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TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULING
People
vs.
Cerilla
The dying
declaration was of
the victim was
applied in this
case as sufficient
to prove the
criminal liability of
the accused
Cerilla.
At around 6:00 pm on 24 April 1998, the victim, Alexander Parreño
(Alexander), his 14-year old daughter, Michelle, and neighbor, Phoebe
Sendin (Sendin), went to the house of Cerilla. They were cordially
welcomed and entertained by Cerilla and his wife. An hour later, a
blackout occurred. At this time, Alexander sought permission from the
couple to leave, which the latter acknowledged. On their way home,
Michelle was walking ahead of Alexander with the latter closely
following his daughter. Suddenly, after walking for about 100 meters
from Cerilla’shouse, Michelle heard an explosion. Michelle immediately
turned her back and saw Cerilla pointing a gun at Alexander who, at that
moment, was staggering towards her. Sendin, who was also with
Alexander and Michelle, did not look back but instead ran away and
proceeded to the house of Mrs. Parreño. Meanwhile, Michelle was
cuddling Alexander beside the road when the latter repeatedly told her
that it was Cerilla who shot him. Twenty minutes lat er, Alexander’s
other daughter arrived. She was also told by Alexander at that moment
that it was Cerilla who shot him.
Police officers rushed to the crime scene and helped carry Alexander
to an ambulance. A police officer was able to ask Alexander who shot
him to which he answered "Pato." "Pato" is an alias by which Cerilla is
known.
Alexander’s wife, Susan, who rushed to the hospital was also told by
Alexander that it was appellant who shot him. Alexander died the
following day.
A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material
facts which concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed
belief that death is impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without
an opportunity of retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a
statement made by a person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is
certain, stating the facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.
NOTE: Requisites for a dying declaration to be admiss ible – (1) The declaration must concern
the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the
facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before and after the assault having a direct
causal connection with it. (2) At the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under
the consciousness of an impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration
admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is
the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders
the dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has ab andoned all hopes of
survival and looked on death as certainly impending. (3) The declarant is competent as a witness.
The rule is that where the declarant would not have been a competent witness had he survived,
the proffered declarations will not be admissible. (4) The declaration must be offered in a
criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. Anent this
requisite, the same deserves no further elaboration as, in fact, the prosecution had caused its
witnesses to take the stand and testify in open court on the substance of Alexander’s ante
mortem statement in the present criminal case for murder.
The victim communicated his ante-mortem statement to three persons who testified with
unanimity that they had been told by the victim himself that it was appellant who shot him.
The statements of victim complied with all the requisites of a dying declaration. First,Alexander’s declaration pertains to the identity of the person who shot him. Second, the fatal
quality and extent of the injuries he suffered underscore the imminence of his death as his
condition was so serious that his demise occurred the following morning after a thirteen (13)-
hour operation. Third, he would have been competent to testify had he survived. Fourth, his dying
declaration is offered in a criminal prosecution for murder where he was the victim.
The fact that the crime was committed during a blackout does not cast doubt on Alexander’s
and Michelle’s positive identification of appellant. While the place of occurrence was dark, this
did not prevent the Alexander or Michelle from identifying the assailant, especially since the shot
was delivered at close range.
The positive identification of appellant must necessarily prevail over his alibi. It was not
physically impossible for appellant to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission. The distance of his house, where he supposedly was, from the locus criminis is
only 120-150 meters, more or less.
Ariatevs.
People
The dyingdeclaration was of
the victim was not
applied in this
case since it
lacked the third
requisite re: that
the declarant
would have been
competent to
testify as the
victim was not
shown to have the
opportunity to see
the assailants.
Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were charged withhomicide for the death of Arthur Ronquillo.
At 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002, his wife, daughter Mirasol, and s on Arnel,
among other persons, on being informed of the shooting of Ronquillo,
repaired to where he was, not far from his residence, and found him
lying on his side and wounded. Although gasping for breath, he was able
to utter to Mirasol, within the hearing distance of Arnel that he was shot
by Badjing and Amado.
Petitioners who were suspected to be the "Badjing" and "Amado"
responsible for the shooting of the victim were subjected to paraffin
tests which yielded negative results.
In a document dated July 1, 2002, the victim's son Arnel gave a
statement in a question and answer style that herein petitioners Jesus
Geraldo and Amado Ariate were the ones who shot his father.
A dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present: (a) itconcerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made
when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending
death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the
dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death.
There is no dispute that the victim's utterance to his children related to the identities of his
assailants. As for the victim's consciousness of impending death, it is not necessary to prove that
he stated that he was at the brink of death; it suffices that, judging from the nature and extent of
his injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so apparent to him that it may safely be inferred
that such ante mortem declaration was made under consciousness of an impending death. The
location of the victim's two gunshot wounds, his gasping for breath, and his eventual death before
arriving at the hospital meet this requirement.
It has not been established, however, that the victim would have been competent to testify
had he survived the attack. There is no showing that he had the opportunity to see his assailant.
Among other things, there is no indication whether he was shot in front, the post-mortem
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TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGIn another document dated July 4, 2002, Mirasol also gave a
statement in a question and answer style that her father uttered that
herein petitioners shot him.
At the witness stand, Mirasol echoed her father's declaration that
"Badjing" and "Amado" shot him. Arnel substantially corroborated
Mirasol's statement.
examination report having merely stated that the points of entry of the wounds were at the "right
lumbar area" and the "right iliac area."
