POLITICAL INTiiGRATION OF TK i GHINliiSS
GOMUNIST PARTY ELITE
1952-1966
by
KHALSD M. KAYALI, B. A.
A THESIS
IN
GOVSRNI NT
Submit ted t o the Graduate F a c u l t y of Texas Tech U n i v e r s i t y i n
P a r t i a l F u l f i l l m e n t of the Requirements f o r
t he Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Approved
December, 1970
T3 1970
fOoJJS Cop. ^
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am deeply indebted to Professor Neale J. Pearson
for his encouragement, assistance and patience in directing
this thesis and to the other members of my committee,
Professor Martin T, Kyre, John H, Burnett and Jacquelin
Collins for their interest and helpful criticism.
11
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii
LIST OF TABLES iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS iv
INTRODUCTION 1
I. The Influence of the First Five-Year Plan on Political Integration 6
II. The Sino-Soviet Alliance and It's Contribution to Mao's Lrive for Political Integration 15
III. The Failure of the Great Leap Forward and It's Influence on Mao's Political Leadership 40
IV. The People's Communes and Political Disintegration 7U
V. The Influence of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on Mao's Political Leadership. .107
VI. Mao's Efforts to Restore Confidence in His Political Leadership I36
VII, Threats to the Party's Political Integration I966-I967 163
VIII. Summary and Conclusion 1^6
BIBLIOGRAPHY IC7
111
LIST OF TA 'LSS
Communist Data on National Income and Production During the Period of Rehabilitation, 1949-52 9
National Product Estimates of the Chinese Mainland, 1952-57 10
Indicators of Economic Developmsnt of the Chinese Mainland, 1952-57 11
13
Estimated Production of Selected Heavy Industries in Mainland China (1950, 1952, and 1957) 26
Output of Major Industrial Products in
Mainland China, 1954-1959 57
Scattered Data on Steel, 1957-1965 59
National Product Istimates of the Chinese Mainland, 1957-1962 60 Estimates of ths Outtut of Food Crcrs and Cotton, 1957-1965 . ". 62
Estimated Production of Maj"or Industrial Commodities in Communist China 64 ^
E s t i m a t e s of Grain Outout in ConirrAinist China , 1949-1956 . . . ' , 7S
Es t ima ted P r o d u c t i o n of Grain in 3h ina , 1957-1965 9^
The Chine S3 Communist P a r t y S tand ing
Committee, 1966 168
C i v i l S t r i f e in the P r o v i n c e s 177
Impact of Purge on C h i n a ' s Economic E l i t ^ . . . . IB4
P o l i t b u r o M.^:nb3rs of trie 9th Con??r,^ss of t l u Chiri ise Communist P a r t y 1* 4
iv
LIST OF ILLUSTRMTTONS
Sino-Soviet Balance of Trade 23
Graphical Illustration of the Chinese Communist Party Unity Between 1949-1957 . . . 33
Basic Organs of the Central Committee . . . . I46
INTRODUCTION
The period preceding the "Cultural Revolution"-^
in Communist China is significant because it witnessed
three important events which caused the ensuing struggle
within the Communist Party of China. These v;ere:
1. the failure of the Great Leap Forward,
2. the failure of the Commune System,
3. the break between China and the Soviet Union.
All of the above produced an increasing economic dis
location and a widespread dissatisfaction, the conse
quences of which were the beginning of disintegration
of the political community. The follov/ing struggle
among the elite also contributed to disintegration of
the ties between the elite group and the masses.
Political control within the party broke down and chaos 2
replaced it.
- Although the "Cultural Revolution" of 1964 is different from the "Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution" of 1966, this study will refer to both events as the "Cultural Revolution."
2 A theoretical discussion of how intepiration
among the political elites influences oclitical integration is carried out by Herbert S. Spiro, "Comparative Politics: A Comnrehensive Approach," Am3rican Political Science Review.'LVI (Sept-mber, 1962), 577.
These ev3nts which took place in the last two
decades in Red China vjere important net only because of
the siz3 and the character of forces that shaped them,
but more so because of v'hat it provided for the student
of politics in terms of data to explore several hypo
theses in an attempt to understand political systems.
Although empirical data are not abundantly available
from Red China, some data are available on changes in
government policies, newspaper editorials, and speeches
of government spokesmen. By applying this data, ons may
answer one or several of the following questions about
China in this period:
1. To what extent does the leadership of a
ruling party in a totalitarian regime permit free
exchange of ideas among its own elite, although free
debate may be one of the party's policies?
2. V/hat kind and hovj much povjer can such a
system put in the hands of its bureaucracy?
3. In a modernizing society, are the values and
ideology of the bureaucracy {citizens employed by the
system) more or less important than their values, ideol
ogy, and system-rewards before their employment?
4. V\/hat is the influence of decentralization of
decision-making on the efficiency of the modernizing
process?-^
The most important aspect of these questions which
this thesis will discuss is the role of Mao Tse-tung in
defeating his foes when this struggle could have led to
the destruction of the party apparatus. The nature of
the struggle was very personal; the Cultural Revolution
was a Maoist revolution aimed at the party hierarchs; the
"cultural revolution" was designed to preserve his charis
matic leadership and to prevent anyone from tarnishing
his reputation. At best, therefore, this study is a study
of policy influence on the political elites in a totali
tarian Communist society; it reflects on the integrative
process and its two components: political socialization
and political recruitment; it also reflects on the goal
functions which include goal specification and goal
attainment.^ This paper does not study these functions,
per se; the study will reflect on their relation to Mao's
attempt to preserve his leadership and reputation in a
- David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 49.
^I have relied on the definitions of these terms as given by Michael P. Gehlen in his book The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, A functional Analysis, (bloominr >:-on: Indiana University Press, 1969), pp. "14-2/ . Mr. Gehlen gives a short comparative analysis of several "fram- works of analysis" of several political scientists such as Kirl Leutch, Jilliarn Mitchell, Gabriel Almond, Sigiaund Keuman and David Apter.
u
single political party and the ruling government in one
political body.
This study reflects on goal specification as it
analyzes the setting of goals by the party leadership.
For instance the sudden shift of emphasis from the Second
Five-Year Plan to the Great Leap Forvjard shows that the
goals of the Leap's were specified by Mao Tse-tung rather
than by the Central Committee. Furthermore, this study
will reflect on goal attainment as it reveals how govern
ment policies contributed to political disintegration.
Similarly political socialization becomes evident through
the various propaganda channels used by the leadership
to criticize those "revisionists" or "rightists."
In the process of developing this paper I hope to
prove the following hypotheses:
1. When policies of a totalitarian leader fail,
the leader will blame others for their failures.
2. When other party officials blame him or
criticize him for incorrect policy or wrong doing, he
will remove them. Victims of a removal or a purge may
not be limited to those who criticize but may be extended
to those in a position to influence public opinion.
3. When the apparatus of the party proves an in
sufficient weapon, he may appeal for help from non-rarty
citizens-- i.e. the Red Guard-- against party opponents--
a technique employed from time to time in democratic
societies.
Although this study is mainly concerned with the
decree of integration within the elites of the Chinese
Communist Party between 195^-1966, it is important to
analyze the forces that influenced the stata of political
integration. -The first two chapters will deal with the
government's policies which enhanced the state of political
integration. Chapters three, four, and five will analyze
thos3 government policies which "stimulatsd political dis
integration within the elites. The last three chapters will
emphasize the political struggle among the elites as a
result of governmental policy failures in domestic and
foreign affairs. These three chapters will also prove the
hypothesis suggested above.
CHAPTER I
THE INFLUENCE OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN
ON POLITICAL INTEGRATION
Until 1955, the leadership of the Communist Party
in China seemed unified and if there had been any con
flicting views within the leadership it was not revealed
to the public. This integration within the elite enabled
the party to carry out its functions harmoniously. These
functions include the function of setting ideological
goals for the state, the exercise of control over its
subjects through government and its enterprises to
assure effective communication within the party hierarchy.
The function of institutionalizing communist roles and
values "by criticism, self-criticism, and confessions"^
was also carried out peacefully. Ultimately the pattern
of the party's integrative process seemed to proceed
C. K. Yang, "Cultural Revolution and Revisionism," o. IV. lang, uuxturax nevui-uoxuxi in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou eds, China in Crisis, Vol. 1, China's Heritap:e and the Communist Political System. Book Two, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 502.
7
without a major o b s t a c l e . 3 And the success of the p a r t y ' s
i n t e g r a t i v e ro le ind ica t ed a kind of cohesion wi th in the
par ty l e a d e r s h i p . In s h o r t , by the year 1955 the Communist
Par ty of China had achieved p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n .
The p a r t y ' s goal funct ions a l so cont r ibuted to the
i n t e g r a t i v e p roces s . The l e a d e r s h i p , through specifying
i t s g o a l s , convinced the genera l p o l i t y t h a t i t s goals
are bes t for the s o c i e t y . This l eade r sh ip promised the
people a b e t t e r l i f e and when these goals were a t t a i n e d ,
the l eade r sh ip in e f f ec t achieved a new pa t t e rn of s o c i a l
order v/ith the l e a s t amount of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . An
exce l l en t example of t h i s success i s the F i r s t Five-Year
Plan which was launched in 1953. The goal was an am
b i t i o u s p ro jec t toward c e n t r a l i z e d planning descr ibed as
the "General Link for the Period of Trans i t ion to S o c i a l
ism"^ The plan ca l l ed for the f u l l u t i l i z a t i o n of
China ' s r e sou rces ; i t speeded up the c o l l e c t i v e campaign
in a g r i c u l t u r e , and i t introduced the compulsory purchase
of s ingle c r o p s . Although the par ty goal was set for five
years , i t was achieved ins tead in three yea r s . Rejoicing
^Whiting, 0£. c i t . , According to Allen S. V/hiting only^one challenge to Mao's a u t h o r i t y occurred between 1949-1955.' Jao Shu-Shih in Shanghai and Kao Kang in Manchuria; both were ousted because they were accused of bu i ld ing "independent kingdoms."
^Jack Gray and Pa t r i ck Cavendish, Chin3se Corr.mimism in C r i s i s : M ioism and the Cu l tu ra l R";vo]utlon, TTev.' York: Freder ick A. Praeger , 1968], p . 20.
6
over its success, the government furnished a relatively
large amount of economic statistics for the period 1952-
1957. Regardless of the accuracy and the reliability of
these figures they must have contributed to the stability
of the regime. Table I-l shows how the national income
had" increased by about 70% by the end of the "Period of
Rehabilitation, 1949-1952."^ This increase contributed
to the recovery after the war. Following this recovery,
the period between 1952-1959 proved to be a period of
continuous grov7th.
The empirical data available show the increased
productivity of these years. The government's statistics
for this period are compared in Table 1-2 to the stat
istics of six United States scholars for the same period,
1952 and 1957, and the average annual growth rates. I
am not interested here in the discrepancies between the
authors' estimates because ray interest here is not in
comparative analysis as much as in showing that every
one agrees that there was a positive increase in national
income. However it is of some value to point out that the
9% per year gross or B.B% per year net (Table 1-3 A) "is
^Ta-chung Lin, "Economic Development of the Chinese Mainland 1949-1965," in Ho and Tsou eds., ££. clt., p. 6I6.
TABLE I - l
COMMUNIST DATA ON NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCTION DURING TH5 PERIOD
OF RilHABILITATION, 1949-52
Year
1949 1950 1951 1952
National I no ome
100.0 lis. 6 13^.3 169.7
Comxbin Output
Industry culture of 1952
2d Gross Value of and Agri-(Billions Yuan)
46.6 57.5 63.3 32.7
SOURCE: The S t a t e S t a t i s t i c a l Bureau, TEN GREAT YEARS (Peking: Fore ign Language P r e s s , 1960) , t p . 16 and 20 . P r i n t e d in China i n C r i s i s , Volume 1, Book Two, ( ed . ) by P i n g - t i Ho and I'ang Tsou, 1968, 616.
10
TABLE 1-2
NATIONAL PRODUCT ESTIMATES OF THE CHINESE MAINLAND, 1952-57 (Billions of 1952 Yuan)
Year
1952 1957
Average Annual Growth Rate
C omrau-nist (Net Material Product)'!'
(1)
61.1 93.5
9.0
Eckstein (Gross National Product)
(2)
'71.3 • • •
• • •
Hol-lister (Gross National Product)
(3)
67.9 102.4
3.6
Li (Net National Product, Reconstructed Communist
Estimate )
(4)
72.9 111.3
"
Net Domestic Product, Reconstructed Communist
Estimate (5)
63.6 104.2
..... _, ... .
Ta-chung Liu
(6)
71.4 95.3
6.0
Wu (Net National Product)
(7)
72.4 94.3
5.6
1: Liu and Yeh, The 1. 2: Alexander Ecks
c_ome of Communist China (Glencoe, 111.: ., Hollister, China's
^'SOURCES: Col. Mainland, p. 220; co
p. 56; col. 3: VvT/i and Social Accounts, 1953), p. 2- col. 4: nist China (Berkeley Press, 1959), p. 106 Chinese Mainland, p. basic Communist data was computed on the product); col. 6: i
Economy of the Chinese tein. The National _ln-The Free Press, I96I), Gross National Product
e Free Press. 1950-57 (Glencoe, 111.: Th C. i-l. Li, Economic Developnient of Commu-and Los Angeles: Un ; col. 5: Liu and Ye 213 (this estimate v; without corrections standard V;estern cone bid., p. 66; col. 7: ckwell. The Economic
iversity of California h, The Economy of the as reconstructed from for reliability, but ept of net don.estic Y. L. Wu., F. P. Potential of Commu-Hoeber, and M. M. Ro
nist China (Menlo Park, Calif., 1964),~p. 241.
This table is printed in C hina in Cris-' s, Volume 1, Book Two, (ed.) by Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, 1908, p. 617.
1 1
TABLE 1-3
INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE MAINLAND, 1952-57
Reconstructed C ommuni st Estimate
Liu-Yeh Estimate
A.
B.
c.
Rates of Growth of Product, Population, and Employment Per Year, % Gross Domestic Product (1952 Prices) Total Per Capita Per VJorker Net Domestic Product (1952 Prices) Total Per Capita Per Worker Population Employment Average Proportion of Capital Formation in Domestic Product (1952 Prices), % Gross Net Incremental Capital-Output Ratios, Computed in 1952 Prices, % Total Gross Net Fixed Gross Net
9.0 6.6 4.9
3.3 6.5 4.7
2 4.0
24.4 20.6
2.7 2.3
2.0 1.6
6.2 3.9 4.6
6.0 3.6 4.4
.3
23.3 19.3
3.9 3.3
2.3 2.2
Source: Ibid.
12
higher than those of all forty-four non-Communist countries
studied in Kuznets except Israel and Jamaica, during early
post-war years." Table 1-3 B shows that the country made
a significant drive toward industrialization during this
period. It is understood that this capital formation is
sometimes exceeded by many industrialized nations i.e.
Japan in the post World War II period but it was also
greater than those of other less developed countries.
The growth in productivity (Table 1-3 C) 319 "would outrank
all the other nations studied by Kuznets, coming ahead of
West Germany (3.3%)."' It is also important to observe
that during this period of industrialization, the consump
tion rate per capita had dropped in 1955 below that of 1933.
(Sections B, C, and D, Table 1-4).
Although increased knowledge, better organization, and
industrialization were some goals of the plan, their in
fluence is not shown in Table 1-3. In fact the increase
in per worker product 4.7 or 4.4 shown in Table 1-3 A is
due to each worker's increase in output rather than an
increase in industrialization. This is verified by the
^Ibid., p. 625. Simon Kuznets studies are published in his article "A Comparative Appraisal," in Abram Berpson and Simon Kuznets eds.. Economic Trends in tha Soviets, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).
' Ibid., p. 629.
TABLE 1-4
INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE MAINLAND, 1952-57
13
Reconstructed Communist Estimate
Liu-Yeh Estimate
A.
B.
"I
D.
E
F.
Rate of Growth of Inputs and Productivity, % Labor (Lj Net Fixed Capital (K) Combined Inputs (L at 7K at 3) "Productivity" of Combined Inputs Total and Per Capita Consumption in 1952 Prices: 1952 and 1957 (Index Numbers, 1933=100) 1952 Total Per Capita 1957 Total Per Capita Rates of Grov;th of Household Consumption (1952 prices), % Share of Total Consumption in Gross Expenditure, % 1952 1957 Share of Increase in Consumption Per Capita in Increase in Gross Expenditure Per Capita 1952-57,
4.0 6.3 4.3 3.9
95.2 33.7
137.3 103.2
5.2
72.3 71.3
63.4 Liu-Yeh Estimate of Shares of Major Sectors Product, %
A Sector M+ Sector 1952 47.9 20.2 1957 39.0 33.7 Liu-Yeh Estimate of Shares of Major Sectors Force, %
1.5 6.5 3.0 2.9
99.4 37.3
123.4 96.9
1.9
73.9 70.3
1952 1957
A Sector 72.9 72.9
M+ Sector 15.5 16.6
in
in
43 Net
S-
Lab(
S-
.5
Sector 23 22 3r
Se( 11 10
.9
.3
:tor .6 .5
Source: Ho and Tsou, _op. cit., pp. 626-627.
14
fact that a decline in mining, manufacturing transport
communication (the m + sector) and in agriculture (A)
was accompanied by a very minor change in the rest of
the economy (the S - sector). This observation is impor
tant at this point because of the government's heavier de
mands which were yet to come under the Great Leap Forward.
According to Ta-chung Liu the average worker was already
producing at full capacity when the government introduced
the Great Leap Forward, which in effect demanded much more
than the forces of production could put out.°
That the nation and the government benefited from
this plan is without a doubt. It increased prosperity
and-provided more opportunities. In short, as a part of
the government goal function, the plan contributed to
political harmony. But usually all major programs of this
dimension result in some important political consequences
and repercussions. The party goals for the First Five-Year
Plan were achieved quickly and successfully but to the dis
may of the party leaders the celebration was short lived.
As I hope to show later in this paper, the party goal
function consequently proved to be the major cause of dis
harmony within the party leadership, i.e., Mao's ideolo
gical goals versus those of his adversaries.^
%bid.. p. 631.
^Yang, 2£. -crt., p. 273.
CHAPTER II
THE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE AND ITS CONTRIBUTION
TO MAO'S DRIVE FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION
Introduction
The seemingly harmonious relationship among the
elites of the Chinese Communist Party before the year
1955 was also enhanced by Mao's foreign policy tov;ard the
Soviet Union. Although many authors debate the motives
of the Sino-Soviet Alliance of 1949, m.ost of the authors
agree on China's immediate economic and political situation
both inside and outside of China.
I have stated earlier that among the functions of
the Chinese Communist Party which helped to bring about
political integration were: the function of setting
ideological goals for the state, the exercise of control
over its subjects, and the function of institutionalizing
Communist roles and values through criticism and self criti
cism. The Chinese Communist ideological functions surely
John Gittings, "The Great Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy" The China Quarterly, (July-Septer .ber, 1969), p. 42. See also Vidya Prakash Dutt, China and the World, An Analysis of Communist China's Forsign Policy^ (New York: Frederick A. Praegar, 1966), p. 58 and Charles B. McLane, "The Moscow-Peking Alliance: The First Decade," Current History, (September, 1967), p. 327.
15
16
would be enhanced by an alliance with the Soviet Union,
which is one of the most powerful nations of the world and
the seat of Communist ideology. Another Chinese foreign
policy goal in its alliance with the Soviet Union was its
need for foreign economic and industrial assistance. And
yet another and perhaps more important than either of the
above was the leadership's goal of attaining a "respectable"
position among the powerful nations of the world. But be
fore I show how Mao Tse-tung achieved his goals through the
Sino-Soviet Alliance, it would be helpful to point out as
briefly as possible the background of this alliance.
It is widely known that Mao and Stalin did not ex
change a feeling of mutual trust prior to Mao's ascendency
to power. During the civil war in China, for example, "the
Soviet encouragement of Chinese Communist ambitions was
initially negligible."^ Stalin's distrust of Mao was
later expressed by the latter in a speech to the Tenth
Party Plenum of October, 1962:
Ev5n after the success of the revolution, Stalin feared that China might degenerate into another Yugoslavia and that I might become a second Tito. I later v;ent to Moscow and concluded the Sino-Soviet Treaty Alliance. Stalin did not wish to sign the Treaty; he finally signed it after two months of negotiations. It
%icLane, Ibid.
17
was only after our resistance to America and support for Korea [in the Korean.War:] that Stalin finally came to trust us.3
On the other hand Mao did not have a feeling of
affection toward Stalin. He gained the leadership of his
party in 1935 and later the leadership of China in 1949
without any major assistance from Stalin. Thus Mao did
not owe an obligation to the government of the Soviet Union
which would render him dependent on the Soviet government.
In fact, from 1935, when Mao completed his long March until
after he was fully established as the leader of China in
1949, the elites of the Soviet Union had given their support
to the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek in the form
of a pact signed in 1945.^ In effect Stalin had clearly
recognized the Nationalist government as the sole government
of all of China.
During the critical years from 1945 through 1943, Soviet assistance to China was limited. Military assistance consisted in allowing the Chinese Communists to gain strategic footholds and to acquire captured Japanese ordance in Manchuria; political assistance was initially given to the Nationalist Government . . .; and economic "assistance" was limited to stripping Manchuria of its industrial assets at the expense of both Chinese rivals.5
•^Gittings, op. cit. p. 44.
^McLane, 0£. cU,. , p. 327.
^Raymond C. Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Ralations," The Annals of the American Adademy of Polltic-1 -ir.d Social Science (Hereafter The Annals). No. 349. (oepteinbar, 19b3T, p. B3.
1 r\
Mao must have felt the impact of Stalin's policy toward the
Nationalist government and he must have been aware of the
activities of the Soviets in Manchuria. Undoubtedly, the
Soviets' agreement with Chiang Kai-shek had placed some
restraints on Moscow's encouragement of Mao's efforts
against the Nationalist government. By the end of World
War II, Mao came to power with little Russian help and
showed not only the Russians but also the non-Marxists that
a successful Communist "revolution" could be based on the
support of the peasants rather than on an industrial pro
letariat.^
The success of Mao in 1949 had presented new realities
for the Soviets. The new situation in China presented ad
vantages as well as disadvantages for the Russians. If one
must search for a motive in the Sino-Soviet Alliance, it
can be argued that the alliance was dictated by the realities
of the situation at the time. Although the Soviet Union was
less responsive to an alliance with China, Stalin must have
seen "a greater role for Moscow in Pacific affairs"' and a
new avenue for spreading communist ideology in Southeast
Asia. China's interests in this alliance, on the other
"Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 204.
7 McLane, OQ. cit. , p. 327.
^Ibid.
19
hand, were of "short-term national interest"^ more immediate
to the demands of Mao's role in bringing about political
integration.
The Ideological Goal
In the case of China, "ideology is certainly an im
portant factor behind most features of Chinese foreign
policy."-'- A communist regime was a new experience for
China. China could not claim an independent Communist
view from that of the Soviet Union at a tine when the
country was suffering economic hardships and in need of
the support of'a powerful ally such as the Soviet Union.
Internally, the Alliance with the Soviet Union created an
ideological bond between the two.nations. It served a
"short-term national interest"- - of adding harmony to the
socialization process. The ruling elite took zhe oppor
tunity to launch a domestic propaganda campaign which im
proved the political integration of the society. By the
end of the Korean War the slogan "learn from the Soviet
Union"-^^ was shouted by everyone in China.
Q
•^Gittings, lop. cit. , p. 42.
^^Ibid., p. 43.
lllbid. John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Disnut.e
A Commentary and Extracts fro i ^ ' iv-cer.t '-ol -nics 19o3-K'67, (London: Oxford University Press, 19o8j, p. 15.
20
Mao Tse-tung was aware of the ideological gap that
existed between his beliefs and those of the leaders of
the Soviet Union. And he did not fail to make it known
through his spokesman Ch'en Po-ta that the
alliance would not be allowed to compromise the distinctiveness of his own doctrinal innovations to Marxism-Leninism.13
When Mao accepted Soviet Leadership of the Communist bloc
by this alliance, he did not accept it uncritically. He
still maintained a "united front" line v/hich consisted of
a four-class coalition with workers, peasants, and petty
bourgeoisie ,"-'- which was opposed by the Soviet leaders.
According to Mao the "united front" would remain in action
during the transitional period to socialism. The Soviets
on the other hand insisted on the "dictatorship of the
proletariat ."- 5 This important ideological gap between
the leaders of both nations did not prevent them from
forming the Sino-Soviet Alliance. However deep was this
gap, the average Chinese was unaware of its nature. Thus
the effect of the alliance was not jeopardized by this ideol
ogical gap.
•^^Gittings, "The Great Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy" OD. cit. , p. 46.
^^Ibid.
l^Ibid.
o 1
It is also believed that while Mao was seeking an
alliance with the Soviet Union to improve the political
and economic situations in China, he was also furthering
his aim to become the leader of the Communist bloc.^^ In
a speech on Stalin's birthday in 1939, Mao said that "Stalin
is the leader of world revolution . . . Since we have him,
things can go well. '
Gittings feels that he implied that either Mao or
someone else would be the leader if Stalin passed away.
This 1939 speech v;as widely publicized ten years later.
It would seem appropriate to assume that China's alliance
with the Soviet Union had brought Mao one step closer to the
world seat of Communist ideological leadership. This last
observation can be better understood when seen in the light
of China's concept of a world order which is discussed later
in this chapter.
The Economic and Indust>rial Goal
The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and
Mutual Assistance was signed in Moscow on the fourteenth of
P'ebruary, 1950. The tv/o agreements signed at the same time
covered (l) the eventual return of the Manchurian Chinese
^^bid.. p. 45.
' Ibid.
22
Changchun Railway to China, (2) a Soviet loan of 300
million dollars, and (3) recognition of the independence
of Mongolia. Later, on March 2?, 1950, agreements were
reached on (4) the establishment of a joint-stock company
to discover petroleum and metals, and (5) the establish
ment of a civil aviation company. A Sino-Soviet Trade
agreement was also signed April 19, 1950.^^ As long as
China paid its debts on time, the Soviets helped the Chinese
build up their economy. According to the Soviet newspaper
Pravda,
The Soviet Union was the first country to extend the hand of fraternal aid to People's China. The construction of modern plants, dispatch of experts, training of students-- all this the Soviet Union did in the sincere desire to help China speed up the creation of a modern economy.^^^
Some authors say that "the high rates of growth in the early
1950's were made possible . . . by Soviet loans, suDplies of
machinery and equipment and technicians.''^ r'or the same
period, "pov/er machinery and electricity per worker in
l3 Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, or. cit.,
p. 4 3 . 19
Oleg Hoef fd ing , "S ino -Sov ie t Economic n e l a t i o n s , 1959-1962," The Annals , No. 349 (September, I963) p . 9 5 .
20 Robert Dernberger, "Economic Fluctuations in Comr.u-
nist China," in Ho and Tsou, o_p. cit. , p. 741. See also Alexanda Eckstein, "Conditions and Prospects for Economic Growth in Communist China (Parts 1 and II)" Vv'orld Politics VII (October 1954), p. 33.
23
industry increased by 30 percent."^^ This was accompanied
by a 50 percent increase in labor's output and 29 percent
reduction in cost for the products produced by this labor.
In the same period, it is estimated that China used the
services of over 11,000 Soviet technicians and "received
almost 1,7 billion United States dollars in Soviet loans."^^
Not until 1956 did China enjoy a favorable trade with the
Soviet Union, as indicated by Figure 1.
Figure 1
SINO-SOVIET BALANCE OF TRADE
i n M i l l i o n Rubles
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
China's exports to the USSR China's imports from the USSR
1961
1950 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 53 59 60
Adapted from Klaus Mehner t . Pekins and Moscow (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons , 1963) , p . 293 .
The i n c r e a s e d e x p o r t s t o the Sov ie t Union were used t o buy
21
22
Dernberger , I b i d . , p . 743
I b i d .
9/
new equipment rather than pay back past loans ahead of
time. In fact, the Soviet Union agreed in August 1953
and February 1959 to supply China with 125 complete plants
valued at about 2 billion dollars in exchange for Chinese
exports. Although these agreements were not fulfilled by
either nation, the agreements reveal China's favorable
position in its trade with the Soviet Union. Professor
Robert Dernberger wrote in 1963 that "China's economic
development will continue to depend upon developments in
Communist China's foreign trade."
Regardless of the amount of loans which were pro
vided by the Soviet Union, they were too small for the
demands of the Chinese economy. However, most of the
needs for industrialization of China, particularly the
development of powerful industries which was included in
China's First Five-Year Plan, came under the Soviet Union
assistance program. Soviet aid in this respect was mainly
in terms of supplying equipment and materials and technicians
rather than financial aid.
In other respects the Soviet aid was very helpful.
It is doubtful that the Chinese could have carried out their First Five-Year Plan without the technical help and equipment which they received from Russia, or without the credits which the Soviet Union did give for
^^Ibid., p. 752
9f;
economic development projects.^
By 1956, the Soviet Union was committed to the construction
of 211 major projects and the provision of technical assist
ance valued at 2 billion dollars. Without these key Soviet
aid projects, which were considered the backbone of China's
industrialization process, and v;ithout the thousands of
advisors and technicians, China's industrialization efforts
would have been far behind their present achievement.^5
Industrial expansion was most noticeable in railway
expansion, in minerals, fuels, and electric power; also con
siderable advances were made in metallurgical and machine-
building industries. An aircraft industry was already
under construction by 1957, and an atomic reactor v;as com
pleted by 1953. As indicated by Table II- 1, the output
of key heavy industries increased between 1950 and 1957
by a considerable amount.
Thus, through economic assistance, the Soviet Union
helped to restore the Chinese economy which until 1950
was battered by long civil war and a war with Japan. More
important for Mao's drive toward political integration was
the influence of this economic aid in giving the Chinese
^A. Doak Barnett, "The Economic Develorment of Communist China I960." in Government of Communist China, ei. by George P. Jan, (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1966), p. 332.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 333.
26
population a hope for the future. A future in which the
Chinese citizen saw himself in a better economic situation.
TABLE II-1
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF SELECTED HEAVY INDUSTRIES IN MAINLAND CHINA
1950 1952 1957
steel
pig iron
coal
electric power
cement
machine tools
.3
B.3
35.0
3.3
1.4
n.a
1.35 5.35 million metric tons
1.9 5.94 million tons
63.53 130. million tons
7.26 19.3 billion kwh
2.36 6.36 million tons
n.a. ' 13.7 23. thousand sets
^ not available
Adapted from Barnett, Ibid., o. 334, and Eckstein, 0£. cit., p. 13.
