Download pdf - Shiloh: A Battlefield Guide (This Hallowed Ground: Guides to Civil Wa)

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This Hallowed Ground: Guides to Civil War Battlefields

S E R I E S E D I T O R S

Brooks D. Simpson

Arizona State University

Mark Grimsley

The Ohio State University

Steven E. Woodworth

Texas Christian University

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Cartography by Christopher L. Brest

University of Nebraska Press

Lincoln and London

•

SHILOH

A BATTLEFIELD GUIDE

BY MARK GRIMSLEY AND

STEVEN E. WOODWORTH

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© 2006 by the Board of Regents of the University

of Nebraska. All rights reserved. Manufactured in

the United States of America.

Text set by G&S Typesetters, Inc., in Linotype Swift,

designed by Gerard Unger, with Helvetica display.

Book designed by Richard Eckersley. Book printed

by Edwards Brothers, Inc.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Grimsley, Mark.

Shiloh : a battlefield guide / by Mark Grimsley and

Steven E. Woodworth.

p. cm. – (This hallowed ground : guides to Civil War

battlefields) Includes bibliographical references.

isbn-13: 978-0-8032-7100-5 (paperback : alk. paper)

isbn-10: 0-8032-7100-x (paperback : alkaline paper)

1. Shiloh, Battle of, Tenn., 1862. 2. Shiloh National

Military Park (Tenn.) – Guidebooks. i. Woodworth,

Steven E. ii. Title. iii. This hallowed ground.

e473.54.g75 2006 976.8'04–dc22 2005011383

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Acknowledgments viii

Introduction xi

How to Use This Guide xiii

The Shiloh Campaign: March–April 1862 3

overview of the first day, april 6, 1862 11

stop 1 Pittsburg Landing, March 1862 13

1a Union Commanders Select an Encampment,

March 17–April 5 13

1b The Confederates Plan an Attack, March 15–April 1 15

stop 2 Shiloh Church, April 4–5 17

stop 3 Fraley Field, April 6 20

3a Powell’s Reconnaissance, April 6, 3:00–5:30 a.m. 21

3b The Confederate Army Advances, April 3–5 23

3c “Tonight We Will Water Our Horses in the Tennessee River,”

April 6, 5:30 a.m. 24

stop 4 Peabody’s Battle Line, 5:30– 8:00 a.m. 27

stop 5 Peabody’s Camp, 8:00– 8:30 a.m. 30

Eastern Route, April 6 32

east stop 6 Spain Field, 7:30–10:00 a.m. 32

6a Miller’s Brigade Deploys, 7:30– 8:00 a.m. 33

6b Gladden’s Brigade Attacks, 8:30–9:00 a.m. 35

6c The Collapse of Miller’s Defense, 8:30–9:00 a.m. 37

6d Chalmers and Jackson Redeploy, 9:00–10:00 a.m. 39

east stop 7 McCuller’s Field, 10:00–11:00 a.m. 41

east stop 8 Stuart’s Defense, 11:00–11:30 a.m. 43

east stop 9 The Peach Orchard, 7:30 a.m.–2:30 p.m. 46

9a Hurlbut to the Rescue, 7:30– 8:30 a.m. 47

9b Hurlbut Deploys, 8:30–9:30 a.m. 49

9c The First “Attack,” 9:00–10:00 a.m. 51

9d The Formation of the Sunken Road Position,

10:00–11:00 a.m. 53

9e “A Few More Charges and the Day Is Ours,” 12:30–2:00 p.m. 56

Contents

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9f The First Assaults, 2:00–2:30 p.m. 58

Hornets’ Nest Excursion 59

stop a 31st Indiana Infantry 60

stop b 12th Michigan Infantry 61

stop c Hickenlooper’s Battery 62

stop d Arkansas State Memorial 63

stop e Munch’s Battery Monument 65

stop f 7th Iowa Infantry 66

stop g 2nd Iowa Infantry 67

east stop 10 The Collapse of the Union Left, 2:00– 4:00 p.m. 69

east stop 11 Johnston’s Death, 2:30 p.m. 71

Western Route, April 6 73

west stop 6 Rea Field, 6:00– 8:00 a.m. 73

6a Sherman’s Division Is Attacked, 6:00–7:00 a.m. 74

6b The 53rd Ohio Fights and Retreats, 7:00– 8:00 a.m. 77

west stop 7 Shiloh Branch, 6:00– 8:00 a.m. 80

west stop 8 Ridge near Shiloh Church 83

8a Buckland’s Brigade Holds Fast, 8:30–10:00 a.m. 84

8b Sherman’s Division Fights and Falls Back, 8:00–10:00 a.m. 86

west stop 9 On the Hamburg-Purdy Road, 10:30–11:00 a.m. 89

west stop 10 Review Field, 10:30–11:00 a.m. 92

west stop 11 McClernand’s Camps 95

11a The Confederates Advance, 11:00–11:30 a.m. 96

11b The Federals Counterattack, 11:30 a.m.–1:00 p.m. 98

west stop 12 Duncan Field, 10:00 a.m.– 4:30 p.m. 101

west stop 13 Hell’s Hollow, 4:00–5:00 p.m. 105

stop 14 Grant’s Last Line, 5 :00 – 6:30 p.m. 108

Dill Branch Excursion 111

overview of the second day, april 7, 1862 113

Eastern Route, April 7 115

east stop 15 The Line of Departure, 5:00 a.m. 115

east stop 16 Wicker Field, 5:00–10:00 a.m. 117

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east stop 17 Bloody Pond, 10:00–11:00 a.m. 119

east stop 18 Davis Wheat Field 122

18a The Federals Attack, 10:30–11:30 a.m. 123

18b The Confederates Counterattack, 11:30 a.m.– 12:00 noon 125

Western Route, April 7 126

west stop 15 Lew Wallace’s Approach, April 6, 12:00 noon–7:15 p.m. 126

west stop 16 Tilghman Branch, 6:30–9:00 a.m. 130

west stop 17 Jones Field, 9:00 a.m.–12:00 noon 132

west stop 18 Sowell Field, 12:00 noon 135

west stop 19 Water Oaks Pond, 12:00 noon–2:00 p.m. 138

afterword The Corinth Campaign, April 8–May 30, 1862 141

appendix a The Union and Confederate Commands on April 6, 1862 145

appendix b Orders of Battle 151

appendix c Organization, Weapons, and Tactics 156

Sources 167

For Further Reading 171

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to extend their

sincere appreciation to Stacy D. Allen,

the National Park Service historian at

Shiloh National Military Park. Stacy

probably knows more about the battle

than anyone, living or dead, and his as-

sistance has greatly improved this

guide.

During the summer of 1998, Mark

Grimsley conducted a staff ride of the

battlefield with the officer cadre of the

3/502nd Infantry Battalion, then com-

manded by Lt. Col. William O. Odom. As

always in such cases, the learning expe-

rience was decidedly mutual. Mark

benefited from it considerably in

preparing his share of the guide.

Finally, we have dedicated this book

to Lt. Col. John F. Guilmartin Jr. (usaf,

Ret.), who flew rescue helicopters dur-

ing the Vietnam War, received the Silver

Star for valor under fire, and received a

PhD from Princeton (which, to hear him

tell it, required considerable valor as

well). A gifted historian, Joe is an even

more gifted teacher. Steve had the privi-

lege of studying under Joe at Rice Uni-

versity. Mark had the same privilege at

The Ohio State University and currently

enjoys the pleasure of having Joe as a

fellow colleague. Joe epitomizes the

term “soldier-scholar.” He is also a gen-

erous friend, a born raconteur, and a

mean hand with a barbecue.

The frontispiece of this book is from

the collection of the Library of Congress

Prints and Photographs Division. All

other illustrations first appeared in

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4 vols.,

ed. Robert Underwood Johnson and

Clarence Clough Buel (New York: Cen-

tury Co., 1887—88). The volume and

page number from which each illustra-

tion was taken appear at the end of

each caption.

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For John F. Guilmartin Jr. Teacher, colleague, and friend

On the skirmish line, blcw 1:465

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On the skirmish line, blcw 3:31

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Introduction

People visit Civil War battlefields to see the ground. This

guide, like its companion volumes in this series, is designed

to help them understand what they see. With a little assis-

tance, they can quickly discern how an almost imperceptible

ridgeline could offer crucial advantages in terms of observa-

tion and fields of fire. They can imagine how an ordinary

patch of undergrowth could disrupt an orderly line of battle.

They can perceive the significance of minor streams, ravines,

and other terrain features that in peacetime easily pass un-

noticed. In short, visitors can extend their appreciation of

the battlefield well beyond the simple reading of plaques or

contemplation of statues and monuments.

Other guides exist, at least for some battlefields. But the

one in your hands was carefully crafted to fill a niche be-

tween the cursory overviews of the battle available in bro-

chures or pamphlets and the detailed treatment of battle ter-

rain and action offered in (for example) the series of U. S.

Army War College guides, which were originally devised for

professional officers. Although outstanding for that purpose,

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the War College guides consist primarily of contemporary

after-action reports, which are often opaquely written, self-

serving (the tendency of commanders to cover one’s rear end

is hardly a modern development), and require considerable

self-study to master. By contrast, Shiloh: A Battlefield Guide is

designed for people who are willing to invest a day exam-

ining the battlefield but who are not necessarily experts—

though we believe even experts will learn a thing or two. The

authors describe what happened, tell you why it mattered,

and whenever possible emphasize the influence of terrain.

Descriptions and maps convey the appearance of the battle-

field in 1862, the position of the contending forces, and the

action in various areas on the field. Although the guide is not

an exhaustive treatment of the entire engagement, it ex-

plores the major (and some of the not-so-major) fighting that

made up the battle of Shiloh.

Finally, while users might benefit from perusing the guide

before visiting the battlefield, such preparation is not essen-

tial. One can simply pick up the guide, drive out to the battle-

field, and begin touring immediately.

The main tour can be completed in approximately six

hours. Also included are two walking excursions, including

one to the so-called Hornets’ Nest, or Sunken Road. Short

summaries of the campaign and of each day’s operations help

establish context. At the end of the guide, there is an abbre-

viated order of battle listing the units present on the field, a

glossary of terms, a discussion of tactics and weaponry, and

a bibliography for further reading.

xii Introduction

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How to Use This Guide

This book is divided into 29 main stops. These proceed from

one part of the battlefield to another in chronological order.

That is, the tour follows the battle as it progressed, from the

morning of April 6 through the afternoon of April 7. Most

stops require about 10 to 15 minutes to complete. A few, such

as the Peach Orchard, take a bit longer. Only a few stops re-

quire users to walk more than 50 yards from their car.

Some of the main stops are divided into two or more sub-

stops. Substops seldom ask you to do much additional walk-

ing. They are simply designed to develop the action at each

point in a clear, organized fashion, and there are as many

substops as required to do the job. In the guidebook, each

substop has a section of text “married” to a map. This tech-

nique enables you to visualize the troop dispositions and

movements at each stop without having to flip around the

guide looking for maps.

The stops and substops follow a standard format: Direc-

tions, Orientation, What Happened, Analysis, and/or Vignette.

The Directions tell you how to get from one stop to the

next (and sometimes from one substop to another). They not

only give you driving instructions but also ask you, once you

have reached a given stop, to walk to a precise spot on the

battlefield. When driving, keep an eye on your odometer;

many distances are given to the nearest tenth of a mile. Im-

portant note: The directions often suggest points of interest

en route from one stop to another. We have found that it

works best to give the directions to a given stop first and then

mention the points of interest. These are always introduced

by the italicized words en route.

Orientation. Once you’ve reached a stop, this section de-

scribes the terrain around you so that you can quickly pick

out the key terrain and get your bearings.

What Happened. This is the heart of each stop. It explains

the action succinctly without becoming simplistic, and when-

ever possible it also explains how the terrain affected the

fighting.

Many stops have a section called Analysis, which explains

why a particular decision was made, why a given attack met

with success or failure, and so on. The purpose is to give you

additional insight into the battle.

Others have a section called Vignette, whose purpose is

to enhance your emotional understanding of the battle by

offering a short eyewitness account or a particularly vivid

anecdote.

Although the basic tour can be completed in about six

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hours, you can also take Excursions to places of special in-

terest. These sections use the same format as the basic stops.

A few conventions are used in the guidebook to keep con-

fusion to a minimum. We have tried not to burden the text

with a proliferation of names and unit designations. They are

used as sparingly as a solid understanding of the battle per-

mits. Names of Confederate leaders and field units are in ital-

ics. The full name and rank of each individual is usually

given only the first time he is mentioned; the Order of Battle

in the back of the book can remind you of precise ranks when

needed.

Directions are particularly important in a guidebook, but

we know that they can often be confusing. We have therefore

tried to make them as foolproof as possible. At each stop

you are asked to face a specific, easily identifiable landmark.

From that point you may be asked to look to your left or

right. To make this as precise as possible, we may sometimes

ask you to look to your left front, left, left rear, or such, ac-

cording to the system shown below:

straight ahead

left front right front

left right

left rear right rear

behind/directly to the rear

Often, after the relative directions (left, right, etc.), we add

the compass directions (north, south, etc.) in parentheses.

The maps can also help you get your bearings.

The many War Department tablets are also excellent tools

for understanding the battlefield. Those outlined in blue rep-

resent units belonging to Grant’s army (identified for the

sake of convenience as the Army of the Tennessee, though it

did not officially acquire that name until after the battle);

those in red correspond to units belonging to the Confeder-

ate army (dubbed the Army of the Mississippi); those in yel-

low indicate units belonging to Buell’s army (the Army of the

Ohio). Square tablets designate positions occupied during

the first day’s battle. Oval tablets identify positions occupied

on the second day.

Monuments commemorate many Union regiments (and a

few Confederate ones), each placed at a key point where a

unit fought, usually its main line of defense. The monument

itself usually occupies the center of the position. The direc-

tions routinely use War Department tablets, National Park

Service interpretive markers, and monuments to help you

orient yourself.

xiv How to Use This Guide

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Although this guidebook is intended primarily for use

on the battlefield, it also contains information helpful for

further study of the battle. A campaign introduction at the

beginning of the book describes the action that preceded Shi-

loh; a similar section at the end tells what happened after-

ward. The stops for each day are preceded by overviews that

outline the day’s main developments.

One final note: Each guide in this series develops the action

in chronological order to the greatest extent possible. We

want your tour of the battlefield to unfold just as the battle

itself unfolded. But because Shiloh was essentially a vast

shoving match—the Confederates pushed the Federals north-

ward on the first day, the Federals did the same in reverse on

the second day—a strictly chronological approach would

have you constantly weaving back and forth in a confusing

pattern of zigzags. For that reason we have created a two-axis

system so that you can follow the action as it progressed on

the eastern side of the battlefield, then on the western side

(or vice versa). The result is a far more coherent picture of the

fighting.

We hope you enjoy your battlefield tour of Shiloh.

Mark Grimsley,

Brooks D. Simpson, &

Steven E. Woodworth

series editors

xv How to Use This Guide

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Battle of Shiloh byThure de Thulstruplc-usz62-3583

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2 The Shiloh Campaign

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Visitors Center

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The Shiloh Campaign

When Confederates fired on Fort Sumter, South Carolina, in

April 1861, the regular U.S. Army numbered scarcely 16,000

officers and men. The Confederacy possessed no regular

army at all, merely a few hundred U.S. Army officers who had

resigned their commissions to join the South. But both sides

would soon employ hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and

in doing so face the task of raising large armies almost from

scratch. Both sides decided to use the state volunteer system.

Each president called on each of his states to provide a cer-

tain quota of troops, organized into regiments of about a

thousand men. To create these regiments, state governors

depended on local politicians or community leaders to raise

companies of volunteers. These companies were hometown

affairs, made up of “boys” and men who had known each

other long before the war. With colorful and warlike names,

homemade banners, and homemade uniforms (or no uni-

forms at all), companies like the Rockford Zouaves (of Illi-

nois) or the Raymond Fencibles (of Mississippi) marched off

to battle as representatives and extensions of their home-

towns, often with the community leaders who had taken

the lead in recruiting now serving as their officers. At large

rendezvous camps, often in or near the state capitals, these

homespun outfits combined into regiments of ten com-

panies. They packed away their company flags or sent them

home— only regiments would carry colors now—and re-

ceived new names. The Rockford Zouaves, for example, offi-

cially became Company F, 11th Illinois Volunteer Infantry.

The officers in the various companies then elected a colonel

and other field officers from among their number.

All this took a great deal of time and was plagued by er-

rors, confusion, and false starts. Lincoln initially called for

only 75,000 volunteers to serve for three months, the legal

term established by the Uniform Militia Act of 1792. By the

end of the summer of 1861, that term had expired. But by

then the Northern states, again at Lincoln’s behest, were rais-

ing vastly larger armies of volunteers for two and three years’

service. Some of the three-month regiments reenlisted as a

body for three-year terms, among them the 11th Illinois, in-

cluding the erstwhile Rockford Zouaves. Much larger num-

bers of troops enlisted for the first time in the fall of 1861.

Through that fall, winter, and spring, the North continued to

raise its armies and forward them to their jump-off points for

offensives into the South. For the Mississippi Valley cam-

paign, that point was Cairo (pronounced “KAY-ro”), Illinois,

where the Ohio River joins the Mississippi.

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The South got off to a somewhat better start, thanks to

Confederate president Jefferson Davis’s legal ability to sum-

mon volunteers for twelve months, not three. But the first-

organized regiments from all the Southern states, including

as they did disproportionate numbers of those who had mil-

itary training or Mexican War experience, generally went to

Virginia to defend the Confederate capital at Richmond. The

first defensive arrangements west of the Appalachians were

made by Tennessee governor Isham G. Harris and adopted by

Confederate authorities once Tennessee formally joined the

Confederacy in June 1861. Harris’s preparations, however, re-

lied on the self-proclaimed neutrality of Kentucky, whose

government forbade troops of either side to cross its borders.

This prohibition was an important benefit to the South since

it protected Tennessee’s entire northern boundary and Lin-

coln felt compelled to respect it, for losing Kentucky, he

feared, might well mean losing the whole war.

It was disastrous for the South, therefore, when in Septem-

ber 1861 Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, commanding Confederate

forces in the Mississippi Valley, decided on his own question-

able authority to violate Kentucky neutrality by occupying

the Mississippi River town of Columbus, Kentucky. Although

sensible in purely military terms—Columbus stands atop a

high bluff that commands the river for miles—politically the

incursion drove most Kentuckians into the arms of the Union.

While some citizens of the Bluegrass State would fight for the

South (including at Shiloh), four times as many would don the

blue. Even worse, Tennessee’s long, nearly defenseless north-

ern border was now open to Union invasion.

That invasion did not come at once. A few days after he

seized Columbus, Polk was superseded as overall western

Confederate commander by his old West Point classmate Al-

bert Sidney Johnston. Colonel of the crack 2nd U.S. Cavalry be-

fore the war and a brevet (honorary) brigadier general, John-

ston had one of the best reputations in the pre–Civil War U.S.

Army. Now as a full Confederate general, he was responsible

for defending all Southern territory from the Appalachians

to the Great Plains. The resources available to him were so

scant that he based his strategy on bluff, keeping his troops

spread out and pushed well forward to create the illusion of

having greater strength. Coupled with the North’s slowness

in raising a large army and the hesitation of the Union gen-

erals who confronted him, Johnston’s deception worked—for

a time.

During the winter of 1861– 62, Union forces in the valleys

of the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers were under the com-

mand of Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, a learned but cautious


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officer. Commanding at the post of Cairo under Halleck

was Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, who had plenty of aggres-

siveness. In November 1861 Grant took some of his troops on

a foray down the Mississippi, resulting in the small and in-

conclusive battle of Belmont, Missouri. Grant’s intention,

however, had been to rip open the Confederate defenses of

the Mississippi Valley. When it failed to happen, he down-

played the movement.

Then, in early 1862, Grant made plans for another foray,

this time with Halleck’s approval and the cooperation of

a squadron of ironclad gunboats under the command of

U.S. Navy flag officer Andrew H. Foote. The gunboats proved

too much for the ill-sited and incomplete Confederate Fort

Henry, guarding the Tennessee River, and it surrendered on

February 6, 1862, before Grant’s ground troops could even

get into position. Johnston had ordered Polk to see to it that the

fortifications along the Tennessee River were completed, but

the latter officer had not done so. Grant then marched a

few miles eastward to the Cumberland River and attacked

Fort Donelson. That bastion proved more difficult than its sis-

ter fort on the Tennessee. Confederate artillerists fended off

the gunboats, and the infantry garrison made a sally that

caught Grant by surprise and for a time drove back the Fed-

erals. Grant, however, refused to accept defeat and counter-

attacked. Taking advantage of a mistake by the Rebel com-

mander, he pushed the Confederates into their fortifications

again, where they surrendered next morning, February 16.

The surrender of Fort Donelson cost the Confederacy not

only the fort and control of the Cumberland River but also

15,000 prisoners of war—soldiers Johnston could ill afford to

lose. Once again Johnston’s orders, this time for the garrison to

fight its way out of Donelson, had been ignored.

These twin Confederate disasters had enormous conse-

quences. Union gunboats, transports, and supply vessels

could now range up the Tennessee River all the way to Muscle

Shoals, Alabama, cutting railroad bridges and penetrating to

such Southern heartland states as Mississippi and Alabama.

The fall of the Cumberland River gave the Union the city of

Nashville, capital of Tennessee, which capitulated without a

fight on February 25. With these two rivers under Federal

control, Polk’s bastion at Columbus, on the Mississippi, was ef-

fectively “turned” and had to be abandoned. Other Rebel de-

fenses along the Mississippi proved inadequate, and by the

beginning of April, Union naval and land forces were ap-

proaching Memphis, with every prospect of taking it.

As a result of this campaign, Grant gained national fame

and a major general’s commission. Unfortunately he also


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gained the intense jealousy of his commander, Halleck. The

latter ordered Grant’s army (identified at the Shiloh National

Military Park and in this guidebook as the Army of the Ten-

nessee, though officially it gained that name only months af-

ter the battle) to proceed up the Tennessee River toward the

Mississippi border and await his arrival and that of another

Union army, now also under Halleck’s supervision, under the

command of Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell. Buell’s army had

advanced from central Kentucky to occupy Nashville after

Grant’s offensive had forced the Confederates out of that city.

Now Buell was to advance overland from Nashville to Grant’s

camp along the Tennessee. Then the combined armies, under

the direct personal command of Halleck, would advance on

the key railroad-junction town of Corinth in northeastern

Mississippi.

In the meantime Halleck trumped up unfounded allega-

tions that Grant had taken to the bottle—in a supposed re-

lapse of problems he had experienced in the Old Army—and

that he was not properly communicating with Halleck’s

headquarters. He therefore relieved Grant and turned over

command of the Army of the Tennessee to Grant’s senior di-

vision commander (and former West Point commandant),

Charles F. Smith. Providence intervened, however. Smith in-

jured his leg climbing into a small boat. The wound became

infected, and a seriously ill Smith took to his bed, allowing

Grant to resume command of his army in late March.

The Army of the Tennessee had encamped on a high,

rolling plateau on the west bank of the Tennessee River just

north of the Mississippi line and about twenty miles from

Corinth. The place, named after a little nearby stopping place

for steamboats, Pittsburg Landing, was an ideal jumping-

off spot for a campaign against Corinth. Grant himself made

his headquarters ten miles downstream (or to the north) at

Savannah, Tennessee. Camped nearby were the various divi-

sions of his army, which by April 6 numbered six, each aver-

aging about 7,000 men.

The 1st Division, commanded by Illinois politician Brig.

Gen. John A. McClernand, had born the brunt of the heavy

fighting at Donelson. It camped near Pittsburg Landing along

with the 2nd Division. Originally commanded by Charles

Smith, the 2nd was now commanded by newly promoted Brig.

Gen. William H. L. Wallace, also of Illinois. Grant was highly

impressed with Wallace, who was one of the rising stars of

the army. Wallace’s men, like McClernand’s, were veterans of

Fort Donelson. Grant’s other veteran division, the 3rd, com-

manded by Brig. Gen. Lew Wallace of Indiana, camped about


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five miles downstream from Pittsburg Landing at Crump’s

Landing.

The 4th and 5th Divisions, mostly inexperienced new

troops, were organized immediately before the army moved

up the Tennessee River in mid-March. The 6th Division came

into existence at its encampment inland from Pittsburg

Landing. By the time Brig. Gen. Benjamin Prentiss began or-

ganizing his command, good campsites close to the landing

were scarce, so his green division found itself on the out-

skirts of the Union camp. Also in a front-line position was

Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman’s 5th Division. Sherman’s had

been one of the first two divisions to disembark at Pittsburg

Landing and had orders from Charles Smith, then com-

manding the expedition, to push far enough inland to allow

camps behind it for three other divisions. Sherman was the

only West Pointer among the division commanders. Until

formal notification of John A. McClernand’s promotion to

major general arrived the day before the battle, Sherman was

also the senior officer in the encampment. His own head-

quarters was near a little Methodist meeting house called

Shiloh Church.

While Grant waited and organized his growing army, and

while Buell slowly approached from Nashville, Albert Sidney

Johnston looked for an opportunity to reverse his previous dis-

mal fortunes. Much of Confederate public opinion turned

against him after the debacles at Forts Henry and Donelson

and sent up a hue and cry for his removal. Johnston could not

have helped but realize that both his own career and the

long-term survival of the Confederacy depended on his find-

ing a way to hurl back the Union advance into the Southern

heartland.

Grant’s February advance up the Tennessee River had sev-

ered Confederate defenses. Johnston himself retained direct

personal command of the forces east of the Tennessee River,

leading them back from Bowling Green, Kentucky, through

Nashville, then southward, and finally west, through north-

ern Alabama below the southernmost bend of the Tennessee

River. The forces west of the Tennessee came under the com-

mand of Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard. The fortuitous hero of

Fort Sumter and of First Manassas (First Bull Run), Beaure-

gard made himself obnoxious in his Virginia assignment

through his constant propensity to meddle in politics. That,

and the desire of Jefferson Davis to aid Johnston without sub-

tracting troops from the eastern theater, led to Beauregard’s

transfer west. When Beauregard arrived, Johnston set him to

supervising Polk in withdrawing the western segment of Con-


01-N3554 11/10/05 5:23 AM Page 7

federate forces southward through West Tennessee and into

Mississippi.

Both of these sundered halves were striving toward

Corinth, Mississippi, where the north-south Mobile & Ohio

Railroad crossed the Memphis & Charleston, an east-west

route that Confederate secretary of war George W. Randolph

called “the vertebrae of the Confederacy.” This spring, all mil-

itary movements—in the West at least—seemed to lead to

Corinth.

Also headed for that rail junction was a contingent of

troops under Brig. Gen. Braxton Bragg. The general and his

men had previously been stationed around Mobile, Alabama,

and Pensacola, Florida, where for a year they did little but

drill. In the spring of 1861, while the eyes of the nation had

been on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, Bragg’s command

had watched another Union post, Fort Pickens, off Pensacola.

Although war had started at Sumter, Bragg and his men had

remained in Florida, where the general had excelled at train-

ing his new troops. In the crisis after the fall of Forts Henry

and Donelson, President Davis finally gave Bragg orders to

take his command to an active fighting front, sending him

to reinforce Johnston. Bragg’s troops moved up the Mobile &

Ohio Railroad and reached Corinth before either Beauregard

or Johnston, securing the vital rail junction, at least for the

time being.

When Confederate forces concentrated at Corinth, John-

ston had about 40,000 men in all. He gave Beauregard, his sec-

ond in command, the task of organizing these troops. On

March 29 Beauregard divided the troops into three corps and

a “Reserve.” The First Corps was commanded by Polk, the

Second by Bragg, the Third by Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee, and

the Reserve by Maj. Gen. George B. Crittenden. Bragg’s Corps

was somewhat oversized, at about 13,000 men, while Critten-

den’s Reserve was rather small. Crittenden himself was soon re-

moved from his position due to allegations of intoxication

while on duty connected with the minor Confederate deba-

cle at Mill Springs, Kentucky, on January 19, 1862. His re-

placement, almost on the eve of the march to battle, was for-

mer U.S. senator and vice president John C. Breckinridge of

Kentucky, now a major general in the Confederate army.

Even with his combined force, Johnston obviously could not

afford to wait for Halleck to organize an even larger force

and march down to besiege him at Corinth. Johnston’s only

hope was to seize the initiative and attack the Union force in

its component parts before they could combine into an un-

stoppable juggernaut. Just as obviously, this would have to

mean attacking Grant before Buell could arrive to reinforce


01-N3554 11/10/05 5:23 AM Page 8

him. Yet Johnston’s newly cobbled-together army, literally only

days old as a unit, needed all the time it could get to sort out

its organization and prepare for battle. Johnston’s plan then

was to wait until his scouts informed him that Buell’s junc-

tion with Grant was imminent.

Late on the evening of April 2, 1862, that notice arrived.

Johnston directed Beauregard to draft orders for the army to

march at daybreak the next morning for Pittsburg Landing.

His plan was that the army should cover the twenty miles or

so to the Union position in a single long march on April 3.

Then at dawn on Friday, April 4, the Confederates would at-

tack Grant’s army as it lay in its camps on the west bank of

the Tennessee, between Owl and Snake Creeks on the north

and Lick Creek on the south. As Johnston explained his battle

plan in a letter to the president, Polk’s Corps would attack on

the left, Hardee’s in the center, and Bragg’s on the right. John-

ston hoped to hit hardest with that large corps on his right

wing, crushing the Union left. He would then drive Grant’s

army away from Pittsburg Landing and possible escape into

the hopeless cul-de-sac of the swampy Owl and Snake Creek

bottoms, where he would be ruined.

But this is not quite how things worked out. In the first

place Johnston was overoptimistic to think that his inexperi-

enced, ill-trained army could march on a night’s notice and

cover twenty miles in a day. In fact many units did not even

leave their camps at Corinth until after the time when the

general had anticipated they would be in position to launch

their attacks. These troops were a far cry from the regulars

Johnston had known in prewar days on the Great Plains. A sec-

ond cause of delay lay in Beauregard’s overly complex march-

ing orders, which had units weaving in and out between

other columns at various road intersections where their

routes crossed. The old regulars themselves—had any been

present—would have been hard pressed to have conformed

to that schedule. Finally, no sooner had the march gotten un-

derway than the clouds disgorged the first drops of what

turned out to be a three-day spring rain. Tramping columns

and rolling wheels soon churned dirt roads into bottomless

mire, and the march bogged down correspondingly.

The result was that despite everyone’s best efforts, the

scheduled attack had to be postponed from April 4 to the

fifth and then again from the fifth to the sixth. By that time

Beauregard was mistakenly sure that the crucial element of

surprise had been lost, and on the evening of April 5, he

strongly urged Johnston to call off the whole operation and

drag his army back through the mud all the way to Corinth.

He was seconded by several of the corps commanders. Re-


01-N3554 11/10/05 5:23 AM Page 9

gardless, Johnston was determined that the attack should

be launched at daybreak. Early the next morning, Sunday,

April 6, as Confederate forces were deploying in preparation

for the assault, Beauregard renewed his demand for an im-

mediate retreat. Again Johnston remained resolute. As they

talked, firing broke out from the front (see Stop 3c), indicat-

ing that the battle had opened and rendering Beauregard’s ar-

gument moot.

The deployment of the Confederate army for the attack

differed from what Johnston had described in his letter to

Davis three days earlier. The orders, written under Beaure-

gard’s direction, called for each corps to stretch in a single

line of battle across the entire front of the army. Hardee’s

Corps was in front, then came Bragg’s, and then Polk’s Corps

formed a third line. Behind them came the Reserve. Hardee

found that his corps could not stretch across the whole front

and so had to borrow a brigade from Bragg to fill out his line.

This arrangement assured that once the battle started, all

Confederate organization above the level of brigade (and

sometimes even regiment) would immediately disintegrate.

Johnston apparently left the details to his second in command

and only discovered Beauregard’s alteration too late to rectify

the situation.


Lieutenant-GeneralW. J. Hardee, C.S.A.blcw 1:553

01-N3554 11/10/05 5:23 AM Page 10

Overview of the First Day, April 6, 1862

Although Johnston’s Confederates did indeed achieve strategic

surprise in their attack on the Army of the Tennessee, it was

a Union patrol from Prentiss’s division that initiated the

fighting early on the morning of April 6 as it probed forward

into Fraley Field and collided with advancing Confederates of

Hardee’s Corps. Prentiss’s division was soon fighting desper-

ately, and shortly thereafter the Rebel attack struck Sher-

man’s division, farther north on the Union right. Although

the troops of both Union commands as well as the attacking

Confederates were untested in battle, most fought stoutly

despite sometimes confused officers and always confusing

terrain.

Most of the Union camps had been laid out with little

thought of defense. When Sherman’s and Prentiss’s divisions

deployed into line of battle, their flanks did not join each

other. This became a problem for the Federals throughout

much of the day, as they succeeded in maintaining a contin-

uous battle line only for a few brief periods. The fighting de-

veloped along two separate axes, almost as if there were two

separate battles being fought parallel to and simultaneous

with each other. When the Confederates blundered into the

gap between the two halves of the Union front, the result was

usually to send one or both of those halves reeling back in re-

treat. Yet that did not happen as often as one might at first

think. The rough, broken terrain and dense thickets that

cover much of the battlefield obstructed vision even in early

April, with trees not yet fully leafed out. The Rebels could

usually discover Union positions only by plowing into them,

and unengaged Confederate units tended to march toward

the heaviest firing.

The gap between Sherman’s and Prentiss’s divisions

proved their undoing in the first phase of the battle, though

heavy Confederate numbers would soon have driven them

back anyway. McClernand came up and supported Sherman

in his second position. Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace did the

same for what was left of Prentiss’s division. In a series of in-

tense encounters, the Confederates continued to batter at the

Union lines and gradually drove them back throughout most

of the day. McClernand and Sherman, on the Union right,

staged a briefly successful counterattack around midday but

then had to continue their retreat. Wallace and Hurlbut,

with Prentiss’s remnant, made a determined stand through-

out the middle of the day along the line of the Peach Or-

chard, the Sunken Road, and a thicket called “the Hornets’

Nest.” Johnston fell while leading a midafternoon charge

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:23 AM Page 11

12 Overview of the First Day

against the Peach Orchard, and Beauregard succeeded to the

Confederate command.

Finally, late in the day, the Peach Orchard–Sunken Road

position crumbled on both its flanks. Hurlbut was driven

back on the left, and Wallace on the right lost contact with

McClernand. With Confederates surging around both sides

of the position, Wallace attempted to withdraw his division

but was wounded and left for dead. Most of his command es-

caped encirclement, but some units were trapped and had to

surrender along with General Prentiss.

With this obstacle out of the way, during the last hour of

daylight, the Confederates advanced toward a final defensive

line Grant had set up along the last high ground before the

landing. The position was strong, being protected naturally

by deep ravines. Grant had packed every available cannon, in-

cluding the army’s siege guns, into the line, and infantrymen

were aplenty as well, as the battered survivors of Sherman’s,

McClernand’s, and Hurlbut’s divisions crowded into the short-

ened line. From the river the gunboats uss Tyler and uss Lex-

ington added their heavy cannon to Grant’s defensive fire-

power, while transports ferried over the lead regiment from

Buell’s army, which began arriving at this opportune moment.

Daylight remained for only a single, immediate assault

with no extensive preparation. The odds against Confederate

success were long, and the cost would likely be high. Yet

so too were the potential rewards. Grant never could have

formed another line had this one broken. His army would

have become a disorganized mob, pushed up against the

river and forced to surrender or swim for it. The Rebels had

paid a very high price to get within this long chance of vic-

tory, and there was no telling when they would ever see such

a chance again. But Beauregard chose not to take it. From his

position well to the rear he sent orders for the troops to sus-

pend the attack, fall back, and make camp for the night. The

general believed that nothing more could be accomplished

that night, that the gunboats were slaughtering his men (in

fact their fire was not all that destructive to the front-line

Confederates), and that Buell’s army was still at least a day’s

march away. Under those circumstances he assumed his

army could finish off Grant in the morning.

