December, 1970

POLITICAL INTiiGRATION OF TK i GHINliiSS

GOMUNIST PARTY ELITE

1952-1966

by

KHALSD M. KAYALI, B. A.

A THESIS

IN

GOVSRNI NT

Submit ted t o the Graduate F a c u l t y of Texas Tech U n i v e r s i t y i n

P a r t i a l F u l f i l l m e n t of the Requirements f o r

t he Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Approved

December, 1970

T3 1970

fOoJJS Cop. ^

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply indebted to Professor Neale J. Pearson

for his encouragement, assistance and patience in directing

this thesis and to the other members of my committee,

Professor Martin T, Kyre, John H, Burnett and Jacquelin

Collins for their interest and helpful criticism.

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii

LIST OF TABLES iii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS iv

INTRODUCTION 1

I. The Influence of the First Five-Year Plan on Political Integration 6

II. The Sino-Soviet Alliance and It's Contribution to Mao's Lrive for Political Integration 15

III. The Failure of the Great Leap Forward and It's Influence on Mao's Political Leadership 40

IV. The People's Communes and Political Disintegration 7U

V. The Influence of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on Mao's Political Leadership. .107

VI. Mao's Efforts to Restore Confidence in His Political Leadership I36

VII, Threats to the Party's Political Integration I966-I967 163

VIII. Summary and Conclusion 1^6

BIBLIOGRAPHY IC7

111

LIST OF TA 'LSS

Communist Data on National Income and Production During the Period of Rehabilitation, 1949-52 9

National Product Estimates of the Chinese Mainland, 1952-57 10

Indicators of Economic Developmsnt of the Chinese Mainland, 1952-57 11

13

Estimated Production of Selected Heavy Industries in Mainland China (1950, 1952, and 1957) 26

Output of Major Industrial Products in

Mainland China, 1954-1959 57

Scattered Data on Steel, 1957-1965 59

National Product Istimates of the Chinese Mainland, 1957-1962 60 Estimates of ths Outtut of Food Crcrs and Cotton, 1957-1965 . ". 62

Estimated Production of Maj"or Industrial Commodities in Communist China 64 ^

E s t i m a t e s of Grain Outout in ConirrAinist China , 1949-1956 . . . ' , 7S

Es t ima ted P r o d u c t i o n of Grain in 3h ina , 1957-1965 9^

The Chine S3 Communist P a r t y S tand ing

Committee, 1966 168

C i v i l S t r i f e in the P r o v i n c e s 177

Impact of Purge on C h i n a ' s Economic E l i t ^ . . . . IB4

P o l i t b u r o M.^:nb3rs of trie 9th Con??r,^ss of t l u Chiri ise Communist P a r t y 1* 4

iv

LIST OF ILLUSTRMTTONS

Sino-Soviet Balance of Trade 23

Graphical Illustration of the Chinese Communist Party Unity Between 1949-1957 . . . 33

Basic Organs of the Central Committee . . . . I46

INTRODUCTION

The period preceding the "Cultural Revolution"-^

in Communist China is significant because it witnessed

three important events which caused the ensuing struggle

within the Communist Party of China. These v;ere:

1. the failure of the Great Leap Forward,

2. the failure of the Commune System,

3. the break between China and the Soviet Union.

All of the above produced an increasing economic dis

location and a widespread dissatisfaction, the conse

quences of which were the beginning of disintegration

of the political community. The follov/ing struggle

among the elite also contributed to disintegration of

the ties between the elite group and the masses.

Political control within the party broke down and chaos 2

replaced it.

- Although the "Cultural Revolution" of 1964 is different from the "Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution" of 1966, this study will refer to both events as the "Cultural Revolution."

2 A theoretical discussion of how intepiration

among the political elites influences oclitical integration is carried out by Herbert S. Spiro, "Comparative Politics: A Comnrehensive Approach," Am3rican Political Science Review.'LVI (Sept-mber, 1962), 577.

These ev3nts which took place in the last two

decades in Red China vjere important net only because of

the siz3 and the character of forces that shaped them,

but more so because of v'hat it provided for the student

of politics in terms of data to explore several hypo

theses in an attempt to understand political systems.

Although empirical data are not abundantly available

from Red China, some data are available on changes in

government policies, newspaper editorials, and speeches

of government spokesmen. By applying this data, ons may

answer one or several of the following questions about

China in this period:

1. To what extent does the leadership of a

ruling party in a totalitarian regime permit free

exchange of ideas among its own elite, although free

debate may be one of the party's policies?

2. V/hat kind and hovj much povjer can such a

system put in the hands of its bureaucracy?

3. In a modernizing society, are the values and

ideology of the bureaucracy {citizens employed by the

system) more or less important than their values, ideol

ogy, and system-rewards before their employment?

4. V\/hat is the influence of decentralization of

decision-making on the efficiency of the modernizing

process?-^

The most important aspect of these questions which

this thesis will discuss is the role of Mao Tse-tung in

defeating his foes when this struggle could have led to

the destruction of the party apparatus. The nature of

the struggle was very personal; the Cultural Revolution

was a Maoist revolution aimed at the party hierarchs; the

"cultural revolution" was designed to preserve his charis

matic leadership and to prevent anyone from tarnishing

his reputation. At best, therefore, this study is a study

of policy influence on the political elites in a totali

tarian Communist society; it reflects on the integrative

process and its two components: political socialization

and political recruitment; it also reflects on the goal

functions which include goal specification and goal

attainment.^ This paper does not study these functions,

per se; the study will reflect on their relation to Mao's

attempt to preserve his leadership and reputation in a

- David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 49.

Î have relied on the definitions of these terms as given by Michael P. Gehlen in his book The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, A functional Analysis, (bloominr >:-on: Indiana University Press, 1969), pp. "14-2/ . Mr. Gehlen gives a short comparative analysis of several "fram- works of analysis" of several political scientists such as Kirl Leutch, Jilliarn Mitchell, Gabriel Almond, Sigiaund Keuman and David Apter.

u

single political party and the ruling government in one

political body.

This study reflects on goal specification as it

analyzes the setting of goals by the party leadership.

For instance the sudden shift of emphasis from the Second

Five-Year Plan to the Great Leap Forvjard shows that the

goals of the Leap's were specified by Mao Tse-tung rather

than by the Central Committee. Furthermore, this study

will reflect on goal attainment as it reveals how govern

ment policies contributed to political disintegration.

Similarly political socialization becomes evident through

the various propaganda channels used by the leadership

to criticize those "revisionists" or "rightists."

In the process of developing this paper I hope to

prove the following hypotheses:

1. When policies of a totalitarian leader fail,

the leader will blame others for their failures.

2. When other party officials blame him or

criticize him for incorrect policy or wrong doing, he

will remove them. Victims of a removal or a purge may

not be limited to those who criticize but may be extended

to those in a position to influence public opinion.

3. When the apparatus of the party proves an in

sufficient weapon, he may appeal for help from non-rarty

citizens-- i.e. the Red Guard-- against party opponents--

a technique employed from time to time in democratic

societies.

Although this study is mainly concerned with the

decree of integration within the elites of the Chinese

Communist Party between 195^-1966, it is important to

analyze the forces that influenced the stata of political

integration. -The first two chapters will deal with the

government's policies which enhanced the state of political

integration. Chapters three, four, and five will analyze

thos3 government policies which "stimulatsd political dis

integration within the elites. The last three chapters will

emphasize the political struggle among the elites as a

result of governmental policy failures in domestic and

foreign affairs. These three chapters will also prove the

hypothesis suggested above.

CHAPTER I

THE INFLUENCE OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN

ON POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Until 1955, the leadership of the Communist Party

in China seemed unified and if there had been any con

flicting views within the leadership it was not revealed

to the public. This integration within the elite enabled

the party to carry out its functions harmoniously. These

functions include the function of setting ideological

goals for the state, the exercise of control over its

subjects through government and its enterprises to

assure effective communication within the party hierarchy.

The function of institutionalizing communist roles and

values "by criticism, self-criticism, and confessions"^

was also carried out peacefully. Ultimately the pattern

of the party's integrative process seemed to proceed

C. K. Yang, "Cultural Revolution and Revisionism," o. IV. lang, uuxturax nevui-uoxuxi in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou eds, China in Crisis, Vol. 1, China's Heritap:e and the Communist Political System. Book Two, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 502.

7

without a major o b s t a c l e . 3 And the success of the p a r t y ' s

i n t e g r a t i v e ro le ind ica t ed a kind of cohesion wi th in the

par ty l e a d e r s h i p . In s h o r t , by the year 1955 the Communist

Par ty of China had achieved p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n .

The p a r t y ' s goal funct ions a l so cont r ibuted to the

i n t e g r a t i v e p roces s . The l e a d e r s h i p , through specifying

i t s g o a l s , convinced the genera l p o l i t y t h a t i t s goals

are bes t for the s o c i e t y . This l eade r sh ip promised the

people a b e t t e r l i f e and when these goals were a t t a i n e d ,

the l eade r sh ip in e f f ec t achieved a new pa t t e rn of s o c i a l

order v/ith the l e a s t amount of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . An

exce l l en t example of t h i s success i s the F i r s t Five-Year

Plan which was launched in 1953. The goal was an am

b i t i o u s p ro jec t toward c e n t r a l i z e d planning descr ibed as

the "General Link for the Period of Trans i t ion to S o c i a l

ism"^ The plan ca l l ed for the f u l l u t i l i z a t i o n of

China ' s r e sou rces ; i t speeded up the c o l l e c t i v e campaign

in a g r i c u l t u r e , and i t introduced the compulsory purchase

of s ingle c r o p s . Although the par ty goal was set for five

years , i t was achieved ins tead in three yea r s . Rejoicing

^Whiting, 0£. c i t . , According to Allen S. V/hiting onlyône challenge to Mao's a u t h o r i t y occurred between 1949-1955.' Jao Shu-Shih in Shanghai and Kao Kang in Manchuria; both were ousted because they were accused of bu i ld ing "independent kingdoms."

^Jack Gray and Pa t r i ck Cavendish, Chin3se Corr.mimism in C r i s i s : M ioism and the Cu l tu ra l R";vo]utlon, TTev.' York: Freder ick A. Praeger , 1968], p . 20.

6

over its success, the government furnished a relatively

large amount of economic statistics for the period 1952-

1957. Regardless of the accuracy and the reliability of

these figures they must have contributed to the stability

of the regime. Table I-l shows how the national income

had" increased by about 70% by the end of the "Period of

Rehabilitation, 1949-1952."^ This increase contributed

to the recovery after the war. Following this recovery,

the period between 1952-1959 proved to be a period of

continuous grov7th.

The empirical data available show the increased

productivity of these years. The government's statistics

for this period are compared in Table 1-2 to the stat

istics of six United States scholars for the same period,

1952 and 1957, and the average annual growth rates. I

am not interested here in the discrepancies between the

authors' estimates because ray interest here is not in

comparative analysis as much as in showing that every

one agrees that there was a positive increase in national

income. However it is of some value to point out that the

9% per year gross or B.B% per year net (Table 1-3 A) "is

^Ta-chung Lin, "Economic Development of the Chinese Mainland 1949-1965," in Ho and Tsou eds., ££. clt., p. 6I6.

TABLE I - l

COMMUNIST DATA ON NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCTION DURING TH5 PERIOD

OF RilHABILITATION, 1949-52

Year

1949 1950 1951 1952

National I no ome

100.0 lis. 6 13^.3 169.7

Comxbin Output

Industry culture of 1952

2d Gross Value of and Agri-(Billions Yuan)

46.6 57.5 63.3 32.7

SOURCE: The S t a t e S t a t i s t i c a l Bureau, TEN GREAT YEARS (Peking: Fore ign Language P r e s s , 1960) , t p . 16 and 20 . P r i n t e d in China i n C r i s i s , Volume 1, Book Two, ( ed . ) by P i n g - t i Ho and I'ang Tsou, 1968, 616.

10

TABLE 1-2

NATIONAL PRODUCT ESTIMATES OF THE CHINESE MAINLAND, 1952-57 (Billions of 1952 Yuan)

Year

1952 1957

Average Annual Growth Rate

C omrau-nist (Net Material Product)'!'

(1)

61.1 93.5

9.0

Eckstein (Gross National Product)

(2)

'71.3 • • •

• • •

Hol-lister (Gross National Product)

(3)

67.9 102.4

3.6

Li (Net National Product, Reconstructed Communist

Estimate )

(4)

72.9 111.3

"

Net Domestic Product, Reconstructed Communist

Estimate (5)

63.6 104.2

..... _, ... .

Ta-chung Liu

(6)

71.4 95.3

6.0

Wu (Net National Product)

(7)

72.4 94.3

5.6

1: Liu and Yeh, The 1. 2: Alexander Ecks

c_ome of Communist China (Glencoe, 111.: ., Hollister, China's

^'SOURCES: Col. Mainland, p. 220; co

p. 56; col. 3: VvT/i and Social Accounts, 1953), p. 2- col. 4: nist China (Berkeley Press, 1959), p. 106 Chinese Mainland, p. basic Communist data was computed on the product); col. 6: i

Economy of the Chinese tein. The National _ln-The Free Press, I96I), Gross National Product

e Free Press. 1950-57 (Glencoe, 111.: Th C. i-l. Li, Economic Developnient of Commu-and Los Angeles: Un ; col. 5: Liu and Ye 213 (this estimate v; without corrections standard V;estern cone bid., p. 66; col. 7: ckwell. The Economic

iversity of California h, The Economy of the as reconstructed from for reliability, but ept of net don.estic Y. L. Wu., F. P. Potential of Commu-Hoeber, and M. M. Ro

nist China (Menlo Park, Calif., 1964),~p. 241.

This table is printed in C hina in Cris-' s, Volume 1, Book Two, (ed.) by Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, 1908, p. 617.

1 1

TABLE 1-3

INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE MAINLAND, 1952-57

Reconstructed C ommuni st Estimate

Liu-Yeh Estimate

A.

B.

c.

Rates of Growth of Product, Population, and Employment Per Year, % Gross Domestic Product (1952 Prices) Total Per Capita Per VJorker Net Domestic Product (1952 Prices) Total Per Capita Per Worker Population Employment Average Proportion of Capital Formation in Domestic Product (1952 Prices), % Gross Net Incremental Capital-Output Ratios, Computed in 1952 Prices, % Total Gross Net Fixed Gross Net

9.0 6.6 4.9

3.3 6.5 4.7

2 4.0

24.4 20.6

2.7 2.3

2.0 1.6

6.2 3.9 4.6

6.0 3.6 4.4

.3

23.3 19.3

3.9 3.3

2.3 2.2

Source: Ibid.

12

higher than those of all forty-four non-Communist countries

studied in Kuznets except Israel and Jamaica, during early

post-war years." Table 1-3 B shows that the country made

a significant drive toward industrialization during this

period. It is understood that this capital formation is

sometimes exceeded by many industrialized nations i.e.

Japan in the post World War II period but it was also

greater than those of other less developed countries.

The growth in productivity (Table 1-3 C) 319 "would outrank

all the other nations studied by Kuznets, coming ahead of

West Germany (3.3%)."' It is also important to observe

that during this period of industrialization, the consump

tion rate per capita had dropped in 1955 below that of 1933.

(Sections B, C, and D, Table 1-4).

Although increased knowledge, better organization, and

industrialization were some goals of the plan, their in

fluence is not shown in Table 1-3. In fact the increase

in per worker product 4.7 or 4.4 shown in Table 1-3 A is

due to each worker's increase in output rather than an

increase in industrialization. This is verified by the

Îbid., p. 625. Simon Kuznets studies are published in his article "A Comparative Appraisal," in Abram Berpson and Simon Kuznets eds.. Economic Trends in tha Soviets, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

' Ibid., p. 629.

TABLE 1-4

INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE MAINLAND, 1952-57

13

Reconstructed Communist Estimate

Liu-Yeh Estimate

A.

B.

"I

D.

E

F.

Rate of Growth of Inputs and Productivity, % Labor (Lj Net Fixed Capital (K) Combined Inputs (L at 7K at 3) "Productivity" of Combined Inputs Total and Per Capita Consumption in 1952 Prices: 1952 and 1957 (Index Numbers, 1933=100) 1952 Total Per Capita 1957 Total Per Capita Rates of Grov;th of Household Consumption (1952 prices), % Share of Total Consumption in Gross Expenditure, % 1952 1957 Share of Increase in Consumption Per Capita in Increase in Gross Expenditure Per Capita 1952-57,

4.0 6.3 4.3 3.9

95.2 33.7

137.3 103.2

5.2

72.3 71.3

63.4 Liu-Yeh Estimate of Shares of Major Sectors Product, %

A Sector M+ Sector 1952 47.9 20.2 1957 39.0 33.7 Liu-Yeh Estimate of Shares of Major Sectors Force, %

1.5 6.5 3.0 2.9

99.4 37.3

123.4 96.9

1.9

73.9 70.3

1952 1957

A Sector 72.9 72.9

M+ Sector 15.5 16.6

in

in

43 Net

S-

Lab(

S-

.5

Sector 23 22 3r

Se( 11 10

.9

.3

:tor .6 .5

Source: Ho and Tsou, _op. cit., pp. 626-627.

14

fact that a decline in mining, manufacturing transport

communication (the m + sector) and in agriculture (A)

was accompanied by a very minor change in the rest of

the economy (the S - sector). This observation is impor

tant at this point because of the government's heavier de

mands which were yet to come under the Great Leap Forward.

According to Ta-chung Liu the average worker was already

producing at full capacity when the government introduced

the Great Leap Forward, which in effect demanded much more

than the forces of production could put out.°

That the nation and the government benefited from

this plan is without a doubt. It increased prosperity

and-provided more opportunities. In short, as a part of

the government goal function, the plan contributed to

political harmony. But usually all major programs of this

dimension result in some important political consequences

and repercussions. The party goals for the First Five-Year

Plan were achieved quickly and successfully but to the dis

may of the party leaders the celebration was short lived.

As I hope to show later in this paper, the party goal

function consequently proved to be the major cause of dis

harmony within the party leadership, i.e., Mao's ideolo

gical goals versus those of his adversaries.^

%bid.. p. 631.

^Yang, 2£. -crt., p. 273.

CHAPTER II

THE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE AND ITS CONTRIBUTION

TO MAO'S DRIVE FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Introduction

The seemingly harmonious relationship among the

elites of the Chinese Communist Party before the year

1955 was also enhanced by Mao's foreign policy tov;ard the

Soviet Union. Although many authors debate the motives

of the Sino-Soviet Alliance of 1949, m.ost of the authors

agree on China's immediate economic and political situation

both inside and outside of China.

I have stated earlier that among the functions of

the Chinese Communist Party which helped to bring about

political integration were: the function of setting

ideological goals for the state, the exercise of control

over its subjects, and the function of institutionalizing

Communist roles and values through criticism and self criti

cism. The Chinese Communist ideological functions surely

John Gittings, "The Great Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy" The China Quarterly, (July-Septer .ber, 1969), p. 42. See also Vidya Prakash Dutt, China and the World, An Analysis of Communist China's Forsign Policy^ (New York: Frederick A. Praegar, 1966), p. 58 and Charles B. McLane, "The Moscow-Peking Alliance: The First Decade," Current History, (September, 1967), p. 327.

15

16

would be enhanced by an alliance with the Soviet Union,

which is one of the most powerful nations of the world and

the seat of Communist ideology. Another Chinese foreign

policy goal in its alliance with the Soviet Union was its

need for foreign economic and industrial assistance. And

yet another and perhaps more important than either of the

above was the leadership's goal of attaining a "respectable"

position among the powerful nations of the world. But be

fore I show how Mao Tse-tung achieved his goals through the

Sino-Soviet Alliance, it would be helpful to point out as

briefly as possible the background of this alliance.

It is widely known that Mao and Stalin did not ex

change a feeling of mutual trust prior to Mao's ascendency

to power. During the civil war in China, for example, "the

Soviet encouragement of Chinese Communist ambitions was

initially negligible."^ Stalin's distrust of Mao was

later expressed by the latter in a speech to the Tenth

Party Plenum of October, 1962:

Ev5n after the success of the revolution, Stalin feared that China might degenerate into another Yugoslavia and that I might become a second Tito. I later v;ent to Moscow and concluded the Sino-Soviet Treaty Alliance. Stalin did not wish to sign the Treaty; he finally signed it after two months of negotiations. It

%icLane, Ibid.

17

was only after our resistance to America and support for Korea [in the Korean.War:] that Stalin finally came to trust us.3

On the other hand Mao did not have a feeling of

affection toward Stalin. He gained the leadership of his

party in 1935 and later the leadership of China in 1949

without any major assistance from Stalin. Thus Mao did

not owe an obligation to the government of the Soviet Union

which would render him dependent on the Soviet government.

In fact, from 1935, when Mao completed his long March until

after he was fully established as the leader of China in

1949, the elites of the Soviet Union had given their support

to the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek in the form

of a pact signed in 1945.^ In effect Stalin had clearly

recognized the Nationalist government as the sole government

of all of China.

During the critical years from 1945 through 1943, Soviet assistance to China was limited. Military assistance consisted in allowing the Chinese Communists to gain strategic footholds and to acquire captured Japanese ordance in Manchuria; political assistance was initially given to the Nationalist Government . . .; and economic "assistance" was limited to stripping Manchuria of its industrial assets at the expense of both Chinese rivals.5

•^Gittings, op. cit. p. 44.

^McLane, 0£. cU,. , p. 327.

^Raymond C. Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Ralations," The Annals of the American Adademy of Polltic-1 -ir.d Social Science (Hereafter The Annals). No. 349. (oepteinbar, 19b3T, p. B3.

1 r\

Mao must have felt the impact of Stalin's policy toward the

Nationalist government and he must have been aware of the

activities of the Soviets in Manchuria. Undoubtedly, the

Soviets' agreement with Chiang Kai-shek had placed some

restraints on Moscow's encouragement of Mao's efforts

against the Nationalist government. By the end of World

War II, Mao came to power with little Russian help and

showed not only the Russians but also the non-Marxists that

a successful Communist "revolution" could be based on the

support of the peasants rather than on an industrial pro

letariat.^

The success of Mao in 1949 had presented new realities

for the Soviets. The new situation in China presented ad

vantages as well as disadvantages for the Russians. If one

must search for a motive in the Sino-Soviet Alliance, it

can be argued that the alliance was dictated by the realities

of the situation at the time. Although the Soviet Union was

less responsive to an alliance with China, Stalin must have

seen "a greater role for Moscow in Pacific affairs"' and a

new avenue for spreading communist ideology in Southeast

Asia. China's interests in this alliance, on the other

"Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 204.

7 McLane, OQ. cit. , p. 327.

Îbid.

19

hand, were of "short-term national interest"^ more immediate

to the demands of Mao's role in bringing about political

integration.