At all events, even if the victim's dying declaration were admissible in evidence, it must identify
the assailant with certainty; otherwise it loses its significance.
However, it is the prosecution, not petitioners, which had the burden of proving that
petitioners were, at the material time, the only ones in the barangay who bore such nicknames
or aliases. This, the prosecution failed to discharge.
When there is d oubt on the identity of the malefactors, motive is essential for their conviction.
The Court notes that in their affidavits supporting the criminal complaint, the victim's wife and
children Mirasol and Arnel proffered not knowing any possible motive for petitioners to shoot
the victim. At the trial, no evidence of any motive was p resented by the prosecution. Petitioners'
defense of denial and alibi thus assumes importance.
People
vs.
De Joya
The dying
declaration was of
the victim was not
applied in this
case since the
purported dying
declaration was
incomplete and it
did not
correspond to the
question asked.
Respondent was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide to
which the respondent pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo
rendered a decision convicting De Joya of the crime charged.
The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together
with their ten year old son Alvin and Herminia’ 88-year old mother,
Eulalia, are residents of Baliuag, Bulacan.
In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia left for school to
teach. Her mother Eulalia was then sitting at their sofa watching the
television set. Her son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. And
at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he
proceeded home.
At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spousesValencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a
friend, went out of the former's house to visit a friend. While at her yard,
Gloria looked back to the direction of the Valencia's house. She noticed
respondent standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's.
When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia lying
down prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He immediately
threw his bag and ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked
her what happened, to which Eulalia answered “Si Paqui”. After saying
these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed away.
Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and
examined the body of Eulalia. The said doctor declared that said Eulalia
had a heart attack which caused her death. When asked by Herminia
Valencia why her mother's ears were punctured, no reply was given by
said doctor. Herminia requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentinodid not issue one and instead immediately left.
Herminia found out that the two gold rings worn by her mother were
missing. The right earring of her mother was likewise missing. All of
these were valued at P300.
That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor
ransacked. The contents of the wardrobe closet were taken out. Its
secret compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the aparador was
destroyed.
On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in by the side
of the cabinet near the door of their room downstairs, more or less one
meter from where the victim was lying prostrate.
Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color
and size, as the other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo
but which she gave to Socorro De Joya, the wife of the respondent.
It must be noted that the words "Si Pa qui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence.
Those two words could have been intended to designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or
(b) the object of a verb. If they had be en intended to designate the subject, we must note that no
predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they were designed to designate the object of a verb,
we must note once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The phrase "Si Paqui" must,
moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's
question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?"
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be
complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the
res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a
full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.
The statement as offered must not be merely a part of the whole as it was expressed by thedeclarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of
the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to
include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which
thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary
statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of
a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement
he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a portion of what he might have been
able to tell.
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted,
accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other
circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified
by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not
therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which
dying declarations are received.It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete.
In other words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible
communication to Alvin.
The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in nature.
When these circumstances are examined one by one, none of them can be said to lead clearly
and necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed the deceased Eulalia. The
quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to have taken place two weeks before
Eulalia's death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof of a motive capable of moving a
person to slay another in such a violent and gory manner.
The testimony of Herminia about the single slipper that she found near or under the cabinet in
the living room where Eulalia was slain, can scarcely be regarded as conclusive evidence that such
slipper was indeed one of the very same pair of slippers that she had given to appellant's wife,
who was also the sister of Herminia's husband. Rubber or beach, walk slippers are made in such
quantities by multiple manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not hundreds ofslippers of the same color, shape and size as the pair that Herminia gave to appellant's wife.
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TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGThe testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of 31 January 1978
around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing
is, by itself, not proof of any act or circumstance that would show that appellant had perpetrated
the slaying or the robbery.
Appellant's failure to present himself to pay his respects to the deceased or her immediate
family during the four-day wake, does not give rise to any inference that ap pellant was the slayer
of Eulalia. Appellant had explained that he had been busily at work, sewing and carrying on his
trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted, had dropped in the Valencias' house in the
afternoon Eulalia was killed and had viewed the body (before it was lying in state) along with
several other persons. His reluctance or inability to participate in the formal wake is notnecessarily a sign of guilt.
Fuentes
vs.
CA
The declaration
made by Zolio was
not given
credence as an
exception to the
hearsay rule under
declaration
against interest
because the so-
called declarant
was not shown to
be dead or unable
to testify.
Petitioner Fuentes seeks the reversal of the decision of the CA
affirming his conviction for murder.
At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989, Julieto Malaspina
together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was
at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur.
Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of
the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a
short hair." Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with
a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground and his companions rushed
to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the victim succumbed to the gaping
wound on his abdomen he muttered that Fuentes s tabbed him.
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo
Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that when the victimwas killed he was conversing with him; that he was compelled to run
away when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear would "kill
all those from San Isidro" because "Jonie," the killer, was from that
place; that since he was also from San Isidro he sought refuge in his
brother's house where he met "Jonie;" that "Jonie" admitted
spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match
before the latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were
many persons milling around the house "Jonie" jumped out and escaped
through the window; that he was arrested at eight o'clock in the
morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay.
One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made
against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his s uccessors in interest
and against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on
necessity and trustworthiness.