Note: Road names in the tour correspond to those currently

used by the National Park Service. They differ in a few in-

stances from those used in 1862. (At the time of the battle, for

example, present-day Gladden Road was a continuation of

Eastern Corinth Road, Fraley Drive was a continuation of

Bark Road, and so on.)

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:23 AM Page 12

13 Union Commanders Select an Encampment

STOP 1 Pittsburg Landing, March 1862

Directions Leave the Visitor Center and turn left onto pittsburg landing

road. Proceed 0.1 mile to Pittsburg Landing. Alternatively, you

can easily walk from the center to the landing and back.

Stop 1a Union Commanders Select an Encampment

March 17–April 5

Directions Walk to the National Park Service interpretive marker facing

the Tennessee River. Several cabins, no longer extant, stood

near this location at the time of the battle.

What Happened Grant’s victory at Fort Donelson opened the Tennessee River

to Union navigation as far as Muscle Shoals, Alabama. But the

principal strategic objective in the region was obviously

Corinth, Mississippi, about twenty miles south of where you

presently stand. Corinth was significant because two trunk

railroads intersected there: the Mobile & Ohio and the Mem-

phis & Charleston. The latter was widely hailed as the Con-

federacy’s backbone: its only direct line of communications

Tennessee River

Lick C

reek

Tenn

esse

e R

iver

Owl Cree

k

ClearCr. Snake Creek Pittsburg Landing

ShilohChurch

Sherman’s HQ

Pittsburg Landing

Adamsville Savannah

OvershotMill

StoneyLonesome

ShilohChurch

Crump’sLanding

Hamburg- Purdy

East

ern

Cor

inth

Road

Cor

inth

Roa

d

Ham

burg-Savannah Road

Road

Shunpike

To Crump’s Landingand Lew Wallace’s3rd Division, 6 miles

To Corinth,20 miles

W. H. L. WALLACE(2nd division)

HURLBUT(4th division)

MCCLERNAND(1st Division)

SHERMAN(5th Division)

PRENTISS(6th Division)

Stuart’s Brigade(5th Division)

LEW WALLACE’S3rd Division

Stop 1a

March 17 – April 5Union commanders selectan encampment.

Stop 1

N

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:23 AM Page 13

from the Atlantic to the Mississippi. The seizure of Corinth

would not only break this “backbone” but also make the

large river port of Memphis untenable for the Confederates.

Although all but forgotten today, in the spring of 1862,

Corinth seemed nearly as important as the Confederate capi-

tal of Richmond, Virginia.

Any Union offensive against Corinth would require an

initial concentration of forces somewhere on the western

bank of the Tennessee River. That concentration began on

March 15, when Maj. Gen. Charles F. Smith instructed Brig.

Gen. William T. Sherman to land his own division and that of

Brig. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut at Pittsburg Landing. Smith,

ailing from an infected leg that would shortly prove fatal,

was downstream in Savannah and selected the landing based

on a map reconnaissance. Grant, restored to command be-

cause of Smith’s illness, inspected the landing in person and

on March 17 approved it as the best location for his army’s

advanced base. The first troops disembarked the following

day. More divisions arrived over the next several days, until

by month’s end six divisions had reached the area: five near

Pittsburg Landing and a sixth at Crump’s Landing some five

miles downstream (north). All in all, the six divisions con-

tained about 42,000 men, most without combat experience.

Analysis Grant approved Pittsburg Landing as a concentration point

because the terrain beyond it offered enough space to en-

camp 100,000 men, the total anticipated when Maj Gen.

Henry W. Halleck’s entire command—that is, the combined

forces of Grant, Brig. Gen. John Pope, and Brig. Gen. Don Car-

los Buell—eventually reached the area. Furthermore, it was

protected to the west by two streams, Owl Creek and Snake

Creek, and to the southeast by a third stream, Lick Creek. All

were swampy and nearly impassable, thereby offering the

Confederates only one avenue of attack, from the southwest.

But neither Grant, Sherman, nor any other senior com-

mander anticipated such an attack. Although the doctrines

of Dennis Hart Mahan, a West Point instructor and America’s

premier military thinker, stipulated that any position in-

volving volunteer troops—especially inexperienced ones—

should be fortified, Grant and Sherman ignored such counsel

because, in Sherman’s words, “such a course would have

made our raw men timid.” This was, at that stage of the war,

a common viewpoint.

14 Stop 1

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:23 AM Page 14

Stop 1b The Confederates Plan an Attack March 15–

April 1

Directions Remain in place.

What Happened Twenty miles south at Corinth, Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston

gathered in his own troops from Columbus and Bowling

Green, Kentucky. Additional forces arrived by rail from New

Orleans and Mobile, bringing Confederate strength to a bit

15 The Confederates Plan an Attack

M I S S O U R I

K E N T U C K YA

RKA

NSA

S

T E N N E S S E E

M I S S I S S I P P I

A L A B A M A

Columbus

Bowling Green

Island No. 10

UnionCity

Fort HenryFort Donelson

Nashville

MurfreesboroColumbiaJackson

Bethel StationCrump’s Landing Savannah

Waynesboro

Pittsburg Landing FayettevilleMemphis

Corinth

Iuka

Grenada

TuscumbiaDecatur

Huntsville

Tennessee River

Mis

siss

ippi

Riv

er

MEMPHIS &CHARLESTON RR

MO

BIL

E &

OH

IO R

R

C. F. SMITH

BUELL

POLK

VAN DORNJOHNSTON

RUGGLES

BRAGG

0 100

Miles

Stop 1b

March 15 – April 1Confederates plan an attack.

N

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:23 AM Page 15

more than 40,000 men by the end of March. Well aware that

Grant’s army would soon be heavily reinforced, Johnston con-

cluded that it must be attacked and destroyed as soon as pos-

sible.

Responsibility for organizing the Confederate force—now

designated the Army of the Mississippi—devolved upon Gen.

P. G. T. Beauregard, Johnston’s second in command and virtually

his de facto co-commander. Beauregard divided the army into

four corps of various sizes. The smallest, the Reserve, under

Brig. Gen. John C. Breckinridge, numbered only 6,439 troops,

no more than an average division. The largest, under Maj.

Gen. Braxton Bragg, contained 13,589 troops. The remaining

corps, led by Maj. Gens. Leonidas Polk and William J. Hardee,

mustered 9,136 and 6,789 men respectively. Beauregard’s ra-

tionale for the four-corps arrangement was to give the im-

pression of a much larger army, since a European corps d’ar-

mée normally contained about 20,000 men.

On April 2, reports that Buell’s army was rapidly ap-

proaching from the east made it imperative to strike Grant at

once. The next morning the leading elements of the Army of

the Mississippi left their camps around Corinth and marched

northward. As with Grant’s command, the great majority of

Confederate troops had no combat experience.

Vignette In mid-March Beauregard instructed Col. Thomas Jordan to lo-

cate Sidney Johnston, then at Decatur, Alabama, and person-

ally deliver a message conveying the urgent need to concen-

trate all available forces at Corinth and attack Grant at the

earliest possible moment. According to Jordan, Johnston read

the message, paced the floor, and then said: “It is so; the pol-

icy is correct in all its details. We should fall upon Grant like

a hurricane and overwhelm him with our concentrated army

as soon as he lands from his transports, then cross the Ten-

nessee River and give Buell battle on his way with reenforce-

ments, and thus relieve our disasters from [Fort] Donelson

down.”

16 Stop 1b

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:23 AM Page 16

STOP 2 Shiloh Church, April 4–5

Directions Return to your car, drive to the Visitor Center, and reset your

odometer. Proceed west on pittsburg landing road 0.3 mile to

corinth–pittsburg landing road. Turn left. Proceed 0.6 mile

to a fork in the road. Bear right, continuing on corinth–pitts-

burg landing road, and proceed 0.4 mile to a second fork. Bear

right again, continuing on corinth–pittsburg landing road.

After another 0.2 mile you will come to yet another fork. Bear

left this time, still continuing on corinth–pittsburg landing

road. Proceed another 0.6 mile to Shiloh Church. Pause by the

side of the road. You need not leave the car.

En route you will pass through much of the area occupied

by Union forces before the battle. None of the troops were

in defensive positions. Rather, they were simply encamped

pending the start of the great offensive against Corinth.

Orientation The Shiloh Church, to your left, is obviously a modern struc-

ture, but it stands on the site of its 1862 namesake. As of 2001

the Sons of Confederate Veterans had constructed a full-scale

replica of the original church, which was small—just 25 by

17 Shiloh Church

Tennessee River

Lick C

reek

Owl Creek Pittsburg Landing

ShilohChurch

Sherman’s HQ

Hamburg- Purdy

East

ern

Cor

inth

Road

Cor

inth

Roa

d

Ham

burg-Savannah Road

Road

To Crump’s Landingand Lew Wallace’s3rd Division, 6 miles

To Corinth,20 miles

W. H. L. WALLACE(2nd division)

HURLBUT(4th division)

MCCLERNAND(1st Division)

SHERMAN(5th Division)

PRENTISS(6th Division)

Stuart’s Brigade(5th Division)

53rd OH

ConfederateCavalry spotted,April 4, 4:00 P.M.

Stop 2April 4 – 5Shiloh Church.

Stop 2

N

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:23 AM Page 17

30 feet—and constructed of rough-hewn logs surmounted by

a clapboard roof. Organized in 1854, the congregation was

part of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South (like many de-

nominations in the prewar years, the Methodist Episcopal

Church had split into Northern and Southern branches,

largely over the issue of slavery). The church lent its name to

the battle, though in the North the engagement was for a

time known as the battle of Pittsburg Landing.

What Happened Prior to the battle, Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman’s 5th Divi-

sion occupied the ground on which you stand. As senior com-

mander whenever Grant was not present in the area, Sher-

man had day-to-day charge of the Union encampments,

which by March 31 contained five divisions and 34,500 com-

bat troops, as well as perhaps 7,500 cooks, hospital orderlies

and doctors, teamsters, and other noncombatants. Addi-

tional units continued to arrive as late as early morning of

the battle’s first day so that when the Confederates attacked,

they faced roughly 45,000 Union troops (excluding a sixth di-

vision stationed at Crump’s Landing).

Sherman had his headquarters about 500 yards to your left

rear (east-northeast of the church). On the morning of April 4,

he first received reports about the approach of a large Con-

federate force, based on a number of small firefights south of

the Union encampments, but dismissed them as nothing

more than Rebel scouting patrols. When a cavalry officer and

one of his own brigade commanders suggested the possibility

of an enemy attack, Sherman replied: “Oh! Tut, tut. You mili-

tia officers get scared too easily.” Col. Thomas Worthington

of the 46th Ohio offered the same warning, and prisoners

held at Shiloh Church spoke freely about being part of an

approaching army of 50,000 men. Sherman still refused to

credit the idea.

Finally, around 4:00 p.m. on April 5, soldiers of the 53rd

Ohio spotted enemy cavalry at the far end of Rea Field. The

colonel of the 53rd, Jesse J. Appler, sent a detachment to in-

vestigate. Shots rang out. An officer ran up to the colonel

with word that he had been fired upon by a “line of men in

butternut clothes.” (“Butternut” was the color of the home-

made dye frequently used in Confederate uniform cloth.)

Appler put his regiment in line of battle and sent word of the

encounter to Sherman. He was mortified when the courier

returned and reported, within earshot of many of the

Ohioans, “Colonel Appler, General Sherman says: ‘Take your

damned regiment back to Ohio. There is no enemy closer

than Corinth.’”

18 Stop 2

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:23 AM Page 18

Analysis Sherman’s response offers two lessons: first, how a com-

mander may overcompensate for previous errors in judg-

ment; second, the reluctance with which many comman-

ders are willing to reassess their assumptions about a given

situation.

In the autumn of 1861, while in command of a force in

Kentucky, Sherman became irrationally convinced that the

enemy confronted him in overwhelming strength. Visited

by Simon Cameron, then Lincoln’s secretary of war, he was

asked how many troops he would need to launch an offen-

sive. Two hundred thousand, Sherman replied. The number

was so ludicrously large that he was shortly relieved of com-

mand. Many regarded him as mentally unbalanced. Only im-

peccable political connections—his brother John was a U.S.

senator—gained Sherman a second chance. Having been too

jittery a few months previously, he proved overly imper-

turbable now.

Sherman was all the more unflappable because both his

immediate superior, Grant, and the overall Union com-

mander in the western theater, Halleck, were convinced that

recent Northern victories had placed the enemy firmly on the

defensive. On the same afternoon that Appler sent up his

alarm, Grant visited the Union encampment, partly in re-

sponse to Sherman’s routine reports about Confederate scout-

ing activity just to the south. Upon returning to his head-

quarters at Savannah, Grant seconded Sherman’s appraisal in

a telegram to Halleck. “I have scarcely the faintest idea of an

attack (general one) being made on us,” he wrote, adding, in

words that would return to haunt him, “but will be prepared

should such a thing take place.”

In fact the Union encampments were as ill-prepared to re-

ceive a major attack as if the Confederates were a hundred

miles away.

19 Shiloh Church

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:23 AM Page 19

STOP 3 Fraley Field, April 6

Directions Continue 0.9 mile to Fraley Field, where the road makes a

sharp left turn and becomes reconnoitering road. Park at

the sharp turn.

20 Stop 3

Confederate sharp-shooter. blcw 2:202

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 20

Stop 3a Powell’s Reconnaissance 3:00–5:30 a.m.

Directions Face in the direction you were traveling before the turn. In

front of you are two small trails. The southernmost of these

(to your left) corresponds to the 1862 trace of the main

Corinth Road. Take the other trail and walk about 150 yards

to a second National Park Service interpretive marker, la-

beled “The Battle Begins.”

Orientation You are at the eastern edge of Fraley Field, named for its 1862

owner, James J. Fraley. At the time of the battle it was a forty-

acre cotton field about 800 yards beyond the southernmost

Union encampments. The Confederate attack in this sector

began from the tree line directly across from you.

What Happened Had you continued up Reconnoitering Road (as you will do

shortly), you would soon have encountered the encampment

of the 1st Brigade of Brig. Gen. Benjamin M. Prentiss’s 6th

Division, led by Col. Everett Peabody, a prewar railroad en-

gineer. On both April 4 and April 5, Federals drilling in

Peabody’s sector noticed Confederate cavalry watching them

21 Powell’s Reconnaissance

Peabody Road

Rec

onno

iter

ing

Corinth Road

Roa

d

Rea Field

SeayField

Fraley’sField

Confederate Cavalry Pickets

Peabody

Powell

25th MOcamp

12th MIcamp

16th WIcamp21st MO

camp

Hardcastle

Stop 3a

3:00 – 5:30 A.M.Powell’s reconnaissance.

Stop 3 N

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 21

from a distance. The colonel dispatched a reconnaissance

party at 4:00 p.m. on the fifth, but darkness fell before they

discovered any enemy forces, and the patrol returned to

camp. Prentiss, in any event, pooh-poohed the notion that

there was any danger in front.

Unconvinced, around midnight Peabody ordered a second

reconnaissance. Led by Maj. James E. Powell of the 25th Mis-

souri, the scouting expedition consisted of three companies

from the 25th Missouri and two from the 12th Michigan—

about 400 men in all.

Initially advancing toward Seay Field (to your left rear),

Powell’s men encountered a handful of Confederate cavalry

pickets, who fired three shots and quickly withdrew. The ma-

jor formed his five companies in a long skirmish line and gin-

gerly continued into Fraley Field. There, about 200 yards

across the field, the Federals encountered two outposts com-

posed of enemy infantry. Although Powell could not know it,

these belonged to Maj. Aaron B. Hardcastle’s 3rd Mississippi Bat-

talion, whose main line stood on a slight rise marked by the

red metal tablet about 250 yards in front of you.

The pickets fired one volley and withdrew to Hardcastle’s

main line. Powell pursued. At a range of less than 200 yards,

the Mississippians opened fire. In the predawn darkness each

side spotted the other mainly by the muzzle flashes from

their muskets. For over an hour they traded volleys until at

length Powell detected a body of enemy cavalry apparently

trying to turn his left flank. At that point he withdrew. Nei-

ther his men nor Hardcastle’s had suffered significant losses,

but the battle of Shiloh was underway.

Note: If the weather is hot or otherwise inclement, the re-

maining portions of Stop 3 can be read from the comfort of

your vehicle.

22 Stop 3a

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 22

Stop 3b The Confederate Army Advances April 3–5


What Happened Powell’s patrol had, of course, encountered the vanguard of

the Army of the Mississippi, finally arrived on the battlefield

after a three-day march from Corinth. Beauregard had directed

his adjutant, Col. Thomas Jordan, to draft instructions for the

approach and attack. Designated Special Order No. 8, Jordan

patterned it after Napoleon’s battle plan for Waterloo, a copy

of which lay before him as he wrote. Fittingly, considering its

model, Special Order No. 8 was a marvel of ineptitude. It had

two main problems. First, the order gave insufficient thought

to the limited road network between Corinth and Pittsburg

Landing, resulting in overcrowding and traffic jams. Second,

it directed each corps to attack in successive waves, one be-

hind the other. In theory each corps would reinforce its pre-

decessor, creating a breaking strain on the Federal divisions

at Pittsburg Landing. As events would demonstrate, it was a

tactic guaranteed to result in the intermingling of units and

consequent loss of organizational control.

23 The Confederate Army Advances

I

IV

II

III

IIIV

III

III

HARDEE

POLK BRECKENRIDGE

BRECKENRIDGE

POLK

BRAGG

BRAGG

BRAGG

GRANT

HARDEE

TENNESSEE

MISSISSIPPI

Tennessee River

Pittsburg Landing

Michie

(Needmore)

Monterrey(present-day Michie)

Cheatham’s division, detached at Bethel Station, rejoined Polk’s corps at Needmore

Corinth is four milessouth of state line onPolk’s line of march

Stop 3b

April 3 – April 5The Confederate Armyadvances.

N

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 23

Stop 3c “Tonight We Will Water Our Horses in the

Tennessee River” 5:30 a.m.


What Happened The Confederate plan called for the Union encampments to

be attacked at daybreak on Friday, April 4. Heavy rain, primi-

tive roads, and wretched traffic management forced the at-

tack’s postponement until the following day. Even then the

24 Stop 3c

PeabodyRoad

Recon

noite

ring

Road

Corinth R

oad

Hardee Road

Pratt Road

Corin

th R

oad

Beauregard

142

22

FraleyField

ReaField

SeayField

Roa

d

Note: Polk’s and Breckinridge’s brigades were still in column at the battle’s commencement. Breckinridge’s Reserve Corps was off-map to the southwest, along the Corinth Road.

Powell

25th MOcamp

BRAGG

HARDEE

53rd OHcamp

POLK

Cleburne

Wood

Shaver

Gladden

PondA

ndersonG

ibsonJackson

Chalm

ersH

ardcastle

Beauregard’s HQ

Stop 3c5:30 A.M.“Tonight we will water ourhorses in the TennesseeRiver.”

N

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 24

troops did not reach their jump-off points before midafter-

noon, further delaying the assault until Sunday, April 6.

Making matters worse, the unseasoned Southern troops

did little to keep their approach quiet. Concerned lest the

rains had dampened their powder, for example, they tested

their charges by firing them rather than prudently extract-

ing them and loading their muskets afresh. Between the de-

lays and the racket, Beauregard feared the army had lost all

chance of surprise and, to a coterie of senior commanders,

urged a withdrawal to Corinth. But Johnston, though just as

impatient with the problems on the march, insisted that the

attack must go forward. “Gentlemen,” he told the assembled

generals, “we shall attack at daylight tomorrow.” With that,

he spun on his heel and strode off, telling his chief of staff: “I

would fight them if they were a million. They can present no

greater front between those two creeks [the Lick and the Owl]

than we can; and the more men they crowd in there, the hot-

ter we can make it for them.”

Johnston’s pronouncement, however, did not end the de-

bate. Dawn on April 6 found Beauregard, Bragg, Hardee, and

several other generals still discussing the advisability of an

attack. Johnston and his staff mutely listened to the exchange

until it was interrupted by the rattle of musketry at Fraley

Field. “The battle has opened gentlemen,” said Johnston. “It is

too late to change our dispositions.” Hoisting himself atop

Fire-eater, his splendid bay thoroughbred, Johnston rode to-

ward the front, telling his staff, “Tonight we will water our

horses in the Tennessee River.”

Analysis Johnston did not merely ride to the front. He remained there,

directing operations on the spot, and behaved in some re-

spects more like a “super-colonel” than a general command-

ing an army. Critics have generally censured Johnston for this

decision, arguing that he should have remained at the rear in

a central location from which he could supervise the entire

battlefield and feed in reinforcements as needed. Instead he

delegated that function to Beauregard. While Johnston rode to-

ward Fraley Field, Beauregard maintained army headquarters

at the junction of the Corinth and Bark Roads, from which he

dispatched the troops of Polk and Breckinridge as they came

upon the field.

Why did Johnston abdicate his “proper” function as army

commander? After the war his son, William Preston Johnston,

explained the decision this way: “He knew that the chief strat-

egy of the battle was in the decision to fight. Once in the pres-

ence of the enemy, he knew that the result would depend on

the way in which his troops were handled. This was his part of the

25 “Tonight We Will Water Our Horses in the Tennessee River”

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 25

work, and he felt full confidence in his own ability to carry it

out successfully.”

Historian John Keegan implicitly validates Johnston’s deci-

sion when he writes, “The first and greatest imperative of

command is to be present in person. Those who impose risk

must be seen to share it.” A reputation for risk taking in the

past is not enough. “Old warriors who have survived risk in-

tact seem to the young to be merely old. . . . It is the spectacle

of heroism, or its immediate report, that fires the blood.”

This was especially true in an army comprised over-

whelmingly of raw officers and troops, and eyewitnesses re-

peatedly testified to the inspiring effect of Johnston’s direct

presence on the battlefield. Even veteran troops sometimes

required such examples. On several occasions, for example,

Gen. Robert E. Lee made— or attempted to make—the same

choice, as in the famous incidents at the battles of the

Wilderness and Spotsylvania in which he attempted to lead

counterattacks in person.

26 Stop 3c

General Albert Sidney Johnston in 1860. blcw 1:542

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 26

STOP 4 Peabody’s Battle Line, 5:30 a.m.– 8:00 a.m.

Directions Return to your car. Proceed 0.4 mile on reconnoitering road

until you reach the Shaver’s Brigade tablet on the right side of

the road. Pull over into the paved turnout and exit your ve-

hicle. Face northeast (the same direction you were driving).

Orientation The Reconnoitering Road follows the approximate Confeder-

ate axis of advance as they surged forward to the attack. Their

battle lines would have extended well out of sight on either

side of you. Note the surrounding vegetation, which is simi-

lar to its 1862 appearance, and the way in which it reduces

visibility to a matter of yards. Note, too, the slight rise in the

ground ahead. Peabody posted two regiments there to delay

the Southern advance.

What Happened The firing in Fraley Field attracted the 6th Division’s com-

mander, Brig. Gen. Benjamin M. Prentiss, who entered Pea-

body’s camp and demanded to know what it meant. When

Peabody explained about having sent Powell out on patrol,

Prentiss furiously (and quite irrationally) accused him of hav-

27 Peabody’s Battle Line

Rec

onno

iteri

ng

RoadRea Field

25th MO

12th MI

21st MO(previousposition)

Wood

Shaver

Stop 4

5:30 – 8:00 A.M.Peabody’s battle line.

Stop 4

N

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 27

ing brought on a major engagement. The general then dis-

patched five companies from the 21st Missouri, under Col.

David Moore, to reinforce Powell’s men. As these moved for-

ward, a company of the 16th Wisconsin, just returning from

picket duty, spontaneously joined them.

This augmented force, astride the present-day Reconnoi-

tering Road, engaged the enemy in Seay Field about 500

yards behind you. In response to a request from Moore (now

the senior officer on the spot), Prentiss soon dispatched the

21st Missouri’s remaining five companies as well. Eventually

four companies from the 16th Wisconsin also joined the fray,

though by that time Powell had withdrawn his men from the

fight. All in all, the skirmish in Seay Field lasted about thirty

minutes.

By that time Peabody had posted the 25th Missouri and

12th Michigan Regiments on the low ridgeline ahead of you.

These were soon supported by the remaining companies of

the 16th Wisconsin. The first major fighting on this sector of

the battlefield now occurred as two Confederate brigades un-

der Brig. Gen. Sterling A. M. Wood and Col. R. G. Shaver col-

lided with the Federals. The Yankees held their fire until the

Rebels came within 125 yards, then unleashed a massive vol-

ley. Because the 25th Missouri contained numerous former

members of the regular army, the firing was effective enough

that it briefly sent the raw Confederates fleeing to the rear.

Only the efforts of numerous officers, including General John-

ston himself, reforged them into a line of battle. At that point

the Confederates advanced to within 75 yards and fired a vol-

ley of their own. A sharp firefight developed at murderously

close range for several minutes until the numerically supe-

rior Confederates curled around Peabody’s open flanks and

forced him back.

Vignette Among the Southern soldiers was future journalist-adven-

turer Henry Morton Stanley, who nine years later would lo-

cate and resupply the famed missionary David Livingstone in

central Africa (“Dr. Livingstone, I presume?”). On this morn-

ing Stanley was a rifleman in the 6th Arkansas in Shaver’s

Brigade:

We . . . loaded, and fired, with such nervous haste as though it de-

pended on each of us how soon this fiendish roar would be hushed.

My nerves tingled, my pulses beat double-quick, my heart throbbed

loudly, almost painfully. . . . I was angry with my rear rank [i.e., the

soldier directly behind him], because he made my eyes smart with the

powder of his musket; and I felt like cuffing him for deafening my

ears! . . . We continued advancing, step by step, loading and firing as

we went. To every forward step, they took a backward move, loading

28 Stop 4

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 28

and firing as they slowly withdrew. . . . After a steady exchange of

musketry, which lasted some time, we heard the order: “Fix bayonets!

On the double-quick!”

There was a simultaneous bound forward. . . . The Federals ap-

peared inclined to await us; but, at this juncture, our men raised a

yell, thousands responded to it, and burst out into the wildest yelling

it has ever been my lot to hear. It served the double purpose of reliev-

ing pent-up feelings and transmitting encouragement along the at-

tacking line. . . .

“They fly!” was echoed from lip to lip. It accelerated our pace, and

filled us with a noble rage. . . . It deluged us with rapture, and

transfigured each Southerner into an exulting victor. At such a mo-

ment, nothing could have halted us. Those savage yells, and the sight

of thousands of racing figures coming toward them, discomfited the

blue-coats, and when we arrived upon the place where they had

stood, they had vanished.

Then we caught sight of their beautiful array of tents.

After the next stop (Stop 5) you have two choices. You may

elect to continue to the right, following the fortunes of the

Union and Confederate forces engaged on the eastern por-

tion of the battlefield, or you may turn left and do the same

for the troops engaged to the west. In this way it becomes

possible to follow the action with the least disruption to the

battle’s chronological development.

The two routes eventually converge at Stop 14 (near the

Visitor Center), but of course it is advisable to follow first one

route, then the other.

29 Peabody’s Battle Line

A Confederate private of the West. blcw 1:594

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 29

STOP 5 Peabody’s Camp, 8:00– 8:30 a.m.

Directions Return to your car and drive 0.3 mile to the T intersection.

Turn right or left (depending on whether you plan to pursue

the eastern or western route), park immediately, and walk to

the pentagonal tablet labeled “25th Missouri Camp,” which

stands immediately north of the t intersection. Face south-

west (back down reconnoitering road).

Orientation In this area you would have seen the “beautiful array of

tents” described by Private Stanley: Sibley tents for the most

part, designed by former U.S. captain Henry Hopkins Sibley

(by 1862 a Confederate brigadier general) and patterned after

the teepees of the Plains Indians. A regulation Sibley tent was

a large cone of canvas, 18 feet in diameter, 12 feet tall, and

supported by a center pole, with a circular opening at the

top for ventilation and a cone-shaped stove for heat. It could

fit 12 men in comfort or, more usually, 20 men in consider-

ably less.

30 Stop 5

Peabody Road

Corinth R

oad

Rec

onno

iteri

ng R

oad

Rea Field

Swett’sMS Battery

25th MOCamp

12th MICamp

25th MO(remnants)

12th MI(remnants)

Wood

Shaver

Stop 5

8:00 – 8:30 A.M.Peabody’s camp.

Stop 5

N

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 30

What Happened As the pentagonal tablet indicates, the tents in this sector be-

longed to the 25th Missouri Regiment of Peabody’s brigade.

By the time Peabody’s survivors withdrew to this position,

they came under fire from six guns of the Warren Mississippi

Light Artillery Battery, commanded by Capt. Charles Swett. The

battery raked the encampment with shot and shell, but its

gunners were exposed to Federal riflemen, and General

Hardee soon ordered it withdrawn. Nevertheless, by that time

Peabody’s brigade had been wrecked. The colonel himself

was dead, shot through the head. (The upturned cannon just

behind you marks the spot where Peabody fell. Similar mor-

tuary monuments commemorate the places where any gen-

eral officer killed or mortally wounded at Shiloh met his fate.)

Analysis Throughout the battle, encampments such as this helped dis-

solve the cohesion of combat units, and in that way they were

as damaging as enemy fire. According to Lt. Col. H. M. Wood-

yard of the 21st Missouri, the very presence of Peabody’s

camp contributed to the dissolution of his regiment: “We

gradually began to fall back and reached our tents, when the

ranks got broken in passing through them. We endeavored to

rally our men in the rear of the tents and formed as well as

could be expected, but my men got much scattered, a great

many falling into other regiments, under the immediate

command of General Prentiss; others divided to other divi-

sions, but continued to fight during the two days.”

Woodyard was being charitable. Some of his men un-

doubtedly returned to the ranks, but others, jarred loose

from their regiment, did no more fighting—like thousands

of others during the course of the day, they went far to the

rear out of harm’s way.

Peabody’s encampment had a similarly disorganizing ef-

fect on the Confederates. “We drew up in the enemy’s camp,”

recalled Private Stanley, “panting and breathing hard. Some

precious minutes were thus lost in recovering our breaths,

indulging our curiosity [by ransacking the abandoned tents],

and reforming our line.” Lt. Liberty I. Nixon of the 26th

Alabama noted that the “Yankees . . . left everything they

had, . . . Corn, Oats, Pants, Vests, Drawers, Shirts, Shoes, and

a great many other things in great abundance and of the

finest quality.”

31 Peabody’s Camp

02-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 31

Eastern Route, April 6

EAST STOP 6 Spain Field, 7:30–10:00 a.m.

Directions If coming from Stop 5, continue 0.3 mile to a fork in the road.

Bear right on bark road, drive an additional 0.1 mile, and pull

in to the turnout just beyond the upturned cannon repre-

senting the site at which Confederate general Adley H. Glad-

den was mortally wounded.

If coming from West Stop 13, return to your vehicle, turn

around, and drive back in the direction from which you just

came. Proceed 3.1 miles to a T intersection. Turn right on

peabody road. Continue 0.3 mile to a fork in the road. Bear

right on bark road, drive an additional 0.1 mile, and pull in to

the turnout just beyond the upturned cannon representing

the site at which Confederate general Adley H. Gladden was

mortally wounded.

A tempting breastwork. blcw 2:196

03-N3554 12/2/05 10:32 AM Page 32

East Stop 6a Miller’s Brigade Deploys 7:30– 8:00 a.m.

Directions Exit your vehicle and face south (down bark road in the

same direction you were traveling).

Orientation You now stand just west of the encampment occupied by

Prentiss’s only other brigade, led by Col. Madison Miller. That

unit, consisting of the 18th Missouri, 61st Illinois, and 18th

Wisconsin, was in and to the northeast of Spain Field (named

for farmer Peter Spain), which was considerably larger in

1862 than today.

What Happened When Peabody became decisively engaged at 7:30 a.m., Pren-

tiss rode to Miller’s headquarters, shouting: “Colonel Miller,

get out your brigade! They are fighting on the right!” Miller

immediately placed the 18th Missouri in line of battle at the

northern end of Spain Field. Prentiss disapproved of the po-

sition, however, and instructed Miller to redeploy to the

southern end of the field, where the regiment would com-

mand the ravine just ahead of you to your left. (A line of

tablets indicates Miller’s advanced position.)

33 Miller’s Brigade Deploys

Spain Field

Miller

1st MN Art’y 5th OH Art’y

16th WI

18th MO 18th WI 61st IL 15th MI

East Stop 6a7:30 – 8:00 A.M.Miller’s Brigade deploys.

East Stop 6

N

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 33

From this base a solid battle line soon began to take shape.

A portion of the 16th Wisconsin arrived and extended

Miller’s position to the west, across Bark Road, while the 18th

Wisconsin and 61st Illinois came up and extended his posi-

tion to the east. Two batteries attached to Prentiss’s division,

the 1st Minnesota Battery and 5th Ohio Battery, took up po-

sitions behind the infantry on the west and east sides of Bark

Road, respectively. (The 1st Minnesota Battery’s position is

partially visible from the east side of the Gladden mortuary

monument, though not from your present position). Finally,

the 15th Michigan, encamped nearby but as yet unassigned

to any brigade or division, further extended Miller’s position

to the east. Its contribution was dubious, however, for its

troops had no ammunition whatever.

By 8:00 a.m. Miller’s battle line, comprising some 3,000

men, was complete. The troops listened nervously as the

crash of gunfire reverberated from the direction of Peabody’s

brigade. Then, like the “sweep of a mid-summer thunder

head rolling across the stubble field,” as one soldier wrote,

the roar of battle surged east to engulf them. Simultaneously

they saw the gleam from hundreds of bayonets in the woods

to their front: Confederate infantry advancing, their muskets

at “right shoulder shift.”

34 East Stop 6a

A straggler on the line of march. blcw 2:515

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 34

East Stop 6b Gladden’s Brigade Attacks 8:30–9:00 a.m.


What Happened Advancing upon Miller’s position was a division under Brig.

Gen. Jones M. Withers composed of three brigades: the first

under Brig. Gen. Adley H. Gladden, the second under Brig.

Gen. James R. Chalmers, the third under Brig. Gen. John K. Jack-

son. The division was part of Bragg’s Corps and as such, most

of it composed part of the second line of the Rebel assault

force.

In one of the many last-minute reshufflings that charac-

terized the Confederate operation, Gladden’s Brigade had ear-

lier been advanced to the first line to extend Hardee’s lead

corps to the east, the purpose being to place the Confederate

right flank securely along Lick Creek and the Tennessee

River. By 7:30 a.m. Johnston, realizing that Hardee’s attack was

veering too far to the left, ordered Chalmers’s Brigade to ex-

tend Gladden’s line to the east on the assumption that Gladden

would be unable to stretch his brigade far enough to connect

both with Hardee’s right and Lick Creek.

35 Gladden’s Brigade Attacks

Spain Field

Miller


16th WI


Gladden

Robertson’sAL Battery

Gage’sAL Battery

East Stop 6b8:30 – 9:00 A.M.Gladden’s Brigade attacks.

N

East Stop 6

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 35

As a result, however, Gladden reached Miller’s line a good

half hour before Chalmers could arrive to support him. Unde-

terred, the Mexican War veteran turned New Orleans mer-

chant sent his four Alabama regiments directly to the attack,

where they promptly received a devastating fire from the

Union infantry and artillery. Capt. Felix Robertson’s four-gun

battery, attached to Gladden’s Brigade, deployed on its left and

opened an effective counterbattery fire. Soon thereafter the

artillery attached to Chalmers’s Brigade, under Capt. Charles P.