The Ideological Goal

In the case of China, "ideology is certainly an im

portant factor behind most features of Chinese foreign

policy."-'- A communist regime was a new experience for

China. China could not claim an independent Communist

view from that of the Soviet Union at a tine when the

country was suffering economic hardships and in need of

the support of'a powerful ally such as the Soviet Union.

Internally, the Alliance with the Soviet Union created an

ideological bond between the two.nations. It served a

"short-term national interest"- - of adding harmony to the

socialization process. The ruling elite took zhe oppor

tunity to launch a domestic propaganda campaign which im

proved the political integration of the society. By the

end of the Korean War the slogan "learn from the Soviet

Union"-^^ was shouted by everyone in China.

Q

•^Gittings, lop. cit. , p. 42.

^Îbid., p. 43.

lllbid. John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Disnut.e

A Commentary and Extracts fro i ^ ' iv-cer.t '-ol -nics 19o3-K'67, (London: Oxford University Press, 19o8j, p. 15.

20

Mao Tse-tung was aware of the ideological gap that

existed between his beliefs and those of the leaders of

the Soviet Union. And he did not fail to make it known

through his spokesman Ch'en Po-ta that the

alliance would not be allowed to compromise the distinctiveness of his own doctrinal innovations to Marxism-Leninism.13

When Mao accepted Soviet Leadership of the Communist bloc

by this alliance, he did not accept it uncritically. He

still maintained a "united front" line v/hich consisted of

a four-class coalition with workers, peasants, and petty

bourgeoisie ,"-'- which was opposed by the Soviet leaders.

According to Mao the "united front" would remain in action

during the transitional period to socialism. The Soviets

on the other hand insisted on the "dictatorship of the

proletariat ."- 5 This important ideological gap between

the leaders of both nations did not prevent them from

forming the Sino-Soviet Alliance. However deep was this

gap, the average Chinese was unaware of its nature. Thus

the effect of the alliance was not jeopardized by this ideol

ogical gap.

•^^Gittings, "The Great Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy" OD. cit. , p. 46.

^Îbid.

lÎbid.

o 1

It is also believed that while Mao was seeking an

alliance with the Soviet Union to improve the political

and economic situations in China, he was also furthering

his aim to become the leader of the Communist bloc.^^ In

a speech on Stalin's birthday in 1939, Mao said that "Stalin

is the leader of world revolution . . . Since we have him,

things can go well. '

Gittings feels that he implied that either Mao or

someone else would be the leader if Stalin passed away.

This 1939 speech v;as widely publicized ten years later.

It would seem appropriate to assume that China's alliance

with the Soviet Union had brought Mao one step closer to the

world seat of Communist ideological leadership. This last

observation can be better understood when seen in the light

of China's concept of a world order which is discussed later

in this chapter.

The Economic and Indust>rial Goal

The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and

Mutual Assistance was signed in Moscow on the fourteenth of

P'ebruary, 1950. The tv/o agreements signed at the same time

covered (l) the eventual return of the Manchurian Chinese

^^bid.. p. 45.

' Ibid.

22

Changchun Railway to China, (2) a Soviet loan of 300

million dollars, and (3) recognition of the independence

of Mongolia. Later, on March 2?, 1950, agreements were

reached on (4) the establishment of a joint-stock company

to discover petroleum and metals, and (5) the establish

ment of a civil aviation company. A Sino-Soviet Trade

agreement was also signed April 19, 1950.^^ As long as

China paid its debts on time, the Soviets helped the Chinese

build up their economy. According to the Soviet newspaper

Pravda,

The Soviet Union was the first country to extend the hand of fraternal aid to People's China. The construction of modern plants, dispatch of experts, training of students-- all this the Soviet Union did in the sincere desire to help China speed up the creation of a modern economy.^^^

Some authors say that "the high rates of growth in the early

1950's were made possible . . . by Soviet loans, suDplies of

machinery and equipment and technicians.''^ r'or the same

period, "pov/er machinery and electricity per worker in

l3 Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, or. cit.,

p. 4 3 . 19

Oleg Hoef fd ing , "S ino -Sov ie t Economic n e l a t i o n s , 1959-1962," The Annals , No. 349 (September, I963) p . 9 5 .

20 Robert Dernberger, "Economic Fluctuations in Comr.u-

nist China," in Ho and Tsou, o_p. cit. , p. 741. See also Alexanda Eckstein, "Conditions and Prospects for Economic Growth in Communist China (Parts 1 and II)" Vv'orld Politics VII (October 1954), p. 33.

23

industry increased by 30 percent."^^ This was accompanied

by a 50 percent increase in labor's output and 29 percent

reduction in cost for the products produced by this labor.

In the same period, it is estimated that China used the

services of over 11,000 Soviet technicians and "received

almost 1,7 billion United States dollars in Soviet loans."^^

Not until 1956 did China enjoy a favorable trade with the

Soviet Union, as indicated by Figure 1.

Figure 1

SINO-SOVIET BALANCE OF TRADE

i n M i l l i o n Rubles

4.0

3.0

2.0

1.0

China's exports to the USSR China's imports from the USSR

1961

1950 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 53 59 60

Adapted from Klaus Mehner t . Pekins and Moscow (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons , 1963) , p . 293 .

The i n c r e a s e d e x p o r t s t o the Sov ie t Union were used t o buy

21

22

Dernberger , I b i d . , p . 743

I b i d .

9/

new equipment rather than pay back past loans ahead of

time. In fact, the Soviet Union agreed in August 1953

and February 1959 to supply China with 125 complete plants

valued at about 2 billion dollars in exchange for Chinese

exports. Although these agreements were not fulfilled by

either nation, the agreements reveal China's favorable

position in its trade with the Soviet Union. Professor

Robert Dernberger wrote in 1963 that "China's economic

development will continue to depend upon developments in

Communist China's foreign trade."

Regardless of the amount of loans which were pro

vided by the Soviet Union, they were too small for the

demands of the Chinese economy. However, most of the

needs for industrialization of China, particularly the

development of powerful industries which was included in

China's First Five-Year Plan, came under the Soviet Union

assistance program. Soviet aid in this respect was mainly

in terms of supplying equipment and materials and technicians

rather than financial aid.

In other respects the Soviet aid was very helpful.

It is doubtful that the Chinese could have carried out their First Five-Year Plan without the technical help and equipment which they received from Russia, or without the credits which the Soviet Union did give for

^Îbid., p. 752

9f;

economic development projects.^

By 1956, the Soviet Union was committed to the construction

of 211 major projects and the provision of technical assist

ance valued at 2 billion dollars. Without these key Soviet

aid projects, which were considered the backbone of China's

industrialization process, and v;ithout the thousands of

advisors and technicians, China's industrialization efforts

would have been far behind their present achievement.^5

Industrial expansion was most noticeable in railway

expansion, in minerals, fuels, and electric power; also con

siderable advances were made in metallurgical and machine-

building industries. An aircraft industry was already

under construction by 1957, and an atomic reactor v;as com

pleted by 1953. As indicated by Table II- 1, the output

of key heavy industries increased between 1950 and 1957

by a considerable amount.

Thus, through economic assistance, the Soviet Union

helped to restore the Chinese economy which until 1950

was battered by long civil war and a war with Japan. More

important for Mao's drive toward political integration was

the influence of this economic aid in giving the Chinese

Â. Doak Barnett, "The Economic Develorment of Communist China I960." in Government of Communist China, ei. by George P. Jan, (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1966), p. 332.

^Îbid.

^Îbid., p. 333.

26

population a hope for the future. A future in which the

Chinese citizen saw himself in a better economic situation.

TABLE II-1

ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF SELECTED HEAVY INDUSTRIES IN MAINLAND CHINA

1950 1952 1957

steel

pig iron

coal

electric power

cement

machine tools

.3

B.3

35.0

3.3

1.4

n.a

1.35 5.35 million metric tons

1.9 5.94 million tons

63.53 130. million tons

7.26 19.3 billion kwh

2.36 6.36 million tons

n.a. ' 13.7 23. thousand sets

^ not available

Adapted from Barnett, Ibid., o. 334, and Eckstein, 0£. cit., p. 13.

Chinese Goal For a "Respectable" Position in World Politics

China's goal for a "respectable" position in world

politics was also one of its motives in signing the Sino-

Soviet Treaty of 1950. The United States was committed

to the Nationalist government and the Soviet Union was in

a 1945 alliance with the Nationalists. China's ensueing

alliance with the Soviet Union provided her with the first

27

international avenue to further its position in the inter

national communist bloc.

Mao's long range goal in international relations is

understood through China's conception of world order. Al

though this perception has its origin centuries before

Confucius, it is best exemplified in the Confucian culture.

In the words of Professor Benjamin I. Schwartz, the "con

cept of universal kingship . . . of a higher culture"^'^

had a "religious cosmic basis" which tied the national

political order to a universal order and to a heavenly

order. The concept pictured a great civilized kingship

of which China was the center.^ This conception of world

order was not exclusively Chinese. It had its parallel in

Mesopotamia and in Egypt, v/hen a foreign power such as

France occupied a part of China, the people, though exposed

to a different culture, remained basically attached to their

traditional one. A similar parallsl exists in the following

statement by Schwartz: "Asure could prevail over Baal, yet

Baal's reality could not be negated."^9 Thus, the Chinese

^^Benjamin I. Schwartz, "The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present," in The Chinese Vvcrld Orner Traditional China's Foreigrn Relations, ed. by Jo .n r ing Fairbank, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 277.

^%orton Ginsburg, "On the Chinese Perception of a World Order," in Ho and Tsou, ££. cit. , p. 75.

^^Schwartz, "The Chinese Perception of /.'orld Order, Past and Present," op.cit. , p. 283.

23

conception of world order survived many dynasties and

several conquerors but was never replaced by any other

image of political philosophy except during the 1390's

when "nationalists", such as Yen Fu, "accepted the V/estern

multistate system with astonishing lack of reservation."^^

After he came to power in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek also took

a similar outlook.

When Mao Tse-tung came to power in 1949 he intro

duced a Marxist-Leninist ideology which proclaimed a new

world order similar to the traditional Chinese perception

but different from it in the fact that the source of this

heaven lies outside Peking in the Communist Dogma. Never

theless, Mao Tse-tung's image

of a world Communist movement centered on Peking is simply the latest version of the concept of a barbarian world 'transformed' . . . by Chinese culture.31

Understanding Mao's image of the world helps us

understand his foreign as well as his domestic policies.

This image formed Mao's basic guide in conducting his

behavior on the international scene. It was within this

framework of concepts that the foreign policy goals of the

Chinese Communist Party were unfolded. These goals were

^Îbid.. p. 235.

^Îbid., p. 234.

90

achieved mainly through the efforts of the Soviet Union.

The ideological goal was achieved in early autumn of 1943

when Mao decided to "lean to one side."^^ Later, in June

1949, Mao reiterated his adherence to the Soviet camp in

his famous speech "On the People's democratic dictator

ship,"- ^ in which he said that

all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.34

Although the tone of his speech indicated that his decision

was mainly based on ideological grounds, the decision must

also have been dictated by "consideration of straightfor

ward real politik."3^ China's fear of the west had not

been eliminated; furthermore, the United States' support

of Nationalist China presented a real threat to the security

of the Communist regime. This threat was often cited by

the party leadership in justifying their alliance with the

Soviets.

The chief value of the Sino-Soviet alliance to the Chinese was the military and. political backing which it provided at a time when the new government was at its most vulnerable, and

- Gittings, 0£. cit., p. 15.

33 Ibid.

^Îbid. Mao's entire speech, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," may be found in Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works. (Peking: Foreign Language Press), III, 415.

^Îbid., p. 16.

30

the need for 'peacefu l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' a t i t s g r e a t e s t . - ' "

In 1950, the Soviet Union and China signed the Sino-Soviet

Treaty of F r i endsh ip , A l l i a n c e , and Mater ia l Ass i s t ance .

M i l i t a r i l y i t was to p ro t ec t China from Japan and the

U. S . , which had e s t a b l i s h e d m i l i t a r y bases in Japan.37

Economically, Russia pledged 300 mi l l ion d o l l a r s and

other a s s i s t ance t o China ' s modernization process . The

secre t ive nature of most of the da ta obscure the exact

Soviet a s s i s t a n c e t o China.

There were no published or known m i l i t a r y prov i s ions or p r o t o c o l s , but i t i s c l ea r t h a t arrangepients were made a t t h a t time to i n s t i t u t e formal m i l i t a r y a s s i s t ance in Soviet supplying of ma te r i a l and t r a i n i n g . 3 3

Some 3,000 Soviet m i l i t a r y exper t s were sent to China to

help organize the Chinese armed f o r c e s . Some 700 1 110-15

f i g h t e r s , 200 p is ton l i g h t bombers were included within a

t o t a l number believed to be 2,430 a i r c r a f t of d i f f e r en t

types t ha t were put i n t o the hands of the Chinese.39 in

1951, Chinese m i l i t a r y expendi tures were 43 percent of

China 's budget . Some of t h i s aid was covered by Soviet

c r e d i t s , some of which China could not redeem. However

^%bid., p. 17.

- 'Dutt, op. cit. , p. 61 33 Garthoff, 0£. cit. , p. 34.

^%fcid.

• • • •

31

generous the Soviet Union may have seemed in its effort to

aid the Chinese, it did not do this without considerable

debate in the Soviet Union of the issues and the consequences

of its act.^0 Stalin realized from the beginning that Mao

did not owe the Soviet Union anything for his victory over

the Nationalist forces. An important factor which encouraged

the Soviet military aid to China was the Korean War. China

intervened in the war at Stalin's insistence. Some authors

believe that the party leaders expected more aid than the

Soviets offered even during the first year of the war.^^

Mao's aim to build nuclear weapons would surely

place Communist China among the exclusive nations of the

world with the awesome power of nuclear weapons. The first

effort toward acquisition of nuclear weapons occurred in

1953 when the Comraittee of Atomic Energy was established

within the Chinese Academy of Sciences.^^ The Soviet Union

had provided the first atomic reactor and agreed to pro

vide the Communist Chinese with technical knovdedge and

documents concerning the atomic reactor. Actually China

was not v/ithout nuclear scientists of its own. Its most

^%ecent Chinese statements in the Red Flag claim that the Soviet Union favored a divided China rather than one united under Mao, Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute 1963-1967, 02. cit., pp. 13-14.

•"•Ibid. See also Garthoff, op. c^t., p. 5.

^^Cheng Chu-yuan, "Progress of huclear .manors in Communist China," in Jan, 0£. cit. , p. 543.

32

important nuclear physicist is Chien San-chiang who studied

in the University of Paris.^3 However, the Soviet aid in

the development of nuclear power for Communist China is of

considerable importance.^^

Complete political integration, according to Herbert

J. Spiro,^5 means the integration of both the ruling elite

as well as the population. The only evidence of dishar

mony between the central elites of the Chinese Communist

Party between 1949-1955 seems to have occurred in 1955

when the rulers of two provinces were ousted.^^ Kao Kang

in Manchuria and Jao Shu-shih in Shanghai were accused of

"building independent kingdoms."^7 By graphical illus

tration, if party unity is represented by a straight line

for the period 1949-1957 on a graph, the following would

appear.

^3lbid., p. 546.

^Îbid., pp. 543-550.

^^Spiro, £p. cit.

^^Documents of the National Conference of the COTI::.U-nist Party of China, i-iarch 1955, (Peking: Forei~n Lanruage Press, 1955), p. 3.

''»A/hiting, o£. cit. , p. 151.

33

A

Figure 2

GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY UNITY BETWEEN 1949-1957

the ouster of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih

1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956

The Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih incidents prompted the

party leadership to initiate a new policy of tight obser

vation over the rulers of the provinces by electing a new

Central Control Committee. This committee, according to

the editor of the People's Daily, was designed

. . . to intensify the struggle against violations of lav; and discipline on the part of Party members and, in particular, to prevent the recurrence of such phenomena as the anti-Party block of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih which could seriously damage the interests of the party.^^

In essence this move by the Central Committee, whose

chairman was Mao Tse-tung was toward centralized control

over party cadres lest they disagree with the policy of the

^^Documents of the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, r.arch 19551 on. £it. , p. 3 .

34

leadership. Kao Kang's belief that the Chinese Communist

party consisted of two parties —"party of the revolution

ary basis and the army"^° -- challenged Mao's authority.

According to the Report on the First Five-Year Plan for

Development of the National Economy of the People's Republic

of China in 1953-1957. the Chinese Communist Party is one

party united under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Accord

ing to Li Fu-ch'un, Vice Premier of the State Council and

Chairman of the State Planning Commission v;ho delivered the

above report July 5, 1955, the Communist Party of China,

"under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party

led by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, . . .has always maintained a

solid and unbreakable unity."^^ The lack of a major support

for Kao Kang and the abrupt success of Mao over his adver

saries minimized the crisis of party unity. The fact that

Mao's move was supported by all the members of the Central

Coramittee illustrates the shallow roots of the crisis.^

Furthermore, this crisis clearly illustrates two important

facts.

One, Mao's intolerance of party leaders who disagreed;

^ % b i d . , p . 1 4 .

^^Robe r t R. Bowie and John K. F a i r b a n k , Corn-nunjst China 1955-1959 P o l i c y Documents wi th A n a l v n i s , (Cambr idge : Ha rva rd U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , r965) , p . 9 0 . The co^Tiplete r e p o r t can be found i n p p . 4 2 - 9 1 .

Documents_of _tj]ê_l['^ ÂSl^}^lLS^J~l^S^- -°'^- t i ' ^ 'ôrvr.:\-n i s t P a r t y of China ,'T-i,:a-ch _ !£ : . i , o n . c i t . , p . 5 7 .

35

and, two, the limits behond which "criticism and self-

criticism"^^ could not reach.

Summary

The influence of foreign policy on political inte

gration is not a new phenomenon. It is evident throughout

diplomatic history. One only needs to recall the War of

1312, and the influence of Thomas Jefferson's foreign

policy toward France and England^3 and how this policy

divided the American people among themselves, and widened

the gap between the Republican party and the Federalist

party. The fact that people are interested in the act

ivities of other nations and in the influence of these

activities upon the interests of their country makes

foreign policy a significant factor in contributing to

political integration or to disintegration. Describing

the interests of the American people in the French Revo

lution of 1739, Alexis de Tocqueville v/rote in 1331:

The sympathies of the people declared themselves with as much violence in favor of France that nothing but the inflexible character of Washington and the immense popularity which he enjoyed could have

^Îbid., p. 3.

53Kendric Charles Babcock, The Rise of American Nationality 1311-1319. (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1905), Vol. XIII, p. 151.

36

prevented the Americans from declaring war against England.^^

The current Japanese foreign policy toward the United

States provides further evidence on the influence of a

nation's foreign policy upon its political system. While

the Japanese government enjoys selling the U.S. one third

of its exports, it suffers from demonstrations by the stu

dents against close relations with the U.S. Another recent

example is the influence of United States involvement in

Viet Nam on the American political system. This influence

is indicated by the considerable opposition among students

as well as the leaders of both the Republican and Demo

cratic Parties.

In addition, as Hans J. Morgenthau has noted, the

government "must also gain the support of the public

opinion of other nations for its foreign and domestic

policies,"^^ a question which we will discuss later.

If the interest of the Chinese people in their

country's foreign policy was dormant, it must have been

^Âlexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), Vol. 1, pp. 234-235.

^^Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations the Struggle for Power and Peace, (iNew York: Alfred A . Knopf, 1967)7 p. 143. A thorough discussion of the relationship between public ordnion and foreign policy is found in Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Conduct of Foreign Policy." in Aspeets of American Government, ed. by Sydney Baily, (London: The Hansard Society, 1950), pp. 99 ff; ^nd In Defense of the National Interest, ([:ew York: Alfred A. r'norf, l'-51/, pp. 22'i ff.

reawakened by the several wars with the foreign powers of

the V/est as well as the war with Japan. Therefore, Mao's

conduct in foreign diplomacy in 1949 had to be supported

by his people, if he was to win political integration.

This chapter has attempted to show how Mao's foreign

policy toward the Soviet Union strengthened the party and

national unity. When the Chinese Communist Party came to

power in 1949, it was faced

with the problem of absorbing vast numbers of non-Communist soldiers and administrators, and of consolidating its hold on the country with a very inadequate i'orce of politically trained and reliable personnel.^^

The support of the Chinese population was most important

to Mao's drive for political integration. In 1949

the Chinese were weary of warfare, which had been almost continuous since 1911, and were willing to pay a high price for peace and strong government.^7

Chinese Communist Party strength was boosted through its

defeat of inflation and through its successful bid to be

the ally of one of the strongest nations of the world.

Mao hoped to achieve three goals from his alliance

with the Russians. First, an ideological goal of in

stitutionalizing communist roles and values which was

achieved through propaganda and slogans such as "learn

56 Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish, 0£. cit. , p. 13.

' Ibid., p. 19.

3^

from the Soviet Union."^° A second goal of economic and

indus t r ia l development was achieved with Soviet ass is tance

through loans, new f a c t o r i e s , s c i en t i f i c assistance and

foreign t r a d e . The l a s t goal for a "respectable" Chinese

position in the world was not achieved although the Soviet

Union's aid for Chinese i ndus t r i a l i za t i on and provision of

nuclear data a'nd technical knov;how increased the Mao

regime's influence.

In the f ina l ana lys i s , the degree of p o l i t i c a l

integration as evident from the support of the people or

the unity of the leadership i t s e l f does not depend on a

set number of data or on an achievement oriented to the

needs of the whole Chinese soc ie ty . But rather p o l i t i c a l

integration depends upon the sa t i s fac t ion of the people

with t he i r government, and the sa t i s fac t ion of the e l i t e s

with those ins t iga t ing the government's po l ic ies .5° Mao

Tse-tung's goals in the Sino-Soviet Alliance obviously

were not professionally planned, as by a draftsman or a

mathematician, but were those of a p o l i t i c i a n . More l i k e l y ,

Mao saw an opportunity for assis tance from a pov;erful "nation;

he sought t h i s ass is tance and gained by i t . His success

strengthened the p o l i t i c a l in tegra t ion of his regime as well

^ G i t t ings , op. c i t . , p . 15. CO

^^Morgenthau, op. c i t . , p . 142

39

as his country. Mao's use of the Sino-Soviet Pact to build

up his regime's power illustrated a process described by

Hans Morgenthau:

The power of a nation . . . depends not only upon the skill of its diplomacy and the strength of its armed forces but also upon the attractiveness for other nations of its political philosophy, political instutitions and political policies.60

His successful foreign diplomacy with the Soviet

Union gained approval from both the people and the elites

of the Communist party. This is true partly because the

elites were communist and had shared with the Russians the

basic Marxist dogma of socialism, and partly because of the

long hardships the country had experienced under the French

and the British rule which discouraged closer association

with the West, even if it was available.