There are three essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a)
the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable
by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify
existed.
The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that theextrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose.
In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove
their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence.
The Court noted, however, that no less than petitioner's own witness, Nerio Biscocho who
claimed he also saw the killing, testified that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner, and "Jonie"
Fuentes are one and the same person.
Consider this factual scenario: the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accused-
appellant, verbally admitted to the latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes,
that he (Zoilo) killed the victim because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking
feature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness.
Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate. The same can be said
of accused-appellant and his un cle Felicisimo.
But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest
cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is noshowing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38
obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto
unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece
of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than
the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted
having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to
produce Zoilo as a witness.
People
vs.
Bernal
The deceased’s
declaration to
another person
that he was having
an affair with the
wife of the
accused wasadmitted in
Respondent, together with two other persons whose identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of
kidnapping in Davao city.
A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his
arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution presented four witnesses.
On the other hand, Theodore Bernal testified for his defense.
In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably acted in conspiracy with the two other unknown
individuals "as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of
purpose." Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances only. The circumstances present in this case sufficiently indicate the par ticipation
of Bernal in the disappearance of Openda, Jr.
Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is
admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
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TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGevidence since it
complied with all
the requisites for
a declaration
against interest to
be considered as
an exception to
the hearsay rule.
On August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto
Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited
Bernal, who was passing by, to join them.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently
because he was going to fetch his child. Thereafter, two men arrived,
approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was "Payat." When
he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other
handcuffed him and told him "not to run because they were policemen"
and because he had an "atraso" or a score to settle with them. They then
hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went to the house ofOpenda, Jr. and informed the latter's mother of the abduction.
The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a
certain Salito Enriquez, tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit
affair with Bernal's wife and this was the motive behind the former's
kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing. On the other hand, the
defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police
on August 5, 1991, and hence, was never kidnapped.
A certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified
that sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and
Bernal's wife were having an affair. Undoubtedly, his wife's infidelity
was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors-in-interest and against third persons.
With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present provision, it is
safe to assume that "declaration against interest" has been expanded to include all kinds of
interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: (1) that
the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the
declarant; (3) that at the time he m ade said declaration the declarant was aware that the same
was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and
believed such declaration to be true.
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His
confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty
Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a
falsehood to his own detriment.
Parel
vs.
Prudencio
The declaration
made by the
petitioner’s father to the effect that
he is the occupant
of the residential
building and not
the owner of such
building, was
admitted and
considered as a
declaration
against interest
(against the heir,
who is the
petitioner in this
case) as anexception to the
hearsay rule.
On February 27, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioner with the RTC alleging that he
is the owner of a two-storey residential house located at No. 61 F orbesPark National Reservation near DPS compound in Baguio City. Such
property was constructed solely from his own funds and declared in his
name under Tax Declaration No. 47048. He commenced the
construction of said house in 1972 until its completion three years later.
When the second floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he
allowed petitioner’s parents to move therein and occupy the second
floor while the construction of the ground floor was on-going to
supervise the construction and to safeguard the materials. When the
construction of the second floor was finished in 1975, respondent
allowed petitioner’s parents and children to transfer and temporarily
reside thereat; it was done out of sheer magnanimity as petitioner’s
parents have no house of their own and since respondent’s wife is the
older sister of Florentino, petitioner’s father.
In November 1985, respondent wrote petitioner’s father a notice forthem to vacate the said house as the former was due for retirement and
he needed the place to which petitioner’s parents heeded when they
migrated to U.S. in 1986. However, without respondent’s knowledge,
petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the
ground floor of respondent’s house. Petitioner’s refusal to vacate the
house despite repeated demands prompted respondent to file the
instant action for recovery of possession.
Petitioner filed h is Answer with Counterclaim alleging that his parents
are the co-owners of the said residential house, i.e., the upper story
belongs to respondent while the ground floor pertains to pet itioner’s
parents.
In deciding in favor of the petitioner, RTC did not give credence to the
tax declaration as well as the several documents showing the City
Assessor’s assessment of the property all in respondent’s name since taxdeclarations are not conclusive proof of ownership. It rejected the
We agree with the CA that respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint
for recovery of possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof.
The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstandingthey are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence
advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his
own pecuniary or moral interest.
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioner’s father and had adequate knowledge
with respect to the subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically
declared that while he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of the same
as it is owned by respondent who is residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would
not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as
well as to his children’s interests as his heirs.
A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the
facts in dispute. Notably, during Florentino’s lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed said
affidavit until 1989, the year of his de ath, there is no showing that he had revoked such affidavit
even when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had b een filed by respondent against him
(Florentino) and petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house which the trial court dismisseddue to the absence of evidence showing that petitioner entered the house against the latter’s will
and held that the remedy of respondent was to file an action for ejectment; and even when a
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was
subsequently dismissed on the ground that respondent’s action should be an accion publiciana
which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
Moreover, the building plan of the residential house dated January 16, 1973 was in the name
of respondent and his wife. It was established during petitioner’s cross -examination that the
existing structure of the two-storey house was in accordance with said building plan.
Notably, respondent has been religiously paying the real estate property taxes on the house
declared under his name since 1974. In fact, petitioner during his cross-examination admitted
that there was no occasion that they paid the real estate taxes nor declared any portion of the
house in their name.
