoundaccidentsleadingtomajorreleasestobemuchmorelikelythanthe1995PickeringAriskassessment.ToGreenpeace’sknowledge,thesignificanceofthesePRAresultshaveneverbeenconsideredbyOFMEM.May2002–Ministry’schoiceofsevereaccident“blueprint”–EmergencyManagementOntario(EMO)concludedthat“EPRC-3isavalid‘blueprint’or‘template’scenarioforthemoresevereaccidentforwhichplanningandpreparednessistobecarriedout.”Becausethemost“severeimpactstothepublicfromEPRC-3istothe1-3kmContiguousZone”EMOconcluded“enhancedpreparedness,includingearlywarningsystemsandpriorityevacuations,isappropriatefortheContiguousZone.”157Notably,EMOdismissedmore“severe”accidents(EPRC-1andEPRC-2)foundinthe1995PickeringAriskassessmentfromconsiderationduetotheirextremelylowprobabilities,comparingsuchevents“…tothatofacometorasteroidstrikeonEarthresultinginamajorextinctionofspecies.”158ThechoiceofEPRC-3asablueprintforthesevereaccidentinthePNERPhighlightsaweaknessincurrentemergencyplanning.SevereaccidentsinthePNERParenotaddressedthroughdetailedplans,butthroughthebeliefthatexistingemergencymeasurescouldbeexpandedintheeventofsuchevents.EPRC-3’sreleasesaremuchsmallerthanFukushimaandChernobyl,whichmeansprovincialauthoritieshaveneverconsideredthefeasibilityofextendingemergencymeasureintheeventofsuchevents.Meanwhile,FukushimaandChernobylhavebeenidentifiedatallofOntario’snuclearstation.2.2Implications:TheEvolutionofOntario’sNuclearEmergencyPreparednessAfterThreeMileIsland,OntarioputinplacedetailedemergencyplanstoaddressaccidentssimilarinscaletoThreeMileIsland.Thatis,Ontario’sdetailedplanningwasdesignedtoprotectOntariansintheeventofalevel5accidentontheInternationalNuclearEventScale(INES).Althoughittookapproximatelyfifteenyears,Ontarioeventuallyincreaseddetailedplanning,albeitlimitedtotheContiguousZone,toaccountforlevel6accidentsontheInternationalNuclearEventScale.Notably,thesevereaccidentchosenbytheOntariogovernmentasa“blueprint”isapproximatelytwenty-fivetimessmallerthantheaccidentalreleasesthatoccurredatFukushima.AlthoughOntario’semergencyplansweremodifiedafterChernobyltoacknowledgemoresevereaccidentscouldoccur,thegovernmenthasdonenothingtoassessitsabilitytoaddressaccidentsonparwithFukushimaorChernobyl.155Ibid,pg.11.156ThecorefractionofIodinereleasebyEPRC-3wasestimatedtobe2E-3.The1-131coreinventoryforaPickeringAreactoris1.93E+18.AsimpleestimateofEPRC-3’siodinereleaseis3.86E+15Bq.157Dr.AaduPilt,ATechnicalAssessmentoftheEnhancedPlanningandPreparednessArrangementsintheContagiousZoneSurroundingOntarioPowerGenerationInc.NuclearGeneratingstations,May2002,pg.6.AcquiredthroughFreedomofInformation.158Ibid.,pgs.2-3.
56
2.3ThechangingunderstandingofCANDUreactorrisksAsdiscussed,theRSC/CAErecommendedin1996that“…detailedemergencyplanningshouldbedoneforaccidentsresultingfromacredibleseriesofeventswhichcouldoccurwithaprobabilityofapproximately10-7/Reactoryear”(Onceintenmillionyearsperreactor)159.Usingthiscut-offprobability,theRSC/CAEconcludedthattherewasnoneedtoexpandthedetailedemergencyplansrecommendedbyWorkingGroup#3afterThreeMileIsland.ThiswasbasedontheconclusionsofOntarioHydro’s1995riskassessmentforthePickeringAnuclearstation,whichfoundthatallaccidentsbelowwithanestimatedlikelihoodabove10E-7resultedinminorreleasesonlyoccurringaftertwenty-fourhours.Toaddressmoresevereaccidents,belowthe10E-7cut-off,theprovincialgovernmentselectedanaccidentfromthePickeringAriskassessment,whichfellbelowtoserveasa“blueprint”160forsevereaccidentplanning.Asnoted,thisscenario,EPRC-3,hadanestimatedlikelihoodof9.4E-8–justbelowtheRoyalSocietyofCanada’scut-offfordetailedplanning.EPRC-3wouldreleaseapproximately3.8E+15ofiodineequivalentandwouldlikelyberatedasanINES6accident.Ontarioeffectivelyhasdetailedplansandpreparednessforaccidentswithreleasesuptoalevel5INESaccidentwithsome“enhanced”measuresintheContiguousZonetodealwithalevel6INESaccident.ForaccidentswithseveritysimilartoEPRC-3,thegovernmentonlyhasconceptualplansandstrategies.ForaccidentswithreleasesaboveINES7orChernobylofFukushima,theprovincedoesnotevenhaveconceptualplansandstrategies.Whilebasingitsrecommendationsontheaccidentscenariosfoundinthe1995PickeringAriskassessment,theRSC/CAEalsonotedthat“…tothiscollectionofaccidentscanbeaddedanynewanalysesofotherscenariosifofcomparableprobability.”161AsdiscussedinSection1.6,sincetheRSC/CAErecommendationswerepublished,newindustryriskassessmentshaveidentifiedaccidentscenariosthatmeetthedetailedplanningcriteriaandaresignificantlymoreseverethanthoseidentifiedinthe1995PickeringAriskassessment.Greenpeacehasfoundnoevidencethatprovincialauthoritieshaveassessedthesescenariosortheirimplicationsforemergencyplanning.InGreenpeace’sview,thisisevidenceofapatternwherePRAresultshavebeenselectivelyusedbygovernmentauthorities.PubliclyAvailableReactorRiskAssessmentssince19971999BruceBRiskAssessment:ThreeyearsaftertheRSC/CAEmadeitsrecommendations,anewriskassessmentfortheBruceBreactorsidentifiedanumberofmoresevereaccidentsthatwouldmeetthecriteriafordetailedplanningandpreparedness.
159W.R.Bruceetal,ReporttotheMinistryoftheEnvironmentandEnergyconcerningtwotechnicalmattersintheProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan,RoyalSocietyofCanada&CanadianAcademyofEngineering,November1996,p.33.160Ibid.161Ibid.
57
Itfoundlargereleaseaccidentshadanestimatedlikelihoodof3.7E-7.Italsoevaluatedthelikelihoodof“severereleases.”Aseverereleasewasdefinedasareleasegreaterthan10percentofthecoreinventoryofcesium-137.Accordingtotheseriskassessments,severereleasescouldleadtoearlyfatalities.Itfoundseverereleaseshadalikelihoodof1.2E-7.162ThismeetstheplanningcriteriarecommendedbytheRSC/CAE.SeeTable16inAppendixAforadditionaldetails.2003and2005BruceARiskAssessment:TosupporttherestartoftwooftheBruceAreactors,BrucePowerpublishedriskassessmentsshowingcrediblecatastrophicscenariosthatwouldmeetthecriteriafordetailedplanning.AsummaryofBruceAriskassessmentresultswasprovidedaspartoftheenvironmentalassessmentoftherestartandlifeextensionoftheBruceAreactors.AlthoughBrucePowerdidnotexplicitlyidentifythelargereleasecategories,thesociallydisruptiveaccidentscenarioscanbededucedfromthedoseestimates.Ex-PlantReleaseCategories1,2,3and4produceearlyfatalitieswith“…animmediateindividualdoseof>3000mSv.”EPRCs1and2haveprobabilitiesabove1E-7andmeetthecriteriafordetailedplanningrecommendedbyRSA/CAE.SeeTable17inAppendixAforadditionaldetails.The2005BruceAriskassessmentupdatefoundlargereleaseaccidentshadanestimatedlikelihoodof1.3-6.Italsofoundseverereleaseshadalikelihoodof4.1E-7.Notably,twoscenarioswouldreleaseover50%of1-131andCs-137.(SeeTable18inAppendixA).Approximatelyathirdoflargereleaseaccidentswereinfactseverereleasescenariosofmorethan10percentofthecoreinventor.2008PickeringBRiskAssessment:In2008,OPGreleasedasummaryofitsmostrecentPRAforthePickeringBnuclearstationtosupporttheenvironmentalreviewofitsproposaltorebuildthefourPickeringBreactors.Itidentifiedfouraccidentsequences(EPRC1,EPRC4,EPRC5AandEPRC7)thatleadtolargereleases.InthisassessmentOPGdefinedlargereleaseasanaccidentthatisexpectedtoreleasemorethan1%ofCs-137intotheenvironment.ItfoundtheLargeReleaseFrequencyforthestationtobe7.1E-7,whichisthesameasthelikelihoodestimateforEPRC5A.Theotherlargeaccidentsequenceshadextremelylowprobabilitiesbetween1E-10and1E-11.163SeeTable19inAppendixAformoredetails.Notably,CNSCstaffdirectedOPGtoassesstheconsequencesofEPRC5Aeventhough7.1E-7fallsbelowthecut-offof1E-6thattheCNSCusestoselectaccidentsforenvironmentalreviews.CNSCstaffgaveseveralreasonsforthis.First,theoriginalriskassessmentOPGsubmittedtotheCommissionfoundthatEPRC5hadaprobabilityof6.3E-6.OPG,however,reassessedthisaccidentscenarioandlowereditsprobabilityto7.1E-7,whichisbelowthecut-offprobabilityforenvironmentalreviews.CNSCstaffnotedthatthiswasonly“marginallybelow”thecut-offprobabilityandarguedthatifexternalevents–flooding,fire,seismic-wereconsidereditbeevencloserorexceedtheassessmentcriteria.164InGreenpeace’sview,OPG’sreassessmentofEPRC5highlightsarisktopublicsafetyrelatedtoanunquestionedrelianceonindustryriskstudies.Suchstudiescanbeeasilymanipulated.Reactoroperatorshaveafinancialandreputationalinterestinexcludingsevereaccidentsfrom
162OntarioPowerGeneration,BruceNGSBRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,November1999,NK29-REP-03611-00001,pg.38.163OPG,PickeringBRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,November14,2008,pg.33.164T.E.Schaubel,(Director,PickeringRegulatoryProgramDivision,CNSC)toD.PatrickMcNeil(SeniorVicePresident,OPG)“PickeringBEnvironmentalAssessment(EA)–CNSCPositiononFinalMalfunctionsandAccidentstobeusedintheEA,”August7,2007,E-DOCS#3068013.
58
environmentalreviewsandfromemergencyresponse.TheDiscussionPaperdoesnotconsiderthebiasofindustryriskstudies. AsdiscussedinSection1.11,EPRC5Awouldreleaseapproximately3.64E+15BqsofI-131and7.1E+13BqsofCs-137.165SeeTable20inAppendixAforadditionaldetails.TheenvironmentalreviewfoundthatthereleaseofCs-137causedlocalizedgroundcontaminationaroundthestation.ThissurprisedEmergencyManagementOntario(EMO)becausethecurrentplanningaccidentonlycontemplatesthereleaseofnoblecases.OPGrespondedtoEMO’sconcernsbystatingthatonlydesignbasisaccidents,whichhaveaprobabilityabove1E-5,areusedforemergencyplanning.Thus,EPRC5didnotmeetthecriteriafordetailedemergencyplanning.166Table21inAppendixAshowsthatOPGconsideredonlyFuelDamageCategories(FDC)3–8DesignBasisaccidents.ItisunclearhowEMOrespondedtoOPG’sposition.The2008PickeringBenvironmentalhighlightstwoongoingandworryingpatterns:First,OPGhashistoricallyarguedagainstplanningforlargeraccidents.Inlate1990s,itsupportedtheRSC/CAE’suseofthePickeringAriskassessmentwhenthefindingsoflargerreleaseswerehighlyimprobable.Adecadelater,OPGcuriouslyomittedmentionoftheRSC-CAErecommendationtoplanforaccidentsabove1E-7whenitsownPRAfoundanaccidentsequencemoreseverethanthecurrentplanningbasis.Instead,OPGassertedplanningoccursfordesign-basisaccidents.Aswillbediscussed,thesecondpatternisOPGreassessmentandmodificationofPRAresultswhentheyareinconvenient.Inlightofthesepatterns,GreenpeacefeelstheDiscussionPaper’sportrayalofindustryriskassessmentsasobjectiveandfactualisimprudent.2011DarlingtonRiskAssessment:Thisriskassessmentidentifiedtwoscenariosthatwouldmeetthecriteriafordetailedemergencyplanning.OnescenarioleadstoreleasesonparwithFukushimaandtheotherleadstolargebutearlyreleases.TheassessmentcharacterizedReleaseCategory1asa“[v]erylargereleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination.”Ithadanestimatedlikelihoodof4.90E-6,butOPGapplied“analyticalenhancements”toreducethelikelihoodto7.8E-07.DuringtheenvironmentalassessmentreviewofDarlington’sproposaltoextendtheoperationallivesoftheDarlingtonreactors,Greenpeaceallegedthese“analyticalenhancements”werecarriedouttoavoidhavingtheconsequencesofthisaccidentassessedintheenvironmentalreview.167Asnoted,OPGalsoreassessedthePickeringBPRAwhenitfoundalargereleaseaccidentshouldbeconsideredinanenvironmentalreview.Unliketheenvironmentalreviewofthelife-extensionofthePickeringBriskassessment,CNSCstaffdidquestionOPG’suseofanalyticalenhancementsorthefailuretoconsiderexternalevents.Notably,theseismicriskassessmentfoundalargereleasefrequencyover1E-6.SeeTable22in
165K.S.Dinnie(Director,NuclearSafetySolutions)toE.Marczak(OPG),“PickeringLifeExtensionProject:AccidentalAirandWaterborneReleaseforPickeringBEnvironmentalAssessment–EPRC5,letter,January19,2007,AcquiredthroughFreedomofInformation.166PatrickMcNeil(SeniorVicePresident,OPG)toT.Schaubel(Director,CNSC),“OPG’sResponsetoEmergencyManagementOntarioCommentsonthePickeringBfinalEnvironmentalAssessmentStudyReport,”letter,NK30-00531,April29,2008.AcquiredthroughFreedomofInformation.167SeeCommissionMemberDocument12-H13.181,SubmissionfromGreenpeaceCanada;AlsoseeCNSCCommissionHearingTranscripts,December5,2012,pgs.367–419.
59
AppendixA.ThishighlightshowtheCNSChasalsobeeninconsistentinitsoversightofindustry
PRAs.
Asnoted,98%oftheaccidentsequenceswithinReleaseCategory1isamulti-unitaccident.168This
explainsthelargecatastrophicradiationreleasesassociatedwiththisscenario.Theassessmentalso
foundonescenario,referredtoasReleaseCategory2,tobealargeandearlyofmorethan1E+14
BecquerelofCesium-137.Eventhoughthisscenariomeetsthecriteriafordetailedplanning,early
releasesarenotcontemplatedinOntario’sdetailedemergencyplans.SeeTable23ininAppendix
Aformoredetails.
Asdiscussed,thesourcetermforthisaccidentwasusedfortheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy,
whichisakeyreferencetotheDiscussionPaper.However,neithertheDiscussionPapernorthe
CNSC’sSevereAccidentStudyacknowledgesthatthisaccidentscenarioisanearlyrelease.169This
underminesthecredibilityofboththeDiscussionPaperandtheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy.
