8/15/2019 Evidence Case Digests - Hearsay

1/20

1

TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULING

People

vs.

Cerilla

The dying

declaration was of

the victim was

applied in this

case as sufficient

to prove the

criminal liability of

the accused

Cerilla.

At around 6:00 pm on 24 April 1998, the victim, Alexander Parreño

(Alexander), his 14-year old daughter, Michelle, and neighbor, Phoebe

Sendin (Sendin), went to the house of Cerilla. They were cordially

welcomed and entertained by Cerilla and his wife. An hour later, a

blackout occurred. At this time, Alexander sought permission from the

couple to leave, which the latter acknowledged. On their way home,

Michelle was walking ahead of Alexander with the latter closely

following his daughter. Suddenly, after walking for about 100 meters

from Cerilla’shouse, Michelle heard an explosion. Michelle immediately

turned her back and saw Cerilla pointing a gun at Alexander who, at that

moment, was staggering towards her. Sendin, who was also with

Alexander and Michelle, did not look back but instead ran away and

proceeded to the house of Mrs. Parreño. Meanwhile, Michelle was

cuddling Alexander beside the road when the latter repeatedly told her

that it was Cerilla who shot him. Twenty minutes lat er, Alexander’s

other daughter arrived. She was also told by Alexander at that moment

that it was Cerilla who shot him.

Police officers rushed to the crime scene and helped carry Alexander

to an ambulance. A police officer was able to ask Alexander who shot

him to which he answered "Pato." "Pato" is an alias by which Cerilla is

known.

Alexander’s wife, Susan, who rushed to the hospital was also told by

Alexander that it was appellant who shot him. Alexander died the

following day.

A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material

facts which concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed

belief that death is impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without

an opportunity of retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a

statement made by a person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is

certain, stating the facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.

NOTE: Requisites for a dying declaration to be admiss ible  – (1) The declaration must concern

the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the

facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before and after the assault having a direct

causal connection with it. (2) At the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under

the consciousness of an impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration

admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is

the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders

the dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has ab andoned all hopes of

survival and looked on death as certainly impending. (3) The declarant is competent as a witness.  

The rule is that where the declarant would not have been a competent witness had he survived,

the proffered declarations will not be admissible. (4) The declaration must be offered in a

criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.  Anent this

requisite, the same deserves no further elaboration as, in fact, the prosecution had caused its

witnesses to take the stand and testify in open court on the substance of Alexander’s ante

mortem statement in the present criminal case for murder.

The victim communicated his ante-mortem statement to three persons who testified with

unanimity that they had been told by the victim himself that it was appellant who shot him.

The statements of victim complied with all the requisites of a dying declaration. First,Alexander’s declaration pertains to the identity of the person who shot him. Second, the fatal

quality and extent of the injuries he suffered underscore the imminence of his death as his

condition was so serious that his demise occurred the following morning after a thirteen (13)-

hour operation. Third, he would have been competent to testify had he survived. Fourth, his dying

declaration is offered in a criminal prosecution for murder where he was the victim.

The fact that the crime was committed during a blackout does not cast doubt on Alexander’s

and Michelle’s positive identification of appellant. While the place of occurrence was dark, this

did not prevent the Alexander or Michelle from identifying the assailant, especially since the shot

was delivered at close range.

The positive identification of appellant must necessarily prevail over his alibi. It was not

physically impossible for appellant to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of

its commission. The distance of his house, where he supposedly was, from the locus criminis is

only 120-150 meters, more or less.

Ariatevs.

People

The dyingdeclaration was of

the victim was not

applied in this

case since it

lacked the third

requisite re: that

the declarant

would have been

competent to

testify as the

victim was not

shown to have the

opportunity to see

the assailants.

Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were charged withhomicide for the death of Arthur Ronquillo.

At 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002, his wife, daughter Mirasol, and s on Arnel,

among other persons, on being informed of the shooting of Ronquillo,

repaired to where he was, not far from his residence, and found him

lying on his side and wounded. Although gasping for breath, he was able

to utter to Mirasol, within the hearing distance of Arnel that he was shot

by Badjing and Amado.

Petitioners who were suspected to be the "Badjing" and "Amado"

responsible for the shooting of the victim were subjected to paraffin

tests which yielded negative results.

In a document dated July 1, 2002, the victim's son Arnel gave a

statement in a question and answer style that herein petitioners Jesus

Geraldo and Amado Ariate were the ones who shot his father.

A dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present: (a) itconcerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made

when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending

death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the

dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death.

There is no dispute that the victim's utterance to his children related to the identities of his

assailants. As for the victim's consciousness of impending death, it is not necessary to prove that

he stated that he was at the brink of death; it suffices that, judging from the nature and extent of

his injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so apparent to him that it may safely be inferred

that such ante mortem declaration was made under consciousness of an impending death. The

location of the victim's two gunshot wounds, his gasping for breath, and his eventual death before

arriving at the hospital meet this requirement.

It has not been established, however, that the victim would have been competent to testify

had he survived the attack. There is no showing that he had the opportunity to see his assailant.

Among other things, there is no indication whether he was shot in front, the post-mortem

8/15/2019 Evidence Case Digests - Hearsay

2/20

2

TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGIn another document dated July 4, 2002, Mirasol also gave a

statement in a question and answer style that her father uttered that

herein petitioners shot him.

At the witness stand, Mirasol echoed her father's declaration that

"Badjing" and "Amado" shot him. Arnel substantially corroborated

Mirasol's statement.

examination report having merely stated that the points of entry of the wounds were at the "right

lumbar area" and the "right iliac area."

