Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc.

Disarmament and International Security

Rise of Terrorism

Director: Ian Liberty

© 2010 Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc. (IDIA)

This document is solely for use in preparation for Philadelphia Model United Nations 2010. Use for other purposes is not

permitted without the express written consent of IDIA. For more information, please write us at idiainfo@idia.net

Policy Dilemma ______________________________________________________________ 1

Chronology__________________________________________________________________ 3 2001 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 _________________________________ 3 2003 - Canal Hotel Bombings in Baghdad _____________________________________________ 4 2004 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 _________________________________ 4 2006 - Bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque______________________________________________ 5 2006 - Israel-Hezbollah War ________________________________________________________ 5 2007 - Lebanon Civil Conflict _______________________________________________________ 6 2007-2008 - Turkish Invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan _______________________________________ 7 2008 - Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul _____________________________________________ 7 2008-2009 - Gaza War _____________________________________________________________ 8

Possible Causes ______________________________________________________________ 9 Post-Colonial Politics and Separatism ________________________________________________ 9 Community Infrastructure and Poverty______________________________________________ 10 Socioeconomic Policies & Globalization ______________________________________________ 11 Comparison of Causes ____________________________________________________________ 12

Actors & Interests____________________________________________________________ 12 States in Civil Conflict ____________________________________________________________ 12 Insurgent Groups ________________________________________________________________ 14 State Sponsors of Terrorism _______________________________________________________ 15 Target States ____________________________________________________________________ 15 Developed States _________________________________________________________________ 16 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) ___________________________________________ 18

Projections & Implications ____________________________________________________ 19

Conclusion _________________________________________________________________ 20

Bibliography________________________________________________________________ 22 Further Reading _________________________________________________________________ 22 Works Cited_____________________________________________________________________ 23 Works Consulted_________________________________________________________________ 27

PhilMUN 2010 1

Policy Dilemma The United Nations (UN) Security Council currently defines terrorism as any

criminal act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury, or provoke a state of terror,

with the purpose to “intimidate a population or compel a government or international

organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”1 While the definition of terrorism

itself is highly debated among the international community, its methods and consequent

effects are much more evident. Terrorism aims to terminate political processes and

produce dissension as a means of forcing change.2 Thus, terrorism not only costs the lives

of civilians and destroys community infrastructure, it also threatens the foundations of

state institutions – the prospect of which hinders regional cooperation and endangers

international security.

Although terrorism in the Middle East is certainly not a new phenomenon, it has

become progressively worse over the last decade. Since the inception of the United

States’ War on Terror, the lack of stability in Iraq has resonated through the region.

Organizations like Al-Qaida have been at the forefront of terrorist attacks. While large

organizations, such as Al-Qaida, have served as the face for the terrorist attacks, smaller,

more localized, affiliations and criminal organizations have also been active participants.3

In particular, insurgent identity groups and militias have both engaged in sectarian and

intra-communal violence.

Even though the number of individual terrorist attacks has decreased in the past

few years, the threat of terrorist activity continues to plague state security and instill fear

among the general population. In the Middle East, Iraq remains at the center of most

terrorist affiliated incidents, as insurgents groups fight against the Iraqi government and

1 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566 (2004), United Nations, http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9969713.09185028.html (accessed 27 December 2009). 2 Bureau of International Information Programs, “State Department on Terrorism in the Middle East, North Africa,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/April/20080430121233eaifas0.4066278.html (accessed 27 December 2009). 3 Ibid.

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coalition forces. The most common modes of attacks have been through improvised

explosive devices (IEDs), including vehicle-borne ones, and suicide bombers.4 Other

terror campaigns in the region have been directed towards Israel, whose targets face

terrorist threats from the West Bank and Gaza. In Lebanon, insurgent groups assassinated

several key political figures to intimidate pro-government forces and shape the numerical

composition of parliament.5 Terrorist activity has also recommenced in Turkey, where

Kurdish rebels in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) are engaged in armed conflict

with the state.

The rise of terrorism in the Middle East is a multifaceted issue that requires

immediate response. Cross-border terror activities in particular require regional

cooperation, as they destabilize the entire region. Indeed, terrorism has a plethora of

effects on the socioeconomic infrastructure of a society. In response to terrorist threats

and incidents, states have begun to allocate a significant portion of their funds toward

military preparation and action.6 This often entails a shift in monetary resources from the

social sector into the armed forces, which weakens social systems like health and

education. As a result, communities begin to deteriorate and children become vulnerable

to external influence, particularly in relation to insurgent groups. With anti-government

arguments and false promises, insurgents groups thus convince susceptible individuals

into supporting their cause – a reality that propagates the cycle of terrorism. If the

international community fails to prioritize the issue, the problems of a destabilized

Middle East will quickly spread to neighboring regions and cause even developed states

to incur socioeconomic devastation.

Responses toward terrorist activities thus far have mostly involved an increase in

security services, with states strengthening their capabilities to fight terrorism. With the

aid of developed states and international organizations, states like Iraq have attempted to

draft reconciliation related legislation and participate in antiterrorism assistance 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 James Phillips, “The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/BG1005.cfm (accessed 27 December 2009).