2013PickeringBRiskAssessment:Thisriskassessmentfoundtheestimatedlikelihoodof
catastrophicaccidentshadrisenbyfourlevelsofmagnitudesincethepreviousassessmentfor
PickeringBwasreleasedin2008.TheseChernobylscaleaccidentsmetthecriteriafordetailed
emergencyplanningrecommendedbytheRCA/CAE.
ReleaseCategory1hadanestimatedprobabilityof2.9E-06andisdescribedasfollows:“Largeearly
releasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination(greater
than3%coreinventoryof(I-131/Cs-137)”.170Thiswouldbeconsideredalevel7INESaccident.See
Table24inAppendixAforadditiondetails.
Thesignificantchangeinthefindingsbetweenthe2008and2013PickeringBriskassessments
highlightsthesignificantuncertaintyinherentinindustryriskassessment.Thisuncertaintyisnot
acknowledgedintheDiscussionPaper.Indeed,theDiscussionPaperonlyusedtheword
uncertaintyoncewhencitingaHealthCanadastudy.171
DuringCNSChearingsin2013onOPG’sapplicationtocontinueoperatingthePickeringnuclear
station,Greenpeacehighlightedthattheriskposedbythestationwasmuchhigherthanpreviously
thought.GreenpeacealsonotedthatthefindingsoftheOPG’smostrecentriskstudiesrequired
OPGtoinvestinriskreductionmeasuresaccordingtoitsownpolicies.172NeithertheCNSCnorOPG
hadacknowledgedthisintheirsubmissions.
CNSCstaffrespondedtoGreenpeace’sconcernsbysimplyassertingthatrecentenhancementsin
responsetotheFukushimadisasterwouldreducethelikelihoodofanaccidentby10to100times.
Staffprovidednoevidenceforthisduringthehearings.CNSCstaffdidnotacknowledgeorexplain
168
YolandeAkletal.,DiscussionPaperonSafetyGoals–Stage1:AnalyzeIssue,ProbabilisticSafetyAssessmentandReliabilityDivision,March2013.169
Seepage34ofDiscussionPaperwhereitacknowledgesthatthesourcetermoftheaccidentassessedintheCNSC’s
SevereAccidentStudy“…ofasimilarmagnitudetoapostulatedaccidentwithafrequencyof3.74x10-7”.Thisisthe
probabilityofReleaseCategory2,whichisalsoanearlyrelease.170
OPG,PickeringBRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,NK30-REP-03611-00021-R000,February2014.171
DiscussionPaper,pg.37.172
See:CommissionMemberDocument13-H2.119,SubmissionfromGreenpeaceCanada.
60
whythelikelihoodoflargereleasehadincreasedbyafactorofathousand.173InGreenpeace’sview,
thisisanexampleoftheCanadianregulator“disowning”riskassessmentinformationwhen
challengesorthodoxy.
InresponsetoGreenpeace’ssubmissiontheCommissiondirectedOPGto“…provideanactionplan
toaddressanyidentifiedissuesshouldOPGexceeditstargetedsafetygoals.”Greenpeacealso
highlightedthatthecurrentapproachtoriskassessmentdoesnotconsidertheaggregateriskof
multi-unitnuclearstationslikePickering.Asaresult,theCommissiondirectedOPGtodevelop“…a
whole-sitePSAoramethodologyforawhole-sitePSA,specifictothePickeringNGSsite.”Notably,
theCNSC’sformalreviewoftheFukushimaaccidentfailedtoidentifythesinglereactorapproachto
riskassessmentasproblematicoranunderestimateofrisk.Despitethis,anewapproachtoassess
site-wideriskhasyettobedeveloped.TheDiscussionPaperfailstoacknowledgethisweaknessin
currentPRAmethodology.ThisissignificantgivenallofOntario’sreactorsaremulti-unitstations.174
2014PickeringARiskAssessment:Thisriskassessmentfoundascenariothatleadstocatastrophic
releaseswithinthefirsttwentyhoursthatmeetthecriteriafordetailedplanning.ThisriskassessmentwasonlyreleasedduetoaformalproceduralrequestmadebyGreenpeaceduring
aforementioned2013licencerenewalhearings.175Itshowsasignificantincreaseinthelikelihoodof
majoraccidencesinceRSC/CAEreviewedthe1995PickeringAriskassessment.
ReleaseCategory1hasanestimatedlikelihoodof4.69E-6andisdescribedasa“Largeearlyrelease
withpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination”.Release
Category1alsoleadstothereleaseof3%ofthecoreinventoryofiodineandcaesium.176Thiswould
bealevel7INESaccident.SeeTable25inAppendixAforadditionaldetails.AsshowninTable6in
Section1.6oflarge–andearly–radioactivereleaseshasincreasedbyfourlevelsofmagnitude
sincethe1995PickeringriskassessmentusedbytheRSC/CAEduringthelastreviewofnuclear
emergencyplanning.ThisisnotacknowledgedintheDiscussionPaper.
2013BruceARiskAssessment:The2013BruceAriskassessmentalsoshowedasignificantincrease
inthelikelihoodofmajoraccidentscomparedtothepreviousPRA.ReleaseCategory0andRelease
Category2releaseapproximately8.5E-16BqofI-131.Theirrespectiveestimatedfrequenciesare
2.90E-6and6.72-06.177TheBruceAriskassessmentdescribesReleaseCategory0sequenceasa
“…severecoredamageatallfourreactorsmoreorlesssimultaneously.Thesesequencesare
predictedtoresultincontainmentfailureswithin24hoursoftheinitiationoftheaccidentsequences.”
178
Similartothefindingsofthe2013PickeringBriskassessment,therevisedBruceAprobability
estimatedwouldtypicallyrequireBrucePowertoinvestinsystemupgrades.BrucePower
respondedtothisbyassertingthatthepost-Fukushimaenhancements–referredtoasEmergency
MitigatingEquipment(EMEs)-wouldreducethelikelihoodofsuchaccidentsbyuptoafactorof10.
173
CNSCPublicHearingTranscripts,May30,2013,Pickering,Ontario,Pgs.284–336.174
CNSC,RecordofDecision,includingReasonsforDecision,intheMatterofOPG’sApplicationtorenewthePower
OperatingLicenceforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation,August2013,pg.23.175
Ibid,pg.23.176
OPG,PickeringARiskAssessmentSummaryReport,NA44-REP-03611-00036-R000,April2014.177
BrucePower,BruceALevel2At-PowerInternalEventsRiskAssessment,NK21-03611.5,December2013,pg.319178
BrucePower,BruceLevel2At-PowerInternalEventsRiskAssessment,December2013,NK21-03611.5PNSAS,pg.319.
61
Notably,evenwithEMEsmanyofthesevereaccidentsequenceswouldstillmeetthecriteriafordetailedplanningrecommendedbytheRSA/CAEinthe1990s.SeeTable26inAppendixAforadditionaldetails.2015BruceBRiskAssessment:The2015BruceBriskassessmentalsofoundthelikelihoodoflargereleaseshadincreasedsignificantly.ReleaseCategories1and2wouldreleasemorethan3%ofareactor’sinventoryofI-131orapproximately8.88E+16Bqofradioiodine.Thesecategorieshavefrequencies4.71E-06and4.97E-07respectively.SeeTable27inAppendixAforadditionaldetails.Again,BrucePowerassertedthefrequencieswereinfactlowerduetotheuseofEMEs.Thesefrequencies,however,stilldonotconsiderthecontributionofexternaleventstoaccidentrisk.Italsodoesnotexplainwhythemorerecentrisksassessmentsfoundmajoraccidentstobemorelikelythanpreviouslythought.2015DarlingtonRiskAssessment:In2015OPGreleasedanupdatedriskassessmentfortheDarlingtonnuclearstationtosupportitsapplicationtorebuildandextendtheoperationoftheplant.Notably,thebaselinereleaseestimatesinthisriskassessmentallassumedEMEcredit.Table28intheAppendixAcomparestheresultsofthe2012and2015Darlingtonriskassessments.GreenpeacerequestedOPGprovidereleasecategoryestimateswithandwithoutEMEcreditasBrucePowerhaddoneinits2014risksummaryreport.179OPGrespondedthatinitslevel2internaleventsriskassessment“…thecasewithnoEMEorSIOsisonlyasensitivitycase.Assuch,theresultsorthissensitivitycasewerenotderivedonanindividualreleasecategorybasis.TheLRFwithoutEMEorSIOsis1.5*10-6occurrencesperreactoryear.”180ItappearsthatthepushtohaveEMEcreditsreducereleasefrequenciessincehassignificantlychangedthemethodologiesandverifiabilityofCanadianprobabilisticriskassessments.Aswillbediscussedinthenextsection,CNSCstaffinternallyreferredtoReleaseCategory1ashavinganestimatedlikelihoodof4.7E-6in2015inbriefingspreparedfortheCNSC’sExecutiveCommittee.181ThisisdifferentthantheprobabilityestimatesOPGhaspubliclyusedforthisscenario.2015InternalCNSCAssessmentofStationBlackoutScenarios:AttherequestoftheCNSC’sExecutiveCommittee,CNSCstaffassessedstationblackoutscenariosattheBruceandDarlingtonstationsin2015.Itconcluded“…alargereleaseoffissionproducts,inparticularradioactivecaesium,canoccurwithinthefirst24hoursforBruce.”ItconcludedasimilarscenarioatDarlington“…wouldhavethelargestofreleasesataround60hours.”182Table27belowfromtheCNSCExecutiveBriefingshowtheseknownaccidentscenarios,whichmeettheRCA/CAEcriteriafordetailedplanning,tohavereleasesonparwithChernobylandFukushima.
179S-PStensiltoR.Manely,“InformationrequestforadditionalProbabilisticRiskAssessmentestimates”,letter,August13,2015.180MemorandumtoGreenpeace,“ResponsetoRequestfromGreenpeaceforInformationfromDarlingtonNGSProbabilisticSafetyAssessment”September10,2015,N-CORR-03611-0562767LOF181BriefingforthePresident,SevereAccidentProgressionWithoutOperatorAction,August24,2015,EDoc#:4811602,pg.6.182Ibid.
62
Table29–ComparisonofStationBlackoutScenariosatBruceBandDarlington
SignificantEvents BruceBTiming
DarlingtonTiming
Cs-137andI-131Release(%ofCoreInventory)
Cs-137Release(Bq)
I-131Release(Bq)
CorecollapsesFirststageofreleasetothe
atmosphere5.9 10.7
BruceB:2.1%DNGS:0.2%
BruceB:5.3E+15DNGS:5.2E+14
BruceB:2.4E+17DNGS:2.3E+16
Shieldtanksidewallmeltsthrough.
CoriumrelocatestotheFuellingMachineDuct.Limitedcoreconcrete
interactionoccursbeforethecoriumisquenched.
Secondstageofreleasetotheatmosphere
18.9 25.0
BruceB:9.2%DNGS:0.7%
BruceB:2.3E+16DNGS:1.8E+15
BruceB:1.1E+18DNGS:8.2E+16
CoriumbecomesuncoveredintheFuellingMachineDuct.
Moltencoreconcreteinteractionresumes.
Thirdstageofreleasetotheatmosphere.
33.3 58.3
BruceB:11%DNGS:8%
BruceB:2.8E+16DNGS:2.1E+16
BruceB:
1.3E+18DNGS:9.3E+17
2.3Implications:ThechangingunderstandingofCANDUreactorrisksAlthoughtheDiscussionPaperrepeatedlyappealstorecentreactorenhancementstojustifymaintainingcurrentemergencyresponseplans,itdoesnotmentionhowrecentPRAshavefoundmajoraccidentstobemuchmorelikelythanpreviouslythought.InGreenpeace’sview,thisindicatesabiasedandselectiveuseofriskassessmentinformation.Indeed,whilereactoroperatorsandtheCNSChaveassertedthatpostFukushimaenhancementswillreducethelikelihoodofanaccidentbyafactorof10or100,industryriskestimateshaveshownthelikelihoodofsucheventstohaveincreasedbyafactorof1000.AlthoughaccidentsonparwithbothFukushimaandChernobylhavemetthecriteriafordetailedplanningrecommendedbytheRSC/CAEinthe1990s,GreenpeacehasfoundnoevidencetoshowthatOFEMEMhasseriouslyconsideredthesescenarios.ThishighlightsbothhoweasyitistomodifyPRAresultsifinconvenientandthesignificantuncertaintiesinherentinsuchriskassessments.What’smore,thispatternofselectivelyusingriskassessmentinformationisinlinewithDr.JohnDowner’sobservationthatreactoroperatorsandnuclearregulatorsfindjustificationsto“disown”inconvenientriskassessmentinformation.InGreenpeace’sview,thiscallsforamoreprecautionaryapproachtonuclearemergencyresponse.2.4Canada’sReviewofEmergencyPreparednesssinceFukushimaSimilartoChernobyl,theFukushimaaccidentshouldhaveinitiatedatransparentassessmentofwhetherthecurrentlimitsondetailedemergencypreparednessmeasuresarestillappropriate.However,sinceFukushimafederal,provincialsafetyauthoritiesandreactoroperatorshaveshowna
63
patternofavoidinganopenandrigorousassessmentoftheadequacyofoffsiteemergency
measuresagainstaFukushima-scaleradiationrelease.
DespitemisleadingassertionsfromtheCNSC,therehasbeennopublicassessmentofthe
consequencesofaFukushima-scaleaccident.Thishasdeprivedthepublicanddecision-makersof
keyinformationontheriskofcontinuingtooperateeighteenreactorsinOntario.
March11,2011–Anearthquakeandtsunamitriggeranaccidentleadstoradiationreleasesfrom
threereactorsattheFukushimaDaiichinuclearstation.Theaccidentreleasesapproximately
1.6E+17ofIodine-131.TheFukushimareleasesareovertwentytimeslargerthantheaccident
previouslychosenasa“blueprint”forOntario’ssevereaccidentplanning.
March20,2011–HearingsonOPG’sproposaltobuildnewreactorsattheDarlingtonnuclearstationbegindespiterequestsfromcivilsocietyorganizationstodelaythehearingstoprovidetime
tolearnlessonsfromtheFukushimadisaster.InlinewithCNSCpolicy,theenvironmental
assessmentdoesnotassesstheconsequencesofaFukushima-scaleaccidentbecauseindustry
expertssucheventstobetoo“improbable.”TheabilityofOntario’semergencyresponseplansto
copewithsuchalargeaccidentwasnotassessed.Theaccidentconsideredwithinthe
environmentalassessment,whichwasreferredtoasa“SafetyGoalRelease”(SGB)assumes1E+15
BqofI-131isreleasedintotheenvironment.Asdiscussed,thisreleasealsoendedupservingasthe
basisfortheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy.
However,initsfinalreportinAugust2011theJointReviewPanelrecommendsOPGberequired
“…toevaluatethecumulativeeffectofacommon-causesevereaccidentinvolvingallofthenuclear
reactorsinthesitestudyareatodetermineiffurtheremergencymeasuresarerequired.”183This
hasnotoccurred.October2011-TheCNSC’sFukushimaTaskForce’sobserved“…itmaybeusefulforthe
environmentalassessmentprocesstoincludeconsiderationofsevereaccidents,shouldthisbe
regardedasresponsivetopublicconcerns”.184TheCNSC’sexclusionofmajoraccidentsfrom
environmentalassessmentshasbeenalong-standingcomplaintofcivilsocietyorganizations.