At all events, even if the victim's dying declaration were admissible in evidence, it must identify

the assailant with certainty; otherwise it loses its significance.

However, it is the prosecution, not petitioners, which had the burden of proving that

petitioners were, at the material time, the only ones in the barangay who bore such nicknames

or aliases. This, the prosecution failed to discharge.

When there is d oubt on the identity of the malefactors, motive is essential for their conviction.

The Court notes that in their affidavits supporting the criminal complaint, the victim's wife and

children Mirasol and Arnel proffered not knowing any possible motive for petitioners to shoot

the victim. At the trial, no evidence of any motive was p resented by the prosecution. Petitioners'

defense of denial and alibi thus assumes importance.

People

vs.

De Joya

The dying

declaration was of

the victim was not

applied in this

case since the

purported dying

declaration was

incomplete and it

did not

correspond to the

question asked.

Respondent was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide to

which the respondent pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo

rendered a decision convicting De Joya of the crime charged.

The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together

with their ten year old son Alvin and Herminia’ 88-year old mother,

Eulalia, are residents of Baliuag, Bulacan.

In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia left for school to

teach. Her mother Eulalia was then sitting at their sofa watching the

television set. Her son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. And

at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he

proceeded home.

At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spousesValencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a

friend, went out of the former's house to visit a friend. While at her yard,

Gloria looked back to the direction of the Valencia's house. She noticed

respondent standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's.

When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia lying

down prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He immediately

threw his bag and ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked

her what happened, to which Eulalia answered “Si Paqui”. After saying

these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed away.

Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and

examined the body of Eulalia. The said doctor declared that said Eulalia

had a heart attack which caused her death. When asked by Herminia

Valencia why her mother's ears were punctured, no reply was given by

said doctor. Herminia requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentinodid not issue one and instead immediately left.

Herminia found out that the two gold rings worn by her mother were

missing. The right earring of her mother was likewise missing. All of

these were valued at P300.

That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor

ransacked. The contents of the wardrobe closet were taken out. Its

secret compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the aparador was

destroyed.

On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in by the side

of the cabinet near the door of their room downstairs, more or less one

meter from where the victim was lying prostrate.

Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color

and size, as the other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo

but which she gave to Socorro De Joya, the wife of the respondent.

It must be noted that the words "Si Pa qui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence.

Those two words could have been intended to designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or

(b) the object of a verb. If they had be en intended to designate the subject, we must note that no

predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they were designed to designate the object of a verb,

we must note once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The phrase "Si Paqui" must,

moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's

question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?"

It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be

complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the

res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a

full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.

The statement as offered must not be merely a part of the whole as it was expressed by thedeclarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of

the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to

include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which

thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary

statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of

a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement

he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a portion of what he might have been

able to tell.

The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted,

accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other

circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified

by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not

therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which

dying declarations are received.It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete.

In other words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible

communication to Alvin.

The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in nature.

When these circumstances are examined one by one, none of them can be said to lead clearly

and necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed the deceased Eulalia. The

quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to have taken place two weeks before

Eulalia's death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof of a motive capable of moving a

person to slay another in such a violent and gory manner.

The testimony of Herminia about the single slipper that she found near or under the cabinet in

the living room where Eulalia was slain, can scarcely be regarded as conclusive evidence that such

slipper was indeed one of the very same pair of slippers that she had given to appellant's wife,

who was also the sister of Herminia's husband. Rubber or beach, walk slippers are made in such

quantities by multiple manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not hundreds ofslippers of the same color, shape and size as the pair that Herminia gave to appellant's wife.

8/15/2019 Evidence Case Digests - Hearsay

3/20

3

TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGThe testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of 31 January 1978

around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing

is, by itself, not proof of any act or circumstance that would show that appellant had perpetrated

the slaying or the robbery.

Appellant's failure to present himself to pay his respects to the deceased or her immediate

family during the four-day wake, does not give rise to any inference that ap pellant was the slayer

of Eulalia. Appellant had explained that he had been busily at work, sewing and carrying on his

trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted, had dropped in the Valencias' house in the

afternoon Eulalia was killed and had viewed the body (before it was lying in state) along with

several other persons. His reluctance or inability to participate in the formal wake is notnecessarily a sign of guilt.

Fuentes

vs.

CA

The declaration

made by Zolio was

not given

credence as an

exception to the

hearsay rule under

declaration

against interest

because the so-

called declarant

was not shown to

be dead or unable

to testify.

Petitioner Fuentes seeks the reversal of the decision of the CA

affirming his conviction for murder.

At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989, Julieto Malaspina

together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was

at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur.

Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of

the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a

short hair." Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with

a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground and his companions rushed

to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the victim succumbed to the gaping

wound on his abdomen he muttered that Fuentes s tabbed him.

Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo

Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that when the victimwas killed he was conversing with him; that he was compelled to run

away when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear would "kill

all those from San Isidro" because "Jonie," the killer, was from that

place; that since he was also from San Isidro he sought refuge in his

brother's house where he met "Jonie;" that "Jonie" admitted

spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match

before the latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were

many persons milling around the house "Jonie" jumped out and escaped

through the window; that he was arrested at eight o'clock in the

morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay.

One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made

against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made

by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact

asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own

interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he

believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his s uccessors in interest

and against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on

necessity and trustworthiness.

There are three essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a)

the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable

by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify

existed.

The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that theextrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose.

In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove

their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence.