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programs, which aim to address issues between certain identity groups and strengthen

legal regimes.7 However, because some states covertly support terrorism by funding

specific organizations, it is important to consider both short and long-term solutions.

Chronology 2001 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373

Following the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States, the UN

Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373 as a comprehensive document

outlining counter-terrorism measures against any such future incidents. Implemented

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows the Council to take direct action for

the restoration of international security, the resolution is binding for all UN member

states.8 Therefore, its passage signaled a shift in international law, as precedent had

originally dictated that only voluntary signatories were bound to UN treaties.

The resolution aims to prevent the organization and development of terrorist

groups, particularly in relation to fund-raising activities.9 It encourages member states to

publicize their information on terrorist groups for the purpose of thwarting international

terrorism. The landmark provision of the resolution calls upon member states to amend

their national laws as a means of ratifying international conventions on terrorism; it

specifies that states criminalize support for terrorist activities on all levels. In order to

monitor state compliance, the Security Council established the Counter Terrorism

Committee (CTC), which conducts assessments and offers procedural assistance.10

However, the CTC is more of a technical body because it does not have the ability to

sanction specific terrorist organizations or individuals. Although the resolution was

successful in facilitating transparency of information among states, it failed to define

7 Bureau of International Information Programs, 1. 8 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373 (2001), United Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1373(2001) (accessed 29 December 2009). 9 Ibid. 10 Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, “The Committee’s Mandate,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/aboutus.html (accessed 29 December 2009).

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terrorism and only included al-Qaida and the Taliban on the sanctions list.11 This allowed

states to interpret terrorism in their own perspectives, theoretically permitting some

authoritarian regimes to label nonviolent protests as terrorist acts.

2003 - Canal Hotel Bombings in Baghdad In August and September of 2003, Al-Qaeda organized the vehicle bombings of

the Canal Hotel in Baghdad, Iraq. The first suicide bombing targeted the United Nations

Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), which the Security Council had created days

earlier as means of incorporating the new Iraqi government into the international

community.12 The second attack led to the withdrawal of over 600 UN staff members

from Baghdad, along with members of other aid agencies; most of the UN branches in

Iraq were subsequently relocated to Jordan. Both blasts killed several UN officials,

including Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to

Iraq. The events hindered international efforts to rebuild Iraq and contributed to a

significant change in UN security protocol. With remote UN supervision, humanitarian

support within Iraq has primarily been through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

2004 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 After a series of terrorist attacks in Egypt, Iraq, and Pakistan, the Security Council

adopted Resolution 1566 to reaffirm Resolution 1373. Unlike its predecessor, Resolution

1566 defined terrorism as: Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.13

In adopting such a definition, the Council established a working group to formulate

recommendations on measures to be imposed upon groups or individuals associated with

such activities. For example, the resolution calls for more effective procedures in

11 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373 (2001), 1. 12 Kim Ghattas, “Mixed Feelings Over UN Iraq Role,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6941560.stm (accessed 29 December 2009). 13 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566 (2004), United Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1566(2004) (accessed 29 December 2009).

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prosecuting involved entities, even recommending extradition.14 The resolution also

advocates that the aforementioned working group consider establishing an international

compensation fund for the victims of terrorist attacks and their families, though it does

not specify funding aside from the seized assets of terrorist organizations and related

affiliates.

2006 - Bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque In February 2006, a bomb detonated at the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, Iraq –

one of the holiest sites in Shia Islam. No organization has taken responsibility for the

attack, but al-Qaeda members confessed to taking part in the bombing.15 Though the

attack itself caused no injuries, the subsequent violence in the days after claimed

hundreds of lives. Shia rebels attacked Sunni mosques and kidnapped or murdered imams

throughout Iraq. In Shia majority cities, Shia terrorists tortured and killed Christian and

Sunni Muslim civilians, journalists, and men of Egyptian, Saudi, and Turkish

nationality.16 Iraqi officials feared that Iraq was on the brink of civil war and

consequently implemented a curfew in Baghdad and surrounding provinces. Despite such

measures, severe sectarian violence continued throughout Iraq, devastating infrastructure

and disrupting everyday life. The bombing demonstrated that the consequences of

terrorist activities, no matter the death toll, often times have greater long-term

implications. In this case, the bombing debilitated Iraq as a governing state, shaking the

already fragile foundations of the nation.

2006 - Israel-Hezbollah War The Israel-Hezbollah War, also known as the 2006 Lebanon War, began when

militants of Hezbollah, a Shia Islamist paramilitary organization in Lebanon, fired

14 Ibid. 15 “Letter May Detail Iraqi Insurgency’s Concerns,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/02/10/sprj.nirq.zarqawi/ (accessed 30 December 2009). 16 Robert F. Worth, “Blast Destroys Shrine in Iraq, Setting off Sectarian Fury,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/22/international/middleeast/22cnd-iraq.html?hp&ex=1140670800&en=1077baccd068bf6b&ei=5094&partner=homepage (accessed 30 December 2009).