Gage, reached the scene and unlimbered within 200 yards of

Miller’s troops. Although both batteries came under consid-

erable musketry fire, their efforts helped prepare the way for

Gladden’s first infantry assault, which began about 8:45 a.m.

Mounted on horseback, the fifty-one-year-old Gladden

made an obvious target and, while leading his men forward,

was almost immediately mortally wounded by a Union shell

fragment. The Confederates recoiled, devastated by both Fed-

eral musketry and fire from the two U.S. batteries, at least

one of which had switched to canister, a close-range anti-

personnel round comprising 27 iron balls, each an inch in

diameter.

Command of the brigade passed to its senior colonel,

Daniel Adams of the 1st Louisiana, who grabbed the regimen-

tal colors and called upon the brigade to make a second

charge. They did so, supported by Robertson’s gunners, who

manhandled their field pieces closer to the enemy.

Analysis Against veteran troops, Adams’s attack would have probably

made little headway. But under the stress of their first com-

bat, some of Miller’s men began to filter to the rear, diluting

the strength of his defensive line and contributing to a sense

of disorganization and anxiety. Further, Prentiss became in-

creasingly concerned about conditions on Peabody’s front.

The defense there seemed to have collapsed, and he kept

looking for a new enemy threat to materialize from that

direction.

36 East Stop 6b

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 36

East Stop 6c The Collapse of Miller’s Defense 8:30–

9:00 a.m.


What Happened While Adams continued his assault, Prentiss continued to

worry about the potential threat to Miller’s right flank. To

guard against such a possibility, the division commander

gave the order to “change front to the right.” Although a rel-

atively straightforward maneuver for veteran troops, it had

serious if not fatal consequences for the integrity of Miller’s

defense. Attempting to comply, his raw troops became disor-

ganized. Worse, the redeployment coincided with a renewed

Confederate assault, adding to the confusion and exposing

Hickenlooper’s battery to a ruinous fire that shot down 59 of

its 80 horses. Two of its guns fell directly into Confederate

hands. Hickenlooper’s Buckeyes were able to extricate the

other four by hand, but the battery’s mobility would be seri-

ously compromised for the balance of the day.

Completing the ruin of Miller’s defense, Chalmers’s Brigade

arrived on the field around 8:30 a.m. and added its weight to

37 The Collapse of Miller’s Defense

Gladden Chalmers

Spain Field


16th WI


Robertson’sAL Battery

Gage’sAL Battery

Direction ofUnion Retreat

Confederate units tended tohalt and plunder Union campsbefore resuming the advance.

East Stop 6c8:30 – 9:00 A.M.Collapse of Miller’s Defense.

N

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 37

the attack. Boiling up from the wooded ravine to your left,

the Rebels slammed into the 18th Wisconsin and sent it

flying in retreat. That opened a hole in Miller’s line and en-

abled Adams’s troops to break through as well. Miller and

Prentiss attempted to reestablish a new position at the north

end of Spain Field, but the attempt was fruitless. By 9:00 a.m.

the brigade had been driven through its camp. It ceased to ex-

ist as an organized unit, and hundreds of its men joined the

growing exodus to the Federal rear.

Vignette George W. McBride, 15th Michigan, described the collapse of

Miller’s defense: “The enemy flank us and are moving to our

rear; some one calls out ‘Everybody for himself!’ The line

breaks, I go with others, back and down the hill, across a

small ravine, and into the camp of the 11th Illinois cavalry,

with the howling, rushing mass of the enemy pressing in

close pursuit. . . . The striking of shot on the ground threw up

little clouds of dust, and the falling of men all around me im-

pressed me with a desire to get out of there. . . . I felt sure that

a cannon-ball was close behind me, giving me chase as I

started for the river. . . . I never ran so fast before.”

As happened so often that day, the pursuing Confederates

halted to rifle the abandoned Union camps. In the one va-

cated by the 18th Wisconsin, a young lieutenant collected an

armful of trophies only to be confronted by Sidney Johnston

himself, who rode onto the scene. “None of that, sir,” the gen-

eral bellowed, “we are not here for plunder!” The lieutenant

looked mortified, so much so that Johnston softened the re-

buke by picking up a tin cup and saying, “Let this be my share

of the spoils today.”

38 East Stop 6c

Cavalry orderly. blcw 2:103

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 38

East Stop 6d Chalmers and Jackson Redeploy 9:00–

10:00 a.m.

Directions Turn around so that you are facing north along gladden

road.

What Happened Having wrecked the Union line in this sector, the obvious

move was for Adams and Chalmers to continue north. In fact

they did so, reinforced by Jackson’s Brigade of Withers’s Divi-

sion. They got as far as the Hamburg-Purdy Road; some units

launched a preliminary attack upon the Union division form-

ing at the Sarah Bell’s Old Cotton Field (see East Stop 9c). But

in the meantime a reconnoitering staff officer reported the

presence of another Union “division” beyond the Confed-

erate right. Johnston determined that this potential threat

would have to be eliminated. At 9:30 a.m., therefore, he with-

drew Jackson’s and Chalmers’s brigades and sent them on a cir-

cuitous cross-country march around the southern side of Lo-

cust Grove Branch (also called Spain Branch).

Unknown to Johnston, the staff officer had already reported

his intelligence to Beauregard, who in turn had sent Breckin-

39 Chambers and Jackson Redeploy

Tennessee River

Spain Branch

Lick C

reek

Shiloh ChurchW. Manse

Georgecabin

Gla

dd

en R

oad

Federal Rd.

Ham

burg-

Savannah Road

Purdy Road

Eas

tern

Peabody Road

Corinth R

oad

Recon

noite

ring

Bark Road Fraley Drive

(historically, Bark Road)

Road

Cor

inth

Roa

dChalmers

Jackson

Chalmers

JacksonAdams

Millerdefeated

ReportedUnion

Division

0 1.0Mile

East Stop 6d

9:00 – 10:00 A.M.Chalmers and Jacksonredeploy.

N

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 39

ridge’s Reserve Corps to deal with the threat. (Johnston soon

sent Beauregard a dispatch instructing him to deploy Breckin-

ridge to the same sector.) Thus by midmorning, approxi-

mately 8,000 Confederates were converging on the Federal

left flank. In this ad-hoc way, though his immediate intent

was defensive, Johnston resurrected his original plan to

launch a powerful sweep toward the Tennessee River.

40 East Stop 6d

Confederate picket with blanket-capote and raw-hide moccasins. blcw 3:70

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 40

EAST STOP 7 McCuller’s Field, 10:00–11:00 a.m.

Directions Return to your vehicle and continue 0.6 mile south to the end

of gladden road. Turn left on fraley drive (historically, Bark

Road). The sign for fraley drive is not visible from the direc-

tion of your approach, but the road will be the first on your

left. Proceed 1.7 miles until you reach the tintersection with

federal road (historically, Hamburg-Savannah Road). Turn

left again and proceed 0.5 mile until you reach the red tablet

marking the location of Chalmers’s Brigade. The tablet is a bit

hard to spot because it is at the edge of a tree line and atop a

cut in the road on the right side. Pull over to the side of the

road. You need not leave your vehicle.

En route note the rugged nature of the terrain to your left.

The brigades of Jackson and Chalmers had to march cross-coun-

try over ground much like it. Also, be aware that you will pass

within about 200 yards of Lick Creek, which parallels Federal

Road for about a quarter mile north of the intersection with

Fraley Drive. (In fact, had you turned south instead of north,

you would have crossed the creek within 0.1 mile.) The

creek’s significance lies in the fact that Johnston depended on

41 McCuller’s Field

LarkinBell’sField

McCuller’sField

Spain Branch

ChalmersJackson

Stuart

Union Skirmishers

71st OH

55th IL

54th OH

Girardey’sGA Battery

Gage’s ALBattery

East Stop 7 10:00 – 11:00 A.M.McCuller’s Field.

N

East Stop 7

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 41

it to anchor his right flank. Evidently he did not realize that

it soon veers sharply to the east, thereby creating an addi-

tional gap of over half a mile between his projected right

flank and the next firm anchor, the Tennessee River.

Orientation The roads over which you have just passed have led you con-

siderably south of the line of march taken by the brigades of

Jackson and Chalmers. But you have managed the trip in con-

siderably less time than they did. Not until at least 11:00

a.m., a full hour after disengaging from their previous posi-

tion, did the Confederates reach this vicinity. You are now

near the northern end of what was once a large field known

as McCuller’s Field. Currently almost completely overgrown,

in 1862 it extended a quarter mile to your rear and an addi-

tional 200 yards in front of you.

Chalmers’s Brigade advanced directly up the road over

which you have just passed. Jackson, meanwhile, appeared

from the direction of the wooded heights to your left rear,

about a quarter mile distant and some 50 feet higher than

your current location. Defending this sector was the 54th

Ohio of Col. David Stuart’s brigade. Its mission was to guard

the ford over Lick Creek to the south, and in fact one of its ten

companies remained at the ford even as the others formed

line of battle astride the Federal Road.

What Happened The Confederate staff officer was mistaken about the pres-

ence of a Federal division in this sector. The only Union force

consisted of a three-regiment brigade under Stuart. Al-

though administratively attached to Sherman’s Fifth Divi-

sion, on the opposite side of the battlefield, Stuart’s was for all

practical purposes functioning as an independent brigade.

The sound of artillery fire to the west had earlier prompted

the colonel to ready his command for action. Receiving word

from Prentiss that he was under attack, Stuart deployed his

three regiments facing diagonally toward the southwest, a

rather awkward arrangement evidently intended to simulta-

neously defend against an enemy attack, continue to keep an

eye on the Lick Creek ford, and maintain a line of retreat if

necessary. The result was to spread the brigade over more

than 600 yards, with four companies deployed as skirmishers

along Locust Grove Run and no reserve whatever. All in all it

would have been prudent for Stuart to withdraw his brigade

to a less exposed position. But in the absence of hard infor-

mation about enemy movements, he chose to remain.

42 East Stop 7

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 42

EAST STOP 8 Stuart’s Defense, 11:00–11:30 a.m.

Directions Continue 0.3 mile. Pull in to the turnout on the right side of the

road, near the sign indicating the park boundary as well

as the red tablet indicating the position of Gage’s Alabama

Battery.

Orientation You now face the northern end of McCuller’s Field. Just

ahead, on the right side of the road, is the blue tablet in-

dicating the position of the 71st Ohio, the northernmost of

Stuart’s three regiments. Opposite it, on the left side of the

road, are two cannon representing the advanced positions of

Girardey’s Georgia Battery and Jackson’s Brigade.

What Happened Stuart’s deployment proved fatal. Two Confederate bat-

teries (Girardey and Gage) initially deployed on the heights,

chased away Stuart’s skirmishers, and threw shells into the

northernmost regiment, the 71st Ohio, whose colonel pan-

icked and permitted—perhaps even led—his regiment on a

pell-mell retreat that did not end for half a mile; they fired no

more than two or three rounds before fleeing the field. Jack-

43 Stuart’s Defense

LarkinBell’sField

McCuller’sField

Spain Branch

Chalmers

Jackson

Stuart(second position)

71st OH

55th IL

54th OH

Girardey’sGA Battery

Gage’sAL Battery

East Stop 8

11:00 – 11:30 A.M.Stuart’s defense.

N

East Stop 8

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 43

son’s Brigade then fell upon Stuart’s center regiment, the 55th

Illinois, which withdrew slightly under the pressure but still

maintained an effective resistance.

At the southern end of Stuart’s line, Chalmers’s Brigade

worked its way toward the 54th Ohio, whose troops defended

the fence line at the northern end of an orchard (no longer

extant) near your current position. If you look behind you (to

the south), you will notice that the ground slopes downward.

This gave the 54th some protection until Chalmers’s men got

within 40 yards of its position, at which point the Ohioans

quickly withdrew.

Abandoned by the 71st Ohio on its right and no longer pro-

tected by the 54th Ohio on its left, the position of the 55th

Illinois rapidly became untenable. In an effort to preserve its

ground as long as possible, the regiment’s commander, Lt.

Col. Oscar Malmborg, gave the command “half wheel left.” As

had occurred in the final moments of Miller’s defense, this

maneuver proved too complex for unseasoned troops to exe-

cute under fire. The regiment’s companies became jumbled,

the soldiers panicked, and within moments the 55th broke

for the rear. Stuart, who witnessed the event, exercised no

better leadership than to denounce the Illinoisans as cow-

ards. But in fact some 500 men from the regiment, together

with 300 from the 54th Ohio, rallied about a quarter mile to

the north along the lip of a deep ravine. There they stood

their ground for several hours.

Analysis A chronic problem at Shiloh was the inability of units to per-

form necessary tactical maneuvers under fire, which often

created panic as the unseasoned soldiers felt matters slip-

ping out of control. During the fight in Stuart’s sector, the

55th Illinois’s confused reaction to the “half wheel left”

command was matched by a similar debacle on the part

of Chalmers’s 52nd Tennessee Regiment. While crossing Spain

Branch during the early stages of the combat with the 54th

Ohio, the Tennesseeans received orders to lie down so that

the rear rank could fire over them. A moment later they were

told to fall back across the stream to clear a field of fire for

Gage’s artillery, at which point most of the regiment broke,

probably mistaking the temporary pull back as an order to

retreat. Chalmers vainly attempted to rally the unit, but only

two companies complied. Disgusted, he attached those two

companies to a different regiment and refused to let the re-

mainder of the 52nd back into the fight.

Prentiss, Miller, Stuart, and Chalmers, like many com-

manders at Shiloh, were all too ready to pin the blame for

their soldiers’ poor performance on cowardice. They should

44 East Stop 8

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:24 AM Page 44

more properly have pointed an accusing finger at them-

selves. It was their responsibility to train their units, under-

stand the limits of their soldiers’ tactical abilities at this early

stage of the war, and work within them.

Note: If you wish to inspect the ravine behind which Stuart’s

men rallied, proceed 0.2 mile to the entrance to Stop 11 on

the National Park Service tour route, labeled “Field Hospi-

tal.” Exit your vehicle and walk behind the “Stuart’s Head-

quarters” pyramid, then beyond the far side of a rail worm

fence and into the tree line. Continue a few more yards and

you will reach the southern lip of the ravine. Stuart’s men ral-

lied on the far (northern) side, albeit to the right (east).

45 Stuart’s Defense

Counting the scars in the colors. blcw 3:284

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 45

EAST STOP 9 The Peach Orchard, 7:30 a.m.–2:30 p.m.

Directions Continue 0.5 mile north on federql road to its intersection

with hamburg-purdy road. At that point federal road be-

comes the hamburg-savannah road (its historical name). Not

quite 0.3 mile beyond the intersection you will find a parking

lot on your left that provides access to the Peach Orchard and

the W. Manse George cabin.

Note: This is a somewhat lengthy stop, and you may wish to

visit the restroom facilities at the Visitor Center before pro-

ceeding. If so, simply continue up the hamburg-savannah

road, then bear right at the next intersection (the corinth–

pittsburg landing road). This will take you directly to the

Visitor Center. Excluding the time you spend there, the trip

to and from the center requires about 10 minutes. Inciden-

tally, if you do take this option, reset your odometer as you

pass the Peach Orchard parking lot. About 0.6 mile ahead, on

the right side of the road, you will pass the site of Brig. Gen.

Stephen Hurlbut’s 4th Division headquarters prior to the

battle.

46 East Stop 9

The Old Hamburg Road which led up to “the hornets’ nest.” From a photograph taken in 1884. blcw1:476

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 46

East Stop 9a Hurlbut to the Rescue 7:30– 8:30 a.m.

Directions Exit your vehicle and walk to the National Park Service in-

terpretive marker labeled “The Peach Orchard.”

Orientation You are standing at the northern end of Sarah Bell’s Old Cot-

ton Field, looking south. The southwestern part of the field,

as well as a portion of its western fringe, is wooded today, but

47 Hurlbut to the Rescue

Tennessee River

East

ern

Cor

inth

Roa

d

Pittsburg Rd.

Corin

th–P

ittsb

urg

Land

ing

Road

Hamburg-Purdy Road

Sunken Road

WickerField

Sarah Bell’sOld Cotton

Field

Pittsburg Landing

Veatch

HURLBUT−

East Stop 9a7:30 – 8:30 A.M. Hurlbut to the rescue.

N

East Stop 9

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 47

otherwise the area is nearly as open now as it was in

April 1862. The cotton field was significant for two reasons.

First, the Hamburg-Savannah Road led directly back to Pitts-

burg Landing, the ultimate Confederate objective, and the

cotton field offered a good position from which to defend it.

Second, it would presently become the eastern anchor of the

Hornets’ Nest, or Sunken Road, position, which begins just

behind the W. Manse George cabin.

What Happened Neither Sherman’s 5th Division nor Prentiss’s 6th Division,

which bore the brunt of the initial Confederate onslaught,

had any previous combat experience. Indeed, in many cases

their regiments had just arrived at Pittsburg Landing and re-

ceived brigade assignments, so they often lacked familiarity

with the other regiments on which their protection now

depended. On the Union left flank, the 4th Division, under

Brig. Gen. Stephen Hurlbut, made its appearance on the field

about three hours after the initial skirmish in Fraley Field. It

came in response to an urgent request for help from Prentiss.

At 7:30 a.m., minutes before Prentiss’s plea reached Hurl-

but’s headquarters, an identical request had arrived from

Sherman on the left. Hurlbut promptly dispatched his 2nd

Brigade, some 2,700 troops under Col. James C. Veatch, to

shore up that sector, leaving him with two infantry brigades,

three artillery batteries, and two battalions of cavalry with

which to assist Prentiss: in all about 4,100 men. It required

perhaps 30 minutes for Hurlbut to send word to his widely

scattered units and assemble them for action, but around

8:00 a.m. he was on the march down the Hamburg-Savannah

Road and by 8:30 reached the sector where you currently

stand.

Vignette Hurlbut’s column advanced through a steady stream of men

from Prentiss’s division. A few of these were walking

wounded. Most, however, had simply left the front. Many no

longer even carried their muskets. Some of them warned, by

way of self-justification, “You’ll catch it—we are all cut to

pieces—the Rebels are coming.” Disgusted by the spectacle,

at least one of Hurlbut’s captains growled to his men that if

any of them ran from the fight, they could expect to be shot.

Perhaps relieved by a show of firmness amid such demoral-

ization, those who heard his threat actually cheered. Over-

come by the same wave of contempt, a lieutenant grabbed

the bridle of a horse whose rider, a colonel, kept babbling

hysterically, “We’re whipped; we’re whipped; we’re all cut to

pieces!” Drawing his revolver, the lieutenant vowed to shoot

the colonel if he didn’t shut up.

48 East Stop 9a

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 48

East Stop 9b Hurlbut Deploys 8:30–9:30 a.m.


What Happened Upon reaching your location, Hurlbut’s two brigades (the 1st

under Col. N. G. Williams and the 3rd under Brig. Gen. J. G.

Lauman) filed off the Hamburg-Savannah Road onto the

country lane leading to the W. Manse George cabin, then

crossed the cotton field and took up a line of battle at its far

end. Hurlbut placed Williams’s brigade parallel to the Ham-

burg-Purdy Road. (Williams in turn deployed his men in a

shallow ravine that would provide them at least some protec-

tion from enemy fire.) He posted Lauman’s brigade in the tim-

berline along the field’s western end at nearly right angles to

Williams. As his artillery arrived, Hurlbut placed Lt. Cuthbert

W. Laing’s 2nd Michigan Battery in support of Williams and

Lt. Edward Brotzman’s 1st Missouri Light Artillery near the

intersection of the Hamburg-Purdy and Hamburg-Savannah

Roads, so as to cover his left flank against any threat from the

southwest. (Hurlbut soon changed his mind and shifted the

1st Missouri Artillery to the apex of his line). His two cavalry

49 Hurlbut Deploys

Sarah Bell’sOld Cotton Field

W. Manse George cabin

PeachOrchard

Lauman

Williams

13th OH

Art’y

1st MOLt. Art’y

1st MO Lt. Art’y(first position)

2nd MIArt’y

2 companies(Adams)2 companies(Jackson)

East Stops 9b & 9c8:30 – 9:30 A.M.Hurlbut deploys.

N

9:00 – 10:00 A.M.First “attack.”

East Stop 9

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 49

battalions he strung out behind the division, evidently as a

straggler line in case his own troops fell victim to the same

panic that had so obviously befallen Prentiss’s men.

Hurlbut’s dispositions were now nearly complete, with a

single exception: His third battery, the 13th Ohio Battery un-

der Capt. John B. Myers, had yet to arrive. This seemed inex-

cusable, particularly since the unit’s camp was almost the

closest to Sarah Bell’s Old Cotton Field and directly adjacent

to the Hamburg-Savannah Road.

Hurlbut later complained that he had sent repeated orders

to Myers, but a sergeant in the battery maintained that his

outfit waited over an hour before any instructions arrived. In

any event, around 9:30 a.m., a good half hour after the rest of

Hurlbut’s command reached the field, Myers’s battery belat-

edly arrived. Hurlbut promptly sent it into the timberline to

support Lauman’s brigade. (Myers demurred, arguing that

the guns should be posted on open ground, but Hurlbut was

in no mood to hear objections.)

Analysis Hurlbut’s initial deployment is open to serious query. Since

his after-action report does not explain his reasoning, one

must speculate. Like many Union generals at Shiloh, Hurlbut

seems to have been intent on holding as advanced a position

as possible without due consideration for why such a position

was advantageous. Here the advantages were scarcely obvi-

ous. The salient created by his deployment of Lauman’s and

Williams’s brigades would have been difficult to defend

against a determined Confederate assault, especially at its

apex, where an attack was especially likely. Then too, by de-

ploying so far forward, Hurlbut completely overlooked the

admirable field of fire afforded by Sarah Bell’s Old Cotton

Field, one of the largest open expanses in terrain character-

ized by woodlands, steep ravines, or both. It is possible that

by hugging the tree lines at the field’s perimeter, Hurlbut ex-

pected to gain early warning of an enemy concentration

against him, but this mission could have been done more ef-

fectively by a thin cordon of skirmishers rather than massed

battle lines.

50 East Stop 9b

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 50

East Stop 9c The First “Attack” 9:00–10:00 a.m.


What Happened Williams’s men had been in position but a short time when

they began to notice Confederate infantry moving through

the woods beyond the Hamburg-Purdy Road. They opened

fire, though with little effect. Lauman’s men did the same,

but only those on the left had anything to shoot at, and

armed as they were with smoothbores, their rounds did not

even carry to the enemy line: the Confederate infantry re-

mained placidly in formation.

A bit later Hurlbut’s division came under a desultory fire

from unseen Confederate artillery (probably Robertson’s Al-

abama Battery). The shelling did little damage, with two con-

spicuous exceptions. First, a fragment ripped through

Williams’s horse, knocking the colonel to the ground, para-

lyzing him for weeks, and eventually forcing him to resign

from the army. Col. Isaac Pugh of the 41st Illinois succeeded

him in command. Second, just as Myers’s battery got into po-

sition, a Confederate shell scored a fluke direct hit on one of

the Federal caissons, causing a terrific blast that killed one

man, wounded eight, and sent practically every officer and

cannoneer in the battery running headlong for the rear. A

team of horses fled as well, taking its caisson and gun along

with it. The remaining cannon remained uselessly on the

field. With no one to man them, volunteers from the other

two batteries eventually went over to spike the guns and cut

the horses from their harnesses. (To “spike” a cannon means

to render it inoperable, usually by plugging the vent at the

breach.) After the battle Hurlbut angrily urged that the 13th

Ohio Battery be disbanded and its captain cashiered from

the army.

Although the Federals had every reason to expect an im-

minent attack, in fact the Confederates confronting them—

Withers’s Division, fresh from its costly victory at Spain Field

(East Stop 6)—were thinking along precisely contrary lines.

Far from contemplating an assault, the Confederates be-

lieved the Federals might well be preparing to attack them.

The aggressive movements observed by Hurlbut’s men were

simply limited reconnaissances by four companies from the

brigades of Adams and Jackson. Then at 10:00 a.m., as we have

seen (East Stop 6d), Jackson and Chalmers received orders to re-

deploy elsewhere. Only Adams’s Brigade remained to keep an

eye on this sector.

51 The First “Attack”

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 51

Analysis This initial “attack” by the Confederates had only one posi-

tive outcome, and that for the Federals, not their opponents.

A brief flurry of confusion on Col. Isaac Pugh’s left flank

caused him to withdraw one of his regiments back to the

Peach Orchard, to your right front. That in turn led Hurlbut

to withdraw his entire advanced line, and within a few min-

utes it occupied a new position behind an old fence along the

edge of the woods. This was in every respect a superior place-

ment: more compact, with both brigades on line instead of at

right angles to each other, and with an extensive field of fire

in front. Had Hurlbut’s division remained in his initial posi-

tion, it might well have been overrun as soon as strong Con-

federate forces reached the scene. If that had occurred, the

crucial Hornets’ Nest position, described below (East Stop 9e),

might have been rendered untenable at the outset.

52 East Stop 9c

Confederate types of 1862. blcw 1:548

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 52

East Stop 9d The Formation of the Sunken Road Position

10:00–11:00 a.m.

Directions Walk north through a thin screen of trees until you find the

eastern terminus of the Sunken Road. You need not walk

down it (if you wish to do so, see the Hornets’ Nest Excursion

on page 59), but note the location and terrain.

Orientation This “Sunken Road” is nowhere near as impressive as its

more famous counterparts at Antietam or Fredericksburg.

Today it is little more than a narrow path. In 1862 it was a dis-

used wagon trail running from your current location north-

west to the Corinth Road, about half a mile distant. As you

will discover if you take the Hornets’ Nest Excursion, parts of

the trail do dip beneath the surrounding terrain, but at the

time of the battle, few noted this fact, and not a single after-

action report makes reference to a “sunken road.” Indeed, its

tactical significance was simply this: it provided a convenient

place on which to align the Union troops that presently ar-

rived to defend this sector.

53 The Formation of the Sunken Road Position

East

ern

Corin

th

Hamburg-Purdy Road

-Savannah Road

Road

Ham

burg

Roa

d

Sunken


DuncanField

WickerField

Davis WheatField

BarnesField

W. Manse George cabin8th IA

Tuttle

Prent

iss

Lauman

PughMcArthur

Sweeny

East Stop 9d N 10:00 – 11:00 A.M.Formation of the SunkenRoad position.

East Stop 9

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 53

What Happened Hurlbut’s division, of course, anchored the eastern end of the

position. Prentiss ultimately succeeded in rallying about 600

men (out of the nearly 5,500 troops he commanded when the

day began). These he posted on Hurlbut’s left. Later in the day

a regiment fresh from St. Louis, the 23rd Missouri, was

sent to reinforce him, doubling his strength to 1,200 men.

Soon afterward about 5,800 seasoned troops from Brig. Gen.

W. H. L. Wallace’s 2nd Division arrived and extended the

Sunken Road position all the way to the Corinth Road. These

composed the 1st Brigade, under Col. James M. Tuttle, and

the 3rd Brigade, under Col. Thomas W. Sweeny. At Prentiss’s

request Sweeny detached one of his regiments, the 8th Iowa,

to deploy in the 6th Division’s sector in order to shore up

Prentiss’s badly depleted command. With that exception,

however, Tuttle’s troops held the right center, Sweeny’s men

the far right. Including the two surviving batteries from

Hurlbut’s division, the Sunken Road position was directly

buttressed by eight batteries: about 33 guns in all.

By 11:00 a.m. the position was complete. In addition, Wal-

lace sent two regiments (the 9th and 12th Illinois) from his

2nd Brigade, led by Brig. Gen. John A. McArthur, to extend

Hurlbut’s left flank east of the Hamburg-Savannah Road.

McArthur brought with him Battery A, Chicago Light Ar-

tillery, under Lt. Peter B. Wood. The general also became the

beneficiary of an accident: a regiment from Sweeny’s

brigade, the 50th Illinois, lost track of its parent unit and

wound up with McArthur. All three regiments took cover in

a deep wooded ravine. The Chicago battery, for its part, un-

limbered east of the Peach Orchard and slightly in front of

McArthur’s infantry.

Analysis The time required to create this line was for all practical pur-

poses a gift from Capt. Samuel Lockett, the Confederate staff

officer who had earlier misidentified Stuart’s brigade as an

entire Union division. His error illustrates the baneful effects

of an inexperienced observer. Not only was Stuart’s unit

merely a brigade, it was an under-strength brigade consisting

of only three regiments, barely 2,000 men in all. The average

Union division at Shiloh consisted of 7,500 men and gener-

ally possessed at least two or three artillery batteries. In

short, there was precious little reason for Lockett to reach

such an alarmist conclusion. But because he did—and be-

cause both Johnston and Beauregard accepted his report with-

out question—the brigades of Chalmers and Jackson, as well as

the two batteries under Gage and Girardey, were sent to neu-

tralize this threat, to say nothing of the two brigades from

Breckinridge’s Reserve Corps that Beauregard dispatched to

54 East Stop 9d

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 54

handle Stuart but did not arrive in time to participate in the

action. It is almost certain that if Withers’s entire division had

remained near Sarah Bell’s Old Cotton Field, they would have

overwhelmed Hurlbut’s under-strength division while it still

occupied its questionable salient formation at the southwest

fringe of the field. Although it is impossible to predict the ul-

timate outcome of such a battle, the chronic pattern at

Shiloh was for Union troops, when confronted by sudden,

forceful pressure, to give way.

Further, the decision to send Chalmers and Jackson against

Stuart not only cost the Confederates at least 90 minutes of

priceless time (from 10:00 a.m. until 11:30 a.m.) but the rapid

cross-country march and subsequent engagement also added

to the troops’ fatigue and casualties—and, moreover, drained

them of ammunition until a resupply could be arranged.

Thus, although these two brigades were barely half a mile

from McArthur’s position after defeating Stuart, it would be

at least another 90 minutes (from 11:30 a.m. until 2 :00 p.m.)

before they could mount another major attack.

Note: This lull affords a good opportunity to consider several

important developments that were happening on other parts

of the battlefield at about this time and that would have

significant bearing on the fighting discussed in East Stop 9e.

Because these developments apply equally to events ad-

dressed in both the eastern and western tours, please turn to

Appendix A for a discussion (unless you have already done so

in the course of following the western route.)

55 The Formation of the Sunken Road Position

Bivouac of the Federal troops, Sunday night. blcw 1:482

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 55

East Stop 9e “A Few More Charges and the Day Is Ours”

12:30–2:00 p.m.

Directions Walk southwest through the Peach Orchard until you reach

the four cannon representing the 1st Missouri Light Artillery,

designated as “Mann’s Battery” on the blue tablet.

Orientation You are now standing along the position held by Hurlbut’s di-

vision after its withdrawal from the southern end of Sarah

Bell’s Old Cotton Field. As you will note if you look to the reg-

imental monuments on your left (28th Illinois) and right

(32nd Illinois), the line ran almost directly east to west.

Pugh’s brigade held this sector; Lauman’s brigade lay beyond

the tree line to your right, its line bearing slightly toward the

northwest until it tied in with Prentiss’s command at the

Sunken Road. McArthur’s brigade (of W. H. L. Wallace’s divi-

sion) continued the line east of the Hamburg-Savannah Road,

its left flank resting at the lip of a 40-foot ravine.

What Happened At 12:30 p.m. the brigade of Col. Winfield S. Statham reached

the southern edge of Sarah Bell’s Old Cotton Field and filed

into position to the right of Col. William H. Stephens’s brigade

56 East Stop 9e

BloodyPond

Stuart(remnant)

Lauman

Pugh McArthur

Gladden(Deas)

Stephens(Maney) Bowen

Jackson

Chalmers

Statham

East Stops 9e & 9f

12:30 – 2:00 P.M.“A few more charges...,”

N

2:00 – 2:30 P.M.First assaults.

East Stop 9

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 56

(Cheatham’s Division), which had taken severe losses in the

initial attacks on the Sunken Road position near the Eastern

Corinth Road (see the Hornets’ Nest Excursion) and had since

shifted to a position facing the southwestern corner of the

Old Cotton Field.

Part of Breckinridge’s Reserve Corps, Statham’s was one of

the two brigades that had earlier been tapped to deal with

the Union “division” (Stuart’s brigade) beyond the Confeder-

ate right flank. Most of its troops took cover under a ridge at

the southern end of the Old Cotton Field, many in the camp

formerly occupied by the 71st Ohio. (Their position is to your

left front but hidden by a belt of trees not present at the time

of the battle). From that protected position they initially

sparred with Pugh’s men at a range of about 450 yards. Out

of Statham’s six regiments, only the rightmost of them, the

20th Tennessee, got into a serious scrap with the enemy—ele-

ments of McArthur’s brigade—and might have gotten into se-

rious trouble had not a regiment from another brigade (prob-

ably Jackson’s) arrived to shore up its exposed flank.

Perhaps 30 minutes later one of Statham’s fellow brigades,

under Brig. Gen. John S. Bowen, came on the field and ex-

tended the Confederate line to the east. General Johnston him-

self led it into position. “Only a few more charges,” he as-

sured them, “and the day is won.” Soon two regiments from

Jackson’s Brigade arrived as well, so that by 1:30 p.m. the

Confederates had over 4,000 troops on hand to drive up the

Hamburg-Savannah Road.

Vignette Just one detail remained before the attack could resume:

someone had to make the soldiers do it. That someone was

not Breckinridge. He approached Johnston, fuming, “General

Johnston, I cannot get my men to make the charge.” “Then I

will help you,” Johnston replied, “we can get them to make the

charge.”

Striding along Bowen’s line, the commanding general

clinked the soldiers’ bayonets with the tin cup he had taken

in the 18th Wisconsin’s camp as his share of the “spoils” (see

East Stop 6c). “Men of Missouri and Arkansas,” he boomed,

“the enemy is stubborn. I want you to show General Beaure-

gard and General Bragg what you can do with your bayonets

and tooth picks [i.e., Bowie knives].” Then, galloping across

the Hamburg-Savannah Road, he made a similar speech to

Statham’s Brigade. “Men, they are stubborn; we must use the

bayonet.” He reached the center of the line and cried, “I will

lead you!” The Confederate battle line went surging forward.

57 “A Few More Charges and the Day Is Ours”

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 57

East Stop 9f The First Assaults 2:00–2:30 p.m.


What Happened From this point at 2:00 p.m. on April 6, Union infantry and ar-

tillerymen watched as rank upon rank of Confederate troops

emerged from the tree line in front (which in 1862 was far-

ther away, beyond the Hamburg-Purdy Road). They could see

officers dressing the regiments and the Stars and Bars waving

above the battle line. Mann’s battery opened up with canister.

Pugh’s infantry held their fire until the Confederates came

within 200 yards, then loosed a massed volley. But the South-

erners continued to charge, and presently the Missouri ar-

tillerists abandoned their field pieces and streamed to the

rear. As the Confederates angled toward the abandoned guns

and the nearby 41st Illinois, Hurlbut took the 32nd Illinois,

placed it in support of its fellow Illinois regiment, and ex-

tended the 3rd Iowa’s line to cover the gap thus created. To-

gether the three midwestern regiments managed to repel

Statham’s men.

A few minutes later the Southerners attacked again, this

time farther to the west, beyond the tree line to your right.

Lauman’s brigade held that part of the line. The attackers in-

cluded Stephens’s Brigade (now under Col. George Maney) and

the remnants of Gladden’s Brigade (now led by Col. Zachariah

C. Deas, its third commander of the day). The assault did not

get far, however, before these Confederates came under a

crossfire, lay down, and began a steady but indecisive mus-

ketry duel with Lauman’s men.