The Court noted, however, that no less than petitioner's own witness, Nerio Biscocho who

claimed he also saw the killing, testified that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner, and "Jonie"

Fuentes are one and the same person.

Consider this factual scenario: the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accused-

appellant, verbally admitted to the latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes,

that he (Zoilo) killed the victim because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking

feature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness.

Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate. The same can be said

of accused-appellant and his un cle Felicisimo.

But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest

cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is noshowing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38

obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto

unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece

of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than

the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted

having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to

produce Zoilo as a witness.

People

vs.

Bernal

The deceased’s

declaration to

another person

that he was having

an affair with the

wife of the

accused wasadmitted in

Respondent, together with two other persons whose identities and

whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of

kidnapping in Davao city.

A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his

arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution presented four witnesses.

On the other hand, Theodore Bernal testified for his defense.

In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably acted in conspiracy with the two other unknown

individuals "as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of

purpose." Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of

circumstances only. The circumstances present in this case sufficiently indicate the par ticipation

of Bernal in the disappearance of Openda, Jr.

Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is

admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the

8/15/2019 Evidence Case Digests - Hearsay

4/20

4

TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGevidence since it

complied with all

the requisites for

a declaration

against interest to

be considered as

an exception to

the hearsay rule.

On August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto

Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited

Bernal, who was passing by, to join them.

After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently

because he was going to fetch his child. Thereafter, two men arrived,

approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was "Payat." When

he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other

handcuffed him and told him "not to run because they were policemen"

and because he had an "atraso" or a score to settle with them. They then

hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went to the house ofOpenda, Jr. and informed the latter's mother of the abduction.

The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a

certain Salito Enriquez, tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit

affair with Bernal's wife and this was the motive behind the former's

kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing. On the other hand, the

defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police

on August 5, 1991, and hence, was never kidnapped.

A certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified

that sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and

Bernal's wife were having an affair. Undoubtedly, his wife's infidelity

was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.

declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to

declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the

declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his

successors-in-interest and against third persons.

With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present provision, it is

safe to assume that "declaration against interest" has been expanded to include all kinds of

interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: (1) that

the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the

declarant; (3) that at the time he m ade said declaration the declarant was aware that the same

was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and

believed such declaration to be true. 

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His

confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty

Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a

falsehood to his own detriment.

Parel

vs.

Prudencio

The declaration

made by the

petitioner’s father to the effect that

he is the occupant

of the residential

building and not

the owner of such

building, was

admitted and

considered as a

declaration

against interest 

(against the heir,

who is the

petitioner in this

case) as anexception to the

hearsay rule.

On February 27, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of

possession and damages against petitioner with the RTC alleging that he

is the owner of a two-storey residential house located at No. 61 F orbesPark National Reservation near DPS compound in Baguio City. Such

property was constructed solely from his own funds and declared in his

name under Tax Declaration No. 47048. He commenced the

construction of said house in 1972 until its completion three years later.

When the second floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he

allowed petitioner’s parents to move therein and occupy the second

floor while the construction of the ground floor was on-going to

supervise the construction and to safeguard the materials. When the

construction of the second floor was finished in 1975, respondent

allowed petitioner’s parents and children to transfer and temporarily

reside thereat; it was done out of sheer magnanimity as petitioner’s

parents have no house of their own and since respondent’s wife is the

older sister of Florentino, petitioner’s father. 

In November 1985, respondent wrote petitioner’s father a notice forthem to vacate the said house as the former was due for retirement and

he needed the place to which petitioner’s parents heeded when they

migrated to U.S. in 1986. However, without respondent’s knowledge,

petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the

ground floor of respondent’s house. Petitioner’s refusal to vacate the

house despite repeated demands prompted respondent to file the

instant action for recovery of possession.

Petitioner filed h is Answer with Counterclaim alleging that his parents

are the co-owners of the said residential house, i.e., the upper story

belongs to respondent while the ground floor pertains to pet itioner’s

parents.

In deciding in favor of the petitioner, RTC did not give credence to the

tax declaration as well as the several documents showing the City

Assessor’s assessment of the property all in respondent’s name since taxdeclarations are not conclusive proof of ownership. It rejected the

We agree with the CA that respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint

for recovery of possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof.

The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstandingthey are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence

advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his

own pecuniary or moral interest.

The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioner’s father and had adequate knowledge

with respect to the subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically

declared that while he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of the same

as it is owned by respondent who is residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would

not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as

well as to his children’s interests as his heirs.

A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the

facts in dispute. Notably, during Florentino’s lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed said

affidavit until 1989, the year of his de ath, there is no showing that he had revoked such affidavit

even when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had b een filed by respondent against him

(Florentino) and petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house which the trial court dismisseddue to the absence of evidence showing that petitioner entered the house against the latter’s will

and held that the remedy of respondent was to file an action for ejectment; and even when a

complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was

subsequently dismissed on the ground that respondent’s action should be an accion publiciana

which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

Moreover, the building plan of the residential house dated January 16, 1973 was in the name

of respondent and his wife. It was established during petitioner’s cross -examination that the

existing structure of the two-storey house was in accordance with said building plan.

Notably, respondent has been religiously paying the real estate property taxes on the house

declared under his name since 1974. In fact, petitioner during his cross-examination admitted

that there was no occasion that they paid the real estate taxes nor declared any portion of the

house in their name.

In this case, the records show that although petitioner’s counsel asked that he be allowed to

offer his documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file the s ame. Thus, the CA didnot consider the documentary evidence presented by petitioner.