In general, the leaders of the party were united

behind the same domestic and foreign policies. The change

in these policies brought about, within the party, crises

of significant magnitude. These crises included such pol

icies as the Great Leap Forv;ard, which will be discussed in

the next chapter, the Commune system, and the deterioration

in the Sino-Soviet relations since 1959. Sach of the above

had a different magnitude; nevertheless, they contributed to

party disharmony.

Ibid. , p. 143.

CHAPTER III

THE FAILURE OF THE GREAT LEAP FORV ARD AND ITS INFLUENCE ON

MAO'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Chapters one and two illustrated the factors behind

the unity of the Chinese Communist Party between 1949-1957.

These factors were the sound economic progress and the

successful foreign policy of the leadership of the party.

So long as the policies of the regime met with relative success, the struggle for pov/er within the party could be contained and the crisis of party unity minimized.!

Such a crisis was that of the purge of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-

shih. The unity of the party v/as the main factor contributing

to effective political control during the period 1949-1957.

But the three years which were to follow were years of crisis

caused partly by the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the

Commune System, and the deterioration in the Sino-Soviet

relations. These three years had a different effect on

party unity. They raised many important questions among

the leadership regarding the basic political philosophy of

Mao Tse-tung in both domestic and foreign affairs. Our

immediate concern is to indicate that the debate within

Ho and Tsou, op. cit. , p. 321.

40

the leadership of the party mainly centered around the

"question of the extent to which Mao's thought could be

vigorously applied in various areas of activities,"^ and

furthermore that the ensuing struggle v/ithin the party also

centered around this same question. This observation is

supported by Chou En-lai's report on the work of the govern

ment:

From 1959 to 1962 . . . the class enemies at home launched renewed attacks on socialism, and consequently once again fierce class struggle ensued . . . they used their bourgeois and revisionist viewpoint to oppose our general line of socialist construction and the general line of our foreign policy.3

The focus of this chapter is to show how the failure of the

Great Leap Forward contributed to this struggle within the

Chinese Communist Party.

The Second Five-Year Plan

It is important to point out that before the First

Five-Year Plan ended, the Eighth National Congress of the

Communist Party of China on September 27, 1956 adopted the

Second Five-Year Plan for the period 1957-1962. This plan

called for an economic growth of 3.5 per cent per annum.

2 Ibid., p. 322.

3Peking Review, January 1, 1965, pp. 12-13.

42

The central task of our Second Five-Year Plan is still to give priority to the .development of heavy industry. This is the chief index of our country's socialization, because heavy industry provides the basis for a strong economy and national defense, as well as the basis for the technical reconstruction of our national economy.^

The success of the First Five-Year Plan demonstrates

that the 3.5 per cent rate growth was feasible because

during the earlier plan the average annual rate of increase

in the NNP was 9.1 per cent. The projected rate for the

Second Five-Year Plan was lower because the planners pro

vided for more investment during this period. However

sound this plan may have been, it was overshadowed by the

adoption of the Great Leap Forward program, a broad cam

paign mounted to induce every family to fully exploit all

resources of nature "in an effort to transform local econo

mics in the course of three years."^ The plan was so bold

that by 1972 China would surpass Great Britain in the total

output of major industrial products." According to Liu Shao-

ch'i, it was Mao Tse-tung who initiated the slogan "Catch up

^See the full text and the quantitative targets for the Second Five-Year Plan in E. Stuart Kirby, Contemporary China. 1956-1957. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press T9W, II, 145.

5 Gray and Cavendish , O_P. c i t . , p . 3 1 .

vVu Y u a n - l i , "The Economic Chal lenge of Communist China ," in Kirby , op . c i t . , p . 4 1 . Also in Bowie and Fa i rbank , o_p. c i t . ~ P . " T 7 .

43

with and outstrip Britain in 15 years."'^

Why V as the Great Leap Forward Adopted?

There are some important questions concerning the

adoption of the Great Leap Forward by the Chinese govern

ment. For instance, why did the government adopt such a

drastic program when the economy was enjoying a success

beyond everyone's expectation? Several authors provide

different answers to this question. Ta-chung Liu claims

that the leadership "having extraordinary ambitions . . .

and an unusual confidence in the ability to put through

radical reorganizations of the economy,"° was not satis

fied with the 1952-1957 pattern of growth. Another reason

for the introduction of the Great Leap Forward is suggested

by Robert Dernberger. He claims that the Chinese govern

ment wanted to increase both the rate of grov/th and the

rate of labor productivity in agriculture in order to in

crease its exports. Professor Anthony M. Tang proposes

another hypothesis. He suggests that the leadership of

Mao Tse-tung adopted the Graat Leap Forv/ard so that the

7 Quoted by Liu Shao-ch'i in "Report on the V-ork of

the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Chine to the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress," in Bowie and Fairbank, Ibid. , p7 422. The report in full is on pp. 417-433.

Ho and Tsou, o_p. cit. , p. 647.

I I

rate of agriculture production would meet the high rate of

industrial output. Professor Tang reasoned "because ag

riculture effectively limited industrialization, agricul

ture needed to be developed."^ Still another hypothesis

is suggested by Jack Gray. He points out that the broad

decentralized economic system of the Great Leap Forv/ard

was adopted by the Communist Party of China in response to

the Soviet Union's efforts to achieve better relations

with the United States. From the Chinese point of view,

argues Professor Gray, this plan would provide the country

with the momentum it needed in case the Soviet Union stopped

helping China, and the plan also would establish the back

ground for guerrilla training in case of an American in

vasion. The author argues that

the importance of military considerations in the Great Leap Forward is suggested by the prominence given not only to the creation of self-sufficient local economics, but to local ability to manufacture steel and to the attempt to arm the whole people as a vast militia.^^

Although these hypotheses differ somewhat in approach

as well as emphasis, each could conceivably contain some

truth for the adoption of the Great Leap Forward. Further

more, none of the above authors doubt that Mao Tse-tung was

%bid. , p. 674.

Gray and Cavendish, £p. cit. , p. 32.

45

attempting to build a self-sufficient economy that would

meet the demands of a rapid industrial development. Though

these authors disagree on the motive for the adoption of

the Great Leap Forward, they agree on the cause of its

failure. According to Alexander Eckstein, "the realities

of the country's economic and technical backwardness,"^1

conflicted with Mao's vision of a rapid economic and in

dustrial development. The peasants as well as the country's

economy were incapable of providing the sudden heavy de

mands put on them by the Great Leap Forward.

The Politico-Ideological Foundations of the Great Leap Forv/ard

The politico-ideological foundation of the Great

Leap Forward help one understand some aspects behind the

failure of the Great Leap Forward. These foundations are

indicated by the slogans "Be red then experts," and "let

politics take command." Both slogans snare the belief that

one's politico-ideological conviction is more important

than his abilities and skills. In a time when the develop

ment of the economy rested on the experts and their skills,

the government put its emphasis on first being "red" and

then on being "expert." This move by the government tended

to alienate the intellectuals who were less inclined toward

11 Ho and Tsou, 0£. cit., pp. 693 and 729

46

Communism than others.-^^

According to Richard Baum, the initiation of the

slogan "red-experts" in 1957 in conjunction with the

Great Leap Forward, was meant to solve two problems which

were facing the Chinese Communist Party: First, the "old"

intellectuals' lack of enthusiasm for socialism; and second,

the lack of economic and technological resources needed

for quick economic development.•'•3

First, the Chinese Communist Party problem with the

"old" intellectuals' lack of enthusiasm became apparent

when the government launched its campaign "Let a Hundred

Flov/ers Blossom . . . a Hundred Schools of thought Con

tend."^^ In July, 1956, the leadership of the party,

under this slogan, encouraged free criticism by the in

tellectuals in order that literature and art might flourish.

When the party leadership discovered that much of the criti

cism was lashed at the party leadership itself, the govern

ment, in an attempt to stem the tide of criticism, adopted

" Richard Baum, "Red and Expert: The Politico-Ideological Foundations of China's Great Leap Forward," Asian Survey^ V (September I964). 1049.

^Îbid., p. 1051.

^^Complete t e x t i s in Bowie and Fairbank, 0£. c i t . , pp. 151-163. A speech "On the Question of I n t e l l e c t u a l s , " by the Prime Minis te r Chou En- la i i s in pp. 123-144.

47

the program of "reform through labor."^5 Intellectuals

and students were sent to the countryside so that they

might appreciate the works of the peasants. This program,

which is also referred to as the "rectification"-^^ move

ment was in line with Mao's thinking

that only by taking part in the production process and class struggle could men advance through the stages of 'rational' and 'perceptual' knowledge.-*-'

Thus through manual labor, Mao hoped to remedy the intellect

uals lack of enthusiasm for Mao's pattern of socialism.

Second, the Communist leadership's problem in achiev

ing a rapid economic development would be quickly solved

if, according to Mao, the workers were motivated by en

thusiastic Communist beliefs. This is consistent with his

belief of "mind over matter. "- ^

It is also believed that the "rectification" move

ment was meant to condition and to educate the people for

the subsequent Great Leap Forward.-'- In his speech "The

Significance of the October Revolution," of November 6, 1957

Liu Shao-ch'i outlined the party's guiding beliefs, explained

' Baum, op. cit. , p. IO5I. 16

Bowie and Fairbank, £P. cit. , p. 343.

Baum, £p. cit.

Ibid.

^%bid.

43

both the slogan "red-expert" and stressed the intellectual

need to be politically motivated.

All those who are in a position to do so should work hard to turn themselves into experts who are both 'red' and expert. The work can not be done well if we are 'red' but not 'expert [sicj 'I Our government functionaries and experts in various fields should make up their minds to remould themselves so as to serve the workers and peasants and work for socialism whole-heartedly; they should incorporate their individual interests in the collective interests of the masses, but not place the former above the latter. Such should be the red experts. The slogan 'first expert then red' is a call for alienation from politics designed to induce the intellectuals to refuse to remould themselves and reject the working class stand. This is in reality a slogan to lead people to the old way of the bourgeois intellectuals. Our intellectuals must understand that it is impossible to keep av;ay from politics. Alienation from revolutionary politics might lead to reactionary politics. Lack of a correct political stand might lead to a reactionary one. Such people can never work for our socialist cause sincerely and reliably, nor serve the workers and peasants whole-heartedly even if they succeed in attaining some knowledge and technique ." 0

The slogan "red and expert" emphasized the Commu

nist Party's conviction that politics and ideology could

increase the production of grain, coal, and iron. The

slogan also recalled Mao's wartime conviction that "ideol

ogy and politics work is alv;ays the soul and guide of every

^^Bowie and Fairbank, 0£. £U., p. 400. This document represents the substance of the Great Leap Forward. It focused on the Leap's purpose to help China catch up with the Capitalist world; it stressed the seriousness of the bourgeois rightists; but more important it stated the "policy of achieving"quantity, speed, quality and economy."

49

kind of work."^l In essence, the political leadership re

garded "mind over Matter" as the key to solving its economic

and technological problems; that if politico-ideological

work was carried out successfully, economic progress would

22

follow naturally. The party leadership was relying on

these slogans to increase productivity at a time when the

Chinese laborer was producing at full capacity, as was shown

in chapter one.

The Momentum and Scope of the Great Leap Forward

In the same speech, cited above, Liu Shao Ch'i set

the momentum and the scope of the Great Leap Forward. The

rate of production would increase rapidly, while quality

would improve through the hard v;ork and dedication of the

masses v;hose daily lives would be regulated to meet the

demands of the Great Leap Forward. The emphasis on a rapid

momentum for the Great Leap Forward was expressed by Liu in

the following:

There are two ways to accomplish this task (agriculture and industrial development): one way is to do things quicker and better, and the other to do things slower and aim at lower standards. Which way should we adopt? The Central Committee of the Party considers that the former-way should be adopted and the latter rejected.^3

21

Baum, op. cit. , p. 1052.

^Îbid., p. 1050.

^^Bowie and Fairbank, o^. cU,. , p. 399.

50

Here Liu seems to assume that even a cautious policy

is a lazy policy. The scope of the Great Leap Forward would

encompass every citizen in the countryl

By relying on the initiative of the masses, we will certainly be able to carry out correctly the policy of achieving quantity, speed, quality and economy, to push forward the socialist construction of our country.24

The individual would be taxed to produce at his ultimate

capability.

In order to build socialism while achieving quantity, speed, quality and economy, we should advocate industry, frugality and hard work in every field of work, whether in running factories, cooperatives, enterprises, schools or any other undertakings.25

Under the Great Leap Forward the lives of every citizen and

the daily activities of all institutions would be observed

closely.

Industry and thrift should also be practised in housekeeping, so that the same principles may prevail in building the country and keeping the house, and become a social convention. The state and the cooperatives should increase their accumulation, and the individual and households should also increase their savings so far as possible instead of spending all their income. Many young workers and functionaries have now a fairly big income but little or no family burden. They should save up their surplus money against future needs.^6

^Îbid.

^Îbid.

2%bid.

51

Economic Targ;ets

Liu Shao-ch'i's speech of November 1957 laid down the

general politico-ideological lines of the Great Leap Forward.

But the details of economic and industrial targets were not

stated until after the Leap had been implerrsnted in Febru

ary, 195^. This delay, according to Robert R. Bowie and

John K. Fairbank, was for fear of opposition within the

party and the need to educate the cadres.^7 Demands now

were put on scientific institutions. For instance, the

association of Chinese Paleontologists pledged to reach

their targets thirteen years sooner than what they pre

viously planned, and pledged further to reach the capitalist

countries' level of research.

Similarly the party demanded an increase in pro

duction of heavy industries. The National People's Congress

demanded that the Great Leap Forward increase steel pro

duction by 19 per cent, electricity by 13 per cent, and

coal production by 17 per cent. The feeling of uncertainty

is illustrated by the leadership revision of their figures.

In March, 1953 targets for steel production were changed

from 6.2 million tons to 7 million tons, to 3-3.5 million

2f? tons in May and finally to 10.7 million tons in August.

' Ibid., p. 17.

Ibid.

52

Problems Generated by t he Great Leap Forward

Unl ike t he F i r s t F ive -Year Plan the Great Leap F o r

ward c a l l e d f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n of sma l l and medium-sized

e n t e r p r i s e s on the l o c a l l e v e l us ing n a t i v e methods of p r o

d u c t i o n . S t e e l f u rnaces i n the backyards of fami ly horres

were b u i l t a s an exper iment for s i m i l a r e n t e r p r i s e s t o 29

fo l low. "^ Although p r o d u c t i o n by t h i s method i n c r e a s e d

s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n , the s t e e l manufactured proved unusable

for s e v e r a l r e a s o n s .

By December, 1953, two m i l l i o n small fu rnaces of

t h i s t ype were r e p o r t e d l y b u i l t . By the fol lov/ ing August ,

fu rnaces wi th a volume under 100 cubic meters had a c a p a c i t y

of 43,000 cubic me te r s compared with 2,414 cubic mete rs

t o t a l c a p a c i t y of t he same s i z e fu rnaces in 1956.30

The new p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g the smal l s c a l e of p roduc t ion

u n i t s p r e s e n t e d s e v e r a l p rob lems . The very smal l u n i t s f e l l

shor t of t he q u a l i t y s t a n d a r d s of the e a r l i e r l a r g e i n d u s

t r i a l u n i t s of t he F i r s t F ive-Year P l a n . The new pig i r o n

produced by t h e s e smal l u n i t s proved u n f i t fo r s t e e l - m a k i n g .

Likewise the i r o n produced proved t o o smal l t o be used by

modern r o l l i n g m i l l s . The problem was so acu te t h a t t he

29 Kirby , op . c i t . , p . 60 .

3 0 l b i d .

53

Ministry of Metallurgical industry called a conference on

October 16, 195^ to discuss it.31

Furthermore, the small unit production resulted in

an uneconomic use of labor and created a problem in trans

portation. According to the Red Flag, the railway car loads

increased from 26,000 in August, 1953 to 32,000 in December;

and by the end of the year, 30-45 million tons of goods

still needed to be transported.32 Finally the selection

of steel as an experimental method upset the

balance of relative growth between different industries attained during 1953-1957, for each contributed to the development of the other.33

The decentralization of industrial planning present

yet other problems. While iron was produced in small fur

naces all over the country, a general authority to distribute

labor and to incorporate the products was lacking.

In a decentralization move, the government took mea

sures to put responsibilities in the hands of local author

ities, to allow local governments to receive more of the tax

money and to exercise more responsibilities in their financial

spending to meet the requirements of the new shift in popu

lation. Population shifts had been underv/ay since 1955-56

31 Ibid., p. 61.

3 Peter S.H. Tang, Communist China Today, (-.ashl nrton: Research Institute of the Sino-Soviet Bloc 19ol), p. 363. Also in Edgar Snow, The Other oide of the River, Red China Today, (New York, Random House, 1962), p. 183.

^^Kirby, opi. crt. , Vol. Ill, p. 61.

54

and continued for administrative reasons as a part of the

"rectification" movement. In August, 1957, the mayor of

Peking had asked that 30-50 per cent of Peking municipal

employees move to work on farms and in factories. Motives

were varied for this request. Among others the government

wanted to advance literacy among the rural population and

wished to keep the cadres close to the masses so as to con

stantly appreciate them and never to feel too high above

them.3^ Secondly, school students as well as university

students were continuing their pilgrimmages to the rural

side so as to feel the hardship of the lives of the peasants.

All this had been a part of the "rectification" movement and

was still continuing during the Great Leap Forward. The

"rectification" movement as has been stated earlier was to

educate the people for the Great Leap Forward. The new

responsibilities in the hands of the local authorities re

sulted in several diversified moves by the local cadres in

an effort to interpret the motives of the government in

Peking.

These cadres responded most energetically to the

demands of the Great Leap Forward. Their response illus

trates both their eagerness to put government policies into

effect and the lack of unified policy planning by the central

3^Bowie and Fairbank, £p. cit.

55

leadership of the Communist party.35 For example, in Shansi

a local meeting on industrial development estimated with

enthusiasm "that over 13,000 factories would be built within

the year."36 The cadres urged the people in Kiangsu Province,

for instance, to contribute to the state any hardware not in

use or any that could be substituted for something else. Some

cadres took the liberty to raise the targets of sons commo

dities especially in agriculture. In Kiangsu Province, the

provincial committee set a goal of 20-25 per cent increase

of grain and cotton production over 1957 which exceeded the

People's Congress target.3'

In summary, the major cause for these problems stems

from the decentralization policy of the Great Leap Forward.

This is illustrated by the bad transportation system which

was unable to cope with the mass production, and which was

also evident by the government inability to transport the

products of the backyard furnaces. The decentralization

which caused the lack of a united policy planning system

contributed also to the production of substandard products.3^

^Îbid.

^^bid., p. 17.

^'Îbid., p. 13.

3°Snow, op. cit. , pp. 133-134^

56

P r o d u c t i o n R e s u l t s

As s h a l l be seen l a t e r , t he Great Leap Forward was

implemented i n F e b r u a r y , 195^ over a s t r o n g o b j e c t i o n from

the " r i g h t i s t s " w i t h i n t he p a r t y . Soon a f t e r i t s imp le

men ta t ion , encou rag ing r e p o r t s were i s s u e d by the govern

ment g i v i n g c r e d i t t o the p rog ram ' s s u c c e s s . Even through

1959 government r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e d t h a t the t a r g e t s of the

Leap were be ing f u l f i l l e d . The government in i t s r e p o r t .

The Communique of Economic Developm.ent in 1953 which was

i ssued on A p r i l 14 , 1959, announced t h a t the p roduc t ion of

such commodities a s " c o t t o n , i r o n and s t e e l had more than

doubled d u r i n g 195^,"-^"^ and t h a t the value of i n d u s t r i a l

p roduc t ion had i n c r e a s e d t o about 66.2 per cen t (Table I I I - l ) .

Few months fo l lowed , and i t became appa ren t t h a t t h e s e f i g

u re s could not be t r u e . V/hen the government could not show

a s u f f i c i e n t i n c r e a s e i n food r a t i o n s and i n d u s t r i a l p r o

d u c t s , i t began to r e v i s e i t s economic f i g u r e s downward. As

i n d i c a t e d by Table I I I - l , the Chinese government on August 29,

1959 r e v i s e d downward the 1953 p roduc t i on of p ig i r o n from

13,630 thousand t o n s t o 9 ,530 thousand t o n s , and ingo t s t e e l

from 11,030 thousand t o n s t o 3,000 thousand t o n s . I t was

a l so admi t ted t h a t a lmost 30 per cen t of t h e i r o n and s t e e l

produced by i nd igenous methods was not usab le for i n d u s t r i a l

O Q

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53

production. The government then abandoned the backyard fur

naces.

Such failures as the backyard furnaces and the down

ward revision of some major industrial outputs, have caused

those outside of China to doubt the legitimacy of the

Chinese government's official estimates of its economy. In

an attempt to reconstruct a true estimate of the various

products, several authors have undertaken the task of study

ing the Chinese economy. Some studies, as indicated in Table

III-2, show that even the revised Chinese government stat

istics are incorrect. For instance Liu and Yeh estimate H

that steel output was 6.3 million tons for 1953 and 3.9 !.-'>

million tons for 1959, while the official revised estimate

was 3 and 13.35 million tons respectively. Similarly, the

same conclusion can be drawn when one compares the figures

of the national product estimates as shown in Table III-3.

In addition to the fact that the estimates by the several

authors for 1953 and 1959 are not as optimistic as the

Chinese government estimates, they are also considered by

some to be too high. For example the 1959 modest increase

of 7 per cent claimed by Wu and Liu and Yeh over 1953 is

considered an overestimate. A valid reason for this con

sideration is that these estimates are based on the wrong

assumption that agricultural production in 1959 had increased

over 1953. According to a respected estimate of the output

TABLE III-2

SCATTERED DATA ON STEEL, 1957-1965

59

Year

1957 1953 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965

Cur ren t Scene

5.35 3.00^;*

13.35^^ 1 3 . 4 5 -

7-3 7-9 3-10

Ste

Emery

5.2 3.0=i-'

13 .4* 1 3 . 5 -

7.0

10 .0

2el ( M i l l i o n Met r i c Tons)

Far E a s t e r n

Economic Review

5.35 11.03^-^ 13 .35* 13 .45*

11-12 7-3 3-9 10 12

U. S. Bureau of Mines

13 .35* 13 .45*

9.5 10 .0 12 .0 14 .0

Liu-Yeh

5.35 6.3 3 .9

* Communist c l a i m s .

Sources: Adopted from Ho and Tsou, £ D . c i t . , p . 637.

60

TABLE I I I - 3

NATIONAL PRODUCT ESTIMATES OF THE CHINESE MAINLAND, 1957-1962 (Billions of 1952 Yuan)

Year

1957 1953 1959 I960 1961 1962

Communist (Net

Material Product)

93.5 125.3 152.9

Hollister (Gross

National Product)

102.4 126.2 142.6 153.1

vVu (Net Domestic Product)

94.3 104.8 112.0 112,5 73.2

Wu (Gross Domestic Product)

32.1 109.0+

Liu-Yeh (Net Domestic

Product)

Reconstructed Communist Estimate

104.2 145.0 176.3

Author* s' Estimate

95.3 103.C-125.0*

* Conjectural estimate.

