Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc.
Disarmament and International Security
Rise of Terrorism
Director: Ian Liberty
© 2010 Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc. (IDIA)
This document is solely for use in preparation for Philadelphia Model United Nations 2010. Use for other purposes is not
permitted without the express written consent of IDIA. For more information, please write us at [email protected]
Policy Dilemma ______________________________________________________________ 1
Chronology__________________________________________________________________ 3 2001 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 _________________________________ 3 2003 - Canal Hotel Bombings in Baghdad _____________________________________________ 4 2004 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 _________________________________ 4 2006 - Bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque______________________________________________ 5 2006 - Israel-Hezbollah War ________________________________________________________ 5 2007 - Lebanon Civil Conflict _______________________________________________________ 6 2007-2008 - Turkish Invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan _______________________________________ 7 2008 - Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul _____________________________________________ 7 2008-2009 - Gaza War _____________________________________________________________ 8
Possible Causes ______________________________________________________________ 9 Post-Colonial Politics and Separatism ________________________________________________ 9 Community Infrastructure and Poverty______________________________________________ 10 Socioeconomic Policies & Globalization ______________________________________________ 11 Comparison of Causes ____________________________________________________________ 12
Actors & Interests____________________________________________________________ 12 States in Civil Conflict ____________________________________________________________ 12 Insurgent Groups ________________________________________________________________ 14 State Sponsors of Terrorism _______________________________________________________ 15 Target States ____________________________________________________________________ 15 Developed States _________________________________________________________________ 16 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) ___________________________________________ 18
Projections & Implications ____________________________________________________ 19
Conclusion _________________________________________________________________ 20
Bibliography________________________________________________________________ 22 Further Reading _________________________________________________________________ 22 Works Cited_____________________________________________________________________ 23 Works Consulted_________________________________________________________________ 27
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Policy Dilemma The United Nations (UN) Security Council currently defines terrorism as any
criminal act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury, or provoke a state of terror,
with the purpose to “intimidate a population or compel a government or international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”1 While the definition of terrorism
itself is highly debated among the international community, its methods and consequent
effects are much more evident. Terrorism aims to terminate political processes and
produce dissension as a means of forcing change.2 Thus, terrorism not only costs the lives
of civilians and destroys community infrastructure, it also threatens the foundations of
state institutions – the prospect of which hinders regional cooperation and endangers
international security.
Although terrorism in the Middle East is certainly not a new phenomenon, it has
become progressively worse over the last decade. Since the inception of the United
States’ War on Terror, the lack of stability in Iraq has resonated through the region.
Organizations like Al-Qaida have been at the forefront of terrorist attacks. While large
organizations, such as Al-Qaida, have served as the face for the terrorist attacks, smaller,
more localized, affiliations and criminal organizations have also been active participants.3
In particular, insurgent identity groups and militias have both engaged in sectarian and
intra-communal violence.
Even though the number of individual terrorist attacks has decreased in the past
few years, the threat of terrorist activity continues to plague state security and instill fear
among the general population. In the Middle East, Iraq remains at the center of most
terrorist affiliated incidents, as insurgents groups fight against the Iraqi government and
1 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566 (2004), United Nations, http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9969713.09185028.html (accessed 27 December 2009). 2 Bureau of International Information Programs, “State Department on Terrorism in the Middle East, North Africa,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/April/20080430121233eaifas0.4066278.html (accessed 27 December 2009). 3 Ibid.
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coalition forces. The most common modes of attacks have been through improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), including vehicle-borne ones, and suicide bombers.4 Other
terror campaigns in the region have been directed towards Israel, whose targets face
terrorist threats from the West Bank and Gaza. In Lebanon, insurgent groups assassinated
several key political figures to intimidate pro-government forces and shape the numerical
composition of parliament.5 Terrorist activity has also recommenced in Turkey, where
Kurdish rebels in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) are engaged in armed conflict
with the state.
The rise of terrorism in the Middle East is a multifaceted issue that requires
immediate response. Cross-border terror activities in particular require regional
cooperation, as they destabilize the entire region. Indeed, terrorism has a plethora of
effects on the socioeconomic infrastructure of a society. In response to terrorist threats
and incidents, states have begun to allocate a significant portion of their funds toward
military preparation and action.6 This often entails a shift in monetary resources from the
social sector into the armed forces, which weakens social systems like health and
education. As a result, communities begin to deteriorate and children become vulnerable
to external influence, particularly in relation to insurgent groups. With anti-government
arguments and false promises, insurgents groups thus convince susceptible individuals
into supporting their cause – a reality that propagates the cycle of terrorism. If the
international community fails to prioritize the issue, the problems of a destabilized
Middle East will quickly spread to neighboring regions and cause even developed states
to incur socioeconomic devastation.
Responses toward terrorist activities thus far have mostly involved an increase in
security services, with states strengthening their capabilities to fight terrorism. With the
aid of developed states and international organizations, states like Iraq have attempted to
draft reconciliation related legislation and participate in antiterrorism assistance 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 James Phillips, “The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/BG1005.cfm (accessed 27 December 2009).