8/15/2019 Evidence Case Digests - Hearsay

5/20

5

TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGaffidavit executed by Florentino declaring the house as owned by

respondent saying that the affidavit should be read in its entirety to

determine the purpose of its execution; that it was executed because of

an advisement addressed to the late Florentino by the City Treasurer

concerning the property’s tax assessment and Florentino, thought then

that it should be the respondent who should pay the taxes; and that the

affidavit cannot be accepted for being hearsay.

A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his

 judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a settled rule

that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not

mean that it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.

Petitioner himself testified that it was his father who saw the progress of the construction and

purchased the materials to be used; and as a young boy he would follow-up some deliveries upon

order of his father and never saw respondent in the construction site. The fact that not one of

the witnesses saw respondent during the construction of the said house does not establish that

petitioner’s father and respondent co-owned the house.

Tison

vs.

CA

The declaration

made by Teodora

Domingo to the

effect that the

petitioners are her

niece and nephew

was admitted in

evidence despite

the absence of

any independent

evidence of

pedigree or

relationship. This

involves the first

scenario of an actor declaration

about pedigree 

wherein the claim

is directed against

the declarant, in

this case against

her estate.

Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance against the private

respondent Teodora Domingo for the parcel of land with a house an

apartment located in Quezon City. The properties were originally owned

by the spouses Martin and Teodora Guerrero.

Petitioners claim to be the niece and nephew of Teodora Guerrero

who died leaving only Martin and the petitioners as the heirs. Upon the

death of his wife, Martin Guerrero then executed an Affidavit of

Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto him, allegedly as the sole

heir, the land in dispute. Subsequently, a TCT was issued to Martin,

which he used in s elling the property to respondent Domingo.

Respondent Domingo thereafter acquired a TCT in her name. The

petitioners claim that they are entitled to inherit ½ of the property by

right of representation.

Petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness,

with the following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners'filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal

certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of

destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes

Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora

Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of

Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton

Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and

Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga

attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora

Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero.

Private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the

ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the

deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family

Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner CorazonDezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and

aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls

short of the quantum of proof required.

There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality

and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.

And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. The issue

as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Teodora Guerrero’s father cannot be

properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the

further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of

herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners

unless and until it is rebutted.

The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties

concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero

in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece.

Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception

to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court , subject to the following

conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related

to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown byevidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam ,

that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the

declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to

both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the

relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself.

There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there

be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where

it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through

his declarations to the property of some other member of the family.

The declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is

admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that

there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered

competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice.

Mendoza

vs.

CA

The act or

declaration

(about pedigree) 

made by the

mother and

brother of the

alleged father of

Teopista Toring to

a certain Isaac

Mendoza, who

was the nephewof the alleged

The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial

Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private

respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida

Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married

at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza

recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and

according her the rights and p rivileges of a recognized illegitimate child.

Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the

plaintiffs allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and

attorney's fees.

Two witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendozaand Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro.

An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed

by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in

his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may

consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in wh ich his name has been

entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of

witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

The Court noted that it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this q uestion of pedigree, and

he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was informed by his father Hipolito,

who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was

Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.

Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.Nevertheless, there are certain safeguards against its abuse. The following requisites have to be

8/15/2019 Evidence Case Digests - Hearsay

6/20

6

TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGfather, was

admitted in

evidence as it

complied with the

needed requisites.

Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring

because she used to work with him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro

himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-

between for their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming

pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro frequently

handed him money to be given to Brigida.

Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista

because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother,

Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and

whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would also give him variousamounts to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro

intended to give certain properties to Teopista.

complied with before the act or d eclaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence: (1)

the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) the pedigree must be in issue; (3) the declarant

must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue; (4) the declaration must be made

before the controversy arose; and (5) the relationship between the declarant and the person

whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.

All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations

about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his

brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to

the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the

complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the complaint wasfiled by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the

relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than

such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of F lorencio Mendoza, in

which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.

Solinap

vs.

Locsin, Jr.

As a general rule,

entries in official

records made in

the performance

of his duty by a

public officer or by

a person in the

performance of a

duty specially

enjoined by law,are prima facie

evidence of the

facts therein

stated. However,

in the case at bar,

the certificate,

which issued by

the Local Civil

Registrar,

presented by the

respondent bore

irregularities and

differences from

the certificate,which was

acquired from the

Civil Registrar

General,

presented by the

petitioners. The

glaring

discrepancies

between the two

Certificates of Live

Birth have

overturned the

genuineness of

the certificated

entered in the

Eleven months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on

December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the RTC a

Petition for Letters of Administration praying that he be appointed

Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged,

among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late

Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal

properties which include undetermined savings, current and time

deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of

real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr.,

Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and(c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.

Before the hearing scheduled by the RTC, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr.,

the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to

be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondent's

petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is

not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin,

who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.

Another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir

of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel

Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that

respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the

statute of limitations.

To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the

deceased, respondent submitted a machine copy of his Certificate ofLive Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the

Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City. It contains the

information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he

was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his

signatures. To prove the existence and authenticity of the document,

respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo

City, who produced and identified in court the bound volume of 1957

records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No.

477 is included. Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph

showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin

bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims,

shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members

of the deceased.

In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth

No. 477 is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate

The records of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are officially and

regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars.

Since the records of births cover several decades and come from all par ts of the country, to merely

access them in the Civil Registry General requires expertise. To locate one single birth record from

the mass, a regular employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these

employees in Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating

from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.

With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously easier.

Thus, in proving the authenticity of the certificate presented by the respondent, more convincing

evidence than those considered by the trial court should have been presented.The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine na ture of certificate presented by

the respondent are dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.