+ V/ithout taking consideration possible ''investment limitations and waste Taking; into consideration possible "investment limitations and waste": 101.4

^nina s Gross Maticn.r^.l Product and S o c : a l Liu and Yeh, The Eccr.omy of t i l .:!

Sources : H o l l i s t e r , Accounts 1950-57. p . 2; Mainland, pp. 116, 220, P o t s r i t i a l of C ommuni s t I I I , pp . 120-122. Adopted f o r t h i s t h e s i s from P i r ;g - t i Ho and Tang Tsou, £ p . c i t . , Volume I , Book I I , p . 632.

hin, se 213, 660 and o6; Wu, Tre .economic

Jhina, Yoluma 1, p. "41, ana volun^

61

of food crops and cotton (Table I I I -4 ) in China, the 1959

output was 163 mil l ion tons as compared with the 1953 out

put of 194 metric tons . The bad output by the ag r i cu l tu ra l

sector was poor pa r t ly because the growing season of 1959

was plagued with the problems of floods, draught and insect

pests.^^

These nat ional ca lamit ies had t he i r effects f e l t

through I960 and 1961. In January I96I Red Flag stated

these d i s a s t e r s

not only affected the fulfi l lment of our agr i cu l tu ra l plan for I960 to a great extent , but also inevi tably created unfavorable conditions for the production of both heavy and l igh t indus t r i e s .^^

Since l ight indus t r i es depend on agriculture for raw

materials, a s igni f icant cut in production was consequently

made by the government. This fact i s pa r t i a l l y supported

by Minister of Agriculture Liao Lu-yen»s declaration in

February I96I in Red Flag tha t twenty million urban

laborers had been sent to the ru ra l areas since the month

of August.^2

The lack of o f f i c i a l economic s t a t i s t i c s and the

downward revis ion of the government's own s t a t i s t i c a l

^^Tang, o£. ci_t., p . 367.

^Îb id . . p . 369. 42.

Ib id .

62

TABLE I I I - 4

ESTIMATES OF THE OUTPUT OF FOOD CROPS AND COTTON, 1957-1965

Year

1957 1953 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965

Food Crops (Million Metric

Tons)

135 194 163 160 167 173 179 133 130

Cotton (Million Bales)

1.6 1.9 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3

Sources: These e s t i m a t e s a re made by the A g r i c u l t u r a l Of f ice r , U .S . Consula te G e n e r a l , Hong Kong. Adopted from R. F . Emery, "Recent Economic Develooment m Communist Ch ina , " Asian Survay , ( J u n e , 1966) , pp . 303-304.

63

figures lead us to doubt the success of the Great Leap For

ward. This belief is further strengthened by the recon

structed figures cited above. Some of these figures on

products such as steel for 1959 and I960 are proven true

by studies carried out in 1970 (Table III-5). Communist

claims for steel production for 1959 and I960 were 13.35

and 13.45 million metric tons respectively; v;hile the most

recent studies by Robert Michael Field estimated steel pro

duction at 10 and at 13 million metric tons for the same

years. If the estimates by Mr. Field are true, the Chinese

claims represent a significant overestimate for steel pro

duction of 33.5 per cent for 1959 and 34.5 per cent for I960

over the actual production for the two years. This compari

son as well as the decrease in output of food crops and

cotton production in 1959, I960, 1961 and 1962 (Table III-4)

point to the failure of the Greao Leap Forward.

The Leadership's Revision of the Great Leap Forward

This failure in agriculture forced the Communist

Party to revise its policy for the Great Leap Forward. One

important result of the crisis in agricultural output was

the breakdown of China's export program which depended

largely on exporting textiles and cotton.^^ Another factor

caused by this crisis was the dramatic change forced upon

43 " Snow, £p. cit. . p. 133.

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65

the party to import more food products instead of heavy

industrial products. By I96O the Chinese Communist Party

had thus "reversed itself"44 on the Great Leap Forv/ard by

concentrating more on the agricultural sector. This

new directive meant that until 1963 or I964 no major new offensives on industrial front were to be undertaken, and then only if the agricultural foundations were secure against future catastrophes.45

When the Party launched the Third Five-Year Plan in 1966,

the emphasis was on "agriculture as the foundation and in

dustry as the leading factor."^

Although the average output of the industrial sector

during the Great Leap period represents an increase over

1957, this increase is by no means representative of the

"Great Leap" which the Communist Party exp2Cted. For in

stance, the average annual output of crude stael for 1953-

1961 is 9.4 compared with 5.4 million metric tons in 1957,

and for coal an average of 230 compared to I3I million metric

tons in 1957. However this average output of both products

does not represent the lower yields of I96I and 1962. Most

industrial products in both years (Table III-5) experienced

a decline in production from I96O. This decline accompanied

^Îbid.. p. 139.

^Îbid.

^^Theodore H.E. Chen, The Chineê_C_omrnuni s t Rerime Uocu.nents and Comn-i^nt.nrv, (London: i a l l iâli : ] \ ^ r5 , 19o7) , p . 195.

66

by the crisis in agriculture which forced the leadership of

the party to revise its strategy represents the failure of

the Great Leap Forward. Revision ultimately was extended

to the slogans of the Great Leap. "Red and expert" v/as

reinterpreted. The "red" was toned down and the "expert"

was re-emphasized. On November 6, 1961, an editorial in

Red Flag stated:

more and more facts have shown that industrial development and technical progress depend on people who have scientific and technical knowledge and technical experience . . . assignment of improper jobs would mean a very great waste of technical resources . . . . We must not confuse technical views with political views . . .^7

Conclusion

I t i s unquest ionable t h a t the Great Leap Forward

was Mao*s idea . Several ava i l ab le documents point out t ha t

the Great Leap was Mao's idea and he was responsible for i t s

adoption. According t o an a r t i c l e by Li Fu-ch'un, the

chairman of the S ta te Planning Commission, "On the Big Leap

Forward in China ' s S o c i a l i s t Cons t ruc t ion ," published in the

Red Flag on October 1, 1959, Mao Tse-tung had planned the

Great Leap Forward as e a r l y as the winter of 1955. Liu

Ui

47 Gray and Cavendish, o^. c_lt., p . 3^ .

67

Fu-ch*un wrote:

In the winter of 1955 . . . Comrade Mao Tse-tung scientifically foresaw the possibility for the national economy to develop at still higher speed and put forward, in time, the slogan of achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in developing socialist construction.43

Furthermore, Liu Shao-ch'i speech "the Significance

of the October Revolution," cited earlier, provides another

support to the idea that the Great Leap was Mao's own policy.

In the speech Liu says that

there are two ways to accomplish this task (development of agriculture and industry): one way is to do things quicker and better, and the other to do things slower and aim at lower standards. Which way should we adopt? The Central Committee of the Party considers that the former way should be adopted and the latter rejected.49

However significant the role of Mao Tse-tung in the adoption

of the Great Leap Forward, it seems appropriate that the

blame of its failure should rest on Mao since he is the

Chairman of the People's Republic of China. But as we shall

see in the following chapters, Mao went to a great extent to

vindicate himself from that responsibility.

^^Bowie and Fairbank, op. crb., p. 537. The basic tone of this document is overwhelming optimism. It gives credit for developing the Leap to Mao, and it predicts that China will catch Britain in major industrial output within ten years, rather than in the previous target time of fifteen years.

^Îbid., p. 399.

)3

The cont roversy wi th in the par ty over the Great Leap

was not caused by the program's f a i l u r e . Rather i t had

s tar ted before the program was i n i t i a t e d . The program's

fa i lure i n t e n s i f i e d the controversy and divided the pa r ty .

Ultimately the debate wi th in the leadersh ip of the par ty

extended u n t i l i t evolved around the extent to which Mao's

thought could be appl ied in var ious p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s .

Speeches by ranking par ty members t e l l us t h a t the

adoption of the Great Leap was ca r r i ed out over some ob

ject ions to i t by high ranking Party l e a d e r s . In the

speech "Report on the Work of the Central Committee of the

Communist Par ty of China to the Second Session of the

Eighth National Congress , " which was del ivered in May,

1953, Liu Shao-ch ' i said t h a t

the cur ren t mighty leap forward in s o c i a l i s t cons t ruc t ion i s the oroduct net only of the successful development of the an t i - r i ^ rh t i s t s t ruggle and the r e c t i f i c a t i o n campaign but a l so of a co r rec t implemientation of the P a r t y ' s general l i n e . ^ ^

The Great Leap Forward had not been implemented when

Liu Shao-ch ' i de l ivered the above speech on November 6, 1957.

But i t seemed t h a t he was educating the public for what lay

ahead for them under the Great Leap Forvârd. In shor t , they

were expected to be convinced t h a t they are Communist f i r s t

^ ^ I b i d . . p . 424.

69

and only then experts; they were expected to dedicate their

daily activities for the success of a program, which for

many reasons, proved to be a "great leap backward;" they

as well as their leaders did not comprehend the people's

lack of abilities to meet the high demands placed upon

them, but the political leadership led them to believe

that they owned these abilities.

After the above speech was delivered, but before it

was published, the People's Daily published a series of

articles by the first secretaries of several provincial

party committees. They show the degree of "conservative

opposition which had to be overcome early in 1953 by the

supporters of an active policy."^^ The series covers ten

provinces, Fukien, Hopei, Hunan, Kansu, Kiangsu, Kirin,

Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Shansi, and Shensi. These series were

similar to an earlier report by Chiang Hua, First Secretary

of the Chekiang Provincial Committee of the Chinese Commu

nist Party. From this report December 9, 1957 "Adhere to

the Correct Line of the Party and Win Victory of the Rec

tification Campaign on Every Front,"^^ it is apparent that

the opposition within the party was centered at least

around three fundamental points: The failure of some party

members to grasp Mao's way of solving contradictions among

^Îbid., p. 20.

^Îbid.

70

the people, their skepticism of Mao's dictation from above,

and their zeal for localism, expected among Party cadres.

Several members of the Party's Provincial Committee

were mentioned by name such as Governor of CheKiang, Sha

Wen-han; Yang Jsu-yi, Vice-Governor; Peng Jui-lin Sun

Chang-lu. Chiang Hua referred to them as "rightists . . ,

hidden within the provincial Party committee."53 Their

opposition to Mao

went to the length of defying the guiding principle of the Central Committee, refused to carry out the directives of the provincial committee and consistently and viciously attacked the provincial committee . . . their criminal activities caused serious damage to the Party cause, damaged the Party prestige, weakened the Party unity and hampered the unified and centralized leadership of the party.54

Skepticism among the leaders of the CheKiang Province is

also evident.

Some comrades became skiptical of the leadership of the provincial committee. Some even had this to say at the Party congress last year: 'the greater the distance from the provincial committee the better.' At the Cadres' conference this year some accused the provincial committee of 'consistent rightist tendency' and 'rightist opportunism;' . . . these comrades took their own course in practical work seriously weakening the united will and fighting capacity of the Party.55

Against "localism," Chiang Hua warned that

^Îbid., p. 333.

54Emphasis are mine. Ibid.

^Îbid.. p. 335.

71

cadres from o ther a reas w i l l become loca l a f t e r they have worked for a c e r t a i n period of time and b u i l t c lose t i e s with the loca l people . . The h ighes t p r i n c i p l e of the P a r t y ' s cadres po l i cy i s p r imar i ly 'communization, ' and prov inc ia l i sm i s incompatible with communism.5o

On December 30, 1957 the Governor and Vice-Governor

of CheKiang were dismissed and were removed also as dep

ut ies to the Nat ional Peop le ' s Congress. Similar r epo r t s

came from Anhwei, Honan, Liaoning, Shantung, and Yunnan.

Some of these s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned the purge of some

Party members including the l oca l Par ty sec re t a ry . For

example P 'an Fu-sheng, deposed sec re ta ry of the Honan

provincial committee was accused of opposing the Central

Committee p o l i c i e s and of having a "s t rong element of

' l oca l i sm. ' "57 Similar i nc iden t s were reported from a l l

the provinces . In the same speech mentioned above, Liu

t e l l s h is audience t h a t som^ of those who disagree with

the philosophy of the Great Leap Forward say "We'll s e t t l e

accounts with you a f t e r the autumn harves t . "5° Liu answers

them by saying "Well, l e t them wait to s e t t l e accounts .

They wi l l lose out in the end I"59 The Kansu cadres ack

nowledged Liu challenge mentioned above and said tha t they

56lbid .

^ 'Îbid. , p . 20.

^^ Ib id . , p . 427.

59 I b i d .

72

would "reckon accounts with leaders after the fall."^^

Apparently the cadres meant that they would reckon with

the leaders after the failure of the Great Leap Forward.

This proves that the Great Leap Forward was im

plemented in February 1953 against a considerable oppo

sition from within the Chinese Communist Party. This

opposition according to important figures within the party

caused disunity within the ruling elite and caused the

ouster of some ranking members of the Chinese Communist

Party. Most important was the appearance of an important

opposition which questioned the basis of Mao's political

philosophy of "faster, better and more economical," -'• and

which criticized his discouragement of localism. Similarly

this opposition, as in the case of those Party elements in

Shansi, "doubted the possibility of a leap forward or of

simultaneously developing agriculture and industry."'-' Thus

the opposition to "faster, better and more economical" which

was generated by the Great Leap Forward developed into an

opposition to Mao's general thinking and to its application

in various areas of life.

Some of this opposition also came from the leaders

Ibid.. p. 21.

• Bowie and Fairbank, ££. cit., p. 399.

^Îbid.

i:

• i

I-Mi

« I In..

73

of the armed forces. The failure of the Great Leap For

ward was accompanied by a decline in per capita consump

tion which was caused by a severe shortage of staple and

subsidiary food and clothing. The peasants felt this de

cline most sharply, and became discontented. This dis

content soon spread within the armed forces whose recruits

came chiefly from the rural areas, and consequently was

transmitted to the leaders. It is no surprise, therefore,

to find that some of the opposition to Mao's leadership

came from the military within the leadership of the

Chinese Communist Party."^

The nature of this opposition and its extent will

be discussed later when we study Mao's moves to combat

his foes in the following chapters. Two other factors

contributing to this opposition or disintegration within

the Party—one, the failure of the Commune system, and two,

the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations—will also be

discussed.

^^Choh-ming Li, "Economic Development," from The China Quarterly; printed in Roderick Macfarouhar, China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 166.

CHAPTER IV

THE PEOPLE'S COMUNSS AND POLITICAL DISINTEGRATION

The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t he p e o p l e ' s communes in Commu

nis t China in March, 1953 , and t h e i r subsequent f a i l u r e

contr ibuted t o p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n w i th in the e l i t e s

of the Chinese Communist P a r t y . J u s t as the f a i l u r e of t he

Great Leap Forward c o n t r i b u t e d t o p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n

among the Communist P a r t y e l i t e s , so the p e o p l e ' s communes

created p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the pa r ty l e a d e r s h i p

and c o n t r i b u t e d t o widespread d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n wi th in the «

peasant masses .

The p e o p l e ' s communes and the Great Leap Forward were

two separa te movements des igned fo r the purpose of rap id

i n d u s t r i a l development . As saen in the previous c h a p t e r ,

the Great Leap Forward was adopted t o achieve i n d u s t r i a l

development whi le r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t the development of a g r i

cul ture was e s s e n t i a l t o a succes s fu l i n d u s t r i a l output.•'•

E s s e n t i a l l y , the a d o p t i o n of the commune system, a month

af te r the i n a u g u r a t i o n of the Great Leap, was geared to

•'•Fu-ch'un L i , "On the Big Leap Forward in Ch ina ' s S o c i a l i s t C o n s t r u c t i o n , " Red F l a g , October 1, 1959. The text i s in Bowie and Fa i rbank , ©£. c i l . , r p . 537-596.

74

75

guarantee the s u c c e s s f u l developn^nt of a g r i c u l t u r e .

The a d o p t i o n of t he Commune system r e p r e s e n t e d a

new government p o l i c y i n a g r i c u l t u r e . The Chinese l e a d e r

ship had fol lowed a p o l i c y of c o o p e r a t i v i z a t i o n s ince

December, 1951 . However, t h e new p o l i c y of communization

was not a new idea t o Mao T s e - t u n g . He had r e f e r r e d t o

e s t a b l i s h i n g a commune system in the r u r a l a r e a s a s e a r l y

as 1955. I n t h a t y e a r , i n i n t r o d u c t o r y remarks t o a book

e n t i t l e d S o c i a l i s t Upsurge in Ch ina ' s Countrvside^ he wrote

that the p e a s a n t s of China might be organized in "a com

p l e t e ly s o c i a l i s t way"^ by 1959. Cen t ra l p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p

d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n v/ith the coopera t ive system and the demands

placed on the a g r a r i a n s e c t o r of the economy by the Great

Leap, prompted the Chinese l e a d e r s h i p to adopt the p e o p l e ' s

commune system i n 1953. When the Chinese Communist P a r t y

Eighth Na t iona l Congress proclaimed in May, 1953 the

"General l i n e f o r S o c i a l i s t Cons t ruc t i on , "3 i t marked the

beginning of t he Great Leap and the new campaign for " F u l l -

The book was publ i shed in January , 1956 and c o n s i s t e d of c o n t r i b u t i o n s from" s e v e r a l a u t h o r s . I t was compiled by the General Off ice of t he Cen t r a l Committee of the Pa r ty on

unere e x i s t s a d i s c r e p a n c y anons i,:iw^î^± a^ôiiv^xo, ..^^^....^ English t i t l e of the book, here I hav- usee t h a t o. Bowie and Fairbank, I b i d . , p . 117.

^ F r a n k l i n W. houn, A Short H i s to ry of Chjner^ Co: 1, (Englewood: P r e n t i c e h a l l , 1967) , p . l o 5 .

76

scale communization."^ In order to understand the operation

of the communes, it is imperative that One have some know

ledge of the earlier cooperative system, since both systems

shared in common some important characteristics.

The Pre-Commune Agrarian Policy, 1951-1953

When the political leadership of China initiated a

cooperative farm system in December, 1951, it referred to

it as a temporary and seasonal "mutual aid."5 The experi

mental stage of organizing cooperatives lasted for two

years. In these cooperatives, the peasant was paid dividends

for the land he contributed. If the peasant v;as compensated

for his land, the program was called the "lower" form, but if

the farmer surrendered his farm to the government without the

compensation, the program was called the "higher'' form.^ At

the end of the experimental stags, on February 15, 1953, the

government officially adopted the cooperative program as a

government policy.'' The cooperatives in existence nu. .bered

140,000. In 1954, according to Mao, the Central Committee

decided to increase the number to 350,000 before the end of

4^ IMd. 5Bowie and Fairbank, OP. cit. , r. 92.

Îbid.

' Ibid.

77

the autumn harvest, with a final target of 600,000 for 1954.

In 1955, the number of cooperatives was raised to 650,000,

and included 16.9 million households out of a total of 100

million.° Apparently some difficulties were experienced in

the cooperatives because suddenly in April, 1955, the govern

ment, referring to disappointing harvest yields in 1953 and

1954 (Table IV-l), warned that "the mistakes of 1953 should

not be repeated,"" and some cooperatives were dissolved.

Nevertheless, on July 6, 1955, Mao continued to urge

a quick cooperative organization by projecting a target of

one million cooperativas by 1957. On July 31, 1955, he

raised the target to 1.3 million by October, 1956.^^ This S

target required an increase of 100 per cent in fourteen

months. The same drive for quick and complete cooparative

organization was expressed in "The Draft Program for Agri

cultural Development in the People Hspublic of China 1956-

1967,"- - which was submitted by the Political Bureau of the

Party's Central Committee on January 23, 1956. It stated

that the cooperatives should include 35 per cent of all the

Îbid.

%bid.

* Mao Tse-tung, "The Question of Agricultural Cooperation," a report delivered at a meeting of secretaries of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region coiP.uiittees of the Party on July 31, 1955. The text is in Bowie and Fairbank, Ibid., pp. 94-105.

• • The complete text is in Bowie and Fairbank, J lid. , pp. 120-126.

'V

73

TABLE I V - l

ESTIMATES OF GRAIN OUTPUT IN C0.#1UNIST CHir-iA

IN MILLIONS OF TOIvS (1949-1956)

1955

1956

135

175-130

Year

Pre-1949 peak

1949

1952

1953

1954

Output

170

150

170

166

170

Per Capita Output (kilograms)

320

275

296

234

232

301

273-236

Source: The estiiTiates U.S. a t t a c h e i n China .

are those of 0 . L. Dawson, former The t a b l e i s adapted from E . F .

t! 2merp;in? Pattern of China's Economic nevolution," Jones , in An ,„ J o i n t jlconomic Coramittee of t h e U.S . Congress , 1967) , p

f l u

Economic Profile of Mainland China, Vol. I, (V.'ashington 93.

7Q

peasants households by 1956. The draft also called upon

Areas where cooperation is on better foundations and where a number of cooperatives of advanced form are already functioning should, in the main, complete the change-over to cooperation of advanced form by 1957. Each district of the remaining areas should, in 1956, set up and run one or more large cooperatives of advanced form (each with a hundred or more peasant households) to serve as examples; and by 1953 they should practically complete cooperation of advanced form.12

By advanced form the draft apparently implied a form re

sembling a commune which was yet to be established.

Meanwhile, the cooperative system apparently met

opposition from within the Chinese Communist Party.- -

This "rightist" opposition is revealed through the official ,».

document "Decision on Agricultural Cooperation," which was

adopted by the Central Committee on October 11, 1955. The

document contained the statement that "Rightist tendencies

in the Party should be censured and overcome."^ The same

point was reiterated by Mao himself in December, 1955, in

a preface to the essays mentioned above. Socialist Ursurge

in China's Countryside. In the preface, he writes that

the problem today is that rightist conservatism is still causing trouble in many fields and rre-venting the work in these fields from keeping

^Îbid.

Ibid., p. 4.

-'- The complete text is in Bowie and Fairbank, Ibid. , pp. 106-110.

y

30

pace with the development of the objective situation.-^5

However, the Chinese Communist Party continued its

expansion of the cooperatives. In April, 1953, twenty-

seven cooperatives with 9,369 households in Sui-p'ing

county, Honan Province, formed an amalgamation called the

Weihsing or Sputnik Federated Cooperative. Sputnik was

destined to be known as the first experimental commune in

Communist China.-^

V hy V.'oS the Commune System Established:

Although the commune system was established to gear

the development of agriculture to meet the demands of the

Great Leap Forward, additional motives may be responsible

for its adoption. It has already been stated that "the

decision grew out of the regime's dissatisfaction v;ith the

performance of the agricultural producers' cooperatives."-'-

One author provides the general explanation that the new

program was a useful tactical move on the part of the leader

ship to mobilize public sentiment in the face of the "rightist"

elements during the Hundred Flowers period. A more sound

"'" The complete preface is in Bowie and Fairbank, Ibid. . pp. 117-119.