58 East Stop 9f

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 58

Hornets’ Nest Excursion

Directions Begin the excursion at the W. Manse George cabin (East Stop

9). Walk through the screen of trees behind the cabin until

you reach a wide pathway.

Orientation You are standing in the Sunken Road. Its eastern terminus, at

the Hamburg-Savannah Road, lies not quite 200 yards to your

right. As you turn left and begin the excursion, you will be

walking toward the Eastern Corinth Road, about 800 yards to

the west. The trail approximates the Union line of battle. The

Confederate attacks would have come from the south—that

is, your left as you proceed down the trail.

59 The Hornets’ Nest Excursion

Sunken Road

Hamburg-Purdy Road

East

ern

Corin

th R

oad

Ham

burg-Savannah R

oad

DuncanField

WickerField

DavisWheatField

W. Manse George cabin PeachOrchard

BloodyPond

Bria

r C

reek

Ruggles’s B

attery

Hornets’Nest

Excursion

N

Stop A

Stop B

Stop C

Stop D & E

Stop F

Stop G

Start Excursion

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 59

STOP A 31st Indiana Infantry

Directions Walk about 260 yards until you reach a large, obelisk-shaped

monument.

What Happened This monument commemorates one of the regiments that

formed the right flank of Hurlbut’s division. The woods in

this area looked much the same in April 1862 (though obvi-

ously you must imagine the foliage as it appeared in early

spring), but thanks to the nineteenth-century practice of en-

closing cultivated fields and letting livestock roam freely,

there was probably less undergrowth. Nevertheless, the

woodlands concealed Union strength and dispositions from

the Confederates.

In his after-action report, Col. Charles Cruft claimed that

the 31st Indiana repelled four attacks from this position.

He estimated that it took “some 30 rounds” per man to drive

back the first assault, with some Rebel soldiers getting

within 10 yards of the Union line. A second attack all but ex-

hausted the regiment’s ammunition. Only a fortunate lull in

the action permitted his troops to receive a fresh supply be-

fore the third assault began. During another short lull the

Hoosiers’ cartridge boxes were again filled, enabling them to

drive back the Confederates’ final assault. In all Cruft esti-

mated that his regiment fired an average of about 100 rounds

per man. “The piles of the enemy’s dead which were lying

along our front when he retreated attested [to] the accuracy

and steadiness of the fire.”

Not all of the Confederate dead in this action perished by

gunfire. During the battle the woods caught fire, and numer-

ous wounded men were burned alive.

Beyond the monument you will enter the sector occupied

by the remnants of Prentiss’s division (about 1,200 men).

60 Stop A

Wood and under-brush called “the hornets’ nest.” blcw 1:588

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STOP B 12th Michigan Infantry

Directions Walk about 150 yards until you reach the blue tablet com-

memorating the 12th Michigan Infantry.

What Happened This tablet commemorates one of two regiments from

Peabody’s brigade that preserved its organization after the

initial Confederate onslaught (Stops 4 and 5). It also marks

the center of Prentiss’s position. Somewhere in this vicinity,

probably around noon, Grant visited the division com-

mander. According to Prentiss, he showed the general his en-

tire position. Grant approved it and ordered Prentiss to hold

the position “at all hazards.” Seldom during the Civil War

was an order more literally obeyed. Prentiss fought his com-

mand until it was surrounded. Then, along with many hun-

dreds of Union troops, he surrendered (see East Stop 13).

After spending six months as a prisoner of war, Prentiss

was released as part of an exchange arrangement negotiated

by Union and Confederate authorities in July 1862. For years

he received little recognition for his tenacious defense of the

Sunken Road. Grant overlooked Prentiss in his after-action

report, and though eventually promoted to major general,

Prentiss consistently received backwater assignments. Osten-

sibly on grounds of ill health, but more probably from a

sense that the high command lacked confidence in him, he

resigned from the army on October 28, 1863.

Prentiss lived until 1901, long enough for President Grant

to appoint him a federal pension agent and to read, in

Grant’s memoirs, this mixed tribute to his performance at

Shiloh: “In one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the divi-

sion commanded by General Prentiss did not fall back with

the others. This left his flanks exposed and enabled the en-

emy to capture him with about 2,200 of his officers and

men. . . . I was with [Prentiss], as I was with each of the divi-

sion commanders that day, several times, and my recollec-

tion is that the last time I was with him was about half past

four, when his division was standing up firmly and the Gen-

eral was as cool as if expecting victory.” Translation: While

Grant respected Prentiss’s pluck, he thought the capture of

his division betrayed tactical ineptitude.

61 12th Michigan Infantry

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 61

STOP C Hickenlooper’s Battery

Directions Walk about 120 feet until you reach the cannon-shaped mon-

ument commemorating the 5th Ohio Independent Battery.

(As of 2001, the barrel of the cannon was defaced, leaving

only the carriage and wheels).

What Happened Over 30 cannon supported the Sunken Road position. The 5th

Ohio Independent Battery was one of two batteries deployed

almost directly on the road. The others occupied a low ridge

to your right (north).

Commanded by Capt. Andrew Hickenlooper, the 5th Ohio

consisted of four 6-pounder James rifled guns and two 6-

pounder smoothbores. Already hotly engaged in the early

morning fighting (see East Stop 6), it had lost two guns. Of

the remaining four, two were deployed a few yards south of

the Sunken Road (to your left) in order to sweep a side trail

with fire. The others remained in reserve, with the 8th Iowa

Infantry close by to provide support.

The advanced guns of the 5th Ohio Battery fought off

the second Confederate attack, loading first with shell, then

with canister as the Confederates came closer. Even so the

Rebels got among the guns, and it briefly seemed that they

would capture them until two companies from the 8th Iowa

drove them back. Afterward infantrymen helped withdraw

the advanced two guns to safety. The last two guns from

Hickenlooper’s battery continued to fight from your current

position.

Unlike most of the Union troops in this sector, the Ohio

gunners largely evaded capture by the Confederates. Al-

though they lost an additional gun and caisson during the af-

ternoon retreat, half the battery remained intact to shore up

Grant’s final line.

62 Stop C

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 62

STOP D Arkansas State Memorial

Directions Walk 90 yards to the two cannon representing Munch’s bat-

tery. Turn left and continue to the monument surmounted by

a Confederate soldier.

What Happened Although this monument commemorates all thirteen Ar-

kansas units that fought at Shiloh, its location is a particular

reminder of the 1st Arkansas, one of four infantry regiments

belonging to Col. Randal L. Gibson’s Brigade, Ruggles’s Division,

Bragg’s Corps. Gibson’s command made the four successive as-

saults on the sector through which you have passed during

your walk from the 31st Indiana monument to this point.

Seldom during the war, let alone the battle of Shiloh, was an

outfit more singularly misused.

Gibson’s Brigade, 2,400 strong, began the day astride the

Corinth Road in the second Confederate attack wave. It ad-

vanced in the wake of the first line, encountered only a few

rounds from Union artillery en route to the front, and was

therefore fresh and all but unbloodied when it reached Davis

Wheat Field shortly before noon.

Soon thereafter Bragg rode up. Around 11:00 a.m., ele-

ments of five Confederate brigades had attacked the Union

line in the vicinity of the Review Field, but these units had

fought all morning, were tired and depleted in numbers, and

made scant headway. Bragg seized the chance to throw new

troops into the fight. He ordered Gibson to attack the enemy

in the sector ahead of him and to his right.

“The brigade,” Gibson wrote in his after-action report,

“moved forward in fine style, marching through an open

field under a heavy fire and half way up an elevation covered

with an almost impenetrable thicket, upon which the enemy

was posted. On the left a battery [Munch’s 1st Minnesota Bat-

tery] opened that raked our flank, while a steady fire of mus-

ketry extended along the entire front. Under this combined

fire our line was broken and the troops fell back; but they

were soon rallied and advanced to the contest. Four times the

position was charged and four times the assault proved un-

availing. The strong and almost inaccessible position of the

enemy—his infantry well covered in ambush and his ar-

tillery skillfully posted and efficiently served—was found to

be impregnable to infantry alone.”

That was putting it mildly. Gibson omitted from the report

that when the first attack failed, he sent a plea to Bragg for ar-

tillery support. Bragg, observing the action from a distance,

imperiously brushed aside the request. He ordered a second

assault. When it too failed, Col. Henry W. Allen of the 4th Loui-

63 Arkansas State Memorial

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 63

siana—shot through both cheeks during the previous at-

tacks—urged Bragg to let the brigade abandon its frontal

assaults and try flanking the Union position instead. The gen-

eral would have none of that. He ordered two more frontal at-

tacks, both without artillery support and both, of course,

made with troops ever more depleted in numbers and worn

by the stress of combat. In the end, wrote Col. James Fagan of

the 1st Arkansas, “we . . . were forced back by overwhelming

numbers entrenched in a strong position. That all was done

that could possibly be done the heaps of killed and wounded

left there give ample evidence.”

At least a third of Gibson’s men were killed or wounded in

these four unsupported attacks, made between noon and

2:00 p.m. Incredibly Bragg deemed these efforts inadequate.

Certain that the brigade had been mishandled and that a

proper assault would have broken the Union line, he con-

fided to his wife that Gibson was “an arrant coward.”

64 Stop D

General Braxton Bragg, C.S.A. blcw 3:601

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 64

STOP E Munch’s Battery Monument

Directions Return to the two guns representing Munch’s battery. As the

blue tablet attests, only one section comprising two guns de-

ployed here. The rest of the battery unlimbered at your next

destination, 100 yards farther along the trail. En route you

will cross the Eastern Corinth Road.

What Happened Like Hickenlooper’s 5th Ohio Battery, Capt. Emil Munch’s 1st

Minnesota Battery had earlier fought in Spain Field (East

Stop 6). Although two of their six guns were disabled in that

action, the Minnesotans managed to get all six safely away.

The two useless cannon were sent to Pittsburg Landing. The

others joined the defense of the Sunken Road and played a

signal role in smashing Gibson’s forlorn attacks.

The 1st Minnesota Battery also helped dozens of Union

troops escape from the Hornets’ Nest when Confederate

units later surrounded it. Around 4:30 p.m., as the battery

joined the withdrawal toward Pittsburg Landing, its can-

noneers spotted Confederate infantry approaching from the

west. They unlimbered long enough to spray the advancing

Rebels with canister, halting the enemy long enough to keep

an escape route open.

65 Munch’s Battery Monument

Battery, forward! blcw 1:487

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 65

STOP F 7th Iowa Infantry

Directions Walk about 110 yards to the 7th Iowa Infantry monument.

Find a nearby location from which you have a good, unob-

structed view of Duncan Field, the open country to your left

(southwest).

What Happened You now stand in the middle of the sector held by Tuttle’s

brigade of W. H. L. Wallace’s 2nd Division, which marched to

reinforce the beleaguered Union line around 8:00 a.m. (see

East Stop 9d). After deploying in the heavy timber behind

you, the 7th Iowa reached this position at about 9:30 a.m.

Here the troops first caught sight of the advancing Confeder-

ates. The regiment’s commander, Lt. Col. James C. Parrott,

wrote in his after-action report: “I ordered my men to lie

down and hold themselves in readiness to resist any attack,

which they did, and remained in that position until ordered

to fall back at about 5 p.m., holding the rebels in check and re-

taining every inch of ground it had gained in the morning,

being all the time under a galling fire of canister, grape, and

shell, which did considerable execution in our ranks, killing

several of my men and wounding others. The regiment,

when ordered, fell back in good order and passed through a

most galling flank fire from the enemy.”

66 Stop F

The ”hornets’ nest” – Prentiss’s troops andHickenlooper’s battery repulsing Hardee’s troops. blcw 1:504

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 66

STOP G 2nd Iowa Infantry

Directions Continue walking about 200 yards to a point where the

Sunken Road widens between the National Park Service in-

terpretive marker labeled “The Hornets’ Nest” and the mon-

ument to the 2nd Iowa Infantry, the rightmost regiment of

Tuttle’s brigade. Face the open field to your left.

What Happened You are looking toward the western half of Duncan Field.

Along the far tree line, some 400 yards distant, was the grand

battery of 53 cannon organized by Brig. Gen. Daniel Ruggles

around 3:30 p.m. (see East Stop 12). The field pieces that com-

memorate their location are largely hidden from view by a

slight rise in the ground halfway across the field, but they are

to the left of the “Ross Headquarters” pyramid, clearly visible

in the distance.

The Confederates, according to some accounts of the

battle, launched numerous infantry assaults across Duncan

Field. In reality only two major attacks occurred in this area,

the first in the morning, the other in midafternoon. Neither

succeeded in dislodging the Federals from their position.

Nor did Ruggles’s battery, though its massive cannonade was

certainly impressive. An officer of the 2nd Iowa wrote: “It

seemed like a mighty hurricane sweeping everything before

it. . . . The great storm of cannon balls made the forest in

places fall before its sweep, . . . men and horses were dying,

and a blaze of unearthly fire lit up the scene. [Yet] at this mo-

ment of horror, when our regiment was lying close to the

ground to avoid the storm of balls, the little birds were

singing in the green trees over our heads!”

Ultimately resistance in the Hornets’ Nest was overcome,

not by infantry or artillery attack, but rather by the retreat of

Sherman and McClernand to the west and Hurlbut to the

east. There is even some question as to how fiercely the Con-

federates contended for the Hornets’ Nest. As Park Historian

Stacy D. Allen notes, although the Southern dead were

buried where their bodies were most heavily concentrated,

none of the battlefield’s known mass graves are located in

this sector. The fame of the Hornets’ Nest, he speculates, may

have been partly due to the perceptions of the defenders.

“Let’s put ourselves in the heads of those Yankees,” Allen told

journalist Tony Horwitz, author of the best-selling book Con-

federates in the Attic. “We’re in this thicket where we can’t see

the rest of the battlefield. There’s rebels coming at us, in bits

and pieces, all day long. Then suddenly we’re still here and

everyone else has retreated. It seems like we fought the battle

on our own.”

67 2nd Iowa Infantry

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 67

Group solidarity and intentional massaging of the facts

also played a role. After the war the surviving veterans

formed the Hornets’ Nest Brigade, led by none other than

Brig. Gen. Benjamin Prentiss. “He was eager to foster the im-

pression that the Hornets’ Nest and his role there were cru-

cial to the battle,” Allen continued. “He played it up big, es-

pecially later in his life.”

This concludes the Hornets’ Nest Excursion. Retrace your

steps to your vehicle.

68 Stop G

Major-General B. M. Prentiss. blcw 1:477

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EAST STOP 10 The Collapse of the Union Left, 2 :00– 4:00 p.m.

Directions Return to your vehicle. Exit the parking lot, turn right, and

proceed 60 yards to the 41st Illinois Infantry monument next

to the hamburg-savannah road. Stand in front of the monu-

ment and look south down the hamburg-savannah road.

Orientation You are standing on the right flank of McArthur’s brigade

from W. H. L. Wallace’s 2nd Division, which had deployed

here around 11:00 a.m. (“McArthur’s brigade” is a term of

convenience: although McArthur was present here, three of

his five regiments were actually deployed on the Union right

thanks to a foul up during the approach march.) To your left

(east) across the road you can see a monument commemo-

rating Willard’s battery, which was in direct support of the

9th and 12th Illinois (of McArthur’s brigade) and the 50th Illi-

nois (of Sweeny’s brigade). These units had picked up an ad-

ditional 50 men from other commands. McArthur’s brigade

continued about 300 yards in that direction, ending at the

edge of a steep ravine. About 400 yards down the road ahead

of you were the brigades of Bowen and Jackson. The 800-man

remnant of Stuart’s brigade was about one-half mile east-

69 The Collapse of the Union Left

BloodyPond

Stuart

(retreats at 2:15 P.M.)

Union Fallback Line

Clanton

Bowen Jackson

Chalmers

Statham

East Stops 10 & 11

2:00 – 4:00 P.M.Collapse of the Union Left.

N

2:30 P.M.Johnston’s death.

East Stop 10

East Stop 11

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 69

southeast on the southern lip of the ravine just mentioned.

Facing it was Chalmers’s Brigade.

What Happened While Statham attacked Pugh’s brigade, Bowen and Jackson

charged against McArthur’s brigade. At almost the same mo-

ment, Chalmers struck Stuart’s brigade, while Col. James Clan-

ton’s 1st Alabama Cavalry threatened Stuart’s left flank. The

combined effect unhinged the Union position in the Peach

Orchard sector. Hurlbut, McArthur, and Stuart grudgingly

withdrew to the north, struggling to establish a new defen-

sive line near the Bloody Pond. This fallback position held

only until 4 :00 p.m., after which the entire force withdrew to

“Grant’s Last Line” (see Stop 12).

Analysis Johnston has been criticized for overcommitting strength

to the Peach Orchard sector. But that area (including Mc-

Arthur’s extension) was of crucial importance because it

blocked the Hamburg-Savannah Road, the quickest access to

Pittsburg Landing. Critics who maintain that Johnston should

have bypassed the position overlook what by this time would

have been obvious to him: The ground near the Tennessee

River consisted of a series of deep ravines. A flanking column

would have had to negotiate each of them (there were in fact

four of them between Chalmers’s 2:00 p.m. position and the

landing) with an intact Union division on the plateau above.

Had Johnston tried this tactic, it would assuredly have failed.

As noted previously, the real mistake was the midmorning

decision to attack Stuart instead of hitting the Union center

before the Federals were prepared.

70 East Stop 10

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 70

EAST STOP 11 Johnston’s Death, 2:30 p.m.

Directions Return to your vehicle and drive about 100 yards down ham-

burg-savannah road to the entrance to Stop 12 on the Na-

tional Park Service tour route, “Death of General Johnston.”

Exit your vehicle, pause to consider the location, then follow

the trail marker into a sheltered ravine about 60 yards far-

ther south.

Orientation You are now about 100 yards east of Sarah Bell’s Old Cotton

Field. The area is wooded today but would have been more

open in 1862. Bowen’s Brigade crossed this ground as it moved

to attack the Union line. Statham’s Brigade charged on Bowen’s

left directly across the cotton field.

What Happened Johnston went in with Statham’s Brigade during the 2:00 p.m.

assault. When he saw that it was succeeding, he rode back to

the south end of the cotton field and encountered Tennessee

governor Isham G. Harris, who was serving on his staff as a

volunteer aide. Pointing to a nick on his handsome riding

boot, he remarked jovially, “Governor, they came very near

putting me hors de combat in that charge.” Alarmed, Harris

asked if Johnston were wounded. The general assured him he

was not, and the governor went off to deliver a message to

Statham. Minutes later other members of Johnston’s staff real-

ized that their commander was indeed wounded. But he was

fully alert and in good spirits, and the injury seemed minor.

Harris returned, and soon afterward Johnston swayed in the

saddle. The governor and another staff officer caught him,

and Harris asked, “General, are you wounded?”

“Yes, and I fear seriously,” Johnston replied.

Harris led his commander’s horse into the ravine where

you now stand, and Johnston was lowered onto the ground.

Staff officers searched without success for the wound. But

the general was clearly dying. Soon his brother-in-law, Col.

William Preston, came up, propped Johnston’s head in his lap,

and asked repeatedly, “Johnston, do you know me?” But the

general died without a word.

An artery in his leg had been cut, and he had bled to death.

Everyone wept, Preston perhaps more than the rest. “Par-

don me, gentlemen,” he said, “you all know how I loved him.”

Then he took out his notebook and wrote Beauregard: “Ravine,

2:30 p.m. Gen. Johnston just fallen, mortally wounded, after a

victorious attack on the left of the enemy. It now devolves on

you to complete the victory.” Harris took the dispatch to Beau-

regard (by now at the so-called Crossroads headquarters north

of Shiloh Church). Beauregard got the news at 3:00 p.m. John-

71 Johnson’s Death

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 71

ston’s body was wrapped in a blanket and furtively taken to

the rear, with efforts made to keep the news from the troops

lest it demoralize them.

Analysis After the battle it was said that if Johnston had lived, the Con-

federates would have won at Shiloh. In a postwar article Pre-

ston argued that despite the “seeming confusion,” there was

really “the most perfect regularity in the development of the

plan of battle” until the general died. Johnston had consis-

tently turned the Union left flank and, “by a series of rapid

and powerful blows, [had broken] the Federal army to

pieces.” With Johnston’s death, however, disappeared the char-

ismatic leadership that had brought his army to the verge of

complete success. “There came a lull in the conflict on the

right, lasting more than an hour. . . . The determinate pur-

pose to capture Grant that day was lost sight of. The strong

arm was withdrawn, and the bow remained unbent. Else-

where there were bloody, desultory combats, but they tended

to nothing.”

Although Preston’s assessment was romantic and worship-

ful, it was certainly reasonable on his part to believe that

Johnston would have maintained the momentum of the Con-

federate drive. What the outcome of that would have been,

however, is much less certain. In all likelihood, if the Con-

federates did not reach Pittsburg Landing by 3:00 p.m., they

never would. By that hour the creation of Grant’s final line

was already well underway, and Buell’s troops were not

far off.

This concludes the eastern tour of the first day’s fighting.

(Unlike the western route, it has no twelfth or thirteenth

stop.) If you have already followed the western route, turn to

page 108 (Stop 14). If you have not followed the western route

and wish to do so, proceed to the next page (West Stop 6).

72 East Stop 11

Scene of General Albert Sidney Johston’s death. From a photographtaken in 1884. blcw 1:563

03-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 72

Western Route, April 6

WEST STOP 6 Rea Field, 6:00– 8:00 a.m.

Directions If coming from Stop 5, return to your vehicle. Proceed about 0.2

mile to the parking area for Rea Springs on the left.

If coming from East Stop 11, return to your vehicle. Turn left

from the parking area and proceed 0.1 mile to a fork in the

road. Bear right and then turn right on hamburg-purdy road.

Brigadier-GeneralWilliam T. Sherman,C.S.A. blcw 4:109

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:25 AM Page 73

West Stop 6a. Sherman’s Division Is Attacked 6:00–

7:00 a.m.

Directions Walk across the road to the cannon representing Water-

house’s battery. Face in the direction the cannon is pointing

(west).

Orientation You are standing on a ridge that composed part of the first po-

sition of Sherman’s 5th Division during the opening phase of

the battle. The Rea cabin stood just across the road on your

74 West Stop 6a

Rea Springs

Shilo

h B

ranc

h

East Fork of Shiloh Branch

ReaField

1st p

ositi

on

53rd OHcamp

3rd position2nd position

Cleburne

6th MS

23rd TN

Wood

N

West Stop 6a

6:00 – 7:00 A.M.Sherman’s Division isattacked.

West Stop 6

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 74

right. Farther in that direction, in the ravine, are Rea Springs

and the east fork of Shiloh Branch. Out of sight today on the

ridge beyond that ravine (but quite visible in the thinner for-

est growth of the 1860s) is Shiloh Church, where Sherman

made his headquarters. Along that ridge and the one on

which you now stand, the regiments of Sherman’s division

had their camps. At the foot of the long slope directly in front

of you, woods and dense thickets mark the course of the main

fork of Shiloh Branch, appearing much as they did in 1862.

Along the open ridge to your left was the camp of the 53rd

Ohio, the left-flank regiment of the division. In 1862 the open

field extended farther in that direction (south). The far tree

line was then about 900 yards from where you stand instead

of the 200 yards today. Out of sight beyond the trees, then as

well as now, Fraley Field (Stop 3) is distant about 1,500 yards

to your left front. The right flank of the main defensive line

of Prentiss’s 6th Division was about 800 yards to your left rear

and extended farther in that same direction.

What Happened Still nervous about what he believed was contact with the en-

emy, Col. Jesse Appler, commanding the 53rd Ohio, estab-

lished a small outpost Saturday evening, April 5, near what

was then the south end of Rea Field, 900 yards to your left.

Early on Sunday morning this patrol returned on the double,

reporting Confederate troops on the Corinth Road, just be-

yond the field’s boundary, and heavy firing to the southwest,

representing the fight in Fraley Field. A few minutes later a

wounded fugitive of Peabody’s command brought eyewit-

ness news of fighting on Prentiss’s front. Appler responded by

ordering the 53rd into line of battle immediately in front of

its camp, a line beginning near where you now stand and ex-

tending perhaps 200 yards directly to your left, facing as you

now do. Then someone spotted Confederate troops moving

across the southern end of Rea Field, advancing against Pren-

tiss’s right flank. Appler therefore pivoted his line to face in

that direction (that is, to your left) and moved forward just

beyond his camp. Confederate skirmishers now appeared in

the woods along Shiloh Branch, directly in front of you. Mut-

tering “This is no place for us,” an increasingly flustered Ap-

pler responded again by pivoting his regiment back to face as

you now do and withdrawing it behind you (and behind the

regiment’s camp) into the edge of the woods. A section (two

guns) of Waterhouse’s battery moved into position at the

edge of the woods on Appler’s right, directly behind you.

About this time, 7:00 a.m., Sherman and his staff arrived

on the scene. Skeptical to the last, the general had responded

to Appler’s prompt notice of contact with the enemy that

75 Sherman’s Division Is Attacked

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 75

morning by sneering to the 53rd’s courier, “You must be aw-

fully scared over there.” Now Sherman and his entourage

rode into Rea Field in front of Appler’s line, about 100 yards

to your left. He peered intently southward, trying to make

out the identity of troops (in fact Confederate) continuing to

cross the south end of the field, several hundred yards far-

ther to your left. Someone called out for him to look to his

right. A line of Confederate skirmishers was emerging from

the thickets along Shiloh Branch, directly in front of you.

Sherman saw them just as they fired and threw up his hand

in startled reaction. One bullet struck the upraised hand. An-

other struck the head of Sherman’s orderly, Sgt. Thomas D.

Holliday, killing him instantly. The truth finally dawned on

the Union general. “My God, we are attacked!” he exclaimed,

then hastily rode back to Appler and told him “to hold his po-

sition; he [Sherman] would support him.” Sherman then

rode off to direct the rest of his division.

Analysis Sherman had allowed his assessment of the strategic situa-

tion—an assumption of almost complete Confederate disor-

ganization and demoralization following the defeats at Forts

Henry and Donelson and the consequent deep withdrawals—

to determine his interpretation of the information he found

directly in front of his picket lines. Despite what in retrospect

appears to have been ample evidence of the Confederate

army’s approach, Sherman continued to interpret all data as

indicating merely probes and skirmishing by light enemy

forces, unsupported by any large body of troops. The moment

of sudden realization here in Rea Field was in one sense the

lowest ebb of Sherman’s career. Up to that point he seemed to

have gotten every decision wrong, jeopardizing his com-

mand and nearly getting himself killed in the bargain. From

this point forward that day, however, his performance was

magnificent and virtually flawless.

76 West Stop 6a

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 76

West Stop 6b. The 53rd Ohio Fights and Retreats 7:00–

8:00 a.m.

Directions Turn around and walk back to the edge of the woods behind

you. Then turn and face in the same direction (west) you were

for West Stop 6a.

Orientation You are now standing on the line of Appler’s 53rd Ohio, fac-

ing as his soldiers did in anticipation of the Confederate

attack. Just to your right were two guns of Waterhouse’s bat-

77 The 53rd Ohio Fights and Retreats

Rea Springs

Shilo

h B

ranc

h

East Fork of Shiloh Branch

ReaField

Regroups for 2

additional attacks

23rd TN

(regrouping)

53rd OH

53rd OHcamp

6th MS

N

West Stop 6b

7:00 – 8:00 A.M.The 53rd Ohio fights andretreats.

West Stop 6

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 77

tery. To your left along the tree line ran the rest of the 53rd’s

battle line. In the open field to your left front were the large,

conical Sibley tents and other impedimenta of the regiment’s

encampment.

What Happened The situation developed quickly after Sherman’s departure.

From the high ground across Shiloh Branch just over 800

yards to your left front, the 12 guns of Maj. Francis Shoup’s

Arkansas Artillery Battalion opened fire on this and the divi-

sion’s other positions to your right around Shiloh Church. Af-

ter firing two rounds in reply, the section of Waterhouse’s

battery, acting on orders from Sherman’s chief of artillery,

Maj. Ezra Taylor, limbered up and moved to join the rest of

the battery farther to your left, on the high ground on the

other side of Rea Springs and the east fork of Shiloh Branch

(visible in springtime from the Rea Springs parking area).

Even as the guns took up their new position, large forma-

tions of Rebel infantry emerged from the thickets along the

main fork of Shiloh Branch (in front of you) and charged to-

ward the 53rd Ohio. Because of the obstructing crest and the

tents of the camp, the 53rd held its fire until the Confeder-

ates had closed to 50 yards, then tore into them with a dev-

astating volley. The attacking wave broke and fled back over

the crest, only to reform and come again. A more sustained

firefight now raged at the same murderous range, with even

more devastating results to the Confederate attackers, who

again fled in disorder, leaving the ground covered with their

dead and wounded. The attacking 6th Mississippi of Brig. Gen.

Patrick R. Cleburne’s Brigade lost 300 of its 425 men in this

fight, while Union casualties were light. At this juncture,

however, Appler broke. Shouting “Fall back and save your-

selves,” he fled to the rear. The regiment followed in disor-

derly retreat.

Analysis The lopsided initial victory of the 53rd Ohio over the 6th Mis-

sissippi had several causes. First, the defenders here were in

the woods, while their attackers were in an open field. Sec-

ond, the Confederates were significantly disorganized and

came on in piecemeal fashion because they had been dis-

rupted in passing through the Shiloh Branch bottoms (more

on this at West Stop 7) as well as the tents and other camp

equipage of the 53rd on the ridge crest itself. Finally, at least

some companies of the 53rd were protected by hastily

erected breastworks formed by throwing down the rails of

the roughly five-foot-high snake rail fence that bordered the

field here. Union soldiers also used bails of hay and perhaps

a few logs to protect their position.

78 West Stop 6b

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 78

The untimely departure of the 53rd Ohio began a process

akin to the falling of dominoes, starting here and running

from left to right along Sherman’s line. The process would

eventually force the division to abandon its initial position

along these ridges. The roughly 600-yard gap between Ap-

pler’s left flank and the right of Prentiss’s division would

probably have triggered the same process some time later

that morning by allowing the Confederates to turn the

Ohioans’ left flank. This threat may have been on Appler’s

mind when he fled the fight, but it was not an immediate

danger, for at that moment the attacking Confederate lines

featured a corresponding gap. As it was, disarray in Southern

ranks, coupled with the outstanding performance of Water-

house’s and Barrett’s Illinois batteries, posted on the high

ground near Shiloh Church and covering the field with their

fire, served to delay the collapse of Sherman’s first position

for about another two hours. By that time Prentiss’s division

had broken, and Sherman would in any case have been ill ad-

vised to maintain his position here.

79 The 53rd Ohio Fights and Retreats

Major-General Patrick R. Cleburne, C.S.A. blcw 4:433

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 79

WEST STOP 7 Shiloh Branch, 6:00– 8:00 a.m.

Directions Return to your vehicle. From the parking area, turn right on

peabody road and proceed 0.1 mile to corinth road. Turn

right and proceed about 0.1 mile, crossing one small bridge

but not the second that quickly follows. Pull to the side of the

road and stop. Walk across the road and stand next to the

marker for Cleburne’s Brigade. Turn around and face the road

(east).

Orientation The small bridge to your left spans the east fork of Shiloh

Branch. The one to your right, over which you passed in your

vehicle, crosses the main fork of Shiloh Branch. The two flow

nearly parallel here and converge about 200 yards behind

you. The ground in front of you and for 100 yards or so to

your right front is a marshy area of dense thickets that Cle-

burne referred to as “an almost impassable morass.” Cleburne’s

Brigade advanced across this ground— or tried to—facing

just as you now do. Almost directly in front of you and not

quite 600 yards away is the 53rd Ohio’s defensive position,

where you stood at Stop 4b. Then as now the view in that di-

rection was almost completely obstructed.

80 West Stop 7

The Morass

ShilohBranch

East Fork ofShiloh Branch

Shiloh Spring

Rea Field

Cleburne

53rd OHcamp

6th MS

23rd TN

West Stop 7N6:00 – 8:00 A.M.Shiloh Branch.

West Stop 7

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 80

What Happened The experience of Cleburne’s Brigade illustrates the difficul-

ties presented by the rough, broken, and wooded terrain of

the Shiloh battlefield. It also helps explain the failure of the

initial Confederate assaults in this sector. Cleburne’s was the

left-flank brigade in Hardee’s first attack wave. On reaching

this point Cleburne’s regiments found the morass to be, as he

later reported, literally impassable for a line of troops. When

the general tried to lead them through, his horse mired

down, reared, and threw him on his back in the deep mud.

The brigade then split, passing around both sides of the mo-

rass, and the two halves did not subsequently cooperate tac-

tically. The 6th Mississippi and 23rd Tennessee passed to the

right of the morass and advanced through Rea Field against

the 53rd Ohio (Stop 4b). After the first repulse there, the

23rd Tennessee proved difficult to rally, and so the 6th Mis-

sissippi carried on the fight alone, with disastrous results.

Meanwhile Cleburne’s other regiments—the 2nd Tennessee, 5th

(later renumbered 35th) Tennessee, 24th Tennessee, and 15th

Arkansas—passed to the left of the morass and veered farther

in that direction, coming up against the rest of Sherman’s di-

vision (West Stops 8 and 9).

Analysis Although the dense thickets along the bottomland of Shiloh

Branch gave some cover to Confederate forces advancing to

attack Sherman’s division, they also had the effect of dis-

rupting and fragmenting the initial attacks so that they oc-

curred in piecemeal fashion. It would have been very hard to

launch any sort of coordinated assault across this difficult

terrain, and the inexperience of both Cleburne and his troops

made them particularly vulnerable to this disrupting fac-

tor. This was particularly the case here at the morass. The

doughty Cleburne, extracting himself from the mire and re-

gaining his horse, strove valiantly to direct his brigade’s as-

saults, galloping around the swamp to direct one half and

then the other, but the effort was doomed from the outset.

This incident also provides one of the many illustrations

of the ill-conceived nature of the Confederate dispositions for

the assault, with each corps stretched across the entire

battlefield. In turn that meant that Cleburne’s Brigade could

not be deployed any other way than it was—stretched out in

a continuous line of battle nearly 1,500 yards long. By con-

trast, with three corps attacking side by side, as General John-

ston had described in a letter to President Davis a few days be-

fore, Cleburne’s task could have been far easier. His brigade

could have advanced on a much narrower front in battalion

column (each regiment in line of battle, one behind the

other) or with a couple of regiments deployed side by side in

81 Shiloh Branch

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 81

line of battle and each of the other four in a compact column

behind, ready to be brought up and deployed as the situation

warranted. Why the Confederates did not operate in the

manner Johnston described to Davis has never been satisfacto-

rily explained.

82 West Stop 7

A shell at headquarters. blcw 4:247

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 82

83 Ridge near Shiloh Church

WEST STOP 8 Ridge near Shiloh Church

Directions Return to your vehicle. Proceed approximately 0.2 miles far-

ther. Pull to the side of the road and park just short of Shiloh

Church.

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 83

84 West Stop 8a

West Stop 8a. Buckland’s Brigade Holds Fast 8:30–

10:00 a.m.

Directions Cross the road and walk across the field to a large monument

surmounted by a statue of a soldier (the 2nd Tennessee monu-

ment). Face in the same direction as the stone soldier. Walk

several steps forward to the edge of the woods, turn, and face

back toward the monument.

Orientation You are standing on the line of Sherman’s center brigade,

commanded by Col. Ralph Buckland. It ran along the tree

line here and the forward slope of the ridge to either side of

you. The smaller monument at the edge of the woods to your

left is that of the 70th Ohio. That regiment’s flank rested near

Shiloh Church, farther to your left, and the monument

marks its center. The other two regiments of Buckland’s

brigade continued the line, curving forward (toward the Con-

federates) to conform to the contour of the ridge. The Con-

federates, including the 2nd Tennessee commemorated here,

charged toward your position, directly up the slope.