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programs, which aim to address issues between certain identity groups and strengthen
legal regimes.7 However, because some states covertly support terrorism by funding
specific organizations, it is important to consider both short and long-term solutions.
Chronology 2001 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373
Following the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States, the UN
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373 as a comprehensive document
outlining counter-terrorism measures against any such future incidents. Implemented
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows the Council to take direct action for
the restoration of international security, the resolution is binding for all UN member
states.8 Therefore, its passage signaled a shift in international law, as precedent had
originally dictated that only voluntary signatories were bound to UN treaties.
The resolution aims to prevent the organization and development of terrorist
groups, particularly in relation to fund-raising activities.9 It encourages member states to
publicize their information on terrorist groups for the purpose of thwarting international
terrorism. The landmark provision of the resolution calls upon member states to amend
their national laws as a means of ratifying international conventions on terrorism; it
specifies that states criminalize support for terrorist activities on all levels. In order to
monitor state compliance, the Security Council established the Counter Terrorism
Committee (CTC), which conducts assessments and offers procedural assistance.10
However, the CTC is more of a technical body because it does not have the ability to
sanction specific terrorist organizations or individuals. Although the resolution was
successful in facilitating transparency of information among states, it failed to define
7 Bureau of International Information Programs, 1. 8 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373 (2001), United Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1373(2001) (accessed 29 December 2009). 9 Ibid. 10 Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, “The Committee’s Mandate,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/aboutus.html (accessed 29 December 2009).
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terrorism and only included al-Qaida and the Taliban on the sanctions list.11 This allowed
states to interpret terrorism in their own perspectives, theoretically permitting some
authoritarian regimes to label nonviolent protests as terrorist acts.
2003 - Canal Hotel Bombings in Baghdad In August and September of 2003, Al-Qaeda organized the vehicle bombings of
the Canal Hotel in Baghdad, Iraq. The first suicide bombing targeted the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), which the Security Council had created days
earlier as means of incorporating the new Iraqi government into the international
community.12 The second attack led to the withdrawal of over 600 UN staff members
from Baghdad, along with members of other aid agencies; most of the UN branches in
Iraq were subsequently relocated to Jordan. Both blasts killed several UN officials,
including Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to
Iraq. The events hindered international efforts to rebuild Iraq and contributed to a
significant change in UN security protocol. With remote UN supervision, humanitarian
support within Iraq has primarily been through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
2004 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 After a series of terrorist attacks in Egypt, Iraq, and Pakistan, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1566 to reaffirm Resolution 1373. Unlike its predecessor, Resolution
1566 defined terrorism as: Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.13
In adopting such a definition, the Council established a working group to formulate
recommendations on measures to be imposed upon groups or individuals associated with
such activities. For example, the resolution calls for more effective procedures in
11 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373 (2001), 1. 12 Kim Ghattas, “Mixed Feelings Over UN Iraq Role,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6941560.stm (accessed 29 December 2009). 13 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566 (2004), United Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1566(2004) (accessed 29 December 2009).
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prosecuting involved entities, even recommending extradition.14 The resolution also
advocates that the aforementioned working group consider establishing an international
compensation fund for the victims of terrorist attacks and their families, though it does
not specify funding aside from the seized assets of terrorist organizations and related
affiliates.
2006 - Bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque In February 2006, a bomb detonated at the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, Iraq –
one of the holiest sites in Shia Islam. No organization has taken responsibility for the
attack, but al-Qaeda members confessed to taking part in the bombing.15 Though the
attack itself caused no injuries, the subsequent violence in the days after claimed
hundreds of lives. Shia rebels attacked Sunni mosques and kidnapped or murdered imams
throughout Iraq. In Shia majority cities, Shia terrorists tortured and killed Christian and
Sunni Muslim civilians, journalists, and men of Egyptian, Saudi, and Turkish
nationality.16 Iraqi officials feared that Iraq was on the brink of civil war and
consequently implemented a curfew in Baghdad and surrounding provinces. Despite such
measures, severe sectarian violence continued throughout Iraq, devastating infrastructure
and disrupting everyday life. The bombing demonstrated that the consequences of
terrorist activities, no matter the death toll, often times have greater long-term
implications. In this case, the bombing debilitated Iraq as a governing state, shaking the
already fragile foundations of the nation.
2006 - Israel-Hezbollah War The Israel-Hezbollah War, also known as the 2006 Lebanon War, began when
militants of Hezbollah, a Shia Islamist paramilitary organization in Lebanon, fired
14 Ibid. 15 “Letter May Detail Iraqi Insurgency’s Concerns,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/02/10/sprj.nirq.zarqawi/ (accessed 30 December 2009). 16 Robert F. Worth, “Blast Destroys Shrine in Iraq, Setting off Sectarian Fury,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/22/international/middleeast/22cnd-iraq.html?hp&ex=1140670800&en=1077baccd068bf6b&ei=5094&partner=homepage (accessed 30 December 2009).