In this case, the records show that although petitioner’s counsel asked that he be allowed to
offer his documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file the s ame. Thus, the CA didnot consider the documentary evidence presented by petitioner.
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TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGaffidavit executed by Florentino declaring the house as owned by
respondent saying that the affidavit should be read in its entirety to
determine the purpose of its execution; that it was executed because of
an advisement addressed to the late Florentino by the City Treasurer
concerning the property’s tax assessment and Florentino, thought then
that it should be the respondent who should pay the taxes; and that the
affidavit cannot be accepted for being hearsay.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a settled rule
that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not
mean that it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
Petitioner himself testified that it was his father who saw the progress of the construction and
purchased the materials to be used; and as a young boy he would follow-up some deliveries upon
order of his father and never saw respondent in the construction site. The fact that not one of
the witnesses saw respondent during the construction of the said house does not establish that
petitioner’s father and respondent co-owned the house.
Tison
vs.
CA
The declaration
made by Teodora
Domingo to the
effect that the
petitioners are her
niece and nephew
was admitted in
evidence despite
the absence of
any independent
evidence of
pedigree or
relationship. This
involves the first
scenario of an actor declaration
about pedigree
wherein the claim
is directed against
the declarant, in
this case against
her estate.
Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance against the private
respondent Teodora Domingo for the parcel of land with a house an
apartment located in Quezon City. The properties were originally owned
by the spouses Martin and Teodora Guerrero.
Petitioners claim to be the niece and nephew of Teodora Guerrero
who died leaving only Martin and the petitioners as the heirs. Upon the
death of his wife, Martin Guerrero then executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto him, allegedly as the sole
heir, the land in dispute. Subsequently, a TCT was issued to Martin,
which he used in s elling the property to respondent Domingo.
Respondent Domingo thereafter acquired a TCT in her name. The
petitioners claim that they are entitled to inherit ½ of the property by
right of representation.
Petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness,
with the following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners'filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal
certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of
destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes
Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton
Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and
Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga
attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora
Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero.
Private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the
ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the
deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family
Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner CorazonDezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and
aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls
short of the quantum of proof required.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. The issue
as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Teodora Guerrero’s father cannot be
properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the
further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of
herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners
unless and until it is rebutted.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece.
Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception
to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court , subject to the following
conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related
to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown byevidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam ,
that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the
declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to
both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the
relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself.
There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there
be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where
it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through
his declarations to the property of some other member of the family.
The declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is
admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that
there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered
competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice.
Mendoza
vs.
CA
The act or
declaration
(about pedigree)
made by the
mother and
brother of the
alleged father of
Teopista Toring to
a certain Isaac
Mendoza, who
was the nephewof the alleged
The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private
respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida
Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married
at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza
recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and
according her the rights and p rivileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the
plaintiffs allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and
attorney's fees.
Two witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendozaand Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro.
An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in
his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may
consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in wh ich his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The Court noted that it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this q uestion of pedigree, and
he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was informed by his father Hipolito,
who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was
Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.
Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.Nevertheless, there are certain safeguards against its abuse. The following requisites have to be
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TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGfather, was
admitted in
evidence as it
complied with the
needed requisites.
Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring
because she used to work with him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro
himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-
between for their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming
pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro frequently
handed him money to be given to Brigida.
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista
because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother,
Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and
whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would also give him variousamounts to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro
intended to give certain properties to Teopista.
complied with before the act or d eclaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence: (1)
the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) the pedigree must be in issue; (3) the declarant
must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue; (4) the declaration must be made
before the controversy arose; and (5) the relationship between the declarant and the person
whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations
about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his
brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to
the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the
complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the complaint wasfiled by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the
relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than
such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of F lorencio Mendoza, in
which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.
Solinap
vs.
Locsin, Jr.
As a general rule,
entries in official
records made in
the performance
of his duty by a
public officer or by
a person in the
performance of a
duty specially
enjoined by law,are prima facie
evidence of the
facts therein
stated. However,
in the case at bar,
the certificate,
which issued by
the Local Civil
Registrar,
presented by the
respondent bore
irregularities and
differences from
the certificate,which was
acquired from the
Civil Registrar
General,
presented by the
petitioners. The
glaring
discrepancies
between the two
Certificates of Live
Birth have
overturned the
genuineness of
the certificated
entered in the
Eleven months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on
December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the RTC a
Petition for Letters of Administration praying that he be appointed
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged,
among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late
Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal
properties which include undetermined savings, current and time
deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of
real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr.,
Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and(c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
Before the hearing scheduled by the RTC, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr.,
the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to
be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondent's
petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is
not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin,
who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.
Another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir
of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel
Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that
respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the
statute of limitations.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased, respondent submitted a machine copy of his Certificate ofLive Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the
Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City. It contains the
information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he
was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his
signatures. To prove the existence and authenticity of the document,
respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City, who produced and identified in court the bound volume of 1957
records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 is included. Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph
showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin
bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims,
shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members
of the deceased.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate
The records of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are officially and
regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars.
Since the records of births cover several decades and come from all par ts of the country, to merely
access them in the Civil Registry General requires expertise. To locate one single birth record from
the mass, a regular employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these
employees in Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating
from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously easier.