However, it was shown that Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and

entered in the Local Civil Registry in January 1957 was based merely on he r general impressions

of the existing records in that Office.

When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from those

appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law,

the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, the Court

found Vencer's explanation not convincing.

Further, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years

thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.

There are other indications of irregularity relative to the certificate presented by the

respondent:

 

The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Theassailed certificate is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries.

  The documents bound into one volume are original copies. The assailed certificate is a

carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries

therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are handwritten.

  Unlike the contents of those other certificates, the assailed certificate does not indicate

important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and

business.

  The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back, there

is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and other

details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up.

It bears stressing that Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court  provides that: Entries in

official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippine, or by

a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the

facts therein stated.

8/15/2019 Evidence Case Digests - Hearsay

7/20

7

TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGLocal Civil

Registry; thus, the

certificate

presented by the

respondent was

held inadmissible

and insufficient to

prove filiation to

the deceased.

of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila,

indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother,

Amparo Escamilla and that the same does not contain the signature of

the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while

respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded

on January 30, 1957, the certificate presented by the respondent was

recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. On the other hand, the

certificate presented by the petitioners appears on a July, 1956 form,

which was already used before respondent's birth. This scenario dearly

suggests that the certificate presented by the respondent was falsified.Petitioners presented as witness a handwriting expert who testified that

the signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa, then Civil

Registrar of Iloilo City, appearing in the respondent’s certifcate  are

forgeries. He thus concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious

document surreptitiously inserted into the bound volume of birth

records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.

The trial court rendered a decision, which was affirmed by the CA on

appeal, holding that the certificate and photograph are sufficient proofs

of respondent’s illegitimate filiation with the deceased.

In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (the one

presented by the respondent from the Local Civil Registrar and the one presented by the

petitioners from the Civil Registrar General) have overturned the genuineness of the certificated

entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is the certificate recorded in the Civil Registry

General.

Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin

cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation

Jison

vs.

CA

The letters and

notes written by

the relatives of

the alleged father,

acknowledgingthe illegitimate

status of the

respondent, does

not fall under the

second scenario

contemplated

under acts or

declaration about

pedigree as

independent

evidence of

pedigree as to the

relationship

between thedeclarant and the

person against

whom the claim is

directed was not

presented.

It also does not

fall within the

purview of the

second type of

family reputation

or tradition

regarding

pedigree as the

letters is not

In her complaint filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA

alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison

since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO

impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny

of FRANCISCO's daughter. As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August1946, in Dingle, Iloilo. MONINA claimed that since childhood, she had

enjoyed the continuous and implied recognition as an illegitimate child

of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged

that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that

she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant

(CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's

refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial

declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and

treat her as such.

In his answer, FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual

relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the

complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and

did not know of her whereabouts since then. Further, he never

recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. Asaffirmative and special defenses, FRANCISCO contended that MONINA

had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was

barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for

dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the

malicious filing of the complaint.

At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11)

witnesses, namely: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela Casabuena,

Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy

Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz and Lope Amolar. These

witnesses explained individual circumstances, which induced them to

believe that MONINA was Francisco’s daughter.  

On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. She

affirmed that as evidenced by certifications from the Office of the Local

Civil Registrar and baptismal certificates, she was born on 6 August 1946

to Esperanza Amolar and FRANCISCO. MONINA first studied at Sagrado

The testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances and

events that occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled

with the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly established the following facts: (1)

FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was in the

employ of the former; (2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts andconduct; and (3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the

years publicly, 35spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.  

MONINA's reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning her birth

is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative

father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the

putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is

devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third

person. Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the inscription

of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the

registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the

latter's part. In like manner, FRANCISCO's lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal

certificates and school records renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity.

However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove the paternity, they may

be admitted as part of MONINA's testimony to corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO spent forher education.

The certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates may not be

taken as circumstantial evidence to prove MONINA's filiation. Since they a re per se inadmissible

in evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial

evidence to prove the same.

As to the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO's relatives, allegedly attesting to

MONINA's filiation, while their due execution and authenticity are not in issue, as MONINA

witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the

contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-

authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and

MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question.

Rule 130, Section 40, provides: The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the

controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence

if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or

8/15/2019 Evidence Case Digests - Hearsay

8/20

8

TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGsimilar to family

possessions such

as family bibles,

family books,

engravings, etc.

Further, it also

cannot form part

of common

reputation.Matters of

pedigree may be

proved by

reputation in the

family, and not by

reputation in the

neighborhood or

vicinity, except

where the

pedigree in

question is

marriage which

may be proved by

commonreputation in the

community.

where she stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado, from 1952 until 1955

(up to Grade 4), FRANCISCO paid for her tuition fees and other school

expenses. She either received the money from FRANCISCO or from Mr.

Lagarto, or saw FRANCISCO give the money to her mother, or Mr.

Lagarto would pay Sagrado directly. After Sagrado, MONINA studied in

different schools, but FRANCISCO continuously answered for her

schooling. For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University

of Iloilo, but she later dropped due to an accident which required a

week's hospitalization. Although FRANCISCO paid for part of the

hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered most of them. In 1963,she enrolled at the University of San Agustin, where she stayed with

Mrs. Franco who paid for MONINA's tuition fees. However, expenses for

books, school supplies, uniforms and the like were shouldered by

FRANCISCO. At the start of each semester, MONINA would show

FRANCISCO that she was enrolled, then he would ask her to canvass

prices, then give her the money she needed. After finishing two

semesters at University of San Agustin, she transferred to De Paul

College and studied there for a year. Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at

Western Institute of Technology. During her senior year, she stayed with

Eusebio and Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She

passed the CPA board exams in 1974 and took up an M.B.A. at De La

Salle University as evidenced by her transcript, wherein FRANCISCO was

likewise listed as “Guardian”.