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rockets at Israeli border towns. During the 34-day military conflict, Israel carried out
massive airstrikes on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon.17 Israeli actions called into question
the methods of fighting cross-border terrorism, as the event affected mostly Lebanese
civilians – in addition to claiming the lives over a thousand noncombatants, the conflict
severely damaged Lebanese infrastructure and displaced approximately one million
Lebanese and 300,000 Israelis. Although Security Council Resolution 1701 called for the
disarmament of Hezbollah, both the Lebanese government and the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) declined to do so, citing that such a move would be
unrealistic without reconstruction of the region.18
2007 - Lebanon Civil Conflict In May 2007, fighting broke between Fatah al-Islam, a Sunni Islamist militant
organization, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in Nahr al-Bared – a camp in
northern Lebanon that is part of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).19 When the insurgents refused to
surrender, thus spurring violence in surrounding refugee camps, the LAF staged a series
of counterattacks, eventually capturing the militant base in September. During this
period, militants of Fatah al-Islam bombed several commercial and residential locales in
Beirut. They also bombed a vehicle carrying personnel from UNIFIL, gathering support
from al-Qaeda.20 As the worst domestic conflict since the Lebanese Civil War, the
fighting not only devastated UNRWA camps but also forced the relocation of several
thousand Palestinians in Nahr al-Bared.21 Lebanese officials held Syria responsible for
supporting Fatah al-Islam and asked other Arab governments, as well as Western states,
to aid Lebanon through logistical and military equipment. 17 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1 (2006), UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45c30b6e0.html (accessed 30 December 2009). 18 Ibid. 19 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, “Archive for May 2007,” 2007 Lebanon Emergency, http://www.unrwa-lebanon.org/nle/?m=200705 (accessed 30 December 2009). 20 Al Jazeera, “Lebanon Blast Kills UNIFIL Troops,” Al Jazeera, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2007/06/2008525122010725840.html (accessed 30 December 2009). 21 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1.
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2007-2008 - Turkish Invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan Days after terminating a unilateral ceasefire with the Turkish government, the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) staged a suicide bombing in a commercial district of
Ankara, the state capital. The bombing occurred as several world leaders gathered in
Turkey for a NATO summit. Shortly after the incident, the Turkish military announced
that it would launch an incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan upon further hostilities, by which
time American troops withdrew from the area.22 Following another suicide bombing and
series of PKK attacks on army bases, Turkish troops launched a ground incursion into
northern Iraq. During this period, the PKK continued to bomb industrial and residential
areas in Turkey, killing both natives and tourists. Unlike its past undertakings, the PKK
also detonated an explosion over the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, halting the supply of
crude oil through the Caucus region for weeks and contributing to a rise in oil prices.23
The PKK terrorist attacks and consequent Turkish military response had widespread
effects; they not only destabilized the region but also the Turkish political system,
helping lead to a failed coup d’état attempt against the existing government.
2008 - Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul In July 2008, a suicide vehicle bombing took place outside the gates of the Indian
embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. The attack was the deadliest since the fall of the Taliban
and prompted a massive investigation by the intelligence agencies of Afghanistan, India,
and the United States.24 The findings of Afghan and Indian agencies had profound
implications on regional relations. The agencies reported that the embassy itself was the
main target, suggesting that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had planned the
22 Selcuk Gokoluk and Orhan Coskun, “Bomb in Turkish Capital Kills Six, Injures 80,” Reuters, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L22619461.htm (accessed 29 December 2009). 23 Alex Barker, “Kurds Lay Claim to Blast on Azeri Oil Pipeline,” Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4836dca-64e1-11dd-af61-0000779fd18c.html?nclick_check=1 (accessed 29 December 2009). 24 Somini Sengupta, “Afghan Bombing Sends Stark Message to India,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/world/asia/09india.html?_r=1 (accessed 30 December 2009).
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attack with either the Taliban or al-Qaida. While the Taliban denied any involvement,
Afghan officials insisted on the collaboration between an insurgent group and the ISI.
After reports of intercepted communication confirming such a relationship arose, U.S.
officials expressed their doubt as to the reliability of Pakistan as an ally in the American
War on Terror.25
Pakistan continued to deny such claims, but participated in bilateral talks with
India to discuss the incident and cross-border terrorism. Meanwhile, Indian defense
officials suggested that their government increase its military presence in Afghanistan.26
Because India already has contributed to Western counter-insurgency operations, other
officials believed that such involvement would jeopardize India’s socioeconomic
investments in the region. Though the joint meetings failed to produce a positive
identification of perpetrators, they demonstrated the importance of joint anti-terror
mechanisms in maintaining transparency and regional stability.
2008-2009 - Gaza War After the end of a ceasefire with Israel in December 2008, Hamas – a Palestinian
Islamist paramilitary organization – began a series of rocket attacks on Israeli towns.