May2012–InresponsetotheCNSC’sFukushimaTaskForcereport,Greenpeaceaskedforthe
CNSCtochangeitspolicyofwithholdinginformationontheconsequencesofmajoraccidentsfrom
thepublic.185Thisincludedexpandingthescopeoftheenvironmentalassessmentontheproposed
life-extensionoftheDarlingtonnuclearstationtoincludesevereaccidents.Greenpeacealso
requestedtheCommissionexpandthescopeofitsreviewoftheFukushimadisastertoinclude
regulatorcapture.TheCommissionrefused.
November2012-DuringhearingsontheenvironmentalreviewofOPG’sproposaltoextendthe
operationallivesoftheDarlingtonreactors,hundredsofcitizensaskforanassessmentofthe
impactsofaFukushima-scaleaccidentatDarlington.GreenpeacespecificallyhighlightedRelease
183
JointReviewPanel–DarlingtonNewNuclearPowerPlantProject,EnvironmentalAssessmentReport,August2011,Reportpg.vi.184
CNSC,FukushimaTaskForceReportDraft,(October2011)pg.56.185
Shawn-PatrickStensil,GreenpeaceCommentsontheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommission’sResponsetoFukushima,April2,2012,CMD12-M23.8.
64
Category1intheDarlington2012riskassessmentasaknownandrealisticaccidentscenariothatcouldcausesignificantoffsiteimpacts.Duringthehearings,CNSCstaffadmittedtheycouldhaveassessedsuchaccidents,buthadsimplydecidednottodoso.Onthelastdayofthe2012hearings,CNSCstaffcommittedtopublishananalysisofalargereleasebeforethecurrenthearings.ThiscommitmentwouldbecometheSevereAccidentStudydiscussedintheDiscussionPaper.April2013–FollowingaprivatemeetingwithOPG,CNSCstaffacceptedthecompany’srecommendationfortheaccidenttobeassessedinCNSC’stheSevereAccidentStudy.Asdiscussed,thisrecommendedsourcetermhasalsobeenusedinHealthCanada’s2017ARGOsstudy.(SeeTable13inSection1.20foracomparisonofsourceterms.)OPGrecommendedCommissionstaffusea“Goldilocks”approachtoselectinganaccidentforitssevereaccidentstudy.Thatis,“nottoobig,nottoosmall,justright.”186Specifically,OPGrecommendedthestudyusethesameaccidentalreleasescenariothatOPGusedfortheenvironmentalreviewfornewreactorsatDarlington.OPGmayhaveconsideredthisreleasescenarioas“justright”becauseitwaseffectivelythesameasthe“blueprint”(EPRC-3)accidenttheprovinceselectedforsevereaccidentplanning.Thisscenariowouldthusnotputinquestionanycurrentemergencymeasures.ItwasalsoeffectivelythesameastheaccidentreviewedintheenvironmentalassessmentofOPG’sproposaltobuildnewreactorsattheDarlingtonsite.However,OPGdidrecommendanadditional“sensitivity”casewithreleasestentimeslargerthancurrentblueprintforemergencyresponse.ThiswasareasonablepropositionbecausetheestimatedemissionswithinaReleaseCategorycanvarybyafactoroften.187Nevertheless,thissensitivitycasewasstilltentimessmallerthantheFukushimaaccident.CNSCstaffacceptedOPG’srecommendations. October2013–OPG,theCNSCandEmergencyManagementOntario(EMO)meettodiscusstheSevereAccidentStudy.Atthemeeting,OPGstatedthestudy’sobjectivewas“todetermineiftheexistingemergencyplansandcountermeasuresinplacetodayprotectthepublicfromtheconsequencesofpotentialoff-siteBeyondDesignbasis(BDB)/Severeaccidents.”OPGsaysthestudyfindstheprovince’semergencyplansprovide“appropriatecountermeasuresandaregenerallyprotective.”188January2014–CNSCmanagementreviewadraftoftheSevereAccidentStudyandaskforthesensitivitycasetoberemovedfromthepublicreleaseofthestudy.FrancoisRinfret,DirectoroftheDarlingtonRegulatoryProgramDivision,toldcolleagues“…thisdocumentwouldbeusedmalevolent-lyinapublichearing.”Herequestedthe“sensitivitycase”,whichwastentimesthesizeofthebaselinerelease,butstillsmallerthanFukushima,toberemovedfromthestudy.CNSC
186JohnPeterstoFredDermarkaretal.,“MinutesofSARPmeetingwithCNSC–April2013”,email,April9,2013,9:26pm.AcquiredthroughFreedomofInformation.187BrucePower,BruceALevel2At-PowerInternalEventsRiskAssessment,NK21-03611.5,December2013,pg.77.188OPG,OverviewofOPG’sapproachtoOff-SiteConsequenceAssessmentarisingfroma“SevereAccident–OPG–EMO–CNSCmeetingOctober16,2016”,presentation.AcquiredthroughFreedomofInformation.
65
directorGregRzentkowskitheearlyreleasescenarioswereremovedfromthestudyreleasedtothepublic.189AswillbediscussedinSection2.4,thesuppressedsensitivitycaseshowedapotentialneedtoexpandemergencymeasures.Forexample,radiationlevelswouldbehighenoughtorequireKIconsumption20kmfromthereactorandshelteringcouldberequiredasfaras40kmfromthestation.ThereleaseofthestudywasdelayedfromFebruarytoJune2014.February2014–EMOstaffaskedstafffromtheMinistryofEnergytoundertakeastudyrelatedto“thescientificbasisofthePNERP”.TheMinistryofEnergyhasrefusedtoreleasethisdocumenttoGreenpeacethroughFreedomofInformation,citingcabinetconfidence.AvailableinformationindicatestheMinistryofEnergyadoptedOPGrecommendedaccidentscenariosforassessment.190AlthoughthegovernmenthastoldtheOfficeoftheInformationCommissionerthatthisanalysiswillinformeventualcabinetrecommendationsforarevisedPNERP,itisnotcitedintheDiscussionPaper.ThisindicatesthatthepublichasbeendeprivedofriskrelatedinformationthathasalreadyinformedtheDiscussionPaper’srecommendations.June2014–TheCNSCreleaseditsdraftreportStudyofConsequencesofaHypotheticalSevereNuclearAccidentandEffectivenessofMitigationMeasures.Theoriginalsensitivitycasewasreplacedbyareleaseonly4timeslargerthanthebaselinerelease.Inthepublicstudy,CNSCstaffassertedthatincreasingthesourcetermwastoaddressthepossibilityofanaccidentatallfourDarlingtonreactors.Duetothesmallsourceterm,thisstudydidnotrespondtotheconcernsGreenpeaceraisedduringthe2012Darlingtonhearings.November2015–OFMEMrequestedcommentonadraftdiscussionpapertoindustrystakeholderssuchasOPGandBrucePowerentitled“PNERPPlanningBasisReview&Recommendations”.Althoughnotpubliclyavailable,CNSCdocumentsobtainedthroughAccesstoInformationindicatethatthestudyreliesontheCNSC’ssevereaccidentstudytoassesstheadequacyofoffsiteemergencypreparedness.191TheDiscussionPaperconcludesthereisnoneedtoexpandoffsiteemergencymeasures.November2015–Athearingstoapprovethelife-extensionoftheDarlingtonnuclearstation,hundredsofcitizenscomplainaboutthelackofinformationonaFukushima-scaleaccident.CNSCstaffassertthestudyfulfilspublicexpectationsbecausethedoseprojectionsinthestudyaresimilarinmagnitudetothedosesobservedfollowingFukushimaaccident.CivilsocietygroupsandconcernedcitizensoverwhelminglyrejectthisCNSCmisleadingportrayalofpublicexpectations.December2015–Followingthe2015Darlingtonhearings,OFMEM’sDirectorofPreventionandRiskmanagementwritestotheCNSCtoaskforassistancewiththeemergencyreview.Mr.SulemannotedthattheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy“validated”thecurrentplanningbasis.However,hesaidit“…hasnowbeenbroughttohisattentionthatamoreappropriatebasisforsevereaccidentdoseconsequenceswould,infact,betheProbabilisticSafetyAssessment(PSA)studiespreparedby189GregRzentkowskitoAndrewMcAllisteretal.,“RE:UpdateonStudyofConsequencesofaSevereNuclearAccident,”email,January7,2014,3:02.AcquiredthroughAccesstoInformation.190GreenpeacehasfiledsupportingevidencewiththeOfficeoftheInformationCommissioneraspartofappealNo.PA14-543191InternalcorrespondenceinwhichCNSCstaffdiscussedthereferencetotheMinistryofEnergy’ssevereaccidentmodellinginthe2015draftDiscussionPaperwasobtainedthroughCNSCAccesstoInformationrequestA-2015-0148.
66
thenucleargeneratingstudies.Giventhatweneitherhaveaccesstothesestudies,nordowehavethein-houseresourcestoscientificallyassesstheminatimelymanner,wekindlyrequestCNSCresourcesbemadeavailabletoprovideOFMEMwiththedistanceversusdoseconsequencesandprobabilityoftheapplicablePSAsforPickering,DarlingtonandBruce.”192Thisisasignificantadmissioninlightoftheforegoingdiscussiononthefindingsofindustryriskassessmentssincethe1990s.ItappearsOFMEMwasnotawarethatitshouldreviewPRAfindingstoassesstheadequacyofnuclearemergencyresponse.ItisunclearwhethertheCNSCdidprovidemodellingonDarlington,BruceandPickeringtoOFMEM.May2017–OFMEMreleasedaDiscussionPaperonProvincialNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan(PNERP):PlanningBasisReviewandRecommendationsforpubliccomment.TheDiscussionPaperreliesheavilyontheCNSC’ssevereaccidentstudytosupportitsrecommendations.Italsocitesanew2017studyproducedHealthCanada.TheHealthCanadastudy,whichusesmoresophisticatedclimatemodelling,useseffectivelythesamesourcetermastheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy.TheHealthCanadastudyalsonotesthattheCNSChasprovidedanewsourcetermtoOFMEMforsuggesteduseinemergencyplanning.193ThissourcetermisnotmodelledintheHealthCanadastudyordiscussionintheDiscussionPaper.TheDiscussionPaperrecommendsagainststrengtheningnuclearemergencypreparedness.2.5Implications:Canada’sReviewofEmergencyPreparednesssinceFukushimaDespitereal-worldexperienceandthefindingsofindustryriskassessmentssincethe1990s,federalandprovincialauthoritieshaveavoidedevaluatingtheoffsiteimpactsofaccidentsofanyaccidentscenarioswithaseveritysignificantlygreaterthanEPRC-3,whichwaschosenbytheOntariogovernmentin2002asa“blueprint”forasevereaccident.Table28belowcomparestheIodidne-131fromreleasesfrompubliclyavailableassessmentandassessmentsthathaveeitherbeensuppressedbytheCNSCorneverundertaken.Table30:Comparison1-131ReleaseScenarios
PubliclyAvailableAssessments AssessmentsnotAvailabletothePublicOntario’s“Blueprint”
SevereAccidentEPRC-3
CNSC’sSevereAccidentRelease
CNSC’sPublicSevereAccident
SensitivityRelease
CNSC’sSupressed
SevereAccidentRelease
FukushimaRelease
ReleasefromRelease
Category1atBruceA
3.86E+15 4.4E+15 1.7E+16 4.4E+16 1.6E+17 1E+18
192Al.Suleman(OFMEM)toT.Jamieson,letter,December18,2015.AcquiredthroughAccesstoInformation.193L.Bergman,etal.,ARGOSModellingofAccidentAandAccidentBScenarios,HealthCanadaandEnvironmentandClimateChangeCanada,May15,2017.
67
AsdiscussedinSection1.8,Germany194andSwitzerland195havecarriedoutopenevaluationsofFukushima-scaleaccidentsattheirnuclearstationssince2011.Thesereviewshaverecommendedexpandingoffsiteemergencymeasures.InCanada,however,theCNSCandOPGhaveactedinunisontoavoidanypublicassessmentofsuchaccidentscenarios.Meanwhile,OFMEMhastakendirectionfromboththeCNSCandOPG.ForGreenpeace,thecoordinatedactionsoftheCNSC,OPGandOFMEMraisequestionsabouttheindependenceofpublicsafetyauthoritiesinCanada.ItalsoshowsaneedfornewmechanismsftoenablethepublictoscrutinizeandchallengethepotentiallyfaultybeliefsandrationalesofOFMEMandtheCNSC.InGreenpeace’sview,thereisaneedtobothplanforlargeraccidentsandempowercitizenstoensurepublicauthoritiesconsiderpublicexpectationsforsafety.2.6TheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy:WhatwashiddenfromCanadians?Sinceitsrelease,theprovincehascitedtheCNSC’sStudyofConsequencesofaHypotheticalSevereNuclearAccidentandEffectivenessofMitigationMeasurestoconcludethatcurrentoffsitemeasuresareadequate.Asnoted,however,thereferenceaccidentusedinthestudyiseffectivelythesameaccidenttheprovinceusedasa“blueprint”(EPRC-3)forcurrentsevereaccidentplanning.Itis,then,notsurprisingthatthestudyconcludescurrentoffsitemeasuresareadequateandrobust.Inshort,thestudydidnotrespondtopublicrequestsforoffsiteemergencymeasurestobestresstestedagainstaFukushima-scaleaccident.Asdiscussed,CNSCmanagementbelievedthatthesensitivitycase,whichwasstilltentimessmallerthanFukushima,wouldbeused“malevolently”bythepublic.196WhatterrordidCNSCmanagementfear?ItappearsthatCNSCmanagementfearedpubliccallstoexpandoffsitenuclearemergencymeasures.AlthoughtheCNSCwithheldtheoriginalsensitivitycasefromthepublicreport,theydidincludeasmallersensitivitycasefourtimeslargerthanthebaselinerelease.Thebaselineandsensitivitycaseshowpublicdoseestimatesincreaselinearlyinproportiontothescaleofreleases.ItisthuspossibletoextrapolatefromtheresultsofthepublicstudytodeterminewhatCNSCstafffearedwouldbeused“malevolently”.TheTable31belowcomparestheresultsoftheCNSC’spublicreport,whichconfirmtheadequacyofcurrentoffsitemeasures,tothesupressedsensitivitycaseandtoanevenlargerFukushimascalerelease,whichiswhatthepublicintervenorshavecalledforsince2011.Table31–ComparisonofPublicandSupressedSARPScenarios
194TheFederalOfficeforRadiationProtection,RODOS-basedsimulationofpotentialaccidentscenariosforemergencyresponsemanagementinthevicinityofnuclearpowerplants,June2015195InspectionfédéraledelasécuriténucléaireIFSN,Examendesscénariosderéférencepourlaplanificationd’urgenceauvoisinagedescentralesnucléaires,2013.196AndrewMcAllister,toJulieBurttetal.,“FORREVIEW:DraftStudyoftheConsequencesofaSevereNuclearAccidentandassociatedCMD14-M5,”email,December9,2013,4:56PM.AcquiredthroughAccesstoInformation.