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rockets at Israeli border towns. During the 34-day military conflict, Israel carried out

massive airstrikes on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon.17 Israeli actions called into question

the methods of fighting cross-border terrorism, as the event affected mostly Lebanese

civilians – in addition to claiming the lives over a thousand noncombatants, the conflict

severely damaged Lebanese infrastructure and displaced approximately one million

Lebanese and 300,000 Israelis. Although Security Council Resolution 1701 called for the

disarmament of Hezbollah, both the Lebanese government and the United Nations

Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) declined to do so, citing that such a move would be

unrealistic without reconstruction of the region.18

2007 - Lebanon Civil Conflict In May 2007, fighting broke between Fatah al-Islam, a Sunni Islamist militant

organization, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in Nahr al-Bared – a camp in

northern Lebanon that is part of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for

Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).19 When the insurgents refused to

surrender, thus spurring violence in surrounding refugee camps, the LAF staged a series

of counterattacks, eventually capturing the militant base in September. During this

period, militants of Fatah al-Islam bombed several commercial and residential locales in

Beirut. They also bombed a vehicle carrying personnel from UNIFIL, gathering support

from al-Qaeda.20 As the worst domestic conflict since the Lebanese Civil War, the

fighting not only devastated UNRWA camps but also forced the relocation of several

thousand Palestinians in Nahr al-Bared.21 Lebanese officials held Syria responsible for

supporting Fatah al-Islam and asked other Arab governments, as well as Western states,

to aid Lebanon through logistical and military equipment. 17 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1 (2006), UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45c30b6e0.html (accessed 30 December 2009). 18 Ibid. 19 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, “Archive for May 2007,” 2007 Lebanon Emergency, http://www.unrwa-lebanon.org/nle/?m=200705 (accessed 30 December 2009). 20 Al Jazeera, “Lebanon Blast Kills UNIFIL Troops,” Al Jazeera, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2007/06/2008525122010725840.html (accessed 30 December 2009). 21 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1.

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2007-2008 - Turkish Invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan Days after terminating a unilateral ceasefire with the Turkish government, the

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) staged a suicide bombing in a commercial district of

Ankara, the state capital. The bombing occurred as several world leaders gathered in

Turkey for a NATO summit. Shortly after the incident, the Turkish military announced

that it would launch an incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan upon further hostilities, by which

time American troops withdrew from the area.22 Following another suicide bombing and

series of PKK attacks on army bases, Turkish troops launched a ground incursion into

northern Iraq. During this period, the PKK continued to bomb industrial and residential

areas in Turkey, killing both natives and tourists. Unlike its past undertakings, the PKK

also detonated an explosion over the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, halting the supply of

crude oil through the Caucus region for weeks and contributing to a rise in oil prices.23

The PKK terrorist attacks and consequent Turkish military response had widespread

effects; they not only destabilized the region but also the Turkish political system,

helping lead to a failed coup d’état attempt against the existing government.

2008 - Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul In July 2008, a suicide vehicle bombing took place outside the gates of the Indian

embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. The attack was the deadliest since the fall of the Taliban

and prompted a massive investigation by the intelligence agencies of Afghanistan, India,

and the United States.24 The findings of Afghan and Indian agencies had profound

implications on regional relations. The agencies reported that the embassy itself was the

main target, suggesting that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had planned the

22 Selcuk Gokoluk and Orhan Coskun, “Bomb in Turkish Capital Kills Six, Injures 80,” Reuters, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L22619461.htm (accessed 29 December 2009). 23 Alex Barker, “Kurds Lay Claim to Blast on Azeri Oil Pipeline,” Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4836dca-64e1-11dd-af61-0000779fd18c.html?nclick_check=1 (accessed 29 December 2009). 24 Somini Sengupta, “Afghan Bombing Sends Stark Message to India,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/world/asia/09india.html?_r=1 (accessed 30 December 2009).

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attack with either the Taliban or al-Qaida. While the Taliban denied any involvement,

Afghan officials insisted on the collaboration between an insurgent group and the ISI.

After reports of intercepted communication confirming such a relationship arose, U.S.

officials expressed their doubt as to the reliability of Pakistan as an ally in the American

War on Terror.25

Pakistan continued to deny such claims, but participated in bilateral talks with

India to discuss the incident and cross-border terrorism. Meanwhile, Indian defense

officials suggested that their government increase its military presence in Afghanistan.26

Because India already has contributed to Western counter-insurgency operations, other

officials believed that such involvement would jeopardize India’s socioeconomic

investments in the region. Though the joint meetings failed to produce a positive

identification of perpetrators, they demonstrated the importance of joint anti-terror

mechanisms in maintaining transparency and regional stability.

2008-2009 - Gaza War After the end of a ceasefire with Israel in December 2008, Hamas – a Palestinian

Islamist paramilitary organization – began a series of rocket attacks on Israeli towns.

During the three-week military conflict, Israel carried out massive airstrikes on the Gaza

Strip, with the aim of stopping Hamas terrorism.27 Like the Israel-Hezbollah War in

2006, Israeli actions called into question the methods of fighting cross-border terrorism,

as the event affected mostly Lebanese civilians. However, this time, the damages were

more intense and constituted a humanitarian crisis; more than a thousand Palestinian

civilians died and over 400,000 people in the region lacked running water and other basic

amenities. In September 2009, a UN mission produced a report – an unprecedented

25 Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world/asia/01pstan.html?hp (accessed 30 December 2009). 26 Sengupta, 1. 27 BBC, “Gaza ‘Looks Like Earthquake Zone,’” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7838618.stm (accessed 30 December 2009).