Thus, in proving the authenticity of the certificate presented by the respondent, more convincing
evidence than those considered by the trial court should have been presented.The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine na ture of certificate presented by
the respondent are dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
However, it was shown that Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and
entered in the Local Civil Registry in January 1957 was based merely on he r general impressions
of the existing records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from those
appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law,
the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, the Court
found Vencer's explanation not convincing.
Further, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years
thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to the certificate presented by the
respondent:
The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Theassailed certificate is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original copies. The assailed certificate is a
carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries
therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are handwritten.
Unlike the contents of those other certificates, the assailed certificate does not indicate
important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and
business.
The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back, there
is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and other
details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up.
It bears stressing that Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that: Entries in
official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippine, or by
a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
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TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGLocal Civil
Registry; thus, the
certificate
presented by the
respondent was
held inadmissible
and insufficient to
prove filiation to
the deceased.
of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila,
indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother,
Amparo Escamilla and that the same does not contain the signature of
the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while
respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded
on January 30, 1957, the certificate presented by the respondent was
recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. On the other hand, the
certificate presented by the petitioners appears on a July, 1956 form,
which was already used before respondent's birth. This scenario dearly
suggests that the certificate presented by the respondent was falsified.Petitioners presented as witness a handwriting expert who testified that
the signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa, then Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City, appearing in the respondent’s certifcate are
forgeries. He thus concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious
document surreptitiously inserted into the bound volume of birth
records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
The trial court rendered a decision, which was affirmed by the CA on
appeal, holding that the certificate and photograph are sufficient proofs
of respondent’s illegitimate filiation with the deceased.
In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (the one
presented by the respondent from the Local Civil Registrar and the one presented by the
petitioners from the Civil Registrar General) have overturned the genuineness of the certificated
entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is the certificate recorded in the Civil Registry
General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin
cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation
Jison
vs.
CA
The letters and
notes written by
the relatives of
the alleged father,
acknowledgingthe illegitimate
status of the
respondent, does
not fall under the
second scenario
contemplated
under acts or
declaration about
pedigree as
independent
evidence of
pedigree as to the
relationship
between thedeclarant and the
person against
whom the claim is
directed was not
presented.
It also does not
fall within the
purview of the
second type of
family reputation
or tradition
regarding
pedigree as the
letters is not
In her complaint filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA
alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison
since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO
impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny
of FRANCISCO's daughter. As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August1946, in Dingle, Iloilo. MONINA claimed that since childhood, she had
enjoyed the continuous and implied recognition as an illegitimate child
of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged
that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that
she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant
(CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's
refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial
declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and
treat her as such.
In his answer, FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual
relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the
complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and
did not know of her whereabouts since then. Further, he never
recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. Asaffirmative and special defenses, FRANCISCO contended that MONINA
had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was
barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for
dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the
malicious filing of the complaint.
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11)
witnesses, namely: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela Casabuena,
Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy
Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz and Lope Amolar. These
witnesses explained individual circumstances, which induced them to
believe that MONINA was Francisco’s daughter.
On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. She
affirmed that as evidenced by certifications from the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar and baptismal certificates, she was born on 6 August 1946
to Esperanza Amolar and FRANCISCO. MONINA first studied at Sagrado
The testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances and
events that occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled
with the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly established the following facts: (1)
FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was in the
employ of the former; (2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts andconduct; and (3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the
years publicly, 35spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.
MONINA's reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning her birth
is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is
devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third
person. Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the inscription
of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the
registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the
latter's part. In like manner, FRANCISCO's lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal
certificates and school records renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity.
However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove the paternity, they may
be admitted as part of MONINA's testimony to corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO spent forher education.
The certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates may not be
taken as circumstantial evidence to prove MONINA's filiation. Since they a re per se inadmissible
in evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial
evidence to prove the same.
As to the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO's relatives, allegedly attesting to
MONINA's filiation, while their due execution and authenticity are not in issue, as MONINA
witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the
contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-
authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and
MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides: The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence
if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
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TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGsimilar to family
possessions such
as family bibles,
family books,
engravings, etc.
Further, it also
cannot form part
of common
reputation.Matters of
pedigree may be
proved by
reputation in the
family, and not by
reputation in the
neighborhood or
vicinity, except
where the
pedigree in
question is
marriage which
may be proved by
commonreputation in the
community.
where she stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado, from 1952 until 1955
(up to Grade 4), FRANCISCO paid for her tuition fees and other school
expenses. She either received the money from FRANCISCO or from Mr.
Lagarto, or saw FRANCISCO give the money to her mother, or Mr.
Lagarto would pay Sagrado directly. After Sagrado, MONINA studied in
different schools, but FRANCISCO continuously answered for her
schooling. For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University
of Iloilo, but she later dropped due to an accident which required a
week's hospitalization. Although FRANCISCO paid for part of the
hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered most of them. In 1963,she enrolled at the University of San Agustin, where she stayed with
Mrs. Franco who paid for MONINA's tuition fees. However, expenses for
books, school supplies, uniforms and the like were shouldered by
FRANCISCO. At the start of each semester, MONINA would show
FRANCISCO that she was enrolled, then he would ask her to canvass
prices, then give her the money she needed. After finishing two
semesters at University of San Agustin, she transferred to De Paul
College and studied there for a year. Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at
Western Institute of Technology. During her senior year, she stayed with
Eusebio and Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She
passed the CPA board exams in 1974 and took up an M.B.A. at De La
Salle University as evidenced by her transcript, wherein FRANCISCO was
likewise listed as “Guardian”.