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DosemSv
24-24(1) 24-24*4(2) 24-24*10 Fukushima*23
Distance
from
Plant
Whole
BodyThyroid
Whole
BodyThyroid
Whole
BodyThyroid
Whole
BodyThyroid
1 25.4 431 101.6 1724 250 4310 575 99133 4.5 70.7 18 282.8 45 407 103.5 1626.16 1.75 26.7 7 106.8 17.5 276 40.25 614.112 0.67 9.82 2.68 39.28 6.7 98.2 15.41 225.8620 0.31 4.4 1.24 17.6 3.1 44 7.13 101.228 0.18 2.49 0.72 9.96 1.8 24.9 4.14 57.2736 0.13 1.75 0.52 7 1.3 17.5 2.99 40.25
50 0.07 0.95 0.28 3.8 0.7 9.5 1.61 21.85
70 0.04 0.52 0.16 2.08 0.4 5.2 0.92 11.96
90 0.03 0.39 0.12 1.56 0.3 3.9 0.69 8.97
Bold=greaterthanthePNERP’slowerProtectiveActionLevel(PAL)forevacuationof10mSv;italicsgreater
thanthePNERP’slowerPALforShelteringof1mSv;50mSvPALforthyroidblocking.
1)TakenfromTable6.1oftheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy(pg.46).
2)TakenfromTable6.2oftheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy(pg.47).
TheaccidentscenarioremovedfrombyCNSCmanagementshowsanexpansionofemergency
measureswouldbeadvisedtoaddressaccidentstentimessmallerthanFukushima.Insucha
scenario:
• EvacuationwouldberequiredfortheentirePrimaryZone.Detailedplanningforsucha
scenarioisalreadyinplace.
• KIconsumptioncouldberequiredoutto20km.KIiscurrentlyonlypre-distributedto
residentswithinthe10kmprimaryzone.
• KIconsumptioncouldberequiredforvulnerablecommunities,childrenandpregnant
women,outto40km.Itisunclearwhatplanningtheprovincehasputinplaceto
rapidlydistributeKIwithin50kmofOntarionuclearstations.
• Shelteringcouldberequiredoutto40km.
BasedontheCNSC’smethodology,aFukushima-sizedaccidentwouldrequireasignificant
expansioninpre-preparedemergencymeasures.Insuchascenario:
• Evacuationwouldlikelyrequiredoutto20km.Thereiscurrentlynodetailed
preparationforsuchanevacuation.
• KIconsumptionrequiredto30km.KIiscurrentlyonlypre-distributedtoresidents
withinthe10kmprimaryzone.
• KIconsumptioncouldberequiredforvulnerablecommunitiesoutto50km.Itis
unclearwhatplanningtheprovincehasputinplacetorapidlydistributeKIwithin50km
ofOntarionuclearstations.
• Shelteringrequiredoutto60km.Thisexceedsthecurrent50kmSecondaryZone.
69
3.ConclusionInthissubmission,Greenpeacesetouttoanswerthefollowingquestion:
DoestheDiscussionPaper’srecommendedupperlimitfordetailedplanningandpreparednessprovideadequatesafetymarginsconsideringreal-wordexperience,thepublic’sexpectationsforsafetyaswellastheuniquehazardsassociatedwiththelocationofOntario’snuclearstationsonboththeGreatLakesandinthedenselypopulatedGreaterTorontoArea?
Theansweris‘no.’Safetymarginsareameansofcompensatingforuncertainty.Inspiteofrealworldoccurrenceofnuclearaccidents,theDiscussionPaperreliesexclusivelyonindustryriskstudiestojustifyitsrecommendations.InGreenpeace’sview,Ontariomustabandonitsprobabilisticapproachtonuclearemergencyplanningandreplaceitwithaprecautionaryanddeterministicapproach.Thatis,theOntariogovernmentshouldselectanupdatedplanningbasisaccidentbyconsideringbestpractices,publicexpectations,real-worldexperienceaswellasinsightsfromindustrytechnicalassessments.TheDiscussionPaperfailstoconsiderrealworldexperienceorpublicexpectationsforsafety.Thegovernmentshouldthereforerejectitsrecommendationtomaintainthehistoricplanningbasisaccident.InsteaditshouldataminimummatchtheprecedentsetbySwitzerlandandputinplacemeasurestoprotectOntariansintheeventofalevel7INESaccidentatanyofthetwenty-fivereactorsthatlinetheGreatLakes.
70
AppendixA
Table1–InternationalNuclearEventScale(INES)
INESScale Description
EquivalentinIodine
131
Lower
Limit
Upper
Limit
7
MajorAccident
Widespreadhealthand
environmentaleffects.External
releaseofasignificantfractionof
reactorcoreinventory.Long-term
environmentalconsequences.
5*1016
-
6
SeriousAccident
Likelythatprotectiveactionsuchas
shelteringandevacuationwillbe
judgednecessarytopreventorlimit
healtheffectsonmembersofthe
public.
5*1015
5*1016
5
Accidentwith
Wider
Consequences
Someprotectiveactionwill
probablyberequired(e.g.localized
shelteringand/orevacuationto
preventorminimizethelikelihood
ofhealtheffects).
5*1014
5*1015
4
Accidentwith
Local
Consequences
Protectiveactionwillprobablynot
berequired,otherthanlocalfood
controls.
5*1013
5*1014
1-3 Nolimits
(1)InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,TheInternationalNuclearandRadiologicalEventScale:User’sManual,2008Edition.Availableat:http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/INES2009_web.pdf
Table2–MultiunitLargeReleaseScenarios
PRA
ReleaseCategory# Description
ReleaseFrequencywithoutexternal
events2011
Darlington
PRA
ReleaseCategory1
Verylargereleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination. 4.90E-006
2013
PickeringB
PRA
Release
Category1
Largeearlyreleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsite
radiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination
(greaterthan3%coreinventoryof(I-131/Cs-137)
2.9E-6
2014
PickeringA
PRA
Release
Category1
Largeearlyreleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsite
radiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination
(greaterthan3%coreinventoryofI-131/Cs-137)
4.69E-6
2013BruceA
PRA
Release
Category0
Earlyverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryofI-131
occurringmainlyafter24hours.2.9E-6
71
2013BruceAPRA
ReleaseCategory1
Lateverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryofI-131occurringmainlyafter24hours.
2.45E-7
2015BruceBPRA
ReleaseCategory0
Earlyverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryof1-131occurringmainlyafter24hours.
4.71E-06
2015BruceBPRA
ReleaseCategory1
Lateverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryofI-131occurringmainlyafter24hours.
4.96E-07
Table3–RecentEarlyReleasesScenarios
PRA
ReleaseCategory# Description
ReleaseFrequencywithoutexternal
events2011
DarlingtonPRA
ReleaseCategory2
Earlyreleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“LargeRelease”ofmorethan1014BecquerelofCesium-137.
3.70E-007
2013PickeringB
PRA
ReleaseCategory1
Largeearlyreleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination(greaterthan3%coreinventoryof(I-131/Cs-137)
2.9E-6
2014PickeringA
PRA
ReleaseCategory1
Largeearlyreleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination(greaterthan3%coreinventoryofI-131/Cs-137)
4.69E-6
2013BruceAPRA
ReleaseCategory0
Earlyverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryofI-131occurringmainlyafter24hours.
2.9E-6
2015BrueBPRA
ReleaseCategory0
Earlyverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryof1-131occurringmainlyafter24hours.
4.71E-06
Table4-PickeringAEx-PlantReleaseCategories1995
Ex-PlantReleaseCategory
ReleaseFrequency
(RY)Description(2)
EPRC1 4E-10Alargeunfilteredreleasefromcontainmentintheperiod0-24hoursafteraccidentinitiation.Thereleaseoccursthroughapre-existingopeninginthecontainmentenvelope.
EPRC2 5.9E-9Alarge,unfilteredreleasefromcontainmentintheperiod6-24hoursafteraccidentsinitiation.ScenariosareverysimilartoEPRC1exceptthatthereisnopre-existingopeninginthecontainmentenvelope.
EPRC3 9.4E-8Anunfilteredreleasefromcontainmentinaperiod1dayto1monthafteraccidentinitiation.ManyoftheeventsequencesinEPRC3involvealatecontainmentfailureduetoahydrogenexplosion.
EPRC4 2.2E-8
Areleasefromcontainmentintheperiod0-6hoursafteraccidentinitiation.Thereleaseoccursthroughapre-existingopeninginthecontainmentenvelope.ManyoftheeventsequencesinEPRC4aresimilartothoseinEPRC1,butthereleaseissmallerbecausesomeofthecontainmentsubsystemsareoperational,mitigatingthedrivingforcesandfilteringtherelease.
EPRC5 1.8E-8Areleasethroughtheheattransportsystemtotheexternalenvironment,bypassingcontainment.Typicalreleasepathwaysinvolvefailureofsteamgeneratortubes,orblowbackthroughtheemergencycoolantinjectionsystem.
72
EPRC6 2.6E-7
Earlyreleasewithinafewsecondoftheaccident,butshortinduration.SequencecouldinvolveaLossofCoolantAccident(LOCA)withsubsequencefailuretoshutdownthereactor,resultinginalargepowerexcursion,butwithallcontainmentsubsystemsavailable.
EPRC7 1.3E-4Severecoredamageoccurswiththecontainmentintactandallsubsystemsavailable.
1)TheEx-PlantReleaseCategoryandReleaseFrequencyaretakenfromTable12.2-1ofOPG’s1995PickeringARiskAssessment,MainReport.2)DescriptionsareadaptedfromthesummariesprovidedbyDr.GordonThompsoninhisreporttotheCanadianSenate:AReviewoftheAccidentRiskPosedbythePickering‘A’NuclearGeneratingStation:AReporttotheStandingCommitteeonEnergy,EnvironmentandNaturalResourcesoftheCanadianSenate,2000,pgs.43-44.3)InthePickeringARiskAssessment,OPGdecidednottocalculatethesourcetermandpotentialconsequencesofEPRCs1and2.OPGgavethefollowingreason:“Atsomelevel,thelikelihoodofoccurrenceofaparticularEPRCbecomessufficientlylowthatitcannolongerbemeaningfultoevaluaterisk,irrespectiveoftheconsequences.Belowthislevelthereisnoneedtoevaluatetheconsequencesindetailalthough,thefrequenciesoftheomittedcategoriesshouldstillbeincorporatedintothecomparisonwithsafetygoalsandfinalconclusionsofthestudy.AprecedentexistsforsuchafrequencycutoffintheCanadianlicensingprocess,whereconsequencesanalysisisnotrequiredfortheindividualeventsequenceswhosecalculatefrequencyfallsbelow10-7/year.InthePARA,acutoffof10-8/yearwaschosentoensurethatnoeventofpossiblesignificancejustbelowthe10-7/yearthresholdhadbeenmissed.”PickeringAProbabilisticRiskAssessmentMainReport,Chapter13,p.13-1.4)ThereleaseforEPRCs3–6werecalculatedbymultiplyingthereleasefactionsprovidedinTable13.3-1(p.13-3)ofthePickeringARiskAssessmentforIodineandCesiumagainstthecoreinventoryforeachisotope.TheReleasefractionsforIodineandtheCesiumforeachEPRCareasfollows:EPRC3-2E-3,EPRC4–7E-3,EPRC5–1E-3,EPRC6–3E-4.Table13.4-2statesthataPickeringreactorcorecontains1.93E+18ofIodine-131and5.03E+16ofCesium-137.TheCesiumreleasesweremultipliedby40toexpressthereleasesinradiologicalequivalenceofIodine-131asrequiredbytheInternationalNuclearEventScaleUser’sManual.
Table14-MaximumPlanningAccident(MPA)ReactorStatus EquilibriumHold-upTimeinContainment
24hours**
PowerLevel 1750MW(th)PlumeReleaseHeight 20mReleasestotheEnvironment NobleGases 100%ofcoreinventory***Iodines 0.1%ofcoreinventory***RemovalTime 1dayWeather(fromendofhold-upperiod)
PasquillFweatherforfirst6hours(windspeedof1m/s).PasquillDweatherfornext18hours(windspeedof5m/s)
WindDirection Steadyfor24hoursWindMeander 22.5®*ReportofProvincialWorkingGroup#8–theUpperLimitforDetailedNuclearEmergencyPlanning,June30,1988p.47.**WhenWorkingGroup8madeitsrecommendationsitthoughtthiswasaconservativeassumptionbecause“Changestobemadeintheup-comingyearstothePickeringsitewillresultinalongerhold-uptime.”***Duringhold-up,muchofthenoblegases(andiodine)inventorywilldecaybyradioactivity.Theactualreleaseisthenlessthan100%(or0.1%).
73
Table15-WorstCredibleRadiationEmission(WCRE)*ReactorStatus EquilibriumHold-upTimeinContainment ZeroPowerLevel 1570MW(th)PlumeReleaseHeight 20mReleasestotheEnvironment NobleGases 100%ofCoreinventoryIodines 1%ofCoreinventory**RatesofRelease NobleGases 10%perhourIodines 1%infirsthourWeather(fromendofhold-upperiod)
PasquillFweatherforfirst6hours(windspeedof1m/s).PasquillDweatherfornext18hours(windspeedof5m/s)
WindDirection Steadyfor24hoursWindMeander 22.5®*ReportofProvincialWorkingGroup#8–theUpperLimitforDetailedNuclearEmergencyPlanning,June30,1988,p.65.Table16–1999BruceBEx-PlantReleaseCategoriesReleaseCategory
(1)Characteristics Frequency
(occ/yr)
PopulationDose(P-Sv)
(2)
EPRC1Largeearlyradioactivityreleaseintocontainment(0-24hoursafterinitiatingevent);Ex-plantreleasedrivenbysteamingwithvaultcoolersunavailabletomitigate.
2.8*10-9 32,900
EPRC2
Largedelayedreleaseintocontainment(atleast6hoursafterinitiatingevent);Pre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairment,Ex-plantreleasedrivenbysteamingwithvaultcoolersunavailabilitytomitigate.
9.1*10-8 35.400
EPRC3
Significantearlyreleaseintocontainment(0-24hoursafterinitiatingevent);Pre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairment;Ex-plantreleasedrivenbysteamingwithvaultcoolersunavailabletomitigate.
2.7*10-8 10,400
EPRC4
Significantdelayedreleaseintocontainment(atleast6hoursafteriniatingevent);Pre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairement;Explantreleasedrivenbysteamingmitigatedbyvaultcoolers.Or,significantdelayedreleaseintocontainment(atleast6hoursafterinitiatingevent);Latecontainmentfailureduetosteam-pressurization;Ex-plantreleasedrivenbysteamingwithvaultcoolersunavailabletomitigate.
6.9*10-8 8,730
EPRC5
Largedelayedreleaseintocontainment(>24hoursafterinitiatingevent);Pre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairment;Ex-plantreleasedrivenbysteamingwithvaultcoolersunavailabletomitigate.
2.0*10-10 22,300
EPRC6Significantdelayedreleaseintocontainment(>24hoursafterinitiatingevent);Pre-existingcontainmentenvelopimpairment;Ex-plantreleasedrivenbysteamingmitigatedbyvaultcoolers.Or,
1.8*10-7 2,800
74
Significantdelayedreleaseintocontainment(>24hoursafterinitiatingevent);Latecontainmentfailureduetosteam-pressurization;Explantreleasedrivenbysteamingvaultcoolersunavailabletomitigate.
EPRC7
Smallreleasefromcontainmentbypass,suchasHTpumpglandsealfailure,boilertuberupture,ECIblowback,pipebreakinD20feed/bleedsystemofLOCA2Asizeoutsidecontainment;Ex-plantreleaseviadirectpathwayoutsidecontainment.