Chinese Goal For a "Respectable" Position in World Politics
China's goal for a "respectable" position in world
politics was also one of its motives in signing the Sino-
Soviet Treaty of 1950. The United States was committed
to the Nationalist government and the Soviet Union was in
a 1945 alliance with the Nationalists. China's ensueing
alliance with the Soviet Union provided her with the first
27
international avenue to further its position in the inter
national communist bloc.
Mao's long range goal in international relations is
understood through China's conception of world order. Al
though this perception has its origin centuries before
Confucius, it is best exemplified in the Confucian culture.
In the words of Professor Benjamin I. Schwartz, the "con
cept of universal kingship . . . of a higher culture"^'^
had a "religious cosmic basis" which tied the national
political order to a universal order and to a heavenly
order. The concept pictured a great civilized kingship
of which China was the center.^ This conception of world
order was not exclusively Chinese. It had its parallel in
Mesopotamia and in Egypt, v/hen a foreign power such as
France occupied a part of China, the people, though exposed
to a different culture, remained basically attached to their
traditional one. A similar parallsl exists in the following
statement by Schwartz: "Asure could prevail over Baal, yet
Baal's reality could not be negated."^9 Thus, the Chinese
^^Benjamin I. Schwartz, "The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present," in The Chinese Vvcrld Orner Traditional China's Foreigrn Relations, ed. by Jo .n r ing Fairbank, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 277.
^%orton Ginsburg, "On the Chinese Perception of a World Order," in Ho and Tsou, ££. cit. , p. 75.
^^Schwartz, "The Chinese Perception of /.'orld Order, Past and Present," op.cit. , p. 283.
23
conception of world order survived many dynasties and
several conquerors but was never replaced by any other
image of political philosophy except during the 1390's
when "nationalists", such as Yen Fu, "accepted the V/estern
multistate system with astonishing lack of reservation."^^
After he came to power in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek also took
a similar outlook.
When Mao Tse-tung came to power in 1949 he intro
duced a Marxist-Leninist ideology which proclaimed a new
world order similar to the traditional Chinese perception
but different from it in the fact that the source of this
heaven lies outside Peking in the Communist Dogma. Never
theless, Mao Tse-tung's image
of a world Communist movement centered on Peking is simply the latest version of the concept of a barbarian world 'transformed' . . . by Chinese culture.31
Understanding Mao's image of the world helps us
understand his foreign as well as his domestic policies.
This image formed Mao's basic guide in conducting his
behavior on the international scene. It was within this
framework of concepts that the foreign policy goals of the
Chinese Communist Party were unfolded. These goals were
^^Ibid.. p. 235.
^^Ibid., p. 234.
90
achieved mainly through the efforts of the Soviet Union.
The ideological goal was achieved in early autumn of 1943
when Mao decided to "lean to one side."^^ Later, in June
1949, Mao reiterated his adherence to the Soviet camp in
his famous speech "On the People's democratic dictator
ship,"- ^ in which he said that
all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.34
Although the tone of his speech indicated that his decision
was mainly based on ideological grounds, the decision must
also have been dictated by "consideration of straightfor
ward real politik."3^ China's fear of the west had not
been eliminated; furthermore, the United States' support
of Nationalist China presented a real threat to the security
of the Communist regime. This threat was often cited by
the party leadership in justifying their alliance with the
Soviets.
The chief value of the Sino-Soviet alliance to the Chinese was the military and. political backing which it provided at a time when the new government was at its most vulnerable, and
- Gittings, 0£. cit., p. 15.
33 Ibid.
^^Ibid. Mao's entire speech, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," may be found in Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works. (Peking: Foreign Language Press), III, 415.
^^Ibid., p. 16.
30
the need for 'peacefu l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' a t i t s g r e a t e s t . - ' "
In 1950, the Soviet Union and China signed the Sino-Soviet
Treaty of F r i endsh ip , A l l i a n c e , and Mater ia l Ass i s t ance .
M i l i t a r i l y i t was to p ro t ec t China from Japan and the
U. S . , which had e s t a b l i s h e d m i l i t a r y bases in Japan.37
Economically, Russia pledged 300 mi l l ion d o l l a r s and
other a s s i s t ance t o China ' s modernization process . The
secre t ive nature of most of the da ta obscure the exact
Soviet a s s i s t a n c e t o China.
There were no published or known m i l i t a r y prov i s ions or p r o t o c o l s , but i t i s c l ea r t h a t arrangepients were made a t t h a t time to i n s t i t u t e formal m i l i t a r y a s s i s t ance in Soviet supplying of ma te r i a l and t r a i n i n g . 3 3
Some 3,000 Soviet m i l i t a r y exper t s were sent to China to
help organize the Chinese armed f o r c e s . Some 700 1 110-15
f i g h t e r s , 200 p is ton l i g h t bombers were included within a
t o t a l number believed to be 2,430 a i r c r a f t of d i f f e r en t
types t ha t were put i n t o the hands of the Chinese.39 in
1951, Chinese m i l i t a r y expendi tures were 43 percent of
China 's budget . Some of t h i s aid was covered by Soviet
c r e d i t s , some of which China could not redeem. However
^%bid., p. 17.
- 'Dutt, op. cit. , p. 61 33 Garthoff, 0£. cit. , p. 34.
^%fcid.
• • • •
31
generous the Soviet Union may have seemed in its effort to
aid the Chinese, it did not do this without considerable
debate in the Soviet Union of the issues and the consequences
of its act.^0 Stalin realized from the beginning that Mao
did not owe the Soviet Union anything for his victory over
the Nationalist forces. An important factor which encouraged
the Soviet military aid to China was the Korean War. China
intervened in the war at Stalin's insistence. Some authors
believe that the party leaders expected more aid than the
Soviets offered even during the first year of the war.^^
Mao's aim to build nuclear weapons would surely
place Communist China among the exclusive nations of the
world with the awesome power of nuclear weapons. The first
effort toward acquisition of nuclear weapons occurred in
1953 when the Comraittee of Atomic Energy was established
within the Chinese Academy of Sciences.^^ The Soviet Union
had provided the first atomic reactor and agreed to pro
vide the Communist Chinese with technical knovdedge and
documents concerning the atomic reactor. Actually China
was not v/ithout nuclear scientists of its own. Its most
^%ecent Chinese statements in the Red Flag claim that the Soviet Union favored a divided China rather than one united under Mao, Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute 1963-1967, 02. cit., pp. 13-14.
•"•Ibid. See also Garthoff, op. c^t., p. 5.
^^Cheng Chu-yuan, "Progress of huclear .manors in Communist China," in Jan, 0£. cit. , p. 543.
32
important nuclear physicist is Chien San-chiang who studied
in the University of Paris.^3 However, the Soviet aid in
the development of nuclear power for Communist China is of
considerable importance.^^
Complete political integration, according to Herbert
J. Spiro,^5 means the integration of both the ruling elite
as well as the population. The only evidence of dishar
mony between the central elites of the Chinese Communist
Party between 1949-1955 seems to have occurred in 1955
when the rulers of two provinces were ousted.^^ Kao Kang
in Manchuria and Jao Shu-shih in Shanghai were accused of
"building independent kingdoms."^7 By graphical illus
tration, if party unity is represented by a straight line
for the period 1949-1957 on a graph, the following would
appear.
^3lbid., p. 546.
^^Ibid., pp. 543-550.
^^Spiro, £p. cit.
^^Documents of the National Conference of the COTI::.U-nist Party of China, i-iarch 1955, (Peking: Forei~n Lanruage Press, 1955), p. 3.
''»A/hiting, o£. cit. , p. 151.
33
A
Figure 2
GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY UNITY BETWEEN 1949-1957
the ouster of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
The Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih incidents prompted the
party leadership to initiate a new policy of tight obser
vation over the rulers of the provinces by electing a new
Central Control Committee. This committee, according to
the editor of the People's Daily, was designed
. . . to intensify the struggle against violations of lav; and discipline on the part of Party members and, in particular, to prevent the recurrence of such phenomena as the anti-Party block of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih which could seriously damage the interests of the party.^^
In essence this move by the Central Committee, whose
chairman was Mao Tse-tung was toward centralized control
over party cadres lest they disagree with the policy of the
^^Documents of the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, r.arch 19551 on. £it. , p. 3 .
34
leadership. Kao Kang's belief that the Chinese Communist
party consisted of two parties —"party of the revolution
ary basis and the army"^° -- challenged Mao's authority.
According to the Report on the First Five-Year Plan for
Development of the National Economy of the People's Republic
of China in 1953-1957. the Chinese Communist Party is one
party united under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Accord
ing to Li Fu-ch'un, Vice Premier of the State Council and
Chairman of the State Planning Commission v;ho delivered the
above report July 5, 1955, the Communist Party of China,
"under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party
led by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, . . .has always maintained a
solid and unbreakable unity."^^ The lack of a major support
for Kao Kang and the abrupt success of Mao over his adver
saries minimized the crisis of party unity. The fact that
Mao's move was supported by all the members of the Central
Coramittee illustrates the shallow roots of the crisis.^
Furthermore, this crisis clearly illustrates two important
facts.
One, Mao's intolerance of party leaders who disagreed;
^ % b i d . , p . 1 4 .
^^Robe r t R. Bowie and John K. F a i r b a n k , Corn-nunjst China 1955-1959 P o l i c y Documents wi th A n a l v n i s , (Cambr idge : Ha rva rd U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , r965) , p . 9 0 . The co^Tiplete r e p o r t can be found i n p p . 4 2 - 9 1 .
Documents_of _tj]^e_l['^ ^ASl^}^lLS^J~l^S^- -°'^- t i ' ^ '^orvr.:\-n i s t P a r t y of China ,'T-i,:a-ch _ !£ : . i , o n . c i t . , p . 5 7 .
35
and, two, the limits behond which "criticism and self-
criticism"^^ could not reach.
Summary
The influence of foreign policy on political inte
gration is not a new phenomenon. It is evident throughout
diplomatic history. One only needs to recall the War of
1312, and the influence of Thomas Jefferson's foreign
policy toward France and England^3 and how this policy
divided the American people among themselves, and widened
the gap between the Republican party and the Federalist
party. The fact that people are interested in the act
ivities of other nations and in the influence of these
activities upon the interests of their country makes
foreign policy a significant factor in contributing to
political integration or to disintegration. Describing
the interests of the American people in the French Revo
lution of 1739, Alexis de Tocqueville v/rote in 1331:
The sympathies of the people declared themselves with as much violence in favor of France that nothing but the inflexible character of Washington and the immense popularity which he enjoyed could have
^^Ibid., p. 3.
53Kendric Charles Babcock, The Rise of American Nationality 1311-1319. (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1905), Vol. XIII, p. 151.
36
prevented the Americans from declaring war against England.^^
The current Japanese foreign policy toward the United
States provides further evidence on the influence of a
nation's foreign policy upon its political system. While
the Japanese government enjoys selling the U.S. one third
of its exports, it suffers from demonstrations by the stu
dents against close relations with the U.S. Another recent
example is the influence of United States involvement in
Viet Nam on the American political system. This influence
is indicated by the considerable opposition among students
as well as the leaders of both the Republican and Demo
cratic Parties.
In addition, as Hans J. Morgenthau has noted, the
government "must also gain the support of the public
opinion of other nations for its foreign and domestic
policies,"^^ a question which we will discuss later.
If the interest of the Chinese people in their
country's foreign policy was dormant, it must have been
^^Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), Vol. 1, pp. 234-235.
^^Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations the Struggle for Power and Peace, (iNew York: Alfred A . Knopf, 1967)7 p. 143. A thorough discussion of the relationship between public ordnion and foreign policy is found in Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Conduct of Foreign Policy." in Aspeets of American Government, ed. by Sydney Baily, (London: The Hansard Society, 1950), pp. 99 ff; ^nd In Defense of the National Interest, ([:ew York: Alfred A. r'norf, l'-51/, pp. 22'i ff.
reawakened by the several wars with the foreign powers of
the V/est as well as the war with Japan. Therefore, Mao's
conduct in foreign diplomacy in 1949 had to be supported
by his people, if he was to win political integration.
This chapter has attempted to show how Mao's foreign
policy toward the Soviet Union strengthened the party and
national unity. When the Chinese Communist Party came to
power in 1949, it was faced
with the problem of absorbing vast numbers of non-Communist soldiers and administrators, and of consolidating its hold on the country with a very inadequate i'orce of politically trained and reliable personnel.^^
The support of the Chinese population was most important
to Mao's drive for political integration. In 1949
the Chinese were weary of warfare, which had been almost continuous since 1911, and were willing to pay a high price for peace and strong government.^7
Chinese Communist Party strength was boosted through its
defeat of inflation and through its successful bid to be
the ally of one of the strongest nations of the world.
Mao hoped to achieve three goals from his alliance
with the Russians. First, an ideological goal of in
stitutionalizing communist roles and values which was
achieved through propaganda and slogans such as "learn
56 Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish, 0£. cit. , p. 13.
' Ibid., p. 19.
3^
from the Soviet Union."^° A second goal of economic and
indus t r ia l development was achieved with Soviet ass is tance
through loans, new f a c t o r i e s , s c i en t i f i c assistance and
foreign t r a d e . The l a s t goal for a "respectable" Chinese
position in the world was not achieved although the Soviet
Union's aid for Chinese i ndus t r i a l i za t i on and provision of
nuclear data a'nd technical knov;how increased the Mao
regime's influence.
In the f ina l ana lys i s , the degree of p o l i t i c a l
integration as evident from the support of the people or
the unity of the leadership i t s e l f does not depend on a
set number of data or on an achievement oriented to the
needs of the whole Chinese soc ie ty . But rather p o l i t i c a l
integration depends upon the sa t i s fac t ion of the people
with t he i r government, and the sa t i s fac t ion of the e l i t e s
with those ins t iga t ing the government's po l ic ies .5° Mao
Tse-tung's goals in the Sino-Soviet Alliance obviously
were not professionally planned, as by a draftsman or a
mathematician, but were those of a p o l i t i c i a n . More l i k e l y ,
Mao saw an opportunity for assis tance from a pov;erful "nation;
he sought t h i s ass is tance and gained by i t . His success
strengthened the p o l i t i c a l in tegra t ion of his regime as well
^ G i t t ings , op. c i t . , p . 15. CO
^^Morgenthau, op. c i t . , p . 142
39
as his country. Mao's use of the Sino-Soviet Pact to build
up his regime's power illustrated a process described by
Hans Morgenthau:
The power of a nation . . . depends not only upon the skill of its diplomacy and the strength of its armed forces but also upon the attractiveness for other nations of its political philosophy, political instutitions and political policies.60
His successful foreign diplomacy with the Soviet
Union gained approval from both the people and the elites
of the Communist party. This is true partly because the
elites were communist and had shared with the Russians the
basic Marxist dogma of socialism, and partly because of the
long hardships the country had experienced under the French
and the British rule which discouraged closer association
with the West, even if it was available.
In general, the leaders of the party were united
behind the same domestic and foreign policies. The change
in these policies brought about, within the party, crises
of significant magnitude. These crises included such pol
icies as the Great Leap Forv;ard, which will be discussed in
the next chapter, the Commune system, and the deterioration
in the Sino-Soviet relations since 1959. Sach of the above
had a different magnitude; nevertheless, they contributed to
party disharmony.
Ibid. , p. 143.
CHAPTER III
THE FAILURE OF THE GREAT LEAP FORV ARD AND ITS INFLUENCE ON
MAO'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Chapters one and two illustrated the factors behind
the unity of the Chinese Communist Party between 1949-1957.
These factors were the sound economic progress and the
successful foreign policy of the leadership of the party.
So long as the policies of the regime met with relative success, the struggle for pov/er within the party could be contained and the crisis of party unity minimized.!
Such a crisis was that of the purge of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-
shih. The unity of the party v/as the main factor contributing
to effective political control during the period 1949-1957.
But the three years which were to follow were years of crisis
caused partly by the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the
Commune System, and the deterioration in the Sino-Soviet
relations. These three years had a different effect on
party unity. They raised many important questions among
the leadership regarding the basic political philosophy of
Mao Tse-tung in both domestic and foreign affairs. Our
immediate concern is to indicate that the debate within
Ho and Tsou, op. cit. , p. 321.
40
the leadership of the party mainly centered around the
"question of the extent to which Mao's thought could be
vigorously applied in various areas of activities,"^ and
furthermore that the ensuing struggle v/ithin the party also
centered around this same question. This observation is
supported by Chou En-lai's report on the work of the govern
ment:
From 1959 to 1962 . . . the class enemies at home launched renewed attacks on socialism, and consequently once again fierce class struggle ensued . . . they used their bourgeois and revisionist viewpoint to oppose our general line of socialist construction and the general line of our foreign policy.3
The focus of this chapter is to show how the failure of the
Great Leap Forward contributed to this struggle within the
Chinese Communist Party.
The Second Five-Year Plan
It is important to point out that before the First
Five-Year Plan ended, the Eighth National Congress of the
Communist Party of China on September 27, 1956 adopted the
Second Five-Year Plan for the period 1957-1962. This plan
called for an economic growth of 3.5 per cent per annum.
2 Ibid., p. 322.
3Peking Review, January 1, 1965, pp. 12-13.
42
The central task of our Second Five-Year Plan is still to give priority to the .development of heavy industry. This is the chief index of our country's socialization, because heavy industry provides the basis for a strong economy and national defense, as well as the basis for the technical reconstruction of our national economy.^
The success of the First Five-Year Plan demonstrates
that the 3.5 per cent rate growth was feasible because
during the earlier plan the average annual rate of increase
in the NNP was 9.1 per cent. The projected rate for the
Second Five-Year Plan was lower because the planners pro
vided for more investment during this period. However
sound this plan may have been, it was overshadowed by the
adoption of the Great Leap Forward program, a broad cam
paign mounted to induce every family to fully exploit all
resources of nature "in an effort to transform local econo
mics in the course of three years."^ The plan was so bold
that by 1972 China would surpass Great Britain in the total
output of major industrial products." According to Liu Shao-
ch'i, it was Mao Tse-tung who initiated the slogan "Catch up
^See the full text and the quantitative targets for the Second Five-Year Plan in E. Stuart Kirby, Contemporary China. 1956-1957. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press T9W, II, 145.
5 Gray and Cavendish , O_P. c i t . , p . 3 1 .
vVu Y u a n - l i , "The Economic Chal lenge of Communist China ," in Kirby , op . c i t . , p . 4 1 . Also in Bowie and Fa i rbank , o_p. c i t . ~ P . " T 7 .
43
with and outstrip Britain in 15 years."'^
Why V as the Great Leap Forward Adopted?
There are some important questions concerning the
adoption of the Great Leap Forward by the Chinese govern
ment. For instance, why did the government adopt such a
drastic program when the economy was enjoying a success
beyond everyone's expectation? Several authors provide
different answers to this question. Ta-chung Liu claims
that the leadership "having extraordinary ambitions . . .
and an unusual confidence in the ability to put through
radical reorganizations of the economy,"° was not satis
fied with the 1952-1957 pattern of growth. Another reason
for the introduction of the Great Leap Forward is suggested
by Robert Dernberger. He claims that the Chinese govern
ment wanted to increase both the rate of grov/th and the
rate of labor productivity in agriculture in order to in
crease its exports. Professor Anthony M. Tang proposes
another hypothesis. He suggests that the leadership of
Mao Tse-tung adopted the Graat Leap Forv/ard so that the
7 Quoted by Liu Shao-ch'i in "Report on the V-ork of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Chine to the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress," in Bowie and Fairbank, Ibid. , p7 422. The report in full is on pp. 417-433.
Ho and Tsou, o_p. cit. , p. 647.
I I
rate of agriculture production would meet the high rate of
industrial output. Professor Tang reasoned "because ag
riculture effectively limited industrialization, agricul
ture needed to be developed."^ Still another hypothesis
is suggested by Jack Gray. He points out that the broad
decentralized economic system of the Great Leap Forv/ard
was adopted by the Communist Party of China in response to
the Soviet Union's efforts to achieve better relations
with the United States. From the Chinese point of view,
argues Professor Gray, this plan would provide the country
with the momentum it needed in case the Soviet Union stopped
helping China, and the plan also would establish the back
ground for guerrilla training in case of an American in
vasion. The author argues that
the importance of military considerations in the Great Leap Forward is suggested by the prominence given not only to the creation of self-sufficient local economics, but to local ability to manufacture steel and to the attempt to arm the whole people as a vast militia.^^
Although these hypotheses differ somewhat in approach
as well as emphasis, each could conceivably contain some
truth for the adoption of the Great Leap Forward. Further
more, none of the above authors doubt that Mao Tse-tung was
%bid. , p. 674.
Gray and Cavendish, £p. cit. , p. 32.
45
attempting to build a self-sufficient economy that would
meet the demands of a rapid industrial development. Though
these authors disagree on the motive for the adoption of
the Great Leap Forward, they agree on the cause of its
failure. According to Alexander Eckstein, "the realities
of the country's economic and technical backwardness,"^1
conflicted with Mao's vision of a rapid economic and in
dustrial development. The peasants as well as the country's
economy were incapable of providing the sudden heavy de
mands put on them by the Great Leap Forward.
The Politico-Ideological Foundations of the Great Leap Forv/ard
The politico-ideological foundation of the Great
Leap Forward help one understand some aspects behind the
failure of the Great Leap Forward. These foundations are
indicated by the slogans "Be red then experts," and "let
politics take command." Both slogans snare the belief that
one's politico-ideological conviction is more important
than his abilities and skills. In a time when the develop
ment of the economy rested on the experts and their skills,
the government put its emphasis on first being "red" and
then on being "expert." This move by the government tended
to alienate the intellectuals who were less inclined toward
11 Ho and Tsou, 0£. cit., pp. 693 and 729
46
Communism than others.-^^
According to Richard Baum, the initiation of the
slogan "red-experts" in 1957 in conjunction with the
Great Leap Forward, was meant to solve two problems which
were facing the Chinese Communist Party: First, the "old"
intellectuals' lack of enthusiasm for socialism; and second,
the lack of economic and technological resources needed
for quick economic development.•'•3
First, the Chinese Communist Party problem with the
"old" intellectuals' lack of enthusiasm became apparent
when the government launched its campaign "Let a Hundred
Flov/ers Blossom . . . a Hundred Schools of thought Con
tend."^^ In July, 1956, the leadership of the party,
under this slogan, encouraged free criticism by the in
tellectuals in order that literature and art might flourish.
When the party leadership discovered that much of the criti
cism was lashed at the party leadership itself, the govern
ment, in an attempt to stem the tide of criticism, adopted
" Richard Baum, "Red and Expert: The Politico-Ideological Foundations of China's Great Leap Forward," Asian Survey^ V (September I964). 1049.
^^Ibid., p. 1051.
^^Complete t e x t i s in Bowie and Fairbank, 0£. c i t . , pp. 151-163. A speech "On the Question of I n t e l l e c t u a l s , " by the Prime Minis te r Chou En- la i i s in pp. 123-144.
47
the program of "reform through labor."^5 Intellectuals
and students were sent to the countryside so that they
might appreciate the works of the peasants. This program,
which is also referred to as the "rectification"-^^ move
ment was in line with Mao's thinking
that only by taking part in the production process and class struggle could men advance through the stages of 'rational' and 'perceptual' knowledge.-*-'
Thus through manual labor, Mao hoped to remedy the intellect
uals lack of enthusiasm for Mao's pattern of socialism.
Second, the Communist leadership's problem in achiev
ing a rapid economic development would be quickly solved
if, according to Mao, the workers were motivated by en
thusiastic Communist beliefs. This is consistent with his
belief of "mind over matter. "- ^
It is also believed that the "rectification" move
ment was meant to condition and to educate the people for
the subsequent Great Leap Forward.-'- In his speech "The
Significance of the October Revolution," of November 6, 1957
Liu Shao-ch'i outlined the party's guiding beliefs, explained
' Baum, op. cit. , p. IO5I. 16
Bowie and Fairbank, £P. cit. , p. 343.
Baum, £p. cit.
Ibid.
^%bid.
43
both the slogan "red-expert" and stressed the intellectual
need to be politically motivated.
All those who are in a position to do so should work hard to turn themselves into experts who are both 'red' and expert. The work can not be done well if we are 'red' but not 'expert [sicj 'I Our government functionaries and experts in various fields should make up their minds to remould themselves so as to serve the workers and peasants and work for socialism whole-heartedly; they should incorporate their individual interests in the collective interests of the masses, but not place the former above the latter. Such should be the red experts. The slogan 'first expert then red' is a call for alienation from politics designed to induce the intellectuals to refuse to remould themselves and reject the working class stand. This is in reality a slogan to lead people to the old way of the bourgeois intellectuals. Our intellectuals must understand that it is impossible to keep av;ay from politics. Alienation from revolutionary politics might lead to reactionary politics. Lack of a correct political stand might lead to a reactionary one. Such people can never work for our socialist cause sincerely and reliably, nor serve the workers and peasants whole-heartedly even if they succeed in attaining some knowledge and technique ." 0
The slogan "red and expert" emphasized the Commu
nist Party's conviction that politics and ideology could
increase the production of grain, coal, and iron. The
slogan also recalled Mao's wartime conviction that "ideol
ogy and politics work is alv;ays the soul and guide of every
^^Bowie and Fairbank, 0£. £U., p. 400. This document represents the substance of the Great Leap Forward. It focused on the Leap's purpose to help China catch up with the Capitalist world; it stressed the seriousness of the bourgeois rightists; but more important it stated the "policy of achieving"quantity, speed, quality and economy."
49
kind of work."^l In essence, the political leadership re
garded "mind over Matter" as the key to solving its economic
and technological problems; that if politico-ideological
work was carried out successfully, economic progress would
22
follow naturally. The party leadership was relying on
these slogans to increase productivity at a time when the
Chinese laborer was producing at full capacity, as was shown
in chapter one.
The Momentum and Scope of the Great Leap Forward
In the same speech, cited above, Liu Shao Ch'i set
the momentum and the scope of the Great Leap Forward. The
rate of production would increase rapidly, while quality
would improve through the hard v;ork and dedication of the
masses v;hose daily lives would be regulated to meet the
demands of the Great Leap Forward. The emphasis on a rapid
momentum for the Great Leap Forward was expressed by Liu in
the following:
There are two ways to accomplish this task (agriculture and industrial development): one way is to do things quicker and better, and the other to do things slower and aim at lower standards. Which way should we adopt? The Central Committee of the Party considers that the former-way should be adopted and the latter rejected.^3
21
Baum, op. cit. , p. 1052.
^^Ibid., p. 1050.
^^Bowie and Fairbank, o^. cU,. , p. 399.
50
Here Liu seems to assume that even a cautious policy
is a lazy policy. The scope of the Great Leap Forward would
encompass every citizen in the countryl
By relying on the initiative of the masses, we will certainly be able to carry out correctly the policy of achieving quantity, speed, quality and economy, to push forward the socialist construction of our country.24
The individual would be taxed to produce at his ultimate
capability.
In order to build socialism while achieving quantity, speed, quality and economy, we should advocate industry, frugality and hard work in every field of work, whether in running factories, cooperatives, enterprises, schools or any other undertakings.25
Under the Great Leap Forward the lives of every citizen and
the daily activities of all institutions would be observed
closely.
Industry and thrift should also be practised in housekeeping, so that the same principles may prevail in building the country and keeping the house, and become a social convention. The state and the cooperatives should increase their accumulation, and the individual and households should also increase their savings so far as possible instead of spending all their income. Many young workers and functionaries have now a fairly big income but little or no family burden. They should save up their surplus money against future needs.^6
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
2%bid.
51
Economic Targ;ets
Liu Shao-ch'i's speech of November 1957 laid down the
general politico-ideological lines of the Great Leap Forward.
But the details of economic and industrial targets were not
stated until after the Leap had been implerrsnted in Febru
ary, 195^. This delay, according to Robert R. Bowie and
John K. Fairbank, was for fear of opposition within the
party and the need to educate the cadres.^7 Demands now
were put on scientific institutions. For instance, the
association of Chinese Paleontologists pledged to reach
their targets thirteen years sooner than what they pre
viously planned, and pledged further to reach the capitalist
countries' level of research.
Similarly the party demanded an increase in pro
duction of heavy industries. The National People's Congress
demanded that the Great Leap Forward increase steel pro
duction by 19 per cent, electricity by 13 per cent, and
coal production by 17 per cent. The feeling of uncertainty
is illustrated by the leadership revision of their figures.
In March, 1953 targets for steel production were changed
from 6.2 million tons to 7 million tons, to 3-3.5 million
2f? tons in May and finally to 10.7 million tons in August.
' Ibid., p. 17.
Ibid.
52
Problems Generated by t he Great Leap Forward
Unl ike t he F i r s t F ive -Year Plan the Great Leap F o r
ward c a l l e d f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n of sma l l and medium-sized
e n t e r p r i s e s on the l o c a l l e v e l us ing n a t i v e methods of p r o
d u c t i o n . S t e e l f u rnaces i n the backyards of fami ly horres
were b u i l t a s an exper iment for s i m i l a r e n t e r p r i s e s t o 29
fo l low. "^ Although p r o d u c t i o n by t h i s method i n c r e a s e d
s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n , the s t e e l manufactured proved unusable
for s e v e r a l r e a s o n s .
By December, 1953, two m i l l i o n small fu rnaces of
t h i s t ype were r e p o r t e d l y b u i l t . By the fol lov/ ing August ,
fu rnaces wi th a volume under 100 cubic meters had a c a p a c i t y
of 43,000 cubic me te r s compared with 2,414 cubic mete rs
t o t a l c a p a c i t y of t he same s i z e fu rnaces in 1956.30
The new p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g the smal l s c a l e of p roduc t ion
u n i t s p r e s e n t e d s e v e r a l p rob lems . The very smal l u n i t s f e l l
shor t of t he q u a l i t y s t a n d a r d s of the e a r l i e r l a r g e i n d u s
t r i a l u n i t s of t he F i r s t F ive-Year P l a n . The new pig i r o n
produced by t h e s e smal l u n i t s proved u n f i t fo r s t e e l - m a k i n g .
Likewise the i r o n produced proved t o o smal l t o be used by
modern r o l l i n g m i l l s . The problem was so acu te t h a t t he
29 Kirby , op . c i t . , p . 60 .
3 0 l b i d .
53
Ministry of Metallurgical industry called a conference on
October 16, 195^ to discuss it.31
Furthermore, the small unit production resulted in
an uneconomic use of labor and created a problem in trans
portation. According to the Red Flag, the railway car loads
increased from 26,000 in August, 1953 to 32,000 in December;
and by the end of the year, 30-45 million tons of goods
still needed to be transported.32 Finally the selection
of steel as an experimental method upset the
balance of relative growth between different industries attained during 1953-1957, for each contributed to the development of the other.33
The decentralization of industrial planning present
yet other problems. While iron was produced in small fur
naces all over the country, a general authority to distribute
labor and to incorporate the products was lacking.