In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before thenJudge Romeo Callejo of the RTC. As additional witnesses, FRANCISCO
presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iñigo Supertisioso, Lourdes
Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal. FRANCISCO declared that
Esperanza’s employment ceased as of October, 1944, and that while
employed by him, Esperanza would sleep with the other female helpers
on the first floor of his residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept
in a room on the second floor. At that time, his household staff was
composed of three female workers and two (2) male workers. After
Esperanza left in October 1944, she never communicated with him
again, neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly
denied having had sexual relations with Esperanza and disavowed any
knowledge about MONINA’s birth. In the same vein, he denied having
paid for MONINA’s tuition fees, in person or otherwise, and asserted
that he never knew that Mr. Lagarto paid for these fees. Moreover,FRANCISCO could not believe that Lagarto would pay for these fees
despite absence of instructions or approval from FRANCISCO. He
likewise categorically denied that he told anyone, be it Danthea Lopez,
Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or Remedios Franco, that MONINA
was his daughter.
The trial court ruled against Monina but the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court’s decision.
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family
portraits and the like may be received as evidence of pedigree.
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the p ortion containing the
first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the d ocuments in
question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the
section containing the second underscored phrase. The scope of the enumeration contained in
the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects
which are commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles which represent, in effect,
a family's joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been described
as objects "openly exhibited and well known to the family," or those "which, if preserved in afamily, may be regarded as giving a family tradition." Other examples of these objects which are
regarded as reflective of a family's reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on
tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.
Clearly, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO’s relatives, as private documents
not constituting "family possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of
Rule 130, Section 40.
Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common
reputation.
Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “Common reputation existing
previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years
old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and
inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputations.”
The weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the
common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is amaterial element of evidence going to establish pedigree. Thus, matters of pedigree may be
proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except
where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the
community.
However, their inadmissibility notwithstanding, such letters and notes, may properly be
admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO
recognized her as his daughter.
As to FRANCISCO's other witnesses, the testimonies of the witnesses are considered
insufficient to overcome MONINA's evidence. It merely consist of denials, which being in the form
of negative testimony, necessarily stand infirm as against positive testimony.
All told, MONINA's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof" required for the success of
an action to establish one's illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding "open
and continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws;"
moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
Ferrer vs.
de Inchausti
The testimony of
Joaquin de
Inchausti,
referring to the
statement made
by his half-brother
Ramon Martinez
de Viademonte, to
Plaintiffs Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer filed a complaint praying
for a declaration that Rosa Matilde Viademonte, mother of the plaintiffs
herein, had the right to succeed to the inheritance left by Isabel
Gonzales in the same proportion and capacity as the other four children
of the latter namely, Ramon, Rafael, Joaquin, and Clotilde. The plaintiffs
allege that they are the only legitimate heirs of Rosa Viademonte and
are entitled to receive the latter’s share, that is, one-fifth of the estate
left by Isabel Gonzales.
Evidence adduced at the trial to prove the origin of the cause of action shows, in a manner
which leaves no room for doubt, that Rosa was not a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzales and
it follows that her children have no right to a part of the hereditary property of Isabel Gonzales.
On Page 9 of the day-book which Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Jr., kept during his lifetime,
appears a memorandum which says: On September 1, 1862, seven o'clock in the evening a
children three days old named Rosa Matilde Robles, according to the baptismal certificate issued
by the acting rector Don Ramon Fernandez of the Cathedral Church of Manila, was delivered to
my mother; this child was baptized by the priest Don Remegio Rodriguez with the authority of
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TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGthe effect that
Rosa Matilde
(mother of the
platintiff) is the
same Rosa
Matilde Robles,
thereby rebutting
the contention
that Rosa Matilda
is a legitimatedaughter of Isabel
Gonzales, was
admitted in
evidence as part
of family
reputation or
tradition
regarding
pedigree.
They allege that Isabel was first married to Ramon Martinez
Viademonte and that their mother Rosa was the fruit of their
relationship. Isabel was then married Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, father
of defendants herein.
Counsel for the plaintiffs sought to establish that Rosa Matilde
Viademonte, mother of the plaintiffs, has been treated and considered
as a daughter of Isabel Gonzales and that on one occasion, the said
Gonzales remarked that the father of Rosa Matilde was Ramon Martinez
de Viademonte.
Also, that Joaquin C. de Inchausti, the son of Isabel Gonzales and JoseJoaquin de Inchausti, dedicated a picture to Rosa in the following
manner: “To my dear and unforgettable sister Rosa.” College records of
the latter at Collegio de Santa Isabel were shown to establish filiation.
The defendants presented an entry in the notebook of Ramon
Viademonte Jr. which showed that true name of Rosa Matilde
Viademonte was Rosa Matilde Robles, born of unknown parents in
September 1, 1952. Notwithstanding the arguments of the plaintiff,
Joaquin de Inchausti testified that one day he was assured by his half-
brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was not his
sister but a mere protégée and that her true name was Rosa Matilde
Robles and that on occasion the said brother showed him a copy of the
certificate of birth which he took from the parochial church.
said rector, and according to the baptismal certificate, it was a child of unknown parents." This
memorandum agrees with the above-mentioned baptismal certificate of Rosa Matilde Robles.