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publication in relation to the history of terrorism in the region – accusing both Palestinian

militants and Israeli defense forces of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity.28

Possible Causes Post-Colonial Politics and Separatism

Acts of terrorism, especially suicide bombing, are often associated with post-

modern war tactics brought by the imposition of Western colonial rule and its subsequent

collapse.29 During imperial rule, colonial administrators specifically defined different

identity groups, proceeding to favor one at the expense of others. With decolonization,

colonial officials arbitrarily drew boundaries and constructed national governments

without considering their regional implications, provoking displacement of individuals

and ethnic clashes.30 From the moment of independence, government officials exploited

past resentment to maintain political authority and assert control over opposing

constituencies. This engrained sense of injustice, whether justified or not, established the

foundations for terrorism in the Middle East.

As a reflection of their separatist beliefs, terrorists utilize post-modern war tactics

to facilitate the creation of new national subjects and boundaries.31 Thus, acts of terrorism

make no distinction between combatants and civilians. Post-colonial politics in Lebanon

and Iraq have contributed to massive civil conflict in each region, both marred by

sectarian instability. Post-conflict resolutions in these regions did not adequately address

the historic prevalence of identity clashes, laying out a framework for the development of

radical separatist beliefs and hence, acts of terrorism by insurgent groups.

28 BBC, “UN Condemns ‘War Crimes’ in Gaza,” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8257301.stm (accessed 30 December 2009). 29 Dan Smith, “Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict,” Berghof Research Center, http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/smith_handbook.pdf (accessed 24 February 2009). 30 Ethel Brooks, “Feminist Perspectives on War and Terror,” Women and Gender Studies at Rutgers University, November 2008. 31 Ibid.

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Community Infrastructure and Poverty Studies have highlighted the correlation between poor community infrastructure

and a rise in terrorism. The likelihood of resorting to terrorist activities is higher in

communities with elevated levels of unemployment and concentrated poverty.32 Such

locales, usually in or surround relatively industrialized areas, also possess high levels of

population turnover and overcrowded IDP or refugee camps. In states with civil conflict,

many rural areas lack basic infrastructure, particularly electricity. A lack of roads and

transportation forces children to travel to remote areas for schooling and limits the ability

of individuals to utilize institutional mechanisms and engage in nonviolent political

participation.33 For example, better transportation can provide security in remote regions

and thus improve the likelihood of legitimate school enrollment and employment.

The deteriorating physical and social infrastructure of these communities may

prompt residents to lose faith in government and search for alternative means of support.

With little income and limited options, parents in impoverished areas are more likely to

send their children to madrasas or other social and educational institutions sponsored by

insurgent groups.34 Because these communities usually lack social investment, the

availability of resources is also limited. This hinders children from attaining a balanced

education or getting appropriate help if something happens to their parents. A lack of

funding in public services further jeopardizes the effectiveness of counter-terrorism

measures, especially those aimed at children, thus propagating a cycle of terrorism

through the next generation.35 Poor infrastructure also affects the capabilities of the social

welfare system – impoverished areas lack the sources of support that offer protection for

vulnerable children and families.

32 Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” Working Paper Series, Harvard University: John F. Kennedy School of Government, RWP04-043. 33 Ibid. 34 Christopher M. Blanchard, “Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background,” Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf (accessed 9 January 2010). 35 Ibid.

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Socioeconomic Policies & Globalization In the developing world, particularly the Middle East, the policies of globalization

reduce budget allocations to education, healthcare, and related preventative measures.36

The desire of states to strengthen their industrial and military sectors further jeopardizes

the maintenance of services necessary for the social development of vulnerable

communities. In particular, such governmental policies usually compel children to

withdraw from educational institutions. This restricts the possibilities available to Middle

Eastern populations, propelling a cycle of economic insecurity that drives terrorism as a

viable option. The far-reaching financial effects of globalization compel governments to

focus more on industry and open the markets up to external influences, which terrorists

argue exploit native workers and cultures.37

Like economic instability, political instability in this region directly fuels terrorism

and jeopardizes social initiatives to hinder its growth. Authoritarian figures may misuse

allocated funds and favor certain identity groups over others, establishing the foundations

for rebel group activities.38 Corruption also makes it unlikely that governments will abide

by international treaties or implement new policies hampering the growth of terrorism,

especially in regards to fiscal support of insurgent groups. A lack of transparency

between different levels of government and outside organizations decreases the

likelihood of cooperation between different actors, which jeopardizes the effectiveness of

programs designed to counter terrorism.39 Corruption also hampers the ability of NGOs

to attain information on events and program initiatives that may be essential to preventing

regional terrorism.

36 Miemie Winn Byrd, “Combating Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Strategy,” Defense Techincal Information Center, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4106.pdf (accessed 9 January 2010). 37 The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security, “Addressing the Causes of Terrorism,” Club de Madrid, http://www.safe-democracy.org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-1.pdf (accessed 9 January 2010). 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.