In a decentralization move, the government took mea
sures to put responsibilities in the hands of local author
ities, to allow local governments to receive more of the tax
money and to exercise more responsibilities in their financial
spending to meet the requirements of the new shift in popu
lation. Population shifts had been underv/ay since 1955-56
31 Ibid., p. 61.
3 Peter S.H. Tang, Communist China Today, (-.ashl nrton: Research Institute of the Sino-Soviet Bloc 19ol), p. 363. Also in Edgar Snow, The Other oide of the River, Red China Today, (New York, Random House, 1962), p. 183.
^^Kirby, opi. crt. , Vol. Ill, p. 61.
54
and continued for administrative reasons as a part of the
"rectification" movement. In August, 1957, the mayor of
Peking had asked that 30-50 per cent of Peking municipal
employees move to work on farms and in factories. Motives
were varied for this request. Among others the government
wanted to advance literacy among the rural population and
wished to keep the cadres close to the masses so as to con
stantly appreciate them and never to feel too high above
them.3^ Secondly, school students as well as university
students were continuing their pilgrimmages to the rural
side so as to feel the hardship of the lives of the peasants.
All this had been a part of the "rectification" movement and
was still continuing during the Great Leap Forward. The
"rectification" movement as has been stated earlier was to
educate the people for the Great Leap Forward. The new
responsibilities in the hands of the local authorities re
sulted in several diversified moves by the local cadres in
an effort to interpret the motives of the government in
Peking.
These cadres responded most energetically to the
demands of the Great Leap Forward. Their response illus
trates both their eagerness to put government policies into
effect and the lack of unified policy planning by the central
3^Bowie and Fairbank, £p. cit.
55
leadership of the Communist party.35 For example, in Shansi
a local meeting on industrial development estimated with
enthusiasm "that over 13,000 factories would be built within
the year."36 The cadres urged the people in Kiangsu Province,
for instance, to contribute to the state any hardware not in
use or any that could be substituted for something else. Some
cadres took the liberty to raise the targets of sons commo
dities especially in agriculture. In Kiangsu Province, the
provincial committee set a goal of 20-25 per cent increase
of grain and cotton production over 1957 which exceeded the
People's Congress target.3'
In summary, the major cause for these problems stems
from the decentralization policy of the Great Leap Forward.
This is illustrated by the bad transportation system which
was unable to cope with the mass production, and which was
also evident by the government inability to transport the
products of the backyard furnaces. The decentralization
which caused the lack of a united policy planning system
contributed also to the production of substandard products.3^
^^Ibid.
^^bid., p. 17.
^'^Ibid., p. 13.
3°Snow, op. cit. , pp. 133-134^
56
P r o d u c t i o n R e s u l t s
As s h a l l be seen l a t e r , t he Great Leap Forward was
implemented i n F e b r u a r y , 195^ over a s t r o n g o b j e c t i o n from
the " r i g h t i s t s " w i t h i n t he p a r t y . Soon a f t e r i t s imp le
men ta t ion , encou rag ing r e p o r t s were i s s u e d by the govern
ment g i v i n g c r e d i t t o the p rog ram ' s s u c c e s s . Even through
1959 government r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e d t h a t the t a r g e t s of the
Leap were be ing f u l f i l l e d . The government in i t s r e p o r t .
The Communique of Economic Developm.ent in 1953 which was
i ssued on A p r i l 14 , 1959, announced t h a t the p roduc t ion of
such commodities a s " c o t t o n , i r o n and s t e e l had more than
doubled d u r i n g 195^,"-^"^ and t h a t the value of i n d u s t r i a l
p roduc t ion had i n c r e a s e d t o about 66.2 per cen t (Table I I I - l ) .
Few months fo l lowed , and i t became appa ren t t h a t t h e s e f i g
u re s could not be t r u e . V/hen the government could not show
a s u f f i c i e n t i n c r e a s e i n food r a t i o n s and i n d u s t r i a l p r o
d u c t s , i t began to r e v i s e i t s economic f i g u r e s downward. As
i n d i c a t e d by Table I I I - l , the Chinese government on August 29,
1959 r e v i s e d downward the 1953 p roduc t i on of p ig i r o n from
13,630 thousand t o n s t o 9 ,530 thousand t o n s , and ingo t s t e e l
from 11,030 thousand t o n s t o 3,000 thousand t o n s . I t was
a l so admi t ted t h a t a lmost 30 per cen t of t h e i r o n and s t e e l
produced by i nd igenous methods was not usab le for i n d u s t r i a l
O Q
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53
production. The government then abandoned the backyard fur
naces.
Such failures as the backyard furnaces and the down
ward revision of some major industrial outputs, have caused
those outside of China to doubt the legitimacy of the
Chinese government's official estimates of its economy. In
an attempt to reconstruct a true estimate of the various
products, several authors have undertaken the task of study
ing the Chinese economy. Some studies, as indicated in Table
III-2, show that even the revised Chinese government stat
istics are incorrect. For instance Liu and Yeh estimate H
that steel output was 6.3 million tons for 1953 and 3.9 !.-'>
million tons for 1959, while the official revised estimate
was 3 and 13.35 million tons respectively. Similarly, the
same conclusion can be drawn when one compares the figures
of the national product estimates as shown in Table III-3.
In addition to the fact that the estimates by the several
authors for 1953 and 1959 are not as optimistic as the
Chinese government estimates, they are also considered by
some to be too high. For example the 1959 modest increase
of 7 per cent claimed by Wu and Liu and Yeh over 1953 is
considered an overestimate. A valid reason for this con
sideration is that these estimates are based on the wrong
assumption that agricultural production in 1959 had increased
over 1953. According to a respected estimate of the output
TABLE III-2
SCATTERED DATA ON STEEL, 1957-1965
59
Year
1957 1953 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Cur ren t Scene
5.35 3.00^;*
13.35^^ 1 3 . 4 5 -
7-3 7-9 3-10
Ste
Emery
5.2 3.0=i-'
13 .4* 1 3 . 5 -
7.0
10 .0
2el ( M i l l i o n Met r i c Tons)
Far E a s t e r n
Economic Review
5.35 11.03^-^ 13 .35* 13 .45*
11-12 7-3 3-9 10 12
U. S. Bureau of Mines
13 .35* 13 .45*
9.5 10 .0 12 .0 14 .0
Liu-Yeh
5.35 6.3 3 .9
* Communist c l a i m s .
Sources: Adopted from Ho and Tsou, £ D . c i t . , p . 637.
60
TABLE I I I - 3
NATIONAL PRODUCT ESTIMATES OF THE CHINESE MAINLAND, 1957-1962 (Billions of 1952 Yuan)
Year
1957 1953 1959 I960 1961 1962
Communist (Net
Material Product)
93.5 125.3 152.9
Hollister (Gross
National Product)
102.4 126.2 142.6 153.1
vVu (Net Domestic Product)
94.3 104.8 112.0 112,5 73.2
Wu (Gross Domestic Product)
32.1 109.0+
Liu-Yeh (Net Domestic
Product)
Reconstructed Communist Estimate
104.2 145.0 176.3
Author* s' Estimate
95.3 103.C-125.0*
* Conjectural estimate.
+ V/ithout taking consideration possible ''investment limitations and waste Taking; into consideration possible "investment limitations and waste": 101.4
^nina s Gross Maticn.r^.l Product and S o c : a l Liu and Yeh, The Eccr.omy of t i l .:!
Sources : H o l l i s t e r , Accounts 1950-57. p . 2; Mainland, pp. 116, 220, P o t s r i t i a l of C ommuni s t I I I , pp . 120-122. Adopted f o r t h i s t h e s i s from P i r ;g - t i Ho and Tang Tsou, £ p . c i t . , Volume I , Book I I , p . 632.
hin, se 213, 660 and o6; Wu, Tre .economic
Jhina, Yoluma 1, p. "41, ana volun^
61
of food crops and cotton (Table I I I -4 ) in China, the 1959
output was 163 mil l ion tons as compared with the 1953 out
put of 194 metric tons . The bad output by the ag r i cu l tu ra l
sector was poor pa r t ly because the growing season of 1959
was plagued with the problems of floods, draught and insect
pests.^^
These nat ional ca lamit ies had t he i r effects f e l t
through I960 and 1961. In January I96I Red Flag stated
these d i s a s t e r s
not only affected the fulfi l lment of our agr i cu l tu ra l plan for I960 to a great extent , but also inevi tably created unfavorable conditions for the production of both heavy and l igh t indus t r i e s .^^
Since l ight indus t r i es depend on agriculture for raw
materials, a s igni f icant cut in production was consequently
made by the government. This fact i s pa r t i a l l y supported
by Minister of Agriculture Liao Lu-yen»s declaration in
February I96I in Red Flag tha t twenty million urban
laborers had been sent to the ru ra l areas since the month
of August.^2
The lack of o f f i c i a l economic s t a t i s t i c s and the
downward revis ion of the government's own s t a t i s t i c a l
^^Tang, o£. ci_t., p . 367.
^^Ib id . . p . 369. 42.
Ib id .
62
TABLE I I I - 4
ESTIMATES OF THE OUTPUT OF FOOD CROPS AND COTTON, 1957-1965
Year
1957 1953 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Food Crops (Million Metric
Tons)
135 194 163 160 167 173 179 133 130
Cotton (Million Bales)
1.6 1.9 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3
Sources: These e s t i m a t e s a re made by the A g r i c u l t u r a l Of f ice r , U .S . Consula te G e n e r a l , Hong Kong. Adopted from R. F . Emery, "Recent Economic Develooment m Communist Ch ina , " Asian Survay , ( J u n e , 1966) , pp . 303-304.
63
figures lead us to doubt the success of the Great Leap For
ward. This belief is further strengthened by the recon
structed figures cited above. Some of these figures on
products such as steel for 1959 and I960 are proven true
by studies carried out in 1970 (Table III-5). Communist
claims for steel production for 1959 and I960 were 13.35
and 13.45 million metric tons respectively; v;hile the most
recent studies by Robert Michael Field estimated steel pro
duction at 10 and at 13 million metric tons for the same
years. If the estimates by Mr. Field are true, the Chinese
claims represent a significant overestimate for steel pro
duction of 33.5 per cent for 1959 and 34.5 per cent for I960
over the actual production for the two years. This compari
son as well as the decrease in output of food crops and
cotton production in 1959, I960, 1961 and 1962 (Table III-4)
point to the failure of the Greao Leap Forward.
The Leadership's Revision of the Great Leap Forward
This failure in agriculture forced the Communist
Party to revise its policy for the Great Leap Forward. One
important result of the crisis in agricultural output was
the breakdown of China's export program which depended
largely on exporting textiles and cotton.^^ Another factor
caused by this crisis was the dramatic change forced upon
43 " Snow, £p. cit. . p. 133.
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65
the party to import more food products instead of heavy
industrial products. By I96O the Chinese Communist Party
had thus "reversed itself"44 on the Great Leap Forv/ard by
concentrating more on the agricultural sector. This
new directive meant that until 1963 or I964 no major new offensives on industrial front were to be undertaken, and then only if the agricultural foundations were secure against future catastrophes.45
When the Party launched the Third Five-Year Plan in 1966,
the emphasis was on "agriculture as the foundation and in
dustry as the leading factor."^
Although the average output of the industrial sector
during the Great Leap period represents an increase over
1957, this increase is by no means representative of the
"Great Leap" which the Communist Party exp2Cted. For in
stance, the average annual output of crude stael for 1953-
1961 is 9.4 compared with 5.4 million metric tons in 1957,
and for coal an average of 230 compared to I3I million metric
tons in 1957. However this average output of both products
does not represent the lower yields of I96I and 1962. Most
industrial products in both years (Table III-5) experienced
a decline in production from I96O. This decline accompanied
^^Ibid.. p. 139.
^^Ibid.
^^Theodore H.E. Chen, The Chine^e_C_omrnuni s t Rerime Uocu.nents and Comn-i^nt.nrv, (London: i a l l i^ali : ] \ ^ r5 , 19o7) , p . 195.
66
by the crisis in agriculture which forced the leadership of
the party to revise its strategy represents the failure of
the Great Leap Forward. Revision ultimately was extended
to the slogans of the Great Leap. "Red and expert" v/as
reinterpreted. The "red" was toned down and the "expert"
was re-emphasized. On November 6, 1961, an editorial in
Red Flag stated:
more and more facts have shown that industrial development and technical progress depend on people who have scientific and technical knowledge and technical experience . . . assignment of improper jobs would mean a very great waste of technical resources . . . . We must not confuse technical views with political views . . .^7
Conclusion
I t i s unquest ionable t h a t the Great Leap Forward
was Mao*s idea . Several ava i l ab le documents point out t ha t
the Great Leap was Mao's idea and he was responsible for i t s
adoption. According t o an a r t i c l e by Li Fu-ch'un, the
chairman of the S ta te Planning Commission, "On the Big Leap
Forward in China ' s S o c i a l i s t Cons t ruc t ion ," published in the
Red Flag on October 1, 1959, Mao Tse-tung had planned the
Great Leap Forward as e a r l y as the winter of 1955. Liu
Ui
47 Gray and Cavendish, o^. c_lt., p . 3^ .
67
Fu-ch*un wrote:
In the winter of 1955 . . . Comrade Mao Tse-tung scientifically foresaw the possibility for the national economy to develop at still higher speed and put forward, in time, the slogan of achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in developing socialist construction.43
Furthermore, Liu Shao-ch'i speech "the Significance
of the October Revolution," cited earlier, provides another
support to the idea that the Great Leap was Mao's own policy.
In the speech Liu says that
there are two ways to accomplish this task (development of agriculture and industry): one way is to do things quicker and better, and the other to do things slower and aim at lower standards. Which way should we adopt? The Central Committee of the Party considers that the former way should be adopted and the latter rejected.49
However significant the role of Mao Tse-tung in the adoption
of the Great Leap Forward, it seems appropriate that the
blame of its failure should rest on Mao since he is the
Chairman of the People's Republic of China. But as we shall
see in the following chapters, Mao went to a great extent to
vindicate himself from that responsibility.
^^Bowie and Fairbank, op. crb., p. 537. The basic tone of this document is overwhelming optimism. It gives credit for developing the Leap to Mao, and it predicts that China will catch Britain in major industrial output within ten years, rather than in the previous target time of fifteen years.
^^Ibid., p. 399.
)3
The cont roversy wi th in the par ty over the Great Leap
was not caused by the program's f a i l u r e . Rather i t had
s tar ted before the program was i n i t i a t e d . The program's
fa i lure i n t e n s i f i e d the controversy and divided the pa r ty .
Ultimately the debate wi th in the leadersh ip of the par ty
extended u n t i l i t evolved around the extent to which Mao's
thought could be appl ied in var ious p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s .
Speeches by ranking par ty members t e l l us t h a t the
adoption of the Great Leap was ca r r i ed out over some ob
ject ions to i t by high ranking Party l e a d e r s . In the
speech "Report on the Work of the Central Committee of the
Communist Par ty of China to the Second Session of the
Eighth National Congress , " which was del ivered in May,
1953, Liu Shao-ch ' i said t h a t
the cur ren t mighty leap forward in s o c i a l i s t cons t ruc t ion i s the oroduct net only of the successful development of the an t i - r i ^ rh t i s t s t ruggle and the r e c t i f i c a t i o n campaign but a l so of a co r rec t implemientation of the P a r t y ' s general l i n e . ^ ^
The Great Leap Forward had not been implemented when
Liu Shao-ch ' i de l ivered the above speech on November 6, 1957.
But i t seemed t h a t he was educating the public for what lay
ahead for them under the Great Leap Forv^ard. In shor t , they
were expected to be convinced t h a t they are Communist f i r s t
^ ^ I b i d . . p . 424.
69
and only then experts; they were expected to dedicate their
daily activities for the success of a program, which for
many reasons, proved to be a "great leap backward;" they
as well as their leaders did not comprehend the people's
lack of abilities to meet the high demands placed upon
them, but the political leadership led them to believe
that they owned these abilities.
After the above speech was delivered, but before it
was published, the People's Daily published a series of
articles by the first secretaries of several provincial
party committees. They show the degree of "conservative
opposition which had to be overcome early in 1953 by the
supporters of an active policy."^^ The series covers ten
provinces, Fukien, Hopei, Hunan, Kansu, Kiangsu, Kirin,
Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Shansi, and Shensi. These series were
similar to an earlier report by Chiang Hua, First Secretary
of the Chekiang Provincial Committee of the Chinese Commu
nist Party. From this report December 9, 1957 "Adhere to
the Correct Line of the Party and Win Victory of the Rec
tification Campaign on Every Front,"^^ it is apparent that
the opposition within the party was centered at least
around three fundamental points: The failure of some party
members to grasp Mao's way of solving contradictions among
^^Ibid., p. 20.
^^Ibid.
70
the people, their skepticism of Mao's dictation from above,
and their zeal for localism, expected among Party cadres.
Several members of the Party's Provincial Committee
were mentioned by name such as Governor of CheKiang, Sha
Wen-han; Yang Jsu-yi, Vice-Governor; Peng Jui-lin Sun
Chang-lu. Chiang Hua referred to them as "rightists . . ,
hidden within the provincial Party committee."53 Their
opposition to Mao
went to the length of defying the guiding principle of the Central Committee, refused to carry out the directives of the provincial committee and consistently and viciously attacked the provincial committee . . . their criminal activities caused serious damage to the Party cause, damaged the Party prestige, weakened the Party unity and hampered the unified and centralized leadership of the party.54
Skepticism among the leaders of the CheKiang Province is
also evident.
Some comrades became skiptical of the leadership of the provincial committee. Some even had this to say at the Party congress last year: 'the greater the distance from the provincial committee the better.' At the Cadres' conference this year some accused the provincial committee of 'consistent rightist tendency' and 'rightist opportunism;' . . . these comrades took their own course in practical work seriously weakening the united will and fighting capacity of the Party.55
Against "localism," Chiang Hua warned that
^^Ibid., p. 333.
54Emphasis are mine. Ibid.
^^Ibid.. p. 335.
71
cadres from o ther a reas w i l l become loca l a f t e r they have worked for a c e r t a i n period of time and b u i l t c lose t i e s with the loca l people . . The h ighes t p r i n c i p l e of the P a r t y ' s cadres po l i cy i s p r imar i ly 'communization, ' and prov inc ia l i sm i s incompatible with communism.5o
On December 30, 1957 the Governor and Vice-Governor
of CheKiang were dismissed and were removed also as dep
ut ies to the Nat ional Peop le ' s Congress. Similar r epo r t s
came from Anhwei, Honan, Liaoning, Shantung, and Yunnan.
Some of these s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned the purge of some
Party members including the l oca l Par ty sec re t a ry . For
example P 'an Fu-sheng, deposed sec re ta ry of the Honan
provincial committee was accused of opposing the Central
Committee p o l i c i e s and of having a "s t rong element of
' l oca l i sm. ' "57 Similar i nc iden t s were reported from a l l
the provinces . In the same speech mentioned above, Liu
t e l l s h is audience t h a t som^ of those who disagree with
the philosophy of the Great Leap Forward say "We'll s e t t l e
accounts with you a f t e r the autumn harves t . "5° Liu answers
them by saying "Well, l e t them wait to s e t t l e accounts .
They wi l l lose out in the end I"59 The Kansu cadres ack
nowledged Liu challenge mentioned above and said tha t they
56lbid .
^ '^Ibid. , p . 20.
^^ Ib id . , p . 427.
59 I b i d .
72
would "reckon accounts with leaders after the fall."^^
Apparently the cadres meant that they would reckon with
the leaders after the failure of the Great Leap Forward.
This proves that the Great Leap Forward was im
plemented in February 1953 against a considerable oppo
sition from within the Chinese Communist Party. This
opposition according to important figures within the party
caused disunity within the ruling elite and caused the
ouster of some ranking members of the Chinese Communist
Party. Most important was the appearance of an important
opposition which questioned the basis of Mao's political
philosophy of "faster, better and more economical," -'• and
which criticized his discouragement of localism. Similarly
this opposition, as in the case of those Party elements in
Shansi, "doubted the possibility of a leap forward or of
simultaneously developing agriculture and industry."'-' Thus
the opposition to "faster, better and more economical" which
was generated by the Great Leap Forward developed into an
opposition to Mao's general thinking and to its application
in various areas of life.
Some of this opposition also came from the leaders
Ibid.. p. 21.
• Bowie and Fairbank, ££. cit., p. 399.
^^Ibid.
i:
• i
I-Mi
« I In..
73
of the armed forces. The failure of the Great Leap For
ward was accompanied by a decline in per capita consump
tion which was caused by a severe shortage of staple and
subsidiary food and clothing. The peasants felt this de
cline most sharply, and became discontented. This dis
content soon spread within the armed forces whose recruits
came chiefly from the rural areas, and consequently was
transmitted to the leaders. It is no surprise, therefore,
to find that some of the opposition to Mao's leadership
came from the military within the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party."^
The nature of this opposition and its extent will
be discussed later when we study Mao's moves to combat
his foes in the following chapters. Two other factors
contributing to this opposition or disintegration within
the Party—one, the failure of the Commune system, and two,
the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations—will also be
discussed.
^^Choh-ming Li, "Economic Development," from The China Quarterly; printed in Roderick Macfarouhar, China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 166.
CHAPTER IV
THE PEOPLE'S COMUNSS AND POLITICAL DISINTEGRATION
The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t he p e o p l e ' s communes in Commu
nis t China in March, 1953 , and t h e i r subsequent f a i l u r e
contr ibuted t o p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n w i th in the e l i t e s
of the Chinese Communist P a r t y . J u s t as the f a i l u r e of t he
Great Leap Forward c o n t r i b u t e d t o p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n
among the Communist P a r t y e l i t e s , so the p e o p l e ' s communes
created p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the pa r ty l e a d e r s h i p
and c o n t r i b u t e d t o widespread d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n wi th in the «
peasant masses .
The p e o p l e ' s communes and the Great Leap Forward were
two separa te movements des igned fo r the purpose of rap id
i n d u s t r i a l development . As saen in the previous c h a p t e r ,
the Great Leap Forward was adopted t o achieve i n d u s t r i a l
development whi le r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t the development of a g r i
cul ture was e s s e n t i a l t o a succes s fu l i n d u s t r i a l output.•'•
E s s e n t i a l l y , the a d o p t i o n of the commune system, a month
af te r the i n a u g u r a t i o n of the Great Leap, was geared to
•'•Fu-ch'un L i , "On the Big Leap Forward in Ch ina ' s S o c i a l i s t C o n s t r u c t i o n , " Red F l a g , October 1, 1959. The text i s in Bowie and Fa i rbank , ©£. c i l . , r p . 537-596.
74
75
guarantee the s u c c e s s f u l developn^nt of a g r i c u l t u r e .
The a d o p t i o n of t he Commune system r e p r e s e n t e d a
new government p o l i c y i n a g r i c u l t u r e . The Chinese l e a d e r
ship had fol lowed a p o l i c y of c o o p e r a t i v i z a t i o n s ince
December, 1951 . However, t h e new p o l i c y of communization
was not a new idea t o Mao T s e - t u n g . He had r e f e r r e d t o
e s t a b l i s h i n g a commune system in the r u r a l a r e a s a s e a r l y
as 1955. I n t h a t y e a r , i n i n t r o d u c t o r y remarks t o a book
e n t i t l e d S o c i a l i s t Upsurge in Ch ina ' s Countrvside^ he wrote
that the p e a s a n t s of China might be organized in "a com
p l e t e ly s o c i a l i s t way"^ by 1959. Cen t ra l p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n v/ith the coopera t ive system and the demands
placed on the a g r a r i a n s e c t o r of the economy by the Great
Leap, prompted the Chinese l e a d e r s h i p to adopt the p e o p l e ' s
commune system i n 1953. When the Chinese Communist P a r t y
Eighth Na t iona l Congress proclaimed in May, 1953 the
"General l i n e f o r S o c i a l i s t Cons t ruc t i on , "3 i t marked the
beginning of t he Great Leap and the new campaign for " F u l l -
The book was publ i shed in January , 1956 and c o n s i s t e d of c o n t r i b u t i o n s from" s e v e r a l a u t h o r s . I t was compiled by the General Off ice of t he Cen t r a l Committee of the Pa r ty on
unere e x i s t s a d i s c r e p a n c y anons i,:iw^^i^± a^^oiiv^xo, ..^^^....^ English t i t l e of the book, here I hav- usee t h a t o. Bowie and Fairbank, I b i d . , p . 117.
^ F r a n k l i n W. houn, A Short H i s to ry of Chjner^ Co: 1, (Englewood: P r e n t i c e h a l l , 1967) , p . l o 5 .
76
scale communization."^ In order to understand the operation
of the communes, it is imperative that One have some know
ledge of the earlier cooperative system, since both systems
shared in common some important characteristics.
The Pre-Commune Agrarian Policy, 1951-1953
When the political leadership of China initiated a
cooperative farm system in December, 1951, it referred to
it as a temporary and seasonal "mutual aid."5 The experi
mental stage of organizing cooperatives lasted for two
years. In these cooperatives, the peasant was paid dividends
for the land he contributed. If the peasant v;as compensated
for his land, the program was called the "lower" form, but if
the farmer surrendered his farm to the government without the
compensation, the program was called the "higher'' form.^ At
the end of the experimental stags, on February 15, 1953, the
government officially adopted the cooperative program as a
government policy.'' The cooperatives in existence nu. .bered
140,000. In 1954, according to Mao, the Central Committee
decided to increase the number to 350,000 before the end of
4^ IMd. 5Bowie and Fairbank, OP. cit. , r. 92.
^Ibid.
' Ibid.
77
the autumn harvest, with a final target of 600,000 for 1954.
In 1955, the number of cooperatives was raised to 650,000,
and included 16.9 million households out of a total of 100
million.° Apparently some difficulties were experienced in
the cooperatives because suddenly in April, 1955, the govern
ment, referring to disappointing harvest yields in 1953 and
1954 (Table IV-l), warned that "the mistakes of 1953 should
not be repeated,"" and some cooperatives were dissolved.
Nevertheless, on July 6, 1955, Mao continued to urge
a quick cooperative organization by projecting a target of
one million cooperativas by 1957. On July 31, 1955, he
raised the target to 1.3 million by October, 1956.^^ This S
target required an increase of 100 per cent in fourteen
months. The same drive for quick and complete cooparative
organization was expressed in "The Draft Program for Agri
cultural Development in the People Hspublic of China 1956-
1967,"- - which was submitted by the Political Bureau of the
Party's Central Committee on January 23, 1956. It stated
that the cooperatives should include 35 per cent of all the
^Ibid.
%bid.
* Mao Tse-tung, "The Question of Agricultural Cooperation," a report delivered at a meeting of secretaries of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region coiP.uiittees of the Party on July 31, 1955. The text is in Bowie and Fairbank, Ibid., pp. 94-105.
• • The complete text is in Bowie and Fairbank, J lid. , pp. 120-126.
'V
73
TABLE I V - l
ESTIMATES OF GRAIN OUTPUT IN C0.#1UNIST CHir-iA
IN MILLIONS OF TOIvS (1949-1956)
1955
1956
135
175-130
Year
Pre-1949 peak
1949
1952
1953
1954
Output
170
150
170
166
170
Per Capita Output (kilograms)
320
275
296
234
232
301
273-236
Source: The estiiTiates U.S. a t t a c h e i n China .
are those of 0 . L. Dawson, former The t a b l e i s adapted from E . F .
t! 2merp;in? Pattern of China's Economic nevolution," Jones , in An ,„ J o i n t jlconomic Coramittee of t h e U.S . Congress , 1967) , p
f l u
Economic Profile of Mainland China, Vol. I, (V.'ashington 93.
7Q
peasants households by 1956. The draft also called upon
Areas where cooperation is on better foundations and where a number of cooperatives of advanced form are already functioning should, in the main, complete the change-over to cooperation of advanced form by 1957. Each district of the remaining areas should, in 1956, set up and run one or more large cooperatives of advanced form (each with a hundred or more peasant households) to serve as examples; and by 1953 they should practically complete cooperation of advanced form.12
By advanced form the draft apparently implied a form re
sembling a commune which was yet to be established.
Meanwhile, the cooperative system apparently met
opposition from within the Chinese Communist Party.- -
This "rightist" opposition is revealed through the official ,».
document "Decision on Agricultural Cooperation," which was
adopted by the Central Committee on October 11, 1955. The
document contained the statement that "Rightist tendencies
in the Party should be censured and overcome."^ The same
point was reiterated by Mao himself in December, 1955, in
a preface to the essays mentioned above. Socialist Ursurge
in China's Countryside. In the preface, he writes that
the problem today is that rightist conservatism is still causing trouble in many fields and rre-venting the work in these fields from keeping
^^Ibid.
Ibid., p. 4.
-'- The complete text is in Bowie and Fairbank, Ibid. , pp. 106-110.
y
30
pace with the development of the objective situation.-^5
However, the Chinese Communist Party continued its
expansion of the cooperatives. In April, 1953, twenty-
seven cooperatives with 9,369 households in Sui-p'ing
county, Honan Province, formed an amalgamation called the
Weihsing or Sputnik Federated Cooperative. Sputnik was
destined to be known as the first experimental commune in
Communist China.-^
V hy V.'oS the Commune System Established:
Although the commune system was established to gear
the development of agriculture to meet the demands of the
Great Leap Forward, additional motives may be responsible
for its adoption. It has already been stated that "the
decision grew out of the regime's dissatisfaction v;ith the
performance of the agricultural producers' cooperatives."-'-
One author provides the general explanation that the new
program was a useful tactical move on the part of the leader
ship to mobilize public sentiment in the face of the "rightist"
elements during the Hundred Flowers period. A more sound
"'" The complete preface is in Bowie and Fairbank, Ibid. . pp. 117-119.
Kirby, op. cit. . Ill, 31.
17 Tang, o_p. cit.
31
explanation claims that the comm.unes
might provide the foundation of a local economy sufficiently diversified and prosperous to give full employment to its inhabitants.^°
Although the Commune System represents a significant break
from the cooperative system, the change was not a drastic
one. As has been stated the party leadership had called
for the creation of "large-scale administrative units,"-'-^
a few months before the launching of the Communes System.
Furthermore, there had been efforts, since 1956, to com-
20 bine cooperatives into "higher scales."
Thus the development of communes may be considered
as a continuation of this amalgamation process.' -'- One R>.
author claims that an important motive for the development
of the commune system was the Soviet union's orbiting of
the Sputnik in late 1957. The adoption of people's communes,
the author believes
to have sLenimed directly froui -iao Tse-tun£:'s desire to further accelerate China's econc.Tiic develonrnent on the heels of the Soviet Union's orbiting of the Sputnik, . . . v. hich Mao seemed to regard as the beginning of a new era on international rivalry based on^technological and economic innovations.22
13 Gray and Cavendish, OP. cit.,. DP. 32-33. Bowie and Fairbank, on. cit. , p. 21.
^^C. K. Yang, A Chinese Village in E^^rlj^j^ninunl^ Transition, (Cambridge: Technology Press, 1959), p. 233.