During the three-week military conflict, Israel carried out massive airstrikes on the Gaza
Strip, with the aim of stopping Hamas terrorism.27 Like the Israel-Hezbollah War in
2006, Israeli actions called into question the methods of fighting cross-border terrorism,
as the event affected mostly Lebanese civilians. However, this time, the damages were
more intense and constituted a humanitarian crisis; more than a thousand Palestinian
civilians died and over 400,000 people in the region lacked running water and other basic
amenities. In September 2009, a UN mission produced a report – an unprecedented
25 Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world/asia/01pstan.html?hp (accessed 30 December 2009). 26 Sengupta, 1. 27 BBC, “Gaza ‘Looks Like Earthquake Zone,’” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7838618.stm (accessed 30 December 2009).
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publication in relation to the history of terrorism in the region – accusing both Palestinian
militants and Israeli defense forces of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity.28
Possible Causes Post-Colonial Politics and Separatism
Acts of terrorism, especially suicide bombing, are often associated with post-
modern war tactics brought by the imposition of Western colonial rule and its subsequent
collapse.29 During imperial rule, colonial administrators specifically defined different
identity groups, proceeding to favor one at the expense of others. With decolonization,
colonial officials arbitrarily drew boundaries and constructed national governments
without considering their regional implications, provoking displacement of individuals
and ethnic clashes.30 From the moment of independence, government officials exploited
past resentment to maintain political authority and assert control over opposing
constituencies. This engrained sense of injustice, whether justified or not, established the
foundations for terrorism in the Middle East.
As a reflection of their separatist beliefs, terrorists utilize post-modern war tactics
to facilitate the creation of new national subjects and boundaries.31 Thus, acts of terrorism
make no distinction between combatants and civilians. Post-colonial politics in Lebanon
and Iraq have contributed to massive civil conflict in each region, both marred by
sectarian instability. Post-conflict resolutions in these regions did not adequately address
the historic prevalence of identity clashes, laying out a framework for the development of
radical separatist beliefs and hence, acts of terrorism by insurgent groups.
28 BBC, “UN Condemns ‘War Crimes’ in Gaza,” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8257301.stm (accessed 30 December 2009). 29 Dan Smith, “Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict,” Berghof Research Center, http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/smith_handbook.pdf (accessed 24 February 2009). 30 Ethel Brooks, “Feminist Perspectives on War and Terror,” Women and Gender Studies at Rutgers University, November 2008. 31 Ibid.
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Community Infrastructure and Poverty Studies have highlighted the correlation between poor community infrastructure
and a rise in terrorism. The likelihood of resorting to terrorist activities is higher in
communities with elevated levels of unemployment and concentrated poverty.32 Such
locales, usually in or surround relatively industrialized areas, also possess high levels of
population turnover and overcrowded IDP or refugee camps. In states with civil conflict,
many rural areas lack basic infrastructure, particularly electricity. A lack of roads and
transportation forces children to travel to remote areas for schooling and limits the ability
of individuals to utilize institutional mechanisms and engage in nonviolent political
participation.33 For example, better transportation can provide security in remote regions
and thus improve the likelihood of legitimate school enrollment and employment.
The deteriorating physical and social infrastructure of these communities may
prompt residents to lose faith in government and search for alternative means of support.
With little income and limited options, parents in impoverished areas are more likely to
send their children to madrasas or other social and educational institutions sponsored by
insurgent groups.34 Because these communities usually lack social investment, the
availability of resources is also limited. This hinders children from attaining a balanced
education or getting appropriate help if something happens to their parents. A lack of
funding in public services further jeopardizes the effectiveness of counter-terrorism
measures, especially those aimed at children, thus propagating a cycle of terrorism
through the next generation.35 Poor infrastructure also affects the capabilities of the social
welfare system – impoverished areas lack the sources of support that offer protection for
vulnerable children and families.
32 Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” Working Paper Series, Harvard University: John F. Kennedy School of Government, RWP04-043. 33 Ibid. 34 Christopher M. Blanchard, “Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background,” Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf (accessed 9 January 2010). 35 Ibid.
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Socioeconomic Policies & Globalization In the developing world, particularly the Middle East, the policies of globalization
reduce budget allocations to education, healthcare, and related preventative measures.36
The desire of states to strengthen their industrial and military sectors further jeopardizes
the maintenance of services necessary for the social development of vulnerable
communities. In particular, such governmental policies usually compel children to
withdraw from educational institutions. This restricts the possibilities available to Middle
Eastern populations, propelling a cycle of economic insecurity that drives terrorism as a
viable option. The far-reaching financial effects of globalization compel governments to
focus more on industry and open the markets up to external influences, which terrorists
argue exploit native workers and cultures.37
Like economic instability, political instability in this region directly fuels terrorism
and jeopardizes social initiatives to hinder its growth. Authoritarian figures may misuse
allocated funds and favor certain identity groups over others, establishing the foundations
for rebel group activities.38 Corruption also makes it unlikely that governments will abide
by international treaties or implement new policies hampering the growth of terrorism,
especially in regards to fiscal support of insurgent groups. A lack of transparency
between different levels of government and outside organizations decreases the
likelihood of cooperation between different actors, which jeopardizes the effectiveness of
programs designed to counter terrorism.39 Corruption also hampers the ability of NGOs
to attain information on events and program initiatives that may be essential to preventing
regional terrorism.