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Comparison of Causes During the late twentieth century, post-colonial governments explicitly ignored

social welfare in negotiations while pouring millions of dollars into defense and military

training. States proposed social welfare and educational programs that attempted to

enforce particular ideas about identity and regional politics.40 This allowed different

identity groups to take advantage of civilian populations, particularly children and

minorities, in reinforcing group ideologies. With the advancement of globalization, states

in the Middle East once again opened to external influence and political leaders followed

the notion that economic development parallels the maintenance of order. However,

terrorist organizations have taken advantage of this belief to reassert ideological battles

and propel movements against external influence. With the social sector of states largely

undeveloped, communities with poor infrastructure are especially vulnerable to joining

terrorist causes and propelling a cycle of terrorism. The lack of a stable economy and

democratic mechanisms in these states allows insurgent groups to silence and control a

significant portion of their related populations.

Actors & Interests States in Civil Conflict

States in civil conflict, primarily as Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan, were plagued

by post-imperial conflict throughout the early twentieth century, thus engraining a notion

of resentment towards Western involvement in state affairs. The movements for and

transition to independence destabilized the nations, leading to the establishment of

insurgent groups and conflict among various identity groups.41 Their governments lost

control over domestic issues and are now unable to provide security for their constituents.

Rebel groups in this region act under near autonomy, asserting control over specific

territories and preventing international aid from reaching civilian populations. The failure

40 Brooks. 41 Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Background Note: Lebanon,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm#political (accessed 2 January 2010).

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of these states to assert political authority places severe restrictions on the international

community in addressing the concerns of vulnerable populations.42

States experiencing some form of civil conflict are interested in stopping violence

and initiating a peaceful path to modernization. They recognize the existence of identity-

based violence and fully condemn acts of terrorism but lack the resources to address the

predicament.43 They are still engulfed by the long-term effects of civil conflict and focus

on political stability as a safety measure against warfare. These states rule over

impoverished constituencies and much of their funds go toward combating terrorism and

restoring access to basic institutions after attacks. Though these states recognize the

influence of insurgent groups on constituencies, they do not have the resources to

establish social programs for groups vulnerable to recruitment.

These states support international NGOs in their efforts to distribute basic

commodities, set up rehabilitation camps, and provide medical assistance. Within their

territories, they house a number of overcrowded internally displaced persons (IDP) camps

and outside their borders, there are thousands of refugees awaiting repatriation. The

governments of these states aim to address the concerns of such vulnerable groups under

national initiatives of reconstruction. Their interests are also long-standing, as

governments look to establish strategic ties and garner additional funding for

socioeconomic projects.44

Economically unstable, these states may also call upon developed states or allies

in the region to provide military and monetary aid for the purposes of training law

enforcement and preventing further uprisings. For example, Iraq is working with the

United States to formulate a national law to promote amnesty among different identity

groups and tackle terrorism from its foundations.45 However, some of these governments

42 Meg Samuelson, “The Disfigured Body of the Female Guerilla,” Signs 32, no. 4 (2007): 833-855. 43 Lakhdar Brahimi, “State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries,” UNPAN, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN026305.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 44 Ibid. 45 Bureau of International Information Programs, 1.

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are not willing to risk losing political stability and may prolong the process of adopting

laws or strengthening social and judicial institutions.

Insurgent Groups Because there is no international consensus on the legal definition of terrorism, not

all insurgent groups are recognized as terrorist organizations by certain states and

institutions. However, the UN categorizes the activities of these groups as terrorist acts if

they fulfill the criteria designated under Security Council Resolution 1373.46 Insurgent

groups regarded as terrorist organizations or as utilizing acts of terrorism usually include

paramilitary forces. They may also have a sociopolitical influence, often participating in

local elections and occupying seats in state parliaments. For example, Hamas holds a

large majority in the Palestinian Parliament and governs the territory of Gaza; aside from

its armed political conflict with Israel, Hamas is also known for funding educational,

health, and cultural services in the region.47

Insurgent groups usually operate as networks and have regional sponsors, which

may be ideologically similar organizations or states that covertly support their goals.

Since the American War on Terror, al-Qaida leadership in particular has become more

decentralized, leading to the emergence of regional units that execute plans in their

respective areas.48

Terrorist organizations vary in the radicalism of their techniques and objectives,

but all aim to change the political status quo. Some insurgent groups may deny

employing terrorism and claim to be “freedom fighters”; but for them, the end justifies

the means, even if that involves civilian casualties.49 For this reason, insurgent groups are

largely unwilling to negotiate with target states or opposition groups without concessions

and rarely participate in bilateral talks. They often terminate ceasefires upon unfavorable

46 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373 (2001), 1. 47 Council on Foreign Relations, “Hamas,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/ (accessed 2 January 2010). 48 Scott Atran, “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,” University of Michigan, http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/twq06spring_atran.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 49 Ibid.