)
'Houn, I b i d .
Houn, o r . cj^t . , a l s o i n Powie a r d F a i r b - n k , o r . cU,.
22,
•*>
S2
If this is true, then it can be argued that the Great Leap
Forward was also launched for the same reason. It is
possible that all of these motives had some influence on
Mao's adoption of the Commune System.
However, the immediate motive behind the adoption
of the Commune System was the leadership awareness of the
insufficiencies of the agricultural producers' cooperatives.^3
This reasoning is supported by the fact that under the Commune
System, the Communist Party would have more control over both
production planning and consumption.
«
The Nature of the Communes
One month a f t e r the es tabl i shment of the Sputnik
Commune, the Po l i t bu ro passed a r e s o l u t i o n by which i t
launched the commune movement over the na t i on . Within
three months, the whole country was involved; and by che
end of the year , 120 mi l l ion peasant households in 752,113
cooperat ives had been reorganized in to 26,000 a g r i c u l t u r a l
communes.^^ These communes were e i t h e r township-wide
23 Tang, op. cit., p. 457.
^^"Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes," (Wuhan Resolution), adopted by the Eighth Central Committee of the Party at its Sixth Session on December 10, 1953, and issued December 17, in Bowie and Fairbank, OP. £it., p. 490. Complete text is on pp. 433-503.
•'Jr
33
(Hsiang) or county-wide (Hsien) u n i t s which were formed
out of s e v e r a l c o o p e r a t i v e f a rms . The c o o p e r a t i v e s w i t h i n
the Communes were renamed " the p r o d u c t i o n b r i g a d e s . " ^ 5
I n two d i f f e r e n t r e s p e c t s the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of
Communes r e p r e s e n t s two moves by the c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p .
In one r e s p e c t , the Communes proved t o be a c e n t r a l i z e d
move by the n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p wi th r e s p e c t t o the c lo se
s u p e r v i s i o n of communes by p a r t y o f f i c i a l s . According t o
a pamphlet "Ques t i ons and Ansv;ers about P e o p l e ' s Communes"^"
c i r c u l a t e d in Canton in Oc tober , 1953, command a g r i c u l t u r e
output could be made more e f f i c i e n t v/ith a c l e a r l i n e of
" o r g a n i z a t i o n a long m i l i t a r y l i n e s . " ^ ' ^ In o t h e r r e s p e c t s ,
the communes proved t o be a d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n move by the
government s i nce t he commune r e p r e s e n t e d a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t
geographic u n i t of t h e Chinese community.^^ 'Within a com
mune, i t was p o s s i b l e t o c r e a t e c a p i t a l and " l a b o r on a
l a r g e r sca le ."^"^ Unl ike the sma l l e r c o o p e r a t i v e , i t was
thought the l a r g e r commune V7ould be ab le t o provide work
5Bowie and Fairbank, Ibid., p. 21.
Translated in U.S. Government Publications, Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter JPRS), 666 D April 21, 1959.
' Ibid.
23 o Gray and Cavendish , o^ . c i t . , pp . 3 2 - 3 3 .
2 9 l b i d .
g
u4
for the unemployed. The Commune was more than just an
amalgamation of several farms. According to the govern
ment's plan, each had "workers, peasants, traders, students,
and militia."30 The 'Wuhan Resolution of the Eighth Central
Committee of the Party of December. 10, 1953, summarized the
nature of the communes by stating that
the people's commune is the basic unit of the socialist social structure of our country, combining industry, agriculture, trade, education and military affairs; at the same time it is the basic organization of the socialist state power.31
The Communes,differed radically from the cooperative
farms in several ways: First, the commune was not limited
to agricultural production, as it engaged in trade, industry,
education, social welfare, public health, military affairs,
and general public works. Second, the peasants turned over
to the commune their private lots, homes, and other belong
ings which they previously had been permitted to keen in
the cooperative farms. Third, unlike the cooperative life,
private family life--for a long time—was dissolved within
the Commune. "Public kitchens, public dormitories, and pub
lic nurseries"32 were established, and children were brought
- Ting-yi Lu (alternate member of the Politburo) "Education i iust be Combined with Productive Labor," Red Flag, July 1, 1953, in Bowie and Fairbank, £p. cijt. , p. 447.
31u Houn, opi. cit.
^^Ibid.. pp. 165-166.
y
^5
up by nurses i n s t ead of t h e i r p a r e n t s . Fourth, "the Free
Supply" system of free food and a r egu la r wage system were
i n i t i a t e d in the p e o p l e ' s communes. F i f t h , the admin i s t r a t ion
of the coimaunes was d iv ided in to three l e v e l s : "the Commune
adminis t ra t ive committee, the admin i s t r a t ive d i s t r i c t (or p ro
duction brigade) and the production team."33 All of these new
p o l i c i e s , e s p e c i a l l y the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the family system,
proved to be major sources of d i scon ten t among the peasants
—and among the cadre and e l i t e with roo t s in the coun t rys ide .
D i s i l l u s i o n and Discontent
Discontent over the adoption of the peop le ' s communes
was apparent-ly expressed a s e a r l y as November, 1953. As
evident from the V/uhan Reso lu t i on - - c i t ed e a r l i e r , sorae
mi l i t a ry a c t i v i t i e s were met with opposi t ion at l e a s t by
the peasants themselves . The r e s o l u t i o n warned agains t
"Commandism," and s t r e s sed t h a t the Communist Par ty Comiaand
and the m i l i t a r y be separa ted .34 i^ i s a l so evident t ha t
the m i l i t a r y "working s ty le"3 5 advocated by the Communist
Party l eade r sh ip led t o other complaints by the peasan t s .
People 's Daily on October 6, 1953 repor ted "sudden a t tacks"36
33Bowie and Fairbank, or), cit. , p. 500.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 25.
^^Ibid.
&6
on the military in some wheat fields. This is supported
by an article in Red Fla , entitled "Have We Already Reached
the Stage of Communism?"^^ In part, the author complained
of people who "regard the militarization of organization
as a condition prepared (sic) (preparatory?) for the
adoption of commandism."-^
The same article reveals that the discontent spread
beyond the peasants, to cadres in many communes. The
author v;rites:
Some we l l - to -do peasants . . . are d i s s a t i s f i e d with t u rn ing t h e i r l ives tock and t r e e s to the communes follovdng the un ive r sa l ;M bu i ld ing of p e o p l e ' s communes and they oppose '5 the g ra in supply system . . . . Some cadres " are indulged in subject iv ism and tha t must be r e c t i f i e d . In a d d i t i o n , there are very few cadres who could not nego t ia te the ' p a s s ' of the u n i v e r s a l bu i ld ing of peop le ' s communes. They se r ious ly r e s i s t the Par ty p o l i c i e s . Some viant t o l i e dov/n and not work anymore .39
The cadres resented the new system mainly because they were
working d i r e c t l y under the pa r ty l eaders in the communes.
In the cooperat ive system they were the responsible l e a d e r s .
Now they f e l t t h a t they were a l s o t r e a t e d as peasan t s .
^^Red Flag November 16, 1953, I b i d . , pp. 479-433. The genera l tone of t h i s a r t i c l e i s p e s s i m i s t i c . The author soundly warns aga ins t the " o v e r - e n t h u s i a s t i c , " and finds i t "necessary to '^exnlain t ha t to jump over the de f in i t e stage of development of object ive condi t ions i s impossible ."
^ I b i d . , p . 432.
39 ib id .
37
Furthermore, they were suspicious of the competence of
local Party leaders, the new collective ownership, and the
"free supply" system.^^ The cadres were inept at readjust
ing to the new system, and they may have felt that the new
changes were too radical to fully accept them. -*-
These problems did not seem to disappear. On the
contrary, other issues were debated in new articles, and
the Commune system seemed to be plagued by endless prob
lems. For instance, the communes could not provide the
peasants with food under the "free supply system," espec
ially with respect t'o rice and other grains. Slogans such
as "Eat rice without pay,"^^ were circulated among the «
peasants. A debate was shaping up in the People's Daily
on the "wage vs. free-supply"43 by October, 1953. But
both "free-supply" system and "Military-Communism" in the
coramunes were maintained through 1953. Obviously, a
better incentive to the "free-supply" system was needed to
induce production. Some communes tried different incentives.
The Hsuanchuang Commune in Hopei established a "half supply,
half wage syste:Ti" 4 but could not provide the peasants with
^^Bowie and Fairbank, Ibid., p. 31.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 23.
^3lbid.
^^Ibid.
•^
>
33
su f f i c i en t supp l i e s of food and, t h e r e f o r e , abandoned t h i s
system a l s o .
Meanwhile, during the f a l l of 1953, a d i scuss ion on
the wages and f ree-supply system took place within the
par ty . An a r t i c l e in the Peop le ' s Daily on September 4 ,
1953, asked t h a t free g ra in supply should be postponed.
Other a r t i c l e s suggested the adopt ion of "piece-wage system
in a g r i c u l t u r e , " 4 5 while the commune workers were demanding
a fixed wage income r a t h e r than a pay by the hour.
The f i r s t seven months of 1959 represented a period
of conso l i da t i on . The government r e a l i z e d t h a t the admin- *S
i s t r a t i o n and the communes must be conso l ida ted . This
process of conso l ida t ion included both counter c r i t i c i s m
and reo rgan iza t ion by the government. By Apr i l , 1959, the
government had sh i f t ed i t s p r i o r i t i e s - - p r o b a b l y with some
pains—from indus t ry t o a g r i c u l t u r e . This was evident in
a speech "Report on Government 'Work,"46 del ivered to the
F i r s t Session of the Second National People ' s Congress by
Chou En- la i on Apr i l 13, 1959. He sa id :
Under present cond i t ions the number of people engaged in a g r i c u l t u r e . . . should not , in gene ra l , be l e s s than 30 per cent of the manpower ava i l ab le in the count rys ide .47
^ 5 l b i d . . pp. 27-23.
^ ^ I b i d . , p . 32 .
47lbid., p. 514. Complete text is on pp. 505-5^9.
39
Thus a major r e o r g a n i z a t i o n e f f o r t by the government was
undertaken; a c l e a r evidence of the f a i l u r e of the Peop le ' s
Communes.
A n t i - R i g h t i s t Campaign
While the government was a t tempting to reorganize
the Communes, a s t rong " a n t i - r i g h t i s t " campaign was launched
by the government. Although an extensive l i s t of those who
were involved in an opposi t ion to Mao was not a v a i l a b l e ,
an admission by a pro-Mao group of a " ' r i g h t i s t ' anti-Mao
comspiracy an teda t ing"^° the Eighth Plenum of the Centra l 3
Committee of August, 1959, a t Lushan, suggests the e x i s t - i.
ence of a major c r i s i s wi th in the Communist Party l eader
ship. This suggest ion i s supported by the following three
i nc iden t s : One, in the Lushan meeting the Minis te r of
Defense P'eng Teh'huai was "openly outspoken in h i s a t t ack
on economic and commercial p o l i c i e s . " ^ ^ I t i s reported tha t
at the meeting P'eng had been supported by such important
party members as Chou Hsiao-chou, the Prov inc ia l Secretary
of Hunan; Chang Wen- t ' i en , the Vice-Minister of Foreign
Affa i rs ; General Huang K'o-chang, the Vice-Minister of
^^W. F. D o r r i l l , Power, Po l i cy , and Ideology in th.e Making of China ' s "Cu l tu ra l Revolution"," (Santa I'lonica: The Rand Corporat ion, 1963), p . v i .
on
Defense; and "a number of l e s s e r p e r s o n a l i t i e s . " 5 0 Two,
a f t e r the Lushan meeting P'eng Teh-huai was "censured and
removed from o f f i c e . " 5 1 And t h i r d , the Lushan meeting
decided to r e t r e a t from the economic program of 1953 which
had included the p e o p l e ' s communes. The r e t r e a t was made
from ownership by the communes to ownership by the production
brigade.5*^ The d i smissa l of the Minis te r of Defense alone
i s a s ign of a major c r i s i s wi thin the ranks of the Chinese
Communist l e a d e r s h i p . At the conclusion of the Lushan meeting
the government launched an a n t i - r i g h t i s t campaign.
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t in the period between ^
the Centra l Committee's Sixth Plenary Session of December, "
1953 and the Lushan meeting of August, 1959, there was no
major " a n t i - r i g h t i s t " campaign except for an "outburst"53
in Red Flag in the February 24, 1959 e d i t i o n . However, the
s ign i f i can t campaign which was launched a f t e r the Lushan
meeting l a s t e d u n t i l December, 1959.^^
The campaign s t a r t e d four days a f t e r the Lushan p l e
num had ooened with two Peop l e ' s Daily e d i t o r i a l s . Both
^^David Char le s , "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-hua i , " The China Quar t e r ly , (October-December, 1961), p . 67.
^•^Dorril l , pjp. c i t . , p . v i i .
^ C h a r l e s , £p . c i t . , p . 63 .
53 • -30
Bowie and Fairbank, ££. cit. , p. ^J>» ^^Ibid., p. 530.
91
editorials warned of the spread of "rightist" ideas.55 The
August 6 editorial "Overcome Rightist-Inclined Sentiment and
Endeavor to Increase Production and Practice Economy,"56 in
cluded a quotation by Mao Tse-tung made in 1955. The quo
tation summarized the feeling of the party leadership toward
those who opposed party policies. And it also gives some
indication of the intensity of criticism voiced against the
Commune System. The quote reads:
The current question is that things can be done with effort are now considered by many people as impossible. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to embark on unceasing criticism against the rightist-inclined conservative ideas ^ now in existence.57 ^
The fact that all cadres were asked to read this
editorial, points to the governriBnt dissatisfaction with a
considerable number of the cadres. The above quote, accord
ing to the editorial, was "a good medicine for the disease
applicable to the rightist-inclined sentiment among some of
the cadres today."5° The widespread opposition is also
55 Charles, £p. cit, p. 69.
56 Complete text is in Bowie and Fairbank, OP. cit.,
pp. 531-533. The opening paragraph of the editorial tell.s of the grim mood of the economy. The impatient leadership of the party and the cadres as well: "It is the urgent task today of industry . . . and the economic front . . . to increase production . . . take a determined stand against the rightist inclined sentiment that has found its way into some of the cadres, . . ."
" Ibid., p. 532.
58 Ibid.
92
evident from the remarks t h a t
the r i g h t i s t - i n c l i n e d conservat ive idea i s doing i t s foul play in many f i e l d s t o such an extent t h a t work in many f i e l d s has fa i l ed to conform to the development of the object ive condi t ions .59
The Red Flag followed with s imi l a r a r t i c l e s in which i t
urged "help" for those comrades who f e l l v ic t ims to the
r i g h t i s t t e n d e n c i e s . ^ ^ In the same month the Liaoning
Provincia l Committee of the Chinese Communist Par ty accused
the " r i g h t i s t s " of voic ing " r i g h t i s t ideas" since March.^•'-
And in the following October Pol-po, Chairman of the Nat
ional Economic Commission, blamed the decline in i n d u s t r i a l
production for June and July on the " r i g h t i s t - i n c l i n e d ^ n
oppor tun i s t s . "^
The a n t i - r i g h t i s t campaign was continued by another
e d i t o r i a l "Long Live the Peop le ' s Communes'." in the People ' s
Daily, August 29, 1959. This a r t i c l e attempted to t race the
h is tory of communes as an " inev i t ab l e h i s t o r i c a l development,' '°3
and s t ressed t h a t i t was developed with the i n i t i a t i v e of the
^ % b i d .
Char les , op. c i t . , p . 69.
Bowie and Fairbank, £P. cit.. p. 33.
Ibid.
-^Ibid. . The genera l tone of t h i s document i n d i c a t e s that some important oppos i t ion within zhe par ty claimed t h a t the communes were imposed upon the Chinese s o c i e t y . Th.e purpose of the author was to r e s t a t e the o f f i c i a l attitud-^ that the couirraines were orrani^-ed in accordance with the wishes of the masses.
93
masses. However, for this study, the article is important
because it admits that opposition to the communes was still
to be found despite the reorganization effort started earlier.
The article also claimed that the Commune System was a pro
duct of a movement by the Chinese peasants;—thereby attempt
ing to shift the blame for the problems created by establish
ment of the communes by Mao and also attempting to justify
their creation on another basis.
The article observed that:
apart from the reactionaries at home and abroad there are certain people who are still dissatisfied with and opposed to the people's commune movement.64
The Commune System, according to the article, was
the result of a social movement rather than a pragmatic
government policy:
They are those v;ithin the ranks of the Chinese people , including cerpain right opportunist-s inside the Communist Party, wno are influenced by bourgeois ideology t<o a rather serious degree. They fail to see that the people's commune movement is the product of a great social move.nent . of the hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants.^-^
The article also includes some quotes from those who
oppose the commune system. One must conclude here that since
these quotes were included in an editorial by the People's
Daily, that they in fact were launched by some important
^^ibid.
65ibid.
94
p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s . The s ta tements doubt the success of the
communes and express d i sapprova l of the condi t ions of the
people ' s communes. And more important they challenge the
basic o r i e n t a t i o n of Mao's t h i n k i n g , the one ind iv idua l to
whom the c r e d i t of c r e a t i n g the communes i s given.66 One
anti-commune quota t ion c i t e d in the August 29, People ' s
Daily claimed t h a t :
The pe op l e ' s commune lacks object ive mater ia l b a s i s . I t i s not a n a t u r a l product of object ive r e a l i t y b u t . t h e f r u i t the wishful thinking of a few who have cooked i t up out of t h in a i r . 6 7
The a r t i c l e quotes the " r i g h t - o p p o r t u n i s t s " to say t ha t "the
people 's communes were se t up too soon and too fas t and are 1 •t
in a mess."6o
Two days l a t e r , in the September 1, 1959 ed i t ion of
the Red F lag , an e d i t o r i a l e n t i t l e d "The Great Call"^^
appeared, in which the Chinese government at tacked the
" r i g h t i s t s " wi thin the Chinese Communist Par ty . The s ig
nif icant degree of oppos i t ion within the par ty i s p a r t i a l l y
revealed by the value which the governriBnt at tached to t h i s
a r t i c l e . The Chinese government pronounced t h i s a r t i c l e ,
along with the Peop le ' s Daily e d i t o r i a l "Overcome R i g h t i s t -
I b i d . , p . 551.
LkM- , P- 553.
I b i d . , p . 552.
^ ^ I b i d . , pp. 556-561.
95
Incl ined Sentiment and Endeavor to increase Production and
Pract ice Economy,"70 " to be requi red reading for anyone
wishing t o be admitted to an i n s t i t u t e of higher l ea rn ing . "71
In "the Great C a l l , " we see once again an evidence of
opposition to the basic o r i e n t a t i o n of Mao's "general l i n e . "
The author of the a r t i c l e s t a t e s :
Keeping in mind our exper iences accumulated during the pas t many yea r s , we not ice t ha t since the enemy has shown such a hos t i l e a t t i tude toward our genera l l i n e , the big leap fo r ward, and the peop le ' s commune movement, t h i s fac t alone has proved t h a t t h i s i s exac t ly the road which we must t ake .72
The keen opposi t ion t o the Commune System i s quoted
by the a r t i c l e t o "s lander" the Comraune and the Great Leap ]
Forward as a "pe t ty -bourgeo i s fana t ic movement."'3 The fact
that much of these c r i t i c i s m s or ig ina ted within the par ty
i s evident by the a r t i c l e ' s claim tha t the c r i t i c i s m s were
directed so as to "dampen the s p i r i t of the cadres and the
masses of the people." '^^ Thus, i f they were not d i rec ted
by the cadres and the masses, then only some par ty e l i t e s
were to be blamed.
A s t a t e of d i s u n i t y was admitted to e x i s t within the
7 0 i b i d . , pp. 531-533.
'^•'-Ibid.. p . 556.
'^^Ibid. . pp. 553-559.
'^^Ibid. , p . 559.
'^^IMd., p . 560.
i
OA
Chinese Communist Party by Liu Lan-t'ao in the article "The
Chinese Communist Party is the Supreme Commander of the
Chinese People in Building Socialism;"'^5 published in the
People's Daily. September 23, 1959. The author claimed that:
A number of comrades . . . say that the party should assume only political and ideological leadership but not organizational leadership over non-Party organizations . . . As we all know . . . only by assuming organizational leadership can political leadership be guaranteed.76
The threat of "rightist-inclined opportunists" to
the harmonious functioning of the Chinese Communist Party
was also explicitly stated by Liu Lan-t'ao. He stated:
At present, a number of rightist-inclined opportunist elements are opposing the general line of the Party, the tre"m.er;aou3 leap forward, and the people's communes. Their attacks on the Party are essentially aimed at advancing the interests of the bourgeoisie and undermining the socialist revolution and socialist construction.77
The discontent and opposition to x-iao' s basic ideologi
cal thinking was also evident in this article. In this par-
ticular instance the basic ideological concept behind the
Great Leap Forward, "placing politics in command, "' ^ was,
according to the author, opposed by some people.
In conclusion, the timing and the intensity of this
75ibid., pp. 571-577.
^%bid., p. 574.
l l z M ' , P« 573. Emphasis i s min.;
1%
r
73 I b i d .
97
" a n t i - r i g h t i s t " campaign show t h a t i t obviously was more
than a rou t ine a t tempt t o poin t out the advantages of the
government's p o l i c i e s and to s t ep up product ion. The a n t i -
r i g h t i s t campaign i s evidence of a widespread discontent and
opposition among the genera l people and e spec i a l l y among the
e l i t e s of the Chinese Communist Pa r ty .
As has been seen above, the " r i g h t i s t " c r i t i c i s m s
of the communes was a l so extended to quest ioning the basic
or ien ta t ion of Mao's "genera l l i n e . "
Why Did the Communes Fa i l ?
I The degree of the Chinese setbacks in agriculture in «
the commune years 195^-1962 is clearly revealed through the '
rate of annual grain yield (Table IV-2).
The first cause for the failure of the communes stems
from their own basic characteristics. Instead of increasing
production, the communes "severely disrupted the national
economy as a whole."'^^ Among the causes of their failure
were the lack of technological base to support the oper
ation, the inexperience of the production brigade (the
cadres), the unhappiness of the peasants over losing their
private plots, the sudden establishment of communal living
which, in essence, abolished the traditional family life,
and work conditions which demanded a greater effort as well
79 Houn, 0£. cit., p. 166.
93
TABLE IV-2
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF GRAIN IN CHINA (1957-65) (in million metric tons)
Year J.R. Wenmohs W. Klatt O.L. Dawson E.F. Jones Official-estimated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1957 1 5 1 5 1 5 135 3 1953 194 205 205 250 ", 1959 163 190 170 270 1960 160 160 160 150 150 1961 167 165 170 162 160 1962 173 130 130 174 174 1963 179 175 1 5 1 3 134 1964 135 190 195 200 200 1965 130 135 193 200 200
Subramanian Swamy and Shahid Javed Burki, "Foodgrains Output in the People's Republic of China, 195S-1965," II^ China Quarterly, No. 41 (January-March, 1970), p. 59. Gathered from the following sources: J.R. -venmohs, "Agriculture in China," Current Scene (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General); /'.K. Klaot, "Grain ProGuction--Com.ment," The China Quarterly. No. 35 (July-September 1968); and ^ Dawson and Jones figures are cited in Edwin F. Jones, "The Emerging Pattern of China's Economic Revoluticn," an economic Profile of Mainland China (V.ashington: Joint : conomic Committee of the U.S. Congress, 1967), Volume I, p. 93-
aBfTn
99
as longer work-day on the pa r t of the peasants . The communes
also suffered from the f r ee - supp ly system, when the communes
were unable to f u l f i l l the peasan t s ' requirements of econo-
raic subs i s t ence . ^ Furthermore, the great amalgamation of
peasants, s t u d e n t s , t e a c h e r s , workers and the m i l i t a r y in
the communes proved t o be a chaot ic s i t u a t i o n . ^ 1 People
with a de f i n i t e s k i l l were suddenly required to adapt t o a
different p o s i t i o n which demanded a new kind of s k i l l . Some
farmers were "suddenly smelting i r o n ; " ° ^ s tudents who were
strangers in the r u r a l commune were working on farms. This
sudden sh i f t in occupations created unpleasant atmospheres
and an "unbearable t ens ion . "^3
A second cause of the f a i l u r e of the communes may
also be a t t r i b u t e d t o the government general policy which
was d i rec ted by Mao Tse- tung. I t i s reca l led tha t the aim
of the Chinese l eade r sh ip was pr imar i ly to develop i ndus t r i a l
iza t ion . The development of the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector was held
important, but i t was secondary to i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . Most
government funds were used t o develop i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,
while the agra r i an sec to r was supposed to develop only by
°^Gray and Cavendish, op. c r t . , p . 34.
^•^Gargi Dut t , "Some Problems of China's Rural Communes," in MacFarguhar, o]^. c i t . , p . 129.
^^ Ib id .
^3 lb id .
•ff
100
the hard work of the peasants, school boys, and teachers.
In short, capital investment was geared to help industry,
while socio-economic reorganization alone was to sustain
agricultural expansion.^^ V/hen Mao realized the inadequate
investment in agriculture, the harm was already done to the
economy of Communist China.
A third cause which definitely contributed to the
failure of the commune system was provided by several natural
calamities. 5 The spring, summer, and autumn of 1959 brought
a "widespread drought, typhoons, floods, and insect pests."^6
Floods were also blamed for the collapse of many dams and
dikes. The Chinese rulers were prompt to blame the commune
failures on these natural disasters. It is absurd to blame
the complete failure of the communes on only the natural
forces. As one author reasons
In China nature has been blamed for calamities which may have had less serious effects had it not been for a deadly conflict between rulers and ruled.o7
By August, 1961, the prospect for the recovery of
agriculture remained dim. "Despite a large shift of labor,"
%bid.. p. 127.
^5w. K., "Communist China's Agricultural Calamities," in MacFarguhar, Ibid., p. 172.
^ o u n , ££. cit., p. 167.
' W. K., 0£. cit.
101
reported the New York Times, "from industry to agriculture
, . . there are no indications that the situation is changing
for the better."^^ Meanwhile, the Chinese government main
tained its position by
playing up disaster reports in key grain areas, apparently to prepare the people for a continuation of the present difficulties.^9
Thus when poor policies caused the unsuccessful eco
nomic development, the government turned to a scapegoat
called natural disasters. In this manner, the Chinese
party elites gave the
explanation for the dislocations caused for two, ^ possibly even three, years in succession, in the 2 wake of the cruel experiment in social engineering J that goes in the name of Communism by way of the communes.90
Reorganization
The disruption in the Communes and the economic
austerity forced the government to introduce new policies
within the communes. New Measures were adopted by the
government before the end of 1953. The Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee on December 10, "restored certain
material incentives for commune members."9-'- It allowed 12
^^"Spread of Apathy in Red China," New York Times, August 7, 1961, p. 3, column 2.
90 VJ.K., op. cit.
"houn, ojp. cit.
]02
hours of s leep and r e c r e a t i o n for the peasants and, in a
decen t ra l i za t ion move, the Committee l imited the s t r i c t ob
servation of the communes by the Centra l Pa r ty . In the Spring
of 1959, the Cent ra l Committee res to red to the peasants the
right t o own small p l o t s ; and i t a l so decided to abandon the
communal k i t chens and dormi to r i es e n t i r e l y . The free supply
system was s u b s t i t u t e d for wages.92 Personal possessions
such as cooking u t e n s i l s and bedding were r e s to red , and the
family l i f e was changed, "the young and aged of each family
[could] a l l l i ve toge the r . "93 The leadership a lso abolished
the misuse of the m i l i t i a as a means of organizing the com
munes. The government declared t h a t the cadres had "mis
understood" what was declared as "ge t t ing organized along
mili tary l i n e s . " 9 4 The par ty leadership now claimed tha t
what i t r e a l l y meant was "ge t t i ng organized on the pa t te rn
of a fac tory ."95
During 1953-1960, when the commune system was s t rugg l ing ,
the incent ive po l icy toward the labor in agr icu l tu re was based
mainly on free g r a i n . Ins tead of mater ia l rewards, " ideo lo
gical and p o l i t i c a l techniques"96 were, according to the
Q2
^ Snow, op. c i t . , p . 435.
^^Ib id .
^^ Ib id .
^^ Ib id . ^^Charles Hoffmann, ".Vork Incentive T'olicy j " ^oir.-u-
nist China," The China Quar te r ly , (January-March, 19b5i, p. 1 - .
103
Central Committee, the "soul and guide for every kind of
work."^"^ Through 1959, the commune workers were allowed
either " to ea t in the commune mess h a l l s , " 9 ^ or take i t
home to prepare i t . By l a t e I960 the "non-material i n
centives" were abandoned. In adopting the new incentive
policy in both i ndus t ry and a g r i c u l t u r e , China 's leaders
gave f i r s t p r i o r i t y t o a g r i c u l t u r e . The new policy was
evident when the government allowed the farmers to make
full use of t h e i r p r iva t e p l o t s . This concession by the
government was published in November, I960 in People ' s
Daily:
. . . The production team may also make full use of odd lots of land and other scattered pieces of land to cultivate different crops and to carry out forestry, animal husbandry, subsidiary activities, and fishery production.^V
The farmers were allowed to keep the incomes made from crops
and animals raised on their farms. Thus an important con
cession was made by the government when the farmer was able
to till his own small private plot. The leadership also
conceded another incentive by introducing the "piece rates."
By this, each peasant was paid according to what he produced.
" Ibid., p. 105.
9^Ibid.
99Lucian Iv. Pye, Tbo S p i r i t of Chinese P o l i t i c s , (Cambridge: The M.I .T. P r e s s , 19^3), p . 209.
104
This move was obviously meant t o help the poor peasant in
the production t eams . l ^^
Other means of r eo rgan iza t ion were made by the l eader
ship. In 1961 the Commune a u t h o r i t i e s were prohibi ted to
impose quotas un l e s s i t was agreed, upon by "the production
brigade and the product ion teams of ten to twenty famil ies ."101
At the end of 1961 an important concession by the leadership
was made t o change the commune system from one ownership to
three l eve l ownership system. The three l eve l s are the
commune, the product ion b r igades , and the production teams.
This measure, according t o Peop le ' s Daily was supposed to
arouse the peasants enthusiasm and create more wi l l ingness to work in a g r i c u l t u r a l production.-'-'^'^
In sp i t e of these changes and concessions, Mao's
leadership continued to adhere to the idea tha t the communes
were successfu l . This was o f f i c i a l l y s ta ted on February 26,
1964 in Red Flag:
The na t i ona l r u r a l i ^ o p l e ' s commune movement s t a r t e d in 1958 has been a great event of epoch-making s ign i f icance in Chinese h i s to ry . . .