Notwithstanding the argument of counsel for the appellants Joaquin de Inchausti stated that
one day he was assured by his half-brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was
not his sister, but that she was only a mere protegee and that her true n ame was Rosa Matilde
Robles, and that on that occasion the said brother showed him the certificate of birth, a copy of
which he took from the parochial church.
In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is now dead, the testimony of Joaquin
Jose de Inchausti referring to the said deceased is admissible, for they are members of the same
family, in accordance with the provisions of section 281 of Act No. 190, and consequently, theconclusion is that Rosa Matilde is the same Rosa Matilde Robles which is mentioned and because
she was born in 1852, in no manner could she be the legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte
and Isabel Gonzalez whose marriage was dissolved in 1836 by the death of the husband.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides: The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence
if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family
portraits and the like may be received as evidence of pedigree.
In Re Mallari The testimonies of
the witnesses,who lived in the
same community
of respondent’s
paternal
grandmother, to
the effect that his
paternal
grandmother was
unmarried and
was a Filipino
citizen, was
admitted in
evidence as an
exception to thehearsay rule under
common
reputation. Since
respondent’s
paternal
grandmother was
a Filipino citizen,
his father was
consequently a
Filipino citizen,
making the
respondent also a
Filipino citizen and
not a Chinese
national.
The SC ordered the investigation of the matter of citizenship of
Florencio Mallare, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on March 5,1962, for the purpose of determining whether his name should be
stricken from the roll of persons authorized to practice law in the
Philippines.
After an investigation, a decision was rendered by this Court holding
that by preponderance of evidence, it appeared that respondent
Mallare's father, Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his
mother admittedly being a Chinese, respondent is likewise a Chinese
national. Consequently respondent Florencio Mallare was declared
excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revoked,
and he was ordered to return to this Court, the lawyer's diploma
previously issued to him.
On February 4, 1969, respondent petitioned the Court for the
reopening of the case and for new trial on the ground, inter alia, of newly
discovered evidence, the introduction of which could alter the decisionpreviously promulgated. The evidence proposed to be presented
consisted of (1) an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate
Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that
Estaben Mallare, respondent's father, is the natural son of Ana Mallare,
a Filipino; and (2) testimonies of certain persons who had a known
Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime.
Specifically, the respondent presented the following witnesses:
Damiana Cabangon who declared that she was with her mother,
the "hilot" who attended to Ana Mallare during her delivery, when
Esteban Mallare was born; that she was present when Esteban
was baptized; that Ana Mallare had lived continuously in
Macalelon and was reputed to be unmarried; that she had never
met or seen Esteban's father, a certain Mr. Dy.
Rafael Catarroja, the former mayor of Macalelon, who declared
that he knew Esteban Mallare even as a child; that Esteban was
The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and
residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration that AnaMallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was
reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and
illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare (respondent’s father). Reputation has been held admissible as
evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born
alive. Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from
persons who are not members of the family — the reason for the distinction is the public interest
that is taken in the question of the existence of marital relations.
The public reputation in Macalelon that Esteban was Ana's natural child, testified to by the
witness, would constitute proof of the illegitimacy of the former. Besides, if Estaban were really
born out of legal union, it is highly improbable that he would be keeping the surname "Mallare"
after his mother, instead of adopting that of his father.
The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana Mallare is a
Tagalog (and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as being mere conclusions devoid
of evidentiary value. The declarations were not only based on the reputation in the communityregarding her race or race-ancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but they must have certain
factual basis. For it must be realized that in this Philippine society, every region possesses certain
characteristics all its own. Thus, a Tagalog would normally detect if a person hails from the same
region even from the way the latter speaks. Considering that the witnesses testified having
known, and lived with, Ana Mallare in Macalelon, their declaration that she is a Tagalog should
receive a high degree of credibility.
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a F ilipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no
other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine
citizenship. Neither could any act taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest
him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien, Esteban's
exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of
April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already
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TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGthen living with his mother, Ana Mallare, a Tagala, who was
cohabiting with a Chinese; that Esteban started voting in 1934, and
became one of his campaign leaders.
Salomon Gimenez, the former mayor of Macalelon, who declared
having known Esteban Mallare; that in the elections of 1925, when
Esteban campaigned for a rival candidate against him, he wanted
to seek for Esteban's disqualification; that he sought the counsel of
Judge Gaudencio Eleazar who advised him that a disqualification
move would not prosper because Esteban's mother was not
married to Esteban's Chinese father. Joaquin Enobal who declared that he was a classmate and
playmate of Esteban Mallare; that he had not seen the husband of
Ana Mallare; that Ana was a Tagalog who had lived in Macalelon.
participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate. These acts are sufficient to
show his preference for Philippine citizenship.
NB: Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “Common reputation existing
previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years
old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and
inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputations.”
DBP Pool
vs.
RMN
The utterances
made by the
bystanders, made
as basis by the
police
investigators in
their report, was
not considered as
part of res gestae
since spontaneity
was notsufficiently
proven. At best,
the testimonies
made by the
police
investigators can
be considered as
independently
relevant
statements
gathered in the
course of their
investigation, and
are admissible notas to the veracity
thereof but to the
fact that they had
been thus uttered.
This involves a civil case filed by Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN)
against DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies and Provident
Insurance Corporation for recovery of insurance benefits.