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state proceedings and become hostile towards international organizations, particularly

those of non-regional influence. However, insurgent groups may also vocalize approval

for state initiatives that parallel their objectives and subsequently cease attacks, as

temporarily done by the PKK after Turkey’s initiation of a legal movement for increasing

Kurdish minority rights.50

State Sponsors of Terrorism It is especially important to note the existence of states that covertly support rebel

groups in their attacks against certain identity groups or states. Their interests are to

thwart internal rebellions and assert political control over their constituencies through the

manipulation of external politics.51 Though these states may be signatories to

international legislation, they disregard the existence of the issue and undermine

international efforts looking to investigate their roles in terrorism. They possess some of

the same objectives as insurgent groups, primarily in wanting to change the political

status quo of the Middle East. However, they often deny involvement to maintain a level

of legitimacy in international reputation and not thwart potential investment. Within the

international arena, they are largely unwilling to cooperate with target states. It is usually

within their interests to spur some form of instability within target states, which is why

they may financially, logistically, or militarily aid insurgent groups in their respective

missions.52 They are usually reluctant to participate in bilateral talks but may become

open to multilateral talks with support of regional allies; for example, Syria recently

began talks with Israel on the exception that Turkey, an ally of both states, is involved.53

Target States Situated primarily along the Mediterranean coast, target states are the object of

terrorist attacks. Their constituents, especially the populations near state borders, are

50 “PKK Ceasefire a Balancing Act for Turkish Government,” Voice of America, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-06-03-voa36-68802802.html (accessed 2 January 2010). 51 Bureau of International Information Programs, 1. 52 Ibid. 53 Robert F. Worth, “Warmer Ties With Turkey Kindle Hopes in Syria,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/world/middleeast/15syria.html (accessed 2 January 2009).

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largely vulnerable to insurgent groups. Unlike states in civil conflict, target states are

generally developed, have functioning governments, and possess the resources to tackle

terrorism. They fully condemn acts of terrorism and spend a significant portion of their

funds on logistical and military equipment to respond to related incidents.54 Target states

like Israel and Turkey have initiated incursions and are willing to respond to terrorist

pressures with force. For them, national sovereignty is of upmost importance; they are

unwilling to concede to terrorist demands that involve infringing upon their territorial

integrity.55

The primary concern of target states is national security and protecting their

constituents from ideological and physical terror. These states support international

NGOs in their humanitarian efforts, but believe that insurgents may use them as safe-

havens and respond accordingly. Target states often have international allies who are

willing to support them with military and monetary aid.56 They participate in multilateral

talks and are open to negotiate with international organizations, but do not recognize the

legitimacy of negotiating with terrorist groups. Thus, they often acknowledge UN orders

but are unwilling to concede anything that would potentially compromise their national

autonomy.

Developed States Developed states have an invested interest in the Middle East and thus support the

economic, social, and political advancement of states experiencing terrorism.57 Within

the international community, these states promote the principles of national sovereignty

and democracy. As third-party negotiators, they recognize the need to address the

vulnerability of certain groups in armed conflicts. They condemn the use of terrorism as a

method of political expression and encourage regional cooperation in responding to the 54 Bekir Cinar, “The Use of Military Force Against Terrorism,” Today’s Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=135640 (accessed 2 January 2010). 55 Ibid. 56 Michel Chossudovsky, “’Triple Alliance’: The US, Turkey, Israel and the War on Lebanon,” Center for Research on Globalization, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=2906 (accessed 2 January 2010). 57 Paul Wilkinson, “International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s Response,” Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp084.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010).

PhilMUN 2010 17

issue.58 For them, current efforts are ineffective in thwarting the foundations of terrorism.

They believe that an international coalition or a higher institution like the UN should be

involved at all levels of conflict-resolution for proposed actions to be successful and

sustainable.

Developed states advocate multilateral talks and direct state intervention as the

most effective ways of addressing terrorism. They call for the universal implementation

of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and support the addition of terrorism into the

jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC).59 In conflict-ridden areas, they call

for the development of monitoring and logistical mechanisms. The European Union

(E.U.) in particular views “accurate and timely information and intelligence [as] crucial

to forestalling terrorist attacks and identifying the perpetrators.”60 Developed states

support strengthening political institutions as a safeguard against terrorism, particularly in

states, like Lebanon, that are experiencing civil conflict.

However, the doctrine of national sovereignty and general mistrust of Western

involvement prevents developed states from staging direct intervention. Oftentimes,

developing states in the region accuse developed states of pushing certain ideologies and

reject their propositions – a situation that endangers the strengthening of social

institutions and hinders progress toward countering terrorism.61 To counter such effects,

developed states fund UN entities and international NGOs that possess good standing

with target regions while still maintaining transparency.62 For example, the United States

Agency for International Development (USAID) often funds school construction in the

West Bank and Gaza Strip through the UNRWA.

58 Ibid. 59 Adamantios Vassilakis, “EU Presidency Statement: Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts,” European Union @ United Nations, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_2065_fr.htm (accessed 2 January 2010). 60 European Union Committee, “After Madrid: the EU’s Response to Terrorism,” The Stationary Office of London, www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/.../53.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 61 United Nations, “2008 Parliamentary Hearing, Background Paper: Session II,” Inter-Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga08/s2.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 62 Kerlin, Janelle, “U.S. Government Funding for International Nongovernmental Organizations,” Urban Institute, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311332_funding_NGOs.pdf (2 January 2010).

PhilMUN 2010 18

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) NGOs are instrumental in addressing the humanitarian consequences of terrorism.