Kirby, op. cit. . Ill, 31.

17 Tang, o_p. cit.

31

explanation claims that the comm.unes

might provide the foundation of a local economy sufficiently diversified and prosperous to give full employment to its inhabitants.^°

Although the Commune System represents a significant break

from the cooperative system, the change was not a drastic

one. As has been stated the party leadership had called

for the creation of "large-scale administrative units,"-'-^

a few months before the launching of the Communes System.

Furthermore, there had been efforts, since 1956, to com-

20 bine cooperatives into "higher scales."

Thus the development of communes may be considered

as a continuation of this amalgamation process.' -'- One R>.

author claims that an important motive for the development

of the commune system was the Soviet union's orbiting of

the Sputnik in late 1957. The adoption of people's communes,

the author believes

to have sLenimed directly froui -iao Tse-tun£:'s desire to further accelerate China's econc.Tiic develonrnent on the heels of the Soviet Union's orbiting of the Sputnik, . . . v. hich Mao seemed to regard as the beginning of a new era on international rivalry based on^technological and economic innovations.22

13 Gray and Cavendish, OP. cit.,. DP. 32-33. Bowie and Fairbank, on. cit. , p. 21.

^^C. K. Yang, A Chinese Village in E^^rlj^j^ninunl^ Transition, (Cambridge: Technology Press, 1959), p. 233.

)

'Houn, I b i d .

Houn, o r . cj^t . , a l s o i n Powie a r d F a i r b - n k , o r . cU,.

22,

•*>

S2

If this is true, then it can be argued that the Great Leap

Forward was also launched for the same reason. It is

possible that all of these motives had some influence on

Mao's adoption of the Commune System.

However, the immediate motive behind the adoption

of the Commune System was the leadership awareness of the

insufficiencies of the agricultural producers' cooperatives.^3

This reasoning is supported by the fact that under the Commune

System, the Communist Party would have more control over both

production planning and consumption.

«

The Nature of the Communes

One month a f t e r the es tabl i shment of the Sputnik

Commune, the Po l i t bu ro passed a r e s o l u t i o n by which i t

launched the commune movement over the na t i on . Within

three months, the whole country was involved; and by che

end of the year , 120 mi l l ion peasant households in 752,113

cooperat ives had been reorganized in to 26,000 a g r i c u l t u r a l

communes.^^ These communes were e i t h e r township-wide

23 Tang, op. cit., p. 457.

^^"Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes," (Wuhan Resolution), adopted by the Eighth Central Committee of the Party at its Sixth Session on December 10, 1953, and issued December 17, in Bowie and Fairbank, OP. £it., p. 490. Complete text is on pp. 433-503.

•'Jr

33

(Hsiang) or county-wide (Hsien) u n i t s which were formed

out of s e v e r a l c o o p e r a t i v e f a rms . The c o o p e r a t i v e s w i t h i n

the Communes were renamed " the p r o d u c t i o n b r i g a d e s . " ^ 5

I n two d i f f e r e n t r e s p e c t s the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of

Communes r e p r e s e n t s two moves by the c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p .

In one r e s p e c t , the Communes proved t o be a c e n t r a l i z e d

move by the n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p wi th r e s p e c t t o the c lo se

s u p e r v i s i o n of communes by p a r t y o f f i c i a l s . According t o

a pamphlet "Ques t i ons and Ansv;ers about P e o p l e ' s Communes"^"

c i r c u l a t e d in Canton in Oc tober , 1953, command a g r i c u l t u r e

output could be made more e f f i c i e n t v/ith a c l e a r l i n e of

" o r g a n i z a t i o n a long m i l i t a r y l i n e s . " ^ ' ^ In o t h e r r e s p e c t s ,

the communes proved t o be a d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n move by the

government s i nce t he commune r e p r e s e n t e d a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t

geographic u n i t of t h e Chinese community.^^ 'Within a com

mune, i t was p o s s i b l e t o c r e a t e c a p i t a l and " l a b o r on a

l a r g e r sca le ."^"^ Unl ike the sma l l e r c o o p e r a t i v e , i t was

thought the l a r g e r commune V7ould be ab le t o provide work

5Bowie and Fairbank, Ibid., p. 21.

Translated in U.S. Government Publications, Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter JPRS), 666 D April 21, 1959.

' Ibid.

23 o Gray and Cavendish , o^ . c i t . , pp . 3 2 - 3 3 .

2 9 l b i d .

g

u4

for the unemployed. The Commune was more than just an

amalgamation of several farms. According to the govern

ment's plan, each had "workers, peasants, traders, students,

and militia."30 The 'Wuhan Resolution of the Eighth Central

Committee of the Party of December. 10, 1953, summarized the

nature of the communes by stating that

the people's commune is the basic unit of the socialist social structure of our country, combining industry, agriculture, trade, education and military affairs; at the same time it is the basic organization of the socialist state power.31

The Communes,differed radically from the cooperative

farms in several ways: First, the commune was not limited

to agricultural production, as it engaged in trade, industry,

education, social welfare, public health, military affairs,

and general public works. Second, the peasants turned over

to the commune their private lots, homes, and other belong

ings which they previously had been permitted to keen in

the cooperative farms. Third, unlike the cooperative life,

private family life--for a long time—was dissolved within

the Commune. "Public kitchens, public dormitories, and pub

lic nurseries"32 were established, and children were brought

- Ting-yi Lu (alternate member of the Politburo) "Education i iust be Combined with Productive Labor," Red Flag, July 1, 1953, in Bowie and Fairbank, £p. cijt. , p. 447.

31u Houn, opi. cit.

^Îbid.. pp. 165-166.

y

^5

up by nurses i n s t ead of t h e i r p a r e n t s . Fourth, "the Free

Supply" system of free food and a r egu la r wage system were

i n i t i a t e d in the p e o p l e ' s communes. F i f t h , the admin i s t r a t ion

of the coimaunes was d iv ided in to three l e v e l s : "the Commune

adminis t ra t ive committee, the admin i s t r a t ive d i s t r i c t (or p ro

duction brigade) and the production team."33 All of these new

p o l i c i e s , e s p e c i a l l y the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the family system,

proved to be major sources of d i scon ten t among the peasants

—and among the cadre and e l i t e with roo t s in the coun t rys ide .

D i s i l l u s i o n and Discontent

Discontent over the adoption of the peop le ' s communes

was apparent-ly expressed a s e a r l y as November, 1953. As

evident from the V/uhan Reso lu t i on - - c i t ed e a r l i e r , sorae

mi l i t a ry a c t i v i t i e s were met with opposi t ion at l e a s t by

the peasants themselves . The r e s o l u t i o n warned agains t

"Commandism," and s t r e s sed t h a t the Communist Par ty Comiaand

and the m i l i t a r y be separa ted .34 i^ i s a l so evident t ha t

the m i l i t a r y "working s ty le"3 5 advocated by the Communist

Party l eade r sh ip led t o other complaints by the peasan t s .

People 's Daily on October 6, 1953 repor ted "sudden a t tacks"36

33Bowie and Fairbank, or), cit. , p. 500.

^Îbid.

^Îbid., p. 25.

^Îbid.

&6

on the military in some wheat fields. This is supported

by an article in Red Fla , entitled "Have We Already Reached

the Stage of Communism?"^^ In part, the author complained

of people who "regard the militarization of organization

as a condition prepared (sic) (preparatory?) for the

adoption of commandism."-^

The same article reveals that the discontent spread

beyond the peasants, to cadres in many communes. The

author v;rites:

Some we l l - to -do peasants . . . are d i s s a t i s f i e d with t u rn ing t h e i r l ives tock and t r e e s to the communes follovdng the un ive r sa l ;M bu i ld ing of p e o p l e ' s communes and they oppose '5 the g ra in supply system . . . . Some cadres " are indulged in subject iv ism and tha t must be r e c t i f i e d . In a d d i t i o n , there are very few cadres who could not nego t ia te the ' p a s s ' of the u n i v e r s a l bu i ld ing of peop le ' s communes. They se r ious ly r e s i s t the Par ty p o l i c i e s . Some viant t o l i e dov/n and not work anymore .39

The cadres resented the new system mainly because they were

working d i r e c t l y under the pa r ty l eaders in the communes.

In the cooperat ive system they were the responsible l e a d e r s .

Now they f e l t t h a t they were a l s o t r e a t e d as peasan t s .

^^Red Flag November 16, 1953, I b i d . , pp. 479-433. The genera l tone of t h i s a r t i c l e i s p e s s i m i s t i c . The author soundly warns aga ins t the " o v e r - e n t h u s i a s t i c , " and finds i t "necessary to 'êxnlain t ha t to jump over the de f in i t e stage of development of object ive condi t ions i s impossible ."

^ I b i d . , p . 432.

39 ib id .

37

Furthermore, they were suspicious of the competence of

local Party leaders, the new collective ownership, and the

"free supply" system.^^ The cadres were inept at readjust

ing to the new system, and they may have felt that the new

changes were too radical to fully accept them. -*-

These problems did not seem to disappear. On the

contrary, other issues were debated in new articles, and

the Commune system seemed to be plagued by endless prob

lems. For instance, the communes could not provide the

peasants with food under the "free supply system," espec

ially with respect t'o rice and other grains. Slogans such

as "Eat rice without pay,"^^ were circulated among the «

peasants. A debate was shaping up in the People's Daily

on the "wage vs. free-supply"43 by October, 1953. But

both "free-supply" system and "Military-Communism" in the

coramunes were maintained through 1953. Obviously, a

better incentive to the "free-supply" system was needed to

induce production. Some communes tried different incentives.

The Hsuanchuang Commune in Hopei established a "half supply,

half wage syste:Ti" 4 but could not provide the peasants with

^^Bowie and Fairbank, Ibid., p. 31.

^Îbid.

^Îbid., p. 23.

^3lbid.

^Îbid.

•^

>

33

su f f i c i en t supp l i e s of food and, t h e r e f o r e , abandoned t h i s

system a l s o .

Meanwhile, during the f a l l of 1953, a d i scuss ion on

the wages and f ree-supply system took place within the

par ty . An a r t i c l e in the Peop le ' s Daily on September 4 ,

1953, asked t h a t free g ra in supply should be postponed.

Other a r t i c l e s suggested the adopt ion of "piece-wage system

in a g r i c u l t u r e , " 4 5 while the commune workers were demanding

a fixed wage income r a t h e r than a pay by the hour.

The f i r s t seven months of 1959 represented a period

of conso l i da t i on . The government r e a l i z e d t h a t the admin- *S

i s t r a t i o n and the communes must be conso l ida ted . This

process of conso l ida t ion included both counter c r i t i c i s m

and reo rgan iza t ion by the government. By Apr i l , 1959, the

government had sh i f t ed i t s p r i o r i t i e s - - p r o b a b l y with some

pains—from indus t ry t o a g r i c u l t u r e . This was evident in

a speech "Report on Government 'Work,"46 del ivered to the

F i r s t Session of the Second National People ' s Congress by

Chou En- la i on Apr i l 13, 1959. He sa id :

Under present cond i t ions the number of people engaged in a g r i c u l t u r e . . . should not , in gene ra l , be l e s s than 30 per cent of the manpower ava i l ab le in the count rys ide .47

^ 5 l b i d . . pp. 27-23.

^ ^ I b i d . , p . 32 .

47lbid., p. 514. Complete text is on pp. 505-5^9.

39

Thus a major r e o r g a n i z a t i o n e f f o r t by the government was

undertaken; a c l e a r evidence of the f a i l u r e of the Peop le ' s

Communes.

A n t i - R i g h t i s t Campaign

While the government was a t tempting to reorganize

the Communes, a s t rong " a n t i - r i g h t i s t " campaign was launched

by the government. Although an extensive l i s t of those who

were involved in an opposi t ion to Mao was not a v a i l a b l e ,

an admission by a pro-Mao group of a " ' r i g h t i s t ' anti-Mao

comspiracy an teda t ing"^° the Eighth Plenum of the Centra l 3

Committee of August, 1959, a t Lushan, suggests the e x i s t - i.

ence of a major c r i s i s wi th in the Communist Party l eader

ship. This suggest ion i s supported by the following three

i nc iden t s : One, in the Lushan meeting the Minis te r of

Defense P'eng Teh'huai was "openly outspoken in h i s a t t ack

on economic and commercial p o l i c i e s . " ^ ^ I t i s reported tha t

at the meeting P'eng had been supported by such important

party members as Chou Hsiao-chou, the Prov inc ia l Secretary

of Hunan; Chang Wen- t ' i en , the Vice-Minister of Foreign

Affa i rs ; General Huang K'o-chang, the Vice-Minister of

^^W. F. D o r r i l l , Power, Po l i cy , and Ideology in th.e Making of China ' s "Cu l tu ra l Revolution"," (Santa I'lonica: The Rand Corporat ion, 1963), p . v i .

on

Defense; and "a number of l e s s e r p e r s o n a l i t i e s . " 5 0 Two,

a f t e r the Lushan meeting P'eng Teh-huai was "censured and

removed from o f f i c e . " 5 1 And t h i r d , the Lushan meeting

decided to r e t r e a t from the economic program of 1953 which

had included the p e o p l e ' s communes. The r e t r e a t was made

from ownership by the communes to ownership by the production

brigade.5*^ The d i smissa l of the Minis te r of Defense alone

i s a s ign of a major c r i s i s wi thin the ranks of the Chinese

Communist l e a d e r s h i p . At the conclusion of the Lushan meeting

the government launched an a n t i - r i g h t i s t campaign.

I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t in the period between ^

the Centra l Committee's Sixth Plenary Session of December, "

1953 and the Lushan meeting of August, 1959, there was no

major " a n t i - r i g h t i s t " campaign except for an "outburst"53

in Red Flag in the February 24, 1959 e d i t i o n . However, the

s ign i f i can t campaign which was launched a f t e r the Lushan

meeting l a s t e d u n t i l December, 1959.^^

The campaign s t a r t e d four days a f t e r the Lushan p l e

num had ooened with two Peop l e ' s Daily e d i t o r i a l s . Both

^^David Char le s , "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-hua i , " The China Quar t e r ly , (October-December, 1961), p . 67.

^•^Dorril l , pjp. c i t . , p . v i i .

^ C h a r l e s , £p . c i t . , p . 63 .

53 • -30

Bowie and Fairbank, ££. cit. , p. ^J>» ^Îbid., p. 530.

91

editorials warned of the spread of "rightist" ideas.55 The

August 6 editorial "Overcome Rightist-Inclined Sentiment and

Endeavor to Increase Production and Practice Economy,"56 in

cluded a quotation by Mao Tse-tung made in 1955. The quo

tation summarized the feeling of the party leadership toward

those who opposed party policies. And it also gives some

indication of the intensity of criticism voiced against the

Commune System. The quote reads:

The current question is that things can be done with effort are now considered by many people as impossible. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to embark on unceasing criticism against the rightist-inclined conservative ideas ^ now in existence.57 ^

The fact that all cadres were asked to read this

editorial, points to the governriBnt dissatisfaction with a

considerable number of the cadres. The above quote, accord

ing to the editorial, was "a good medicine for the disease

applicable to the rightist-inclined sentiment among some of

the cadres today."5° The widespread opposition is also

55 Charles, £p. cit, p. 69.

56 Complete text is in Bowie and Fairbank, OP. cit.,

pp. 531-533. The opening paragraph of the editorial tell.s of the grim mood of the economy. The impatient leadership of the party and the cadres as well: "It is the urgent task today of industry . . . and the economic front . . . to increase production . . . take a determined stand against the rightist inclined sentiment that has found its way into some of the cadres, . . ."

" Ibid., p. 532.

58 Ibid.

92

evident from the remarks t h a t

the r i g h t i s t - i n c l i n e d conservat ive idea i s doing i t s foul play in many f i e l d s t o such an extent t h a t work in many f i e l d s has fa i l ed to conform to the development of the object ive condi t ions .59

The Red Flag followed with s imi l a r a r t i c l e s in which i t

urged "help" for those comrades who f e l l v ic t ims to the

r i g h t i s t t e n d e n c i e s . ^ ^ In the same month the Liaoning

Provincia l Committee of the Chinese Communist Par ty accused

the " r i g h t i s t s " of voic ing " r i g h t i s t ideas" since March.^•'-

And in the following October Pol-po, Chairman of the Nat

ional Economic Commission, blamed the decline in i n d u s t r i a l

production for June and July on the " r i g h t i s t - i n c l i n e d ^ n

oppor tun i s t s . "^

The a n t i - r i g h t i s t campaign was continued by another

e d i t o r i a l "Long Live the Peop le ' s Communes'." in the People ' s

Daily, August 29, 1959. This a r t i c l e attempted to t race the

h is tory of communes as an " inev i t ab l e h i s t o r i c a l development,' '°3

and s t ressed t h a t i t was developed with the i n i t i a t i v e of the

^ % b i d .

Char les , op. c i t . , p . 69.

Bowie and Fairbank, £P. cit.. p. 33.

Ibid.

-Îbid. . The genera l tone of t h i s document i n d i c a t e s that some important oppos i t ion within zhe par ty claimed t h a t the communes were imposed upon the Chinese s o c i e t y . Th.e purpose of the author was to r e s t a t e the o f f i c i a l attitud-^ that the couirraines were orrani^-ed in accordance with the wishes of the masses.

93

masses. However, for this study, the article is important

because it admits that opposition to the communes was still

to be found despite the reorganization effort started earlier.

The article also claimed that the Commune System was a pro

duct of a movement by the Chinese peasants;—thereby attempt

ing to shift the blame for the problems created by establish

ment of the communes by Mao and also attempting to justify

their creation on another basis.

The article observed that:

apart from the reactionaries at home and abroad there are certain people who are still dissatisfied with and opposed to the people's commune movement.64

The Commune System, according to the article, was

the result of a social movement rather than a pragmatic

government policy:

They are those v;ithin the ranks of the Chinese people , including cerpain right opportunist-s inside the Communist Party, wno are influenced by bourgeois ideology t<o a rather serious degree. They fail to see that the people's commune movement is the product of a great social move.nent . of the hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants.^-^

The article also includes some quotes from those who

oppose the commune system. One must conclude here that since

these quotes were included in an editorial by the People's

Daily, that they in fact were launched by some important

^îbid.

65ibid.

94

p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s . The s ta tements doubt the success of the

communes and express d i sapprova l of the condi t ions of the

people ' s communes. And more important they challenge the

basic o r i e n t a t i o n of Mao's t h i n k i n g , the one ind iv idua l to

whom the c r e d i t of c r e a t i n g the communes i s given.66 One

anti-commune quota t ion c i t e d in the August 29, People ' s

Daily claimed t h a t :

The pe op l e ' s commune lacks object ive mater ia l b a s i s . I t i s not a n a t u r a l product of object ive r e a l i t y b u t . t h e f r u i t the wishful thinking of a few who have cooked i t up out of t h in a i r . 6 7

The a r t i c l e quotes the " r i g h t - o p p o r t u n i s t s " to say t ha t "the

people 's communes were se t up too soon and too fas t and are 1 •t

in a mess."6o

Two days l a t e r , in the September 1, 1959 ed i t ion of

the Red F lag , an e d i t o r i a l e n t i t l e d "The Great Call"^^

appeared, in which the Chinese government at tacked the

" r i g h t i s t s " wi thin the Chinese Communist Par ty . The s ig

nif icant degree of oppos i t ion within the par ty i s p a r t i a l l y

revealed by the value which the governriBnt at tached to t h i s

a r t i c l e . The Chinese government pronounced t h i s a r t i c l e ,

along with the Peop le ' s Daily e d i t o r i a l "Overcome R i g h t i s t -

I b i d . , p . 551.

LkM- , P- 553.

I b i d . , p . 552.

^ ^ I b i d . , pp. 556-561.

95

Incl ined Sentiment and Endeavor to increase Production and

Pract ice Economy,"70 " to be requi red reading for anyone

wishing t o be admitted to an i n s t i t u t e of higher l ea rn ing . "71

In "the Great C a l l , " we see once again an evidence of

opposition to the basic o r i e n t a t i o n of Mao's "general l i n e . "

The author of the a r t i c l e s t a t e s :

Keeping in mind our exper iences accumulated during the pas t many yea r s , we not ice t ha t since the enemy has shown such a hos t i l e a t t i tude toward our genera l l i n e , the big leap fo r ward, and the peop le ' s commune movement, t h i s fac t alone has proved t h a t t h i s i s exac t ly the road which we must t ake .72

The keen opposi t ion t o the Commune System i s quoted

by the a r t i c l e t o "s lander" the Comraune and the Great Leap ]

Forward as a "pe t ty -bourgeo i s fana t ic movement."'3 The fact

that much of these c r i t i c i s m s or ig ina ted within the par ty

i s evident by the a r t i c l e ' s claim tha t the c r i t i c i s m s were

directed so as to "dampen the s p i r i t of the cadres and the

masses of the people." '^^ Thus, i f they were not d i rec ted

by the cadres and the masses, then only some par ty e l i t e s

were to be blamed.

A s t a t e of d i s u n i t y was admitted to e x i s t within the

7 0 i b i d . , pp. 531-533.

'^•'-Ibid.. p . 556.

'^Îbid. . pp. 553-559.

'^Îbid. , p . 559.

'^ÎMd., p . 560.

i

OA

Chinese Communist Party by Liu Lan-t'ao in the article "The

Chinese Communist Party is the Supreme Commander of the

Chinese People in Building Socialism;"'^5 published in the

People's Daily. September 23, 1959. The author claimed that:

A number of comrades . . . say that the party should assume only political and ideological leadership but not organizational leadership over non-Party organizations . . . As we all know . . . only by assuming organizational leadership can political leadership be guaranteed.76

The threat of "rightist-inclined opportunists" to

the harmonious functioning of the Chinese Communist Party

was also explicitly stated by Liu Lan-t'ao. He stated:

At present, a number of rightist-inclined opportunist elements are opposing the general line of the Party, the tre"m.er;aou3 leap forward, and the people's communes. Their attacks on the Party are essentially aimed at advancing the interests of the bourgeoisie and undermining the socialist revolution and socialist construction.77

The discontent and opposition to x-iao' s basic ideologi

cal thinking was also evident in this article. In this par-

ticular instance the basic ideological concept behind the

Great Leap Forward, "placing politics in command, "' ^ was,

according to the author, opposed by some people.

In conclusion, the timing and the intensity of this

75ibid., pp. 571-577.

^%bid., p. 574.

l l z M ' , P« 573. Emphasis i s min.;

1%

r

73 I b i d .

97

" a n t i - r i g h t i s t " campaign show t h a t i t obviously was more

than a rou t ine a t tempt t o poin t out the advantages of the

government's p o l i c i e s and to s t ep up product ion. The a n t i -

r i g h t i s t campaign i s evidence of a widespread discontent and

opposition among the genera l people and e spec i a l l y among the

e l i t e s of the Chinese Communist Pa r ty .