Ch ina ' s g rea t p rac t i ce of the people ' s commune and the gradua l ly perfected policy in the course 01 t h i s p r a c t i c e , w i l l add a brand new chapter to the precious book of Marxism-Leninism.-L*^-?
^^^offman, op. j c r t . , p . 10^-
Snow, ££ . c i t . , p . 436.
Pye, cip. c i t . , p . 210.
^ ^ h b i d . , p . 211.
105
In conc lus ion , the communes were formed to solve a
gigantic problem in Communist China, instead i t created new
ones. This thought has been s t a t ed by Professor Lucian W.
Pye. He said t h a t the Commune movement
, . . ha s t y p i f i e d the many ways in which the Chinese Communist p o l i t i c a l system has appeared to provide answers for the modernization of China but has in f ac t i n t e n s i f i e d the problem.^^4
The Commune' movement, l i ke the Great Leap Forward,
caused d i s rup t ion and p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t eg ra t i on within the
fuling e l i t e s of the Chinese Communist Par ty . This d i s
integrat ion was e x p l i c i t l y admitted by a high ranking mem
ber of the Chinese Communist Pa r ty , Liu Lan - t ' ao , a l t e rna t e
Secretary of the S e c r e t a r i a t e of the P a r t y ' s Central Committee:
The aforementioned mistakes of opposing the pract i c e of placing p o l i t i c s in coimnand, opposing the role of the CCP Committee at various leve ls as the core of l e a d e r s h i p , opposing the pract ice of placing the f i r s t s ec re t a ry in command, in order to downgrade, weaken, and even discard the leadership of the P a r t y , are e s s e n t i a l l y r e f l ec t ions of bourgeois ind iv idua l i sm, l i be ra l i sm, and anarchism within the P a r t y . They run d iametr ica l ly counter to the Par ty cha rac t e r of the P ro l e t a r i a t e .-^^5
Although the only p o l i t i c a l purge mentioned here was
the ouster of P'eng Teh-huai in 195^, several high ranking
msmbers of the Chinese Communist Party were l a t e r ousted by
Mao. The purge of L o J u i - c h ' i n g , Minis ter of Public Secur i ty ,
and P'eng Chen the Secre ta ry General in November, 1965 was
^^^Ibid., p. 217.
• ^ Bowie and Fairbank, OP. it. , p. 575.
106
definitely c a r r i e d out because both o f f i c i a l s had opposed
Mao's p o l i c i e s . 10^ I t i s poss ib le t ha t Mao did not have the
support necessary in the Centra l Committee to r e l i eve them
of t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . I f he could have ousted them
through the pa r ty machinery, why did he seek the help of
the People ' s L ibe ra t ion Army as well as the Red Guards?
The following chap te r s w i l l d i scuss t h i s question as well
as Mao's e f f o r t s in ous t ing other high ranking personnel
in the Chinese Communist P a r t y . Before I can do t h i s , i t
is necessary t o d i s c u s s the influence of Mao's fa i lu re in
his p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s with the Soviet Union and how t h i s
failure cont r ibuted t o p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . This wi l l
be the topic of the following chapter .
^O^Phill ip Bridgham, "Mao's 'Cul tura l Revolut ion ' : Origin and Development," The China (.quarterly. No. 29 IJanuary-March, 1967), op. 21-22.
CHAPTER V
THE INFLUENCE OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
ON MAO'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
I n Chapter Two we saw how mutual ideology and
national i n t e r e s t s provided suppor t fo r the Sino-Sovie t
Al l iance . I n t h i s c h a p t e r we s h a l l see how c o n f l i c t i n g
views of n a t i o n a l i n t e re s t s*^ by Communist China and the
Soviet Union caused a S ino -Sov ie t d i spu t e which con t r ibu ted
to p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n i n the Chinese Communist P a r t y .
In Chapter Two I s t a t e d t h a t Marx i s t -Len in i s t ideology
represented a u n i f y i n g f a c t o r i n S ino-Sovie t r e l a t i o n s . But
as other i s s u e s of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t developed, such as the
"rape of Manchurian i n d u s t r y " ^ by the S o v i e t s , previous u n i
fying f a c t o r s were g r a d u a l l y weakened.3 Other important
issues of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t t o both n a t i o n s l a t e r developed
Quest: Greg Plant) June ^ General Commun: ^..^.,„ . ^ . . ,^^ ^ of i n d u s t r i a l equipment" a f t e r - o r l d --ar I I .
^Schwartz , I b i d .
107
103
as a r e su l t of the S o v i e t Union maneuvers in i n t e r n a t i o n a l
r e l a t i o n s which c o n f l i c t e d wi th Chinese i n t e r e s t s . I would
suggest t h a t the b a s i c cause of t h e s e c o n f l i c t s was Mao's
image of a world o r d e r - (Chapter T w o ) - whose cen te r hope
fully would be China . E s s e n t i a l l y the Sino-Sovie t d i spu te
erupted as a r e s u l t of C h i n a ' s p e r s i s t e n t e f f o r t s to become
a superpower and R u s s i a ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o prevent i t . 4
I t was not s imply an a c c i d e n t t h a t the Sino-Soviet
dispute and the Sov ie t Un ion ' s withdrawal of adv i so r s and
technic ians from China co inc ided with the adoption of the
Great Leap Forward and the Commune System. Mao hoped to
achieve r ap id economic development , acqui re nuclear weapons,
conquer Taiwan and become the "dominant power in East and
Southeast A s i a . " 5 Mao's hope, however, c o n f l i c t e d with the
United S t a t e s ' p o l i c y i n As i a , and with the Soviet Union 's
"policy of c o e x i s t e n c e . " ^ xMao's s t r a t e g y was to discourage
Moscow from e s t a b l i s h i n g any c lose t i e s with V-ashington; he
believed t h a t "peace fu l c o e x i s t e n c e " was the wrong po l i cy
because
^The Sovie t i n t e n t i o n t o " c r i p p l e " the Chinese nuc lear Duild-up i s mentioned in S ino-Sov ie t C o n f l i c t : Rerort on ^^^Q-^Q^^^t C o n f l i c t and i t s I m p l i c a t i o n s . H. Doc. i\o. 237, oVth Congress , 1 s t S e s s i o n , U.S . Government, May 1/., 1965, n. 3R.
. ^^v'illiam E. G r i f f i t h , S ino-Sov ie t Re la t ions 196/.-1965. l^arabridge: The M . I . T . P r e s s , 1967) , p . h.
nf c.. ^^^^ London, Un i ty and C o n t r a d i c t i o n : M-^'pr Anjuc £L_^no-SoviQt. h.'.i^iir.rc. {f,^u, Y^r^i' F reder ick .i. i i - : \ . 'i Publisher , 1962) , p . 149!
c t s
109
the American 'paper t i g e r ' wi l l eventual ly withdraw r a t h e r than e i t h e r f igh t gue r r i l a wars i n d e f i n i t e l y or e s c a l a t e to general war.7
In conclus ion , any cooperation or understanding be
tween the United S t a t e s and the Soviet Union which would have
meant an easing of the world tens ion was, according to Mao's
thinking, in c o n f l i c t with China 's i n t e r e s t because a Soviet-
American understanding could mean the Soviet Union would not
help China bui ld the nuclear bomb. Accordingly, China per
s is tent ly opposed "Khrushchev's e f f o r t s to develop a dialogue
with the United S t a t e s . " ^ On the other hand, Russ ia ' s i n
sistence on cooperat ion with the United States and the with-
drawal of Russian s c i e n t i s t s and mi l i t a ry technicians from
China in I960 were based on a fear tha t China might reach
i t s goal of a superpower.9
In accordance with Mao's image of world order, Mao
made i t known t h a t the Soviet Union did not have a monopoly
over the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Marxis t -Leninis t ideology. How
ever, China maintained t h i s view only as i t applied to the
Sino-Soviet c o n f l i c t or when i t involved a pro-Chinese s ta te
'^Ibid.
^Richard Lowenthal, "Communist China's Foreign Policy" in Ho and Tsou, ojp. cj^. , p. 7.
^Harold C. Hinton, Co-nunist China in //orId Politics, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19^6), p. 7.
110
such a s A lban i a . On the o t h e r hand, when Yugoslavia de
clared in A p r i l , 195^ t h a t " i d e o l o g i c a l monopoly and
p o l i t i c a l hegemony"!^ of the Sovie t Union was a g rea t ob
stacle t o the development of s o c i a l i s m . Communist China
vehemently opposed and s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i z e d Yugoslavia .
Commenting on the Yugoslav a t t i t u d e toward Russ ia , the
People 's Dai ly on May 5 s a id t h a t T i t o ' s po l icy was an
" a n t i - M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t " and "ou t -and-ou t revisionist ."-^-^
Furthermore, a cco rd ing t o the Chinese s t r a t e g y , China con
s i s t e n t l y opposed the Sov ie t Union on i s s u e s such as d i s
armament, war and peace , peacefu l coex i s t ence , movements of
l i be ra t ion f r o n t s , and others.- ' -^ The Chinese expressed
opposition when Sov ie t a c t i o n e i t h e r did not r ep re sen t an
aggressive Chinese view or when i t at tempted to c lose the
gap between the E a s t e r n and V/estern b l o c s .
Sino-Soviet D i f f e r e n c e s Over Poland, Hungary, Albania, and
Yugoslavia
S ino-Sov ie t d i f f e r e n c e s f i r s t appeared on i n t e r n a t i o n a l
London, o_£. c_it . , p . 170.
^^"Reds i n Pe ip ing At tack T i to i sm," Kew York Times, May 6, I958, p . 1 3 , Column 1.
^^Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , " P a t t e r n s and Limits of the Sino-Soviet D i s p u t e , " Problems of Com;:iunism, 1.0. 5, ^ o l . lA (September-October, I 9 6 0 ) , pp . 1-7.
I l l
issues concerning Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and and Albania
in the m i d - f i f t i e s . In the ea r l y part of 1955, China opposed
the Soviet p o s i t i o n aga ins t Poland and Hungary when both
countries r e s i s t e d Soviet pressure .-'•3 On November 4 1956
a People's Daily e d i t o r i a l - " P a t r i o t i c Hungarians Str ive to
Defend Socialism and Smash the Counter-Revolutionary Resto
ration" - a t tacked the Soviet posi t ion on Poland, reasoning
that
Poland has i n s i s t e d on i t s s o c i a l i s t system. I t has continued i t s support of the Warsaw Treaty and i t s pol icy of f r iendship with the Soviet Union.14
The Chinese pos i t i on on Hungary was d i f fe ren t . When Ferenc
Nagy attempted to "dissolve the Communist dictatorship,"•'•5
by declaring n e u t r a l i t y and withdrawing from the Warsaw
Pact, China promptly changed i t s pos i t ion . I t i s even believed
that Mao urged Khrushchev to intervene m i l i t a r i l y in Hungary.^^
The reason for the change in the Chinese posi t ion toward Hun
gary, a People ' s Daily e d i t o r i a l declared on November 4, 1956,
was as follows:
•^3John G i t t i n g s , Survey of the Sino-Soviet d i spu te , ^ » S i l . , p . 14,
^ ^ I b i d . , p . 70. 1 5
Hinton, op. c i t . , p . 32. ^ ^ I b i d . . p p . 3 2 - 3 3 .
112
In Hungary the counter-revolutionaries have the upper hand and the Nagy Government has announced its withdrawal from the Vv'arsaw Treaty.-^'
The Chinese action thus clearly revealed that China would
be willing to tolerate a challenge to the Soviet leadership
as long as this did not reach a point of a breakup of the
communist bloc. Especially so, if China were permitted to
act as a big advisor and an ally to the challenger state.
Poland, for instance, is reported to have consulted with Mao
who in turn mediated with Khrushchev on^behalf of Poland.
When the Soviet government proposed to condemn Poland at a
meeting of the Communist parties in October, 1956, China
rejected the proposal.-^° The Chinese, through the coming
years, remained loyal to Poland and continued to blame the
Soviets for their "error of great-power chauvinism,"-•-
Sino-Soviet differences over Yugoslavia follov/ed a
similar style to that of Hungary. First, Communist China
had some "reservations"^^ about Stalin's aggressive attitude
- ' Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Disnute, OP. cit.
^^Ibid.
•^"The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves-- Ccmment on the Onen Letter of the'Central Coin/.iittee of the CPSU," an editorial by People's Daily and Red Flag, September 6, 1963, cuotBd in Gittings, Ibid. , p. 71. The complete text is in Griffith, The Sino-Soviet h.ift (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press 1964), pp. 3S'S-420.
^^Hinton, op. cj^. , p. 91 r.nd in London, £P. cit:., p. I58.
113
toward Tito. In 195^ a People's Daily editorial referred to
the Cominform resolution of 194^, which criticized Yugoslavia
by claiming that there were some "defects" and "mistakes" in
the method by which the resolution was implerrvented. ^ Second,
when—after the death of Stalin in 1953—Khrushchev pur
sued a line of reconciliation with Tito, China did not ob
ject. But third,' when the Seventh Congress of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia issued a draft for its meeting in
which the Congress attacked Stalin, attacked the Soviet mono
poly on the Communist ideology, and reaffirmed each State's
freedom to choose its way to socialism, China vehemently
attacked Yugoslavia. A pertinent question here is China's
willingness to support Poland against the Soviet monopoly,
but her failure to support Yugoslav defiance of the Soviets.
Several reasons account for this change in the Chinese atti
tude. First, Yugoslavia had attacked Stalin as early as
December, 1956, at a time when Mao was calling upon Khrushchev
to refrain from such criticisms.^3 Second, Yugoslavia was seek
ing a neutralist position, Tito having accused both military
^^Editorial, People's Daily, May 5, 195^, cited in Dutt, 2p. cit., p. 6E]
^^Bowie and Fairbank, o_p. cit., p. 411*
23A radio broadcast in Peiping said that "the attitude taken by Comrade Tito . . . toward Stalin's mistakes and other related questions . . . cannot be regarded by us as well balanced or objective." Reported in Greg MacGregor, "Peiping Regime Scorns Titoism; Hails Soviet Ties." New York Times, December 29, 1956, p. 1, Column 8.
114
blocs as the sources of v.orld tension.^^ And third, as a
result of Khrushchev's call for peaceful coexistence with
the West,China's attitude became more militant. China
criticized Yugoslavia in an effort to discourage Khrushchev
from "pursuing too energetically a mirage of coexistence with
the 'imperialist coup'."^5 i^ ^n effort to associate Yugo
slavia's action with the V.'est Ch'en'Po-ta, the propaganda
spokesman of the Chinese Communist Party, concluded in a
Red Flag article on November 1, 195^ that the U.S. aid to
Yugoslavia of 1700 million dollars between 1945-1957 had
caused the Yugoslav anti ^'Marxist-Leninist" attitude.
It is precisely the import of large quantities of U.S. aid and the 'American way of life' that has wrought a change in the consciousness of the Yugoslav leading group, caused revisionist ideology to grov; up in its midst, and determined its internal and external policies v;hicn are directed against the Soviet. Union, againso Com.munism, a?:ainst the Socialist, cam^ and against socialism in its ov/n country.26
Unlike Peking's persistent attack on the Yugoslav
leadership, Moscow's criticism was milder and less frequent,
apparently in line with Khrushchev's efforts to lessen the
^^London, Ibid., p. 170. Also in "Tito Affirms Course in Retort to Soviet," New York Times, April 20, 1957, T: . 1, Column 7.
^Bowie and Fairbank, o^. ci_t,. , p. 19.
Dutt, op. cit. , p. 62.
115
differences within the Communist camp.^^ j ^ ^^ attempt to
calm the differences, Khrushchev, evidently, was willing to
tolerate "revisionism"^^ within the international communist
movement. In fact, as early as 195^, while the Soviet Union
was criticising the Yugoslav policies as anti "Marxist-
Leninist," Khrushchev was encouraging a better Yugoslav-
Russian relationship.29 China, however, wanted the Soviets
to take an aggressive action against Tito. This is evident
by the Chinese cries of "betrayed," when the Russians estab
lished better relations with Yugoslavia in 1962.
In the case of Albania, Sino-Soviet differences were
of important consequences. Unlike Poland, Hungary, and Yugo
slavia, differences over Albania resulted in a decisive Sino-
Soviet schism.30 Albania feared domination by its antagonis
tic neighbor Yugoslavia for many years. For instance, the
Albanians felt Stalin's break with Yugoslavia in 194^ dis
couraged Tito from dominating Albania. They also credited
' Barry Farrell, ed.. Political Leadership in . astern Europe and the Soviet Union, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 89-90.
Dutt, 2p. cit. , p. 69.
^^On April 27, 195^, Khrushchev sent a message to Tito in which he expressed hopes for "strengthening of friendship between our countries." This message Wc.s later printed on page one of Pravda on May 8, 195^. Reported in "Soviet Publishes Praises for Tito," New York Times, May 9, 195^, n. 2, Column 6.
^^v^illiam t:. Griffith, "' urODean Cor.nunism and the Sino-Soviet Schism," The Annals, lio. 349 (September, 1963), p. 144.
116
Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 with further dis
couraging Yugoslavia from doing the same thing to Albania.
Therefore , when Sino-Soviet differences over Yugoslavia
became public, Albania's leader, Snver Hoxha, promptly
chose the Chinese view. Albania sought close ties with China
as early as 1956. It is reported that upon his return from
China's Eighth Party Congress of September,1956, Hoxha said
that Albania had "a valuable and dear friend"31 in China.
This friendship became evident at the Third Congress of the
Rumanian V/orkers' Party held in June, I960. It is reported
that a "violent clash"32 ^^g aired between Khrushchev and
the Chinese delegate P'eng Chen in an effort— by Khrushchev—
to bring about a debate involving the other Communist parties.
The Communist Party of Albania proved to be the only party to
choose the Chinese side which essentially called for a hard
line against the Viest.
A year later the Twenty-Second Congress of the Soviet
Communist Party-- held in October, 1961-- further demonstrated
the deep schism in Sino-Soviet relations. Khrushchev surprised
the Chinese delegation by retaliating against Albania. Khrush
chev attacked Albania for being anti-Soviet and "for having
^\uoted in Daniel Tretiak, "The Founding of the Sino-Albanian Entente," The China U-uarterly, (Anril-June, 19b2), pp. 123-143.
32Gittings, Survey nf the Sino-Soviet Dispute, or. cit., p. 123.
117
betrayed the Socialist Camp."33 i^ reply, the Chinese dele
gate Chou En-lai defended Albania and revealed his opposition
to the Soviet move by saying that
We hold that, should a dispute or difference unfortunately arise between fraternal parties, it should be resolved patiently in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and on the principles of equality and unanimity through consultations.34
Upon delivering his speech, Chou En-lai left Moscow and was
received by Mao Tse-tung in Peking airport. In the same
month the Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi took the oppor
tunity in celebrating Albania's liberation to warn Khrush
chev that *
All provocations and disruptive schemes directed against Albania by imperialism, Yugoslav modern revisionism and the reactionaries of various countries will certainly meet v;ith ignominious defeat.35
It is evident from this discussion that Sino-Soviet
differences over Poland, Hungary, Yueoslavia and Albania
were motivated by Chinese interests. China's attempt to be
a co-leader, if not the leader of the Communist bloc, was in
line with its efforts to deny a Soviet monopoly over the in
ternational communist movement. The leadership of the move
ment by China, or at least the Chinese influence upon the
33 Dutt, op. cit. , p. 126.
^^Ibid.
3 5ibid., p. 127.
M f^
movement, represented a Chinese national interest. So long
as Poland and Hungary challenged the Soviet leadership but
remained within the movement, China supported them. But
when Hungary and Yugoslavia chose to withdraw from the move
ment, China objected, ubviously China was seeking allies from
the movement against the Soviet views. Therefore when Albania
sided with the Chinese, China welcomed its move. But Khrush
chev was not willing to surrender to either the Chinese or
the Albanians. In his speech at the Bucharest meeting,
mentioned above, Khrushchev made it known that "'vVe do not
intend to yield to provocations and to deviate from the
general line of our foreign policy."36 The schism signi
ficantly came as a result of contradicting interests of
Communist China and the Soviet Union. Mao's effort to
deprive Moscow's leadership of the Communist Camp and
Khrushchev's efforts to deny Mao a share in this leadership
brought about the Sino-Soviet schism.37
The Sino-Soviet Schism and the V/est
China's interest in the leadership of the international
communist movement was not the only factor that caused a schism
36Quoted in Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute , op. cit.
37}iarold Hinton, op. cit. , pp, 469-4^^. According to Professor Hinton Khrushchev's fall was caused by the Sino-Soviet conflict.
119
in the Sino-Soviet relations. Chinese efforts to prevent
closer ties between the American and the Soviet governments
would perhaps account for the major contributing cause for
this schism. It is recalled that Albania's support of China's
views at the Bucharest meeting, before all the heads of East
European ruling parties except for Albania, was over inter
national issues such as peaceful coexistence and disarmament.3^
Furthermore, China's criticisms of Yugoslavia, as has been
stated, were partially meant to discourage the Soviets from
easing international tension.
The West's influence on Sino-Soviet relations is
exemplified in Khrushchev's efforts to ease international
tension through a policy of peaceful coexistence and dis
armament. Khrushchev's efforts however were met by nersis-
tent Chinese opposition. The Sino-Soviet schism was material
ized as several important international incidents developed.
20th Congress of the CPSU
According to the leadership of Communist China, the
origin of the Sino-Soviet "split in the international commu
nist movement"39 was the Twentieth Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union which was held in F ebruary, 1956.
3^Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Disnut?, oj . cit.
39 See Note No. 16.
120
In that congress Khrushchev delivered his secret speech in
which he denounced Stalin, advocated a policy of peaceful
coexistence, and called for nuclear disarmament. The Chinese
leadership was opposed to all three issues in Khrushchev's
report. The Chinese leadership claimed that "the criticism
of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU was wrong both in
principle and in method,"40 that Stalin was
a great Marxist-Leninist, a great proletarian revolutionary . . . made some serious mistakes, but compared to his great and meritorious deeds his mistakes are only secondary.41
The Soviet leaders, however, were unmoved by the Chinese
remarks. In reply to the Chinese allegations, Pravda accused
the Chinese Comnmnist Party leaders of having "taken on them
selves the role of the defenders of the cult of the individual
and disseminators of Stalin's erroneous ideas."42
Criticizing Khrushchev's policy of coexistence, the
Chinese said:
This erroneous thesis is a clear revision of the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the state and revolution and a clear denial of the universal significance of the road of the October revolution.^^
^^Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, c£. c^t. , p. 390.
4llbid.
^^"The Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to Party Organization and all Communists of the Soviet Union," Pravda, July 14, 1963, quoted in Gittings, gj^. cit. , p. 64.
^3Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Scviet Distute, oi . ci t. , p. 62.
121
The exchange of accusations by the leaders of both
nations continued until the summer of 195^. At that time,
developments in the Middle East prompted Khrushchev to
communicate directly with President Eisenhower at Camp David
in order to ease the international, situation. This action,
however, increased the Sino-Soviet debate.
The Middle East Crisis and the First Summit Meeting
On July 4, 195^, an Iraqui military group under the
leadership of Abdul Karim Kasem overthrew the government of
King Faisal. Acting out of fear that the United States might
intervene, the Chinese government called upon the Soviet Union
to intervene first in order to discourage the "imperialists"
from attacking Iraq.^^ While ignoring the Chinese wishes,
Khrushchev proposed a summit meeting which would include
India, the United States, Britain, and France but exclude
Communist China. Consequently, Mao objected to this move for
three reasons. One, Mao felt that he was insulted for not
being invited. Tv/o, Mao did not feel that it was appropriate
for India to be invited to participate in Big Power diplomacy,
while China was ignored. And three, the summit move by
Khrushchev represented an obstacle to China's policy of in
tensified struggle. China's policy was to encourage confront
ations by liberation fronts and coups such as those which took
^^Hinton, o£. ci_t., p. 37.
place in the Middle Eas t .45
However, P res iden t Eisenhower suggested t ha t the
meeting be on the U.N. Secur i ty Council l e v e l , t o which the
Soviet government agreed.46 As far as tlie Chinese govern
ment was concerned, China continued to oppose any mutual
understanding by the Sovie ts and the Americans on i n t e r
nat ional i s s u e s . Furthermore, China remained outside of
t h i s high l e v e l meet ing.
In an e f f o r t to r eassure Mao, in order to prevent a
further severe s e t back in Sino-Soviet r e l a t i o n s , Khrushchev
v i s i t ed Peking (July 31-August 3 , 195^) and t r i e d to woo
Mao to accept the Soviet move. Apparently, ne i ther of the
leaders was able t o convince the other of h i s views and no
compromise was reached. After Khrushchev's v i s i t , Mao on
August 4 made h i s views c l e a r through the o f f i c i a l P e o r l e ' s
Daily. According to Mao "begging would not preserve peace,"
but a " m i l i t a r y s t ruggle would."47
Unhappy with Khrushchev's po l i cy , Mao made i t known
to the world t h a t the Soviet Union no longer represented the
leadership of the Communist b loc . In another e d i t o r i a l , a
People 's Daily w r i t e r said t ha t Mao had concluded t ha t " a l l
^^ Ib id .
^^Garthoff, op. p i t . , p . 92.
^'^Dutt, 2n. c i t , . , p . 7 1 .
123
reactionaries are doomed to perish," and that "imperialism
and all reactionaries are paper tigers."4^ According to Mao
this statement comprises an "invincible Marxist-Leninist
ideological weapon."^^ With this "ideological weapon," the
Soviet Union should not fear a nuclear war because the West
will not fight. Therefore, the enemy should be "despised"
strategically and maneuvered "tactically" until he "perishes."5^
At this time Khrushchev was trying to convince the
Chinese that he was a friendly ally and that he was willing
to help China attain economic development. New trade agree
ments were signed by the Soviet Union and Communist China.
On November 6, 195^, both governments announced that the
Soviet Union would construct forty-seven nev; industrial enter
prises in addition to 211 already under construction, and the
Soviet Union would supply China vjith some important scientific
and technical information. On February 7, 1959, a trade
agreement was signed by Khrushchev and Chou En-lai which
called for the construction of seventy-eight more industrial
projects to be built by the Soviets. If this Soviet gener
osity was meant to persuade the Chinese to the Soviet views,
it failed.
^%bid., p. 72.
^%bid.
50lbid.
1 0 24
Khrushchev's concern over winning the Communist
Chinese t o h i s point of viev; and h i s des i r e to maintain
harmonious r e l a t i o n s with them are evident in h i s second
v i s i t t o China on September 30, 1959, a f t e r h i s r e tu rn from
the United S t a t e s . After confer r ing with Pres ident Eisenhower,
Khrushchev flev; d i r e c t l y t o Peking a f t e r changing planes a t
Moscow's a i r p o r t . At the Peking a i r p o r t he to ld h i s host
that the t a l k s a t Camp David "without doubt, should lead to
the improvement of the r e l a t i o n s between our two count r ies
and to the r e l a x a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t ens ion . "51 To the
disappointed Khrushchev, the Chinese, however, fa i led to
make a welcoming speech and ref ra ined from answering h i s
speech. At a banquet on the same day, Khrushchev took the
opportunity to reaff i rm h i s pos i t i on :
We . . . must do ever2/thing possible to p re clude war as a means of s e t t l i n g outstanding ques t i ons . These ques t ions must be solved through nego t i a t i on .52
Khrushchev's t r i p to Peking, as the t r i p before i t , fa i led
to persuade Mao to adopt the Soviet pol icy of peaceful co
ex i s tence . In f a c t , t h i s t r i p may have been l e s s successful
than the previous one in 195S. In con t ras t t o the 195^ t r i p ,
the l a t e s t one f a i l ed to produce a j o in t comm.unique af ter the
^^Ib id .
52The complete text of the speech is in Gittings, op. crt., rp. 328-337.
125
formal t a l k s between Khrushchev and xMao.
As ev iden t from severa l sources , Khrushchev's concern
over the i n t e r n a t i o n a l t ens ion stemmed p a r t i a l l y from Russ i a ' s
concern of China ' s a c q u i s i t i o n of a modern weapon system.53
The New York Herald Tribune repor t ed , a week a f t e r Khrushchev
had l e f t the United S t a t e s , t h a t the Soviet leader had l e f t
the impression t h a t "he was in a hurry to achieve peaceful
coexistence p a r t l y because he f ea r s the growing power of
China."54 There may a l s o have been a substance to China 's
fear t h a t an American-Soviet understanding might jeopardize
China's chance of r ega in ing Taiwan because, according to the
American Secre ta ry of S t a t e , Chr i s t i an Her ter , Khrushchev
"did not exclude the i s l and from an agreement to foreswear
the use of force ."55 China ' s unhappiness with American-
Soviet n e g o t i a t i o n s which might include Taiwan were gener
a l ly not discussed pub l i c ly u n t i l September 1, 1963, when
a People ' s Daily a r t i c l e dec la red :
We have not fo rgo t ten and wi l l not forget what the Soviet l e a d e r , Khrushchev, said about the question of Taiwan a f t e r h i s v i s i t to the United S t a t e s in October, 1959.
He said t h a t the quest ion of Taiwan vjas an in9en-d ia ry f ac to r in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l si tuation.5<
53Gi t t ings , Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, OP. c j j , . , p. 117.
^4 bid.
55ib id .
^ ^ b i d . . p . I I B .
126
The differences over international issues continued between
the leadership of the Soviet Union and the leadership of
Communist China, but no major rift took place in their re
lations. The Chinese, meanwhile, held to the view that only
future actions would reveal whether the United States was
actually sincere in its devise to improve the international
climate .
The Proposed Summit Meeting of I960
Soviet efforts to hold a Big Four summit meeting in
Paris in I960 brought about increased Chinese criticism and
widened the gap between the two countries. The first few
months of I960 were marked by a steady escalation of the
polemics between the Soviets and the Chinese. 57 And the
political differences between them were taking to the inter
national Communist movement.
As Khrushchev was preparing for the summit conference,
an American U-2 aircraft flying a spy mission over the Soviet
Union was shot down on May 1, I960. Unfortunately for Khrush
chev, the incident seemed to confirm the Chinese harsh analysis
of "imperialism."5^ The Chinese capitalized on the incident
by taking the attitude of "we told you so." Thirteen days
-^'London, op. cit. , p. l69.
5^Hinton, pj). cit. , pr. 41-42.
127
after the incident Mao, referring to the Soviets, told a
delegation of Latin Americans that "some people" had said
that Eisenhower was a peace loving man, and he (Mao) hoped
that these people would learn from the U-2 incident.59
Khrushchev, however, remained unmoved. On May 20, he told
the German leaders of East Berlin that although the summit
conference was wrecked.