36 Miemie Winn Byrd, “Combating Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Strategy,” Defense Techincal Information Center, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4106.pdf (accessed 9 January 2010). 37 The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security, “Addressing the Causes of Terrorism,” Club de Madrid, http://www.safe-democracy.org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-1.pdf (accessed 9 January 2010). 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.
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Comparison of Causes During the late twentieth century, post-colonial governments explicitly ignored
social welfare in negotiations while pouring millions of dollars into defense and military
training. States proposed social welfare and educational programs that attempted to
enforce particular ideas about identity and regional politics.40 This allowed different
identity groups to take advantage of civilian populations, particularly children and
minorities, in reinforcing group ideologies. With the advancement of globalization, states
in the Middle East once again opened to external influence and political leaders followed
the notion that economic development parallels the maintenance of order. However,
terrorist organizations have taken advantage of this belief to reassert ideological battles
and propel movements against external influence. With the social sector of states largely
undeveloped, communities with poor infrastructure are especially vulnerable to joining
terrorist causes and propelling a cycle of terrorism. The lack of a stable economy and
democratic mechanisms in these states allows insurgent groups to silence and control a
significant portion of their related populations.
Actors & Interests States in Civil Conflict
States in civil conflict, primarily as Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan, were plagued
by post-imperial conflict throughout the early twentieth century, thus engraining a notion
of resentment towards Western involvement in state affairs. The movements for and
transition to independence destabilized the nations, leading to the establishment of
insurgent groups and conflict among various identity groups.41 Their governments lost
control over domestic issues and are now unable to provide security for their constituents.
Rebel groups in this region act under near autonomy, asserting control over specific
territories and preventing international aid from reaching civilian populations. The failure
40 Brooks. 41 Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Background Note: Lebanon,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm#political (accessed 2 January 2010).
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of these states to assert political authority places severe restrictions on the international
community in addressing the concerns of vulnerable populations.42
States experiencing some form of civil conflict are interested in stopping violence
and initiating a peaceful path to modernization. They recognize the existence of identity-
based violence and fully condemn acts of terrorism but lack the resources to address the
predicament.43 They are still engulfed by the long-term effects of civil conflict and focus
on political stability as a safety measure against warfare. These states rule over
impoverished constituencies and much of their funds go toward combating terrorism and
restoring access to basic institutions after attacks. Though these states recognize the
influence of insurgent groups on constituencies, they do not have the resources to
establish social programs for groups vulnerable to recruitment.
These states support international NGOs in their efforts to distribute basic
commodities, set up rehabilitation camps, and provide medical assistance. Within their
territories, they house a number of overcrowded internally displaced persons (IDP) camps
and outside their borders, there are thousands of refugees awaiting repatriation. The
governments of these states aim to address the concerns of such vulnerable groups under
national initiatives of reconstruction. Their interests are also long-standing, as
governments look to establish strategic ties and garner additional funding for
socioeconomic projects.44
Economically unstable, these states may also call upon developed states or allies
in the region to provide military and monetary aid for the purposes of training law
enforcement and preventing further uprisings. For example, Iraq is working with the
United States to formulate a national law to promote amnesty among different identity
groups and tackle terrorism from its foundations.45 However, some of these governments
42 Meg Samuelson, “The Disfigured Body of the Female Guerilla,” Signs 32, no. 4 (2007): 833-855. 43 Lakhdar Brahimi, “State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries,” UNPAN, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN026305.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 44 Ibid. 45 Bureau of International Information Programs, 1.
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are not willing to risk losing political stability and may prolong the process of adopting
laws or strengthening social and judicial institutions.
Insurgent Groups Because there is no international consensus on the legal definition of terrorism, not
all insurgent groups are recognized as terrorist organizations by certain states and
institutions. However, the UN categorizes the activities of these groups as terrorist acts if
they fulfill the criteria designated under Security Council Resolution 1373.46 Insurgent
groups regarded as terrorist organizations or as utilizing acts of terrorism usually include
paramilitary forces. They may also have a sociopolitical influence, often participating in
local elections and occupying seats in state parliaments. For example, Hamas holds a
large majority in the Palestinian Parliament and governs the territory of Gaza; aside from
its armed political conflict with Israel, Hamas is also known for funding educational,
health, and cultural services in the region.47
Insurgent groups usually operate as networks and have regional sponsors, which
may be ideologically similar organizations or states that covertly support their goals.
Since the American War on Terror, al-Qaida leadership in particular has become more
decentralized, leading to the emergence of regional units that execute plans in their
respective areas.48
Terrorist organizations vary in the radicalism of their techniques and objectives,
but all aim to change the political status quo. Some insurgent groups may deny
employing terrorism and claim to be “freedom fighters”; but for them, the end justifies
the means, even if that involves civilian casualties.49 For this reason, insurgent groups are
largely unwilling to negotiate with target states or opposition groups without concessions
and rarely participate in bilateral talks. They often terminate ceasefires upon unfavorable
46 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373 (2001), 1. 47 Council on Foreign Relations, “Hamas,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/ (accessed 2 January 2010). 48 Scott Atran, “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,” University of Michigan, http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/twq06spring_atran.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 49 Ibid.