3.5*10-6 760
EPRC8
Significantearlyreleaseintocontainmentduetofailureofreactorshutdown;Pre-existingorearlyconsequentialcontainmentenvelopeimpairment(containmentenvelopecrackduetoover-pressurebysteamsurge);Earlyshort-termex-plantpuff-release.
4.7*10-10 40
EPRC9
Designbasisfuelfailureevents(largeLOCA,singlechanneleventswithcontainmentpressurization,LOCA*ECIandLOCA*ECR,moderatorheatsinkavailable;Earlyex-plantreleaseduetocontainmentbypasswithfailureofboilerSRVcooldown,ordepletedcontainmentvacuumandpre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairment.
5.9*10-6 240
EPRC10Designbasisfuelfailureevents(seeEPRC9);Intactcontainmentandallcontainmentsystemsavailable;DelayednoblegasreleaseviaEFADS(>24hoursafterinitiatingevent).
5.8*10-5 7
LargeOff-SiteRelease(perunit)EPRC1–6(3) 3.7*10-7 SevereOff-SiteRelease(perunit)EPRC1-3,5 1.2*10-7 (1)ThefirstthreecolumnsaretakenfromTable2-7oftheBBRA,p.29.(2)ThepopulationdoseestimatesaretakenfromTable2-11oftheBBRA,p.36.(3)LargeandSevereReleasesestimatesaretakenfromTables2-2and2-3oftheBBRA.ALargereleaseisdefinedasareleasegreaterthan1percentofthecoreinventoryofcesium-137.ASeverereleaseisdefinedasareleasegreaterthan10percentofthecoreinventoryofcesium-137.
Table17–2003BruceARiskAssessment
ReleaseCategory
MeanFrequency(occurrencesperreactoryear)
MeanIndividualDose(mSv)
MeanIndividualRisks(Sv.y-1)
PopulationRisks(Person-Syy-1)
EPRC1 1.5*10-7 >3000* * 4.9*10-3
EPRC2 3.6*10-7 >3000* * 1.3*10-2
EPRC3 6.4*10-8 >3000* * 6.7*10-4
EPRC4 8.6*10-8 >3000* * 7.5*10-4
EPRC5 2.2*10-9 260 5.7*10-10 5.0*10-5
EPRC6 9.1*10-7 3000 2.7*10-6 2.5*10-3
EPRC7 2.6*10-5 590 1.5*10-5 2.0*10-2
EPRC8 7.0*10-10 220 1.5*10-10 2.8*10-8
EPRC9 2.8*10-5 270 7.6*10-6 6.7*10-3
EPRC10 3.0*10-5 37 1.1*10-6 2.1*10-4
Totalrisk(perunit) 3.5*10-5 4.6*10-2
Totalrisk(per4unitstation) 1.4*10-4 1.8*10-1
*SinceEPRC1,2,3and4arepredictedtoresultinanimmediateindividualdoseof>3000mSv,theyareconsideredintheanalysistocontributetoanearlyfatalityrisk.ThetotalcontributionofEPRC1toEPRC4toearlyfatalityiscalculatedasthesumoftheindividualmeanfrequencies,or6.6*10-7perunit,or2.7*10-6forfourunits.(1in1,520000reactoryears)
75
Table3.5.11-5,3-110,BruceARefurbishmentforLifeExtensionandContinuedOperationsProject,EAStudyReport
Table18–2005BruceARiskAssessmentUpdate
SafetyGoal
Consequencecategories
contributingtoSafetyGoal
SafetyLimit(perreactoryearunlessotherwisestated)
Calculatedfrequency(Notes1)
Integratedfrequencyofcontributors
(PRY)Note2
ComparisonofIntegrated
Frequencywithlimit
SevereCoreDamage(SCD)
FDC1-ICFDC1-OCFDC2-ICFDC2-OC
1E-4 6.55E-81.16E-127.72E-53.64E-5
5.7E-5* MeetsLimit
EarlyFatality(EF)
EPRC1**EPRC2**EPRC3EPRC4
1E-5persiteyear
2.61E-88.60E-71.02E-84.97E-8
4.5E-7* MeetsGoal
DelayedFatality(DF)
EPRC5EPRC6EPRC7EPRC8EPRC9EPRC10
1E-4persiteyear
1.42E-9/1.85E-119.36E-7*/1.4E-7*3.88E-5/1.15E-60.02.06E-5/2.7E-74E-5/7.4E-8
1.3E-6* MeetsLimit
LargeRelease(LR)
EPRC1**EPRC2**EPRC3EPRC4EPRC5EPRC6
1E-5 2.61E-88.6E-71.02E-84.97E-81.42E-99.36E-7*
1.3E-6* MeetsLimit
SevereRelease(SR)
EPRC1**EPRC2**EPRC3EPRC5
1E-6 2.61E-88.6E-71.02E-81.42E-9
4.1E-7* MeetsLimit
TheseresultsarefromtheBruceANuclearGeneratingStationProbabilisticRiskAssessment,BAPRAUpdatePart1SummaryReport,P.A.Robinson,NSSReport11575/TR/001Issue01,February2005.CitedinReviewofBruceNGSAAgainstModernSafetyStandards:SummaryReport,March2006,preparedbyR.A.Brown&AssociatesLtd.,AcquiredthroughAccesstoInformation.*indicatesthatthefrequencyhasremoveddouble-accountingbothwithinanindividualconsequencecategoryandwhererelevantbetweenthecontributorsfromdifferentconsequencescategories.FortheDelayedFatalitygoal,asaconservativesimplification,theoverallfrequencypresentedissimplythesumoftherisksfromindividualEPRCcontributors.**ItisnoteworthythatthereleasefractionforI-131forEPRC1and2isover50%.ForCs-137thereleasefractionis50%inthecaseofEPRC-1is52%and76%forEPRC-2.Source:CNSC–ProbabilisticSafetyAssessmentandReliabilityDivision,BruceAProbabilisticRiskAssessment(PAPRA)DetailedReview:MainReport,DocumentFileNumber:26-1-7-4-3,pg.161.
Table19–2008PickeringBRiskAssessment
EPRC Characteristics Frequency(Occ/yr)
76
1Fastaccidentprogression(<6hours),coupledwithpre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairmentorearlyconsequentialcontainmentenvelopefailureandunavailabilityofcontainmentheatremovalsystems
1.1*10-10
2 Delayedaccidentprogression(>6hours),coupledwithpre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairmentandunavailabilityofcontainmentheatremovalsystems. 1*10-11
3 Fastaccidentprogression,coupledwithpre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairmentbutcontainmentheatremovalsystemsavailable 1*10-11
4 Fastaccidentprogressioninwhichpartialimpairmentof,containmentsystemsleadstopotentialforenhancedrelease 2.4*10-10
5aSlowaccidentprogressionthatresultsinlate(>24hours)releasesfromcontainment.EPRC5Aisconsideredtohavethepotentialforseverecoredamageinmorethanasingleunit.
7.1*10-7
5b Slowaccidentprogressionthatresultsinlate(>24hours)releasesfromcontainment.EPRC5Baffectsasingleunitonly. 2.1*10-8
6 Slowaccidentprogressionbutinvolvingadirectpathwayforradioactivereleasethatinitiallybypassescontainment 1*10-11
7 Delayedaccidentprogressioninwhichpartialimpairmentofcontainmentsystemsleadstopotentialforenhancedrelease. 1*10-11
8 Non-severeaccidentsinconjunctionwithapre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairment.Releaseispredominantlythroughacontrolled,filteredpathway. 1.3*10-6
9 Severeaccidentsequencesinwhichthecontainmentenvelopeisintactanallcontainmentsystemsareavailable.Releaseisthroughacontrolledfilteredpathway.
1.0x10-6
LargeReleaseFrequency(perunit)EPRC1-5,5A,7(2) 7.1*10-7
(1)ThistableistakenfromTable3inthe2008PickeringBRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,p.45(2)TheLargeReleaseFrequencyistakenfromTable4ofthe2008PickeringBRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,p.46.
Table20–PickeringBEPRC5SourceTerm
SingleUnit Multi-unitAccidentRadionuclide Release(Bq) Release(Bq)
Kr-85 1.43E+15 5.72E+15Kr-85m 1.47E+17 5.88E+17Kr-87 2.90E+17 1.16E+18Kr-88 4.10E+17 1.64E+18Xe-133 1.20E+17 4.80E+17Xe-135 1.20E+17 4.80E+17I-131 6.13E+14 2.45E+15I-132 9.09E+14 3.64E+151-133 1.29E+15 5.16E+15I-134 1.40E+15 5.60E+15I-135 1.20E+15 4.80E+15Cs-134 7.59E+12 3.04E+13Cs-136 1.12E+13 4.48E+13Cs-137 1.77E+13 7.08E+13Rb-86 2.11E+11 8.44E+11Sb-127 4.46E+13 1.78E+14Sb-129 1.54E+14 6.16E+14
77
Source:K.S.Dinnie(Director,NuclearSafetySolutions)toE.Marczak(OPG),“PickeringLifeExtensionProject:AccidentalAirandWaterborneReleaseforPickeringBEnvironmentalAssessment–EPRC5,letter,January19,2007,AcquiredthroughFreedomofInformation.
Table21–2008PickeringBAssessmentwithAccidentCategories
ReleaseSource ReleaseEventMean
Frequency(/Yr)
IndividualRisk(2) SocietalRisk(1)
IndividualDose IndividualRisk(8)
NormalOperation Routine 1.0 6.8E-6 3.4E-7 N/A
DesignBasis FDC3-5(8) 1.13E-3(3) 1.13E-3(3) 7.6E-8 6.6E-4
Te-127 4.20E+13 1.68E+14Te-127m 3.58E+12 1.43E+13Te-129 1.50E+14 6.00E+14Te-129m 2.04E+13 8.16E+13Te-131m 7.28E+13 2.91E+14Te-132 6.97E+14 2.79E+15Sr-89 3.90E+12 1.56E+13Sr-90 9.34E+10 3.74E+11Sr-91 5.64E+12 2.26E+13Sr-92 6.07E+12 2.43E+13Mo-99 1.29E+13 5.16E+13Rh-105 5.98E+12 2.39E+13Ru-103 9.15E+12 3.66E+13Ru-105 6.86E+12 2.74E+13Ru-106 1.30E+12 5.20E+12Tc-99m 1.14E+13 4.56E+13La-140 9.65E+11 3.86E+12La-141 9.11E+11 3.64E+12La-142 8.77E+11 3.51E+12Nb-95 6.17E+11 2.47E+12Nd-147 3.40E+11 1.36E+12Pr-143 8.18E+11 3.27E+12Y-90 1.12E+10 4.48E+10Y-91 5.90E+11 2.36E+12Y-92 7.24E+11 2.90E+12Y-93 8.26E+11 3.30E+12Zr-95 7.19E+11 2.88E+12Zr-97 9.25E+11 3.70E+12Ce-141 4.86E+12 1.94E+13Ce-143 4.91E+12 1.96E+13Ce-144 1.74E+12 6.96E+12Ba-139 6.65E+14 2.66E+15Ba-140 6.49E+14 2.60E+15
78
Accidents FDC6-8 3.81E-3(4) 4.53E-5(4) 8.6E-9 7.5E-5
SevereAccidents
EPRC1EPRC2EPRC3EPRC4EPRC5AEPRC5BEPRC6EPRC7EPRC8EPRC9
1.1E-101E-111E-112.4E-107.1E-72.1E-81E-111E-111.3E-61E-6
1.4(5)
0.42(5)
0.55(5)
0.23(5)
0.51(9)
0.013(5)
0.14(5)
0.69(5)
1.2E-3(10)
4.5E-3(5)
7.6E-122.08E-132.76E-132.8E-121.8E-9(10)1.3E-117E-143.5E-137.9E-112.3E-10
2.1E-78E-99.9E-99.5E-83.2E-52.4E-71.8E-91.1E-87.1E-72E-6
TotalQuantifiedAccidentRisk(1Unit)
8.7E-8(11) 7.7E-4(11)
TotalQuantifiedAccidentRisk(4Units) 3.4E-7(11) 3E-3(11)
Totalrisk(NormalOperation+ReactorAccidents) 6.8E-7 6E-31.Within100kmradiusofstation2.Atsiteboundaryassumedtobeabout1km.3.FDC3-5Cumulativedoseassumedtobe25%ofEPRC9dose.4.FDC6-8Cumulativedoseassumedtobe1%ofEPRC9dose.5.IndividualDose–(a)EmergencyphaseandLongtermdirectexposuredoseat1km,plus(b)anadditional1%foringestion.6.IndividualRisk=Annualprobabilityoffatalitytocriticalindividual;SocietalRisk=Fatalitiesperyearwithin100kmofPickeringNGS.7.Contributionfornormaloperationassumedtobesameasforindividualriskonarelative-percentagebasis.8.NoteFDC=FuelDamageCategory.Includesat-powerandshutdowncontribution,andinsideandoutsidecontainment.9.EPRC5Aconsequenceisestimatedtobe4*EPRC5B.10.IndividualDose=(a)EmergencyphaseandLongtermdirectexposuredoseat1km,plus(b)anadditional1%ingestion,plus(c)individualdoseforFDC3-5.11.SingleunittotaldoesnotincludeEPRC5A;4unittotal=1*EPRC5Aplus4*(1unittotal).Source:OPG,PickeringBRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,ReleaseNovember14,2008.
Table22–2011DarlingtonAssessmentSummaryforExternalEvents
ExternalEventSevereCoreDamageFrequency
LargeRelease
FrequencyFireAt-Power 1.9E-6 9.7E-8
SeismicAt-Power(1) 3.7E-6 3.7E-6FloodingAt-Power 4.8E-7 4.8E-7(2)
1)Seismicresultsreportedforeventswithafrequencyofoccurrenceupto1E-4(recurrenceintervalof10,000years)2)LRFforat-powerinternalfloodingwasnotassessedduetothelowfrequencyofseverecoredamage.LRFisboundedbySCDfrequency.Source:OPG,DarlingtonNGSRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,REP-03611-10072,May29,2012,pg.96.
Table23–2011DarlingtonRiskAssessment
ReleaseCategory# Description
BaselinePredictedFrequencyPerReactorYear(1)
PopulationDose(person-SV)(2)
LatentCancerFatalities
79
(1)ThesearethebaselinepredictedfrequenciestakenfromTable16oftheDarlingtonNGSRiskAssessment
SummaryReport.ThesearebeforeOPGchangedmodelingassumptionstoreducetheprobabilityofthe
severeaccidentRC1.
(2)BasedonOPG'sprojected2013populationtoaradiusof100kmfromDarlingtonsite.Notably,the
ScreeningReportindicatesthatthepopulationdoseforRC7willdoubleby2055becauseofpopulationgrowthwithintheGTA.
(3)LatentCancerfatalitiesiscalculatedbyusingariskcoefficientof0.05deathsperPerson-Sv.Thismethod
hasalsobeenusedbyOPG.
Table24-PickeringBReleaseCategories2013(1)
ReleaseCategory# Description
ReleaseFrequencywithoutexternal
events
Release
Category1
Largeearlyreleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffects
and/orwidespreadcontamination(greaterthan3%coreinventoryof
(I-131/Cs-137)
2.9E-6
Release
Category2
Earlyreleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“LargeRelease”definition
(greaterthan1014BqofCs-137butlessthanRC1occurringmainly
within24hours)
N/A
Release
Category3
Delayedlargereleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“LargeRelease”
definition(greaterthan1014BqofCs-137butlessthanRC1occurring
mainlywithin24hours)
9.7E-07
Release
Category4
Earlysmallreleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“SmallRelease”definition
(greaterthan1015BqofI-131butlessthanRC2occurringmainly
within24hours)
N/A
(3)
RC1Verylargereleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination.