We will not do anything that might aggravate the international situation and bring it back to the worst times of the cold v;ar.60
Mao's next move was to humiliate the Soviet Union be
fore the international movement in a hope to gain support of
the Communist parties. By this move Mao was, in essence,
challenging the Soviet leadership of the Communist bloc. -
This took place before the General Council of the -Vorld
Federation of Trade Unions in Peking on June 5, 1960.^^ The
head of the Chinese delegation, Lin King-i, declared in his
speech on June 7 that ''No negotiations, in any case, c
place the struggle of the v;orking class and the masses of
the people in different countries.^3 On the fcllov.dng day
an re-
^^Dutt, ££. cit., p. 93.
^^Sydney Gruson, "Premier in Berlin," N^w York Times, May 21, I960, p. 1, Column 8.
Hinton, ££. cit., p. 169.
^^Ibid.
^3Dutt, or. cj_t., p. 103.
12^
the Vice-Pres ident of the Al l China Federat ion of Trade
Unions r e j e c t e d Khrushchev's disarmament proposals by
s t a t ing :
There are people who believe that such proposals can be realized when imperialism still exists and that the danger of war can be eliminated by relying on such proposals. This is an unrealistic illusion.64
But the Chinese were unsuccessful in this attempt to
either humiliate the Soviets or gain a considerable support
from the members of the bloc. One significant aspect of this
attack was to intensify the Sino-Soviet conflict.
Two weeks later, Khrushchev personally attended the
Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party in Bucharest on
June 22. The Russian leader took the opportunity to defend
his policies and to attack those policies advocated by
Peking. The Mayor of Peking, P'eng Ch'en, maintained how
ever, the validity of the Chinese policies on all international
issues. The inevitability of a Sino-Soviet breakup became
evident when the Soviet Union, acting unilaterally, withdrew
all its technicians and advisors from China. At a time when
China was experiencing a great difficulty in economic develop
ment, this act helped only to worsen the relations between
the two countries.
The confrontation by the leaders of Communist China
and the Soviet Union was once again reenacted at the Forty-
^^Ibid.
129
Third ann iversa ry of the October Revolution in Moscow in I960.
The Chinese de lega t ion lead by Liu Shao-ch ' i came to f ight
for i t s viev/s, while Khrushchev was there represent ing the
views of h i s country .65 After severa l weeks of d iscuss ions
among the e ighty-one Communist p a r t i e s present , a "communique,"
known as the "Moscow Statement ," was adopted. The communique
revealed t h a t the Soviet view prevai led over t ha t of the
Chinese. On the i ssue of world revolu t ions the s tatement , ad
hering to the Soviet view, s t a t ed t ha t world revolu t ions can
be developed "ch i e f ly by t h e i r economic cons t ruc t ion ."66
The Chinese claimed t h a t r evo lu t ions could be staged only
through armed s t r u g g l e s . The dec la ra t ion s ta ted the working
class in severa l c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , along with the help
of "d i f fe ren t p a r t i e s and public organiza t ions ,"67 could
unite the people t o win p o l i t i c a l power without c i v i l war.
Similar ly , the Soviet view on disarmament prevailed over tna t
of the Chinese. The "Communique" s t a ted tha t
the implementation of the programme for general and complete disarmament nut forward by the Soviet Union would be of h i s t o r i c importance for the d e s t i n i e s of mankind.68
Because the Chinese were unable to muster enough support
^^Ib id .
^ % b i d . , p . 107.
^'^Ibid. , p . 112.
^ ^ I b i d . , p . 109.
130
for t h e i r views from o ther communist p a r t i e s , they did not
pe r s i s t in t h e i r point of view. In s t ead , the Chinese
acclaimed the s o l i d a r i t y of the Sino-Soviet r e l a t i o n s . To
emphasize t h i s s o l i d a r i t y , Peking leaders concentrated on
such po in t s in the communique as ".the a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t
s t ruggle"^^ and the denuncia t ion of Yugoslavia and the
United S t a t e s .
Kennedy and Khrushchev
Sino-Soviet r e l a t i o n s , hovjever, turned "rapidly t o
wards an open p o l i t i c a l and ideo log ica l break in 1961,""^^
Sino-Soviet d i f f e rences quickly developed over i ssues such
as the Khrushchev-Kennedy Conference of 1961, the Bay of
Pigs Invasion C r i s i s , and the Test-ban Treaty. On these
i s sues , the Chinese view was the more m i l i t a n t , more
aggressive, and more independent of the Soviet Union. The
struggle for l eade r sh ip wi th in the divided bloc and Commu
nis t movement was c l e a r l y replaced by the open proclamation
of Peking as an independent force in world p o l i t i c s and "the
center of a new world-wide movement."^^
By 1964 the l eade r s of Communist China became con
vinced t ha t Khrushchev was a l l y i n g Russia with the United
70 Lowenthal, o_p. c i t . , p . 7.
71 I b i d .
131
States "aga ins t them on a l l c r u c i a l foreign pol icy i s sues . "72
Within the i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist movement, the Russians
t r i ed to expe l l the Chinese Communist Par ty from the move
ment in the years from I963 to I965, through strong pressure
on pro-Soviet p a r t i e s . In I960 i t was thought tha t the Sino-
Soviet d i spute had some " l i m i t s " beyond which the dispute
would not reach.' ' '3 As i t s tands today the dispute has ex
ceeded these l i m i t s ; the two na t ions no longer seem to care
much about u n i t y wi thin the Communist b loc .
As of October, 1970, the Sino-Soviet border dispute
remains u n s e t t l e d . China i s s t i l l without a Soviet ambassador;
and the Chinese p ress accuses the Soviet leaders "of being
worse than Hitler .""^4
The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Mao's Leadership
The inf luence of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the leader
ship of the Chinese Communist Par ty i s profound. I t i s pro
found because the d i spu te affected Communist China 's economy
and foreign diplomacy as we l l . China 's economy de f in i t e l y
suffered from the t e rmina t ion of the Sino-Soviet t r a d e . The
'^^Griff i th , Sino-Soviet Re la t ions . 1964-1965, OP. p i t . , p. 12.
73 '"^Brzezinski, op. c i t . , p . 1. '^^"C^uarterly Chronicle and Documentation-China and the
Soviet Union," The China Quar te r ly , (July-Septenber, 1970), p. IS5.
132
country's m i l i t a r y s t r eng th was jeopardized by the wi th
drawal of the Soviet s c i e n t i s t s and t echn ic i ans . These are
the f a c t o r s t h a t accounted for the influence of the Sino-
Soviet d ispute on Mao's l e a d e r s h i p . However, i t i s d i f f i
cult t o measure the degree of the d i spu te s ' e f fec t on
China's l e ade r sh ip because the dispute accompanied other
domestic f a i l u r e s such as the Great Leap Forward and the
Commune System. Furthermore, the Chinese setbacks within
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist movement must have "contr ibuted
to the genera l mood of c r i s i s . " 7 5
I t i s widely accepted t h a t the dismissal of China 's
Minister of Defense Marshal P'eng Teh-huai involved a d i s
pute over Mao's pol icy with the Soviet Union.'^6 Marshal
P 'eng 's purge was e x p l i c i t e l y r e l a t ed to the Sino-Soviet
dispute in an a r t i c l e published in the People ' s Daily as
well as the magazine Red Flag . The a r t i c l e accused Khrush
chev of conspi r ing with Marshal P'eng Teh-huai against Mao's
leadership.'^' ' ' Several i nc iden t s occurred which prompted
'^^John G i t t i n g s , "The Great-Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign P o l i c y , " op. c i t . , p . 53.
'^^Git t ings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Disnute, op. c^ t . , p. 96. Also in Raymond Garthoff, The Annals, OP. c i ^ . , ^ . 90, and in Uri Ra'anan, "Peking ' s Foreign r o l i c y ';.ebate l . b ^ -1966," in Ho and Tsou, 0£. cU,. , p . 3^ .
'77"The Leaders of the CPSU Are the Greatest S o l i t e r s of our Times," Peking Review, No. 6, Vol. VII, Uebruar> I, 1964), pp. 5-21.
133
Mao to be l ieve t h a t a conspiracy was taking p l ace . From
April 24 t o June 13, 1959, P'eng v i s i t e d Albania. Khrush
chev was a l s o in Albania and i t i s believed t h a t P'eng
expressed t o the Soviet l eader h i s concern about the gradual
de te r io ra t ion in Sino-Soviet r e l a t i o n s . More important was
an incident which involved P'eng with the Soviet leaders
prior to the famous Lushan meeting of August, 1959, in
which the Min i s t e r of Defense a t tacked Mao's p o l i c i e s . Pr ior
to the meeting Marshal P'eng Teh-huai i s reported to have
sent a l e t t e r t o Khrushchev in which he c r i t i c i z e d the
domestic and fore ign p o l i c i e s of the Chinese Communist Par ty .
P 'eng's a c t i ons demonstrated h i s fear t ha t "the growing
breach with the Soviet Union"7o would jeopardize Soviet arms
aid. P ' e n g ' s sympathetic a t t i t u d e toward Moscov; was con
firmed by Khrushchev v:ho c r i t i c i z e d the Chinese leadership
for removing P'eng from o f f i c e . At the Bucharest Conference
of June, i960, Khrushchev accused the Chinese of persecuting
comrades who opposed t h e i r p o l i c i e s or contacted the Sovie t s .
After r e f e r r i n g to P'eng Teh-huai Khrushchev brought up the
case of Kao Kang who was purged e a r l i e r in 1955. The Soviet
leader said t h a t Kao Kang's only " g u i l t " was opposition to
Chinese pol icy toward the Soviet Union. '^
"^^arthoff , "Sovie t -Sino Mi l i t a ry Re la t ions , " pp. c^t .
'^"Charles, op. c i t . , p . 75.
134
Other high ranking members of the Chinese Communist
Party were dismissed because of their support for P'eng Teh-
huai' s views. In December I966 People's Daily criticized
those "class enemies" within the party who from 1959 to 1962
used their bourgeois and revisionist viewpoints to oppose our general line of socialists construction and the general line of our foreign policy.^^
Among those who were accused of having expressed such views
were Lo Jui-ch'ing, the Chief of Staff who advocated re
conciliation with the Soviet Union, Peng Chen, Secretary
General of the Chinese Communist Party, Vm Han, former deputy
mayor of Peking and his two senior aides Liao Mo'sha and Teng
To held similar views. All these important party officials
were purged in 1966. Other party officials who adhered to
similar views and were purged in 1966 were Chou Yang, Deputy
Director of the Economic Research Institute in the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, who in I96O and 1961 "laid down a long
series of written and verbal charges against Mao's policies."°'^
These are a few but significant examples of the in
fluence of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the party elite. How
ever these examples do not reveal the extent of the crisis
within the Chinese Communist Party. The manner in which
the purge was carried out and the large number of officials
Ho and Tsou, OP. cit. , p. 322,
- Donald Zagoria, "The Sprateric Debate in hekirg, in Ho and Tsou, Ibid., p. 263.
^^ho and Tsou, Ibid., p. 55.
ti
135
removed or humil ia ted t e l l s more about the ex ten t t o which
the Sino-Soviet c o n f l i c t , the f a i l u r e of the Great Leap
Forward and the Commune System influenced p o l i t i c a l d i s
integration of the e l i t e of the Chinese Communist Party.
I wi l l develop t h i s in the following chapter .
CHAPTER VI
MAO'S EFFORTS TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE
IN HIS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
The consequences of the Great Leap Forward, the
Commune System, and the S ino -Sov ie t d i spu te on. the l e a d e r
ship of the Chinese Communist P a r t y were p o l i t i c a l in n a t u r e .
One evidence i s Mao 's 195^ d e c i s i o n not to stand for r e
e l e c t i o n as a c a n d i d a t e fo r Chairman of Communist China.
Another consequence was P ' eng T e h - h u a i ' s a t t a c k on Mao's
p o l i c i e s in t he Lushan meet ing of August, 1959. Mao's de
c i s ion , which was i s s u e d on December 17, coincided with the
l e a d e r s h i p ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s over the Communes during the Wuhan
meeting of the Eighth C e n t r a l Committee of December 10, 195S.
The reader should r e c a l l the f a c t t h a t t h i s same committee
issued a r e s o l u t i o n v^hich d e a l t mainly with Commune problems.
These, however, a re only two examples of the inf luence of
policy f a i l u r e s on the e l i t e s of the Chinese Communist P a r t y .
4 h e communique which was adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of December 195^ claimed t h a t Mao's dec i s ion would enable him t o b e t t e r "concentr^-te h i s e n e r g i e s on a e a l m p with q u e s t i o n s of the d i r e c t i o n , po l i cy and l ine ol the party and the s t a t e . " The complete t e x t of the communique i s in Bowie and F a i r b a n k , oje. ci_t. , pp . 4^7-488.
136
137
The full effect of these failures is best understood by
studying the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."'^
This "revolution" is important for this study because it
provides a valuable source of information about the Chinese
elites in the years between 195^ and I967. As one author
has suggested:
This most profound crisis in the history of the Peking regime provides us with the best available opportunity to study the Chinese political system.3
The interest here is twofold: (l) to point out that
the "revolution" was a product of Mao's difficulties in do
mestic as well as foreign affairs; and (2) to show that—
in an attempt to restore confidence in his personal leader
ship— Mao blamed the difficulties on those who opposed him,
and responded to their opposition by relieving the accused
of their positions.
The Origin of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution
The lack of reliable data has led to disagreement
among students of politics outside China on the origin and
effects of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Some
of the different hypotheses on the origin of this "revolution"
Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," The China Quarterly, (April-June, 1969), p. 63.
^Ibid.
136
and t h e i r au thors a r e :
1 . The " r evo lu t ion" i s a " log ica l s e r i e s of spontaneous e r u p t i o n s . " (V/. F. D o r r i l l ) 4 -^
2 . I t r e p r e s e n t s a " r e c t i f i c a t i o n " movement as a
function of "Chinese Communist ideology," (S. J . Noumoff)5
3 . I t i s the r e s u l t of a power s t rugg le , unrelated
to p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s , in which Mao's foes were in te res ted
mainly in t ak ing power away from Mao Tse-tung. (Victor Zora)^
4 . I t i s caused by domestic i s s u e s . (Christ ian
Duevel) '
5. I t i s caused by foreign policy i s s u e s . (Franz
Schurmann)
I f ee l t h a t each of these hypotheses i s e i t he r wrong
or incomplete. I r e j e c t the f i r s t hypothesis because i t i g
nores the accusa t ions launched agains t those persons ousted
from o f f i ce . The hypothes is a lso ignores the p o s s i b i l i t i e s
^ D o r r i l l , op. c i t .
^S. J . Noumoff, "China 's Cul tura l Revolution as a Rect i f icat ion Movement," Pac i f ic Affa i rs , Nos. 3 and 4, Vol. 40, (Fa l l -Winter , 1967-1968}, pp. 221-234.
^Victor Zora, "The Hidden Bat t le for Power in Red China," Look Magazine, Vol. 30 (August 23, 1966), pp. . ' ; -2o.
"^Christian Duevel, "China 's Yezhovshchina," Radio Liberty Research Paper, No. 10 (1966), c i ted in Tsou, OP. e ^ -
^Franz Schurmann, N w York K^view of Books, October 20, 1966, c i t ed in Tsou, I b i d .
139
of p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s fol lowing a widespread economic setback
such as the Great Leap Forward. I t i s inconceivable tha t
such a p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s would a r i se without a def in i te cause
or a p a r t i c u l a r s t imulus , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the country had
experienced some considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s in foreign and
domestic p o l i c i e s . The second hypothesis i s too l imited to
account for the p o l i t i c a l purges which h i t the highest level
of the Chinese Communist P a r t y . Furthermore, the r e c t i f i c a
tion movements of the past were conducted through the press
only, i . e . , t h a t of 1956 assoc ia ted with the "Hundred Flowers"
policy.9 S i m i l a r l y , the t h i r d t h e s i s i s unacceptable for the 0
simple reason t h a t hard ly any p o l i t i c a l power struggle occurs
without r e l a t i o n s h i p to p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . P'eng Teh-huai, as
stated, was ousted in 1959 because of a disagreement over
specific p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . The absence of foreign policy
issues from the four th hypothes is and the absence of domestic
policy influence from the f i f t h hypothesis make each one in
complete .
I there fore propose t h a t the Great P r o l e t a r i a t Cultural
Revolution represented a power s t ruggle brought about by Mao's
failure in both domestic and foreign p o l i c i e s . The domestic
programs of the Great Leap Forward and the Commune System as
well as the Sino-Soviet Al l iance were geared to achieve
9 . Gray and Cavendish, OP. c i t . , p . 80.
140
indus t r ia l development. I n d u s t r i a l development obviously
created a bureaucracy and an e l i t e group. Both innovations
were new to Mao and were fore ign to h i s p o l i t i c a l thought of
the "mass l i n e , " t h a t h i s t o r y i s created by the masses ra ther
than by ind iv idua ls . - i^ His objec t ions to the new development
are evident in remarks he made in I960 which were not pub
lished for severa l y e a r s . Mao to ld a group of foreign
v i s i to r s in I960 t h a t he had feared the "era of revolution"
had been replaced by the "era of the organizer."^^ This
group of "organizers" opposed Mao's emphasis on revolut ion, 12 having a vested i n t e r e s t in improving i t s own s t a t u s .
Thus, a s t ruggle arose out of Mao's e f for t to control the
bureaucratic and par ty elites.-^-^
Mao a t tacked the bureaucracy and " r ev i s i on i s t s " in
the following manner: "push to the l i m i t , " time your action
so that " there must be ne i t he r p rocras t ina t ion nor prec ip i ta te
^ ^ I b i d . . p . 149. See note 21 below.
^^Hans Granquis t , The Red Guard, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, P u b l i s h e r s , 1967), p . 5.
12 Gray and Cavendish, OP., c i t . , p . 68.
l^Harold D. Lasswel l , "Russia and China in a .-lodernizing World: A Concluding Note," in Soviet and Chinese Communi .m^ Simi la r i t i es and Dif fe rences , ed. by Donald - . Treadgcld, (Seattle 1 Unive r s i ty of -Washington Press , 1967), p. ^29. A good discuss ion of the inf luences of i ndus t r i a l fa i lure on po l i t i ca l con t ro l i s in Barrington Moore, J r . , "Kctes on the Process of Acquiring Power," v.'orld P o l i t i c s , ho. 1, Vol. 8, (October, 1955),' op. 2-6 .
141
action," and i n o r d e r t o d i scourage those " r e v i s i o n i s t s " " i t
often pays t o be rude ."14
The Campaign t o Reorganize the Army
Although Mao d id not "push t o the l i m i t " u n t i l l a t e
1965, he s t a r t e d h i s a t t a c k soon a f t e r the Lushan meeting of
the Cent ra l Committee August 2 -16 , 1959. During the meeting
P'eng Teh-hua i , the M i n i s t e r of Defense, a t tacked the s h o r t
comings of t h e Communes and " the mass campaigns in i n d u s t r y
and a g r i c u l t u r e , " the Great Leap Forward, and Sino-Soviet
d i f f i cu l t i e s . - ' - ^ At f i r s t , the government p ress was s i l e n t
about P ' e n g ' s a t t a c k . I n f a c t P a r t y l e a d e r s permit ted a p ro
t rac ted debate e i t h e r because the government wanted to know
P ' eng ' s a s s o c i a t e s or because Mao did not take the a t t a ck
very s e r i o u s l y . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t Mao was t e s t i n g the
genera l s ' l o y a l t y , s i nce P 'eng was very popular in the
People L i b e r a t i o n Army (PLA) .
I t was not ve ry long before Mao made h i s moves kncwn.
During the month of September s e v e r a l p rov inc i a l newspapers
for the f i r s t t ime a s s o c i a t e d the " r i g h t i s t s " with the Soviet
^^Although those "codes"— as Alexander George c e l l s them— r e f e r t o the Sov ie t p o l i t i c a l system, I fee l t ha t t! ey can be a p p l i e d t o Mao's p o l i t i c a l l e a d - r s h i r as w ? l l , nl3;«:-neer George, The " O p e r a t i o n a l Code" a Nor^ected .••.-rroecr lo Z' -Study of P o l i t i c a l Leaders and Jec i s ion-•• .hlni : , i:-?.nia - o n i c a : The Rand C o r p o r a t i o n , 19o7) , - p . 3> ^ d Uj.
^ C h a r l e s , or^. c i t . , p . 67 .
142
Union. On September 16, the d i smissa l s of P'eng and several
associates were announced.^6
P'eng Teh-hua i ' s replacement by Lin Piao marked a
major s tep in the process of dest roying the old bureaucracy
and e l i t e s . Lin P i a o ' s p r inc ip le r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was to turn
the PLA from a p ro fes s iona l m i l i t a r y f ight ing organization
into an organiza t ion for p o l i t i c a l work. 1*7 P'eng ac tua l ly
had had l i t t l e choice betv/een c rea t ing a professional army and
a p o l i t i c a l one. In the case of China,, according to S. M,
Chiu, c rea t ion of one of these was possible but not of both
simultaneously. 1° The average so ld i e r and the mi l i t a ry cadre
could not afford to divide t h e i r time between harvesting crops
and learning the techniques of a modern army organized on the
Soviet model. P'eng was aware of t h i s as he was t ry ing to
build a modern p rofess iona l army.^9 But i t i s important to
note tha t Mao's move aga ins t professionalism did not begin
with the 1959 ous te r of P'eng Teh-huai.^^ Professionalism
• rbid., p. 70.
• ' Sllis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corns. 19^9-1964, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967) , p. 13o.
^^S. M. Chiu, "The Chinese Communist Army in Transition," Far Eastern Survey, No. 11, Vol. 27, (November, 1958i , pp. 163-174.
19 Joffe, o_p. cit. . p. 6.
^^Ibid.. p. 127.
143
in the army c o n f l i c t e d wi th th^ s t a t i n . r . ^ u r, s t a tements by Mao in I937 and
1956 on the "mass l i n e . " Th-s^ qt^tcm..,^ n . s . s ta tements were t o apply t o
the army a s w e l l a s t hose i n c i v i l i a n l i f e . The s ta tements
that " the p a r t y must r e p r e s e n t the masses ,"21 would, accord-
ing t o John G i t t i n g s ensure t h a t m i l i t a r y t h ^ n r v ar-n o«.-c l o s e l y i n t e g r a t e d J ^ i t h ^ T I ^ ^ ^ T V ^ ^ i ^ ^ ' r e q u i r e m e n t s of the s i t u a t i o n . 2 2 ^-^^^^V and
In e f f ec t i t meant t h a t m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e was influenced
by the l i f e of the masses . Thus poor economic cond i t ions
would r e q u i r e the s o l d i e r s t o work on farms and in f a c t o r i e s .
Mao's r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t p ro fess iona l i sm was a l so shared
by some m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . Th i s i s i nd ica t ed by P'eng Teh-
huai when he r e f e r r e d i n I956 t o
Some o f f i c e r s [who a r e j only "sa t i s f ied with our pas t b a t t l e e x p e r i e n c e , and are not s u f f i c i e n t l y e n t h u s i a s t i c about the study of modernized m i l i t a r y knowledge . ^3
By the beginning of the Great Leap Forward in the summer of
195s, a debate s t a r t e d between p a r t y l eade r s wanting m i l i t a r y
personnel t o h a r v e s t the c rops and those in the PLA who
21 P M u ^^*^° ^^s> "V^hat i s the Mass Line?" Chieh-L^ng-chun p a . IL ibe ra t i on Army Ngwspaner) , ( Ju ly 3 , 1956J c i t ed in John f i t t i n g s , I'he r.Qla px- the Chinese Army. (London: Oxford un ive r s i t y P r e s s , I967) , p . 170. M ^ s wr i t i ngs on the "rr.a (IQI?)''^^^ be ga the red from On P r a c t i c e end On Cont rad ic t ion 4.U / » ^^''^ On the Cor ren t Handling of Cont rad ic t ion ,'v:nor.-the Peopla (1957) . "^
ass
^ ^ G i t t i n g s , I b i d . 23
^ , P ' eng T e h - h u a i , " P o l i t i c a l Off icers M-.i:i. f.'.rive to otuay .Mi l i ta ry . . f f a i r s , " L i b e r a t i o n Army hewsDtr:r (eei t o r i B D , U'iarch 29, 1956) . C i t^d in G i t t i n r s , I b i d . , r . 1!)0.
144
protested a g a i n s t the use of m i l i t a r y personnel for non
profess iona l p u r s u i t s . 2 4 I n Ju ly 195^ , 'Marshal Chu Teh
stated the views of the p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p :
There a r e people who advocate an e x c l u s i v e l y m i l i t a r y v ievjpoin t , who have a one-sided r e gard f o r m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s and look dovm upon p o l i t i c s , have a one-s ided high regard for • v o c a t i o n and t echn ique and look down upon ideo logy . . . in e s s e n c e , t h i s i s a kind of m a n i f e s t a t i o n of bourgeo is m i l i t a r y ideas .25
The appointment of Lin Piao meant the r e s t o r a t i o n of
party l e a d e r s h i p over t he PLA. In the f i r s t major speech
after t a k i n g over i n September, 1959 Lin ca l l ed for " i n
tens i f ied p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n , s t r i c t e r pa r ty c o n t r o l , and
more con tac t with the masses . ^^ In fu r the r e f f o r t s t o
strengthen p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l of the PLA in I960 Lin Piao
proposed s e v e r a l new b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s knovm as the "Four
F i r s t s . "27 F i r s t came t he "human f a c t o r " in the r e l a t i o n
ships between men and weapons; second, p o l i t i c s v;as f i r s t
in the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o l i t i c a l work and m i l i t a r y work;
th i rd , ideology was f i r s t in the r e l a t i o n s h i p between rou t ine
3ducation and i d e o l o g i c a l p o l i t i c a l educa t ion ; and four th .
24Ralph L. Powel l , "Commissars in the Hlconomy: Learn From The PLA' Movement in China ," Asian Survey, No. ^, >/ol. 5, (March, I965), pp . 125-126.
25chu Teh, " P e o p l e ' s Army, P e o p l e ' s '. 'ar," 1;"- -^^"^ News Agency, J u l y 3 1 , 195^; r epo r t ed ir, Ba^iigr^ilHi, U ' ^ ' n i . Consulate-General , Hong KonK and c i t e d by G i t t m r s , n-^. --c •:_ of the Chinese Army, O P . c i t . , p . 175.
' ^^Gi t t i ngs , I b i d . , p . 243.
^ ' 'Powel l , p p . c r t . , p . 12^.
145
"living thought" was f i r s t in the r e l a t i onsh ip between book
study and i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . I t i s c lear tha t Lin was in
effect r e i t e r a t i n g Mao's concept of " p o l i t i c s in command."
To br ing the PLA c lose r to Party leadership , the Party
enlarged the M i l i t a r y Affa i r s Committee in I960; put more
emphasis on Par ty membership in a l l PLA companies; and paid
special a t t e n t i o n t o youth in the PLA. I t i s obvious tha t
these changes were a l s o meant to lessen the influence of the
remaining old e l i t e s within the PLA.
The M i l i t a r y Affa i r s Committee (MAC)(See Chart VI-l)
was and i s the con t ro l organ of the Central Committee and
i t s Pol i tburo over the m i l i t a r y . By enlarging the MAC, the
Party leadership thus mMnimized the chance of power concen
trat ion in the hands of a few members of the MAC. Substan
tive mi l i t a ry power r e s i d e s within t h i s committee whose
chairman since 195^ has been the Minister of Defense— Lin
Piao. Except for very sens i t i ve quest ions , the MAC decides
al l matters pe r t a in ing to the People Liberation Army. The
most important dec i s ions are taken by the fu l l Politburo
or i t s smaller Standing Committee. In 1961, the Mil i tary
Affairs Committee passed a r e so lu t ion "Strengthening of
Pol i t ical and Ideo log i ca l V/ork Among the Armed Forces,"
which cal led for a r a d i c a l overhaul of the content and the
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machinery of political indoctrination in the PLA.^^ Be
ginning in 1961, the MAC started holding an annual Liber
ation Army Political V ork Conference. The conference was
to be attended by high ranking cadres from every province
who gathered to review each one's progress, after which the
Conference calls upon them to vjork harder.
The company as the basic unit of organization in the
PLA received special attention from the Party leadership.
Prior to 1961, approximately one-third of all PLA companies
and most platoons and squads had no Party cells. The Mili
tary Affairs Comraittee decided to remedy this situation by
placing Party cells in all companies. By April, I96I, Party
branches were re-established in all niilitary companies while
eighty per cent of the platoons and over half of the squads
had Party cells. In November, 1961, the Chinese Communist
Party referred to the Party branches as
the basic-level organizaticnisj of the Party in the ar-ied forces, the basic transmission belt(s) between the Party and the T.asses, and the core of unified leadership and unity of companies.29
The importance of this was stated later by General Hsia Hua
on April 1, 1963:
^^John Gittings, "The 'Learn From the nrmy' Camnaign," The China (-quarterly. (/vpril-June , 1964) , r. 154.
^^Gittings, "The Role of the Chinese Army," OP. cit., p. 247.
148
The company is the basic combat unit. It must be tough in the battlefield. It cannot do this if it does not have the strong leadership of the Party or the practical work''of a Party branch . . . . The Quality of the work of a company depends on the work of its Party branch and on the role played by its Party members. The Party branch is the nucleus of leadership and unity of the company and is the company's fortress. 30
By this reorganization, the Party hoped to assure itself
that the military would be closely controlled by the Party
leadership.
Attention was also devoted to the young people in
the People Liberation Army, in order to secure the loyalty
of the rank and file soldier who comprised a significant
portion of the PLA. As Liu Chih-chien noted on May 3, 1961:
Since the revolutionary military service system v;as put into practice, all privates in our Army have been 3/ouths, and a considerable norticn of its basic level cadres have also been youths.^^
The young were further encouraged to ;ioin the Young Communist
League to interviev; veterans, read meraoirs of military heroes,
and to follow in the steps of model soldiers such as Lei Feng,
a young soldier of poor background who died in 1962 at the age
of twenty. Lei died, not in the battlefield, but in an acci
dent while carrying out his routine work. V-.hile his diary
was circulated among the soldiers, he was hailed for his
30lhid.
^-^Gittings, "The 'Learn From the Army' Ca-nraif n," OP. cit. , p. 155 .
149
dedication to the state, to his work, to Mao's writings, and
to his fellow comrades. According to John Gittings, Lei's
story was probably circulated more extensively than any
other story during the 1960's. Another lesser known m.artyr,
V/ang Chieh, was made a hero after he died in I965 by falling
on an explosive to protect his comrades.32
The hero question here is not so important for this
discussion as the fact that all these characters were young
and that the Party leadership emphasized the role of Mao's
thoughts-- in their diaries. In one respect one might con
clude that the real issue at stake was the survival of Mao's
"mass line" the system of elites and bureaucracy whose
leaders questioned Mao's leadership. Just as important was
the image of .-lao as a successful relicy rriaker.