In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before thenJudge Romeo Callejo of the RTC. As additional witnesses, FRANCISCO

presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iñigo Supertisioso, Lourdes

Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal. FRANCISCO declared that

Esperanza’s employment ceased as of October, 1944, and that while

employed by him, Esperanza would sleep with the other female helpers

on the first floor of his residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept

in a room on the second floor. At that time, his household staff was

composed of three female workers and two (2) male workers. After

Esperanza left in October 1944, she never communicated with him

again, neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly

denied having had sexual relations with Esperanza and disavowed any

knowledge about MONINA’s birth. In the same vein, he denied having

paid for MONINA’s tuition fees, in person or otherwise, and asserted

that he never knew that Mr. Lagarto paid for these fees. Moreover,FRANCISCO could not believe that Lagarto would pay for these fees

despite absence of instructions or approval from FRANCISCO. He

likewise categorically denied that he told anyone, be it Danthea Lopez,

Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or Remedios Franco, that MONINA

was his daughter.

The trial court ruled against Monina but the Court of Appeals reversed

the trial court’s decision.

affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family

portraits and the like may be received as evidence of pedigree.

It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the p ortion containing the

first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the d ocuments in

question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the

section containing the second underscored phrase. The scope of the enumeration contained in

the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects

which are commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles which represent, in effect,

a family's joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been described

as objects "openly exhibited and well known to the family," or those "which, if preserved in afamily, may be regarded as giving a family tradition." Other examples of these objects which are

regarded as reflective of a family's reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on

tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.

Clearly, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO’s relatives, as private documents

not constituting "family possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of

Rule 130, Section 40.

Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common

reputation.

Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court   provides that “Common reputation existing

previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years

old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and

inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputations.” 

The weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the

common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is amaterial element of evidence going to establish pedigree. Thus, matters of pedigree may be

proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except

where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the

community.

However, their inadmissibility notwithstanding, such letters and notes, may properly be

admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO

recognized her as his daughter.

As to FRANCISCO's other witnesses, the testimonies of the witnesses are considered

insufficient to overcome MONINA's evidence. It merely consist of denials, which being in the form

of negative testimony, necessarily stand infirm as against positive testimony.

All told, MONINA's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof" required for the success of

an action to establish one's illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding "open

and continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws;"

moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Ferrer vs.

de Inchausti

The testimony of

Joaquin de

Inchausti,

referring to the

statement made

by his half-brother

Ramon Martinez

de Viademonte, to

Plaintiffs Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer filed a complaint praying

for a declaration that Rosa Matilde Viademonte, mother of the plaintiffs

herein, had the right to succeed to the inheritance left by Isabel

Gonzales in the same proportion and capacity as the other four children

of the latter namely, Ramon, Rafael, Joaquin, and Clotilde. The plaintiffs

allege that they are the only legitimate heirs of Rosa Viademonte and

are entitled to receive the latter’s  share, that is, one-fifth of the estate

left by Isabel Gonzales.

Evidence adduced at the trial to prove the origin of the cause of action shows, in a manner

which leaves no room for doubt, that Rosa was not a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzales and

it follows that her children have no right to a part of the hereditary property of Isabel Gonzales.

On Page 9 of the day-book which Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Jr., kept during his lifetime,

appears a memorandum which says: On September 1, 1862, seven o'clock in the evening a

children three days old named Rosa Matilde Robles, according to the baptismal certificate issued

by the acting rector Don Ramon Fernandez of the Cathedral Church of Manila, was delivered to

my mother; this child was baptized by the priest Don Remegio Rodriguez with the authority of

8/15/2019 Evidence Case Digests - Hearsay

9/20

9

TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGthe effect that

Rosa Matilde

(mother of the

platintiff) is the

same Rosa

Matilde Robles,

thereby rebutting

the contention

that Rosa Matilda

is a legitimatedaughter of Isabel

Gonzales, was

admitted in

evidence as part

of family

reputation or

tradition

regarding

pedigree.

They allege that Isabel was first married to Ramon Martinez

Viademonte and that their mother Rosa was the fruit of their

relationship. Isabel was then married Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, father

of defendants herein.

Counsel for the plaintiffs sought to establish that Rosa Matilde

Viademonte, mother of the plaintiffs, has been treated and considered

as a daughter of Isabel Gonzales and that on one occasion, the said

Gonzales remarked that the father of Rosa Matilde was Ramon Martinez

de Viademonte.

Also, that Joaquin C. de Inchausti, the son of Isabel Gonzales and JoseJoaquin de Inchausti, dedicated a picture to Rosa in the following

manner: “To my dear and unforgettable sister Rosa.” College records of

the latter at Collegio de Santa Isabel were shown to establish filiation.

The defendants presented an entry in the notebook of Ramon

Viademonte Jr. which showed that true name of Rosa Matilde

Viademonte was Rosa Matilde Robles, born of unknown parents in

September 1, 1952. Notwithstanding the arguments of the plaintiff,

Joaquin de Inchausti testified that one day he was assured by his half-

brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was not his

sister but a mere protégée and that her true name was Rosa Matilde

Robles and that on occasion the said brother showed him a copy of the

certificate of birth which he took from the parochial church.

said rector, and according to the baptismal certificate, it was a child of unknown parents." This

memorandum agrees with the above-mentioned baptismal certificate of Rosa Matilde Robles.