As has been seen above, the " r i g h t i s t " c r i t i c i s m s

of the communes was a l so extended to quest ioning the basic

or ien ta t ion of Mao's "genera l l i n e . "

Why Did the Communes Fa i l ?

I The degree of the Chinese setbacks in agriculture in «

the commune years 195^-1962 is clearly revealed through the '

rate of annual grain yield (Table IV-2).

The first cause for the failure of the communes stems

from their own basic characteristics. Instead of increasing

production, the communes "severely disrupted the national

economy as a whole."'^^ Among the causes of their failure

were the lack of technological base to support the oper

ation, the inexperience of the production brigade (the

cadres), the unhappiness of the peasants over losing their

private plots, the sudden establishment of communal living

which, in essence, abolished the traditional family life,

and work conditions which demanded a greater effort as well

79 Houn, 0£. cit., p. 166.

93

TABLE IV-2

ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF GRAIN IN CHINA (1957-65) (in million metric tons)

Year J.R. Wenmohs W. Klatt O.L. Dawson E.F. Jones Official-estimated

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

1957 1 5 1 5 1 5 135 3 1953 194 205 205 250 ", 1959 163 190 170 270 1960 160 160 160 150 150 1961 167 165 170 162 160 1962 173 130 130 174 174 1963 179 175 1 5 1 3 134 1964 135 190 195 200 200 1965 130 135 193 200 200

Subramanian Swamy and Shahid Javed Burki, "Foodgrains Output in the People's Republic of China, 195S-1965," II^ China Quarterly, No. 41 (January-March, 1970), p. 59. Gathered from the following sources: J.R. -venmohs, "Agriculture in China," Current Scene (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General); /'.K. Klaot, "Grain ProGuction--Com.ment," The China Quarterly. No. 35 (July-September 1968); and ^ Dawson and Jones figures are cited in Edwin F. Jones, "The Emerging Pattern of China's Economic Revoluticn," an economic Profile of Mainland China (V.ashington: Joint : conomic Committee of the U.S. Congress, 1967), Volume I, p. 93-

aBfTn

99

as longer work-day on the pa r t of the peasants . The communes

also suffered from the f r ee - supp ly system, when the communes

were unable to f u l f i l l the peasan t s ' requirements of econo-

raic subs i s t ence . ^ Furthermore, the great amalgamation of

peasants, s t u d e n t s , t e a c h e r s , workers and the m i l i t a r y in

the communes proved t o be a chaot ic s i t u a t i o n . ^ 1 People

with a de f i n i t e s k i l l were suddenly required to adapt t o a

different p o s i t i o n which demanded a new kind of s k i l l . Some

farmers were "suddenly smelting i r o n ; " ° ^ s tudents who were

strangers in the r u r a l commune were working on farms. This

sudden sh i f t in occupations created unpleasant atmospheres

and an "unbearable t ens ion . "^3

A second cause of the f a i l u r e of the communes may

also be a t t r i b u t e d t o the government general policy which

was d i rec ted by Mao Tse- tung. I t i s reca l led tha t the aim

of the Chinese l eade r sh ip was pr imar i ly to develop i ndus t r i a l

iza t ion . The development of the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector was held

important, but i t was secondary to i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . Most

government funds were used t o develop i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,

while the agra r i an sec to r was supposed to develop only by

°^Gray and Cavendish, op. c r t . , p . 34.

^•^Gargi Dut t , "Some Problems of China's Rural Communes," in MacFarguhar, o]^. c i t . , p . 129.

^^ Ib id .

^3 lb id .

•ff

100

the hard work of the peasants, school boys, and teachers.

In short, capital investment was geared to help industry,

while socio-economic reorganization alone was to sustain

agricultural expansion.^^ V/hen Mao realized the inadequate

investment in agriculture, the harm was already done to the

economy of Communist China.

A third cause which definitely contributed to the

failure of the commune system was provided by several natural

calamities. 5 The spring, summer, and autumn of 1959 brought

a "widespread drought, typhoons, floods, and insect pests."^6

Floods were also blamed for the collapse of many dams and

dikes. The Chinese rulers were prompt to blame the commune

failures on these natural disasters. It is absurd to blame

the complete failure of the communes on only the natural

forces. As one author reasons

In China nature has been blamed for calamities which may have had less serious effects had it not been for a deadly conflict between rulers and ruled.o7

By August, 1961, the prospect for the recovery of

agriculture remained dim. "Despite a large shift of labor,"

%bid.. p. 127.

^5w. K., "Communist China's Agricultural Calamities," in MacFarguhar, Ibid., p. 172.

^ o u n , ££. cit., p. 167.

' W. K., 0£. cit.

101

reported the New York Times, "from industry to agriculture

, . . there are no indications that the situation is changing

for the better."^^ Meanwhile, the Chinese government main

tained its position by

playing up disaster reports in key grain areas, apparently to prepare the people for a continuation of the present difficulties.^9

Thus when poor policies caused the unsuccessful eco

nomic development, the government turned to a scapegoat

called natural disasters. In this manner, the Chinese

party elites gave the

explanation for the dislocations caused for two, ^ possibly even three, years in succession, in the 2 wake of the cruel experiment in social engineering J that goes in the name of Communism by way of the communes.90

Reorganization

The disruption in the Communes and the economic

austerity forced the government to introduce new policies

within the communes. New Measures were adopted by the

government before the end of 1953. The Chinese Communist

Party Central Committee on December 10, "restored certain

material incentives for commune members."9-'- It allowed 12

^^"Spread of Apathy in Red China," New York Times, August 7, 1961, p. 3, column 2.

90 VJ.K., op. cit.

"houn, ojp. cit.

]02

hours of s leep and r e c r e a t i o n for the peasants and, in a

decen t ra l i za t ion move, the Committee l imited the s t r i c t ob

servation of the communes by the Centra l Pa r ty . In the Spring

of 1959, the Cent ra l Committee res to red to the peasants the

right t o own small p l o t s ; and i t a l so decided to abandon the

communal k i t chens and dormi to r i es e n t i r e l y . The free supply

system was s u b s t i t u t e d for wages.92 Personal possessions

such as cooking u t e n s i l s and bedding were r e s to red , and the

family l i f e was changed, "the young and aged of each family

[could] a l l l i ve toge the r . "93 The leadership a lso abolished

the misuse of the m i l i t i a as a means of organizing the com

munes. The government declared t h a t the cadres had "mis

understood" what was declared as "ge t t ing organized along

mili tary l i n e s . " 9 4 The par ty leadership now claimed tha t

what i t r e a l l y meant was "ge t t i ng organized on the pa t te rn

of a fac tory ."95

During 1953-1960, when the commune system was s t rugg l ing ,

the incent ive po l icy toward the labor in agr icu l tu re was based

mainly on free g r a i n . Ins tead of mater ia l rewards, " ideo lo

gical and p o l i t i c a l techniques"96 were, according to the

Q2

^ Snow, op. c i t . , p . 435.

^Îb id .

^^ Ib id .

^^ Ib id . ^^Charles Hoffmann, ".Vork Incentive T'olicy j " ôir.-u-

nist China," The China Quar te r ly , (January-March, 19b5i, p. 1 - .

103

Central Committee, the "soul and guide for every kind of

work."^"^ Through 1959, the commune workers were allowed

either " to ea t in the commune mess h a l l s , " 9 ^ or take i t

home to prepare i t . By l a t e I960 the "non-material i n

centives" were abandoned. In adopting the new incentive

policy in both i ndus t ry and a g r i c u l t u r e , China 's leaders

gave f i r s t p r i o r i t y t o a g r i c u l t u r e . The new policy was

evident when the government allowed the farmers to make

full use of t h e i r p r iva t e p l o t s . This concession by the

government was published in November, I960 in People ' s

Daily:

. . . The production team may also make full use of odd lots of land and other scattered pieces of land to cultivate different crops and to carry out forestry, animal husbandry, subsidiary activities, and fishery production.^V

The farmers were allowed to keep the incomes made from crops

and animals raised on their farms. Thus an important con

cession was made by the government when the farmer was able

to till his own small private plot. The leadership also

conceded another incentive by introducing the "piece rates."

By this, each peasant was paid according to what he produced.

" Ibid., p. 105.

9Îbid.

99Lucian Iv. Pye, Tbo S p i r i t of Chinese P o l i t i c s , (Cambridge: The M.I .T. P r e s s , 19^3), p . 209.

104

This move was obviously meant t o help the poor peasant in

the production t eams . l ^^

Other means of r eo rgan iza t ion were made by the l eader

ship. In 1961 the Commune a u t h o r i t i e s were prohibi ted to

impose quotas un l e s s i t was agreed, upon by "the production

brigade and the product ion teams of ten to twenty famil ies ."101

At the end of 1961 an important concession by the leadership

was made t o change the commune system from one ownership to

three l eve l ownership system. The three l eve l s are the

commune, the product ion b r igades , and the production teams.

This measure, according t o Peop le ' s Daily was supposed to

arouse the peasants enthusiasm and create more wi l l ingness to work in a g r i c u l t u r a l production.-'-'^'^

In sp i t e of these changes and concessions, Mao's

leadership continued to adhere to the idea tha t the communes

were successfu l . This was o f f i c i a l l y s ta ted on February 26,

1964 in Red Flag:

The na t i ona l r u r a l i ^ o p l e ' s commune movement s t a r t e d in 1958 has been a great event of epoch-making s ign i f icance in Chinese h i s to ry . . .

Ch ina ' s g rea t p rac t i ce of the people ' s commune and the gradua l ly perfected policy in the course 01 t h i s p r a c t i c e , w i l l add a brand new chapter to the precious book of Marxism-Leninism.-L*^-?

^^ôffman, op. j c r t . , p . 10^-

Snow, ££ . c i t . , p . 436.

Pye, cip. c i t . , p . 210.

^ ^ h b i d . , p . 211.

105

In conc lus ion , the communes were formed to solve a

gigantic problem in Communist China, instead i t created new

ones. This thought has been s t a t ed by Professor Lucian W.

Pye. He said t h a t the Commune movement

, . . ha s t y p i f i e d the many ways in which the Chinese Communist p o l i t i c a l system has appeared to provide answers for the modernization of China but has in f ac t i n t e n s i f i e d the problem.^^4

The Commune' movement, l i ke the Great Leap Forward,

caused d i s rup t ion and p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t eg ra t i on within the

fuling e l i t e s of the Chinese Communist Par ty . This d i s

integrat ion was e x p l i c i t l y admitted by a high ranking mem

ber of the Chinese Communist Pa r ty , Liu Lan - t ' ao , a l t e rna t e

Secretary of the S e c r e t a r i a t e of the P a r t y ' s Central Committee:

The aforementioned mistakes of opposing the pract i c e of placing p o l i t i c s in coimnand, opposing the role of the CCP Committee at various leve ls as the core of l e a d e r s h i p , opposing the pract ice of placing the f i r s t s ec re t a ry in command, in order to downgrade, weaken, and even discard the leadership of the P a r t y , are e s s e n t i a l l y r e f l ec t ions of bourgeois ind iv idua l i sm, l i be ra l i sm, and anarchism within the P a r t y . They run d iametr ica l ly counter to the Par ty cha rac t e r of the P ro l e t a r i a t e .-^^5

Although the only p o l i t i c a l purge mentioned here was

the ouster of P'eng Teh-huai in 195^, several high ranking

msmbers of the Chinese Communist Party were l a t e r ousted by

Mao. The purge of L o J u i - c h ' i n g , Minis ter of Public Secur i ty ,

and P'eng Chen the Secre ta ry General in November, 1965 was

^^Îbid., p. 217.

• ^ Bowie and Fairbank, OP. it. , p. 575.

106

definitely c a r r i e d out because both o f f i c i a l s had opposed

Mao's p o l i c i e s . 10^ I t i s poss ib le t ha t Mao did not have the

support necessary in the Centra l Committee to r e l i eve them

of t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . I f he could have ousted them

through the pa r ty machinery, why did he seek the help of

the People ' s L ibe ra t ion Army as well as the Red Guards?

The following chap te r s w i l l d i scuss t h i s question as well

as Mao's e f f o r t s in ous t ing other high ranking personnel

in the Chinese Communist P a r t y . Before I can do t h i s , i t

is necessary t o d i s c u s s the influence of Mao's fa i lu re in

his p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s with the Soviet Union and how t h i s

failure cont r ibuted t o p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . This wi l l

be the topic of the following chapter .

Ô^Phill ip Bridgham, "Mao's 'Cul tura l Revolut ion ' : Origin and Development," The China (.quarterly. No. 29 IJanuary-March, 1967), op. 21-22.

CHAPTER V

THE INFLUENCE OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

ON MAO'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

I n Chapter Two we saw how mutual ideology and

national i n t e r e s t s provided suppor t fo r the Sino-Sovie t

Al l iance . I n t h i s c h a p t e r we s h a l l see how c o n f l i c t i n g

views of n a t i o n a l i n t e re s t s*^ by Communist China and the

Soviet Union caused a S ino -Sov ie t d i spu t e which con t r ibu ted

to p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n i n the Chinese Communist P a r t y .

In Chapter Two I s t a t e d t h a t Marx i s t -Len in i s t ideology

represented a u n i f y i n g f a c t o r i n S ino-Sovie t r e l a t i o n s . But

as other i s s u e s of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t developed, such as the

"rape of Manchurian i n d u s t r y " ^ by the S o v i e t s , previous u n i

fying f a c t o r s were g r a d u a l l y weakened.3 Other important

issues of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t t o both n a t i o n s l a t e r developed

Quest: Greg Plant) June ^ General Commun: ^..^.,„ . ^ . . ,^^ ^ of i n d u s t r i a l equipment" a f t e r - o r l d --ar I I .

^Schwartz , I b i d .

107

103

as a r e su l t of the S o v i e t Union maneuvers in i n t e r n a t i o n a l

r e l a t i o n s which c o n f l i c t e d wi th Chinese i n t e r e s t s . I would

suggest t h a t the b a s i c cause of t h e s e c o n f l i c t s was Mao's

image of a world o r d e r - (Chapter T w o ) - whose cen te r hope

fully would be China . E s s e n t i a l l y the Sino-Sovie t d i spu te

erupted as a r e s u l t of C h i n a ' s p e r s i s t e n t e f f o r t s to become

a superpower and R u s s i a ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o prevent i t . 4

I t was not s imply an a c c i d e n t t h a t the Sino-Soviet

dispute and the Sov ie t Un ion ' s withdrawal of adv i so r s and

technic ians from China co inc ided with the adoption of the

Great Leap Forward and the Commune System. Mao hoped to

achieve r ap id economic development , acqui re nuclear weapons,

conquer Taiwan and become the "dominant power in East and

Southeast A s i a . " 5 Mao's hope, however, c o n f l i c t e d with the

United S t a t e s ' p o l i c y i n As i a , and with the Soviet Union 's

"policy of c o e x i s t e n c e . " ^ xMao's s t r a t e g y was to discourage

Moscow from e s t a b l i s h i n g any c lose t i e s with V-ashington; he

believed t h a t "peace fu l c o e x i s t e n c e " was the wrong po l i cy

because

^The Sovie t i n t e n t i o n t o " c r i p p l e " the Chinese nuc lear Duild-up i s mentioned in S ino-Sov ie t C o n f l i c t : Rerort on ^^^Q-^Q^^^t C o n f l i c t and i t s I m p l i c a t i o n s . H. Doc. i\o. 237, oVth Congress , 1 s t S e s s i o n , U.S . Government, May 1/., 1965, n. 3R.

. ^^v'illiam E. G r i f f i t h , S ino-Sov ie t Re la t ions 196/.-1965. lârabridge: The M . I . T . P r e s s , 1967) , p . h.

nf c.. ^^^^ London, Un i ty and C o n t r a d i c t i o n : M-^'pr Anjuc £L_^no-SoviQt. h.'.iîir.rc. {f,û, Y^rî' F reder ick .i. i i - : \ . 'i Publisher , 1962) , p . 149!

c t s

109

the American 'paper t i g e r ' wi l l eventual ly withdraw r a t h e r than e i t h e r f igh t gue r r i l a wars i n d e f i n i t e l y or e s c a l a t e to general war.7

In conclus ion , any cooperation or understanding be

tween the United S t a t e s and the Soviet Union which would have

meant an easing of the world tens ion was, according to Mao's

thinking, in c o n f l i c t with China 's i n t e r e s t because a Soviet-

American understanding could mean the Soviet Union would not

help China bui ld the nuclear bomb. Accordingly, China per

s is tent ly opposed "Khrushchev's e f f o r t s to develop a dialogue

with the United S t a t e s . " ^ On the other hand, Russ ia ' s i n

sistence on cooperat ion with the United States and the with-

drawal of Russian s c i e n t i s t s and mi l i t a ry technicians from

China in I960 were based on a fear tha t China might reach

i t s goal of a superpower.9

In accordance with Mao's image of world order, Mao

made i t known t h a t the Soviet Union did not have a monopoly

over the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Marxis t -Leninis t ideology. How

ever, China maintained t h i s view only as i t applied to the

Sino-Soviet c o n f l i c t or when i t involved a pro-Chinese s ta te

'Îbid.

^Richard Lowenthal, "Communist China's Foreign Policy" in Ho and Tsou, ojp. cj^. , p. 7.

^Harold C. Hinton, Co-nunist China in //orId Politics, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19^6), p. 7.

110

such a s A lban i a . On the o t h e r hand, when Yugoslavia de

clared in A p r i l , 195^ t h a t " i d e o l o g i c a l monopoly and

p o l i t i c a l hegemony"!^ of the Sovie t Union was a g rea t ob

stacle t o the development of s o c i a l i s m . Communist China

vehemently opposed and s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i z e d Yugoslavia .

Commenting on the Yugoslav a t t i t u d e toward Russ ia , the

People 's Dai ly on May 5 s a id t h a t T i t o ' s po l icy was an

" a n t i - M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t " and "ou t -and-ou t revisionist ."-^-^

Furthermore, a cco rd ing t o the Chinese s t r a t e g y , China con

s i s t e n t l y opposed the Sov ie t Union on i s s u e s such as d i s

armament, war and peace , peacefu l coex i s t ence , movements of

l i be ra t ion f r o n t s , and others.- ' -^ The Chinese expressed

opposition when Sov ie t a c t i o n e i t h e r did not r ep re sen t an

aggressive Chinese view or when i t at tempted to c lose the

gap between the E a s t e r n and V/estern b l o c s .

Sino-Soviet D i f f e r e n c e s Over Poland, Hungary, Albania, and

Yugoslavia

S ino-Sov ie t d i f f e r e n c e s f i r s t appeared on i n t e r n a t i o n a l

London, o_£. c_it . , p . 170.

^^"Reds i n Pe ip ing At tack T i to i sm," Kew York Times, May 6, I958, p . 1 3 , Column 1.

^^Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , " P a t t e r n s and Limits of the Sino-Soviet D i s p u t e , " Problems of Com;:iunism, 1.0. 5, ^ o l . lA (September-October, I 9 6 0 ) , pp . 1-7.

I l l

issues concerning Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and and Albania

in the m i d - f i f t i e s . In the ea r l y part of 1955, China opposed

the Soviet p o s i t i o n aga ins t Poland and Hungary when both

countries r e s i s t e d Soviet pressure .-'•3 On November 4 1956

a People's Daily e d i t o r i a l - " P a t r i o t i c Hungarians Str ive to

Defend Socialism and Smash the Counter-Revolutionary Resto

ration" - a t tacked the Soviet posi t ion on Poland, reasoning

that

Poland has i n s i s t e d on i t s s o c i a l i s t system. I t has continued i t s support of the Warsaw Treaty and i t s pol icy of f r iendship with the Soviet Union.14

The Chinese pos i t i on on Hungary was d i f fe ren t . When Ferenc

Nagy attempted to "dissolve the Communist dictatorship,"•'•5

by declaring n e u t r a l i t y and withdrawing from the Warsaw

Pact, China promptly changed i t s pos i t ion . I t i s even believed

that Mao urged Khrushchev to intervene m i l i t a r i l y in Hungary.^^

The reason for the change in the Chinese posi t ion toward Hun

gary, a People ' s Daily e d i t o r i a l declared on November 4, 1956,

was as follows:

•^3John G i t t i n g s , Survey of the Sino-Soviet d i spu te , ^ » S i l . , p . 14,

^ ^ I b i d . , p . 70. 1 5

Hinton, op. c i t . , p . 32. ^ ^ I b i d . . p p . 3 2 - 3 3 .

112

In Hungary the counter-revolutionaries have the upper hand and the Nagy Government has announced its withdrawal from the Vv'arsaw Treaty.-^'

The Chinese action thus clearly revealed that China would

be willing to tolerate a challenge to the Soviet leadership

as long as this did not reach a point of a breakup of the

communist bloc. Especially so, if China were permitted to

act as a big advisor and an ally to the challenger state.

Poland, for instance, is reported to have consulted with Mao

who in turn mediated with Khrushchev on^behalf of Poland.

When the Soviet government proposed to condemn Poland at a

meeting of the Communist parties in October, 1956, China

rejected the proposal.-^° The Chinese, through the coming

years, remained loyal to Poland and continued to blame the

Soviets for their "error of great-power chauvinism,"-•-

Sino-Soviet differences over Yugoslavia follov/ed a

similar style to that of Hungary. First, Communist China

had some "reservations"^^ about Stalin's aggressive attitude

- ' Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Disnute, OP. cit.

^Îbid.

•^"The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves-- Ccmment on the Onen Letter of the'Central Coin/.iittee of the CPSU," an editorial by People's Daily and Red Flag, September 6, 1963, cuotBd in Gittings, Ibid. , p. 71. The complete text is in Griffith, The Sino-Soviet h.ift (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press 1964), pp. 3S'S-420.

^^Hinton, op. cj^. , p. 91 r.nd in London, £P. cit:., p. I58.

113

toward Tito. In 195^ a People's Daily editorial referred to

the Cominform resolution of 194^, which criticized Yugoslavia

by claiming that there were some "defects" and "mistakes" in

the method by which the resolution was implerrvented. ^ Second,

when—after the death of Stalin in 1953—Khrushchev pur

sued a line of reconciliation with Tito, China did not ob

ject. But third,' when the Seventh Congress of the League of

Communists of Yugoslavia issued a draft for its meeting in

which the Congress attacked Stalin, attacked the Soviet mono

poly on the Communist ideology, and reaffirmed each State's

freedom to choose its way to socialism, China vehemently

attacked Yugoslavia. A pertinent question here is China's

willingness to support Poland against the Soviet monopoly,

but her failure to support Yugoslav defiance of the Soviets.