4.90E-006 6.00E+004 3000
RC2Earlyreleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“LargeRelease”ofmorethan1014BecquerelofCesium-137.
3.70E-007 1.20E+003 60
RC3Latereleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“LargeRelease”ofmorethan1014BecquerelofCesium-137.
0 Notavailable.
RC4 Earlyreleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“SmallRelease” 2.00E-009 1.10E+003 55
RC5 Latereleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“SmallRelease” Notavailable. Notavailable.
RC6 GreaterthannormalcontainmentleakagebelowSmallReleaselimit. Notavailable. Notavailable.
RC7Normalcontainmentleakage.Leakageacrossanintactcontainmentenvelopeorlong-termfilteredrelease.
1.50E-006 5.40E+001 2.70
RC8 BasematMelt-through.Noreleasetoatmosphere. 4.90E-006
80
Release
Category5
Delayedsmallreleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“SmallRelease”
definition(greaterthan1015BqofI-131butlessthanRC3occurring
mainlyafter24hours)
2.0E-7
Release
Category6
Mitigatedbutgreaterthannormalcontainmentleakageandbelow
SmallReleaselimit(greaterthan1014BqofI-131butlessthanRC5
occurringmainlyafter24hours).
N/A
Release
Category7
Normalleakagethroughanintactcontainmentandfilteredrelease
occurringmainlyafter24hours.N/A
Release
Category8
Undergroundreleaseviabasematmelt-through.Noreleaseto
atmosphere.N/A
1)ThefirsttwocolumnsofthistableweretakenfromTable9ofthePickeringBRiskAssessmentSummary
Report(p.101).ColumnthreeistakenTable15ofthesamereport(p.107).
2)TheIodineReleasecolumnwascalculatedbymultiplyingthereleasefractionsmentionedinthesecond
columnwiththecoreinventoryofIodine-131.Iodinewaschosenbecauseitisusedtodetermineratingson
theInternationalNuclearEventScale.BecausethecoreinventoryforthePickeringBreactorswasnotreadily
available,thePickeringAinventorywasusedasanequivalent.See:Table13.4-1,“RadioactiveInventoryof
ReactorCore”,PickeringARiskAssessmentMainReport,1995,p.13-8.
Table25–PickeringAReleaseCategories2014
Release
CategoryDescription(1)
Frequency
(2)
INES
Level
Release
Category1
Largeearlyreleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffects
and/orwidespreadcontamination(greaterthan3%coreinventoryof
I-131/Cs-137)
4.69E-6 7
Release
Category2
Releaseinexcessof1014BqofCs-137butlessthanRC1occurring
within24hours.N/A 6?
Release
Category3
Releaseinexcessof1014BqofCs-137butlessthanRC1occurring
after24hours.3.45-8 6
1)ThefirstandsecondcolumnsaretakenfromTable7ofthePickeringARiskAssessment.Thesummed
LargeReleaseFrequencyis4.72E-6.
2)ThethirdcolumnistakenfromTable12ofthe2014PickeringARiskAssessment.Thesefrequency
estimatesexcludeexternalevents.
Table26–2013BruceAat-PowerInternalEventsLevel2ReleaseCategoryResults
ReleaseCategory(RC) FrequencyFrequencywith
EMECreditDescription
RC0 2.9E-6 6.32E-7
Earlyverylargerelease->~3%core
inventoryofI-131occurringmainlyafter24
hours.
RC1 2.45E-7 4.25E-8
Lateverylargerelease->~3%core
inventoryofI-131occurringmainlyafter24
hours.
RC2 6.72E-6 7.91E-7
EarlyRD-152LargeRelease–Mixtureof
fissionproductscontaining>1014BqofCs-
137but<~3%coreinventoryofI-131
occurringmainlywithin24hours
RC3 1.21E-12 1.05E-13 LateRD-152LargeRelease–Mixtureof
81
fissionproductscontaining>1014BqofCs-137but<~3%coreinventoryofI-131
occurringmainlyafter24hours.
RC4 7.68E-8 7.65E-9
EarlyRD-152SmallRelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1015Bqof1-
131but<1014BqofCs-137occurringmainlywithin24hours.
RC5 2.03E-12 4.97E-14
LateRD-152SmallRelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1015BqofI-131but<1014BqofCs-137occurring
mainlyafter24hours.
RC6 1.47E-6 2.97E-7
Mitigatedrelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1014BqofI-131but<1015BqofI-131occurringmainlyafter24
hours.
RC7 6.52E-6 1.93E-6 CETSuccessPath–Slowreleasecontaining<1014BqofI-131.
RC8 2.19E-6 3.67E-7 BasematMelt-through–PenetrationofFMDconcretebasematduetoCCI
LargeReleaseFrequencyTotal 9.87E-6 3.67E-7 SumofRC0toRC3
SmallReleaseFrequencyTotal 9.95E-6 1.47E-6 SumofRC0toRC5.
Source:AttachmentA–BruceAandBruceBInternalEventsLevel2ReleaseCategoryResults,F.Saunders(BrucePower)toS-PStensil(Greenpeace),“GreenpeaceInformationRequest,”letter,February13,2015.
Table27-BruceBat-PowerInternalEventsLevel2ReleaseCategoryResults
ReleaseCategory Frequency FrequencywithEMECredit Description
ReleaseCategory0 4.71E-06 5.9E-7 Earlyverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryof1-131occurringmainlyafter24hours.
ReleaseCategory1 4.96E-07 6.2E-8 Lateverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryofI-131occurringmainlyafter24hours.
ReleaseCategory2 2.70E-07 3.61E-8
EarlyRD-152LargeRelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1014BqofCs-137but<~3%coreinventoryofI-131occurringmainly
within24hours
ReleaseCategory3 1.43E-08 1.99-9
LateRD-152LargeRelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1014BqofCs-137but<~3%coreinventoryofI-131occurringmainly
after24hours.
ReleaseCategory4 1.74E-7 2.05E-8
EarlyRD-152SmallRelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1015Bqof1-131but<1014BqofCs-137occurringmainlywithin24
hours.
ReleaseCategory5 0 0LateRD-152SmallRelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1015BqofI-131but<1014BqofCs-137occurringmainlyafter24hours.
ReleaseCategory6 5.74E-6 1.38E-6Mitigatedrelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1014BqofI-131but<1015BqofI-
131occurringmainlyafter24hours.
82
ReleaseCategory7 4.08E-6 1.33E-6CETSuccessPath–Slowreleasecontaining<
1014BqofI-131.
ReleaseCategory8 4.94E-6 6.2E-7BasematMelt-through–PenetrationofFMD
concretebasematduetoCCI
LargeReleaseFrequencyTotal
5.49E-6 6.93E-7 SumofRC0toRC3
SmallReleaseFrequencyTotal
5.67E-6 7.14E-7 SumofRC0toRC5.
Source:AttachmentA–BruceAandBruceBInternalEventsLevel2ReleaseCategoryResults,F.Saunders(BrucePower)toS-PStensil(Greenpeace),“GreenpeaceInformationRequest,”letter,February13,2015.
Table28–VariationsinDarlingtonLargeReleaseFrequency
DARA2012(1) DARA2015(2)
ReleaseCategoryBaselinePredictedFrequency
EnhancedModel
withSIOs
EnhancedModelwithoutSIOs
BaselinePredictedFrequencywithEMEs
WithEMEandSIOs(3)
D-RC1(Alevel7INESaccidentwithmorethe3%ofI-131tothe
environment)
4.9E-06 5.1E-08 7.8E-07 5.0E-07OPGwouldnot
provide.GreenpeaceEstimate:2E-7
D-RC2(Alevel6INESaccidentwithreleasesequivalenttothe
CNSC’ssevereaccidentstudy)
3.7E-07 3.6E-07 5.2E-07 5.2E-07OPGwouldnot
provide.GreenpeaceEstimate:2E-7
D-RC3 0 0 0 0 0
SummedFrequencyofLargeReleasesCategories 5.27E-06 4.11E-07 1.3.6 1E-6 4E-7(4)
(1)TheDARA2012numbersweretakenfromTable16DarlingtonRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,p.104.(2)TheDARA2015numbersweretakenfromTable17ofthe2015DarlingtonRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,p.110.ItshouldbenotedthatGreenpeacerequestedDARAfrequencyestimateswithoutcreditforEmergencyMitigatingEquipment,butOPGrefused.(3)GreenpeacerequestedOPGprovideReleaseCategoryestimateswithoutcreditforbothEMEsandSIOs.OPGrespondedthat:“IntheLevel2InternalEventsforAt-PowerPSAthecasewithnoEMEorSIOsisonlyasensitivitycase.Assuch,theresultsofthissensitivitycasewerenotderivedonanindividualreleasecategorybasis.TheLRFwithoutEMEorSIOsis1.5E-6occurrencesperreactoryear.”(MemorandumtoGreenpeace,“ResponsetoRequestfromGreenpeaceforInformationfromDarlingtonNGSProbabilisticSafetyAssessment”September10,2015,N-CORR-03611-0562767LOF)ThisimpliesthatEMEsimpactonlargereleasefrequencyisapproximately0.5E-6(1.5E-6withoutEMEscomparedto1E-6).(4)Table13ofthe2015indicatesthatthesummedLRFwithEMEsandSIOsis4E-7.BasedonthisGreenpeaceestimatestheRC1andRC2wouldbeequalto2E-7each.
1
June12,2018
MatthewTorigian
DeputyMinisterofCommunitySafety
MinistryofCommunitySafetyand
CorrectionalServices
25GrosvenorStreet11thFloor
Toronto,Ontario
M7A1Y6
Re:Ensuringtheimpartialityofthepublicserviceinregardtonuclearemergencyplanning
DearDeputyMinisterTorigian,
IwritetoseekclarificationonthestepstheMinistryhastakentoensurethepublicserviceis
competentandfreefromconflictofinterestincarryingoutitsresponsibilitytoprotectpublic
safetyintheeventofanuclearemergency.
OverthepastseveralyearsGreenpeacehasbecomeincreasinglyconcernedthattheOntario
publicservice’sresponsibilitytoupholdthepublicinterest–andpublicsafety–mayhavebeen
compromisedbyitsrelianceonreactoroperatorsforpolicyadvice.TheAuditorGeneralof
OntarioechoedGreenpeace’sconcerninher2017report,whichnotedthatin2015astaff
memberwaspaiddirectlybyanuclearpowercompanywhilebeingworkingattheMinistry.The
AuditorobservedthatthistypeofarrangementcouldposearisktotheMinistry’sobjectivity.
Greenpeaceagrees.
I’mcontactingyounowbecauseithascometoGreenpeace’sattentionthattheMinistryhas
continuedtorelyonstafffromnuclearcompaniestocarryoutitsfunctions.
InthedocumentattachedtothisletterIhighlightseveralexamplesofhowtheMinistry’s
relianceonOntarioPowerGeneration(OPG)staffmayhavecompromisedethicaland
professionalbehaviourofthepublicservice.Iamconcernedthatthisongoingrelianceon
nuclearindustrystaffmayhavecompromisedtheneutralityofthepublicservice.
Asyouknow,thepurposeofPublicServiceofOntarioAct(hereinPublicServicesAct)isto
ensurethepublicserviceiseffective,non-partisan,professional,ethicalandcompetent.
UpholdingthesevaluesisneededsothatbothOntariansandMinisterscantrustandhave
confidenceinthepolicies,proposalsandprogramsoverseenbythepublicservice.
ThePublicServiceActrequirespublicservantstotakestepstoavoidanyconflictofinterest
betweentheirprofessionaldutiesandtheirprivateaffairs.Staffsecondedfromnuclear
companiesareinaclearconflictofinterest.Whilethepublicserviceismandatedtoadvancethe
publicinterest,nuclearcompaniesaremotivatedbyprofit.Giventhatnuclearcompaniespay
2
foremergencyresponsemeasures,industrystaffmaynotsupportstrengtheningpublicsafetyif
itleadstoincreasedcostsforreactoroperators.IhaveseennoevidencethattheMinistryhas
reflectedontheimpactitsrelianceonnuclearoperatorsmayhaveonpublicsafetyandpublic
trust.
Forthisreason,Iaskyoutoprovideclarityonwhatstepshavebeentakentoensuretheethical
andneutraloperationofthepublicserviceinregardtoitsresponsibilitytooverseethe
adequacyofnuclearemergencyresponse.ThiswillalsohelpclarifywhethertheMinistryhas
soughttorespecttheobjectivesofthePublicServicesAct.
Ithusrespectfullyrequestresponsestothefollowingquestions:
• PleaseprovidealistofallstaffloanedorsecondedtotheMinistryofCommunitySafety
toassistwiththeoversightofnuclearemergencyresponsesincethe2011Fukushima
disaster.Pleaseincludetheirresponsibilitiesandtheperiodduringwhichtheyassisted
theMinistry.
• Foreachstaffmembersecondedorloanedfromanuclearcompany,suchasOPG,
pleasestatewhethertheMinistrysoughtadvicefromtheConflictofInterest
Commissionerregardingtheethicalacceptabilityandpotentialconflictsofinterest.If
advicewasnotrequestedfromtheConflictofInterestCommissioner,werethereother
formalprocessesusedtoevaluatetheethicalacceptabilityofthesesecondments?
• HastheMinistryestablishedanypoliciesorprocedurestoensurearrangementswith
nuclearcompaniesdonotimpedetheMinistry’sabilitytoobjectivelyassessnuclear
risksandprovideunbiasedanalysistotheMinisterandthepublic?Pleaseindicate
whetherthesedocumentspubliclyavailable.
• TheMinistryappearstohaveanongoingandinformalrelianceonOPG,whichisa
Crowncorporation,fortechnicalandstaffingsupport.HastheMinistryestablishedany
guidelinesorprocedurestoensureOPG’sbusinessinterestsdonotundulyinfluence
governmentoperations,advicetotheMinisterorrelationshipswithpublic
stakeholders?
• HastheMinistryassessedthestaffingneedsandfinancialsupportrequiredto
implementthelatestProvincialNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan(PNERP)aswellas
anyCanadianNuclearSafetyCommissionrequirementsthatmayimpactMinistry
operations?
Thankyouforyourattention.Greenpeacemakestheserequestsinthehopethattheywillhelp
clarifywhatactionstheMinistryhastakentoensuretheintegrityofitsoversightofnuclear
emergencyresponse.
Intheeventthattherehasbeeninsufficientconsiderationoftheseissues,Greenpeacewill
supportandencouragepoliciesandactionstostrengthentheindependenceandcompetencyof
thepublicservice.
3
Truly,
Shawn-PatrickStensil
SeniorEnergyAnalyst
GreenpeaceCanada
33CecilSt.,
Toronto,Ontario
M5T1N1
CC:
SidneyB.Linden,ConflictofInterestCommission
BonnieLysyk,AuditorGeneralofOntario
BrianBeamish,InformationandPrivacyCommissioner
J.DavidWake,TheOfficeoftheIntegrityCommissioner
Marie-FranceLalonde,MPP,Ottawa-Orléans
TheHonourableAndreaHorvath,LeaderoftheOpposition
MikeSchreiner,MPPGuelph,LeaderoftheGreenPartyofOntario
4
SummaryofConcerns
Sincethe2011theFukushimaaccidentbegan,Greenpeacehasbeenraisingconcernsrelatedto
theadequacyofOntario’sProvincialNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan(PNERP).Wehave
attemptedtoencouragethemodernizationofthePNERPandhaveputasignificantamountof
effortintodevelopingandproposingconstructiveproposalsforimprovingpublicsafety.