ShilohBranch


Shiloh Spring

Rea Field

Shiloh ChurchBuckland

Hildebrand

OH

70th OH

77th OH

OH

Barrett’sBattery

Schwartz’sBattery

Waterhouse’sBattery

15th AR

24th TN

2nd TN

5th TN

OH

70th OHcamp

48th OHcamp

77th OHcamp

72nd

48th

57th

Cleburne

West Stop 8aN8:30 – 10:00 A.M.Buckland’s Brigade holdsfast.

West Stop 8a

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 84

85 Buckland’s Brigade Holds Fast

What Happened The four regiments of Cleburne’s Brigade that passed to the

left of the morass came up to attack Sherman’s center

brigade here and along the ridge to your right. They suffered

one bloody repulse after another. The 2nd Tennessee’s colonel,

hard-driving William B. Bate, led his regiment in three sepa-

rate charges, all of which were beaten back with casualties

that totaled nearly a third of his men. Bate was trying to lead

the regiment in a charge against Barrett’s battery near Shiloh

Church (to your left, Stop 6b) when he himself was badly

wounded in the lower leg. Cleburne’s other regiments fared

little better as Sherman’s line here held firm. A similar fate

awaited the troops of Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson’s Brigade

of Bragg’s Corps (the second assault wave) as well as those of

Brig. Gen. Patton Anderson’s Brigade of Polk’s Corps (the third

wave), both of which came up in turn and suffered repulses

along this line.

Analysis Many of the reasons for the initial Confederate defeat in this

sector are the same as those that prevailed in Rea Field (out

of sight to your left). The rugged terrain and the faulty de-

ployment of the Confederate army prevented the Southern-

ers from launching large coordinated assaults. Their piece-

meal attacks involved only a few regiments at a time and

were readily beaten off by Buckland’s men. Additional fac-

tors were the strong defensive position held by Buckland’s

brigade, with a fairly good field of fire in front of it, and the

particularly resolute fight put up by these regiments. Al-

though like the rest of Sherman’s troops they were com-

pletely unseasoned and undergoing their first experience of

hostile fire, they nevertheless stood up to their work here for

about two hours before being forced to retreat not by pres-

sure from the front, but rather by the unraveling of the line

south of Shiloh Church. Sherman was able to give his per-

sonal attention to the line along this ridge and beyond the

Church as far as the east fork of Shiloh Branch, and the stand

speaks well of his leadership.

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 85

86 West Stop 8b

West Stop 8b. Sherman’s Division Fights and Falls Back

8:00–10:00 a.m.

Directions Turn to your left and walk past the 70th Ohio monument,

then bear left on the path through the woods. You will be

walking just behind the position of Buckland’s firing line.

The path emerges near Shiloh Church and the cannon com-

memorating Barrett’s battery, just opposite the church. Face

in the same direction as the cannon.

ShilohB

ranch


Shiloh Spring

Rea Field

Shiloh Church

70th OH

77th OH

OH

Barrett’s Battery

Waterhouse’sBattery

2nd TN

6th MS

OH

70th OHcamp

48th OHcamp

77th OHcamp

48th

57th

53rd OHcamp

57th OHcamp

23rd TN(regrouping)

Washington (LA) Art’y

Bankhead’s TN Battery

Shoup’s Artillery Battalion(3 Batteries)

Wood

Cleburne

Johnson

Anderson

Russel

(regiments interm

ingled, regrouping,

some advancing to renew

attack)

N 8:00 – 10:00 A.M.Sherman’s Division fightsand falls back.

West Stop 8b

West Stop 8b

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 86

87 Sherman’s Division Fights and Falls Back

Orientation This position was held during the early morning hours of

April 6 by Barrett’s battery, formally known as Battery B, 1st

Illinois Light Artillery. It was part of the ridge position that

Sherman’s division held for over two hours in the face of fu-

rious Confederate assaults. The concentration of Confederate

artillery in this sector, 12 guns of Shoup’s Arkansas Artillery Bat-

talion, was located about 1,100 yards directly in front of you.

The north end of Rea Field, on the other side of the east fork

of Shiloh Branch, is about 700 yards to your left front, and

the open field in 1862 stretched 900 yards or so farther in

that direction. Sherman had his headquarters here near the

church. The left flank of Buckland’s brigade was just to your

right, and the right flank of Col. Jesse Hildebrand’s brigade

was just the other side of the road.

What Happened Barrett’s gunners and those of Waterhouse’s battery (Battery

E, 1st Illinois Light Artillery), on the other side of Shiloh

Church, fired on Confederates advancing up the ridge in

front of you as well as at Shoup’s artillery (and other guns that

arrived later) on high ground on the other side of Shiloh

Branch. From this position in 1862, it was possible to see into

Rea Field to the south (your left front), and Sherman and his

gunners could see Confederate infantry moving into and

across the field. They brought these troops under fire very ef-

fectively and were able to cover Rea Field for some time after

Appler’s 53rd Ohio fled the fight. Although they could delay

the unraveling of Sherman’s left flank, they could not pre-

vent it indefinitely. Confederate troops pressing up from Rea

Field and across the east fork forced the collapse of the re-

maining two regiments of Hildebrand’s brigade, one after

the other.

Seeing that the position had become untenable, Sherman

ordered what was left of his division—the artillery, Buck-

land’s brigade, some fragments of Hildebrand’s command,

and the almost untouched brigade of Col. John D. McDowell

farther north (out of sight to your right)—to fall back to the

line of the Hamburg-Purdy Road, about 600 yards behind

you. On Sherman’s orders Barrett’s battery pulled out first

and made good its escape. Waterhouse’s guns also would

have gotten away cleanly if not for the ill-timed combative-

ness of Sherman’s chief of artillery, Taylor. Seeing Water-

house beginning to withdraw, Taylor rode up, asserting that

every inch of ground must be contested and ordering the bat-

tery to unlimber and go into action again just 100 yards in

rear of its previous position. Waterhouse obeyed, but it was a

hopeless gesture in the face of what was rapidly becoming a

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 87

88 West Stop 8b

Rebel juggernaut. He and his first lieutenant were wounded,

and three of the battery’s guns were lost.

Analysis Barrett’s and Waterhouse’s batteries, like the infantry of

Buckland’s brigade, performed magnificently and made an

important contribution to prolonging Sherman’s stand here.

This is all the more remarkable considering the complete

lack of experience of Waterhouse’s men. They had received

their horses only ten days before the battle and had drilled

with them only three times. The final collapse of the position

from left to right was all but foreordained by the fact that

Sherman’s division never tied in to Prentiss’s right flank, far-

ther to the left. The several-hundred-yard-wide gap between

them made the first day’s battle into two largely separate

fights (represented by the two different routes in this guide

book). That gap also allowed the Confederates to outflank re-

peatedly both wings of Union defenders.

Still Sherman’s stubborn stand here paid important divi-

dends to the Union cause. About two and a half miles directly

in front of you, near the place where the Bark Road forks off

from the main Corinth Road (beside which you stand), Beau-

regard had his headquarters. As second in command of the

Confederate army at Shiloh, Beauregard was handling the

business of feeding reserves into the fight while command-

ing general Johnston did his best to direct the battle from the

front. According to Johnston’s battle plan of striking hardest

on the Union left, prying Grant’s army away from Pittsburg

Landing, and crushing it against the swamps in the Owl

Creek bottoms, Beauregard should have been funneling the

bulk of his reinforcements to the Confederate right. Instead

he followed a policy of sending reinforcements toward the

sound of the heaviest firing. By putting up a stiff fight here,

this far forward, for a full hour after Prentiss’s division had

collapsed and fallen back a mile from its initial position,

Sherman’s men gave Beauregard plenty of heavy firing to hear.

Consequently the Confederate general directed an undue

proportion of his available reinforcements to this front

rather than the Confederate right, where Johnston had wanted

to push for a decision.

Nevertheless, Sherman’s troops, and the four brigades of

two additional divisions that joined them on their fighting

retreat, were not immune from disaster. If they could not be

cut off from Pittsburg Landing by a Confederate advance on

this axis, they could certainly be driven through it and into

the river. Thus the fighting would continue to be desperate.

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 88

89 On the Hamburg-Purdy Road

WEST STOP 9 On the Hamburg-Purdy Road, 10:30–11:00 a.m.

Directions Return to your vehicle. Proceed 0.4 mile to the hamburg-

purdy road. Just past the intersection and the prominent

cannon-barrel monument on your right, pull to the side of

the road and park. Walk over to the monument and look

back toward the direction from which you have just been

driving.

Orientation This large monument commemorates Col. Julius Raith

(pronounced “right”), commander of a brigade in Maj. Gen.

John A. McClernand’s 1st Division. You are standing about

where Raith’s battle line met the Confederate onslaught and

facing about as his men did. The road in front of you is

the Hamburg-Purdy Road, along which Sherman’s battered

division formed up, farther to your right. The rest of Mc-

Clernand’s division took up a line angling back to your left

rear. The Confederate attack came toward you all along the

line to your right and left.

What Happened As Sherman’s troops fell back to a new position along the

Hamburg-Purdy Road, McClernand’s division advanced from

WaterOaksPond

Hamburg-Purdy Road

Eastern Corinth

Road

Corinth

Road Woolf

Field

Buckland

Veatch

Marsh

Anderson

Johnson Russell

Stewart

Schwartz’s Battery

17th ILcamp

Behr’sBattery

Burrow’sBattery

43rd IL49th IL 11th IL 20th IL

West Stop 9N10:30 – 11:00 A.M.On the Hamburg-PurdyRoad.

West Stop 9

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 89

90 West Stop 9

its camps in the Woolf Field vicinity (behind you) and moved

into position on Sherman’s left. This gave the Federals a con-

tinuous line across the entire northern half of the battlefield,

with five full brigades deployed as well as remnants of a sixth

(the remains of Hildebrand’s shattered command). The Con-

federates, now a hodgepodge of regiments from various bri-

gades of three different corps, followed up their victory in

the Shiloh Church sector and swarmed forward to strike the

new defensive line.

Sherman, still energetically directing his division’s fight

with conspicuous valor, had a horse shot out from under him

near here about this time. It was his second of the day. The

third horse, which an aide found and brought to him, was

killed twenty minutes later. Capt. Frederick Behr and his 6th

Indiana Battery came galloping up just to your right, and

Sherman directed him to unlimber and open fire on the rap-

idly advancing Confederates. Behr had just given the order

and the men had begun to obey when the captain fell dead

with a Confederate bullet in him. The men of the battery fled

in panic, abandoning five of their six guns.

The fight was extremely intense, but McClernand’s divi-

sion soon crumbled. Sherman’s had to follow, and their

troops streamed northward (to your right rear) in retreat,

abandoning the camps of McClernand’s division as those of

Sherman’s had been given up scarcely an hour before. Colo-

nel Raith, who had assumed command of one of McCler-

nand’s brigades only a few hours before because its regular

commander was sick, received a mortal wound here while

trying to rally his troops.

In response to a previous request from Sherman, Hurl-

but had detached a brigade from his division and sent it

to reinforce this position. That brigade, commanded by Col.

James C. Veatch, moved up behind the front here (behind

you) just as McClernand’s division was being driven back.

Veatch’s brigade fought long enough to cover McClernand’s

retreat before itself falling back in disorder.

Analysis At first glance the circumstances here might have seemed to

favor a successful Union stand. The Federal position pre-

sented a long, continuous front, and more than half of the

troops in it, McClernand’s division, were not only fresh to the

fighting that day but also, unlike Sherman’s men, combat vet-

erans of the heaviest fighting at Fort Donelson. Yet several im-

portant factors worked against the Federals here. This site,

though it was a convenient line on which to rally, did not of-

fer the terrain advantages that Sherman’s division had en-

joyed in its previous position along the forward slope of the

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 90

91 On the Hamburg-Purdy Road

ridge near Shiloh Church. A soldier of Col. C. Carroll Marsh’s

2nd Brigade of McClernand’s division, trying to hold the line

about 200 yards to your left, wrote: “We could not see them

[the Rebels] as they crouched down behind a rise of ground,

while we were entirely exposed and within easy range of

their guns. . . . We had to load on our backs and fire on our

knees to keep from all being killed, so our fire was not so

rapid.” In addition, the Confederates, despite rampant con-

fusion in their ranks, still held the advantage of momentum,

as will be seen more fully at the next stop.

Major-General John A. McClernand. blcw1:405

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 91

92 West Stop 10

WEST STOP 10 Review Field, 10:30–11:00 a.m.

Directions Return to your vehicle. Proceed along the corinth road. The

road forks almost immediately. Bear right (the left fork is one

way from the opposite direction). Proceed about 0.3 mile. Pull

to the side and park. Through the trees to your right is an open

field, on the edge of which are two cannon and a monument

commemorating Capt. Edward McAllister’s Battery D, 1st Illi-

nois Light Artillery. Walk to the cannon and stand next to

them, facing in the direction they point.

Orientation In front of you is a field that Grant’s soldiers called Review

Field, for several units had used it for that purpose. You are

standing on the defensive line of McClernand’s division, part

of the position he took up in connection with Sherman’s

along the Hamburg-Purdy Road (see West Stop 7). The Con-

federates advanced from the far side of the clearing and

through the woods on either side. The road on the far side of

the field is the Hamburg-Purdy Road.

McAllister’s battery, consisting of four 24-pounder how-

itzers, was part of McClernand’s division. It took up a posi-

tion here, where the open ground in front gave it a good field

WaterOaksPond

WoolfField

ReviewField

Hamburg-Purdy Road

Corinth Road

McAllister’s Battery

Shaver

Wood17th ILcamp

20th IL

4th TN

12th TN

Stanford’sMS Battery

48th IL

45th IL 13th IA18th IL

29th ILcamp

43rd ILcamp

West Stop 10N10:30 – 11:00 A.M.Review Field.

West Stop 10

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 92

93 Review Field

of fire. To your left was Col. Abraham M. Hare’s 1st Brigade

of McClernand’s division, and to your right Marsh’s 2nd

Brigade.

What Happened The Confederate attack here is a prime example of the con-

fusion among the jumbled units of Johnston’s army, stemming

in large part from Beauregard’s faulty initial deployment. The

advancing units at this particular point of the field consisted

of a regiment (the 4th Tennessee) of Brig. Gen. Alexander P.

Stewart’s Brigade of Polk’s Corps and a regiment (the 12th Ten-

nessee) of Col. Robert M. Russell’s Brigade of the same corps,

both separated from their brigades. Coming up on the left of

these regiments (your right) was Wood’s Brigade of Hardee’s

Corps. The combined force was led by Brig. Gen. Thomas C.

Hindman of Hardee’s Corps. The energetic Hindman, conspicu-

ous in an oilcloth poncho, raced about trying to get the two

Tennessee regiments in position for an attack against Mc-

Allister’s battery, “whooping like a Commanche, and with his

horse on a dead run,” until a shot from one of the Federal

cannon dismembered Hindman’s horse and tossed the general

10 feet through the air. Staggering to his feet, Hindman

shouted, “Tennesseans, take that battery,” and then col-

lapsed. McAllister’s guns also succeeded in silencing Capt.

Thomas J. Stanford’s Mississippi Battery, which attempted to

support the attack from the far side of the field.

The two Tennessee regiments charged. The fire of Mc-

Allister’s guns induced one of them, the 4th, to swerve to its

left (your right), into the cover of the forest, where Wood’s

Brigade was also advancing. This brought a very heavy force

to bear on the two Union regiments just to your right, the

45th Illinois and beyond it the 48th Illinois. In an extremely

intense firefight, the Illinoisans, outnumbered by about

three to one, suffered very high casualties, especially among

officers. The 48th broke first, which meant that the 45th also

had to retire. On the far side of the 48th, Lt. Jerome B. Bur-

row’s 14th Ohio Battery was completely overrun, losing all

six guns. With the line falling to pieces, Hare’s brigade (on

your left) and McAllister’s battery also had to fall back. Cap-

tain McAllister, though suffering four minor wounds, still

managed to get three of his four guns away; too many horses

had been shot to draw off the fourth.

Analysis The Confederates, though disorganized, were highly moti-

vated by their previous successes in overrunning several

Union positions and camps. This momentum, along with the

more or less accidental local superiority in numbers they

achieved here, proved decisive in this fight.

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 93

94 West Stop 10

Vignette Along the firing line of the 45th Illinois, in the woods to your

right, Capt. Luther H. Cowan noticed the last words of those

of his men who were killed in this fight. “Those who were

wounded and died soon,” he explained in a letter to his wife,

“seemed to care for nothing only for the safety of their com-

rades and victory; their last words being invariably cheering

their brother soldiers and telling them never to give up.

About the last words that Geo. Warner spoke were to thank

God that he had been spared to fire (I think) 32 times with

good aim at the enemy, surely a great consolation. Poor Nel-

son Blinberry was shot so fatally that he did not speak a word.

He was shot near the heart under the left breast. He was in a

stooping posture, when he was shot he rose up, put his hand

on his breast, walked about ten steps and fell dead never ut-

tering a groan. He was as good a soldier as ever left Jo Davies

county and that is saying a good deal.”

Lt. Nesbitt Baugher of the same regiment described in a

letter to his father three days later his own experience of be-

ing shot during this action. “The first wound I received was

in the right leg, below the knee, passing through the leg, but

breaking no bones. This shot knocked me down, and I tried

to crawl off the field, when another shot took me about two

inches to the right of the rectum. I thought that was getting

no better fast. So I got up the best I could and whilst hobbling

along was hit in the right shoulder. I turned round and

defiantly held up my sword, when a bullet split on its edge

and entered my face at the cheek bone. Another bullet struck

between two of my fingers cutting them slightly.”

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 94

WEST STOP 11 McClernand’s Camps

Directions Return to your vehicle. Immediately upon starting, turn

sharply left on mcclernand road, which should enter

corinth–pittsburg landing road directly to the left of

where you have been parked. Proceed just over 0.3 mile to a

point at which the road bends sharply (more than 90 degrees)

to the left. The broad paved area on the outside edge of this

sharp bend gives ample room to park. Do so.

95 McClernand’s Camps

Capture of a Confiederate battery. blcw 1:527

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 95

West Stop 11a. The Confederates Advance 11:00–

11:30 a.m.

Directions Just on the left side of the road (that is, inside the bend) is a

cannon commemorating Capt. Robert Cobb’s Kentucky Battery.

Walk to the cannon and stand near it, facing in the direction

it points.

Orientation You are standing amid the camps of McClernand’s division,

specifically those of Marsh’s brigade, which here lay along a

96 West Stop 11a

Sher

man

Roa

d

Jones Field

Woolf Field

45th IL camp

48th IL camp

20th IL camp

11th IL camp

McAllister’sBattery

Burrow’sBattery

Cobb’s KYBattery

Disorganized Confederate units

Taylor’s Guns

N

West Stop 11a

11:00 – 11:30 A.M.The Confederates advance.

West Stop 11a

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 96

more or less north-south line. The center of the 45th Illinois’s

camp is about 250 yards behind you, and the center of the

48th Illinois’s camp is about 125 yards in front of you. You are

facing in the same direction as McClernand’s fleeing troops

as they strove to escape the debacle along the Hamburg-

Purdy Road line. You are also facing as the pursuing Confed-

erates did when they arrived.

What Happened As their troops streamed back through here in retreat, Mc-

Clernand and Marsh attempted to rally the men for a stand

nearby. Their efforts proved futile, for the men were badly

confused and the Confederate pursuit was too close. The

Union troops continued their flight through Marsh’s remain-

ing camps until they reached Jones Field, campsite of another

of McClernand’s brigades, about 750 yards in front of you.

Entering Marsh’s camps, the pursuing Confederates

paused, partially because they were winded and extremely

disorganized and partially because they were eager to plun-

der the tents. This desire stemmed both from curiosity and

from hunger since many of the Confederates had long since

consumed the last of the rations issued in Corinth three days

ago that were supposed to have lasted them until after the

battle. The pause became prolonged, for many of the Confed-

erate officers either could not or would not get their men

moving again. Russell’s Brigade probed forward through the

woods and had a bloody but inclusive clash with the 15th

and 16th Iowa Regiments—recently arrived troops Grant had

sent to bolster McClernand—near the south end of Jones

Field.

While the bulk of Confederate strength in this sector ran-

sacked Marsh’s camps or otherwise milled around in dis-

order, Sherman’s and McClernand’s Federals regrouped in

Jones Field. Major Taylor brought together nine guns—

Barrett’s battery and fugitive guns from other batteries—and

set them up on a rise in the south end of Jones Field. A fierce

duel ensued between those guns and Confederate artillery

situated at the north end of Woolf Field, particularly Cobb’s

Kentucky Battery.

Vignette Union artillery pounded Cobb’s Kentucky Battery and its sup-

porting infantry. Confederate soldier Johnny Green of Ken-

tucky saw three of the four men in the file next to his killed

by a single shell. Another shell killed two of Cobb’s gunners

and tore both hands off a third. Looking at the bloody

stumps, the stunned artillerist gasped, “My Lord, that stops

my fighting.”

97 The Confederates Advance

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 97

West Stop 11b. The Federals Counterattack 11:30 a.m.–

1:00 p.m.

Directions Turn to your left rear, cross the road, and walk about 40 yards

to the tablet marking the position of the 11th Iowa, on the

right-hand side of the road. Turn and face the tablet.

Orientation You are standing roughly on the line that Union troops

reached in their midday counterattack and held for about an

98 West Stop 11b

WoolfField

JonesField

Sher

man

Roa

d

Pond

Cleburne (−)

Russell

Trabue

Anderson

Johnson and Stewart

(intermingled)

Har

e an

d R

aith

(inte

rmin

gled

)

Marsh

McD

owel

l45th IL

40th

IL13

th M

O6t

h IA

46th

OH

Cobb’s KY Battery(captured)

Hodgson’s LABattery

48th IL camp

20th IL camp

11th IL camp

McAllister’s Battery

Burrow’sBattery

16th IA

15th IA

West Stop 11b N 11:30 A.M. – 1:00 P.M.The Federals counterattack.

West Stop 11b

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 98

hour afterward. The Confederates advanced from your front

directly toward your present position.

What Happened About 11:30 a.m. McClernand and Sherman launched a coun-

terattack from their positions around Jones Field back to-

ward the camps of Marsh’s brigade in Woolf Field. McDow-

ell’s brigade of Sherman’s division was still virtually fresh,

having merely fallen back to keep pace with the rest of the di-

vision without having received a serious attack itself. It an-

chored the far right of the Union advance (to your right).

Some Union regiments were out of ammunition, and others

did not get the order, but in all about two-thirds of the two

divisions joined in the assault. The disorganized Confeder-

ates were thrown back. McClernand’s men overran Cobb’s Ken-

tucky Battery, capturing all six guns.

Sherman and McClernand, however, simply did not have

the manpower to hold this advanced position against the

weight of numbers the Confederates could eventually deploy

against it— once the Rebels sorted themselves out. The

brigades of Russell, Stewart, and Johnson (all three from Polk’s

Corps), Brig. Gen. Patton Anderson (of Bragg’s Corps), and Col.

Robert P. Trabue (of Breckinridge’s Reserve Corps), along with

other odds and ends of Confederate units in the area, all par-

ticipated in pushing back the Federals. Still it proved to be no

easy task. Capt. W. Irving Hodgson’s Louisiana Battery, the 5th

Company of the New Orleans Washington Artillery, took up a po-

sition about 200 yards directly in front of you, hoping to use

close-range artillery fire to blast McClernand’s men out of the

position where you now stand, but accurate rifle fire from

the Union infantrymen was soon exacting such a toll on can-

noneers and horses that the battery was compelled to limber

up and make a hasty retreat.

It is important to remember that the woods in this area

were far thinner than they are now.

What finally broke the Federals loose from this position

was the progressive crumbling of their right flank, Mc-

Dowell’s brigade. The Union advance had slanted across the

Confederate front, exposing McDowell’s flank to attack by the

brigades of Trabue and Brig. Gen. Preston Pond (of Bragg’s

Corps). McDowell’s brigade, previously all but untouched, was

soon wrecked and driven back. The rest of the line, including

Marsh’s brigade (extending from here to your left), fell back

fighting to the vicinity of Jones Field by about 1:00 p.m.

Analysis Although some critics have characterized Sherman and Mc-

Clernand’s counterattack as wasted valor, it did serve to

99 The Federals Counterattack

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 99

throw the Confederates off balance, win another two hours

of valuable time in the fighting retreat toward the river, and

draw into the vortex of fighting here reinforcements (such as

Trabue’s Brigade) that ought to have been directed to the Con-

federate right (or right center) if Johnston’s original attack

plan was to have any chance of success.

Vignette The 45th Illinois, of Marsh’s brigade, advanced on your left. It

had been raised in northwestern Illinois, an area known for

its lead mines, and the principal town of the region, Grant’s

adopted hometown of Galena, was even named for the min-

eral that was at the heart of the local economy. The 45th was

therefore nicknamed “the Lead Mine Regiment.” As its major

led the Illinoisans forward as part of the midday counterat-

tack, he waved a “sabre longer than himself” and shouted en-

couragement to the men: “Go in boys. Give them some more

Galena pills. They’ll think they have opened a new lead

mine.” As the regimental surgeon described the action, “the

fight was a fierce one. Our men fell short of ammunition and

charged bayonets, the enemy retreating and running.”

Further Exploration Sherman Road (gravel, closed to auto traffic) extends north-

ward from the sharp bend of the road you are on. A hike of

about 0.5 mile along this road will take you past the camp-

sites of Marsh’s brigade (markers are located in the woods a

few yards to the right of the road) and into the south end of

Jones Field, where you will find, among others, the position

marker for Barrett’s (Taylor’s) Battery B, 1st Illinois Light Ar-

tillery.

Now is a good point in the tour to consider several important

developments that were happening on other parts of the

battlefield at about this time, events that would have

significant influence on the fighting discussed in West Stop

12. Because these developments apply equally to the course

of the battle addressed in both the East and West Tours,

please turn to Appendix A (page 145) for a discussion (unless

you have previously read that section as part of the eastern

route).

100 West Stop 11b

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 100

WEST STOP 12 Duncan Field, 10:00 a.m.– 4:30 p.m.

Directions Return to your vehicle. Proceed on mcclernand road about

0.4 mile to corinth–pittsburg landing road. Turn left and

proceed 0.5 mile to Ruggles’s Battery. Park in the turnout on the

left. Walk to the nearest cannon in the line that extends to

the right of the road. Face in the direction the cannon are

pointing.

En route, at about the 0.1 mile point, where McClernand

Road bends sharply to the right, you may notice the marker

for the Washington Artillery on the right.

Orientation The clearing in front of you is Duncan Field, which had been

a cotton field prior to the battle, but by April 1862 it was over-

grown with weeds, some of them as high as a man’s head. On

the right-hand side of the Corinth–Pittsburg Landing Road,

about 150 yards directly in front of you, stood the Joseph

Duncan farmhouse and outbuildings, along with a stack of

cotton bales. Beyond the farmstead, beginning on the right-

hand side of the Corinth–Pittsburg Landing Road and run-

ning along the tree line at the far side of the field, is the farm

101 Duncan Field

Bria

r Cre

ek

DuncanFarm Buildings

DuncanField

Corinth Road

East

ern

Cor

inth

Roa

d

Sunken Road

8th IL7th IL

58th IL

2nd IA7th IA

12th IA

Munch’sBattery

Ruggles’s B

attery

8th IL

West Stop 12N10:00 A.M. – 4:30 P.M.Duncan Field.

West Stop 12

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 101

lane known as the Sunken Road. Farther to your right along

the Sunken Road is the area of dense thickets known as the

Hornets’ Nest, and beyond that the road passes between the

Peach Orchard and Bloody Pond (see East Stops 9 and 17).

What Happened The Union divisions of Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace were

camped close to Pittsburg Landing, farthest from the initial

fighting of the morning. The two generals moved their

troops up to support the hard-pressed divisions in front.

Hurlbut sent one brigade, Veatch’s, to reinforce Sherman and

took his other two brigades into line on the left (your right)

of the remnants of Prentiss’s division forming up at the far

end of the Sunken Road. That put Hurlbut’s men in the vicin-

ity of the Peach Orchard. Wallace brought his division into

line on Prentiss’s right, covering the entire length of the

Sunken Road visible to you as well as an additional stretch

out of sight in the woods and thickets beyond the right edge

of the field (as you view it).

Throughout the late morning and afternoon, several Con-

federate attacks hammered at the Sunken Road and Peach Or-

chard (see the Hornets’ Nest Excursion). Particularly after

Sherman and McClernand fell back to Jones Field (to your left

rear) about 1:00 p.m., more and more Confederate units

turned south and southeastward toward this sector. The first

Rebel troops began moving into position on this side of the

field as early as 10:00 a.m., and Confederate artillery began

dueling with Union guns across the clearing. At 10:30 the

first assault was launched, traversing the far right side of the

field and the woods beyond. Like the seven other assaults that

followed (as some observers counted them), some of them out

of sight to your right, it was a bloody failure. About 3:00 p.m.

two regiments of Federals, the 7th and 58th Illinois, moved

forward and took cover amid the buildings and cotton bales

of the Duncan farmstead, directly in front of you, where you

see several trees and a monument consisting of a pyramid of

cannon balls. Confederates of the (Louisiana) Crescent Regiment

and the 38th Tennessee, supported by two batteries of artillery,

drove them out. At 3:30 another major Confederate assault

crossed Duncan Field and again broke up amid appalling

slaughter within a few yards of the Sunken Road.

After the failed 3:30 assault, several Confederate officers

began energetically collecting artillery for use against the

Union position. Brig. Gen. Daniel Ruggles, a division com-

mander in Bragg’s Corps, was one of these officers, and his-

tory has called this concentration of guns “Ruggles’s Battery.”

The long line of cannon stretching away to your right com-

102 West Stop 12

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 102

memorates some 53 guns that bombarded the Sunken Road

during the late afternoon. The barrage reached a crescendo

at about 4:30 p.m. but quickly faded in intensity. The Union

guns that had initially answered the Confederates with accu-

rate fire now withdrew, as did much of the supporting in-

fantry. But several thousand Union soldiers found them-

selves surrounded and were compelled to surrender.

Analysis The Sunken Road position became one of the keys to the first

day’s fighting. In most places it was not anything like a

“ready-made trench” because it was not deep enough. At few

places it could provide more than minimal cover to a prone

soldier. It was, however, a tangible line on which Wallace’s di-

vision and the remnants of Prentiss’s command could form

up and defend.

Confederate efforts against the Sunken Road were not im-

pressive. The eight separate frontal assaults, each delivered

by about a single brigade, were hardly an advertisement for

the tactical skills of the Confederate officers in immediate

command on this part of the field, chiefly Bragg. Doing bet-

ter, however, would not have been easy. Beauregard’s defective

initial alignment of the army—with the corps spread out one

behind another—had led to substantial fragmentation of

units of brigade size and larger. Hard fighting and rough ter-

rain had contributed to this as well. As a result it would have

been extremely difficult and time-consuming to mass troops

for a larger-than-brigade-size assault. While outflanking the

enemy always sounds good in the abstract, difficulties

loomed in the form of rough terrain and unknown enemy

strength and dispositions. Much time would have been lost

in an attempted flanking movement, with results no general

standing where you now stand on the afternoon of April 6,

1862, could have predicted. Bragg chose to bet that one more

assault would carry the position. He bet wrong.

What finally gave the Confederates the Sunken Road was

their success in driving back McClernand, to the west of the

sector, in the early afternoon (West Stop 11b) and their even-

tual success in driving back Hurlbut, to the east of it (East

Stop 10). The retreat of the units on their flanks forced most

of the Union troops in the Sunken Road at least to attempt

withdrawal. Ironically the impressive collection of artillery

here and to your right probably contributed little if anything

to the Union retreat. Civil War artillery was notoriously inef-

fective against defending infantry, and in any event, the Fed-

erals were soon falling back due to other causes.

Most important, however, the time the Confederates lost

103 Duncan Field

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 103

while stalled here in front of the Sunken Road may have been

the difference between success and failure in their grand of-

fensive of the first day.

En route to the next stop, you may wish to pause and view

the Sunken Road where it joins the Corinth Road— on the far

side of the field on the right-hand side of the road. If you wish

to study the Federal position in more depth, turn to page 101

for a walking excursion through this sector. In order to fol-

low the stops in the excursion, walk along the Sunken Road

to the far end (at the Peach Orchard), then turn around and

walk back, reading and observing the stops.

104 West Stop 12

Brigadier-GeneralW. H. L. Wallace.blcw 1:478

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 104

WEST STOP 13 Hell’s Hollow, 4:00–5:00 p.m.

Directions Return to your vehicle. Proceed 0.5 mile. On your right is the

Confederate Memorial. Park in the pullout on the right side

of the road. Stand in the grassy area in front of the monu-

ment and face the direction in which you were driving.

En route, approximately 0.3 miles from Stop 10, notice the

large monument with an upended cannon barrel on your

right. This commemorates where Brig. Gen. William H. L.

105 Hell’s Hollow

StacyField

CloudField

H e l l ’ s H o l l o w

East

ern

Cor

inth

Rd.

Corin

th R

oad

Ham

burg-Savannah Road

Jackson

Chalm

ers

Trabue

Prentisssurrenders

W. H. L. Wallaceis wounded

58th

IL

8th IA

14th IA

23rd

MO

12th IA

Cre

scen

tR

eg’t

22nd

TN

5th

TN

38th

TN

33rd TN

1st AL Cav.

3rd IAcamp

41st ILcamp

32nd ILcamp

28th ILcamp

31st INcamp

West Stop 13N4:00 – 5:00 P.M.Hell’s Hollow.

West Stop 13

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 105

Wallace fell, mortally wounded, during the Union retreat

from the Hornets’ Nest.

Orientation You are in the part of the battlefield known as Hell’s Hollow.The Sunken Road is about 600 yards behind you. Grant’s finaldefensive line around Pittsburg Landing is just over a mile infront of you. Much closer, about 180 yards to your right rearbeyond the woods, is Stacy Field, site of the camp of the 3rdIowa. At the time of the Civil War, the woods on your leftstopped—and Cloud Field started—about 50 yards to yourleft. There, on the near edge of Cloud Field, was the camp ofthe 41st Illinois and, beyond it, those of several other Unionregiments, all of Hurlbut’s division.

You are facing in much the same direction as the Unionsoldiers as they retreated from the Sunken Road sector.

What Happened Shortly after 4:00 p.m. it was becoming apparent that theSunken Road position would not hold much longer. With hisright-flank brigade, Sweeny’s, beginning to crumble and Con-federate troops streaming unimpeded around his right flank,W. H. L. Wallace knew he had to get his division out quickly ifit was going to get out at all. He ordered an immediate re-treat, but as he was overseeing the operation about 300 yardsbehind you (where you saw the cannon-barrel monument enroute from the last stop), he was shot through the head. WithConfederate troops closing in rapidly from behind and bothsides, his staff officers reluctantly left him for dead.

At about 4:15 p.m. the 2nd and 7th Iowa, some of the firsttroops to march through Hell’s Hollow in the retreat fromthe Sunken Road, found Confederate troops in possession ofthe 3rd Iowa’s camp in Stacy Field, to your left front. The 2ndand 7th deployed into line of battle, pushed the Confederatesback, and broke through to Pittsburg Landing. A member ofthe 7th later explained, “If we had not left when we did, wewould all have been taken prisoners.”