Respondent owns several broadcasting stations all over the country.
Provident covered respondent’s transmitter equipment and generating
set for the amount ofP13,550,000.00 under Fire Insurance Policy No.
30354, while petitioner covered respondent’s transmitter, furniture,
fixture and other transmitter facilities for the amount of P5,883,650.00
under Fire Insurance Policy No. F-66860.
In the evening of July 27, 1988, respondent’s radio station located in
SSS Building, Bacolod City, was razed by fire causing damage in theamount of P1,044,040.00. Respondent sought recovery under the two
insurance policies but the claims were denied on the ground that the
cause of loss was an excepted risk (i.e., any loss or damage occasioned
by or through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the
following consequences, namely: (c) War, invasion, act of foreign
enemy, hostilities, or warlike operations (whether war be declared or
not), civil war; (d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising, insurrection,
rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power).
The insurance companies maintained that the evidence showed that
the fire was caused by members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA); and consequently, denied
the claims.
The RTC rendered a decision, which was subsequently affirmed by the
CA, in favor of respondent RMN. The lower court held that the onlyevidence that can be considered to determine if the fire was due to the
intentional act committed by the members of the NPA are the
testimonies of witnesses Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and SPO3 Leonardo
Rochar who were admittedly not present when the fire occurred. Their
testimonies were limited to the fact that an investigation was conducted
and in the course of the investigation they were informed by bystanders
that heavily armed men entered the transmitter house, poured gasoline
and then lighted it. After that, they went out shouting "Mabuhay ang
NPA". The persons whom they investigated and who actually saw the
burning of the station were not presented as witnesses.
The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as part of res gestae. While it may
concede that these statements were made by the bystanders during a startling occurrence, it
cannot be said however, that these utterances were made spontaneously by the bystanders and
before they had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres
received the bystanders’ statements while they were making the ir investigations during and after
the fire. It is reasonable to assume that when these statements were noted down, the bystanders
already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and exchange
information, not to mention theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in disquieting
situations where hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether these
utterances were the products of truth. That the utterances may be mere idle talk is not remote.
At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres that these statements were mademay be considered as independently relevant statements gathered in the course of their
investigation, and are admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been
thus uttered.
Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with its weight and
sufficiency.23 Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade.24 Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders that it was the members of
the CPP/NPA who caused the fire may be admitted as evidence, it does not follow that such
declarations are sufficient proof. These declarations should be calibrated vis-à-vis the other
evidence on record. And the trial court aptly noted that there is a need for additional convincing
proof, viz.:
The Court finds the foregoing to be insufficient to establish that the cause of the fire was the
intentional burning of the radio facilities by the rebels or an act of insurrection, rebellion or
usurped power. Evidence that persons who burned the radio facilities shouted "Mabuhay angNPA" does not furnish logical conclusion that they are members of the NPA or that their act was
an act of rebellion or insurrection. Additional convincing proof need be submitted. Defendants
failed to discharge their responsibility to present adequate proof that the loss was due to a risk
excluded.25
While the documentary evidence presented by petitioner, i.e., (1) the police blotter; (2) the
certification from the Bacolod Police Station; and (3) the Fire Investigation Report may be
considered exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official records, nevertheless, as noted
by the CA, none of these documents categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of
the CPP/NPA.
Consequently, the insurance companies are liable to pay the respondent for the damage it
incurred.
Talidano
vs.
The copies of the
fax messages were
not considered as
falling within the
Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by Falcon
Maritime and Allied Services, Inc. and was assigned to M/V Phoenix
Seven, a vessel owned and operated by Hansu Corporation which is
based in Korea.
Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court mentions two acts which form part of the res
gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the res
gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the res gestae are the statements
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TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULING
Falcon
Maritime
meaning of res
gestae, either as a
spontaneous
statement (as
spontaneity was
not proven) or as
a verbal act (as
there was no
accompanying
statement to theequivocal act).
Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always
discriminated against and maltreated the vessel’s Filipino crew. This
prompted him to send a letter-complaint to the officer-in-charge of the
International Transport Federation, a measure that allegedly was
resented by the chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed on
21 January 1997. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 27 October
1999.
Private respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily
disembarked the vessel after having been warned several times of
dismissal from service for his incompetence, insubordination, disrespectand insulting attitude toward his superiors. It cited an incident involving
petitioner’s incompetence wherein the vessel invaded a different route
at the Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of petitioner who was
then supposed to be on watch duty. As proof, it presented a copy of a
fax message, sent to it on the date of incident, reporting the vessel’s
deviation from its course due to petitioner’s neglect of duty at the
bridge, as well as a copy of the report of crew discharge issued by the
master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing petitioner’s
complaint, holding that he was validly dismissed for gross neglect of
duties, however, this was subsequently reversed by the NLRC on appeal.
The NLRC held that the fax messages in support of the alleged
misbehavior and neglect of duty by petitioner have no probative value
and are self-serving. It added that the ship’s logbook should have beensubmitted in evidence as it is the repository of all the activities on board
the vessel, especially those affecting the performance or attitude of the
officers and crew members, and, more importantly, the procedures
preparatory to the discharge of a crew member. The NLRC also noted
that private respondent failed to comply with due p rocess in terminating
petitioner’s employment.
accompanying the equivocal act. The Court held that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of
the res gestae.
To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the principal act be
a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to
contrive or devise a