In areas of conflict, NGOs are mainly responsible for allocating basic resources and

sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. When dealing with the issue

at hand, NGOs want states to respect international humanitarian law and respond

proportionately to terrorist attacks.63 During the Gaza War, several NGOs like Amnesty

International and OXFAM reported on the severe implications of Israeli response on

civilian life and provided vulnerable groups with basic resources. As a response to

terrorist attacks on residential areas in Iraq, UN-Habitat initiated the Urban and Housing

Rehabilitation Program (UHRP), which constructs emergency shelter for families without

homes and helps strengthen civil society through community work.64 Some NGOs also

attempt to establish bilateral relations with governments in order to influence post-

conflict resolution so that it includes counter-terrorism measures.65

NGOs situated in states with civil conflict often become single actors in their

plight to aid vulnerable groups. Host countries usually lack stable infrastructure and

states are not able to provide funds, leaving NGOs to oversee their programs without

direct assistance.66 In some conflict-ridden regions, NGOs themselves become the targets

of rebel groups during insurgencies and face expulsion. Coupled with time limits, these

roadblocks prevent NGOs from fully pursuing their agendas. In recent years, NGOs

began promoting partnerships with grassroots organizations as a method of ensuring that

long-term goals are still pursued after withdrawal. Recognizing the role of social

63 NGO Monitor, “The NGO Front in the Gaza War: The Durban Strategy Continues,” NGO Monitor, http://www.ngo-monitor.org/data/images/File/NGO_Front_Gaza.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 64 UN-Habitat, “Strengthening the Capacity of the Housing Sector in Iraq,” UN-Habitat, http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=692&catid=203&typeid=13&subMenuId=0 (accessed 2 January 2010). 65 UN Economic and Social Council. Commission on the Status of Women Acting as Preparatory Committee for Women 2000, 3rd Session. Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action (E/CN.6/2000/PC/2). 19 January 2000. 66 UN Economic and Social Council (E/CN.6/2000/PC/2), 10.

PhilMUN 2010 19

institutions in reconstruction, these organizations specialize in community resilience and

development.67

Projections & Implications Terrorism is a multifaceted issue with far-reaching implications for society. It has

cost the lives of innocent civilians and affects a number of vulnerable populations by

diminishing community infrastructure and hindering socioeconomic development. Not

only do acts of terrorism infringe upon international law and the rights of human beings,

but they also have multifaceted affects on society.

The short and long-term consequences of disregarding the rise of terrorism in the

Middle East are tremendous. States will continue to experience massive population

displacement, as refugees flow into neighboring nations, creating slums around urban

centers.68 In some states, these displacements lead to family breakdown and changes in

community structures, eroding traditional ways of life. Such an environment has major

repercussions for childhood development, as diminishing social institutions ensure that

children preserve a repetitive cycle within their societies.69

A multifaceted response to the issue directly corresponds to regional development

and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Without

formulating a response, the international community will indirectly give legitimacy to

rebel groups that subjugate vulnerable populations. The prevalence of insurgent activity

will lead to an increase in state funds toward military services and propagate the

deterioration of socioeconomic infrastructure in the region.70 Thus, acts of terrorism, no

matter how minimal the damage or small in scope, threaten the very foundations of state

institutions. As the global community has witnessed in the last decade, terrorism hinders

regional development and greatly endangers international security.

67 Groots International, “Grassroots Women’s Initiatives in Reconstruction and Governance,” Groots International, http://www.groots.org/download/Sri_Lanka_exchange.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 68 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 69 Phillips, 1. 70 Bureau of International Information Programs, 1.

PhilMUN 2010 20

Conclusion Unfortunately, the issue of terrorism has remained at a status quo for the past few

years. Since the passage of Security Council Resolution 1373 in 2001, the international

community has come to disagree on the precise definition of terrorism. The UN has

passed resolutions reauthorizing the document and establishing counter-terrorism

programs to combat, in particular, sectarian conflict. However, the scope of UN activities

remains limited and cooperation within the Middle East remains low. State initiatives

have focused mostly on military responses and prosecution, overlooking the preventative

capabilities of a strengthened social sector. Without regional cooperation and the

inclusion of measures to prevent identity-related tribulations in post-conflict resolution,

insurgents’ reliance on armed conflict as a means of political change will continue to

increase

PhilMUN 2010 21

Discussion Questions • What is the definition of terrorism as recognized by the UN? What are the some of the

problems associated with adopting a universal definition? How may these hinder efforts to address terrorism?

• What was the importance of UN Security Council Resolution 1373? How did it

deviate from precedent and what were some of its landmark provisions? • How did the Canal Hotel bombings change UN practices in the Middle East? • What is the significance of the al-Askari Mosque bombing in relation to the effects of

terrorist activities? How did it demonstrate the importance of identity politics in sustaining terrorism?

• Why did the Lebanese government and UNIFIL refuse to disarm Hezbollah despite

UN command? What does this demonstrate about the influence of insurgent groups on civilian populations?

• In relation to state responses to terrorism, what did the Israel-Hezbollah and Gaza

Wars call into question? How can the committee address this issue without infringing upon national sovereignty?

• What are some of the roadblocks that NGOs and developed states face in their

attempts to help states in civil conflict combat terrorism? • How can the UN address the issue of state sponsored terrorism? • In certain societies in the Middle East, sectarian conflict and poor community

infrastructure are roadblocks to initiating counter-terrorism measures. What can the international community do to combat this without infringing too heavily on societal values?