Other Union troops retreated through this area in rapidsuccession, until by 4:45 p.m. eleven of the fifteen regimentsin Wallace’s division had successfully withdrawn, along withall the artillery in the division’s sector. Among the units thatdid not get out was the 58th Illinois. Having held the frontjust north of the Sunken Road and briefly taken the Duncanfarm buildings (near West Stop 12), the 58th attempted to re-treat through Hell’s Hollow around 4:45 only to find its routehopelessly blocked by the ever-growing Confederate pres-ence in this area. Most of the regiment’s 300 surviving mem-bers surrendered in and behind the area where you are nowstanding. Most or all of 8th Iowa and the 23rd Missouri alsosurrendered nearby at about this time. The 12th Iowa ran out

106 West Stop 13

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 106

of time and space and laid down its arms in the abandonedcamp of the 41st Illinois, about 50 yards to your right front,and exultant Confederate cavalrymen dragged the regi-ment’s flag back and forth through a mud puddle.

Analysis Once Sherman’s and McClernand’s divisions were drivenback from their positions in Woolf Field (West Stop 11), thecollapse of the Sunken Road position was only a matter oftime. Confederate forces began to flow around both the leftand right flanks of the defenders. For example, Trabue’s Ken-tucky brigade, which had been fighting McClernand’s men inWoolf Field, moved southeastward and eventually took up aposition facing you about 100 yards directly ahead, blockingthe escape of the Union regiments still in this sector. OtherConfederate units made similar moves. Nevertheless, the sixhours during which Wallace’s division, along with Hurlbut’sand the remnants of Prentiss’s, stalled the Confederate ad-vance were probably decisive in defeating Johnston’s plans andsaving Grant’s army.

Vignette Contrary to the expectations of his staff officers, W. H. L. Wal-lace did not immediately die as a result of his head wound.He lay on the battlefield throughout the stormy night ofApril 6, and the following day, when Union troops retook thisground, they found the general clinging to life.

Early on the morning of the sixth, Wallace’s wife, Ann, hadarrived by steamboat at Pittsburg Landing to pay her husbanda surprise visit. The outbreak of the battle prevented her fromgoing to his camp, and she spent the day helping tend thewounded who were brought aboard her steamboat as well asthe others at the landing. That evening she received the re-port that her husband was dead and his body left to the pur-suing Rebels. “God gave me strength,” she later recalled, andshe went on tending the wounded through most of the night.

The next day Ann was overjoyed when her beloved Will wasbrought in from the field, badly wounded but conscious andable to recognize her voice and speak to her. Taken to theCherry Mansion in Savannah, Grant’s prebattle headquarters,Wallace lived until April 10, frequently conversing with hiswife. Ann and his friends began to hope that he might recover.That day, however, an infection set in, and he failed rapidly.His last words, spoken to Ann, were, “We meet in Heaven.”

This concludes the western tour. If you have not yet taken theeastern tour and wish to do so, turn to page 33 (East Stop 6).If you have completed both tours and are ready to proceed tothe completion of the first day’s fighting, continue to thenext page.

107 Hell’s Hollow

04-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 107

108 Stop 14

STOP 14 Grant’s Last Line, 5:00– 6:30 p.m.

Directions If coming from East Stop 11, on exiting the parking area, turn

right on hamburg-savannah road and proceed 0.9 mile to

corinth–pittsburg landing road. Turn right and proceed 0.5

mile to a T intersection. Turn right on pittsburg landing

road. Proceed 0.2 mile and park in the turnout on the right-

hand side of the road, opposite the large white column of the

Iowa monument. Walk to the cannon commemorating Bat-

tery C, 1st Missouri Light Artillery (Mann’s battery). Face in

the direction the cannon are pointing.

If coming from West Stop 13, return to your vehicle. Pro-

ceed in the same direction you were last driving 0.8 mile to a

T intersection. Turn right on pittsburg landing road. Proceed

0.2 mile and park in the turnout on the right-hand side of the

road, opposite the large white column of the Iowa monu-

ment. Walk to the cannon commemorating Battery C, 1st

Missouri Light Artillery (Mann’s battery). Face in the direc-

tion the cannon are pointing.

Tennessee River

Dill Branch

PittsburgLanding

AndersonChalmers

Peas (−) Jackson

Markgraf’sBattery

Munch’sBattery

Pow

ell’s

Bat

tery

Silv

ersp

ore’

s B

atte

ry

McAllister’sBatteryS

tone

’s B

atte

ry

Dre

sser

’s B

atte

ryM

ann’

s B

atte

ry

Ric

hard

son’

s B

atte

ry

Sch

war

tz’s

Bat

tery

Wel

ker’s

Bat

tery

Hic

kenl

oope

r’sB

atte

ry

sieg

e gu

ns

USS Tyler

USS Lexington

Stop 14N5:00 – 6:30 P.M.Grant’s last line.

Stop 14

05-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 108

109 Grant’s Last Line

Orientation You are standing at the last line of defense taken up by

Grant’s troops on the evening of April 6. Pittsburg Landing

and the Tennessee River are about 650 yards to your left. The

Union line extended from near the landing, through where

you now stand and about another 1,200 yards to your right,

then curved somewhat to your right rear to a point about a

mile from where you are. The ground in front of you de-

scends gradually at first and then very steeply into the ravine

of Dill’s Branch, a tributary of the Tennessee. A side ravine of

the main Dill’s Branch ravine begins just to your left front.

The rim of the main Dill’s Branch ravine is a little more than

600 yards in front of you. The bottom of the ravine is about

80 feet below the level on which you are now standing.

What Happened Making full use of the time for which the troops of Wallace,

Prentiss, and Hurlbut were fighting around the Hornets’ Nest

and Sunken Road, Grant prepared to make a final stand

along this line. He had his chief of staff, Col. Joseph D. Web-

ster, collect all the artillery he could find. Webster brought

the army’s siege guns into position on this line, along with

two as yet uncommitted batteries, and then added to his ar-

tillery force as batteries fled from the crumbling positions

farther south and west. By 6:00 p.m. he had 41 guns along

this line, 10 of them positioned on a ridge jutting forward

near the river so that they could fire right up the length of

Dill’s Branch ravine. Also firing up the length of that valley

from their positions on the Tennessee River were the gun-

boats uss Tyler and uss Lexington, both armed with cannon far

larger than any of the field or even siege guns in Grant’s

army. Supporting the artillery on this line were some 18,000

infantry, the whole remaining combat strength of the Army

of the Tennessee, including Sherman’s and McClernand’s di-

visions, which moved back to form the right end of the line.

On the far left end of the line, Grant’s soldiers were joined by

about 550 fresh troops of Brig. Gen. William “Bull” Nelson’s

4th Division of Don Carlos Buell’s Army of the Ohio, just then

arriving on the battlefield from the other side of the river af-

ter marching up the east bank from Savannah that after-

noon. The rest of Buell’s army was approaching the opposite

bank and awaiting ferrying across the river.

At about 6:00 p.m., several hundred yards to the south (in

front) of where you now stand, Bragg marshaled about 4,000

Confederate troops and sent them forward to attack this last

line. “One more charge, my men, and we shall capture them

all,” he exhorted. But the attack failed before the firepower of

Webster’s massed artillery, and the Confederates fell back

05-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 109

just as the sun was setting. As Bragg and his division com-

mander Jones M. Withers struggled to get additional troops

into line and prepare a larger assault, orders came from Beau-

regard, now far to the rear in the vicinity of Shiloh Church, to

halt the attack and pull the troops back. “The victory,” read

Beauregard’s message to Bragg, “is sufficiently complete.” “My

God,” exclaimed Bragg, “Was a victory ever sufficiently com-

plete?” He considered suspending execution of the order, but

other units were already withdrawing, and no time re-

mained to reverse their course and stage a final assault be-

fore complete darkness fell.

Analysis Both armies were battered, depleted, and all but exhausted.

Beauregard, from his headquarters in the rear, was ill posi-

tioned to know the situation at the front. Around him was

the debris common to the rear areas of all Civil War armies

engaged in battle—wounded men, skulkers, and other strag-

glers who had become separated from their regiments. Such

scenes always conveyed the impression that the army was

suffering severely. Also, much of the fire of the Union gun-

boats was passing over its intended targets near the front and

landing closer to Beauregard. The new Confederate com-

mander had received faulty intelligence to the effect that

Buell’s army would not join Grant for several more days, and

he probably believed he had Grant’s army at his mercy and

could destroy it at leisure in the morning. Beauregard there-

fore canceled the attack with probably about an hour of at

least partial daylight remaining.

What did that order mean for the course of the battle? Of

the positions the Confederates had taken thus far during the

day, Shiloh ridge and the Hornet’s Nest had held for hours,

while the Hamburg-Purdy Road line had gone to pieces in

less than an hour. Grant’s final position was stronger than

any of these. Would it have held, or would it have gone to

pieces like the Hamburg-Purdy Road line? Along with such

factors are the intangibles, the questions as to how much

continued willingness to face battle was left in the soldiers of

the opposing armies. If the Confederates had been able to

break this line, it seems almost impossible that Grant could

have formed another between here and the landing, and the

result would have been the capture of most of his army.

Could one final massed Rebel assault have broken this

line? Probably not. Yet the Confederates had come a very long

way and had paid an extremely high price to get here—too

far and too high to justify giving up while any hope still re-

mained of achieving a truly complete victory.

110 Stop 14

05-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 110

Dill Branch Excursion

Directions If you wish to examine the terrain over which the Confeder-

ates made their final sunset attack, walk from the Visitor

Center parking area to the right of the flagpole to four ar-

tillery pieces on a knoll, representing Stone’s battery. (It is

also the next battery east of Mann’s battery [Stop 14]). To the

right of Stone’s battery, just beyond a split-rail fence, is a

small path leading south. Follow it for about 350 yards. You

will find a Confederate tablet indicating the farthest advance

of Chalmers’s skirmishers as they made the attack in this sec-

tor. About 10 yards to the left of the tablet, Dill Branch ravine

drops off precipitately.

Approximately 90 feet deep, the ravine empties into the

Tennessee River. When the river is high, backwater inundates

the narrow valley, making the mouth of Dill Branch impass-

able and rendering its bottom soggy even a half-mile inland.

By 5:30 p.m. on April 6, Union artillery supported by infantry

covered the ravine, as did to a limited extent the Union gun-

111 Grant’s Last Line

Tennessee River

Dill

Branch

CloudField

PittsburgLanding

Cor

inth

Roa

d

Ham

burg-

Savannah Road

Corin

th–P

ittsb

urg

Land

ing

Road

Anderson

Jackson Chalmers

Gladden

10th

MS

Stone’sBattery

BRECKINRIDGE

Union Line

Dill BranchExcursion

N

05-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 111

boats prowling the river. The artillery was not just in the area

of the Visitor Center. Two batteries controlled a spur that jut-

ted out about 200 yards in advance of the main line, thereby

subjecting any attacking force to a crossfire. Small wonder

the Confederates got no farther than this point.

112 Stop 14

Brigadier-General Ulysses S. Grant. blcw 1:464

05-N3554 11/10/05 5:26 AM Page 112

Overview of the Second Day, April 7, 1862

Morning had no sooner broken on Monday, April 7, than

Grant made good his decision to counterattack. Buell’s fresh

and unbloodied Army of the Ohio (about 13,000 effectives)

would take the left side of the Union line. Grant’s own badly

bloodied Army of the Tennessee, or what was left of it (about

25,000 effectives, including the 7,300 men of Maj. Gen. Lew

Wallace’s fresh division), would take the right. Grant’s orders

were simple: drive southwest and retake the ground lost on

April 6.

At first Buell’s troops encountered little or no resistance,

as Beauregard had pulled his army back some distance the

evening of the sixth. But as the Federals neared the scene of

some of the previous day’s hardest fighting, they encoun-

tered solid Confederate battle lines, and a furious combat

erupted and continued with little intermission until mid-

afternoon. The Sunken Road, Peach Orchard, Sarah Bell’s Old

Cotton Field, and the nearby Davis Wheat Field once again

saw desperate fighting. Several times the Confederates coun-

terattacked, sometimes with considerable local success, but

each time their success was short-lived, for the steady Union

pressure drove the scene of the fighting relentlessly south-

westward.

On the Union right advanced the Army of the Tennessee. It

was a wonder, of sorts, that several thousand men of Sher-

man’s, McClernand’s, and Hurlbut’s traumatized divisions

could be gotten into line and marched forward into battle at

all, after what they had seen in the past twenty-four hours.

But advance they did, finding the Confederate defenders ini-

tially at a disadvantage in this sector. Lew Wallace’s division,

advancing on the extreme Union right, outflanked the Con-

federate line and repeatedly forced it to retire. Had Wallace

been more aggressive, the results might have been even more

spectacular.

Hemming the battlefield on the north was Owl Creek,

with its adjoining bottomlands. Owl Creek does not, how-

ever, flow on a straight east-west line. Rather it slants from

southwest to northeast as it makes its way to Snake Creek

shortly before the latter joins the Tennessee River. The Army

of the Tennessee, driving westward along Owl Creek’s south

bank, slanted farther and farther south due to the course of

the creek. This not only brought it closer to Buell’s Army of

the Ohio but also effectively gave the Confederates a shorter

front to defend. That fact, coupled with Wallace’s extreme

caution, allowed Bragg to cobble together a defensive line

more or less along the axis of the Hamburg-Purdy Road,

06-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 113

roughly the same place (but facing the opposite direction) as

Sherman and McClernand’s short-lived position of the previ-

ous day. Fierce fighting raged along this line for two hours,

especially in the vicinity of Water Oaks Pond. By midafter-

noon, however, Confederate commanders had become con-

vinced—rightly so—that their army was on the verge of col-

lapse and could take little more punishment. On Beauregard’s

order, the Army of the Mississippi disengaged and began the

march back to Corinth. The exhausted Federals made little

pursuit.

114 Overview of the Second Day

Major-General Don Carlos Buell. blcw1:384

06-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 114

Eastern Route, April 7

EAST STOP 15 The Line of Departure, 5:00 a.m.

Directions From the Visitor Center, exit the parking lot, turn right, and pro-

ceed about 50 yards west on the corinth–pittsburg landing

road until you see two gold tablets on the left side of the

road. The tablets note the participation of two divisions of

Buell’s Army of the Ohio. Pull over to the side. You need not

leave your vehicle, but pause to consider the location.

From West Stop 19, return to your vehicle. Proceed 1.8

miles to the Visitor Center and use the parking lot there to

turn around. From there turn right and proceed about 50 yards

west on the corinth–pittsburg landing road until you see

two gold tablets on the left side of the road. The tablets note

the participation of two divisions of Buell’s Army of the Ohio.

Pull over to the side. You need not leave your vehicle, but

pause to consider the location.

Orientation You are presently in the assembly area of Nelson’s division on

the evening of April 6. “Grant’s Last Line” stretched off to

both the east and west. Dill Branch lies about 450 yards be-

yond (south of ) the two tablets.

What Happened At least some elements (possibly only the 36th Indiana) of

Col. Jacob Ammen’s 10th Brigade, of Nelson’s division, arrived

in time to help repel the last Confederate attack on the first

day’s battle. The rest of Nelson’s division arrived by 9:00 p.m.,

followed within two hours by the First Division, under Brig.

Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden. The Sixth Division, under Brig.

Gen. Thomas J. Wood, arrived the afternoon of April 7, albeit

too late to play a significant role in the fighting. For all prac-

tical purposes, Buell brought 13,000 men into the second

day’s battle.

Although Grant and Buell encountered each other as early

as 1:00 p.m. on April 6, they never made plans for a coordi-

nated counterattack. Their loose arrangement called for

Buell’s troops to attack east of the Corinth Road, while

Grant’s troops advanced west of it.

Vignette In his after-action report, Crittenden noted: “We had great

difficulty in landing our troops. The bank of the river at the

landing was covered with from 6,000 to 10,000 entirely de-

moralized soldiery. I was so disgusted, that I asked General

Buell to permit me to land a regiment and drive them away.

I did not wish my troops to come in contact with them. [Buell

declined.] We landed, however, forcing our way through this

115 Eastern Route

06-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 115

mob, and stood to our arms all night on the road, half a mile

from the landing, at the place designated by General Buell. At

about 5 a.m. we were conducted to our position by General

Buell in person. My division took its position on the right of

General Nelson. When General [Alexander McD.] McCook

came upon the field he took his position (directed by General

Buell, as I am informed) on my right, which placed me in the

center of our army.”

116 East Stop 15

Major-General Thomas L. Crittenden.blcw 1:526

06-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 116

EAST STOP 16 Wicker Field, 5:00–10:00 a.m.

Directions Continue 0.3 mile and turn left on the corinth–pittsburg

landing road. Proceed 0.6 mile to a fork in the road. Bear left,

which will place you on the hamburg-savannah road. Reset

your odometer. Proceed 0.5 mile to a blue tablet commemo-

rating the 11th Iowa. (This landmark is used only for conve-

nience; the 11th Iowa took no part in the fighting on April 7.)

You will find it on the right side of the road, a few yards be-

yond the Missouri monument on the left. Pull over. You need

not exit your vehicle, but face the open field to your right

front.

En route you will pass Cloud Field, a large open area to the

left front (southeast) of the fork in the road. Near the site

of “Hurlbut’s Headquarters” pyramid, a line of Confederate

pickets spotted Nelson’s advancing troops, fired a single

volley, and then fell back “just as fast as their legs could

carry them.”

Orientation You are currently at the northeast edge of Wicker Field.

117 Wicker Field

Tennessee River

Dill Branch

Bloody Pond

Cloud Field

PittsburgLanding

WickerField

StacyField

Cor

inth

Roa

d

Ham

burg-

Savannah Road

Corin

th–P

ittsb

urg

Land

ing

Road

NELSON

Rousseau(McCook’s Div.)

Hazen Bruce Ammen

Sporadic fighting in this area, 9:00–10:00 a.m.

Confederate skirmishers encountered at 8:30 a.m.

East Stop 16N5:00 – 10:00 A.M.Wicker Field.

East Stop 16

06-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 117

What Happened Advancing south across the Dill Branch ravine and through

Cloud Field, Nelson’s men reached this point around 8:00

a.m. Here Crittenden’s division arrived to support their right

flank. In this area the Federals encountered their first

significant resistance, from Confederate infantry supported

by artillery. Col. William B. Hazen’s 19th Brigade, advancing

through Wicker Field, bore the brunt of their fire. A sporadic

90-minute contest erupted, prolonged in part because Nel-

son’s own artillery had yet to reach the field.

To make up the deficit, Buell loaned Nelson a battery of

rifled guns under Capt. John Mendenhall, which belonged to

Crittenden’s division. The battery initially unlimbered in the

center of Wicker Field, but enemy sniper fire forced it to re-

deploy some 350 yards to the south—your next stop.

118 East Stop 16

Major-General William Nelson. blcw 1:376

06-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 118

EAST STOP 17 Bloody Pond, 10:00–11:00 a.m.

Directions Continue 0.1 mile to a turnout just short of Bloody Pond,

which is visible to your right. Leave your vehicle. Stand be-

hind the cannon on the left (east) side of the road. Face in the

same direction as the cannon.

Orientation You are currently a few dozen yards north of the Sunken

Road and Peach Orchard sectors.

What Happened Surprised by the arrival of fresh Union troops on the field,

and equally surprised by the disorganization of their own

army, it took time for Beauregard and his corps commanders

to establish a coherent line of defense. By 10:00 a.m., how-

ever, such a line had emerged. Hardee and Breckinridge led the

Confederates in this sector: five badly depleted infantry

brigades and four artillery batteries. Although so ill orga-

nized that Confederate dispositions are difficult to establish

with certainty, it appears that Hardee controlled Confederate

forces from the southwest end of Sarah Bell’s Old Cotton

Field to the site of Stuart’s abandoned Union camp to

your left (east). Breckinridge’s line followed the tree line at the

119 Bloody Pond

Bloody Pond

PeachOrchard

DuncanField

WickerField


DavisWheatFieldBarnes

Field

W. Manse Georgecabin

Ham

burg-Savannah Road

Hamburg-Purdy

East

ern

Cor

inth

Sunken RoadRoad

Road

Mendenhall’sBattery Terril’s Battery

Washington(LA) Art’y

CRITTENDON

Bruce Ammen

(Moore)

Martin(formerly Bowen)

Chalmers

Hazen

East Stop 17N10:00 – 11:00 A.M.Bloody Pond.

East Stop 17

06-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 119

western edge of the cotton field, then paralleled the Sunken

Road about as far as the Eastern Corinth Road.

Arriving where you presently stand, Mendenhall’s battery

(on the right side of the road) and Capt. William R. Terrill’s re-

cently arrived battery of mostly smoothbore Napoleons ( just

in front of you) came under a well-directed fire from a hidden

Confederate battery somewhere near the W. Manse George

cabin. They could counter it only by observing the puffs of

smoke rising above the trees after each discharge. Making

matters worse, the Union cannoneers also came under

enfilading fire from a second Confederate battery off to the

right. Both Mendenhall and Terrill had to shift facing and

spread out their guns in order to hold their ground.

Around 10:00 a.m. Beauregard ordered Hardee “to charge

the enemy in conjunction with General Breckinridge.” Al-

though theoretically coordinated, in reality the two corps

commanders had no time to consult before their attacks be-

gan. Jumping off from the Davis Wheat Field, Hardee’s assault

angled toward what would become known as the Bloody

Pond, struck the brigades of Col. Sanders D. Bruce and Hazen,

and briefly threatened to overrun Mendenhall’s battery. The

Federal cannoneers used a combination of case shot and can-

ister against the onrushing troops, while Hazen personally

led a bayonet charge by the 6th Kentucky. Between them, the

gunners and infantry managed to repel the Confederates.

“They run!” cried some of Bruce’s men, and the shout echoed

up and down the Union line.

Vignette Two days after the battle, Mendenhall ordered a lieutenant to

inspect the effectiveness of his batteries’ fire. The lieutenant

duly reported:

In the skirts of wood upon which our direct fire was first opened there

were posted six bronze field pieces, supported by a formidable body

of infantry. Of the effective nature of our fire upon this point I was en-

abled to judge from the appearance of trees shattered by case shot at

very low range; of carriage wheels strewn over the ground; of one

caisson completely disabled and abandoned; of dead horses, four of

which were left here, and of the enemy’s dead, nine of whom still re-

main, besides those already buried. To the rear of this point I found

one gun abandoned, behind which were 5 dead horses, and around

which the trees were again shattered at so low range as to show that

the enemy must have been driven from this position with great loss,

although from the fact that the dead had been buried I could not de-

termine the number. I am satisfied that the cannonading from the

right of this point, to which we afterwards replied, was from guns of

the same battery, which was abandoned near the spot. Along the

120 East Stop 17

06-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 120

skirts of the wood enfiladed by our fire the underbrush was com-

pletely cut up, but I found only 2 dead horses to give evidence of the

enemy’s presence there.

Proceeding through the thicket from which the enemy emerged

later in the day I found the bushes broken down by our canister and

the ground thickly strewn with their dead. From the fact that our

burying parties were already engaged in covering the dead I found

it impracticable, without erring upon one extreme, to determine the

number killed by our own fire; but I venture to mention the fact that

within the narrow area where I stood more than 100 dead were still

to be counted. The position occupied by the enemy’s battery silenced

by our own contained 27 dead horses and 7 dead still unburied. I

was assured by a soldier that large numbers of the enemy’s dead had

already been removed from the thicket showered by our canister.

121 Bloody Pond

Lieutenant-GeneralJohn C. Breckinridge,C.S.A. blcw 1:576

06-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 121

EAST STOP 18 Davis Wheat Field

Directions Proceed 0.3 mile to a fork in the road. Bear right, then turn

right on hamburg-purdy road. Continue 0.4 mile until you

reach the red oval tablet that marks the position of the Wash-

ington (Louisiana) Artillery. Pull over to the right shoulder

and stop.

En route note the now-familiar landmarks of the Peach Or-

chard and Sarah Bell’s Old Cotton Field. Just after your right

turn, you will pass a succession of oval tablets, beginning

with a gold one marking the position of Ammen’s brigade at

the end of the second day. The proliferation of oval tablets

illustrates how the Hamburg-Purdy Road became, after

11:00 a.m., the main Confederate line of resistance.

122 East Stop 18

Wounded and stragglers on the way to the landing, and ammunition-wagons going to the front. blcw 1:484

06-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 122

East Stop 18a The Federals Attack 10:30–11:30 a.m.

Directions Exit your vehicle and face the open field.

Orientation You are facing north, into Daniel Davis’s wheat field, which

was significantly larger in 1862 than it is today. The Bloody

Pond is beyond the woods about a half mile to your right

front. The Sunken Road is about a quarter mile directly

ahead. The Hamburg-Purdy and Eastern Corinth Roads inter-

sect about 70 yards to the west.

What Happened Some of the worst fighting on April 7 occurred here and in

the area immediately to the east. At 10:30 a.m., having

thrown back Hardee’s spoiler attack, Nelson’s division ad-

vanced across Sarah Bell’s Old Cotton Field only to meet a se-

vere fire from Confederate infantry hidden just south of the

Hamburg-Purdy Road. The brigades of Ammen and Bruce

were badly hurt, not just by the heavy musket volleys but

also by an enfilading fire from the Washington (Louisiana) Ar-

tillery and McClung’s Tennessee Battery, both posted in Davis

Wheat Field. Emboldened by this success, Hardee ordered a

123 The Federals Attack

Bloody Pond

PeachOrchard

DuncanField

WickerField


DavisWheatField

BarnesField

Ham

burg-Savannah Road

Hamburg-Purdy

East

ern

Cor

inth

SunkenRoad

Roa

d

Road

Note: Only brigade-sized Confederate formations are labeled; Moore’s brigadewas an ad hoc, not regularly organized, formation.

Mendenhall’sBattery Terril’s Battery


CRITTENDEN

Bruce Ammen

(Moore)


Chalmers

Hazen

McClung’s(TN) Battery

W. S. Smith(CRITTENDEN)

East Stop 18aN10:30 – 11:30 A.M.The Federals attack.

East Stop 18a

06-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 123

counterattack but got only as far as the W. Manse George

cabin before Hazen’s brigade stopped them.

Then in turn Hazen attacked, supported by Col. William

Sooy Smith’s 11th Brigade of Crittenden’s neighboring divi-

sion. Together they shoved the Confederate infantry back to

the Hamburg-Purdy Road, stormed the Washington Artillery,

and briefly captured three guns before a counterattack by the

(Louisiana) Crescent Regiment and 19th Louisiana recovered

them, though not before the Federals managed to spike the

cannon with mud.

124 East Stop 18a

On the Union picket line–relieving pickets. blcw 4:1

06-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 124

East Stop 18b The Confederates Counterattack

11:30 a.m.–12:00 noon


What Happened The Louisianans’ success endangered the right flank of Nel-

son’s division. Meanwhile a second Confederate counterat-

tack endangered Nelson’s left. Initially made with just two

regiments, this second strike soon involved two improvised

brigades under Col. R. A. Smith and Maney, each composed of

perhaps 400 men, plus the 10th Mississippi. With more expe-

rience the Federals could have redeployed so as to fend off

these threats. But they were new to combat, and the Confed-

erate counterattack, though weak in numbers, sufficiently

alarmed Nelson that he ordered a general withdrawal to the

Sunken Road, Bloody Pond, and southern end of Wicker

Field. There, protected by artillery, the division remained un-

til it became apparent that the Confederate army was in re-

treat toward Corinth (see West Stop 19).

This completes the eastern tour of the action on April 7. If

you have not yet taken the western tour and wish to do so,

continue on to the next page.

125 The Confederates Counterattack

Bloody Pond

PeachOrchard

DuncanField

WickerField


DavisWheatField

BarnesField

W. Manse Georgecabin

Ham

burg-Savannah Road

Hamburg-Purdy

East

ern

Cor

inth

SunkenRoad

Roa

d

Road

Note: Only brigade-sized Confederate formations are labeled; Moore’s brigadewas an ad hoc, not regularly organized, formation.

Bruce Ammen

(Moore)


Chalmers

Hazen

W. S. Smith(CRITTENDEN)

(Maney)


East Stop 18bN11:30 A.M. – 12:00 noonThe Confederatescounterattack.

East Stop 18b

06-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 125

Western Route, April 7

WEST STOP 15 Lew Wallace’s Approach, April 6, 12:00 noon–7:15 p.m.

Directions From Stop 14, turn around and proceed 0.8 mile on pittsburg

landing road. Pull to the side of the road and park in the

turnout on the left before you reach the intersection with

state highway 22. You may remain in your vehicle for this

stop or stand beside it.

From East Stop 18, proceed 0.2 mile to eastern corinth

road. Turn right and proceed 0.6 mile ( joining the corinth–

pittsburg landing road en route) to a T intersection. Turn

left on pittsburg landing road and proceed 0.5 mile. Pull to the

side of the road and park in the turnout on the left before you

reach the intersection with state highway 22. You may re-

main in your vehicle for this stop or stand beside it.

Orientation You are near the extreme right flank of Grant’s final line. The

road beside you is the one finally used by Lew Wallace in

bringing his division to the field.

Tenn

esse

e R

iver

Snake Creek

Clear Creek

Owl Cree

k

Snake Creek

Smith

Overshot Mill

Pittsburg Landing

Adamsville StoneyLonesome

Crump’sLanding

Shunpike

Rive

r Roa

d

Purdy Road

Grant’sLast Line

West Stop 15N12:00 noon – 7:15 P.M.Lew Wallace’s approach,April 6.

West Stop 15

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 126

What Happened Wallace made contact with the rest of Grant’s army near here

at about 7:15 p.m., fully seven hours later than Grant had ex-

pected him.

Posted at Crump’s Landing, five miles downriver from the

rest of the army, Lew Wallace’s 3rd Division had been consid-

ered the most likely target for a Confederate surprise attack.

Several days earlier Grant had ordered him to confer with fel-

low division commander W. H. L. Wallace (no relation) on the

best means for moving troops from Pittsburg Landing to re-

inforce the 3rd Division in that event.

On the morning of April 6, however, the Confederates

struck the main army rather than the isolated division. Hear-

ing the firing, Lew Wallace got his men under arms and had

them concentrate near the camp of his center brigade at

Stoney Lonesome, two and a half miles inland from Crump’s

Landing. Wallace himself was still at Crump’s when Grant’s

steamboat passed by while taking the commander from his

headquarters at Savannah to Pittsburg Landing. Grant had

the vessel halt at Crump’s, where he and Wallace held a brief

conversation. He told Wallace to have his division ready to

march immediately upon receipt of orders. That was about

8:30 a.m.

Arriving at Pittsburg Landing, Grant quickly realized that

he faced a serious attack and lost no time directing his adju-

tant general, Capt. John A. Rawlins, to order the 3rd Division

to come up at once. Rawlins in turn repeated the command

to a staff officer who was to ride to Wallace. The messenger

requested the order in writing, and Rawlins hastily scrawled

something on a piece of paper and gave it to him. After the

battle that piece of paper was lost, and its contents became

the heart of a controversy that ruined Lew Wallace’s career.

Rawlins said the order directed Wallace to march via the

road closest to the river (this one, the Hamburg-Savannah

Road). The general claimed it said nothing of the sort. In any

event, Wallace marched his division via the Shunpike, a road

that led from Stoney Lonesome, where he had his three

brigades concentrated, to the north end of the camps of

Sherman’s division, north of Shiloh Church.

Exacerbating the situation was Lew Wallace’s apparent im-

pression that the situation at Pittsburg Landing was not very

serious. He took until noon to put his division in motion.

Grant expected him on the battlefield by that time. Then

Wallace marched his men on the Shunpike most of the way

to Sherman’s old camps before learning (from one of several

staff officers Grant dispatched to him that day with increas-

ingly urgent demands for Wallace to make haste) that Sher-

127 Lew Wallace’s Approach

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 127

man and the rest of the army had been driven back and that

he could not possibly make contact via the Shunpike. He

would have to countermarch, but instead of simply about-

facing his division, Wallace insisted on turning the brigades

in order from the head of the column, keeping his favorite

brigade in the lead but wasting valuable time while that unit

marched back along the entire length of the column. Grant’s

staff officers, including by now Rawlins himself, stayed with

Wallace but could not infuse him with their own sense of ur-

gency. Despite the very respectable 2.5-mile-per-hour pace

the division maintained once it turned about, Grant’s staff

officers fumed at the frequency and length of the rest halts

Wallace called and at his unwillingness to leave his artillery

behind or otherwise sacrifice march order for the sake of

speed. Rawlins even considered placing the general under ar-

rest. His fulminations proved of no avail, however, and the

3rd Division missed all of the first day’s fighting.

Grant never forgave Lew Wallace for (as Grant saw it) let-

ting him down in his hour of need. In vain Wallace spent

months appealing to every authority he could reach in hopes

of proving he had acted rightly at Shiloh and reviving a com-

pletely stalled military career. The stubborn fact remained

that at a moment of life-and-death importance to the Army of

the Tennessee, Wallace had made the wrong judgment and

failed to sense and therefore fulfill the pressing need of his

commander.

Vignette Johann Stuber, a German-speaking soldier in the 58th Ohio,

of Lew Wallace’s Division, wrote in his diary an account of

the day’s march and the uneasy night that followed:

Midday we received orders to get ready, strike the tents, and take ra-

tions for 10 days. About one o’clock we marched with our heavy packs

on our backs . . . toward Pittsburg Landing. It was terribly hot; the

soldiers of the other regiments threw their blankets and overcoats

away, so that on both sides of the road for a short distance, where

halts were made, whole heaps of clothing lay. After marching about

seven miles we came again to an open place about a mile from our

camp, and threw our packs in a heap, from which they were to be

taken to the boat. Thus relieved we went forward again, but on a

road leading more to the left. I was very exhausted and fell somewhat

behind and had to go twice as fast afterward to catch up with the reg-

iment. It was already almost dark when I caught up with the regi-

ment in a dark forest at the edge of a swamp on a road with foot-deep

mud. . . . After a[nother] mile of difficult marching we came to a clear-

ing and immediately thereafter to the camp of a Union regiment,

where badly wounded soldiers lay in many tents. In an open forest

with large oak trees we halted and lay down in ranks to rest, which

128 West Stop 15

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 128

we very much needed. Despite the continuing cannonade of the gun-

boats we went immediately to sleep. At one o’clock [in the morning]

a thunderstorm broke loose and a heavy rain soaked us to the skin.

The poor wounded on the nearby battlefield were awakened by this

rain and cried out in such heartrending tones for help that one could

hear them for miles. It was highly painful for everyone to hear these,

for we could bring them no help. Between them and us stood the pick-

ets; we dared not leave our places without running the danger of be-

ing shot down by the Rebel pickets. Several times during the night the

pickets fired so heavily at each other that one had to believe the battle

was beginning again already. It was a hard time for the poor sol-

diers. Each could imagine that by the next evening he might no

longer be alive or might be a cripple who for the rest of his life would

depend on the charity of his fellow men.

129 Lew Wallac’s Approach

Union gun-boats atShiloh on the eveningof the first day, detail.blcw 1:592

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 129

WEST STOP 16 Tilghman Branch, 6:30–9:00 a.m.

Directions From West Stop 15, walk 130 yards to your left front to the guns

and monument commemorating the 9th Indiana Battery.

Face in the direction the guns are pointing.

Orientation You are standing on the line of Lew Wallace’s division, facing

as his soldiers did as they prepared to begin their attack on

the morning of April 7. Stretching out to your left was the

brigade of Col. Morgan L. Smith, to your right was that of Col.

John M. Thayer, and beyond Thayer’s brigade was that of Col.

Charles Whittlesey. In front of you is the valley of Tilghman

(or Glover) Branch. The bluffs about 350 yards in front of you

represent the far side of the valley. The cut and embankment

that carry State Highway 22 over the valley directly in front

of you was of course not present in 1862.