Thus, while reorranizing the army, Mao made efforts to
extricate himself from the responsibilities for the bad eco
nomic situation in the country. To ^rotect his leadershin,
he blamed mistakes on influential bureaucrats and cadres,
men who opposed his policies. His efforts at justifyinr his
own policy positions nrcvided the background for taking a
"Learn From the Army" campaign to the masses.
32 Gray and Cavendish, op. c_rt. , p. 111.
150
The Campaign of "Learninp" From the Army"
Mao's intention to destroy the influential bureaucrats
was revealed in February, 1962. Commenting on the influence
of the cadres and promising that a "proletariat vanguard"
would isolate and replace the "revisionists," a People's
Daily editorial declared:
We cannot think that the people of various classes, forming 90 per cent of the population are walking the socialist road under their own motivation or that a small percentage could not under any circumstances enlarge their influence.
Thus it is very evident there must be a proletariat vanguard resolutely upholding the principles of Marxism-Leninism to unite the former in the direction of socialism and isolate the latter completely.33
It is obvious from this statement that the "small percentage"
were those who either opposed Mac within the Party or the
bureaucracy. V.'hatever the reason for these charges, tne
single most outstanding issue here seems to be the distri
bution of power. Those who were ousted from the Party had
challenged Mao's policies; and many other cadres, by virtue
of their place in a highly procedural bureaucracy, had ac
quired power. Both groups represented a threat to Mao's
influence within the Party, the military, and the masses.
Therefore, he "could not under any circumstances enlarge
their influence."
33"K3d China hotes Discord in Party," He v;_York JLki^s, February 7, 1962, p. 8, column 5.
151
In a communique issued on September 28, 1962, the
Central Committee made a strong attack on the "revisionists;"
blamed the failure of Mao's policies on the "opportunists;"
and announced the dismissal of two top military leaders,
General Huang Ko-cheng and General Tan Cheing, from the
Party Secretariate.34 Huang was Army Chief of Staff when
Marshal P'eng Teh-huai had been purged in September, 1959.
(Both officers supported P'eng's attack on the government's
policies and Mao's action was interpreted as a retaliation
for their support of P'eng.)35 The communique also charged
that "leading cadres" were incompetent.36
In 1962 Mao noticed that the country was still plagued
with unrest and dissidence while the army was marked by order
and discipline. After Red Flag admitted in September, 1962
that industry was in a sorry state,37 Mao decided to strengthen
3^The Central Committee Communicue was distributed by Hsinhua through the Chinese Communist Press Agency. Reported in "Peking Charges Key Aides Failed," New York Times, September 29, 1962, p. 2, Column 1, and September 30, p. 2, Column 3.
^^Ibid.
3%bid.
' The government had previously admitted shortcomings in agriculture when labor was taken away from the industrial centers and sent to the rural areas. However, it had not admitted failure in industry until Sentember 29, 1962. K ned. Flag article said that "The process of realizing socialist industrialization can only be a gradual process,^and the process of improving working ecuipment, too, can on^y be a gradual process." The statement is a far cry from the tneory behind the Great Leap Forward, v/hMch was to acrteve moustry "better, faster, and'more economic." Cited in "i-el:inr :.helv3S Industrial Drive," Ivew York Times. SeptBi.iber 20, 196.-, r- 1, Column 5.
15
his political leadership by applying the methods and tech
niques of the PLA to the general Chinese society to carry
his campaign to the Chinese community, industries, trade
unions, government departments and rural cadres.38
By January, 1964, the Party leadership felt that
the reorganization and political indoctrination of the
army had reached a successful stage. A People's Daily
editorial declared on January 1 that
a great change has been brought about in the ideological aspect of the troops, the viewpoint of class and class struggle has become even more definite, the proletarian fighting will has become stronger, the concept of combat readiness has been strengthened, the revolutionary spirit of working hard and the fine communist quality has been further developed, and more and more heroes, models, good persons and good deeds have emerged.39
The "Learn From the Army" campaign in the Chinese
community was publicly announced by a People's Daily editorial
on February 1, 1964.^^ Political indoctrination of the peo
ple was not the only object of the campaign. A more important
object of this movement was to establish political departments
3^"Government Demands People Emulate Disciplined Army," New York Times. February 3, 1964, p. S, Column 5.
3^Gittings, £p. cit., p. 157.
^^Sditorial, "Learn From the Experience of the Peonle's Liberation Army in Political and Ideological V.ork," People's Daily. February 1, 1964. Translated in Survey of the China mainland Press. (Hong b.ong: U.S. Consulate-General), o. 315^. Cited in Gittings, Ibid.« p. 153.
153
following the example of the People Liberation Army v;ithin
the civilian population. In February, I964, the political
cadres of transportation, communications and industrial
departments of the party held a national conference in which
the creation of political cells to control the political
work of these departments was discussed. Later, these cadres
were directed to create organs for political v;ork in all the
provinces and regions.^-^
The Central Committee leadership also created other
political departments for finance and trade.42
It is doubtful whether the new political departments
would be as successful as they became in the army. As one
author stated the matter:
It is doubtful that non-material incentives that stimulated self-sacrifice in tre ar:r:ed services will be as effective in shops, factories, and banks.43
Although Mao did not destroy the old bureaucracy, he brought
it under closer Party control.
However successful Mao was in carrying out the campaign
to the people, the course of the camnaign was much more differ.
ent than that which he undertook in the PLA itself. This
^^Powell, op. cvt., op. 130-131.
^^Ibid.. p. 131.
^3rbid., p. 137.
154
difficulty is evident in the outcome of the campaign which
resulted in creating the "revolution" in culture and the
"Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution." The cause for the
campaign's difficulty lies in the fact that Mao had much
greater opposition within the bureaucracy than within the
PLA.
The "Revolution" in Culture. 1964-1970
The "revolution" in culture, which began in 1964,^^
refers to Mao's attack on influential intellectuals within
the Chinese Communist Party. Although, Mao claims that the
campaign was launched because of his concern for the Chinese
youth— to protect them from the influence of the "revision
ists"— his actual rationale was. that which he voiced in a
secret speech to the Tenth Plenum of the Party in September,
1962 and which according to Philip Bridgham was to
explain failures and criticism 01 party policies as largely the handiwork of 'foreign and domestic class enemies' against v;hom it was now necessary to launch a nation-wide 'class struggle' camnaign.^-^
^Viao's attack which resulted in ousting university profassors, revising the textbooks and closing several technical universities did not ease the pressure until July 22, 1970. According to some party leaders the "lack of teachers and of technical training has hampered industrial develon.nent and production in recent years." Reported in "China Softens Attitude on Profs, School Policy," The vVashington Post, July 23, 1970, p. A12.
^^Bridgham, 0£. cj^. , p. 8. H comnlete text ol .-lao speech has never been published. The only knov;leri_-? ci its contents comes from excerpts quoted by other party leacers.
s
5
In this speech, Mao warned against the effects of the
criticisms of intellectual dissidents by saying
that a number of people were making use of the writing of novels to carry out anti party activities and were creating a climate' in publ,ic opinion for the restoration of capitalism.4o
Official concern was first openly voiced by a Red Flag
article on March 21, I964. The article
urged older party members to educate future leaders in revolutionary traditions so that they will not abandon the principles of the present regime.47
Mao's campaign against intellectual dissidents re
vealed some important sympathizers for P'eng Teh-huai
within the Party. Among the first three writers singled
out by Mao were Yang Hsien-chen, Feng Tinn", and Chou Ku-
ch'eng. Yang, probably the most important of the three,
was the president of the Peking Higher Party School until
1961 when he v;as purged on September 13, 1964, he was a
member of the Central Committee, H September Red Fla?
article accused him of misinterpreting the basic law of
social development. Yang had ar? ued that things ''units two
^^This Guote from Mao's speech v:a5 first retorted by the r ew China Kev/s Agency on July 30, 1966. Cited in Bridgham, Ibid., p. 8.
' "China Fears V. st Influences Youths' Moves to Bolster the keal of Future Red Leaders," N-w York Tiir.es, March 22, 196/., p. 13, Column 1.
156
into one,"48 ^^^ according to Mao's essay On Practice and On
Contradictions of 1937, forces clash rather than unite.
Feng Teng was also a Moscow graduate of Philosophy and
was the Deputy Chairman of the philosophy department at Peking
University. He, like Yang, was blamed for following the
U.S.S.R. Feng's mistake according to his critics, was that
he did not introduce class struggle with his arguments.49
Chou Ku-cheng, a well-known historian of Lenin,
government official, and member of the presidium of the
minority Peasants and vjorkers Democratic Party, was accused
of associating himself with Yang on the issue of contradiction
Chou was accused of claiming that art transcends the realm of
conflict. The Red Flag article of September 13 compared the
development of the arguments among these three authors to
the development of Trotsky's arguments in Russia during the
1920's.5^
Three other authors linked to Yang were also purged:
Li Ming, a philosophy lecturer; and Ai Heng-wu and Lin Ching-
shan, co-authors of an article elaborating Yang's views.5
^^"Peking is Purging Chinese Backers of Soviet Policy," New York Times. September 14, 1964, P* 1> Column 5.
^^"Feking Denounces Another Intellectual in Party," New York Times. October 6, 1964, p. 6, Column 4.
^^"Peking is Purging Chinese Backers of Soviet Policy," op. cit.
51 Ibid.
157
Another celebrated author and Party official purged
in June, 1966, was VJu Han, an opera writer, who had been a
Vice Mayor of Pgking under Peng Chen. 'vVu, however, had been
criticized earlier in I964 and 1965 for his opera The Dis
missal of hai Fui written in I96O-I96I. He was accused of
writing sympathetic defense of the Minister of Defense
after the dismissal of P'eng Teh-huai. Furthermore, he
was accused of showing conflict between peasants and officials
in the opera to humiliate Mao's agrarian policies.^^ On
December 20, I965 People's Daily carried an article of self-
criticism by Vvu Han and the Peking Daily carried a similar
article on January 12, I966.
V/u Han had been writing a rticles since 1961 under the
series "The Three Family Village"53 for the Peking Front Line.
Two other Peking politicians and authors of the series, Teng
T'o and Liao Mo-sha, were also severely criticized. Teng
was a secretary of the Peking Municipal Party Com.mittee, the
editor of Front Line . and a subordinate of the Mayor of
Peking, Pen Chen.
On May 8, 1966, an "onen fire" attack by the Liberation
^ Yao vVsn-vuan of the Shanghai . en Hui Pao accuded :u Han of using the "nast to ridicule the present," in an^article on Hovember^'lO, I965. Cited by Stephen u'halley, "The -ultural Revolution and the attack on the 'Tlree Family'.illage .ihe. China Quarterly, (July-S^ntember, 19o6), p. 149.
53 Ibid.. pp. I54-I56.
158
Army Daily criticized all three authors.54 Teng was accused
of deliberately attacking Chairman Mao by criticizing his
policies in I96I and 1962. In June the government continued
its extensive attack on the "Three Family Village" series.
A typical article by the three authors was the "Great Empty
Talk," published in Front Line in I96I. It referred to the
young generation which was taught big things that had no
meaning. Such "Great Empty Talk" was the following poem:
The heaven is our father. The earth is our mother. The sun is our governess. The east wind is our benefactor.
The west wind is our enemy.55
In June, 1966,'the three authors were ousted from their
offices along with the Mayor of Peking, P'eng Chen, who was
also a member of the ruling Politburo.5°
The next target of the Party leadership was the
university system. Lu P'ing, the president of Peking
University and a secretary of its Party cell and Sung Shuo,
the deputy director of the University Department of the
Municipal Party Committee, were ousted "for shielding dis
graced intellectuals."37 Another official of Peking
^^"Yugoslav Press Reports China Has Dismissed Two Major Figures," New York Times. May 29, 1966, p. 4, Column 2.
"Bridgham, op. cit. , P. 155.
^^Seymour Topping, "Peking Confirms Key Aide's Ouster From Party Post," New York Times, June 4, 1966, p. 1, Column 6.
^Vlbid.
159
University, P'ing Pei-yun, was ousted for the same reason.
The president of Nanking University, Kuan Ya-ming was also
ousted in June because of a "villainous conspiracy to supp
ress the revolutionary movement."5°
When several leaders from Burma visited Communist
China on June 18, 1966, they asked the Chinese officials
the meaning of these purges. The reply from Chou En-lai
was that the purges were the result of the "Cultural Revo
lution."59 If we conclude here by accepting Chou's con
clusion we might miss the whole issue involved-- that of
the challenge to Mao's authority by members of the Party
elite. Mao was really after P'eng Chen as a political
deviate who had supported P'eng Teh-huai. It is apparent
from the previous discussion that P'eng had actually obtained
considerable support, if not for him, at least for views
which he advocated in the Lushan meeting of 1959. His support,
which was in opposition to Mao, was centered mainly in two
party organizations, the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party and the Peking Municipal Party Committee.60
^^"University Chief Ousted by Peking," Ngw York Times. June 17, 1966, p. 8, Column 3.
^^"Chou Describes Purge as 'Cultural Revolution'," Krw York Times, June 19, 1966, p. 18, Column 6.
^^Harry Gelman, "Mao and the Permanent Purge," Problem of Communism. Vol. 15, (November-December, 1966), pp. 2-14.
160
Mao's attack on the intellectuals did not end his
efforts to restore confidence in his political leadership.
It rather started an extensive political crisis that en
gulfed every province and resulted in the ouster of many
provincial leaders. These crises will be discussed in the
following chapter when we consider the political aspects of
the "Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution" of 1966.
Conclusion
Mao's failure in domestic and foreign policies created
opposition within his leadership. This was evident in a
speech Mao delivered on July 23, 1959, before a conference of
Party members. He said:
I was not in a hurry to speak, and have endured it by stiffening my scalp. For 20 days I have shown my forbearance, and now the conference will soon be adjourned.
You have said what you wanted to say, and the minutes attest to that. If you have caught me in the wrong, you can punish me.61
A significant manifestation of opposition to Mao was the re
fusal of Liu Shao-chi to support Mao Tse-tung in the "Cultural
Revolution." According to the New York Times. "It is Mao's
^^"Speeches and Letters of Mao Tse-tung," New_Ypr:k_Time_s, March 1, 1970, p. 1, Column 5. The speech which was_delivered at an undisclosed conference was recently acouired v;ith other important documents by the United States government.
161
blunders in the last decade that changed Liu and created
questions in Liu's head."62
Similarly, since the failure of the Great Leap Forward,
Teng Hsiao-p'ing, General Secretary of the Party, must have
felt a deep resentment toward Mao. According to Mao himself
in 1966,
There were many things about which they did not consult with me. These things should have been discussed by the Central Committee and decisions taken on them. Teng Hsiao-p'ing never consulted with me. He has never consulted with me about anything since 1959.63
These highly-placed opponents of Mao and their influence
in China's governmental bureaucracy caused Mao to launch a
campaign against the bureaucracy. Mao's aim was to destroy
the old bureaucracy and to bring it under the Party super
vision. He started with the People Liberation Army because
that was the origin of the strongest opposition; and he probably
reasoned that after being purged, the PLA would be a powerful
ally in destroying other opposition within the powerful bur
eaucracy outside the PLA.
By appealing to the young, he directed his campaign
at the most susceptable ground to absorb his ideas. To do
^^Sditorial, "Climax in Peking," New York Tim^s. December 18, I966, p. 12, Column 1.
^3"Speeches and Letters of Mao Tse-tung," New York Timesy op. cit.
162
t h i s i t was e s s e n t i a l t o him t o remove a l l of the w r i t e r s
and p ro fesso r s who questioned the s a n c t i t y of h i s thought .
In conc lus ion , although Mao pretended to p ro tec t
the young from "Revisionism" and cap i t a l i sm, h i s main pur
pose v;as r e s t o r a t i o n of conficence in h i s leadersh ip by
destroying overt and covert opposi t ion in the bureaucracy.
Thus the campaign was a s t ruggle for power r a the r than a
"Cul tura l Revolut ion" or a spontaneous erupt ion of even t s .
This s t ruggle centered mainly on Mao's e f f o r t s to regain
the inf luence and power he had had before China had under
taken the t a sk of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n under the rule of the
Chinese Communist P a r t y .
CHAPTER VII
THREATS TO THE PARTY'S POLITICAL INTEGRATION
1966-1967
Additional threats to the political integration of
the Chinese Communist Party elite resulting from Mao's
failures in domestic and foreign policies can be realized
from studying events in the I966-I967 period when Mao
sought to regain political control by ousting and humil
iating his opponents.
By political disintegration, I mean the division of
the elite into several disunited groups, the breakdown of
normal procedures among the party elites, and a China in
tumult which posed uncertain and unexpected threats to all
influential party leaders, including Mao's wife, Chiang
Ch'ing,
One of the most important factors in the political
upheaval of I966-I967 was the Red Guards organization. The
Red Guards were important for two reasons: One, their
creation and use shows us that Mao was unable to use the
Central Committee and the party machinery to oust his
opponents in the various provinces; and, two. Red Guard
activities overshadowed almost every other political act
ivity in China in I966-I967.
163
164
The Red Guards «
An often-cited proof of Mao's zeal for political
upheavals to achieve success is in his report on the
Peasant Movement in Hunan in 1927:
A revolution is not the same as inviting people to dinner or writing an essay or painting a picture or embroidering a flower; it cannot be anything so refined, so calm and gentle, or so 'mild, kind, courteous, restrained, and magnanimous.' . . . To put it bluntly, it was necessary to bring about a brief reign of terror in every rural area, else one could never suppress the activities of the counterrevolutionaries in the countryside or overthrow the authority of the gentry.-•-
According to Hans Granquist, the ideas expressed in this
paragraph have been used twice during the period since the
Communist take-over— in 1950, against the landowners in
the countryside, and in 1966, against Mao's opponents. Be
tween these two periods of violence, the emphasis was on
persuasion, re-education, and "thought reform." Mao's ideas
on violence in this quotation were repeated in his July 13,
1966^ instructions to the Red Guards:
They really created a disturbance on the streets of Nanking. The more I saw, the happier I felt.
Do not be afraid to make trouble. The more trouble you make and the longer you make it last the better.
Granquist, £0. cit. , p. 26.
^"Speeches and Letters of Mao Tse-tung," OP. CU..
165
Confusion and trouble are always noteworthy. It can clear things up. The more you are afraid of ghosts the more you will encounter them. However, do not fire your guns. It is never good to open fire.-
A second factor behind the chaotic activities of the
Red Guards stemmed from student unhappiness with the "class
enemies" in the schools and Party. There was growing dis
illusionment with both among the students of poor back
grounds. This disillusionment started with the Party's
insistence on removing the distinction between the illit
erate masses and the intellectual aristocracy. A majority
of the students from poor backgrounds supported the Party's
move but students from miiddle class backgrounds objected to
this and objected to having to work in the countryside.
Furthermore, poor students who v/ere looking forv/ard to a
Utopia professed by the Party leadership, iret opposition
from the professional cadres in the countryside, who were
apt to protect their positions against students' indifference."*
By 1965, according to John Israel, the majority of the
students who were born after 1945 realized that although the
educational system granted them preferential treatment "the
system is really designed not for Cthem], but for the better,
prepared children of the bourgeoise." The first action taken
^Ibid.
^John Israel, "The Red Guards in Historical P-rsr3Ctiv' Continuity and Change ir the Chinese Youtt H.GV-ment," ^_i China L.uarterly. (April..June, 1967), PP* --4«
166
by poorer students against the "bourgeoise class"5 was to
support Mao's purge of school officials in the summer of
1965. Student hatred was revealed in a student pamphlet
of July 20, 1965:
For 17 years our school has been ruled by the bourgeois c l a s s . VJe s h a l l not t o l e r a t e t h i s any longer' . . . . Old and young gentlemen, we t e l l you f rankly , you a l l s t ink and you are nothing but r o t t e n t r a s h . . . Formerly you were in a p r iv i l eged p o s i t i o n , sat on our heads and l e t your excrement f a l l on us to show tha t you were s u p e r i o r . Today you are under d i c t a t o r s h i p and you su f fe r .6
In November, s tuden t s moved to press the "bourgeoise" leader
ship of the Young Communist League, to allow grea te r l eader
ship o p p o r t u n i t i e s for the s tudents themselves in the.League
and the Pa r ty .
Mao's idea of p o l i t i c a l upheaval and the d i s i l l u s i o n
ment of poorer s tuden ts with the p robab i l i t y of facing a
glorious future provided two f ac to r s for a chaotic p o l i t i c a l
s i tua t ion within the Chinese community.
The 1966 Plenum of the Centra l Committee
On Sugust 1-12, 1966 the Central Committee held i t s
f i r s t "plenary sess ion" since 1962. The meeting revealed
widespread oppos i t ion within the par ty e l i t e s and led to the
creat ion of the Red Guards.
A l i s t of 201 top Chinese Communist leaders issued on
^ I b i d .
% b i d .
167
August 19 over Peking radio revealed some important changes
in the ranks of the Chinese elite." Liu Shao-chi, once Mao's
heir-apparent was listed third, after Lin Piao. Further,
more than 100 regular and alternate members of the Central
Committee were missing from the list. Among those missing
were two military members of the Politburo, Liu Pe-cheng
and Li Ching-chuan. Deputy Premier Nieh Jung-chen, a
member of the Central Committee was also the Deputy Chair
man of the National Defense Council. Also missing was
Chang Chih-chung, Deputy Chairman of the Defense Council,
and the following ministers: Tiao Lu-yen of Agriculture,
Liu VJen-hui of Forestry, Chiang Nan-hsiang of Higher Edu
cation, and Kao Yang-min of Chemical Industry. The list
also revealed that the Party's top organ of the Standing
Committee, had been enlarged from seven to ten membars
(Table VII-1) . Two of the three new members who were close
friends of Mao were given important political posts. Tao
Chu was named head of the Central Committee and Chen Po-ta
was placed in charge of the "Cultural Revolution."
Placing Chen Po-ta, the editor of Red Flag and a close
ally of Lin Piao, at the head of the "Cultural Revolution"
which introduced the Red Guards represented a move toward
political violence. It also signaled Mao's dissatisfaction
' "Red China Hints Purge Hits More TOP Leaders," Nejv York Times. August 2, 1966, p. 4, Column 3.
168
TABLE V I I - 1
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY STANDING COMIvlITTES
AUGUST 12, 1966
Mao T s e - t u n g Teng H s i a o - p ' i n g
Lin P iao Kang Sheng^^
Chou E n - l a i Liu Shao-chi
Tao Chu*: Chu Teh
Chen P o - t a Li Fu-chen*
* New member.
Source : New York Times, August 18, 1966, p . 2 , and November 17 , 1966, p . 9 .
with the " C u l t u r a l Revo lu t ion" as "a modest r e c t i f i c a t i o n
campaign" under the l e a d e r s h i p of Liu Shao-chi and the
normal p rocedures of t he P a r t y a p p a r a t u s . ° According t o
W. F . D o r r i l l ,
. . . , Mao, f r u s t r a t e d by the f a i l u r e of the i d e o l o g i c a l r e v o l u t i o n t o keep up with h i s r i s i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s , sought an e x p l a n a t i o n , or r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , in the hidden motives of those he had e n t r u s t e d with i t s l e a d e r s h i p - -mot ives t o be g leaned from a t o r t u o u s , a r b i t r a r y , and a t t i m e s pa rano id r e i r v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e i r p r e v i o u s l y accep ted s t a t emen t s and a c t i o n s . ^
I s r a e l , op . c i t . , p . 9 .
^Emphasis a r e mine. D o r r i l l , £ 0 . p i t . , p . 1/*1.
169
A most significant act of the "plenary session" was
the adoption on August 8, I966, of a sixteen-point "Decision
Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."^0
The decision described the movement in progress as "a great
revolution that touches people to their very soul-"-'-- the
decision also accused "bourgeoisie," who had been over
thrown earlier, of
Still trying to use old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes [the four oldsj to corrupt their minds, and endeavor to stage a comeback.1^
The document called upon the masses to throw away
the "four olds" and to adopt the "four news" [new traditions,
ideas, culture, and habitsU "to change the mental outlook of
the whole society."-^3
In essence, the sixteen points called for the masses
to defeat the "class enemy" of "bourgeoise" persons "in leading
^^David Oancia, "Red China is Torn by Policy D-bate," New York Times, August, 1966, p. 1, Column I6.
-"- Quoted in Dorrill, _op. cit., p. 142.
^^Quoted in Dorrill, 0£. cit., p. 142. The decision may or may not be referring to a coup to oust Mao in the previous two months. According to a press dispatch from Peking— published in the Yugoslav journal Politica-- Liu Shao-chi was planning to call a plenary session, on July 21, to oust Mao Tse-tung and to bring back to power P'eng Chen. I have discounted the validity of this dispatch for lack^of significant support by several authors. For a contrary view on the dispatch see Gene T. Hsiao, Asian Survey. (June, 19o7J.
13 ^Dorrill, o£. cit. , p. 143.
170
positions who have gained a foothold in the Party and have
set out on the capitalist path."14
In conclusion, this plenary session which brought
about the far-reaching changes in the Party leadership was
obviously manipulated by Mao to serve his ends. The absence
of half of the top leaders from the meeting and the presence
of "revolutionary students and teachers from Peking instit
utions" as participants provide that Mao was definitely
suffering from a lack of sufficient support within the elite
group. The existence of opposition to Mao, although not
united, is evident in a Red Flag article published on August
12. Without naming names, the editorial criticized leaders
who were behind the masses (behind the Cultural Revolution).
They think they are aristocrats away above the lower classes. They are accustomed to monopolizing all activities, to giving and to turning the masses into a dreary state.16
The Red Guard. Mao's Instrument
It is not clear when Mao first decided to use the
Chinese youth as an instrument of the Cultural Revolution.
^Granquist, OP. cit. . p. 100.
^^Ibid.
-^^Oancia, "Red China is Torn by Policy Debate." It is not clear who was behind this editorial, or how it could hav^ escaped the chief editor Chen Po-ta. Piowev r, accordirg to I'.r Oancia, the Red Flag issue was late nin^ hours iue to a late decision to removj .lao's picture fro:!i th.e par^r.
171
We know t h a t Mao t o l d the l eaders of the Cul tural Revo
lu t ion on Ju ly 22, 1966, t h a t they had f a i l e d .
The r evo lu t i on has been imposed on you people because you did not carry out the r e v o l u t i o n yourse lves .
During the session those comrades who have come t o a t tend the conference should go t o Peking Un ive r s i t y and the Broadcasting College t o read the b ig -charac te r pos t e r s .
When you go there you should be surrounded by s t u d e n t s . More than 100 people have been a s sau l t ed a t the Broadcasting College. In t h i s era of ou r s , i t i s a good th ing to have the l e f t i s t s a s sau l t ed by the r i g h t i s t s because the l e f t i s t s are tempered in t h i s way.17
The f i r s t unve i l ing of the Red Guards took place on
July 29, 1966, two days before the opening of the Eleventh
Plenum. On t h a t day, a s tudent group represent ing various
Peking schools met with Mao Tse-tung and Chou E n - l a i . I t i s
l i ke ly t ha t the name "Red Guards" was adopted during t h i s
meeting. 1*7 On August 16, a gathering of s tudents frcm a l l
the provinces was addressed by the recent ly appointed head of
the Cul tu ra l Revolut ion, Chen Po- ta , and two days l a t e r , an
" o f f i c i a l debut" of the Guards was held at a Peking Rally in
the presence of Mao. Hsinhua, the Chinese news agency des
cribed the youths ' f e e l i n g s as follows:
•'-^"Speeches and L e t t e r s of Mao Tse-tung," or . 211-Address to Regional S a c r e t a r i e s and Members of the Cul tural Revolution Group, Ju ly 22, 1966.
1 ' I s r a e l , £p . c i t . , p . 11 .
172
'Red Guards' down below shouted joyfully: "Look, Chairman Mao is wearing our red arm band. He approves of our 'Red Guards'." They cheered: "Long live Chairman Mao'. Long life long life to Chairman Mao I"18 '
In theory, the Red Guards were organized in a series
of chain commands reaching up to the leaders of the "Cultural
Revolution." For instance, Party work teams were sent to
schools and provinces to organize the work of the Guards.
But in practice there was no distinction between the Red
Guards or the students who were members of the Youth League
or the Party itself. In general, most Red Guard activities
were carried out without control from the Party leaders,
but with encouragement from Mao himself. By September, 1966,
according to a defecting Red Guard leader, '//ang Ch'ao-t'ian,
work teams left the schools and the Guards were thereby free
to interpret the official articles and act upon their inter
pretation.1^ School officials and Party cadres were purged
by the students, thus leaving school buildinfrs and govern
ment offices in the hands of the students.
It is possible that the work teams left the students
to act alone because of pressure from Mao himself. On August
23, 1966, Mao delivered a speech before the Central Committee
Work Conference in which he said:
l^Ibid.
19ibid.
173
The principle question is what policies we should adopt regarding the problem of disturbances in various areas. My views are as follows: I firmly believe that a few months of disturbances will be mostly for the good and that little bad will result from these disturbances.
If the students want to be on the streets, let them. V/hat is wrong with their putting up big-character posters in the streets?20
An important indicator of Mice's approval of the Red
Guards was the facilities provided the youth by the govern
ment. According to Wang Ch'ao-t'ien, some 6,000 army veh
icles were put at their disposal and they exhausted one-fifth
of China's annual transportation budget in two months. All
this was done in the name of "exchanging revolutionary ex
perience," but the most widely known activities of the stu
dents were public rallies that repeated Mao's words and
criticized Mao's opponents through sP3eches and wall posters.
Soon after the Red Guards went out into the streets,
signs of opposition to their activities becamie evident. A
People's Daily editorial of September 11 marked the first
time a government spokesman admitted the existence of a con
flict between the government officials and the Red Guards.^1
The editorial warned that officials should neither organize
opposition to the Red Guards nor feud with them; it also
20TT Speeches and Letters of Mao Tse-tung," on. cU..
^^"Red Guard Foes '/-arned by Peking," New York Timis, September 12, 1966, p. 1, Column 7.
^
174
acknowledged that "certain officials" were "using various
pretexts to put pressure"22 on the activities of the Red
Guards.
In summary, the Red Guards were started by Mao as a
radical group in an effort to purge his opponents and to
further spread his influence throughout the Country. Mao's
use of the Red Guard bypassed Party apparatus, evident in
a Red Flag article published in August, 1966. Commenting
on the sixteen-point directive of the Eleventh Plenum, the
paper said:
Experience has shown that each unit must carry out the work of the Cultural Revolution by relying on its own masses and should not depend on arrangements made by upper-level organs , .• . Each unit should carry out its work without the help of work-teams dispatched by upper-level organs.23
The Political Crisis
The struggle which was carried out by Mao to reshape
his Party and leadership took place in three areas: in the
streets, the provinces and the Central Committee. In all
three areas, the Red Guard was the main instrument, although
often supported by the People Liberation Army.