Several reasons account for this change in the Chinese atti

tude. First, Yugoslavia had attacked Stalin as early as

December, 1956, at a time when Mao was calling upon Khrushchev

to refrain from such criticisms.^3 Second, Yugoslavia was seek

ing a neutralist position, Tito having accused both military

^Êditorial, People's Daily, May 5, 195^, cited in Dutt, 2p. cit., p. 6E]

^^Bowie and Fairbank, o_p. cit., p. 411*

23A radio broadcast in Peiping said that "the attitude taken by Comrade Tito . . . toward Stalin's mistakes and other related questions . . . cannot be regarded by us as well balanced or objective." Reported in Greg MacGregor, "Peiping Regime Scorns Titoism; Hails Soviet Ties." New York Times, December 29, 1956, p. 1, Column 8.

114

blocs as the sources of v.orld tension.^^ And third, as a

result of Khrushchev's call for peaceful coexistence with

the West,China's attitude became more militant. China

criticized Yugoslavia in an effort to discourage Khrushchev

from "pursuing too energetically a mirage of coexistence with

the 'imperialist coup'."^5 i^ ^n effort to associate Yugo

slavia's action with the V.'est Ch'en'Po-ta, the propaganda

spokesman of the Chinese Communist Party, concluded in a

Red Flag article on November 1, 195^ that the U.S. aid to

Yugoslavia of 1700 million dollars between 1945-1957 had

caused the Yugoslav anti ^'Marxist-Leninist" attitude.

It is precisely the import of large quantities of U.S. aid and the 'American way of life' that has wrought a change in the consciousness of the Yugoslav leading group, caused revisionist ideology to grov; up in its midst, and determined its internal and external policies v;hicn are directed against the Soviet. Union, againso Com.munism, a?:ainst the Socialist, cam^ and against socialism in its ov/n country.26

Unlike Peking's persistent attack on the Yugoslav

leadership, Moscow's criticism was milder and less frequent,

apparently in line with Khrushchev's efforts to lessen the

^^London, Ibid., p. 170. Also in "Tito Affirms Course in Retort to Soviet," New York Times, April 20, 1957, T: . 1, Column 7.

^Bowie and Fairbank, o^. ci_t,. , p. 19.

Dutt, op. cit. , p. 62.

115

differences within the Communist camp.^^ j ^ ^^ attempt to

calm the differences, Khrushchev, evidently, was willing to

tolerate "revisionism"^^ within the international communist

movement. In fact, as early as 195^, while the Soviet Union

was criticising the Yugoslav policies as anti "Marxist-

Leninist," Khrushchev was encouraging a better Yugoslav-

Russian relationship.29 China, however, wanted the Soviets

to take an aggressive action against Tito. This is evident

by the Chinese cries of "betrayed," when the Russians estab

lished better relations with Yugoslavia in 1962.

In the case of Albania, Sino-Soviet differences were

of important consequences. Unlike Poland, Hungary, and Yugo

slavia, differences over Albania resulted in a decisive Sino-

Soviet schism.30 Albania feared domination by its antagonis

tic neighbor Yugoslavia for many years. For instance, the

Albanians felt Stalin's break with Yugoslavia in 194^ dis

couraged Tito from dominating Albania. They also credited

' Barry Farrell, ed.. Political Leadership in . astern Europe and the Soviet Union, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 89-90.

Dutt, 2p. cit. , p. 69.

^Ôn April 27, 195^, Khrushchev sent a message to Tito in which he expressed hopes for "strengthening of friendship between our countries." This message Wc.s later printed on page one of Pravda on May 8, 195^. Reported in "Soviet Publishes Praises for Tito," New York Times, May 9, 195^, n. 2, Column 6.

^^vîlliam t:. Griffith, "' urODean Cor.nunism and the Sino-Soviet Schism," The Annals, lio. 349 (September, 1963), p. 144.

116

Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 with further dis

couraging Yugoslavia from doing the same thing to Albania.

Therefore , when Sino-Soviet differences over Yugoslavia

became public, Albania's leader, Snver Hoxha, promptly

chose the Chinese view. Albania sought close ties with China

as early as 1956. It is reported that upon his return from

China's Eighth Party Congress of September,1956, Hoxha said

that Albania had "a valuable and dear friend"31 in China.

This friendship became evident at the Third Congress of the

Rumanian V/orkers' Party held in June, I960. It is reported

that a "violent clash"32 ^^g aired between Khrushchev and

the Chinese delegate P'eng Chen in an effort— by Khrushchev—

to bring about a debate involving the other Communist parties.

The Communist Party of Albania proved to be the only party to

choose the Chinese side which essentially called for a hard

line against the Viest.

A year later the Twenty-Second Congress of the Soviet

Communist Party-- held in October, 1961-- further demonstrated

the deep schism in Sino-Soviet relations. Khrushchev surprised

the Chinese delegation by retaliating against Albania. Khrush

chev attacked Albania for being anti-Soviet and "for having

^\uoted in Daniel Tretiak, "The Founding of the Sino-Albanian Entente," The China U-uarterly, (Anril-June, 19b2), pp. 123-143.

32Gittings, Survey nf the Sino-Soviet Dispute, or. cit., p. 123.

117

betrayed the Socialist Camp."33 i^ reply, the Chinese dele

gate Chou En-lai defended Albania and revealed his opposition

to the Soviet move by saying that

We hold that, should a dispute or difference unfortunately arise between fraternal parties, it should be resolved patiently in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and on the principles of equality and unanimity through consultations.34

Upon delivering his speech, Chou En-lai left Moscow and was

received by Mao Tse-tung in Peking airport. In the same

month the Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi took the oppor

tunity in celebrating Albania's liberation to warn Khrush

chev that *

All provocations and disruptive schemes directed against Albania by imperialism, Yugoslav modern revisionism and the reactionaries of various countries will certainly meet v;ith ignominious defeat.35

It is evident from this discussion that Sino-Soviet

differences over Poland, Hungary, Yueoslavia and Albania

were motivated by Chinese interests. China's attempt to be

a co-leader, if not the leader of the Communist bloc, was in

line with its efforts to deny a Soviet monopoly over the in

ternational communist movement. The leadership of the move

ment by China, or at least the Chinese influence upon the

33 Dutt, op. cit. , p. 126.

^Îbid.

3 5ibid., p. 127.

M f^

movement, represented a Chinese national interest. So long

as Poland and Hungary challenged the Soviet leadership but

remained within the movement, China supported them. But

when Hungary and Yugoslavia chose to withdraw from the move

ment, China objected, ubviously China was seeking allies from

the movement against the Soviet views. Therefore when Albania

sided with the Chinese, China welcomed its move. But Khrush

chev was not willing to surrender to either the Chinese or

the Albanians. In his speech at the Bucharest meeting,

mentioned above, Khrushchev made it known that "'vVe do not

intend to yield to provocations and to deviate from the

general line of our foreign policy."36 The schism signi

ficantly came as a result of contradicting interests of

Communist China and the Soviet Union. Mao's effort to

deprive Moscow's leadership of the Communist Camp and

Khrushchev's efforts to deny Mao a share in this leadership

brought about the Sino-Soviet schism.37

The Sino-Soviet Schism and the V/est

China's interest in the leadership of the international

communist movement was not the only factor that caused a schism

36Quoted in Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute , op. cit.

37}iarold Hinton, op. cit. , pp, 469-4^^. According to Professor Hinton Khrushchev's fall was caused by the Sino-Soviet conflict.

119

in the Sino-Soviet relations. Chinese efforts to prevent

closer ties between the American and the Soviet governments

would perhaps account for the major contributing cause for

this schism. It is recalled that Albania's support of China's

views at the Bucharest meeting, before all the heads of East

European ruling parties except for Albania, was over inter

national issues such as peaceful coexistence and disarmament.3^

Furthermore, China's criticisms of Yugoslavia, as has been

stated, were partially meant to discourage the Soviets from

easing international tension.

The West's influence on Sino-Soviet relations is

exemplified in Khrushchev's efforts to ease international

tension through a policy of peaceful coexistence and dis

armament. Khrushchev's efforts however were met by nersis-

tent Chinese opposition. The Sino-Soviet schism was material

ized as several important international incidents developed.

20th Congress of the CPSU

According to the leadership of Communist China, the

origin of the Sino-Soviet "split in the international commu

nist movement"39 was the Twentieth Congress of the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union which was held in F ebruary, 1956.

3^Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Disnut?, oj . cit.

39 See Note No. 16.

120

In that congress Khrushchev delivered his secret speech in

which he denounced Stalin, advocated a policy of peaceful

coexistence, and called for nuclear disarmament. The Chinese

leadership was opposed to all three issues in Khrushchev's

report. The Chinese leadership claimed that "the criticism

of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU was wrong both in

principle and in method,"40 that Stalin was

a great Marxist-Leninist, a great proletarian revolutionary . . . made some serious mistakes, but compared to his great and meritorious deeds his mistakes are only secondary.41

The Soviet leaders, however, were unmoved by the Chinese

remarks. In reply to the Chinese allegations, Pravda accused

the Chinese Comnmnist Party leaders of having "taken on them

selves the role of the defenders of the cult of the individual

and disseminators of Stalin's erroneous ideas."42

Criticizing Khrushchev's policy of coexistence, the

Chinese said:

This erroneous thesis is a clear revision of the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the state and revolution and a clear denial of the universal significance of the road of the October revolution.^^

^^Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, c£. c^t. , p. 390.

4llbid.

^^"The Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to Party Organization and all Communists of the Soviet Union," Pravda, July 14, 1963, quoted in Gittings, gj^. cit. , p. 64.

^3Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Scviet Distute, oi . ci t. , p. 62.

121

The exchange of accusations by the leaders of both

nations continued until the summer of 195^. At that time,

developments in the Middle East prompted Khrushchev to

communicate directly with President Eisenhower at Camp David

in order to ease the international, situation. This action,

however, increased the Sino-Soviet debate.

The Middle East Crisis and the First Summit Meeting

On July 4, 195^, an Iraqui military group under the

leadership of Abdul Karim Kasem overthrew the government of

King Faisal. Acting out of fear that the United States might

intervene, the Chinese government called upon the Soviet Union

to intervene first in order to discourage the "imperialists"

from attacking Iraq.^^ While ignoring the Chinese wishes,

Khrushchev proposed a summit meeting which would include

India, the United States, Britain, and France but exclude

Communist China. Consequently, Mao objected to this move for

three reasons. One, Mao felt that he was insulted for not

being invited. Tv/o, Mao did not feel that it was appropriate

for India to be invited to participate in Big Power diplomacy,

while China was ignored. And three, the summit move by

Khrushchev represented an obstacle to China's policy of in

tensified struggle. China's policy was to encourage confront

ations by liberation fronts and coups such as those which took

^^Hinton, o£. ci_t., p. 37.

place in the Middle Eas t .45

However, P res iden t Eisenhower suggested t ha t the

meeting be on the U.N. Secur i ty Council l e v e l , t o which the

Soviet government agreed.46 As far as tlie Chinese govern

ment was concerned, China continued to oppose any mutual

understanding by the Sovie ts and the Americans on i n t e r

nat ional i s s u e s . Furthermore, China remained outside of

t h i s high l e v e l meet ing.

In an e f f o r t to r eassure Mao, in order to prevent a

further severe s e t back in Sino-Soviet r e l a t i o n s , Khrushchev

v i s i t ed Peking (July 31-August 3 , 195^) and t r i e d to woo

Mao to accept the Soviet move. Apparently, ne i ther of the

leaders was able t o convince the other of h i s views and no

compromise was reached. After Khrushchev's v i s i t , Mao on

August 4 made h i s views c l e a r through the o f f i c i a l P e o r l e ' s

Daily. According to Mao "begging would not preserve peace,"

but a " m i l i t a r y s t ruggle would."47

Unhappy with Khrushchev's po l i cy , Mao made i t known

to the world t h a t the Soviet Union no longer represented the

leadership of the Communist b loc . In another e d i t o r i a l , a

People 's Daily w r i t e r said t ha t Mao had concluded t ha t " a l l

^^ Ib id .

^^Garthoff, op. p i t . , p . 92.

^'^Dutt, 2n. c i t , . , p . 7 1 .

123

reactionaries are doomed to perish," and that "imperialism

and all reactionaries are paper tigers."4^ According to Mao

this statement comprises an "invincible Marxist-Leninist

ideological weapon."^^ With this "ideological weapon," the

Soviet Union should not fear a nuclear war because the West

will not fight. Therefore, the enemy should be "despised"

strategically and maneuvered "tactically" until he "perishes."5^

At this time Khrushchev was trying to convince the

Chinese that he was a friendly ally and that he was willing

to help China attain economic development. New trade agree

ments were signed by the Soviet Union and Communist China.

On November 6, 195^, both governments announced that the

Soviet Union would construct forty-seven nev; industrial enter

prises in addition to 211 already under construction, and the

Soviet Union would supply China vjith some important scientific

and technical information. On February 7, 1959, a trade

agreement was signed by Khrushchev and Chou En-lai which

called for the construction of seventy-eight more industrial

projects to be built by the Soviets. If this Soviet gener

osity was meant to persuade the Chinese to the Soviet views,

it failed.

^%bid., p. 72.

^%bid.

50lbid.

1 0 24

Khrushchev's concern over winning the Communist

Chinese t o h i s point of viev; and h i s des i r e to maintain

harmonious r e l a t i o n s with them are evident in h i s second

v i s i t t o China on September 30, 1959, a f t e r h i s r e tu rn from

the United S t a t e s . After confer r ing with Pres ident Eisenhower,

Khrushchev flev; d i r e c t l y t o Peking a f t e r changing planes a t

Moscow's a i r p o r t . At the Peking a i r p o r t he to ld h i s host

that the t a l k s a t Camp David "without doubt, should lead to

the improvement of the r e l a t i o n s between our two count r ies

and to the r e l a x a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t ens ion . "51 To the

disappointed Khrushchev, the Chinese, however, fa i led to

make a welcoming speech and ref ra ined from answering h i s

speech. At a banquet on the same day, Khrushchev took the

opportunity to reaff i rm h i s pos i t i on :

We . . . must do ever2/thing possible to p re clude war as a means of s e t t l i n g outstanding ques t i ons . These ques t ions must be solved through nego t i a t i on .52

Khrushchev's t r i p to Peking, as the t r i p before i t , fa i led

to persuade Mao to adopt the Soviet pol icy of peaceful co

ex i s tence . In f a c t , t h i s t r i p may have been l e s s successful

than the previous one in 195S. In con t ras t t o the 195^ t r i p ,

the l a t e s t one f a i l ed to produce a j o in t comm.unique af ter the

^Îb id .

52The complete text of the speech is in Gittings, op. crt., rp. 328-337.

125

formal t a l k s between Khrushchev and xMao.

As ev iden t from severa l sources , Khrushchev's concern

over the i n t e r n a t i o n a l t ens ion stemmed p a r t i a l l y from Russ i a ' s

concern of China ' s a c q u i s i t i o n of a modern weapon system.53

The New York Herald Tribune repor t ed , a week a f t e r Khrushchev

had l e f t the United S t a t e s , t h a t the Soviet leader had l e f t

the impression t h a t "he was in a hurry to achieve peaceful

coexistence p a r t l y because he f ea r s the growing power of

China."54 There may a l s o have been a substance to China 's

fear t h a t an American-Soviet understanding might jeopardize

China's chance of r ega in ing Taiwan because, according to the

American Secre ta ry of S t a t e , Chr i s t i an Her ter , Khrushchev

"did not exclude the i s l and from an agreement to foreswear

the use of force ."55 China ' s unhappiness with American-

Soviet n e g o t i a t i o n s which might include Taiwan were gener

a l ly not discussed pub l i c ly u n t i l September 1, 1963, when

a People ' s Daily a r t i c l e dec la red :

We have not fo rgo t ten and wi l l not forget what the Soviet l e a d e r , Khrushchev, said about the question of Taiwan a f t e r h i s v i s i t to the United S t a t e s in October, 1959.

He said t h a t the quest ion of Taiwan vjas an in9en-d ia ry f ac to r in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l si tuation.5<

53Gi t t ings , Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, OP. c j j , . , p. 117.

^4 bid.

55ib id .

^ ^ b i d . . p . I I B .

126

The differences over international issues continued between

the leadership of the Soviet Union and the leadership of

Communist China, but no major rift took place in their re

lations. The Chinese, meanwhile, held to the view that only

future actions would reveal whether the United States was

actually sincere in its devise to improve the international

climate .

The Proposed Summit Meeting of I960

Soviet efforts to hold a Big Four summit meeting in

Paris in I960 brought about increased Chinese criticism and

widened the gap between the two countries. The first few

months of I960 were marked by a steady escalation of the

polemics between the Soviets and the Chinese. 57 And the

political differences between them were taking to the inter

national Communist movement.

As Khrushchev was preparing for the summit conference,

an American U-2 aircraft flying a spy mission over the Soviet

Union was shot down on May 1, I960. Unfortunately for Khrush

chev, the incident seemed to confirm the Chinese harsh analysis

of "imperialism."5^ The Chinese capitalized on the incident

by taking the attitude of "we told you so." Thirteen days

-^'London, op. cit. , p. l69.

5^Hinton, pj). cit. , pr. 41-42.

127

after the incident Mao, referring to the Soviets, told a

delegation of Latin Americans that "some people" had said

that Eisenhower was a peace loving man, and he (Mao) hoped

that these people would learn from the U-2 incident.59

Khrushchev, however, remained unmoved. On May 20, he told

the German leaders of East Berlin that although the summit

conference was wrecked.

We will not do anything that might aggravate the international situation and bring it back to the worst times of the cold v;ar.60

Mao's next move was to humiliate the Soviet Union be

fore the international movement in a hope to gain support of

the Communist parties. By this move Mao was, in essence,

challenging the Soviet leadership of the Communist bloc. -

This took place before the General Council of the -Vorld

Federation of Trade Unions in Peking on June 5, 1960.^^ The

head of the Chinese delegation, Lin King-i, declared in his

speech on June 7 that ''No negotiations, in any case, c

place the struggle of the v;orking class and the masses of

the people in different countries.^3 On the fcllov.dng day

an re-

^^Dutt, ££. cit., p. 93.

^^Sydney Gruson, "Premier in Berlin," N^w York Times, May 21, I960, p. 1, Column 8.

Hinton, ££. cit., p. 169.

^Îbid.

^3Dutt, or. cj_t., p. 103.

12^

the Vice-Pres ident of the Al l China Federat ion of Trade

Unions r e j e c t e d Khrushchev's disarmament proposals by

s t a t ing :

There are people who believe that such proposals can be realized when imperialism still exists and that the danger of war can be eliminated by relying on such proposals. This is an unrealistic illusion.64

But the Chinese were unsuccessful in this attempt to

either humiliate the Soviets or gain a considerable support

from the members of the bloc. One significant aspect of this

attack was to intensify the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Two weeks later, Khrushchev personally attended the

Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party in Bucharest on

June 22. The Russian leader took the opportunity to defend

his policies and to attack those policies advocated by

Peking. The Mayor of Peking, P'eng Ch'en, maintained how

ever, the validity of the Chinese policies on all international

issues. The inevitability of a Sino-Soviet breakup became

evident when the Soviet Union, acting unilaterally, withdrew

all its technicians and advisors from China. At a time when

China was experiencing a great difficulty in economic develop

ment, this act helped only to worsen the relations between

the two countries.

The confrontation by the leaders of Communist China

and the Soviet Union was once again reenacted at the Forty-

^Îbid.

129

Third ann iversa ry of the October Revolution in Moscow in I960.

The Chinese de lega t ion lead by Liu Shao-ch ' i came to f ight

for i t s viev/s, while Khrushchev was there represent ing the

views of h i s country .65 After severa l weeks of d iscuss ions

among the e ighty-one Communist p a r t i e s present , a "communique,"

known as the "Moscow Statement ," was adopted. The communique

revealed t h a t the Soviet view prevai led over t ha t of the

Chinese. On the i ssue of world revolu t ions the s tatement , ad

hering to the Soviet view, s t a t ed t ha t world revolu t ions can

be developed "ch i e f ly by t h e i r economic cons t ruc t ion ."66

The Chinese claimed t h a t r evo lu t ions could be staged only

through armed s t r u g g l e s . The dec la ra t ion s ta ted the working

class in severa l c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , along with the help

of "d i f fe ren t p a r t i e s and public organiza t ions ,"67 could

unite the people t o win p o l i t i c a l power without c i v i l war.

Similar ly , the Soviet view on disarmament prevailed over tna t

of the Chinese. The "Communique" s t a ted tha t

the implementation of the programme for general and complete disarmament nut forward by the Soviet Union would be of h i s t o r i c importance for the d e s t i n i e s of mankind.68

Because the Chinese were unable to muster enough support

^Îb id .

^ % b i d . , p . 107.

^'Îbid. , p . 112.

^ ^ I b i d . , p . 109.

130

for t h e i r views from o ther communist p a r t i e s , they did not

pe r s i s t in t h e i r point of view. In s t ead , the Chinese

acclaimed the s o l i d a r i t y of the Sino-Soviet r e l a t i o n s . To

emphasize t h i s s o l i d a r i t y , Peking leaders concentrated on

such po in t s in the communique as ".the a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t

s t ruggle"^^ and the denuncia t ion of Yugoslavia and the

United S t a t e s .

Kennedy and Khrushchev

Sino-Soviet r e l a t i o n s , hovjever, turned "rapidly t o

wards an open p o l i t i c a l and ideo log ica l break in 1961,""^^

Sino-Soviet d i f f e rences quickly developed over i ssues such

as the Khrushchev-Kennedy Conference of 1961, the Bay of

Pigs Invasion C r i s i s , and the Test-ban Treaty. On these

i s sues , the Chinese view was the more m i l i t a n t , more

aggressive, and more independent of the Soviet Union. The

struggle for l eade r sh ip wi th in the divided bloc and Commu

nis t movement was c l e a r l y replaced by the open proclamation

of Peking as an independent force in world p o l i t i c s and "the

center of a new world-wide movement."^^

By 1964 the l eade r s of Communist China became con

vinced t ha t Khrushchev was a l l y i n g Russia with the United

70 Lowenthal, o_p. c i t . , p . 7.

71 I b i d .

131

States "aga ins t them on a l l c r u c i a l foreign pol icy i s sues . "72

Within the i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist movement, the Russians

t r i ed to expe l l the Chinese Communist Par ty from the move

ment in the years from I963 to I965, through strong pressure

on pro-Soviet p a r t i e s . In I960 i t was thought tha t the Sino-

Soviet d i spute had some " l i m i t s " beyond which the dispute

would not reach.' ' '3 As i t s tands today the dispute has ex

ceeded these l i m i t s ; the two na t ions no longer seem to care

much about u n i t y wi thin the Communist b loc .