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state proceedings and become hostile towards international organizations, particularly
those of non-regional influence. However, insurgent groups may also vocalize approval
for state initiatives that parallel their objectives and subsequently cease attacks, as
temporarily done by the PKK after Turkey’s initiation of a legal movement for increasing
Kurdish minority rights.50
State Sponsors of Terrorism It is especially important to note the existence of states that covertly support rebel
groups in their attacks against certain identity groups or states. Their interests are to
thwart internal rebellions and assert political control over their constituencies through the
manipulation of external politics.51 Though these states may be signatories to
international legislation, they disregard the existence of the issue and undermine
international efforts looking to investigate their roles in terrorism. They possess some of
the same objectives as insurgent groups, primarily in wanting to change the political
status quo of the Middle East. However, they often deny involvement to maintain a level
of legitimacy in international reputation and not thwart potential investment. Within the
international arena, they are largely unwilling to cooperate with target states. It is usually
within their interests to spur some form of instability within target states, which is why
they may financially, logistically, or militarily aid insurgent groups in their respective
missions.52 They are usually reluctant to participate in bilateral talks but may become
open to multilateral talks with support of regional allies; for example, Syria recently
began talks with Israel on the exception that Turkey, an ally of both states, is involved.53
Target States Situated primarily along the Mediterranean coast, target states are the object of
terrorist attacks. Their constituents, especially the populations near state borders, are
50 “PKK Ceasefire a Balancing Act for Turkish Government,” Voice of America, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-06-03-voa36-68802802.html (accessed 2 January 2010). 51 Bureau of International Information Programs, 1. 52 Ibid. 53 Robert F. Worth, “Warmer Ties With Turkey Kindle Hopes in Syria,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/world/middleeast/15syria.html (accessed 2 January 2009).
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largely vulnerable to insurgent groups. Unlike states in civil conflict, target states are
generally developed, have functioning governments, and possess the resources to tackle
terrorism. They fully condemn acts of terrorism and spend a significant portion of their
funds on logistical and military equipment to respond to related incidents.54 Target states
like Israel and Turkey have initiated incursions and are willing to respond to terrorist
pressures with force. For them, national sovereignty is of upmost importance; they are
unwilling to concede to terrorist demands that involve infringing upon their territorial
integrity.55
The primary concern of target states is national security and protecting their
constituents from ideological and physical terror. These states support international
NGOs in their humanitarian efforts, but believe that insurgents may use them as safe-
havens and respond accordingly. Target states often have international allies who are
willing to support them with military and monetary aid.56 They participate in multilateral
talks and are open to negotiate with international organizations, but do not recognize the
legitimacy of negotiating with terrorist groups. Thus, they often acknowledge UN orders
but are unwilling to concede anything that would potentially compromise their national
autonomy.
Developed States Developed states have an invested interest in the Middle East and thus support the
economic, social, and political advancement of states experiencing terrorism.57 Within
the international community, these states promote the principles of national sovereignty
and democracy. As third-party negotiators, they recognize the need to address the
vulnerability of certain groups in armed conflicts. They condemn the use of terrorism as a
method of political expression and encourage regional cooperation in responding to the 54 Bekir Cinar, “The Use of Military Force Against Terrorism,” Today’s Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=135640 (accessed 2 January 2010). 55 Ibid. 56 Michel Chossudovsky, “’Triple Alliance’: The US, Turkey, Israel and the War on Lebanon,” Center for Research on Globalization, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=2906 (accessed 2 January 2010). 57 Paul Wilkinson, “International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s Response,” Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp084.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010).
PhilMUN 2010 17
issue.58 For them, current efforts are ineffective in thwarting the foundations of terrorism.
They believe that an international coalition or a higher institution like the UN should be
involved at all levels of conflict-resolution for proposed actions to be successful and
sustainable.
Developed states advocate multilateral talks and direct state intervention as the
most effective ways of addressing terrorism. They call for the universal implementation
of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and support the addition of terrorism into the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC).59 In conflict-ridden areas, they call
for the development of monitoring and logistical mechanisms. The European Union
(E.U.) in particular views “accurate and timely information and intelligence [as] crucial
to forestalling terrorist attacks and identifying the perpetrators.”60 Developed states
support strengthening political institutions as a safeguard against terrorism, particularly in
states, like Lebanon, that are experiencing civil conflict.
However, the doctrine of national sovereignty and general mistrust of Western
involvement prevents developed states from staging direct intervention. Oftentimes,
developing states in the region accuse developed states of pushing certain ideologies and
reject their propositions – a situation that endangers the strengthening of social
institutions and hinders progress toward countering terrorism.61 To counter such effects,
developed states fund UN entities and international NGOs that possess good standing
with target regions while still maintaining transparency.62 For example, the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) often funds school construction in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip through the UNRWA.