Greenpeaceisveryconcernedthatthevalueofoureffortsmayhavebeencompromisedby
whatwebelievetobeaneffectivelackofseparationbetweennuclearcompanies,inparticular
OntarioPowerGeneration(OPG),andtheMinistryofCommunitySafetyandCorrectional
Services(henceforthreferredtoas“theMinistry”).
TheMinistryhasasignificantresponsibility:protectingpublicsafety.Thegovernmentneedsan
impartialpublicservicetoensureitreceivesadvicethatisinformedbythepublicinterest,
objectiveandindependent.Impartialityalsoencouragespublicconfidenceandtrustin
governmentoversightandensuresthatpublicconcernsreceivefairandobjectivetreatmentno
mattertheirpoliticalviews.
TheOntariogovernmentisalsoOPG’ssoleshareholder.OPG’soperationsatthePickeringand
DarlingtonnuclearstationsareapublicsafetyriskandrequiretheMinistrytoprepare
emergencyresponseplans.AsOPGpaysforoffsitenuclearemergencymeasuresaroundits
stations,ithasafinancialinterestinlimitingtheirexpansion.
Notably,unlikeBrucePower,OPGdoesnotappearontheOfficeoftheIntegrityCommissioner’s
LobbyistRegistry.GreenpeaceisconcernedthatOPG’sstatusasaCrownCorporationmayhave
ledgovernmentauthoritiestotreatOPGasanextensionofthepublicserviceinsteadoflike
privatecompany.ThisraisesquestionswhethertheviewsofGreenpeaceandothercivilsociety
intervenershavebeentreatedfairlybythepublicservice.GivenOPG’sbusinessinterests,itmay
alsoraisequestionsregardingtheobjectivityandindependenceofadviceprovidedto
government.
Itisastatedpurposepersection1(1)ofthePublicServiceAct“Toensurethatthepublicservice
ofOntarioisnon-partisan,professional,ethicalandcompetent.”Thisdocumentaimstoprovide
severalexamplesofgovernmentactivitiesthatmayhavecontravenedatleastthespiritofthe
PublicServiceAct.ThemajorityoftheexamplesrelatetotheMinistry’sdirectorinformal
relianceonOPGindevelopingoradvisingonpolicyrelatedtonuclearemergencyplanningin
theProvinceofOntario.
Thatsaid,ethicalbehaviourwithinthepublicservicerequiresreflectingupontheimpactof
decisions,especiallywherethepublicinterestobjectivesofthegovernmentmaybeinfluenced
byprivateinterests.Greenpeacewishestobetterunderstandwhat,ifany,processesarein
placetosafeguardormitigatethepotentialforOPG’sprivatebusinessintereststoimpact
governmentdecision-makingandtherelationshipbetweentheMinistryandnon-industryactors
suchasGreenpeace.
5
DirectRelianceonOPGstaff
TheAuditorGeneralofOntario’s2017reportobservedthattheMinistry’sresponsibilityfor
nuclearemergencyresponserequiresittohaveexpertstaffabletoprovidethegovernment
“…withindependentandobjectiveadvice.”However,theAuditorconverselynotedthatthe
Ministryhadfailedtofillkeypositionsandreliedinsteadona“…networkofretirednuclear
powercompanystaffandanuclearconsultinggroup.”In2015,theMinistryevenreliedonstaff
paiddirectlybyanuclearcompany.1
TheAuditorconcludedthat:“ThistypeofarrangementcouldposearisktoEMO’s[Emergency
ManagementOntario]objectivity”andrecommendedtheMinistry“useindependentnuclear
expertiseatalltimestoassessnuclearrisks,plansandresponsestrategies.”Inresponse,the
MinistryagreedwiththeAuditor’sconcernsandrecognized“…theneedforindependenceand
clarityinitsarrangementswiththenuclearpowercompanies.”2
Despitethis,ithascometoGreenpeace’sattentionthattheMinistryhascontinuedtorelyon
nuclearcompanystafftocarryoutitsresponsibilitiesfornuclearemergencyresponse.
AccordingtohisLinkedInprofile,OPGemployeeJimColeshasapparentlybeen“Onloanfrom
OPGtosupport[the]developmentoftheProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan”sinceJuly2017.
Mr.ColeswasOPG’sDirectorofEmergencyManagementandFireProtectionfrom2012to
2015.
AsOPG’sDirectorofEmergencyManagementandFireProtection,Mr.Coleschairedthe
committeein2013thatdevelopedCanadianStandardsAssociationGroupstandardN1600,
Generalrequirementsfornuclearemergencymanagementprograms.Notably,CSAstandards
aredevelopedusingaconsensus-basedprocessamongindustrystakeholdersandgovernment
agencies.ThismeansthatOPGorBrucePowercanblocktheadoptionofanyproposed
standardsthatmayconflictwiththeirfinancialinterests.Thestandardwasalsodeveloped
withoutpublicconsultation.Notably,thestandardsubsequentlybecameastandardagainstthe
PNERPwasre-assessedandupdated.
Thus,OPGhashadprivilegedaccesstoinfluencethescopeofrevisionstoPNERPthroughMr.
Coles.OutsideofgovernmentOPGhasbeenabletoinfluenceCSAStandardN1600in2013and
nowinsidetheMinistrythroughMr.Coles’apparentsecondmenttoassistwiththe
developmentofthe2017PNERP.GreenpeaceencouragestheMinistrytoclarifyMr.Coles
presentroleandresponsibilitiesingovernmentaswellaswhatprocedureshavebeenputin
placetomitigatethepotentialinfluenceofhisemployer.
InformalRelianceonOPGstaff ThroughdocumentationobtainedthroughFreedomofInformationlegislation,Greenpeacehas
notedthatMinistrystaffhaveshownatendencytoinformallyrelyonOPGstaffforadviceon
technicalmatters.ThisisanindicationthattheMinistrylackssufficientstaffwithtechnical
expertisetomaketechnicalassessmentsindependently.
1AuditorGeneralofOntario,AnnualReport,Chapter3,Section3.04–EmergencyManagementinOntario,December
2017,pg.253.2Ibid.,pg.254,
6
TheglaringexamplewhichbestillustratesthisinformalrelianceonOPGstaffoccurredafter
Greenpeace,theCanadianEnvironmentalLawAssociation(CELA)andDurhamNuclear
Awareness(DNA)metwithMadeleineMeilleur,theMinisterofPublicSafetyandCorrectional
Services,inAugust2013.Themeetingwasinitiatedduetoconcernstheorganizationsraised
duringCanadianNuclearSafetyCommission(CNSC)hearingsonOPG’sapplicationtocontinue
operatingthePickeringnuclearstationinMay2013.TheMinistry’sinadequateoversightof
nuclearemergencypreparednesswasafocusofdiscussionduringthesehearings.
Alsoraisedatthehearing,werefindingsfromOPG’smostrecentriskassessmentforthe
Pickeringnuclearstation.Thisassessmentfoundthatanaccidentleadingtoalargeradiation
releasewasmuchmorelikelythanpreviouslythought.Indeed,inthe1990stheRoyalSocietyof
Canada(RSC)recommendedthatthegovernmentputinplace“…detailedemergencyplanning
shouldbedoneforaccidentsresultingfromacredibleseriesofeventswhichcouldoccurwitha
probabilityofapproximately10-7/reactoryear.”
3Risksassessmentsatthetimeshowed
accidentsmeetingthiscriteriadidnotleadtolargeradioactivereleases.However,therisk
assessmentpublishedbyOPGin2013foundmajoraccidentswouldmeetthecriteriaproposed
bytheRoyalSocietyofCanadafordetailedplanning.
Unfortunately,GreenpeacehasfoundnoevidenceshowingthatMinistryhasindependently
reviewedthesignificanceoftheaforementionedriskstudiesbeforeorafterourmeetingwith
theMinister.Onthecontrary,correspondenceobtainedthroughFreedomofInformationshows
that,inresponsetoarequestfromtheMinister,MinistrystaffaskedOPGtoprovidetheir
analysisoftheissue(seeAttachment2).Basedthis,Greenpeaceisdeeplyconcernedthatthe
issuesithasraisedwiththeMinisterhaveineffectbeendealtwithbyOPG.InGreenpeace’s
view,thisexemplifieshowthelackofindependentexpertisewithintheMinistryhasleadto
possibleunfairtreatmentofstakeholdersbythepublicservice.
Notably,MinisterMeilleurcommittedtoholdapublicconsultationonnuclearemergency
responseduringtheAugust2013meeting.However,thispublicconsultationdidnotoccuruntil
May2017.AccordingtootherdocumentsacquiredthroughFreedomofInformation,the
MinistrycontinuedtoconsultbehindcloseddoorswithOPGandotherindustrystakeholderson
possiblechangestothePNERPthroughoutthisperiod.
OPG’sOrganizationalInterestsinthePNERPConsultationGreenpeaceisconcernedthatOPG’sprivateinterestsmayhaveinfluencedthetimingandscope
ofMinistry’s2017publicconsultationonnuclearemergencypreparedness.
Asnoted,MinisterMeilleurcommittedtoholdapublicreviewonnuclearemergencyresponse
in2013,buttheconsultationdidnotoccuruntil2017.Theadequacyoftheprovince’s
emergencypreparednesswasalsoafocusoftheCNSC’sreviewofOPG’sapplicationforfive-
yearoperationallicenseforthePickeringnuclearstation.ThislicenceexpiresinJuly2018and
willbereviewedthissummer.
3IW.R.Bruceetal,ReporttotheMinistryoftheEnvironmentandEnergyconcerningtwotechnicalmattersinthe
ProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan,RoyalSocietyofCanada&CanadianAcademyofEngineering,November1996,pg.
33.
7
AccordingtodocumentsobtainedthroughFreedomofInformation,OPGwasconcernedany
furtherdelayinupdatingOntario’snuclearemergencyresponseplansbeforetheCNSC’s
relicensinghearingscouldleadtoregulatorysanctionbytheCommission.Inaninternal
documentdetailingriskstoitslicenceapplication,OPGobserved:
ThereisatightschedulefortheProvincetohavetheupdatedPNERPapprovedby
Cabinetbytheendof2017,beforetheSpring2018electionandPart1Hearing.Thereis
ariskthat,ifthePNERPisnotupdatedandapprovedintimebythecurrentCabinet,it
willbesignificantlydelayedbeyondthe2018PNGSlicenceexpirydateandwillraise
questionsabouttherobustnessofoff-siteemergencypreparednessaroundPickering.
TheseissuescouldthreatenPickeringrelicensingandresultinholdpointsand/ora
shorterlicenceterm<10years.4
Tomitigatetheserisks,thedocumentstatesthatOPGwas“…engagedatseniorlevelsto
provideappropriatesupportandconsultation.”5Asearliernoted,OPG’sformerDirectorof
EmergencyManagementandFireProtectioniscurrently“onloan”totheMinistrytoassistwith
revisionstothePNERP.Mr.Colessecondmentmaybeoneoftheactionstakentoreducethe
riskofregulatorysanctionbytheCommission.
AlsoofsignificanceisthattheCityofTorontorequestedthegovernmentextendthepublic
consultationperiod“toSeptember30,2017inordertoallowmunicipalitiesandcitizensto
providemeaningfulinput.”6Althoughtheprovinceprovidedatwoweekextensiontothe
consultation,itmeantthatTorontoCouncilwasunabletoconsideremergencyplanningissues
duetocouncilholidaysoverthesummerbreak.
OPG’sinternalenterpriseriskassessmentsalsoindicateitwasconcernedbythecost
implicationsoftheprovincedecidingtoputinplaceemergencyplanstoaddressmoresevere
accidents.SinceFukushima,Greenpeaceandotherorganizationshavearguedfromapublic
safetyperspectivethatitwouldbeprudenttoprepareaccidentsleadingtolargeradioactive
releases.
InadocumententitledFailuretoObtainaLongerTermLicenceRenewalforPickering,OPG
describethecostimpactsonthecompanyifthegovernmentdecidedtostrengthenpublic
safety:
In2016,theCNSCadvisedtheOFMEMtoconsidermoresevereaccidentsintheupdate
tothePNERP,whichmayresultinpotentialchangestotheplanningbasis.These
changesmayincludenewprotectiverequirementsandexpansionoftheemergency
planrequirementsforPickering.Newprotectiverequirementsmayresultintheneed
formodificationstoPickeringthatcouldhavecostimplicationsforoperatingthestation
to2024.Changestotheemergencyplanrequirementsmayentailexpandingthe
evacuationzoneandpotassiumiodidepilldistribution.Thismayimpactthepublic’s
4OPG,RiskRegistry–PickeringRelicensing2018,May31,2017,FOI#17-048,pg.393.5Ibid.6MM31.31,RequestforExtensionoftheGovernmentofOntario’sdeadlineforcommentsonitsDiscussionPaperon
nuclearemergencypreparedness-byCouncillorNeethanShan,secondedbyCouncillorPaulAinslie,July4,2017.
8
perceptionofnuclearandcouldaffectPickering’slongertermlicenseapplication.7
InGreenpeace’sview,theaforementionedextractsfromOPG’splanningandenterpriserisk
documentsshowthecompanyhadclearmotivationstobothlimitpublicconsultationandto
preventthegovernmentfrompreparingformoreseverenuclearaccidents.InGreenpeace’s
view,OPGhasaclearprivateinterestinminimizingpublicsafety.
ConsideringthatOPG’sprivateinterestsconflictwithMinistry’spublicsafetymandate,
GreenpeacerequestsclarificationonwhatstepsweretakentosafeguardMinistryobjectivityof
governmentoperationsbeforeandduringthe2017PNERPpublicconsultations.
EnsuringtheCompetenceoftheCivilService:AdequateFunding
Overthepastdecade,ithasbecomeapparenttoGreenpeacethattheMinistryisunderstaffed
andneitherabletofulfillnewplanningrequirementsputinplacesinceFukushimanorthe
public’sexpectationfortransparencyandopengovernment.
GreenpeaceisconcernedthattheMinistrymaybemademorevulnerabletotheinfluenceof
OPGandotherprivateinterestsduetoafailuretobothmaintainsufficientindependent
expertiseandanticipatefuturestaffingneeds.ThisspeakstowhethertheMinistryhasmade
adequateefforttoensurethepublicserviceis“competent”asstatutorilyrequiredunder
Section1(1)ofthePublicServicesAct.
AstheAuditorGeneralobservedinher2017report,thegovernmentexpectsnuclearpower
companiestocoverthefullcostofmanagingitsnuclearemergencymanagementprogram.In
2015,theMinistryreceived$750,000fromreactoroperators.TheAuditorobservedthatthe
Ministrycouldprovidenobasisdemonstratinghowthisamountwasdetermined.8
Notably,CabinetDocumentsfrom1987showthatthegovernmentofthedayestimatedthe
costofnuclearemergencyresponsetobeapproximately$396,600annually.9Whenadjustedfor
inflation,thisequalsapproximately$730,000in2015dollars–effectivelythesameamount
citedbytheAuditor.