What Happened Early on the morning of April 7, Lew Wallace and Grant met

in a field behind Smith’s brigade, to your left. Grant simply

ordered Wallace to advance due west. That meant crossing

the valley of Tilghman Branch, ahead of you. Confederate ar-

130 West Stop 16

Tilghman Branch

Russian Tenant Field

PerryField

M. L. S

mith

Thayer

Whittlesey

9th INBattery

Pond

Ketchum’sAL Battery

West Stop 16N6:30 – 9:00 A.M.Tilghman Branch.

West Stop 16

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 130

tillery, Capt. William H. Ketchum’s Alabama Battery, held the

high ground on the far side of Tilghman Branch (to your left

front), supported by Pond’s brigade, which had just moved up

into line along the top of the bluffs. Pond somehow had not

been notified when the rest of the Confederate army pulled

back to go into bivouac the previous evening, and his was the

most advanced Rebel unit that morning.

Wallace decided not to send his infantry across Tilghman

Branch until his artillery could silence or drive off the Con-

federate guns. He ordered up Capt. N. S. Thompson’s 9th In-

diana Battery and Lt. Charles H. Thurber’s Battery I, 1st Mis-

souri Light Artillery, which engaged in a half-hour-long

artillery duel with Ketchum. Silas Grisamore, an officer in the

18th Louisiana in Ponds’s Brigade, said the Yankees were “send-

ing their shot through the trees over our heads.” Thomas’s

gunners did, however, succeed in dismounting one of Ketch-

um’s guns, and Pond gave orders to fall back. The Confederate

artillery and infantry withdrew to the south end of Jones

Field, about 1,200 yards to your left front. Wallace’s troops

then crossed the valley of Tilghman Branch and ascended the

bluffs on the far side without opposition.

Analysis Grant wanted an aggressive attack on the morning of April 7,

but Lew Wallace, who had the only fresh division in the Army

of the Tennessee as well as the key position on the far north

end of the battlefield, delivered a cautious and circumspect

advance, as evidenced in his delay in crossing Tilghman

Branch. In this case Wallace did have some reason for his

caution. Although he had at least a five-to-one advantage over

Pond in infantry, the terrain in the Tilghman Branch valley

was a major obstacle, to which several members of the divi-

sion alluded in their accounts of the battle. “A swamp lay be-

tween us and the enemy,” recalled one soldier, “and we were

ordered to cross it. Some of our men mired up to their knees

and had to be pulled out by their comrades, but pressed on

and gained the other side.” The 76th Ohio’s Capt. S. M. Em-

mons summed it up: “The ball opened, and we marched, . . .

through swamps knee deep, through brush, over hills and

across hollows.”

131 Tilghman Branch

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 131

WEST STOP 17 Jones Field, 9:00 a.m.–12:00 noon

Directions Return to your vehicle. Turn left on state highway 22 and pro-

ceed 0.9 mile to the picnic area on your right. Turn into the

picnic area and use it to turn around. Leaving the picnic area,

turn left on state highway 22. Proceed about 0.2 mile and park

in the turnout on the right near the cannonball-pyramid

monument denoting the headquarters of Hare’s brigade of

McClernand’s division. Walk to the monument and stand

next to it. Face toward the nearby cannon and thus in the

same direction those guns are pointing.

Orientation Once again you are standing on the line of Lew Wallace’s di-

vision, facing as his soldiers did as they made a second and

longer pause in their April 7 attack. As before, you are ap-

proximately at the junction of Smith’s (on your left) and

Thayer’s (on your right) brigades; Whittlesey’s brigade was

still farther to the right. In front of you and angling off to

your left front is Jones Field. The Confederates were at the

south end of the field and in the far tree line to your left

front, from 500 to 650 yards distant.

132 West Stop 17

JonesField

M. L. Sm

ith

Thayer

Whittlesey

9th INBattery

Gib

son

Thurber’sBattery

Confederate Line

(elements of various units)

West Stop 17 N 9:00 A.M. – 12:00 noonJones Field.

West Stop 17

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 132

What Happened After taking the bluffs on the west side of Tilghman Branch,

Wallace found that he faced virtually no Confederate opposi-

tion and that he was on the northern (that is to say, left) flank

of the Rebel army. Correctly calculating that the swamps

along the Owl Creek bottoms (the bottoms start about a

quarter mile to your right; the creek is that far again in the

same direction) would protect his own right flank, Wallace

decided to attack the Confederate flank by wheeling his divi-

sion to the left, changing its direction of advance from west

to southwest and then south. Where you now stand, the di-

vision was already partially through that maneuver and was

facing southwest.

Here, however, Wallace called a halt to his advance be-

cause Sherman’s division had not yet moved up on his left

flank. Despite the fact that he was in a position to devastate

the Confederate army and possessed an overwhelming ad-

vantage in numbers in this sector, Wallace waited. The op-

portunity before him was enhanced by the fact that General

Ruggles had unwisely ordered Pond’s Brigade to another part

of the field, leaving only a more or less ad-hoc collection of

troops under Ruggles and Wood to dispute any advance the

Federals might have cared to make.

Wallace detected Pond’s departure and had his artillery

shell the marching column, drawing return fire from a Con-

federate battery at the south end of the field. In Wallace’s

words, “A fine artillery duel ensued.” Confederate cavalry

and infantry counterattacked the Union artillery, just in

front of you. Louisiana and Arkansas troops of Gibson’s

Brigade succeeded in getting in among Thurber’s guns before

the Union infantry of Smith’s brigade drove them off, saving

the cannon.

Wallace’s infantry suffered few casualties from the

shelling because most of them were sheltered in the woods

and by the lower ground slightly behind and on either side of

you. The general took all the advantage he could of the un-

even terrain to shelter his troops as much as possible. Cap-

tain Emmons was appreciative, writing of “the skill of our

commander” in “taking advantage of the hills and causing us

to lie down, shells and cannon balls flying close over our

heads.”

Finally Sherman’s division swept into the field on your far

left, the brigades that had fought desperately on the Shiloh

Church ridge the day before now forming a splendid—but

short—line of battle. Reassured, Wallace renewed his own ad-

vance, continuing to wheel to the left with his three brigades

in echelon, Smith leading on the left, Thayer a bit behind

him in the center, and Whittlesey bringing up the rear on the

133 Jones Field

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 133

right. Smith’s and Thayer’s brigades were both out in the

open field at the same time and made quite a sight, with neat

ranks and waving colors. The Confederates on the far side of

the field put up some resistance but were soon driven off,

and the Union advance continued.

Analysis All day long Lew Wallace showed an exaggerated sensitivity

to getting separated from the rest of the army as well as an

excessive caution. Such concerns are proper within reason,

but Wallace carried them too far and thus did not take ad-

vantage of the opportunity that lay before him here. A more

aggressive advance on this flank might have spared some of

the hard fighting farther south (out of sight to your left).

One thing, though, can be said for the general’s caution: it

kept his casualty rate low. Of the 7,337 men in his division,

Wallace would this day lose only 491 casualties.

134 West Stop 17

Major-General Lew Wallace. blcw 1:27

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 134

WEST STOP 18 Sowell Field, 12:00 noon

Directions Return to your vehicle. Although your next destination lies

south, for safety’s sake please proceed 0.6 mile to the park

entrance (marked by a large sign with the words “Visitors

Center”), and turn right on pittsburg landing road. About

50 yards farther use the pullout where you parked for West

Stop 15 in order to turn around. Return to state highway 22

and turn left. Proceed 0.9 mile to the picnic area on your right.

Turn right into the picnic area. Proceed 0.2 mile. Park by the

side of the road and face the open field to your left.

Orientation You are standing at about the center of the line of Thayer’s

brigade, facing as his soldiers did as they continued their ad-

vance from Jones Field. Smith’s brigade (on your left) contin-

ued this line farther to your left, while Whittlesey’s brigade

was to the right and rear, struggling to keep up on the out-

side of the 3rd Division’s left-wheel maneuver. The long, nar-

row cleared area in which you are standing represents

wartime Sowell Field, but the field was more than twice as

wide, though of about the same length. The wartime tree line

135 Sowell Field

Sowell Field

Crescent Field

Wharton’sTexas Rangers

23rd INThayer M. L. Smith

West Stop 18 N 12:00 noonSowell Field.

West Stop 18

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 135

in front of you was about 100 yards away and 30 feet below

the spot on which you now stand.

What Happened After clearing the southern and western edges of Jones Field,

Wallace’s division continued its left wheel until, by the time

it moved up onto the ridge on which you are now standing,

it was facing due south, just as you now are. Thayer now ef-

fectively formed the extreme right flank of the Union line,

since Whittlesey, due to the terrain and his difficult position

on the outside of the wheeling maneuver, had been unable to

keep up. While Thayer was still engaging the retiring Con-

federate infantry to his front (and yours), he noticed a body

of Confederate cavalry advancing as if to pass his right flank.

This was Col. John A. Wharton’s regiment of Texas Rangers.

Beauregard had ordered Wharton to ride around the Union

flank and strike the Federal line from the rear. Seeing the Tex-

ans coming, Thayer ordered his right-flank regiment, the

23rd Indiana, to shift its line 110 yards farther right, putting

the unit directly in their path. The Texans were moving up

single file because of the difficult terrain, and they never

stood a chance. Wharton and the other men at the head of the

line opened up with their carbines, hoping the tail of the col-

umn could get up and help them before they were all slaugh-

tered, but it was no use. Wharton’s own horse went down, and

so did many of his rangers. “I was sacrificing the lives of my

men,” Wharton later explained, “fighting 30 men against at

least a regiment, with the advantage of position, and with no

prospect but that the men would all be killed as they came in

view, as they could only advance by file.” So he pulled them

back, had them dismount, and then go at the Yankees in a

proper skirmish line on foot. That failed too. The Texans were

getting the worse of the exchange when orders came from

Beauregard to pull back and cover the retirement of other

forces on the Confederate left.

After a brief pause, during which Whittlesey caught up

and came into line, Wallace’s division pressed on.

Analysis Mounted cavalry was singularly ineffective on the battlefield

of Shiloh, but this was only a more extreme example of what

was true on virtually all the major battlefields of the Civil

War. This was partially because the rifled musket, or rifle,

with which most Civil War soldiers were armed, allowed in-

fantrymen to shoot down cavalry and break up their charges

at a relatively safe distance. In part as well, it was a factor of

the rough terrain, which broke up cavalry formations and

slowed its movements.

Rough terrain made Shiloh especially difficult for the cav-

136 West Stop 18

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:27 AM Page 136

alry, as demonstrated in this case. Wharton’s Texas Rangers,

some of the toughest and most experienced volunteer horse

soldiers on either side, scarcely made a dent when they ran

up against a Union infantry regiment. The Hoosiers of the

23rd Indiana were determined and had gained combat expe-

rience at Fort Donelson. The ground here in front of Sowell

Field prevented the Texans from assuming any mounted for-

mation that gave even a remote chance of success, and even

when dismounted they were still handicapped by the shorter

range of their carbines. Other things being equal, carbines

were never a match for rifles, and other things were certainly

no better than equal for Wharton’s men this day.

137 Sowell Field

Major-General Martin L. Smith, C.S.A. blcw3:476

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:28 AM Page 137

WEST STOP 19 Water Oaks Pond, 12:00 noon–2:00 p.m.

Directions Return to your vehicle. Proceed in the direction you have been

traveling, continuing around the loop in Sowell Field (the

picnic area) and back the way you came, a total of about

0.4 mile, to state highway 22. Turn right and proceed 0.9 mile

to hamburg-purdy road. Turn left and proceed approximately

another 0.4 mile to corinth road. Turn left. About 50 yards

beyond the intersection, the road forks. Bear right. Just be-

yond the intersection you will see two cannons on the left

side of the road representing Rutledge’s Tennessee Battery. Pull to

the side of the road and park. Walk to the cannons. Stand next

to them and face in the direction they are pointing.

Orientation About 80 yards in front of you is Water Oaks Pond. The need

to follow modern automobile roads has made the trip here

from Sowell Field (West Stop 18) seem unnaturally long. In

fact Sowell Field is slightly less than three-quarters of a mile

away to your left front. The Corinth Road, on which you were

just driving, leads off to your right front toward Pittsburg

Landing, about 2.3 miles away. You are facing in the same di-

138 West Stop 19

WaterOaksPond

Shiloh Church

Review Field

WoolfField

Cor

inth

Roa

d Hamburg-Purdy Road

Rou

ssea

u

Rut

ledg

e’s

TN B

atte

ry

CH

EAT

HA

MGib

son

Woo

d

Ander

son

LEW WALLACESHERMAN

MCCLERNAND

West Stop 19 N 12:00 noon – 2:00 P.M.Water Oaks Pond.

West Stop 19

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:28 AM Page 138

rection as the Confederate defenders during the early after-

noon of April 7.

What Happened The area around you witnessed some of the most intense

fighting on April 7. While Lew Wallace’s division and other

troops of the Army of the Tennessee were pressing their way

closer to this spot from the direction of Sowell and Jones

Fields, to your front and left front, the Union troops of the

Army of the Ohio were battling their way westward from

Pittsburg Landing along the Corinth Road and south of it,

to your right and right front. Meanwhile Bragg made a con-

certed effort to cobble together here a defensive line that he

hoped would finally halt the Union advance.

After the triumph over the Rebel cavalry in Sowell Field

and the general retirement of the Confederate left, Wallace

feared that if he pursued the enemy any farther in this di-

rection, he would become entangled with the neighboring

divisions of Sherman and McClernand. He therefore halted

his command and began the cumbersome process of wheel-

ing its line back to the right in order to march some distance

farther west before turning south again to flank the Confed-

erates once more. This maneuver was of great benefit to

Bragg, for it kept Wallace’s division, which by then lay di-

rectly to your left and left front, from coming in on his flank

and crumbling his line before it could form. With his flank

safe for now, Bragg put up a stiff fight against Union troops

advancing from your front and right front.

Early in the afternoon Bragg launched a counterattack.

Wood’s Brigade, now numbering less than 650 men, advanced

over the ground where you now stand, its soldiers facing as

you do. They charged right through Water Oaks Pond (in

front of you), waist deep in some places, then pressed on

across Woolf Field beyond. The Confederate counterattack

drove Sherman’s and McClernand’s divisions back. Wallace,

who was in a position to crush the Confederates’ left flank,

nevertheless went over to the defensive and for a time even

considered retreating. Still the Confederates’ inability to dis-

lodge Wallace (his right-flank regiment, the 11th Indiana, did

some very hard fighting to maintain its position) helped stall

their attack.

At this point, troops of McCook’s division (particularly

Brig. Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau’s brigade) of the Army of the

Ohio moved up the Corinth Road to strike the right flank of

the Confederates in Woolf Field. Charge and countercharge

surged back and forth across the ground where you now

stand. Sherman described the area as “a point of water-oaks

139 Water Oaks Pond

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:28 AM Page 139

and thickets” and a “green point of timber” where arose “the

severest musketry fire I ever heard.”

Rutledge’s Tennessee Battery came up to support the Rebel

line here and fired for some 30 minutes. But Confederate

officers in this and other sectors of the line recognized by

this time that their army was nearing the point of collapse.

Beauregard came to realize this as well and about 2:00 p.m. or-

dered a general withdrawal of the army toward Corinth.

Union troops pursued only as far as their camps of the previ-

ous morning. The battle of Shiloh was over.

Vignette In the heat of battle, there was a certain irrationality about

men’s perceptions. A strange logic seemed to decide which

events of carnage each passed over as a matter of course and

which struck horror into their hearts even as they watched

them. An example of this is an account written by Capt.

George Rogers of the 20th Ohio five days after the battle re-

ferring to this phase of the fight:

I will not attempt to entertain you by descriptions of the horrors . . . ,

but . . . I can assure you of one thing, however, and that is those things

don’t affect one very much while he is engaged in fighting. What

moved me more than anything during the engagement was the effort

of a field officer to dispatch the noble animal that had carried him

safely across a great field, over which the fight was raging furiously.

In crossing, the horse had received a shot in his lower jaw—the officer

seeing the animal could not be saved, mounted his lead horse, and

riding several times around the wounded brute, discharged six balls

from his pistol into the horse’s body—bringing him with the last shot,

to the ground—the man the while weeping like a child. But in a mo-

ment the scene was changed—the tears were dried and that humane

rider plunging his rowels into the side of his fresh horse, flew across

the plains. . . . That scene . . . remains the most vividly planted in my

memory of all those I saw on that memorable day.

This completes the western tour of the fighting on April 7. If

you have not yet taken the eastern tour and wish to do so,

turn to page 115 (East Stop 15).

140 West Stop 19

07-N3554 11/10/05 5:28 AM Page 140

Afterword

The Corinth Campaign, April 8–May 30, 1862

The battle of Shiloh marked the Confederacy’s supreme ef-

fort to reverse the early tide of Union success that had begun

at Forts Henry and Donelson the preceding February. It

nearly succeeded. Grant never again came as close to disaster

as he did on April 6, 1862.

Shiloh led some Northerners to lose faith in Grant. Its

horrific death toll shocked America. The casualties there ex-

ceeded the combined casualties of all of America’s previous

wars combined. Amid the anguish of this loss, many blamed

Grant, whose failure to anticipate the Confederate surprise

attack had, they argued, run up the butcher’s bill. There were

even false reports that Grant had been drunk before or dur-

ing the battle.

Grant’s commanding officer, Halleck, moved quickly to

sideline him. Four days after the battle, Halleck arrived at

Pittsburg Landing to take personal command of the com-

bined forces there, the armies of Grant and Buell, previously

commanded by Grant. Halleck then summoned the army of

Maj. Gen. John Pope, which had taken Island Number Ten

and New Madrid on the Mississippi River the day after Shiloh

ended. With these three armies, numbering over 100,000

men, Halleck proposed to march on Corinth. Rather than

leave Grant in command of the largest single component

of this force, Halleck named him to the meaningless post of

second in command and gave the Army of the Tennessee,

Grant’s army, to Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas. Grant consid-

ered resigning his commission, but Sherman, who was rap-

idly becoming his best friend, talked him out of it.

In describing the advance of this enormous force from

Pittsburg Landing to Corinth during the weeks that followed,

historians have tended to use terms ordinarily reserved for

the study of geology—“glacial” being the one most often ap-

plied. The adjective fits. Halleck’s advance got started in ear-

nest three weeks after the battle and averaged about two-

thirds of a mile per day for the next month. Each night the

general had his troops entrench massively—no one was

going to catch Henry W. Halleck with a surprise attack.

Yet the long delay entailed by this slow advance could have

amounted to another virtual engraved invitation for the Con-

federates to take back the initiative, as they had already done

at Shiloh.

What was required for this to happen was a sufficiently

daring and resourceful Confederate commander, but such a

man was lacking. After Johnston’s death on April 6, command

08-N3554-AFT 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 141

of Confederate forces in the West passed to Beauregard. An

officer who could sometimes show great, even excessive,

imagination, Beauregard tended to choke under pressure and

heavy responsibility. In fairness the task that faced him was

no easy one. His army was badly outnumbered, even after the

addition of a smaller force from the trans-Mississippi under

Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn. The Confederates would have to over-

come serious problems of supply and transportation in order

to carry out the kind of successful turning movement that

Bragg achieved later that summer. Perhaps no general could

have surmounted the difficulties Beauregard faced. At any

rate Beauregard did not. On May 29 he came to the conclusion

that Corinth could not be held any longer without the dan-

ger of his army being trapped and captured. That night he

carried out a skillful evacuation, detailing troops to cheer

when trains puffed into the Corinth railroad station to create

the impression that reinforcements were arriving rather

than (as was in fact the case) supplies and equipment going

out. The next morning the Federals advanced to find the vi-

tal railroad town empty. Beauregard took up a position at Tu-

pelo, Mississippi, a couple of days’ march south of Corinth.

The slow pace of Halleck’s advance and the failure to bag

any part of the Confederate army marred the luster of his

achievement. Still, at a time when affairs in Virginia were not

going much to the liking of the Lincoln administration, Hal-

leck’s solid if unspectacular success sufficed to win him pro-

motion to general in chief of all Union armies. He took up his

post in Washington but proved as ineffective there as he had

in the West. At least he was out of Grant’s way.

On the Confederate side, Beauregard had even worse prob-

lems with his government. Although he wrote of his with-

drawal from Corinth in glowing terms and claimed that it

should be counted as equal to a great victory, President Davis

was not impressed. The president had never really forgiven

the Louisiana general for failing to complete the victory that

he believed his old West Point friend, Johnston, had had

within his grasp when the general died on the afternoon of

the first day at Shiloh. Abandoning Corinth without a major

battle confirmed his low regard for the accidental top west-

ern general. When Beauregard took an unauthorized sick

leave a fortnight later, Davis promptly replaced him with the

recently promoted Bragg.

With that the scene was set for the further course of the

war in the West, as the Union and Confederate soldiers who

had fought at Shiloh were in coming months and years to

confront each other on such battlefields as Perryville, Stone’s

River, Champion’s Hill, Vicksburg, and Chickamauga. On

142 Afterword

08-N3554-AFT 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 142

these and other fields in the West the Union rarely lost the

strategic initiative, while the Confederacy strove in vain to

hold on to what it still had or to win back some of what it had

lost almost at the outset. But never again would Southern

arms come as close to complete victory as they had in the sec-

ond springtime of the war, in the woods and fields between

Shiloh Church and Pittsburg Landing.

143 The Corinth Campaign

Major-General Henry W. Halleck. blcw 1:276

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Crump’s Landing. From a photograph taken in 1884. blcw1:467

08-N3554-AFT 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 144

Appendix A: The Union and Confederate Commands on April 6, 1862

It is impossible to understand the afternoon phase of the

battle of Shiloh without a discussion of three command-and-

control developments that shaped the overall fighting.

Grant Reaches the Battlefield, 7:00–11:30 A.M.

Sunday morning found the Union commander at his head-

quarters in the handsome William H. Cherry mansion atop

a bluff overlooking the Tennessee River just west of Savan-

nah. He had two things on his mind: the impending arrival

of Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell’s Army of the Ohio, whose lead

division had just reached town, and the imperative need to

transfer his headquarters permanently to Pittsburg Landing,

not because he feared a Confederate attack but rather be-

cause he had just learned of John McClernand’s promotion

to major general, which meant that the Illinois politician

now outranked Sherman, the only man Grant trusted to

supervise the encampment in his absence. To forestall Mc-

Clernand’s inevitable bid to assert his new rank, Grant would

thenceforth have to be personally present at the landing.

Around 7:00 a.m., as he and his staff sat down to breakfast,

they heard a vague rumble upstream (south). “That’s firing,”

remarked Col. Joseph D. Webster, Grant’s fifty-one-year-old

chief of staff. The words scarcely left his mouth when an or-

derly confirmed the sound of artillery coming from upriver.

Walking outside, Grant and his staff recognized that an en-

gagement had indeed begun somewhere. “Where is it, at

Crump’s, or Pittsburg Landing?” asked Webster. “I think it’s

at Pittsburg,” Grant replied, and in short order commander,

staff, orderlies, and clerks piled aboard the steamer Tigress

for the trip south.

Before casting off, Grant scribbled two messages: one to

Brig. Gen. William Nelson, commanding Buell’s lead divi-

sion, instructing that officer to locate a guide and march

along the east bank to a point opposite Pittsburg Landing;

the other a note to Buell explaining about the apparent en-

gagement upstream and his directive to Nelson.

The Tigress stopped first at Crump’s Landing, where Grant

found Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace apparently waiting for him on

the hurricane deck of the steamer Jesse K. Bell. The Tigress

warped in close enough for the two generals to have a brief,

shouted conference. Grant instructed Wallace to have his di-

vision ready to march at a moment’s notice. Wallace replied

that his three brigades were already concentrated at Stoney

Lonesome and prepared to move. Grant nodded approvingly,

09-N3554-APA 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 145

the Tigress pulled away, and the vessel continued at top speed

to Pittsburg Landing.

Just after leaving Crump’s, the Tigress encountered the

steamer John Warner racing downstream. The two vessels

drew alongside one another, a board was placed across the

two decks, and a lieutenant from Brig. Gen. W. H. L. Wallace’s

staff clambered over with word that the army was under gen-

eral attack and that its right and center had been forced back.

He added that the enemy force was large. Grant seemed un-

perturbed by the news. He did not even rise from his deck

chair, just muttered a piece of bravado about surrounding

the enemy when he reached the battlefield.

If Grant seriously believed such a thing, he undoubtedly

reconsidered his view when the Tigress reached Pittsburg

Landing at 9:00 a.m. By that hour Sherman’s division had

been pummeled, Prentiss crushed, and at least 3,000 demor-

alized soldiers were already cowering along the bluff. Grant

hobbled ashore (he had been injured when, two days previ-

ously, his horse had slipped in the mud), threaded his way to

the top of the bluff, and promptly issued three directives.

First, he ordered an ammunition train sent forward to the

firing line. Second, he established a straggler line comprising

two recently arrived and as yet unassigned regiments, the

15th and 16th Iowa, buttressed by Battery I, 2nd Illinois Light

Artillery. Finally, he dispatched a third regiment, the 23rd

Missouri, to join what remained of Prentiss’s division.

That done, Grant and his staff rode off toward the front. A

half mile down the Corinth Road they encountered W. H. L.

Wallace, whose division had been farthest to the rear and

was then making its way toward the fighting. Wallace made

a brief report to Grant, who for the first time realized both

that the enemy was making a full-scale assault on the Pitts-

burg Landing camps (he had previously thought it might sim-

ply be a gambit to distract attention from a thrust upon

Crump’s Landing) and that the situation was dire. At that

point Grant dispatched a staff officer with orders for Lew

Wallace’s division to march to Pittsburg Landing as soon as

possible. He also composed another dispatch to Nelson: “The

attack on my forces has been very spirited from early this

morning. The appearance of fresh troops on the field now

would have a powerful effect, both by inspiring our men and

disheartening the enemy. If you will get upon the field, leav-

ing all your baggage on the east bank of the river, it will be a

move to our advantage, and possibly save the day to us. The

rebel forces are estimated at over 100,000 men. My head-

quarters will be in the log building on the top of the hill,

146 Appendix A

09-N3554-APA 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 146

where you will be furnished a staff officer to guide you to

your place on the field.”

After Wallace’s briefing, Grant then visited the remaining

four division commanders on the battlefield, beginning with

Sherman, on the Union right, and working his way over to

Prentiss on the left. Sherman seemed thoroughly the master

of the situation on his front, but McClernand seemed “fussy

and flurried,” and indeed affairs in his sector looked bad

enough that Grant ordered up his only immediate reserve,

the 15th and 16th Iowa, to McClernand’s assistance.

For the most part Grant cultivated an air of complete

calm, almost as if he were simply on a routine inspection

tour. Only when he and his staff came under artillery fire

while crossing Duncan Field did he declare, “We must ride

fast here!” Both he and his staff ran the gauntlet without

harm, except that one shell fragment wounded the horse of

his engineer, Capt. James B. McPherson (who two years later

would command the Army of the Tennessee), while another

struck Grant’s scabbard, throwing his sword to ground.

It was probably 11:15 a.m. or 11:30 a.m. when Grant

reached Prentiss, by now well established along the Sunken

Road. Appreciating the position’s superior field of fire and the

way in which it protected the Hamburg-Savannah Road, the

enemy’s most direct route to Pittsburg Landing, Grant in-

structed Prentiss to hold the Sunken Road “at all hazards.”

He then rode off to establish a coherent defensive line farther

to rear.

Confederate Command and Control, 5:30 A.M.–12:00 noon

Confederate command arrangements at Shiloh were among

the most peculiar of any major battle in American history.

With the partial and largely ineffectual exception of Beaure-

gard, none of the senior leadership—Johnston, Hardee, Bragg,

Polk, or Breckinridge—made any serious attempt to exercise

overall control of the forces nominally in their charge. Nor

can one point to any division commanders who handled (or

were allowed to handle) their brigades in a unified, coordi-

nated manner. For all practical purposes, the Confederate

side of the battle was fought by pick-up teams of brigades

summoned to one task or another by anyone from a staff

officer to Johnston himself.

In theory the Confederate command arrangements were

rational if unorthodox. Hardee and Bragg would control the

initial attack, with the latter commander handling his troops

so as to support and reinforce the former. Johnston would

oversee the battle from the front, exploiting his considerable

147 Union and Confederate Commands

09-N3554-APA 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 147

personal presence to rally or inspire the largely green sol-

diers who composed the Army of the Mississippi. Polk and

Breckinridge would remain in reserve until needed, at which

point Beauregard would dispatch them to the sector where

their brigades could be used to best advantage.

Beauregard performed his function from a succession of

temporary headquarters, the first at the intersection of the

Corinth and Bark Roads, the second established around

9:20 a.m. in the northern part of Fraley Field. Although occa-

sionally issuing direct orders affecting troop movements—

it was he, for example, who dispatched two brigades from

Breckinridge’s Reserve Corps to attack the supposed Union di-

vision on the right (Col. David Stuart’s brigade of Sherman’s

5th Division; see East Stops 6d and 7)—for the most part Beau-

regard’s instructions were for Polk and Breckinridge to follow

Bragg and go in wherever they were called upon to help. By

midmorning if not sooner, Beauregard had largely lost control

of the reinforcement process. The real commanding general,

for all practical purposes, became his chief of staff, Col.

Thomas Jordan.

Riding about the rear area, Jordan repeatedly came upon

units standing idle for lack of instructions. “In all such cases,”

he wrote, “assuming the authority of my position, I gave or-

ders in the name of General Johnston.” Presently Jordan col-

lected the chiefs of staff of Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, as well as

the chief aides-de-camp of Bragg and Johnston, “all of whom I

employed in assisting to press the Confederate troops toward

the heaviest firing, and to keep the batteries advancing.”

Jordan’s tactical philosophy echoed Beauregard’s, which de-

rived in turn from a defective understanding of Napoleon’s

operational art. Beauregard had somewhere read that the em-

peror advised subordinates, when in doubt, to march to the

sound of the heaviest firing. Although martial in tone, such

counsel virtually guaranteed that units would strike the en-

emy where he was strongest, thus often enough reinforcing

failure. Even worse, if possible, it converted the Confederate

offensive into little more than a shoving match.

By 11:00 a.m. it became obvious to Bragg and Polk that the

brigades from the various corps had become hopelessly in-

termingled and the existing command arrangement was un-

workable. “If you will take care of the center, I will take care

of the right,” Bragg told Polk. Hardee, they further agreed,

would handle the left, Breckinridge the reserve, and they dis-

patched staff officers to communicate this revised system to

the other corps commanders.

Even this new arrangement failed to work, however. By

that hour Breckinridge was no longer in reserve. Bragg got only

148 Appendix A

09-N3554-APA 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 148

as far as Barnes Field, where he halted to supervise attacks on

the Sunken Road position. The commander on the right (to

the extent that he actually exerted command) was Johnston.

Union Reinforcements Arrive, Afternoon and Evening

Grant had three reservoirs of reinforcements: a limited

supply of regiments immediately available near Pittsburg

Landing; Lew Wallace’s 3rd Division, stationed at Crump’s

Landing; and Buell’s approaching army.

As we have seen, Grant committed the first group of re-

inforcements as soon as he reached the field. Wallace’s divi-

sion, for its part, took much longer to join the fighting than

Grant anticipated (see West Stop 15). That left the Army of

the Ohio.

Slowed by heavy rains, high water, and a succession of de-

stroyed bridges, Buell had been advancing from Nashville to-

ward Pittsburg Landing since March 15. Only about half of

his 70,000-man army actually made the march. The rest were

widely scattered: Some units garrisoned Nashville. One divi-

sion marched into northern Alabama. Other troops held the

mountainous region of eastern Kentucky.

Buell’s most serious delay occurred at Columbia, Ten-

nessee. His army reached the town on March 25 but required

four days to construct a bridge across the Duck River. Far

from asking Buell to make haste, however, Grant encouraged

him to march “by easy stages” so that his troops would be

fully rested when they reached Pittsburg Landing. Grant re-

peated his doubts that the Confederates would attack. If they

did, he vowed, he could beat them more easily than at Fort

Donelson.

Of course, events completely belied Grant’s facile opti-

mism. Fortunately for him, Buell’s lead division, under Nel-

son, reached Savannah on April 5. When the battle erupted

the next morning, Grant could therefore order it to march at

once to a point opposite Pittsburg Landing. Nelson’s men got

underway about 1:30 p.m. Thanks to the wretched state of

the route, some of it little more than “a black mud swamp,”

Nelson’s first brigade, under Col. Jacob Ammen, required

three and a half hours to cover the seven miles between Sa-

vannah and the point opposite the landing: all things con-

sidered, a very respectable performance.

Union transports soon began transporting Nelson’s divi-

sion across the river. It took until 7 :30 p.m. for Ammen’s

brigade to complete its crossing, with the other brigades fol-

lowing during the evening. Enraged by the sight of so many

skulkers, the tempestuous Nelson was sorely tempted to

open fire on them, particularly since they interfered with the

149 Union and Confederate Commands

09-N3554-APA 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 149

landing of his own troops. Nothing so draconian occurred,

however, and as the night deepened, Buell’s remaining divi-

sions began to steam upstream from Savannah. By dawn on

April 7, three divisions from the Army of the Ohio (those of

Nelson, Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden, and Brig. Gen. Alex-

ander McD. McCook) had reached the battlefield. Approxi-

mately 20,000 fresh Union troops were now at hand.

One might suppose that Grant would have been grateful

for Buell’s arrival. In fact, then and later, he took pains to

minimize the significance of Buell’s contribution, while

Sherman later claimed that Buell “did not seem to trust us . . .

and I really feared he would not cross over his army that

night, lest he should become involved in a general disaster.”

The charge was grossly unfair. That said, Buell was equally

unfair in his insistence that only the arrival of his army saved

Grant from total destruction. The most judicious conclusion

is that, without Buell’s arrival, Grant would have held his

final defensive line but would not have been able to unleash

the successful April 7 counterattack.

150 Appendix A

Major-General Alexander McD. McCook. blcw 1:491

09-N3554-APA 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 150

Appendix B: Orders of Battle

Union Forces ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE (Grant)

1st Division (McClernand)Abbreviations:

bde: brigade

bn: battalion

s.s.: sharpshooters

co: company

1st bde(Hare)

8th il

18th il

11th ia

13th ia

2nd il Lt. Artillery,Battery D

2nd bde(Marsh)

11th il

20th il

45th il

48th il

3rd bde(Raith)

17th il

29th il

43rd il

49th il

Carmichael’s ilCavalry

not brigaded: Stewart’s il Cavalry; 1st il Light Artillery, Battery D; 2nd il Light Artillery, Battery E; 14th oh Battery

2nd Division (W. H. L. Wallace)

1st bde(M. Smith)

11th in

24th in

8th mo

2nd bde(Thayer)

23rd in

1st ne

58th oh

68th oh

3rd bde(Whittlesey)

20th oh

56th oh

78th oh

78th oh

not brigaded: 9th in Battery; 1st mo Light Artillery, Battery I;11th il Cavalry, 3rd Bn; 5th oh Cavalry, 3rd Bn

1st bde(Tuttle)

2nd ia

7th ia

12th ia

14th ia

2nd bde(McArthur)

9th il

12th il

13th mo

14th mo (Birge’ss.s.)

81st oh

3rd bde(Sweeny)

7th il

50th il

52nd il

57th il

58th il

8th ia

not brigaded: 2nd il Cavalry, Cos. A and B; 2nd U.S. Cavalry,Co. C; 4th U.S. Cavalry, Co. I; 1st il Light Artillery, Battery A; 1st mo Light Artillery, Batteries D, H, and K

3rd Division (Lew Wallace)

10-N3554-APB 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 151

5th Division (Sherman)

6th Division (Prentiss)

152 Appendix B

4th bde(Rousseau)

6th in

5th ky

1st oh

15th U.S. Infantry,1st Bn.