58 Ibid. 59 Adamantios Vassilakis, “EU Presidency Statement: Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts,” European Union @ United Nations, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_2065_fr.htm (accessed 2 January 2010). 60 European Union Committee, “After Madrid: the EU’s Response to Terrorism,” The Stationary Office of London, www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/.../53.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 61 United Nations, “2008 Parliamentary Hearing, Background Paper: Session II,” Inter-Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga08/s2.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 62 Kerlin, Janelle, “U.S. Government Funding for International Nongovernmental Organizations,” Urban Institute, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311332_funding_NGOs.pdf (2 January 2010).
PhilMUN 2010 18
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) NGOs are instrumental in addressing the humanitarian consequences of terrorism.
In areas of conflict, NGOs are mainly responsible for allocating basic resources and
sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. When dealing with the issue
at hand, NGOs want states to respect international humanitarian law and respond
proportionately to terrorist attacks.63 During the Gaza War, several NGOs like Amnesty
International and OXFAM reported on the severe implications of Israeli response on
civilian life and provided vulnerable groups with basic resources. As a response to
terrorist attacks on residential areas in Iraq, UN-Habitat initiated the Urban and Housing
Rehabilitation Program (UHRP), which constructs emergency shelter for families without
homes and helps strengthen civil society through community work.64 Some NGOs also
attempt to establish bilateral relations with governments in order to influence post-
conflict resolution so that it includes counter-terrorism measures.65
NGOs situated in states with civil conflict often become single actors in their
plight to aid vulnerable groups. Host countries usually lack stable infrastructure and
states are not able to provide funds, leaving NGOs to oversee their programs without
direct assistance.66 In some conflict-ridden regions, NGOs themselves become the targets
of rebel groups during insurgencies and face expulsion. Coupled with time limits, these
roadblocks prevent NGOs from fully pursuing their agendas. In recent years, NGOs
began promoting partnerships with grassroots organizations as a method of ensuring that
long-term goals are still pursued after withdrawal. Recognizing the role of social
63 NGO Monitor, “The NGO Front in the Gaza War: The Durban Strategy Continues,” NGO Monitor, http://www.ngo-monitor.org/data/images/File/NGO_Front_Gaza.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 64 UN-Habitat, “Strengthening the Capacity of the Housing Sector in Iraq,” UN-Habitat, http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=692&catid=203&typeid=13&subMenuId=0 (accessed 2 January 2010). 65 UN Economic and Social Council. Commission on the Status of Women Acting as Preparatory Committee for Women 2000, 3rd Session. Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action (E/CN.6/2000/PC/2). 19 January 2000. 66 UN Economic and Social Council (E/CN.6/2000/PC/2), 10.
PhilMUN 2010 19
institutions in reconstruction, these organizations specialize in community resilience and
development.67
Projections & Implications Terrorism is a multifaceted issue with far-reaching implications for society. It has
cost the lives of innocent civilians and affects a number of vulnerable populations by
diminishing community infrastructure and hindering socioeconomic development. Not
only do acts of terrorism infringe upon international law and the rights of human beings,
but they also have multifaceted affects on society.
The short and long-term consequences of disregarding the rise of terrorism in the
Middle East are tremendous. States will continue to experience massive population
displacement, as refugees flow into neighboring nations, creating slums around urban
centers.68 In some states, these displacements lead to family breakdown and changes in
community structures, eroding traditional ways of life. Such an environment has major
repercussions for childhood development, as diminishing social institutions ensure that
children preserve a repetitive cycle within their societies.69
A multifaceted response to the issue directly corresponds to regional development
and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Without
formulating a response, the international community will indirectly give legitimacy to
rebel groups that subjugate vulnerable populations. The prevalence of insurgent activity
will lead to an increase in state funds toward military services and propagate the
deterioration of socioeconomic infrastructure in the region.70 Thus, acts of terrorism, no
matter how minimal the damage or small in scope, threaten the very foundations of state
institutions. As the global community has witnessed in the last decade, terrorism hinders
regional development and greatly endangers international security.
67 Groots International, “Grassroots Women’s Initiatives in Reconstruction and Governance,” Groots International, http://www.groots.org/download/Sri_Lanka_exchange.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 68 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 69 Phillips, 1. 70 Bureau of International Information Programs, 1.
PhilMUN 2010 20
Conclusion Unfortunately, the issue of terrorism has remained at a status quo for the past few
years. Since the passage of Security Council Resolution 1373 in 2001, the international
community has come to disagree on the precise definition of terrorism. The UN has
passed resolutions reauthorizing the document and establishing counter-terrorism
programs to combat, in particular, sectarian conflict. However, the scope of UN activities
remains limited and cooperation within the Middle East remains low. State initiatives
have focused mostly on military responses and prosecution, overlooking the preventative
capabilities of a strengthened social sector. Without regional cooperation and the
inclusion of measures to prevent identity-related tribulations in post-conflict resolution,
insurgents’ reliance on armed conflict as a means of political change will continue to
increase
PhilMUN 2010 21
Discussion Questions • What is the definition of terrorism as recognized by the UN? What are the some of the
problems associated with adopting a universal definition? How may these hinder efforts to address terrorism?