ThisindicatesthattheMinistrymayhavesimplylosttracksincetheChernobyldisasterofthe
basisforitsresourcerequirements.ItalsosuggeststhattheMinistryhasnotbeenregularly
forecastingitsstaffingneedsandadjustingitsfundingrequestsfromreactoroperators.
Requirementsfornuclearemergencyresponsehavechangedsignificantlysincethe1986
Chernobyldisaster.Forexample,theprovinceisnowexpectedtoparticipateregularlyin
emergencyexercisesateachofOntario’snuclearstations.Publicexpectationsregarding
transparency,publicconsultationandopengovernmenthavealsoevolved.Forexample,the
7FreedomofInformationRequest17-048,pg.4038AuditorGeneralofOntario,AnnualReport,Chapter3,Section3.04–EmergencyManagementinOntario,December
2017,pg.253.9SolicitorGeneral,CabinetSubmission–ChernobylAccidentReport,AnnexC–ResourcesforNuclearEmergency
Planning,February19,1987,pg.8.
9
2017PNERPhasnewcallsforregularpublicconsultationandgovernmenttransparency.These
allhaveimpactsonstaffingrequirements.
InGreenpeace’sview,theMinistryincreasesthelikelihoodthatOPG’sprivateinterestsmay
inappropriatelytaintgovernmentdecision-makingbyfailingtoanticipateandresourceits
staffingneeds.DoingsoresultsintheMinistry’soverrelianceondirectsupportfromnuclear
companies.ThisnotonlyunderminestheMinistry’sindependence,butthecompetencyofthe
publicservice.
11
Attachment2ThescreenshotbelowshowscorrespondencebetweenMinistrystaffandOPG.InAugust2013,
Greenpeace,theCanadianEnvironmentalLawAssociation(CELA)andDurhamNuclear
Awareness(DNA)metwiththeMadeleineMeilleur,theMinisterofPublicSafetyand
CorrectionalServices.FollowingthemeetingMinistrystaffaskedOPGtoclarifytheconcernswe
raisedwiththeMinisterinsteadofcarryingoutitsownindependentassessment.
June1,2018
MinisteroftheEnvironmentandClimateChange
200Scacre-CoeurBoulevard,2ndFloor
Gatineau,Quebec
K1A0H3
Re:CommentsontheConsultationPaperonApproachtoRevisingtheProjectList
Towhomitmayconcern,
Thankyoufortheopportunitytocommentonthegovernment’sConsultationPaperonApproachtoRevisingtheProjectList:ANewImpactAssessmentSystem.
ThegovernmenthasproposedtheImpactAssessmentAct(“IAA”)toreplacethe2012versionoftheCanadianEnvironmentalAssessmentAct(CEAA2012).InGreenpeace’sview,CEAA2012wasastepbackwardinenvironmentalprotection.Theprojects
designatedforenvironmentalassessmentsunderCEAA2012areinsufficient.Significantprojectswereexcludedthatcouldharmourprogresstowardssustainability.Itshould
notbeconsideredanappropriatebaselinefortheIAA
TheConsultationPaperproposesanapproachfordeterminingwhatprojectswillbe
consideredunderIAA.Greenpeaceisconcernedbythattheproposedapproachisinsufficientlyclearandtoonarrowtoencouragegovernmentauthoritiestotakeactions
thatencourageCanada’stransitiontowardsustainabledevelopment.Inshort,the
proposedapproachisinadequatetocompensatefortheerosionofenvironmental
protectioncausedbyCEAA2012.
Inthissubmission,wefocusonnuclearprojectsthatshouldbeincludedinanupdated
projectlist.Specifically,anyapproachtodesignatingprojectsshouldensurethatthe
followingprojectsareassessed:
• Allnewreactorconstructionprojects,includingproposalstobuildexperimental
SmallModularReactors(SMR);
• Reactorlife-extensionproposals,whichwereexcludedfromreviewsunderCEAA2012;and,
• Reactordecommissioningplansandwastemanagementstrategies.
ForbroadercommentsontheConsultationPaper,pleasenotethatGreenpeaceCanadasupportsthecommentsfiledbytheCanadianEnvironmentalLawAssociation(CELA).
Factorsforassessingaproject’scontributiontosustainability
TheConsultationPaperstatesthatundertheIAAwillfocusonwhetheraproject’sadverseeffectsareinthepublicinterest.Thispublicinterestdeterminationwillbe
guidedbya“project’scontributiontosustainability”.
Ifproperlyimplemented,thiscouldbeasignificantadvancementfromhow
environmentalassessmentsofnuclearprojectswerecarriedoutunderCEAA2012and1992.Unlikeotherindustries,nuclearprojectshavenotundergonesustainability
assessmentsunderCEAA2012and1992.Asdiscussedinprevioussubmissionsonthe
proposeIAA,environmentalreviewsofnuclearprojectshavealwaysfocusedstrictly
ontheeffectsofprojectsinsteadoftheircontributiontosustainability.TheConsultationPaperstatesitwishestomoveawayfromthisapproach.
However,thegovernmentshouldconsiderthatthestrictfocusoneffectsinreviewsof
nuclearprojectswasoccurringevenbeforeCEAA2012.Thiswasduetotheinfluenceof
theCanadianNuclearSafetyCommission(CNSC),whichhasadmitteditlacksthe
knowledgeandunderstandingofsustainability.1
Forexample,eventheJointReviewPanelthatassessedOntarioPowerGeneration’s
(OPG)proposaltobuilduptofournewnuclearreactorsattheDarlingtonnuclear
stationdidnotundertakeasustainabilityassessment.Thepanelacknowledgedthat
suchanassessmentwouldput“…greateremphasisonthelegacyintermsofwaste
legacyandnuclearliability.Toachievethis,anenvironmentalassessmentwouldneeda
frameworkthatlooksatthesustainabilityofaprojectstartingwiththepreparationof
theEISGuidelines,atminimum.”2
Itgoeswithoutsayingthatamoremeaningfulconsiderationoflong-livedradioactive
wasteandthetransferofaccidentliabilitytoCanadianswouldhaveimpactedthe
conclusionsandrecommendationsoftheDarlingtonenvironmentalassessment.This
failureofgovernmentauthoritiestoapplysustainabilityassessmentstonuclearprojects
evenunderCEAA1992showswhythegovernment’supdatedprojectlistmustprovide
cleardirectionstogovernmentauthoritiesrelatedtonuclearprojects.
TheConsultationPaperlistsfivefactorsforqualifyingprojectswithinfederaljurisdictionforimpactassessments.Thesefactorsare:magnitude,geographicextent,timing,
frequency,durationandreversibility.
Nuclearprojectscausesignificantadverseeffectsintermsoftheirdurationand
reversibility.Thetwomostobviousexamplesareradioactivewasteandreactor
accidents.Radioactivewasteislong-livedandeffectivelyirreversible.Theenvironmental
andsocialimpactsofanuclearaccidentsimilartoChernobylorFukushimaarealsolong-
livedandirreversible.
1CanadianEnvironmentalAssessmentAgency,DeepGeologicalRepositoryforlowandintermediatelevelradioactive
wasteproject,JointReviewPanel,Transcripts,Thursday,October3,2013,Volume15,pgs.182-185.2JointReviewPanelEnvironmentalAssessmentReport:DarlingtonNewNuclearPowerPlantProject,
June2011,Pg.140.
AsseenwiththeJointReviewPanelreviewofOPG’sproposaltobuildnewreactorsat
Darlington,theimpactnuclearwasteorreactoraccidentsonCanada’sshiftto
sustainabilityhavenotbeenassessedinCanadianenvironmentalreviews.Thisrequires
thegovernmenttostateclearlythatsuchimpactsbeassessedundertheIAAandits
supportingregulations.
Governmentauthorities–specificallytheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommission-have
usedtwoinappropriatereasonstoexcludeaccidentsandradioactivewastefrom
environmentalreviews:theassertedlowprobabilityofnuclearaccidentsandthe
existenceofpoliciesforthemanagementofradioactivewaste.
InarulingonwhetherCEAAwascorrectlyappliedtotheproposaltobuildnewreactors
atDarlington,JusticeRussellfoundthatexcludingmajoraccidentsfromenvironmental
reviewsdeprivesthepublicanddecision-makersofinformationneededtoassessthe
desirabilityofaproject.Heobserved:
“Onpolicygrounds,itislogicalthatsuchscenarios[suchasFukushimaor
Chernobyl]shouldbeconsideredbypoliticaldecision-makers,becauseonce
againtheyseemtoengagemainlyquestionof“society’schosenlevelof
protectionagainstrisk”thatwillbedifficultforaspecializedregulatorytoassess
withlegitimacy.”3
Frequencyisincludedasafactortobeconsideredindeterminingprojectsunderthe
IAA.Greenpeacerequeststhegovernmentclarifythataprecautionaryapproachbe
usedtotheapplicationoffrequencyifforeseeableconsequencesmaybeirreversibleor
oflongduration.
TheexistenceoftheNuclearLiabilityandCompensationAct,whichtransfersthefinancialrisksofnuclearaccidentsfromreactoroperatorsandsupplierstoCanadians,
showsthattheimpactsofnuclearaccidentsarewithinfederaljurisdiction.Considering
thatCanadiansshouldertheriskofnuclearaccidents,thefederalgovernmentshould
ensurethepublicisprovidedfullinformationonthepotentialimpactofsuchaccidents
beforeprojectsareallowedtoproceed.
Recommendation:Thefederalgovernment’sapproachtodeterminingprojectsunder
theIAAshouldstatethatanyreactorprojectcoveredbytheNuclearLiabilityandCompensationActwillundergoanassessmentundertheIAA.
Asnoted,governmentauthoritieshavealsocitedtheexistenceofpoliciestojustify
ignoringthepotentialenvironmentalandsocialimpactsofradioactivewasteproduction
fromenvironmentalreviews.
DurhamRegion,whichhoststenreactorsattheDarlingtonandPickeringnuclear
stations,hasstatedthatthecurrentenvironmentalassessmentprocesshasnotproperly
assessedtheimpactsofradioactivewastes.DurhamRegioncontendsthattheexclusion
3GreenpeaceCanadav.Canada(AttorneyGeneral),2014FC463(CanLII),Paragraph331
orradioactivewasteassessmentfromenvironmentalreviewshasleadtoan
unacceptablesituationwherereactoroperatorsandthefederalgovernmenthavebeen
allowedtopostponedecisionsonthelong-termmanagementofradioactivewaste.
Asnoted,reactoroperationcreatesradioactivewaste.Nuclearwasteisanadverse
effectinthatisbothlonginduration–arguablypermanentforsometypesofwaste–
andirreversible.Thus,thegovernmentshouldmakeclearinitsregulationsthatany
projectproposalthatmaycreatelong-livedradioactivewasteswillundergoareview
undertheIAA.
Inlinewiththis,DurhamRegionhasaskedthegovernmenttoensurethat:“Approvalof
anuclearprojectshouldrequireaproponenttohaveanuclearwastedisposalsolution
availablebeforethenew/refurbishednuclearreactorsarepermittedtooperate.”4
DurhamRegion’srecommendationisalignedwithakeyobjectiveofsustainability
assessment;thatis,todiscouragedecisionsthatwillresultinthetransferofadverse
effectsorriskstofuturegenerations.5
Recommendation:Thefederalgovernment’sapproachtodeterminingprojectsshould
statethatanyreactorprojectthatcreateslong-livedradioactivewasteswillundergoan
assessmentundertheIAA.Thisincludesbothproposalstoextendtheoperationallives
ofexistingstationsandtheconstructionofnewreactors,includingprototypeSmall
ModularReactors(SMR).
DecommissioningandWasteManagement
ThegovernmentshouldensuretheIAA’ssupportingregulationsappropriatelycompensateforthehistoricfailureofgovernmentpoliciestoopenlyconsiderthe
adverseeffectsofradioactivewasteproduction.Thisincludesnewstrategicimpact
assessmentsofdecommissioningandradioactivemanagementplans.
NuclearstationswerebuiltinCanadawithoutenvironmentalreviews.Theywerebuilt
andallowedtooperatebasedonthepromisethattheradioactivewastesproducedby
thestationwouldbesenttootheroff-sitewastemanagementfacilities.Thestation’s
communityacceptance–whatwenowcall“sociallicence”-hasbeenbasedonthis
promise.
Afterseveraldecades,ithasbecomeevidenttosomereactorhostcommunitiesthat
radioactivewastemayremainon-siteforextendedperiodoftimeifnotpermanently.
Forexample,thePickeringnuclearissettoclose,butthereisstillnoapprovedoff-site
planforthelong-termmanagementthelong-livedradioactivewastesproducedbythe
station.
4GarryCubitt(ChiefAdministrativeOfficer,DurhamRegion)toKevinBlair(MajorProjectsManagementOffice,
NaturalResourcesCanada),“EnvironmentalandRegulatoryReviewsDiscussionPaper,”August28,2017.5Gibson,R.B.(2006).Sustainabilityassessment:Basiccomponentsofapracticalapproach.ImpactAssessmentand
ProjectAppraisal24(3):170-182.
Inlightofthis,DurhamRegionhasrequestedtobefinanciallycompensatedforthe
long-termstorageofradioactivewastesatthePickeringandDarlingtonnuclear
stations.6Fromtheperspectiveofenvironmentalprotection,theforeseeablepossibility
thatreactorsitesmayunintentionallyevolveintolong-termradioactivewastestorage
facilitiesraisesquestionsofwhethersuchplansshouldbeproactivelyassessedunder
theIAA.
CitingthelackofclarityrelatedtoreactordecommissioningundertheupdatedIAA,DurhamRegionhasaskedtheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommission(CNSC)“….to
committhattheRegionofDurhamwillbeformallynotifiedofandengagedinthe
decision-makingprocesswithrespecttoconductinganEAforPNGSdecommissioning
sinceourcommunitywillbedirectlyaffectedfordecadesbythedecommissioning
process.”7Greenpeacesupportstheinclusionofreactordecommissioningonthe
projectlist.
Insummary,Greenpeaceurgesthegovernmenttoensurethatitsapproachto
determiningprojectsundertheIAAconsidersthehistoricweaknessesinthe
government’soversightofradioactivewasteproduction.Withoutcleardirectionfrom
thefederalgovernment,decommissionednuclearstationsmayinadvertentlybecome
long-termradioactivewastestoragefacilitieswithoutappropriatereviewsofhowto
mitigatepotentialadverseeffects.Itisthusimperativethatstrategicimpact
assessmentsofdecommissioningbeincludedontheIAA’sprojectlist.
Recommendation:Thefederalgovernment’sapproachtodeterminingprojectsunder
theIAAshouldincludethedecommissioningplansofexistingnuclearstations,including
contingencyplansforlong-termwastemanagementatthesite.
Conclusion
Thankyouforthisopportunitytocommentonthegovernment’sConsultationPaperonthegovernment’sapproachtorevisingtheprojectlistundertheproposedImpactAssessmentAct.Pleasedon’thesitatetocontactmeifyourequireanyclarifications.
Truly,
Shawn-PatrickStensil
SeniorEnergyAnalyst,GreenpeaceCanada
6DurhamRegion,SubmissionfromtheRegionalMunicipalityofDurhamregardingtheapplicationofOntarioPowerGeneration(OPG)torenewthePowerReactorOperatingLicenceforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation(PNGS)fromSeptember1,2018toAugust31,2028,May7,2018,pg.14.7Ibid,pg.16.