5th bde(Kirk)

34th il

19th in

30th in

77th pa

6th bde(Gibson)

32nd in

39th in

15th oh

49th oh

Artillery: 5th U.S.Artillery, Battery H

1st bde(Peabody)

12th mi

21st mo

25th mo

16th wi

2nd bde(Miller)

61st il

18th mo

18th wi

not brigaded: 15th, 16th ia; 23rd mo; 11th il Cavalry, 8 cos.;1st mn Battery; 5th oh Battery

unassigned troops15th MI; 14th WI; 1st IL Light Artillery, Batteries H and L; 2nd IL Light Artillery, Batteries B and F; 8th OH Battery

ARMY OF THE OHIO (Buell)

2nd Division (McCook)

1st bde(McDowell)

40th il

6th ia

46th oh

6th in Battery

2nd bde(Stuart)

55th il

54th oh

71st oh

3rd bde(Hildebrand)

53rd oh

57th oh

77th oh

4th bde(Buckland)

48th oh

70th oh

72nd oh

not brigaded: 4th il Cavalry, 1st and 2nd Bns; 1st il Light Artillery, Batteries B and E

1st bde(Williams)

28th il

32nd il

41st il

3rd ia

2nd bde(Veatch)

14th il

15th il

46th il

25th in

3rd bde(Lauman)

31st in

44th in

17th ky

25th ky

not brigaded: 5th oh Cavalry, 1st and 2nd Bns; 2nd miBattery; 1st mo Light Artillery, Battery C; 13th oh Battery

4th Division (Hurlbut)

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153 Orders of Battle

1st bde(Russell)

11th la

12th tn

13th tn

22nd tn

Bankhead’s tnBattery

2nd bde(Stewart)

13th ar

4th tn

5th tn

33rd tn

Stanford’s msBattery

20th bde(Garfield)

51st in

13th mi

64th oh

65th oh

21st bde(Wagner)

15th in

10th in

57th in

24th ky

ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI ( Johnston, Beauregard)

I Corps (Polk)

1st Division (Clark)

11th bde(Boyle)

9th ky

13th ky

19th oh

59th oh

14th bde(W. Smith)

11th ky

26th ky

13th oh

not brigaded: 3d ky Cavalry; 1st oh Light Artillery, Battery G;4th U.S. Artillery, Batteries H and M

6th Division (Wood)

10th bde(Ammen)

36th in

6th oh

24th oh

19th bde(Hazen)

9th in

6th ky

41st oh

22nd bde(Bruce)

1st ky

2nd ky

20th ky

Cavalry: 2nd in

5th Division (Crittenden)

4th Division (Nelson)

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154 Appendix B

1st bde(Gladden)

21st al

22nd al

23rd al

26th al

1st la

Robertson’s alBattery

Gage’s al Battery

2nd bde(Chalmers)

5th ms

7th ms

9th ms

10th ms

52nd tn

3rd bde( Jackson)

17th al

18th al

19th al

2nd tx

Girardey’s gaBattery

Cavalry: Clanton’sal Regiment

1st bde(Gibson)

1st ar

4th la

13th la

19th la

Bains’s ms Battery

2nd bde(Anderson)

1st fl Bn

17th la

20th la

9th tx

ConfederateGuards ResponseBn

Hodgson’s la Bat-tery, WashingtonArtillery

3rd bde(Pond)

16th la

18th la

(la) Crescent Regiment

(la) Orleans Guard Bn

38th tn

Ketchum’s alBattery

2nd Division (Withers)

II Corps (Bragg)

1st Division (Ruggles)

1st bde( Johnson)

Blythe’s ms Bn

2nd tn

15th tn

154th tn (senior)

Polk’s tn Battery

2nd bde(Stephens)

7th ky

1st tn Bn

6th tn

9th tn

Smith’s ms Battery

cavalry: 1st ms; ms and al Bn

unattached: 47th tn (arrived on April 7)

2nd Division (Cheatham)

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155 Orders of Battle

1st bde(Trabue)

4th al Bn

31st al

3rd ky

4th ky

5th ky

6th ky

tn Bn (Crews)

Byrne’s ms Battery

Lyon’s (Cobb’s) kyBattery

2nd bde(Bowen)

9th ar

10th ar

1st mo

2nd Confederate

Hudson’s ms Bat-tery

Watson’s laBattery

3rd bde(Statham)

15th ms

22nd ms

19th tn

20th tn

28th tn

45th tn

Rutledge’s tnBattery

unattached: Forrest’s tn Cavalry; Wharton’s tx Cavalry;Adams’s ms Cavalry; McClung’s tn Battery; Roberts’s ar Battery

1st bde(Hindman)

2nd ar

5th ar

6th ar

7th ar

3rd Confederate

Miller’s tn Battery

Swett’s ms Battery

2nd bde(Cleburne)

15th ar

6th ms

2nd tn (Provi-sional)

5th (35th) tn

23rd tn

24th tn

Shoup’s ar Ar-tillery Bn

3rd bde(Wood)

16th al

8th ar

9th (14th) ar Bn

3rd ms Bn

27th tn

44th tn

55th tn

Harper’s msBattery

Reserve Corps (Breckinridge)

III Corps (Hardee)

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Appendix C: Organization, Weapons, and Tactics

You will get much more from your battlefield tour if you take

a few minutes to become familiar with the following infor-

mation and then refer to it as necessary.

The Organization of Civil War Armies

Following is a diagram of the typical organization, and range

of strength, of a Civil War army:

Note: The Union army at Shiloh had no corps organizations.

Both Grant’s and Buell’s armies were composed of several di-

visions reporting directly to army headquarters.

The Basic Battlefield Functions of Civil War Leaders

In combat environments the duties of Civil War leaders di-

vided into two main parts: decision making and moral sua-

sion. Although the scope of the decisions varied according to

rank and responsibilities, they generally dealt with the move-

ment and deployment of troops, artillery, and logistical sup-

port (signal detachments, wagon trains, and so on). Most of

the decisions were made by the officer himself, whose staff

helped with administrative paperwork but in combat func-

tioned essentially as glorified clerks; they did almost nothing

in the way of sifting intelligence or planning operations. Once

made, the decisions were transmitted to subordinates either

by direct exchange or by courier, with the courier either car-

rying a written order or conveying the order orally. More

rarely, signal flags were used to send instructions. Except in

siege operations, when the battle lines were fairy static, the

telegraph was almost never used in tactical situations.

Moral suasion is the art of persuading troops to perform

their duties and dissuading them from a failure to perform

army(40,000–120,000 men)

corps(10,000–30,000 men)

division(3,000–8,000 men)



brigade(1,500–3,000 men)



regiment(300–800 men)

corps(10,000–30,000 men)

corps(10,000–30,000 men)





11-N3554-APC 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 156

them. Civil War commanders often accomplished this by per-

sonal example, and conspicuous bravery was a vital attribute

of any good leader. It is therefore not surprising that 8 per-

cent of Union generals—and 18 percent of their Confederate

counterparts—were killed or mortally wounded in action.

(By contrast, only about 3 percent of Union enlisted men

were killed or mortally wounded in action.)

Although any leader might be called upon to intervene di-

rectly on the firing line, army, corps, and division command-

ers tended to direct from behind the battle line, and their du-

ties were mainly supervisory. In all three cases their main

ability to influence the fighting, once it was underway, was

by the husbanding and judicious commitment of troops held

in reserve.

Army commanders principally decided the broad ques-

tions—whether to attack or defend, where the army’s main

effort(s) would be made, and when to retreat (or pursue). In

effect they made most of their key choices before and after

an engagement rather than during it. Once battle was actu-

ally joined, their ability to influence the outcome dimin-

ished considerably. They might choose to wait it out or they

might choose, temporarily and informally, to exercise the

function of a lesser leader. In various Civil War battles, army

commanders conducted themselves in all sorts of ways: as de-

tached observers, “super” corps commanders, division com-

manders, and so on, all the way down to de facto colonels,

trying to lead through personal example.

Corps commanders chiefly directed main attacks or super-

vised the defense of large, usually well-defined, sectors. It was

their function to carry out the broad (or occasionally quite

specific) wishes of the army commander. They coordinated

all the elements of their corps (typically infantry divisions

and artillery battalions) in order to maximize its offensive or

defensive strength. Once battle was actually joined, they

influenced the outcome by “feeding” additional troops into

the fight—sometimes by preserving a reserve force (usually a

division) and committing it at the appropriate moment,

sometimes by requesting additional support from adjacent

corps or from the army commander.

Division commanders essentially had the same functions as

corps commanders, though on a smaller scale. When attack-

ing, however, their emphasis was less on “feeding” a fight

than keeping the striking power of their divisions as com-

pact as possible. The idea was to strike one hard blow rather

than a series of weaker ones.

The following commanders were expected to control the

actual combat—to close with and destroy the enemy:

157 Organization, Weapons, and Tactics

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Brigade commanders principally conducted the actual busi-

ness of attacking or defending. They accompanied the at-

tacking force in person or stayed on the firing line with the

defenders. Typically they placed about three of their regi-

ments abreast of one another, with about two in immediate

support. Their job was basically to maximize the fighting

power of their brigades by ensuring that these regiments had

an unobstructed field of fire and did not overlap. During an

attack it often became necessary to expand, contract, or oth-

erwise modify the brigade frontage to adapt to the vagaries

of terrain, the movements of adjacent friendly brigades,

and/or the behavior of enemy forces. It was the brigade com-

mander’s responsibility to shift his regiments as needed

while preserving, if possible, the unified striking power of

the brigade.

Regiment commanders were chiefly responsible for making

their men do as the brigade commanders wished, and their

independent authority on the battlefield was quite limited.

For example, if defending they might order a limited coun-

terattack, but they usually could not order a retreat without

approval from higher authority. Assisted by company com-

manders, they directly supervised the soldiers, giving specific,

highly concrete commands: move this way or that, hold your

ground, fire by volley, forward, and so on. Commanders at

this level were expected to lead by personal example and to

display as well as demand strict adherence to duty.

Civil War Tactics

Civil War armies basically had three kinds of combat troops:

infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Infantrymen fought on foot,

each with his own weapon. Cavalrymen were trained to fight

on horseback or dismounted, also with their own individual

weapons. Artillerymen fought with cannon.

infantry

Infantry were by far the most numerous part of a Civil War

army and were chiefly responsible for seizing and holding

ground.

The basic Civil War tactic was to put a lot of men next to

one another in a line and have them move and shoot to-

gether. By present-day standards the notion of placing troops

shoulder to shoulder seems insane, but it still made good

sense in the mid-nineteenth century. There were two reasons

for this: First, it allowed soldiers to concentrate the fire of

what were still rather limited weapons. Second, it was almost

the only way to move troops effectively under fire.

Most Civil War infantrymen used muzzle-loading muskets

158 Appendix C

11-N3554-APC 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 158

capable of being loaded and fired a maximum of about three

times a minute. Individually, therefore, a soldier was noth-

ing. He could affect the battlefield only by combining his fire

with that of other infantrymen. Although spreading out

made them less vulnerable, infantrymen very quickly lost

the ability to combine their fire effectively if they did so. Even

more critically, their officers rapidly lost the ability to con-

trol them.

For most purposes, the smallest tactical unit on a Civil

War battlefield was the regiment. Theoretically composed of

about 1,000 officers and men, in reality the average Civil War

regiment went into battle with about 300– 600 men. What-

ever its size, though, all members of the regiment had to be

able to understand and carry out the orders of their colonel

and subordinate officers, who generally could communicate

only through voice command. Since in the din and confusion

of battle, only a few soldiers could actually hear any given

command, most got the message chiefly by conforming to

the movements of the men immediately around them. Main-

taining “touch of elbows”—the prescribed close interval—

was indispensable for this crude but vital system to work. In

addition, infantrymen were trained to “follow the flag”—the

unit and national colors were always conspicuously placed in

the front and center of each regiment. Thus, when in doubt

as to what maneuver the regiment was trying to carry out,

soldiers could look to see the direction in which the colors

were moving. That is one major reason why the post of color

bearer was habitually given to the bravest men in the unit. It

was not just an honor, it was insurance that the colors would

always move in the direction desired by the colonel.

En route to a battle area, regiments typically moved in a

column formation, four men abreast. There was a simple ma-

neuver whereby regiments could very rapidly change from

column to line—that is, from a formation designed for ease

of movement to a formation designed to maximize fire-

power— once on the battlefield. Regiments normally moved

and fought in line of battle—a close-order formation actually

composed of two lines, front and rear. Attacking units rarely

“charged” in the sense of running full-tilt toward the enemy;

such a maneuver would promptly destroy the formation as

faster men outstripped slower ones and everyone spread out.

Instead a regiment using orthodox tactics would typically

step off on an attack moving at a “quick time” rate of 110

steps per minute (at which it would cover about 85 yards per

minute). Once under serious fire the rate of advance might be

increased to a “double-quick time” of 165 steps per minute

(about 150 yards per minute). Only when the regiment was


11-N3554-APC 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 159

within a few dozen yards of the defending line would the

regiment be ordered to advance at a “run” (a very rapid pace

but still not a sprint). Thus a regiment might easily take

about ten minutes to “charge” 1,000 yards, even if it did not

pause for realignment or execute any further maneuvers

along the way.

In theory an attacking unit would not stop until it reached

the enemy line, if even then. The idea was to force back the

defenders through the size, momentum, and shock effect of

the attacking column. (Fixed bayonets were considered in-

dispensable for maximizing the desired shock effect). In re-

ality, however, the firepower of the defense eventually led

most Civil War regiments to stop and return the fire— often

at ranges of less than 100 yards. And very often the “charge”

would turn into a stand-up firefight at murderously short

range until one side or the other gave way.

It is important to bear in mind that the above represents a

simplified idea of Civil War infantry combat. As you will see

as you visit specific stops here at Shiloh, the reality could

vary significantly.

artillery

Second in importance to infantry on most Civil War battle-

fields was the artillery. Not yet the “killing arm” it would be-

come during World War I, when 70 percent of all casualties

would be inflicted by shellfire, artillery nevertheless played

an important role, particularly on the defense. Cannon fire

could break up an infantry attack or dissuade enemy in-

fantry from attacking in the first place. Its mere presence

could also reassure friendly infantry and so exert a moral ef-

fect that might be as important as its physical effect on the

enemy.

The basic artillery unit was the battery, a group of between

four and six fieldpieces commanded by a captain. Early in the

war batteries tended to be attached to infantry brigades. But

over time it was found that they worked best when massed

together, and both the Union and Confederate armies

presently reorganized their artillery to facilitate this. Even-

tually both sides maintained extensive concentrations of ar-

tillery at corps-level or higher. Coordinating the fire of 20 or

30 guns on a single target was not unusual, and occasionally

(as in the bombardment that preceded Pickett’s Charge at

Gettysburg) concentrations of well over 100 guns might be

achieved.

Practically all Civil War fieldpieces were muzzle loaded

and superficially appeared little changed from their coun-

160 Appendix C

11-N3554-APC 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 160

terparts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In fact,

however, Civil War artillery was quite modern in two re-

spects. First, advances in metallurgy had resulted in cannon

barrels that were much lighter than their predecessors but

strong enough to contain more powerful charges. Thus,

whereas the typical fieldpiece of the Napoleonic era fired a 6-

pound round, the typical Civil War–era fieldpiece fired a

round double that size, with no loss in ease of handling. Sec-

ond, recent improvements had resulted in the development

of practical rifled fieldpieces that had significantly greater

range and accuracy than their smoothbore counterparts.

Civil War fieldpieces could fire a variety of shell types,

each with its own preferred usage. Solid shot was considered

best for battering down structures and for use against

massed troops (a single round could sometimes knock down

several men like ten pins). Shell—hollow rounds that con-

tained an explosive charge and burst into fragments when

touched off by a time fuse—were used to set buildings afire

or to attack troops behind earthworks or under cover. Spheri-

cal case was similar to shell except that each round contained

musket balls (78 in a 12-pound shot, 38 in a 6-pound shot); it

was used against bodies of troops moving in the open at

ranges of from 500 to 1,500 yards. At ranges of below 500

yards, the round of choice was canister, essentially a metal

can containing about 27 cast-iron balls, each 1.5 inches in di-

ameter. As soon as a canister round was fired, the sides of the

can would rip away and the cast-iron balls would fly directly

into the attacking infantry or ricochet into them off the

ground, making the cannon essentially a large-scale shotgun.

In desperate situations double and sometimes even triple

charges of canister were used.

As recently as the Mexican War, artillery had been used ef-

fectively on the offensive, with fieldpieces rolling forward to

advanced positions from which they could blast a hole in the

enemy line. The advent of the rifled musket, however, made

this tactic dangerous—defending infantry could now pick off

artillerists who dared to come so close—and so the artillery

had to remain farther back. In theory the greater range and

accuracy of rifled cannon might have offset this a bit, but

rifled cannon fired comparatively small shells of limited ef-

fectiveness against infantry at a distance. The preferred use of

artillery on the offensive was therefore not against infantry,

but against other artillery—what was termed “counterbat-

tery work.” The idea was to mass one’s own cannon against a

few of the enemy’s cannon and systematically fire so as to kill

the enemy’s artillerists and dismount his fieldpieces.


11-N3554-APC 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 161

cavalry

“Whoever saw a dead cavalryman?” was a byword among

Civil War soldiers, a pointed allusion to the fact that the

battlefield role played by the mounted arm was often negli-

gible. For example, at the battle of Antietam—the bloodiest

single day of the entire war—the Union cavalry suffered ex-

actly 5 men killed and 23 wounded. This was in sharp con-

trast to the role played by horsemen during the Napoleonic

era, when a well-timed cavalry charge could exploit an in-

fantry breakthrough, overrun the enemy’s retreating foot

soldiers, and convert a temporary advantage into a complete

battlefield triumph.

Why the failure to use cavalry to better tactical advan-

tage? The best single explanation might be the fact that for

much of the war, there was simply not enough of it to

achieve significant results. Whereas cavalry had comprised

20–25 percent of Napoleonic armies, in Civil War armies it

generally averaged 8–10 percent or less. The paucity of cav-

alry may be explained in turn by its much greater expense

compared with infantry. A single horse might easily cost ten

times the monthly pay of a Civil War private and necessitated

the purchase of saddles, bridles, stirrups, and other gear as

well as specialized clothing and equipment for the rider.

Moreover, horses required about 26 pounds of feed and for-

age per day, many times the requirement of an infantryman.

One might add to this the continual need for remounts to re-

place worn-out animals and the fact that it took far more

training to make an effective cavalryman than an effective

infantryman, as well as the widespread belief that the

heavily wooded terrain of North America would limit oppor-

tunities to use cavalry on the battlefield. All in all it is per-

haps no wonder that Civil War armies were late in creating

really powerful mounted arms.

Instead cavalry tended to be used mainly for scouting and

raiding, duties that took place away from the main battle-

fields. During major engagements their mission was princi-

pally to screen the flanks or to control the rear areas. By 1863,

however, the North was beginning to create cavalry forces

sufficiently numerous and well armed to play a significant

role on the battlefield. At Gettysburg, for example, Union cav-

alrymen armed with rapid-fire breach-loading carbines were

able to hold a Confederate infantry division at bay for several

hours. At Cedar Creek in 1864, a massed cavalry charge late

in the day completed the ruin of the Confederate army. And

during the Appomattox campaign in 1865, Federal cavalry

played a decisive role in bringing Lee’s retreating army to bay

and forcing its surrender.

162 Appendix C

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Appreciation of the Terrain

The whole point of a battlefield tour is to see the ground over

which men actually fought. Understanding the terrain is ba-

sic to understanding almost every aspect of a battle. It helps

explain why commanders deployed their troops where they

did, why attacks occurred in certain areas and not in others,

and why some attacks succeeded and others did not.

When defending, Civil War leaders often looked for

positions with as many of the following characteristics as

possible:

First, it obviously had to be ground from which they could protect

whatever it was they were ordered to defend.

Second, it should be elevated enough so as to provide good obser-

vation and good fields of fire—they wanted to see as far as possible

and sometimes (though not always) to shoot as far as possible. The

highest ground was not necessarily the best, however, for it often af-

forded an attacker defilade—areas of lower ground that the defend-

ers’ weapons could not reach. For that reason leaders seldom placed

their troops at the very top of a ridge or hill (the “geographical

crest”). Instead they placed them a bit forward of the geographical

crest at a point from which they had the best field of fire (the “mili-

tary crest”). Alternatively they might even choose to place their

troops behind the crest. This concealed the size and exact deployment

of the defenders from the enemy and offered protection from long-

range fire. It also meant that an attacker, upon reaching the crest,

would be silhouetted against the sky and susceptible to a sudden, po-

tentially destructive fire at close range.

Third, the ground adjacent to the chosen position should present

a potential attacker with obstacles. Streams and ravines made good

obstructions because they required an attacker to halt temporarily

while trying to cross them. Fences and boulder fields could also slow

an attacker. Dense woodlands could do the same but offered conceal-

ment for potential attackers and were therefore less desirable. In ad-

dition to its other virtues, elevated ground was also prized because

attackers moving uphill had to exert themselves more and got tired

faster. Obstacles were especially critical at the ends of a unit’s posi-

tion—the flanks—if there were no other units beyond to protect them.

That is why commanders “anchored” their flanks, whenever possible,

on hills or the banks of large waterways.

Fourth, it must offer ease of access for reinforcements to arrive

and, if necessary, for the defenders to retreat.

Fifth, a source of drinkable water—the more the better—should

be immediately behind the position if possible. This was especially

important for cavalry and artillery units, which had horses to think

about as well as men.


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When attacking, Civil War commanders looked for differ-

ent things:

First, they looked for weaknesses in the enemy’s position, especially

“unanchored” flanks. If there were no obvious weaknesses, they

looked for a key point in the enemy’s position— often a piece of ele-

vated ground whose loss would render the rest of the defensive line

untenable.

Second, they searched for ways to get close to the enemy position

without being observed. Using woodlands and ridgelines to screen

their movements was a common tactic.

Third, they looked for open, elevated ground on which they could

deploy artillery to “soften up” the point to be attacked.

Fourth, once the attack was underway, they tried, when possible,

to find areas of defilade in which their troops could gain relief from

exposure to enemy fire. Obviously it was almost never possible to find

defilade that offered protection all the way to the enemy line, but

leaders could often find some point en route where they could pause

briefly to “dress” their lines.

Making the best use of terrain was an art that almost al-

ways involved tradeoffs among these various factors—and

also required consideration of the number of troops avail-

able. Even a very strong position was vulnerable if there were

not enough men to defend it. A common error among Civil

War generals, for example, was to stretch their line too thin

in order to hold an otherwise desirable piece of ground.

Estimating Distance

When touring Civil War battlefields, it is often helpful to

have a general sense of distance. This can help you, for ex-

ample, estimate how long it took troops to get from point A

to point B or to visualize the points at which they would have

become vulnerable to different kinds of artillery fire. There

are several easy tricks to bear in mind:

— Use reference points for which the exact distance is known. Many

battlefield stops give you the exact distance to one or more key

sites in the area. Locate such a reference point, then try to divide

the intervening terrain into equal parts. For instance, say the ref-

erence point is 800 yards away. The ground about halfway in be-

tween will be 400 yards; the ground halfway between yourself and

the midway point will be 200 yards, and so on.

— Use the football field method. Visualize the length of a football

field, which of course is about 100 yards. Then estimate the num-

ber of football fields you could put between yourself and the dis-

tant point of interest.

164 Appendix C

11-N3554-APC 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 164

— Use cars, houses, and other common objects that tend to be roughly

the same size. Most cars are about the same size and so are many

houses. Become familiar with how large or small such objects ap-

pear at various distances—300 yards, 1,000 yards, 2,000 yards,

and such. This is a less accurate way of estimating distance, but

it can be helpful if the lay of the land makes it otherwise hard

to tell whether a point is near or far. Look for such objects that

seem a bit in front of the point. Their relative size can provide a

useful clue.

Maximum Effective Ranges of Common Civil War Weapons

Rifled musket 400 yds.

Smoothbore musket 150 yds.

Breech-loading carbine 300 yds.

Napoleon 12-pounder smoothbore cannon

Solid shot 1,700 yds.

Shell 1,300 yds.

Spherical case 500–1,500 yds.

Canister 400 yds.

Parrott 10-pounder rifled cannon


3-inch ordnance rifle (cannon)


Further Reading

Coggins, Jack. Arms and Equipment of the Civil War. 1962; re-

print, Wilmington nc: Broadfoot, 1990. The best introduc-

tion to the subject: engagingly written, profusely illus-

trated, and packed with information.

Griffith, Paddy. Battle Tactics of the Civil War. New Haven ct:

Yale University Press, 1989. Argues that in a tactical sense,

the Civil War was more nearly the last great Napoleonic

war rather than the first modern war. In Griffith’s view the

influence of the rifled musket on Civil War battlefields has

been exaggerated; the carnage and inconclusiveness of

many Civil War battles owed less to the inadequacy of Na-

poleonic tactics than to a failure to properly understand

and apply them.

Jamieson, Perry D. Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States

Army Tactics, 1865–1899. Tuscaloosa: University of Ala-

bama Press, 1994. The early chapters offer a good analysis

of the tactical lessons learned by U.S. Army officers from

their Civil War experiences.

Linderman, Gerald F. Embattled Courage: The Experience of Com-

bat in the American Civil War. New York: Free Press, 1987.

This thoughtful, well-written study examines how Civil


11-N3554-APC 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 165

War soldiers understood and coped with the challenges of

the battlefield.

McWhiney, Grady, and Perry D. Jamieson. Attack and Die: Civil

War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage. Tuscaloosa:

University of Alabama Press, 1982. Although unconvinc-

ing in its assertion that their Celtic heritage led Southern-

ers to take the offensive to an inordinate degree, this is an

excellent tactical study that emphasizes the revolutionary

effect of the rifled musket. Best read in combination with

Griffith above.

166 Appendix C

A Union battery taken by surprise. blcw 1:598

11-N3554-APC 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 166

Sources

Shortened titles given here are listed in full in section “For

Further Reading.”

Stop 1 (Pittsburg Landing): (a) William T. Sherman, Memoirs of Gen-

eral William T. Sherman, 2 vols. in 1 (1875; Bloomington: Indi-

ana University Press, 1957), 1 :229; (b) Maj. H. M. Dillard,

quoted in Eyewitnesses at the Battle of Shiloh, ed. David R. Logs-

don (Nashville: Kettle Mills, 1994), 3.

Stop 2 (Shiloh Church): Sword, Shiloh, 124 (first quote); Daniel,

Shiloh, 137 (second quote); U.S. War Department, The War of the

Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128

vols. (Washington >dc: Government Printing Office, 1881–

1901), vol. 10, pt. 1, 89 (third quote) [hereinafter cited as OR;

all references are to series 1].

Stop 3 (Fraley Field): (b) G. T. Beauregard, “The Campaign of Shiloh,”

in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. C. C. Buel and R. U.

Johnson, 4 vols. (New York: Century, 1887), 1 :579 (first quote);

OR, 10, pt. 1, 89 (second quote); (c ) William Preston Johnston,

“Albert Sidney Johnston at Shiloh,” in Battles and Leaders,

1 :555, 556, 553 (first, second, and third quotes); John Keegan,

The Mask of Command (New York: Viking Penguin, 1987), 329

(fourth quote).

Stop 4 (Peabody’s Battle Line): Logsdon, Eyewitnesses, 15.

Stop 5 (Peabody’s Camp): OR, vol. 10, pt. 1, 283 (first quote); Logsdon,

Eyewitnesses, 18 (second and third quotes).

East Stop 6 (Spain Field): (a) Daniel, Shiloh, 152 (first quote); Sword, Shiloh,

158 (second quote); (c) Logsdon, Eyewitnesses, 17 (first quote);

Daniel, Shiloh, 196 (second quote).

East Stop 9 (The Peach Orchard): (a) Daniel, Shiloh, 192 (first quote);

Sword, Shiloh, 235 (second quote); (e) Daniel, Shiloh, 217 (first

quote); Sword, Shiloh, 263– 64 (second quote).

Hornets’ Nest (a) OR, vol. 10, pt. 1, 235; (b) U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of

Excursion U. S. Grant, 2 vols. (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1885), 1 :340;

(d) OR, vol. 10, pt. 1, 480, 488 (first and second quotes); Daniel,

Shiloh, 213 (third quote); (f ) OR, vol. 10, pt. 1, 150; (g) Sword,

Shiloh, 292 (first quote); Tony Horwitz, Confederates in the Attic:

Dispatches from the Unfinished Civil War (New York: Pantheon,

1998), 178 (second quote).

12-N3554-REF 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 167

East Stop 11 (Johnston’s Death): Johnston, “Albert Sidney Johnston at

Shiloh,” 564– 65.

West Stop 6 (Rea Field): OR, 10, pt. 1, 264.

West Stop 8 (Ridge near Shiloh Church): (a) OR, vol. 10, pt. 1, 581;

(b) Thomas W. Connelly, History of the Seventieth Ohio Regiment

(Cincinnati: Peak Bros., n.d.), 22.

West Stop 9 (On the Hamburg-Purdy Road): (a) Ira Blanchard, I Marched

with Sherman: Civil War Memoirs of the 20th Illinois Volunteer In-

fantry (San Francisco: J. D. Huff, 1992), 54; (b) Lucius W. Barber,

Army Memoirs of Lucius W. Barber, Company “D,” 15th Illinois Vol-

unteer Infantry (Chicago: J. M. W. Jones, 1894), 52–53.

West Stop 10 (Review Field): (a) Daniel, Shiloh, 179; (b) Luther H. Cowan to

Harriet Cowan, Apr. 27, 1862, Luther H. Cowan Papers, State

Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison; (c) Nesbitt Baugher

to “Dear Father,” Apr. 9, 1862, Cowan Papers.

West Stop 11 (McClernand’s Camps): (a) Johnny Green, Johnny Green of the Or-

phan Brigade: The Journal of a Confederate Soldier, ed. A. D. Kir-

wan (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1956), 26;

(b) Statement of Dr. Reilly, assistant surgeon of the 45th Illi-

nois, in Warren [Ill.] Independent, Apr. 22, 1862, Cowan Papers.

West Stop 13 (Hell’s Hollow): (a) Daniel, Shiloh, 230; (b) Sword, Shiloh, 441.

Stop 14 (Grant’s Last Line): (a) Daniel, Shiloh, 253; (b) Daniel, Shiloh,

254–55 (quote); (c) Daniel, Shiloh, 249 (both quotes).

East Stop 15 (Line of Departure): OR, vol. 10, pt. 1, 355.

East Stop 16 (Wicker Field): Daniel, Shiloh, 268.

East Stop 17 (Bloody Pond): OR, vol. 10, pt. 1, 534 (first quote); Sword,

Shiloh, 389 (second quote); OR, vol. 10, pt. 1, 374–75 (third

quote).

West Stop 15 (Lew Wallace’s Approach): (a) Stacy Allen, “If He Had Less

Rank: Lew Wallace and Ulysses S. Grant,” in Grant’s Lieu-

tenants: From Cairo to Vicksburg, ed. Steven E. Woodworth (Law-

rence: University Press of Kansas, 2001); (b) Johann Stuber,

Mein Tagebuch ueber die Erlebnisse im Revolutions-Kriege (Cincin-

nati: S. Rosenthal, 1896), 22–23.

168 Sources

12-N3554-REF 11/10/05 5:30 AM Page 168

West Stop 16 (Tilghman Branch): (a) Silas T. Grisamore, The Civil War Remi-

niscences of Major Silas T. Grisamore, ed. Arthur W. Bergeron Jr.

(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993), 38; (b)

undated letter, R. W. Burt Letters, Western Historical Manu-

script Collection, 23 Ellis Library, University of Missouri–

Columbia; (c) letter from Capt. S. M. Emmons, Lt. J. H. H.

Hunter, and Lt. F. Morrison, East Liverpool (Ohio) Mercury

May 15, 1862, 2.

West Stop 17 ( Jones Field): (a) OR, vol. 10, pt. 1, 171; (b) letter from Capt.

S. M. Emmons, Lt. J. H. H. Hunter, and Lt. F. Morrison, East Liv-

erpool (Ohio) Mercury May 15, 1862, 2.

West Stop 18 (Sowell Field): OR, vol. 10, pt. 1, 627.

West Stop 19 (Water Oaks Pond): (a) OR, vol. 10, pt. 1, 251; (b) George Rogers

to “My Dear Friend,” Apr. 12, 1862, Wiley Sword private col-

lection, printed in In Camp on the Rappahannock: The Newsletter

of the Blue & Gray Education Society 4, no. 2, Fall 1998, 14.

Appendix A (The Union and Confederate Commands on April 6): Daniel,

Shiloh, 174 (first quote); OR, vol. 10, pt. 2, 95 (second quote);

Daniel, Shiloh, 176; Thomas Jordan, “Notes of a Confederate

Staff-Officer at Shiloh,” Battles and Leaders, 1 :599– 600 (third

quote); Daniel, Shiloh, 209 (fourth quote); Stephen D. Engle,

Don Carlos Buell: Most Promising of All (Chapel Hill: University

of North Carolina Press, 1999), 217 (fifth quote); OR, vol. 10,

pt. 1, 332 (sixth quote); Sherman, Memoirs, 1 :246 (seventh

quote).

169 Sources

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Beating the long roll. blcw 4:179

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For Further Reading

Allen, Stacy D. “Shiloh!: A Visitor’s Guide.” Columbus oh:

Blue & Gray, 2001. Written by the Shiloh National Military

Park historian, this excellent brief survey is a revision of

two articles originally published in the February 1997 and

April 1997 issues of Blue & Gray Magazine. It includes not

only a well-illustrated narrative of the campaign and

battle but also detailed tours of the Confederate approach

march from Corinth to Shiloh, Nelson’s march to Pittsburg

Landing, Lew Wallace’s ill-fated march to the battlefield,

and the postbattle rear-guard action at Fallen Timbers.

Highly recommended.

Daniel, Larry J. Shiloh: The Battle that Changed the Civil War. New

York: Simon and Schuster, 1997. This most recent study of

Shiloh builds on the work of McDonough and Sword while

based on deep archival research of its own. It is the best

starting point for those interested in a thorough explo-

ration of the battle.

Engle, Stephen D. Struggle for the Heartland: The Campaigns from

Fort Henry to Corinth. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,

2001. This concise, reliable study places the Shiloh cam-

paign within the context of western-theater operations

from February through June 1862.

Foote, Shelby. Shiloh. 1954; reprint, New York: Vintage, 1991.

Despite some minor historical missteps, this is a generally

accurate, well-crafted, and gripping novel about the

battle, told through the eyes of numerous participants.

Frank, Joseph Allan, and George Reeves. “Seeing the Elephant”:

Raw Recruits at the Battle of Shiloh. Westport ct: Greenwood,

1989. An interesting study based on a close reading of hun-

dreds of first person accounts by common soldiers in the

battle.

McDonough, James Lee. Shiloh: In Hell before Night. Knoxville:

University of Tennessee Press, 1977. A good strategic over-

view, but it is brief, almost cursory, in its treatment of the

tactical details. McDonough faults Beauregard for his fail-

ure to press home the Confederate assault after Johnston’s

death.

Sword, Wiley. Shiloh: Bloody April. 1974; reprint, Dayton oh:

Morningside, 1988. Comparable in depth to Daniel and

much more detailed than McDonough, Sword primarily

blames Johnston for the Confederate loss.

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Reveille. blcw 4:475

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In This Hallowed Ground: Guides to the Civil War Battlefields series

Chickamauga: A Battlefield Guide

with a section on Chattanooga

Steven E. Woodworth

Gettysburg: A Battlefield Guide

Mark Grimsley and Brooks D. Simpson

Shiloh: A Battlefield Guide

Mark Grimsley and Steven E. Woodworth

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Feeling the enemy. blcw 3:224

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