The streets provided a public arena for the humiliation
of top Party leaders. From August, 1966 to January, 1967
^^Ibid.
^Gray and Cavendish, op. c_it_., p. 1-3.
175
every member of the Cent ra l Committee, except Mao and Lin
Piao, was c r i t i c i z e d . Some were publ ic ly humiliated by
having t o confess t h e i r " e r r o r s " before public meetings.^^
On September.14, 1966, the Red Guards c r i t i c i z e d Liu
Shao-chi for defending the Peking branch of the Par ty ; and
c r i t i c i z e d Li Ching-chuan, the F i r s t Secretary of the P a r t y ' s
Southwest Bureau (the provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow, Yunnan,
and the autonomous region of T i b e t ) . Wang Fen, the F i r s t
Secretary of the Kansu Par ty was a l so c r i t i c i z e d . ^ 5 Party
General Secre ta ry Teng Hsiao-p ' ing and the Chief of the
Peking Municipal Committee, Li Hsueh-feng, and h i s Deputy
Wu Teh were c r i t i c i z e d by Red Guard pos te r s , on October 27,
apparently for t h e i r close assoc ia t ion with the ousted P'eng
Chen.26
On November 22, 1966, Red Guard posters announced the
dismissal of a t l e a s t twenty members of the Pa r ty ' s Propa
ganda Department. Among those who were purged were wang
Kuang, the propaganda chief for five provinces of cen t ra l
and south China, and Tseng Tun, the propaganda chief for the
24 Ibid. ^^David Oancia, "Troops Moved into Peking," "ew York
Times. September 15, 1966, p. 19, Column 1.
26David Oancia, "Red Guards Start ^ Peking Uxodus," New York Times. October 28, 1966, p. 19, -olumn i.
176
Hupeh p r o v i n c e . More than h a l f of the t o t a l members of the
P a r t y ' s propaganda organ were purged.27
C r i s i s i n the P r o v i n c e s . 1Q67
At l e a s t s i x t e e n of the twenty- f ive provinces were
involved i n p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s . (Table V I I - 2 ) . Some top
p rov inc i a l o f f i c e r s were ous t ed , many c r i t i c i z e d and a few
were p u b l i c l y b e a t e n . Red Guards were met with s t rong
opposi t ion from p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c e r s for two r e a s o n s . One,
the d i s t a n c e from Peking minimized Mao's immediate p r e s s u r e .
And two, perhaps more impor tan t was the s t r u c t u r e of power
within each p r o v i n c e . Each province as well as each major
c i t y was c o n t r o l l e d by a p r o v i n c i a l committee of the Chinese
Communist P a r t y with more power than the loca l government
o f f i c e r s . Above t h e s e committees were s i x r eg iona l Par ty
bureaus with s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l con t ro l independent of
Peking. I t was a g a i n s t these pow3rs t h a t Mao d i r e c t e d h i s
a t tack i n the p r o v i n c e s . And i t i s because of the s t r eng th
of these power c e n t e r s t h a t Mao used m i l i t a r y fo rce .^^
On Janua ry 22, Kiangsi Province was the scene oi
m i l i t a r y c l a s h e s and the ob jec t of government c r i t i c i s m .
Denounced by the government were Deputy Governor of K i rngs i ,
27"Some Chief P ropagand i s t s Purged," N v; Yo -k Tim^n, November 23 , 1966, p . 5 , Column 1.
2^"China Strug,~les A.'^3ipst I t s e l f , " !Liw_Yc:n vjIUjni s. f'abruary 5 , 1967, Sec . IV, p . 2, Jo ln -n 1.
177
TABLE VII -2
CIVIL STRIFE IN THE PROVINCES
Region Reported Province s t r i f e
Southern Region
Kiangsu
Anhwei
Region Reported Province s t r i f e
Northern Region
Hopeh
Shansi
X
X
Chekiung
Fukien
Hupeh
Hunan
Kiangsi
Kwangtung
Kwangsi
Szechwan
Dweichow
Yunnan
X
X
X
X
X
Liaoning
Kirin
Heilungking
Shensi
Shantung
Honan
Western Region
Inner Mongolia
Kansu and Nanghsia
Tsignhai
Sinkiang
Tibet
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
178
Li Chieh-yung; Deputy Mayor of Nanchang, Kao Ksiao-yao; and
Lo Meng-wen, a c l o s e fr iend of Liu Shao-chi and a member of
the Prov inc ia l Communist Party Committee. The radio denoun-
ciat ion warned s i m i l a r o f f i c i a l s that mi l i tary force would
be used i f necessary to unseat undesirable leaders .29
Similar c r i s e s were reported in the provinces of
Anhwei, Shansi , Szechwan, and Kv/eiyang. On January 29
wall pos ters reported tvjelve dead in mi l i tary struggles in
these as a r e s u l t of skirmishes between Mao's forces and o n
the provincial forces.-^^
On January 30, Peking radio claimed that the city
of Kweiyang, the capital of Kweichow, was in x Iaoist hands.31
Similar report claimed victory in Sinkiang and in the Pro
vince of Heilunghiang. The Secretary of the Northeast China
bureau of the Party's Central Committee Sun Jen-chiung was
forced to publicly admit making errors against the Party. At
the same tine wall posters criticized Li Ching-chuan, a mem
ber of the Party's Politburo and the responsible official of
Southeast China, which included Kweichow, Szechwan, Yunnan
'Radio in Red China Tells of Unrest in Kiangsi Region, -imes. January 21, 1967, p. 1, Column 1. ...so in New York T
January 2 3 , 19^7, p . 3 , Column 2. 30joseph L e l y v e l d , " . n t i - M . o i s t s . r e . e r o r t e n - ' ^ - i - l e d
in S i n k i a n g , " New York Times, o^.nuary ^ 0 , 196. , .... ^ , -oiumn. 4-6. '
^ ^ " F i f t h Chinese C i ty Clai::ied by - b o i s t s , " I^-wJlllJi Times. February 1, 1967, p . 1, Column .-.
•t
1
179
and T i b e t . The p o s t e r s a s s o c i a t e d him with P 'eng Chen.32
In S ink iang Wang En-mao, t he m i l i t a r y commander, was ousted
a f t e r c l a s h e s wi th Mao 's t r o o p s . And in Ju ly Li Ching-chuan
was r e p o r t e d ous ted from h i s p o s i t i o n . 3 3
D i v i s i o n i n t he P a r t y Hiera rchy
Although Mao was met with oppos i t ion from the p ro
vinces and members of t he C e n t r a l Committee, t h i s oppos i t ion
was not u n i t e d . P a r t y l e a d e r s h i p was divided i n to th ree
separate g r o u p s . One, the group behind Mao Tse-tung was
headed by Lin P iao and f ive m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . Three of the
o f f i c e r s were members of the P o l i t b u r o . They were Marshals
Hsu K s i a n g - c h i e n , Nieh Jung-chen , and Yeh Chien-yin? . The
other two were Hsiao Hua, D i r e c t o r of the General P o l i t i c a l
Department and Yang Cheng-wu, Acting Chief of Staff , who was
l a t e r purged in Feb rua ry , 1968.34
A second group headed by Chou i n - l a i des i red more
moderation but d id not a t t a c k the C u l t u r a l Revolut ion. This
group inc luded Chen Yi , the Foreign M i n i s t e r , and Li Hsien-
nien, the Finance M i n i s t e r and a few vice premiers .
^^"Take Over i n Hei lungkiang P rov ince , " N w York T ines , February 2 , 1967, p . 4 , Column 2 .
33Til lman Durd in , "Maoist demonst ra tors in Peking Use Balloons and S t r eamers t o A s s a i l L i u , " L-w /ork . i . . . . ^ , ^ ^ 1 / i ^ , 1967, p . 1 1 , Column 1 .
^^Char l e s Mohr, "Power ^^lite in Z^ij^ i^ 'l'''\^^:^^V[^'^ By P u r g e , " New York Times, Febi'uary 1 - , - L / ^ ' . i* »
180
The t h i r d group i s divided in to two sub-groups. One,
those who had been purged such as Lo Jui-ching, the Army
Chief of Staff , and Liu Ting-y i , head of the Propaganda De
partment and h i s Deputy, Chou Yang, and Yang Shang-kun, an
a l te rna te member of the Par ty s e c r e t a r i a t . The second sub
group was headed by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-p' ing and
represented those who were c r i t i c i z e d and humiliated by the
Red Guards.3^
Mao's most sus ta ined a t t acks were directed at Liu
Shao-chi and Teng H s i a o - p ' i n g . The breakdown of harmony
within the Cu l tu ra l Revolution group i t s e l f and the Party
i l l u s t r a t e s the break-up of the normal procedures of the
Par ty ' s funct ions a t the top leve l by allov/ing the Red Guard
and t h e i r pos t e r s t o provide the arena of discussions instead
of tha t in the Cent ra l Committee.
As repor ted by Red Flag. Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-
p'ing t r i e d to r e s t r a i n the Red Guards by control l ing the i r
a c t i v i t i e s and thus p ro tec t ing the Party organizat ion.3° On
December 16, 1966, the P a r t y ' s t heo re t i ca l organ, the Red Flag.
declared t h a t the Red Guards were necessary in order to control
the P a r t y ' s appara tus . The a r t i c l e , appar:)ntly r e f e r r i n - to
35 I b i d .
3^"Red Guard Viewed As Ear t o a Coup," :: w York Tir-es, December 17 , 1966, p . 1, Column 8.
181
Liu and Teng, claimed that a handful in the leadership "could
start a coup if given a chance."37
On December 23 the Army Chief of Staff, who was a
close friend of Liu and Teng, was arrested. The announcement
of his arrest also said that a rally against Liu and Teng
would be held on December 25.3^ Two days later reports from
Peking admitted that Liu had confessed to committing errors
against the Party. On January 1, 1967, wall posters de
clared that Liu, his wife, Wang Hsiao-ping and Teng admitted
to having committed ideological error against Mao's teach
ings. Two weeks later, however, Liu withdrew his confession
and claimed that he had been correct all along and asked that
the Party allow him to withdraw his self-criticism. Mean
while wall posters were continuously criticizing Teng. On
February 6, it was announced that Liu and Teng had been re
lieved of their positions, but not their Party membership.
The attack on top Party officials was complicated when
members of Mao's own group were criticized. Tao Chu, who was
placed as the head of the Propaganda Department of the Cen
tral Committee in September, 1966, was denounced for acting
without consulting Mao and was ousted.39
^ 7 l b i d .
3^"Liu Confesses to Er ro r , " Now York Times. December 27, 1966, p . 1, Column 5.
39"Tao Chu Openly Attacked," New York Times, July 22, 1967, p . 4 , Column 3 .
i^tiibZ
182
I n J a n u a r y , 1967, high ranking o f f i c i a l s wi th in the
Cu l tu ra l Revo lu t ion Committee were a t t a c k e d . Three members
were accused of t r y i n g t o form a s epa ra t e c o n t r o l l i n g organ
i z a t i o n w i t h i n the movement. They included Lu Chih-chien
deputy head of the P o l i t i c a l Department of the PLA, and
Wang Jen-chung and Chang P ' i ng -huan of the Propaganda De
partment of the C e n t r a l Committee. Min i s t e r of Foreign
Af fa i r s , Ch 'en Yi , was accused of "minimizing the mistakes
of the work- teams."40 The M i n i s t e r of Public Secur i ty
Ksieh Fu-chih was c r i t i c i z e d by Mao's wife of having " se t
himself above t he P a r t y and t he people."^-'-
By t h e 'end of 1967 most of the Red Guards had re turned
to t h e i r s c h o o l s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , in March, 1968, wall pos te r s
declared t h a t Yang Cheng-wu, new Chief of Staff ( rep lac ing
Lu J u i - c h i n g ) , Yu L i - c h i n ( the p o l i t i c a l commissar of the
Air F o r c e ) , and Fu Chung-pi (commander of the Peking g a r r i
son) were d i s m i s s e d . 4 2 i n May, Chen T s a i - t a u , the Lushan
region M i l i t a r y Commander, was imprisoned for a l l e g e d l y having
^^Gray and Cavendish , op. c U . . , p . 131.
^ ^ I b i d . , pp . 131-132.
^2"K3w Army Chief Hamed in China," ? ew YopK March 30, I 9 6 8 , p . 9 , Column 1.
i ^
183
held two of Mao 's men in p r i s o n in the previous year.43
And f i n a l l y , t he C e n t r a l Committee formally expelled Liu
Shao-chi from t he Chinese Communist Pa r ty .44
I t i s imposs ib l e t o s t a t e a l l of the names and t o t a l
number of t h o s e who were d ismissed without checking the per
sonnel in each of the depar tments of the Chinese Communist
Party. Such a s tudy has been done on one such group by
Richard K. Diao.^5 He s t u d i e d the inf luence of the Cultural
Revolution on t he economic e l i t e of the Chinese government.
And h i s f i n d i n g s seem t o suppor t t h i s study (Table \ r [ I - 3 ) ,
I f we add the t o t a l number of those presumed purged in the
f i r s t two groups of Table V I I - 3 , the average would equal 53.3
per cent presumed purged out of the top 30 o f f i c i a l s in the
^3"i4ao Reported t o Have Escaped During Attempted Coup Last July i n V/uhan," New York Times. M^y 10, 1968, p . 22, Column 3 . According t o v^all p o s t e r s Mao and Lin Piao and two top c u l ture r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a r r i v e d in Vjuhan on July 15, 1967 along with Chao E n - l a i . The p o s t e r s claimed t h a t Mao, Lin, and ^hao escaped the coup a t t emp t by the r eg iona l m i l i t a r y commander Chen T s a i - t a o . 'Bu t t he two r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were imprisoned in Wuhan, the c a p i t a l of Huneh'. On July 25, 1967, the two men Vice-Premier Hsieh Fu -ch i and '.Vang Li re turned to Peking ana were h a i l e d in a Peking r a l l y on t h e i r "safe r e tu rn from Wuhan." See "Peking Repor t s Ral ly t o Onpose v 'uhan J i s s i d e n c e , New York Times, J u l y 26, 1967, p . 4 , Column 3 .
^^"Chinese Reds S x o e l l Liu From the P a r t y , " le'^' ^-ork Times, November 2 , 1968, p . 1, Column 2. Hong Kon^ newsrarer .^enhui D;^ily r e p o r t e d t h a t the Cen t ra l lom^T.ittee which ex-palled Liu was "packed" with p r o v i n c i a l l eaders nios^ ol y.r.om ware m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s . See Tillman J u r d i n , ^"^^ ioists hacr.?a a Party M e e t i n g , " New York Times, December 9, Ivo^:, p . i . , Column 1 .
^^Richard K. Diao , "The Imnact of the Cul t ' . ra l ' - v o lu t ion on C h i n a ' s :^conomic S l i t - , " lli^LjliaL^':-^!!^-!^^^' (April-June, 1970) , pp . 65 -80 .
TABLS VII-3
IMPACT OF PURGE OK CHINA'S ECONOMIC ELITE
184
Size of
group No.
Presumed purged
2 14 26 55
Party members' * Group 1 8 Group 2 22 Group 3 69 Group 4 195
Non-Party Group 5 18 1
Total Party groups
294 97 Total of
a l l groups 312 98
25 64 38 28
33
31
10
71
81
Presumed s t i l l in off ice
No.
6 8
29 28
75 36 42 14
56
24
26
S t a tu s unknown
No. %
14 112
126
133
20 57
39
43
43
Source: Diao, p . 6 8 .
* Group 1 r e p r e s e n t s the h ighes t economic command; Group 2 r e p r e s e n t s t he 22 h igh-ranking Par ty mem
bers of t he P o l i t b u r o ; Group 3 c o n s i s t s of the 69 o f f i c i a l s a t the deputy-
minister l e v e l ; Group 4 c o n s i s t s of the 195 Par ty o f f i c i a l s , two of
whom were a s s i s t a n t m i n i s t e r s , but the o ther 193 were of depu ty -min i s t e r l e v e l and above but did not hold any o ther p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e .
185
Chinese economy. Ce r t a in ly t h i s i s a high figure and would
const i tu te a d i s i n t e g r a t e d group. I f h i s findings are
correct t h a t 31 per cent of a l l the economic e l i t e were
purged t h i s would c o n s t i t u t e a s t a t e of p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e
grat ion.
Conclusion
The 1966-1967 breakdown of the Party forced the e l i t e
to be on the defensive side against Mao and his Red Guards.
The e l i t e ceased t o dominate t h e i r own national and i t s
provincial Par ty organs.
O f f i c i a l s who were ousted from t h e i r posi t ions and
those who were c r i t i c i z e d cons t i tu ted a ma lor i tv of the
Chinese Communist Par ty e l i t e . The fact tha t these of f ic ia l s
were prevented from car ry ing out t h e i r functions according to
the ru les of the Par ty cons t i tu t ed a s ta te of disharmony im-
posed by the t h r e a t of Mao and h is Cultural Revolution.
Geographical ly, Par ty machinery was crinpled by the
PLA's e f f o r t s a t subduing the r ebe l l ious o f f i c i a l s in the
provinces. The s ix teen provinces which faced c i v i l s t r i f e
represented 64 per cent of the t o t a l number of rrevinces
(Table V I I - 2 ) .
The scope and nature of the c r i s e s seem to l^r.d support
to the t h e s i s t h a t the e l i t e of the Chinese Co. r.munist Pr=rty
had reached a s t a t e of p o l i t i c a l c i s in tegra t ion by 1^,-00-1067.
CHAPTER VIII
SUI '.IARY AND CONCLUSION
This s tudy has a t tempted t o t r a c e three important
developments i n the Chinese Communist system which began
in 1958. They a re t h e Great Leap Forward, the Commune
System, and the S i n o - S o v i e t c o n f l i c t . The emphasis was
placed on the i n f l u e n c e t h e s e developments had on the
p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n of the Chinese Communist e l i t e in
an at tempt t o prove t h a t t h e s e developments have caused a
widespread p o l i t i c a l d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n which resu l t2d in the
p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the e l i t e .
I n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , the inf luence of each of these
events i s b e t t e r e v a l u a t e d as a pa r t of the broader , t o t a l
effect of t h e s e t h r e e e v e n t s . Since the three developments
occurred almost s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , i t i s l o g i c a l to conclude
that widespread economic d i s l o c a t i o n and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n
resu l ted from the combined e f f e c t of the th ree devBlon-ents
ra ther than from each a s an i s o l a t e d event . For i n s t ance ,
a l l t h i n g s being e q u a l , the f a i l u r e of the Com:.rune System
alone did not cause p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . I t i s only
necessary t o po in t out t h a t each of the th ree dev ^ l o r . - n i s
cont r ibuted d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t u l t i : n^ te ly r e su l t ed :n
p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n .
I r 6
187
I t was equa l ly necessary to show tha t the Party
e l i te was p o l i t i c a l l y in tegra ted in the ear ly 1950»s in
order to prove t h a t p o l i t i c a l d i s in t eg ra t ion resul ted from
events which began in 1958. Chapters I and II showed that
the Chinese l eade r sh ip enjoyed an outstanding level of
po l i t i ca l i n t e g r a t i o n between 1949 and 1957:
The Chinese e l i t e had manifested throughout these years a remarkable cont inui ty of membersh ip , with the only major exception being the purge of the " a n t i - p a r t y bloc" of Kao Kane and Jao Shu-shih in 1954.1 ^
The f a i l u r e of Mao's p o l i c i e s a f te r that period stemmed
from the inadequacies of h i s own leadership . Mao's leader
ship, with i t s i deo log i ca l commitment oriented in the back
ward v i l l ages of r u r a l China, lacked the educational and
tachnical knowledge to d i r e c t a system of modern indus t r i a l
development.2 The consequences of Mao's fa i lures were wide
spread d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n within the Chinese Communist Party
(Chapters I I I -V) . The s ingle most important evidence of
•^Robert H. Donaldson and Derek J . Waller, The 1956 Central Committees of the Chinese and Soviet Communist Par t i es ; A Comparative Analysis of E l i t e Composition and Change. (Vander-bi l t Univers i ty , 1970), p . 5. (Read at a professional meeting).
Mao i s repor ted to have said on July 23, 1959, that I t i s b a s i c a l l y impossible to an t i c ipa te some th ings . Coal
and iron could not walk by themselves, and had to be t ransported by r o l l i n g s tock , I did not an t ic ipa te t h i s point —
^eing not versed in cons t ruc t i on , I knew nothing about industr ial p lanning ." New York Times, M?:rch 1, 1970, p . 1.
188
t h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n was P»eng Teh -hua i ' s a t t a c k on Mao's
p o l i c i e s and h i s subsequent purge by Mao Tse- tung. Because
of the s e c r e c y t h a t sur rounds the a c t i v i t i e s of the Chinese
l e ade r sh ip , the f u l l na tu re of t h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n remains
unknown. But t he p o l i t i c a l upheaval which followed t h i s
period of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n (1958-1966) po in t s a t a more
ser ious s t a t e t han one of d i s c o n t e n t . V/e know, a t l e a s t
of one member of the e l i t e , Teng H s i a o - p ' i n g , who stopped
consul t ing with Mao Tse- tung about Par ty p o l i c i e s a f t e r
1958.3 Cons ide r ing the c lose t i e s and f r i endsh ip of the
e l i t e group which da ted from the 1920 ' s , Teng's ac t ion may
indica te more than d i s c o n t e n t . No one in the Vi/est has
doubted the l o y a l t y of Liu S h a o - c h ' i , P'eng Teh-huai , or
Teng H s i a o - P ' i n g t o the Chinese Communist Pa r ty . Yet we
find in the a t t a c k on them re f e r ences to t h e i r " taking the
c a p i t a l i s t r o a d . " 4 Mao's a c t i o n may be i n t e rp re t ed as the
a r t i f i c i a l c r e a t i o n of i s s u e s as a means of maintaining
power.5 Thus, when s igns of d i scon ten t and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n
become ev iden t w i t h i n the ranks of the Communist e l i t e , one
•^See Chapter VI , note 63 .
^ " Q u a r t e r l y Chron ic le and Documentation," The ^hina Cduarterly, ( Ju ly -Sep tember , 1969), P» 1^7.
^George Met. Kahin, Guy J . Pauker, -md L;:cian ... . y - , "Comparative P o l i t i c s of ricn-V.estern dountriBS, •^''•"^- -• P o l i t i c a l Science Review, XLIA (1955), 1^35-
may conclude that actually there exists a more serious state
of political disorder.
Furthermore, the overwhelming criticisms directed at
Mao and his teachings by university officials and writers
who received the support of important party officials (1960-
1963) indicate that Mao's control over his party leadership
had weakened.6 Mao's attempt to go outside the party to
gather political support by employing the Red Guards as an
instrument to purge his enemies is a clear indication that
he lacked support within the party to implement his wishes.
At that point in time, the machinery of the Chinese Central
Committee was crippled. If Central Committee meetings issued
statements condemning officials who took "the capitalist road,
this came only after the committee was "nacked" v;ith military
officers exercising their rights as Central Committee members.
When the military was used to coerce provincial leaders and
the Red Guard was used to humiliate the elite of the Party,
the party machine was no longer integrated as in 1949-1957.
The state of disintegration vMthin the elite group is
evident not only from the breakdown of party maohinery de
scribed above but also from oh:e disagreement v/ithin the
party elite expressed by P'eng Teh-huai's attack, by P'eng
^See Chapter VI.
1 on
Chen's ouster, by the dissatisfaction voiced by the univ
ersity presidents, by Liu Shao-chi's objections to the
Cultural Revolution and by Chou 5n-lai's refusal to support
this "Revolution." A further manifestation of this dis-
integration was the disorganized nature of Mao's opposition.^
The relationship of agreement on decision-making to political
disintegration is stated by Lester G. Seligman. He argues
that agreement among decision-makers on decision-making
methods and acceptance of these methods "will depend upon the
integration among the elites.""
The relationship of political harmony in a society
to political integration of the elite is stated by Raymond
Aron:
The composition of the governing elipe may be progressively altered, ~he relative i.noorpance of the various groups in the elite may be changed, but a society can only survive '-ir.c rrosoer if there is true collaboration between those groups. In one way or another, there must be unity of orinion and action on essential points in the elite.^
A final testament to what has been discussed in this
report is the outcome of the Ninth Congress of April 1-2/i,
1969. The Congress showed that the Cultural Revolution v/as
actually directed against an elite faction of the Chinese
' See Chapter VII.
^ L e s t e r G. Seliginan, "f^l i te Recru i tment and P o l i t i c a l Development ," J o u r n a l of } c l i t i c s , XXVI C u g u s t , I96/4), 61 / . .
^Ci ted by Celigraan, Ib i d.
191
Communist Party. According to a speech at the Congress by
Lin Piao, a struggle started in 1957 betv;een two groups
within the Party, those who supported Mao and those who
opposed him. The conflict, according to Lin, had been in
progress since then. At the opening of his report he traced
the "inevitability of the Cultural Revolution" by citing
the "crimes" of Liu Shao-ch'i since the 1920's. On the
Party struggle Lin said:
From the struggle against the bourgeois rightists in 1957 to the struggle to uncover P'eng Teh-huai's anti-Party clique at the Lushan Meeting in 1959, from the great debate of the general line of the Party in building socialism to the struggle between the two lines in th.e socialist education movement--the focus of the struggle v/es the question of whether to take the socialist road or to take thie capitalist road, whether to uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat or to restore the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.
3very single victory of Chairr.an Mac's tro-letarian revolutionary line, every victory in every major canioaign launched by the rarty a~3inst the bourgeoisie, v/as gained only ait3r smashing the revisionist line renresented by Liu Shao-ch'i, v/hich v;as Right or [if itj was -eit' m icrTi, it was Right in essence.-0
Commenting on the 1966-1967 crisis, Lin niade it clear that
Liu's supporters were the main target:
After Liu Shao-ch'i's dcv/nfall, his revisionist clique and his accents in various rlaoes changed their tactics tirrie and again, putting forward slogans v/hich were "Left" in form but Right in essence such as "suspecting all" and "overthrowing all," in a futile attempt to go on hitting
"Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," ££. cit.
1 2
hard at the many and protecting their own handful. Moreover, they created splits among the revolutionary massjs and hoodwinked a section of the masses so as to protect themselves. When these schemes v/ere shattered by the proletarian revolutionaries, they launched another frenzied counterattack, and that is the adverse current lasting from the winter of I966 to the spring of 1967.li '
Although speaking from a point of strength, Lin did not de
clare a victory had been achieved by Mao nor did he announce
an end to the Cultural Revolution. Hov;ever, in a conciliatory
tone, he proposed that "we should continue to help" those who
committed errors against the Party:
V/ith regard to good people who committed the errors characteristic of the capitalist-readers in power but have now raised their political consciousness and gained the understanding of the masses, they should be nromntly "liberated," assigned to suitable work and encouraged to go among the masses of the worKers and peasants to remould their -/vorld outlook. As for those v/no have made a little progress and becorr to some extent av/akened, v/e should continue to heln them, proceeding from the viev/point of unity. 12
Elite Membership of the ilinth Congress
The outcome of the liinth Congress revealed some impor
tant facts about the new Chinese Communist Party elite. Al
though the Congress indicated Mao had won a victory, a revised
lllbid.
^^Ibid., pp. 148-149.
193
membership on the Central Committee revealed that certain
compromises were made. For instance only a "few Red Guards
or radioals"13 were elected. Nieh Yuan-tzu, the author of
a famous poster criticizing the president of Peking Univer
sity, was made only an alternate member of the Central
Committee. Nevertheless, Mao's strength was evident. Only
forty-two of the 97 members of the previous Central Committee
had survived while about forty per cent of the elected mem
bers of the Committee are active military personnel. The
Ninth Congress enlarged Committee membership from 97 to 170.
The Politburo was also enlarged from 17 to 21 (Table VIII-1).
Ten of the new members are military men. But the new Standing
Committee of the Party v/hich new Party constitution created,
was reduced from seven to five members. Its membership in
cluded Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Ch'en ?o-ta, Chou Sn-lai and
K'ang Sheng. The two new members Ch'en Po-ta and K'ane: Shen?
were the leaders responsible for the Cultural Revolution.
The four members who were drooned were Teng Hsiao-p'in?,
Ch'en Yun, Chu Te , and Liu Shao-ch'i, all of whom were
attacked for criticizing Mao's policies.
Finally, a useful comparison of tie political orisis
in China with the political crisis in the Soviet Union can
be carried out to show the similarities of political upheaval
- Ibid. , p. 145.
o/
TABL ; V I I I - 1
POLITBURO i'iSMB. RS OF THE 9TH C0r^GR5SS THE CHIKJ^SS COMiUhlST. PARTY
^ Mao T s e - t u n g
- L i n P i a o
"I' C h ' e n P o - t a
'^ Chou E n - l a i
' K ' a n g Sheng
Yeh Chun (wi fe of L i n P i a o )
O" 'O Yeh Chien-yin;
Liu Po-cheng
Chiang Ching (wife of Mao)
Chu Teh
Hsu Shih-yu
Chen Hsi-lien
Li Hsien-nien
Li Tso-peng
Wu Fa-hsien
Chang Chun-chiao
Chiu Hui-tso
Yao vVeh-yuan
Huang Yung-sheng
Tung Pi-wu
Hsieh Fu-chih
' Members of the Standing Coimnittee
Source: New York Times, "Top Party Croup, Politburo and Steering Body Named in ^nina," April 29, 19*69, p. 12, Column 1.
195
caused by the process of industrialization. In I958-I966
Mao faced similar problems to those faced by Stalin in the
1930's. Both leaders were faced with unskilled leadership
to undertake the process of industrial development. In both
countries the crisis caused disintegration of the ruling
elite. Mao's actions to reintegrate his Party's elite were
similar yet different in some respects from those of Stalin.
In the Soviet Union in the 1930's, as in Communist China in
the 1960's, political upheaval affected students, the in
tellectuals, workers in the industrial and the urban sectors
and the military organization as well. Mao used the Red
Guards to purge his victims while Stalin used military courts.
Both leaders accused their opponents of counter-revolutionary
activities.14 Political disintegration of the Soviet Commu
nist Party in 1936-1938 was similar to the disintegration of
the Chinese Communist Party. As revealed by Khrushchev's
speech to the Twentieth Party Congress,
Of the 139 members and candidates of the Party's Central Committee who were elected at the Seventeenth Congress, 98 were arrested and shot mostly in 1937-38 .15
l^Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, /.'orId Revolutionary Elite: Studies in Coercive Ideological l-iovem nts, (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 114.
l^Treadgold, op. cit., p. 53.
196
However, a major difference in the outcome of the two purges
in both countries is that in the Soviet Union "the technical
intelligentsia" assumed a more important role within the
Party hierarchy, while in China the leadership of the Party
continued to emphasize the significance of "politics in
command," and "red then expert" slogans.
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