• What was the importance of UN Security Council Resolution 1373? How did it
deviate from precedent and what were some of its landmark provisions? • How did the Canal Hotel bombings change UN practices in the Middle East? • What is the significance of the al-Askari Mosque bombing in relation to the effects of
terrorist activities? How did it demonstrate the importance of identity politics in sustaining terrorism?
• Why did the Lebanese government and UNIFIL refuse to disarm Hezbollah despite
UN command? What does this demonstrate about the influence of insurgent groups on civilian populations?
• In relation to state responses to terrorism, what did the Israel-Hezbollah and Gaza
Wars call into question? How can the committee address this issue without infringing upon national sovereignty?
• What are some of the roadblocks that NGOs and developed states face in their
attempts to help states in civil conflict combat terrorism? • How can the UN address the issue of state sponsored terrorism? • In certain societies in the Middle East, sectarian conflict and poor community
infrastructure are roadblocks to initiating counter-terrorism measures. What can the international community do to combat this without infringing too heavily on societal values?
• Has globalization played a role in the rise of terrorism? Explain why and/or why not.
What types of socioeconomic policies are favorable to limiting the influence of terrorism?
• Identify governmental programs that your state initiated to combat terrorism. What
lessons can be learned from their successes and/or failures? What is your state currently doing to address the concerns of vulnerable populations?
PhilMUN 2010 22
Bibliography Further Reading Bureau of International Information Programs, “State Department on Terrorism in the
Middle East, North Africa,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/April/20080430121233eaifas0.4066278.html
This source provides a comprehensive background of the issue and why terrorism should be at the forefront of the global agenda. It includes a quick summary of international progress and lays out a series of possible frameworks in combating terrorism. The document gives a good understanding of the underlying causes propelling terrorism and the military, economic, and social issues at hand.
United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon
Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1 (2006), UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45c30b6e0.html
This source provides a good insight onto the humanitarian aspect of the issue at hand. It illustrates the necessity of mechanisms for the social advancement of vulnerable populations and outlines the progression of international initiatives over time. Organized by the Human Rights Council, this document particularly focuses on the role of NGOs in addressing the consequences of terrorist acts and state responses to related incidents. It calls into the question the actions of targeted states.
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566 (2004), United Nations,
http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1566(2004)
This is the quintessential UN document for understanding the role of the UN in addressing the issue. It outlines the jurisdiction of related UN agencies in combating terrorism and highlights the importance of regional conventions. It summarizes the agreed conclusions of the Security Council and provides useful objectives for formulizing successful resolutions.
PhilMUN 2010 23
Works Cited Abadie, Alberto. “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” Working
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Al Jazeera, “Lebanon Blast Kills UNIFIL Troops,” Al Jazeera,
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Atran, Scott. “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,” University of
Michigan, http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/twq06spring_atran.pdf BBC, “Gaza ‘Looks Like Earthquake Zone,’” BBC,
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8257301.stm Blanchard, Christopher M. “Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background,”
Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf Brahimi, Lakhdar. “State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries,” UNPAN,
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Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Background Note: Lebanon,” U.S. Department of State,
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PhilMUN 2010 24
Chossudovsky, Michel. “’Triple Alliance’: The US, Turkey, Israel and the War on Lebanon,” Center for Research on Globalization, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=2906
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PhilMUN 2010 25
Phillips, James. “The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/BG1005.cfm
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PhilMUN 2010 26
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Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga08/s2.pdf Vassilakis, Adamantios. “EU Presidency Statement: Threats to International Peace and
Security Caused by Terrorist Acts,” European Union @ United Nations, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_2065_fr.htm
Wilkinson, Paul. “International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s
Response,” Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp084.pdf
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PhilMUN 2010 27
Works Consulted Brooks, Ethel. “Feminist Perspectives on War and Terror,” Women and Gender Studies
at Rutgers University, November 2008. Bureau of International Information Programs, “State Department on Terrorism in the
Middle East, North Africa,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/April/20080430121233eaifas0.4066278.html
Groots International, “Grassroots Women’s Initiatives in Reconstruction and
Governance,” Groots International, http://www.groots.org/download/Sri_Lanka_exchange.pdf
Samuelson, Meg. “The Disfigured Body of the Female Guerilla,” Signs 32, no. 4 (2007):
833-855. Smith, Dan. “Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict,” Berghof Research Center,
http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/smith_handbook.pdf UN Economic and Social Council. Commission on the Status of Women Acting as
Preparatory Committee for Women 2000, 3rd Session. Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action (E/CN.6/2000/PC/2). 19 January 2000.
UN-Habitat, “Strengthening the Capacity of the Housing Sector in Iraq,” UN-Habitat,
http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=692&catid=203&typeid=13&subMenuId=0
United Nations, “2008 Parliamentary Hearing, Background Paper: Session II,” Inter-
Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga08/s2.pdf