Notwithstanding the argument of counsel for the appellants Joaquin de Inchausti stated that

one day he was assured by his half-brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was

not his sister, but that she was only a mere protegee and that her true n ame was Rosa Matilde

Robles, and that on that occasion the said brother showed him the certificate of birth, a copy of

which he took from the parochial church.

In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is now dead, the testimony of Joaquin

Jose de Inchausti referring to the said deceased is admissible, for they are members of the same

family, in accordance with the provisions of section 281 of Act No. 190, and consequently, theconclusion is that Rosa Matilde is the same Rosa Matilde Robles which is mentioned and because

she was born in 1852, in no manner could she be the legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte

and Isabel Gonzalez whose marriage was dissolved in 1836 by the death of the husband.

Rule 130, Section 40, provides: The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the

controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence

if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or

affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family

portraits and the like may be received as evidence of pedigree. 

In Re Mallari The testimonies of

the witnesses,who lived in the

same community

of respondent’s

paternal

grandmother, to

the effect that his

paternal

grandmother was

unmarried and

was a Filipino

citizen, was

admitted in

evidence as an

exception to thehearsay rule under

common

reputation. Since

respondent’s

paternal

grandmother was

a Filipino citizen,

his father was

consequently a

Filipino citizen,

making the

respondent also a

Filipino citizen and

not a Chinese

national.

The SC ordered the investigation of the matter of citizenship of

Florencio Mallare, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on March 5,1962, for the purpose of determining whether his name should be

stricken from the roll of persons authorized to practice law in the

Philippines.

After an investigation, a decision was rendered by this Court holding

that by preponderance of evidence, it appeared that respondent

Mallare's father, Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his

mother admittedly being a Chinese, respondent is likewise a Chinese

national. Consequently respondent Florencio Mallare was declared

excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revoked,

and he was ordered to return to this Court, the lawyer's diploma

previously issued to him.

On February 4, 1969, respondent petitioned the Court for the

reopening of the case and for new trial on the ground, inter alia, of newly

discovered evidence, the introduction of which could alter the decisionpreviously promulgated. The evidence proposed to be presented

consisted of (1) an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate

Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that

Estaben Mallare, respondent's father, is the natural son of Ana Mallare,

a Filipino; and (2) testimonies of certain persons who had a known

Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime.

Specifically, the respondent presented the following witnesses:

  Damiana Cabangon who declared that she was with her mother,

the "hilot" who attended to Ana Mallare during her delivery, when

Esteban Mallare was born; that she was present when Esteban

was baptized; that Ana Mallare had lived continuously in

Macalelon and was reputed to be unmarried; that she had never

met or seen Esteban's father, a certain Mr. Dy.

  Rafael Catarroja, the former mayor of Macalelon, who declared

that he knew Esteban Mallare even as a child; that Esteban was

The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and

residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration that AnaMallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was

reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and

illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare (respondent’s father). Reputation has been held admissible as

evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born

alive. Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from

persons who are not members of the family — the reason for the distinction is the public interest

that is taken in the question of the existence of marital relations.

The public reputation in Macalelon that Esteban was Ana's natural child, testified to by the

witness, would constitute proof of the illegitimacy of the former. Besides, if Estaban were really

born out of legal union, it is highly improbable that he would be keeping the surname "Mallare"

after his mother, instead of adopting that of his father.

The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana Mallare is a

Tagalog (and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as being mere conclusions devoid

of evidentiary value. The declarations were not only based on the reputation in the communityregarding her race or race-ancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but they must have certain

factual basis. For it must be realized that in this Philippine society, every region possesses certain

characteristics all its own. Thus, a Tagalog would normally detect if a person hails from the same

region even from the way the latter speaks. Considering that the witnesses testified having

known, and lived with, Ana Mallare in Macalelon, their declaration that she is a Tagalog should

receive a high degree of credibility.

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a F ilipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no

other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine

citizenship. Neither could any act taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest

him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien, Esteban's

exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of

Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of

April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already

8/15/2019 Evidence Case Digests - Hearsay

10/20

10

TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULINGthen living with his mother, Ana Mallare, a Tagala, who was

cohabiting with a Chinese; that Esteban started voting in 1934, and

became one of his campaign leaders.

  Salomon Gimenez, the former mayor of Macalelon, who declared

having known Esteban Mallare; that in the elections of 1925, when

Esteban campaigned for a rival candidate against him, he wanted

to seek for Esteban's disqualification; that he sought the counsel of

Judge Gaudencio Eleazar who advised him that a disqualification

move would not prosper because Esteban's mother was not

married to Esteban's Chinese father.  Joaquin Enobal who declared that he was a classmate and

playmate of Esteban Mallare; that he had not seen the husband of

Ana Mallare; that Ana was a Tagalog who had lived in Macalelon.

participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate. These acts are sufficient to

show his preference for Philippine citizenship.

NB: Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “Common reputation existing

previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years

old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and

inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputations.” 

DBP Pool

vs.

RMN

The utterances

made by the

bystanders, made

as basis by the

police

investigators in

their report, was

not considered as

part of res gestae 

since spontaneity

was notsufficiently

proven. At best,

the testimonies

made by the

police

investigators can

be considered as

independently

relevant

statements 

gathered in the

course of their

investigation, and

are admissible notas to the veracity

thereof but to the

fact that they had

been thus uttered.