• Has globalization played a role in the rise of terrorism? Explain why and/or why not.

What types of socioeconomic policies are favorable to limiting the influence of terrorism?

• Identify governmental programs that your state initiated to combat terrorism. What

lessons can be learned from their successes and/or failures? What is your state currently doing to address the concerns of vulnerable populations?

PhilMUN 2010 22

Bibliography Further Reading Bureau of International Information Programs, “State Department on Terrorism in the

Middle East, North Africa,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/April/20080430121233eaifas0.4066278.html

This source provides a comprehensive background of the issue and why terrorism should be at the forefront of the global agenda. It includes a quick summary of international progress and lays out a series of possible frameworks in combating terrorism. The document gives a good understanding of the underlying causes propelling terrorism and the military, economic, and social issues at hand.

United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon

Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1 (2006), UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45c30b6e0.html

This source provides a good insight onto the humanitarian aspect of the issue at hand. It illustrates the necessity of mechanisms for the social advancement of vulnerable populations and outlines the progression of international initiatives over time. Organized by the Human Rights Council, this document particularly focuses on the role of NGOs in addressing the consequences of terrorist acts and state responses to related incidents. It calls into the question the actions of targeted states.

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566 (2004), United Nations,

http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1566(2004)

This is the quintessential UN document for understanding the role of the UN in addressing the issue. It outlines the jurisdiction of related UN agencies in combating terrorism and highlights the importance of regional conventions. It summarizes the agreed conclusions of the Security Council and provides useful objectives for formulizing successful resolutions.

PhilMUN 2010 23

Works Cited Abadie, Alberto. “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” Working

Paper Series, Harvard University: John F. Kennedy School of Government, RWP04-043.

Al Jazeera, “Lebanon Blast Kills UNIFIL Troops,” Al Jazeera,

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2007/06/2008525122010725840.html Alex Barker, “Kurds Lay Claim to Blast on Azeri Oil Pipeline,” Financial Times,

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4836dca-64e1-11dd-af61-0000779fd18c.html?nclick_check=1

Atran, Scott. “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,” University of

Michigan, http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/twq06spring_atran.pdf BBC, “Gaza ‘Looks Like Earthquake Zone,’” BBC,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7838618.stm BBC, “UN Condemns ‘War Crimes’ in Gaza,” BBC,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8257301.stm Blanchard, Christopher M. “Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background,”

Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf Brahimi, Lakhdar. “State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries,” UNPAN,

http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN026305.pdf Brooks, Ethel. “Feminist Perspectives on War and Terror,” Women and Gender Studies

at Rutgers University, November 2008. Bureau of International Information Programs, “State Department on Terrorism in the

Middle East, North Africa,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/April/20080430121233eaifas0.4066278.html

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Background Note: Lebanon,” U.S. Department of State,

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PhilMUN 2010 24

Chossudovsky, Michel. “’Triple Alliance’: The US, Turkey, Israel and the War on Lebanon,” Center for Research on Globalization, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=2906

Cinar, Bekir. “The Use of Military Force Against Terrorism,” Today’s Zaman,

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Reuters, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L22619461.htm Groots International, “Grassroots Women’s Initiatives in Reconstruction and

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PhilMUN 2010 25

Phillips, James. “The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/BG1005.cfm

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http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-06-03-voa36-68802802.html Samuelson, Meg. “The Disfigured Body of the Female Guerilla,” Signs 32, no. 4 (2007):

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ods.un.org/TMP/9969713.09185028.html

PhilMUN 2010 26

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566 (2004), United Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1566(2004)

United Nations, “2008 Parliamentary Hearing, Background Paper: Session II,” Inter-

Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga08/s2.pdf Vassilakis, Adamantios. “EU Presidency Statement: Threats to International Peace and

Security Caused by Terrorist Acts,” European Union @ United Nations, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_2065_fr.htm

Wilkinson, Paul. “International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s

Response,” Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp084.pdf

Worth, Robert F. “Blast Destroys Shrine in Iraq, Setting off Sectarian Fury,” New York

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PhilMUN 2010 27

Works Consulted Brooks, Ethel. “Feminist Perspectives on War and Terror,” Women and Gender Studies

at Rutgers University, November 2008. Bureau of International Information Programs, “State Department on Terrorism in the

Middle East, North Africa,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/April/20080430121233eaifas0.4066278.html

Groots International, “Grassroots Women’s Initiatives in Reconstruction and

Governance,” Groots International, http://www.groots.org/download/Sri_Lanka_exchange.pdf

Samuelson, Meg. “The Disfigured Body of the Female Guerilla,” Signs 32, no. 4 (2007):

833-855. Smith, Dan. “Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict,” Berghof Research Center,

http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/smith_handbook.pdf UN Economic and Social Council. Commission on the Status of Women Acting as

Preparatory Committee for Women 2000, 3rd Session. Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action (E/CN.6/2000/PC/2). 19 January 2000.

UN-Habitat, “Strengthening the Capacity of the Housing Sector in Iraq,” UN-Habitat,

http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=692&catid=203&typeid=13&subMenuId=0

United Nations, “2008 Parliamentary Hearing, Background Paper: Session II,” Inter-

Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga08/s2.pdf