This involves a civil case filed by Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN)

against DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies and Provident

Insurance Corporation for recovery of insurance benefits.

Respondent owns several broadcasting stations all over the country.

Provident covered respondent’s transmitter equipment and generating

set for the amount ofP13,550,000.00 under Fire Insurance Policy No.

30354, while petitioner covered respondent’s transmitter, furniture,

fixture and other transmitter facilities for the amount of P5,883,650.00

under Fire Insurance Policy No. F-66860.

In the evening of July 27, 1988, respondent’s radio station located in

SSS Building, Bacolod City, was razed by fire causing damage in theamount of P1,044,040.00. Respondent sought recovery under the two

insurance policies but the claims were denied on the ground that the

cause of loss was an excepted risk (i.e., any loss or damage occasioned

by or through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the

following consequences, namely: (c) War, invasion, act of foreign

enemy, hostilities, or warlike operations (whether war be declared or

not), civil war; (d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising, insurrection,

rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power).

The insurance companies maintained that the evidence showed that

the fire was caused by members of the Communist Party of the

Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA); and consequently, denied

the claims.

The RTC rendered a decision, which was subsequently affirmed by the

CA, in favor of respondent RMN. The lower court held that the onlyevidence that can be considered to determine if the fire was due to the

intentional act committed by the members of the NPA are the

testimonies of witnesses Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and SPO3 Leonardo

Rochar who were admittedly not present when the fire occurred. Their

testimonies were limited to the fact that an investigation was conducted

and in the course of the investigation they were informed by bystanders

that heavily armed men entered the transmitter house, poured gasoline

and then lighted it. After that, they went out shouting "Mabuhay ang

NPA". The persons whom they investigated and who actually saw the

burning of the station were not presented as witnesses.

The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as part of res gestae. While it may

concede that these statements were made by the bystanders during a startling occurrence, it

cannot be said however, that these utterances were made spontaneously by the bystanders and

before they had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres

received the bystanders’ statements while they were making the ir investigations during and after

the fire. It is reasonable to assume that when these statements were noted down, the bystanders

already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and exchange

information, not to mention theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in disquieting

situations where hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether these

utterances were the products of truth. That the utterances may be mere idle talk is not remote.

At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres that these statements were mademay be considered as independently relevant statements gathered in the course of their

investigation, and are admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been

thus uttered.

Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with its weight and

sufficiency.23 Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the

weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and

persuade.24 Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders that it was the members of

the CPP/NPA who caused the fire may be admitted as evidence, it does not follow that such

declarations are sufficient proof. These declarations should be calibrated vis-à-vis the other

evidence on record. And the trial court aptly noted that there is a need for additional convincing

proof, viz.:

The Court finds the foregoing to be insufficient to establish that the cause of the fire was the

intentional burning of the radio facilities by the rebels or an act of insurrection, rebellion or

usurped power. Evidence that persons who burned the radio facilities shouted "Mabuhay angNPA" does not furnish logical conclusion that they are members of the NPA or that their act was

an act of rebellion or insurrection. Additional convincing proof need be submitted. Defendants

failed to discharge their responsibility to present adequate proof that the loss was due to a risk

excluded.25

While the documentary evidence presented by petitioner, i.e., (1) the police blotter; (2) the

certification from the Bacolod Police Station; and (3) the Fire Investigation Report may be

considered exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official records, nevertheless, as noted

by the CA, none of these documents categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of

the CPP/NPA.

Consequently, the insurance companies are liable to pay the respondent for the damage it

incurred.

Talidano

vs.

The copies of the

fax messages were

not considered as

falling within the

Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by Falcon

Maritime and Allied Services, Inc. and was assigned to M/V Phoenix

Seven, a vessel owned and operated by Hansu Corporation which is

based in Korea.

Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court  mentions two acts which form part of the res

gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the res

gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the res gestae are the statements

8/15/2019 Evidence Case Digests - Hearsay

11/20

11

TITLE DOCTRINE FACTS RULING

Falcon

Maritime

meaning of res

gestae, either as a

spontaneous

statement (as

spontaneity was

not proven) or as

a verbal act (as

there was no

accompanying

statement to theequivocal act).

Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always

discriminated against and maltreated the vessel’s Filipino crew. This

prompted him to send a letter-complaint to the officer-in-charge of the

International Transport Federation, a measure that allegedly was

resented by the chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed on

21 January 1997. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 27 October

1999.

Private respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily

disembarked the vessel after having been warned several times of

dismissal from service for his incompetence, insubordination, disrespectand insulting attitude toward his superiors. It cited an incident involving

petitioner’s incompetence wherein the vessel invaded a different route

at the Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of petitioner who was

then supposed to be on watch duty. As proof, it presented a copy of a

fax message, sent to it on the date of incident, reporting the vessel’s

deviation from its course due to petitioner’s   neglect of duty at the

bridge, as well as a copy of the report of crew discharge issued by the

master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.

The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing petitioner’s

complaint, holding that he was validly dismissed for gross neglect of

duties, however, this was subsequently reversed by the NLRC on appeal.

The NLRC held that the fax messages in support of the alleged

misbehavior and neglect of duty by petitioner have no probative value

and are self-serving. It added that the ship’s logbook should have beensubmitted in evidence as it is the repository of all the activities on board

the vessel, especially those affecting the performance or attitude of the

officers and crew members, and, more importantly, the procedures

preparatory to the discharge of a crew member. The NLRC also noted

that private respondent failed to comply with due p rocess in terminating

petitioner’s employment. 

accompanying the equivocal act. The Court held that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of

the res gestae.

To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the principal act be

a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to

contrive or devise a