As of October, 1970, the Sino-Soviet border dispute

remains u n s e t t l e d . China i s s t i l l without a Soviet ambassador;

and the Chinese p ress accuses the Soviet leaders "of being

worse than Hitler .""^4

The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Mao's Leadership

The inf luence of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the leader

ship of the Chinese Communist Par ty i s profound. I t i s pro

found because the d i spu te affected Communist China 's economy

and foreign diplomacy as we l l . China 's economy de f in i t e l y

suffered from the t e rmina t ion of the Sino-Soviet t r a d e . The

'^^Griff i th , Sino-Soviet Re la t ions . 1964-1965, OP. p i t . , p. 12.

73 '"^Brzezinski, op. c i t . , p . 1. '^^"Cûarterly Chronicle and Documentation-China and the

Soviet Union," The China Quar te r ly , (July-Septenber, 1970), p. IS5.

132

country's m i l i t a r y s t r eng th was jeopardized by the wi th

drawal of the Soviet s c i e n t i s t s and t echn ic i ans . These are

the f a c t o r s t h a t accounted for the influence of the Sino-

Soviet d ispute on Mao's l e a d e r s h i p . However, i t i s d i f f i

cult t o measure the degree of the d i spu te s ' e f fec t on

China's l e ade r sh ip because the dispute accompanied other

domestic f a i l u r e s such as the Great Leap Forward and the

Commune System. Furthermore, the Chinese setbacks within

the i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist movement must have "contr ibuted

to the genera l mood of c r i s i s . " 7 5

I t i s widely accepted t h a t the dismissal of China 's

Minister of Defense Marshal P'eng Teh-huai involved a d i s

pute over Mao's pol icy with the Soviet Union.'^6 Marshal

P 'eng 's purge was e x p l i c i t e l y r e l a t ed to the Sino-Soviet

dispute in an a r t i c l e published in the People ' s Daily as

well as the magazine Red Flag . The a r t i c l e accused Khrush

chev of conspi r ing with Marshal P'eng Teh-huai against Mao's

leadership.'^' ' ' Several i nc iden t s occurred which prompted

'^^John G i t t i n g s , "The Great-Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign P o l i c y , " op. c i t . , p . 53.

'^^Git t ings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Disnute, op. c^ t . , p. 96. Also in Raymond Garthoff, The Annals, OP. c i ^ . , ^ . 90, and in Uri Ra'anan, "Peking ' s Foreign r o l i c y ';.ebate l . b ^ -1966," in Ho and Tsou, 0£. cU,. , p . 3^ .

'77"The Leaders of the CPSU Are the Greatest S o l i t e r s of our Times," Peking Review, No. 6, Vol. VII, Uebruar> I, 1964), pp. 5-21.

133

Mao to be l ieve t h a t a conspiracy was taking p l ace . From

April 24 t o June 13, 1959, P'eng v i s i t e d Albania. Khrush

chev was a l s o in Albania and i t i s believed t h a t P'eng

expressed t o the Soviet l eader h i s concern about the gradual

de te r io ra t ion in Sino-Soviet r e l a t i o n s . More important was

an incident which involved P'eng with the Soviet leaders

prior to the famous Lushan meeting of August, 1959, in

which the Min i s t e r of Defense a t tacked Mao's p o l i c i e s . Pr ior

to the meeting Marshal P'eng Teh-huai i s reported to have

sent a l e t t e r t o Khrushchev in which he c r i t i c i z e d the

domestic and fore ign p o l i c i e s of the Chinese Communist Par ty .

P 'eng's a c t i ons demonstrated h i s fear t ha t "the growing

breach with the Soviet Union"7o would jeopardize Soviet arms

aid. P ' e n g ' s sympathetic a t t i t u d e toward Moscov; was con

firmed by Khrushchev v:ho c r i t i c i z e d the Chinese leadership

for removing P'eng from o f f i c e . At the Bucharest Conference

of June, i960, Khrushchev accused the Chinese of persecuting

comrades who opposed t h e i r p o l i c i e s or contacted the Sovie t s .

After r e f e r r i n g to P'eng Teh-huai Khrushchev brought up the

case of Kao Kang who was purged e a r l i e r in 1955. The Soviet

leader said t h a t Kao Kang's only " g u i l t " was opposition to

Chinese pol icy toward the Soviet Union. '^

"^ârthoff , "Sovie t -Sino Mi l i t a ry Re la t ions , " pp. c^t .

'^"Charles, op. c i t . , p . 75.

134

Other high ranking members of the Chinese Communist

Party were dismissed because of their support for P'eng Teh-

huai' s views. In December I966 People's Daily criticized

those "class enemies" within the party who from 1959 to 1962

used their bourgeois and revisionist viewpoints to oppose our general line of socialists construction and the general line of our foreign policy.^^

Among those who were accused of having expressed such views

were Lo Jui-ch'ing, the Chief of Staff who advocated re

conciliation with the Soviet Union, Peng Chen, Secretary

General of the Chinese Communist Party, Vm Han, former deputy

mayor of Peking and his two senior aides Liao Mo'sha and Teng

To held similar views. All these important party officials

were purged in 1966. Other party officials who adhered to

similar views and were purged in 1966 were Chou Yang, Deputy

Director of the Economic Research Institute in the Chinese

Academy of Sciences, who in I96O and 1961 "laid down a long

series of written and verbal charges against Mao's policies."°'^

These are a few but significant examples of the in

fluence of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the party elite. How

ever these examples do not reveal the extent of the crisis

within the Chinese Communist Party. The manner in which

the purge was carried out and the large number of officials

Ho and Tsou, OP. cit. , p. 322,

- Donald Zagoria, "The Sprateric Debate in hekirg, in Ho and Tsou, Ibid., p. 263.

^^ho and Tsou, Ibid., p. 55.

ti

135

removed or humil ia ted t e l l s more about the ex ten t t o which

the Sino-Soviet c o n f l i c t , the f a i l u r e of the Great Leap

Forward and the Commune System influenced p o l i t i c a l d i s

integration of the e l i t e of the Chinese Communist Party.

I wi l l develop t h i s in the following chapter .

CHAPTER VI

MAO'S EFFORTS TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE

IN HIS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

The consequences of the Great Leap Forward, the

Commune System, and the S ino -Sov ie t d i spu te on. the l e a d e r

ship of the Chinese Communist P a r t y were p o l i t i c a l in n a t u r e .

One evidence i s Mao 's 195^ d e c i s i o n not to stand for r e

e l e c t i o n as a c a n d i d a t e fo r Chairman of Communist China.

Another consequence was P ' eng T e h - h u a i ' s a t t a c k on Mao's

p o l i c i e s in t he Lushan meet ing of August, 1959. Mao's de

c i s ion , which was i s s u e d on December 17, coincided with the

l e a d e r s h i p ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s over the Communes during the Wuhan

meeting of the Eighth C e n t r a l Committee of December 10, 195S.

The reader should r e c a l l the f a c t t h a t t h i s same committee

issued a r e s o l u t i o n v^hich d e a l t mainly with Commune problems.

These, however, a re only two examples of the inf luence of

policy f a i l u r e s on the e l i t e s of the Chinese Communist P a r t y .

4 h e communique which was adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of December 195^ claimed t h a t Mao's dec i s ion would enable him t o b e t t e r "concentr^-te h i s e n e r g i e s on a e a l m p with q u e s t i o n s of the d i r e c t i o n , po l i cy and l ine ol the party and the s t a t e . " The complete t e x t of the communique i s in Bowie and F a i r b a n k , oje. ci_t. , pp . 4^7-488.

136

137

The full effect of these failures is best understood by

studying the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."'^

This "revolution" is important for this study because it

provides a valuable source of information about the Chinese

elites in the years between 195^ and I967. As one author

has suggested:

This most profound crisis in the history of the Peking regime provides us with the best available opportunity to study the Chinese political system.3

The interest here is twofold: (l) to point out that

the "revolution" was a product of Mao's difficulties in do

mestic as well as foreign affairs; and (2) to show that—

in an attempt to restore confidence in his personal leader

ship— Mao blamed the difficulties on those who opposed him,

and responded to their opposition by relieving the accused

of their positions.

The Origin of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution

The lack of reliable data has led to disagreement

among students of politics outside China on the origin and

effects of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Some

of the different hypotheses on the origin of this "revolution"

Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," The China Quarterly, (April-June, 1969), p. 63.

Îbid.

136

and t h e i r au thors a r e :

1 . The " r evo lu t ion" i s a " log ica l s e r i e s of spontaneous e r u p t i o n s . " (V/. F. D o r r i l l ) 4 -^

2 . I t r e p r e s e n t s a " r e c t i f i c a t i o n " movement as a

function of "Chinese Communist ideology," (S. J . Noumoff)5

3 . I t i s the r e s u l t of a power s t rugg le , unrelated

to p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s , in which Mao's foes were in te res ted

mainly in t ak ing power away from Mao Tse-tung. (Victor Zora)^

4 . I t i s caused by domestic i s s u e s . (Christ ian

Duevel) '

5. I t i s caused by foreign policy i s s u e s . (Franz

Schurmann)

I f ee l t h a t each of these hypotheses i s e i t he r wrong

or incomplete. I r e j e c t the f i r s t hypothesis because i t i g

nores the accusa t ions launched agains t those persons ousted

from o f f i ce . The hypothes is a lso ignores the p o s s i b i l i t i e s

^ D o r r i l l , op. c i t .

^S. J . Noumoff, "China 's Cul tura l Revolution as a Rect i f icat ion Movement," Pac i f ic Affa i rs , Nos. 3 and 4, Vol. 40, (Fa l l -Winter , 1967-1968}, pp. 221-234.

^Victor Zora, "The Hidden Bat t le for Power in Red China," Look Magazine, Vol. 30 (August 23, 1966), pp. . ' ; -2o.

"^Christian Duevel, "China 's Yezhovshchina," Radio Liberty Research Paper, No. 10 (1966), c i ted in Tsou, OP. e ^ -

^Franz Schurmann, N w York K^view of Books, October 20, 1966, c i t ed in Tsou, I b i d .

139

of p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s fol lowing a widespread economic setback

such as the Great Leap Forward. I t i s inconceivable tha t

such a p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s would a r i se without a def in i te cause

or a p a r t i c u l a r s t imulus , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the country had

experienced some considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s in foreign and

domestic p o l i c i e s . The second hypothesis i s too l imited to

account for the p o l i t i c a l purges which h i t the highest level

of the Chinese Communist P a r t y . Furthermore, the r e c t i f i c a

tion movements of the past were conducted through the press

only, i . e . , t h a t of 1956 assoc ia ted with the "Hundred Flowers"

policy.9 S i m i l a r l y , the t h i r d t h e s i s i s unacceptable for the 0

simple reason t h a t hard ly any p o l i t i c a l power struggle occurs

without r e l a t i o n s h i p to p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . P'eng Teh-huai, as

stated, was ousted in 1959 because of a disagreement over

specific p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . The absence of foreign policy

issues from the four th hypothes is and the absence of domestic

policy influence from the f i f t h hypothesis make each one in

complete .

I there fore propose t h a t the Great P r o l e t a r i a t Cultural

Revolution represented a power s t ruggle brought about by Mao's

failure in both domestic and foreign p o l i c i e s . The domestic

programs of the Great Leap Forward and the Commune System as

well as the Sino-Soviet Al l iance were geared to achieve

9 . Gray and Cavendish, OP. c i t . , p . 80.

140

indus t r ia l development. I n d u s t r i a l development obviously

created a bureaucracy and an e l i t e group. Both innovations

were new to Mao and were fore ign to h i s p o l i t i c a l thought of

the "mass l i n e , " t h a t h i s t o r y i s created by the masses ra ther

than by ind iv idua ls . - i^ His objec t ions to the new development

are evident in remarks he made in I960 which were not pub

lished for severa l y e a r s . Mao to ld a group of foreign

v i s i to r s in I960 t h a t he had feared the "era of revolution"

had been replaced by the "era of the organizer."^^ This

group of "organizers" opposed Mao's emphasis on revolut ion, 12 having a vested i n t e r e s t in improving i t s own s t a t u s .

Thus, a s t ruggle arose out of Mao's e f for t to control the

bureaucratic and par ty elites.-^-^

Mao a t tacked the bureaucracy and " r ev i s i on i s t s " in

the following manner: "push to the l i m i t , " time your action

so that " there must be ne i t he r p rocras t ina t ion nor prec ip i ta te

^ ^ I b i d . . p . 149. See note 21 below.

^^Hans Granquis t , The Red Guard, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, P u b l i s h e r s , 1967), p . 5.

12 Gray and Cavendish, OP., c i t . , p . 68.

l^Harold D. Lasswel l , "Russia and China in a .-lodernizing World: A Concluding Note," in Soviet and Chinese Communi .m^ Simi la r i t i es and Dif fe rences , ed. by Donald - . Treadgcld, (Seattle 1 Unive r s i ty of -Washington Press , 1967), p. ^29. A good discuss ion of the inf luences of i ndus t r i a l fa i lure on po l i t i ca l con t ro l i s in Barrington Moore, J r . , "Kctes on the Process of Acquiring Power," v.'orld P o l i t i c s , ho. 1, Vol. 8, (October, 1955),' op. 2-6 .

141

action," and i n o r d e r t o d i scourage those " r e v i s i o n i s t s " " i t

often pays t o be rude ."14

The Campaign t o Reorganize the Army

Although Mao d id not "push t o the l i m i t " u n t i l l a t e

1965, he s t a r t e d h i s a t t a c k soon a f t e r the Lushan meeting of

the Cent ra l Committee August 2 -16 , 1959. During the meeting

P'eng Teh-hua i , the M i n i s t e r of Defense, a t tacked the s h o r t

comings of t h e Communes and " the mass campaigns in i n d u s t r y

and a g r i c u l t u r e , " the Great Leap Forward, and Sino-Soviet

d i f f i cu l t i e s . - ' - ^ At f i r s t , the government p ress was s i l e n t

about P ' e n g ' s a t t a c k . I n f a c t P a r t y l e a d e r s permit ted a p ro

t rac ted debate e i t h e r because the government wanted to know

P ' eng ' s a s s o c i a t e s or because Mao did not take the a t t a ck

very s e r i o u s l y . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t Mao was t e s t i n g the

genera l s ' l o y a l t y , s i nce P 'eng was very popular in the

People L i b e r a t i o n Army (PLA) .

I t was not ve ry long before Mao made h i s moves kncwn.

During the month of September s e v e r a l p rov inc i a l newspapers

for the f i r s t t ime a s s o c i a t e d the " r i g h t i s t s " with the Soviet

^Âlthough those "codes"— as Alexander George c e l l s them— r e f e r t o the Sov ie t p o l i t i c a l system, I fee l t ha t t! ey can be a p p l i e d t o Mao's p o l i t i c a l l e a d - r s h i r as w ? l l , nl3;«:-neer George, The " O p e r a t i o n a l Code" a Norêcted .••.-rroecr lo Z' -Study of P o l i t i c a l Leaders and Jec i s ion-•• .hlni : , i:-?.nia - o n i c a : The Rand C o r p o r a t i o n , 19o7) , - p . 3> ^ d Uj.

^ C h a r l e s , or^. c i t . , p . 67 .

142

Union. On September 16, the d i smissa l s of P'eng and several

associates were announced.^6

P'eng Teh-hua i ' s replacement by Lin Piao marked a

major s tep in the process of dest roying the old bureaucracy

and e l i t e s . Lin P i a o ' s p r inc ip le r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was to turn

the PLA from a p ro fes s iona l m i l i t a r y f ight ing organization

into an organiza t ion for p o l i t i c a l work. 1*7 P'eng ac tua l ly

had had l i t t l e choice betv/een c rea t ing a professional army and

a p o l i t i c a l one. In the case of China,, according to S. M,

Chiu, c rea t ion of one of these was possible but not of both

simultaneously. 1° The average so ld i e r and the mi l i t a ry cadre

could not afford to divide t h e i r time between harvesting crops

and learning the techniques of a modern army organized on the

Soviet model. P'eng was aware of t h i s as he was t ry ing to

build a modern p rofess iona l army.^9 But i t i s important to

note tha t Mao's move aga ins t professionalism did not begin

with the 1959 ous te r of P'eng Teh-huai.^^ Professionalism

• rbid., p. 70.

• ' Sllis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corns. 19^9-1964, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967) , p. 13o.

^^S. M. Chiu, "The Chinese Communist Army in Transition," Far Eastern Survey, No. 11, Vol. 27, (November, 1958i , pp. 163-174.

19 Joffe, o_p. cit. . p. 6.

^Îbid.. p. 127.

143

in the army c o n f l i c t e d wi th th^ s t a t i n . r . ^ u r, s t a tements by Mao in I937 and

1956 on the "mass l i n e . " Th-s^ qt^tcm..,^ n . s . s ta tements were t o apply t o

the army a s w e l l a s t hose i n c i v i l i a n l i f e . The s ta tements

that " the p a r t y must r e p r e s e n t the masses ,"21 would, accord-

ing t o John G i t t i n g s ensure t h a t m i l i t a r y t h ^ n r v ar-n o«.-c l o s e l y i n t e g r a t e d J ^ i t h ^ T I ^ ^ ^ T V ^ ^ i ^ ^ ' r e q u i r e m e n t s of the s i t u a t i o n . 2 2 ^-^^^^V and

In e f f ec t i t meant t h a t m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e was influenced

by the l i f e of the masses . Thus poor economic cond i t ions

would r e q u i r e the s o l d i e r s t o work on farms and in f a c t o r i e s .

Mao's r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t p ro fess iona l i sm was a l so shared

by some m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . Th i s i s i nd ica t ed by P'eng Teh-

huai when he r e f e r r e d i n I956 t o

Some o f f i c e r s [who a r e j only "sa t i s f ied with our pas t b a t t l e e x p e r i e n c e , and are not s u f f i c i e n t l y e n t h u s i a s t i c about the study of modernized m i l i t a r y knowledge . ^3

By the beginning of the Great Leap Forward in the summer of

195s, a debate s t a r t e d between p a r t y l eade r s wanting m i l i t a r y

personnel t o h a r v e s t the c rops and those in the PLA who

21 P M u ^^*^° ^^s> "V^hat i s the Mass Line?" Chieh-L^ng-chun p a . IL ibe ra t i on Army Ngwspaner) , ( Ju ly 3 , 1956J c i t ed in John f i t t i n g s , I'he r.Qla px- the Chinese Army. (London: Oxford un ive r s i t y P r e s s , I967) , p . 170. M ^ s wr i t i ngs on the "rr.a (IQI?)''^^^ be ga the red from On P r a c t i c e end On Cont rad ic t ion 4.U / » ^^''^ On the Cor ren t Handling of Cont rad ic t ion ,'v:nor.-the Peopla (1957) . "^

ass

^ ^ G i t t i n g s , I b i d . 23

^ , P ' eng T e h - h u a i , " P o l i t i c a l Off icers M-.i:i. f.'.rive to otuay .Mi l i ta ry . . f f a i r s , " L i b e r a t i o n Army hewsDtr:r (eei t o r i B D , U'iarch 29, 1956) . C i t^d in G i t t i n r s , I b i d . , r . 1!)0.

144

protested a g a i n s t the use of m i l i t a r y personnel for non

profess iona l p u r s u i t s . 2 4 I n Ju ly 195^ , 'Marshal Chu Teh

stated the views of the p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p :

There a r e people who advocate an e x c l u s i v e l y m i l i t a r y v ievjpoin t , who have a one-sided r e gard f o r m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s and look dovm upon p o l i t i c s , have a one-s ided high regard for • v o c a t i o n and t echn ique and look down upon ideo logy . . . in e s s e n c e , t h i s i s a kind of m a n i f e s t a t i o n of bourgeo is m i l i t a r y ideas .25

The appointment of Lin Piao meant the r e s t o r a t i o n of

party l e a d e r s h i p over t he PLA. In the f i r s t major speech

after t a k i n g over i n September, 1959 Lin ca l l ed for " i n

tens i f ied p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n , s t r i c t e r pa r ty c o n t r o l , and

more con tac t with the masses . ^^ In fu r the r e f f o r t s t o

strengthen p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l of the PLA in I960 Lin Piao

proposed s e v e r a l new b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s knovm as the "Four

F i r s t s . "27 F i r s t came t he "human f a c t o r " in the r e l a t i o n

ships between men and weapons; second, p o l i t i c s v;as f i r s t

in the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o l i t i c a l work and m i l i t a r y work;

th i rd , ideology was f i r s t in the r e l a t i o n s h i p between rou t ine

3ducation and i d e o l o g i c a l p o l i t i c a l educa t ion ; and four th .

24Ralph L. Powel l , "Commissars in the Hlconomy: Learn From The PLA' Movement in China ," Asian Survey, No. ^, >/ol. 5, (March, I965), pp . 125-126.

25chu Teh, " P e o p l e ' s Army, P e o p l e ' s '. 'ar," 1;"- -^^"^ News Agency, J u l y 3 1 , 195^; r epo r t ed ir, BaîigrîlHi, U ' ^ ' n i . Consulate-General , Hong KonK and c i t e d by G i t t m r s , n-^. --c •:_ of the Chinese Army, O P . c i t . , p . 175.

' ^^Gi t t i ngs , I b i d . , p . 243.

^ ' 'Powel l , p p . c r t . , p . 12^.

145

"living thought" was f i r s t in the r e l a t i onsh ip between book

study and i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . I t i s c lear tha t Lin was in

effect r e i t e r a t i n g Mao's concept of " p o l i t i c s in command."

To br ing the PLA c lose r to Party leadership , the Party

enlarged the M i l i t a r y Affa i r s Committee in I960; put more

emphasis on Par ty membership in a l l PLA companies; and paid

special a t t e n t i o n t o youth in the PLA. I t i s obvious tha t

these changes were a l s o meant to lessen the influence of the

remaining old e l i t e s within the PLA.

The M i l i t a r y Affa i r s Committee (MAC)(See Chart VI-l)

was and i s the con t ro l organ of the Central Committee and

i t s Pol i tburo over the m i l i t a r y . By enlarging the MAC, the

Party leadership thus mMnimized the chance of power concen

trat ion in the hands of a few members of the MAC. Substan

tive mi l i t a ry power r e s i d e s within t h i s committee whose

chairman since 195^ has been the Minister of Defense— Lin

Piao. Except for very sens i t i ve quest ions , the MAC decides

al l matters pe r t a in ing to the People Liberation Army. The

most important dec i s ions are taken by the fu l l Politburo

or i t s smaller Standing Committee. In 1961, the Mil i tary

Affairs Committee passed a r e so lu t ion "Strengthening of

Pol i t ical and Ideo log i ca l V/ork Among the Armed Forces,"

which cal led for a r a d i c a l overhaul of the content and the

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machinery of political indoctrination in the PLA.^^ Be

ginning in 1961, the MAC started holding an annual Liber

ation Army Political V ork Conference. The conference was

to be attended by high ranking cadres from every province

who gathered to review each one's progress, after which the

Conference calls upon them to vjork harder.

The company as the basic unit of organization in the

PLA received special attention from the Party leadership.

Prior to 1961, approximately one-third of all PLA companies

and most platoons and squads had no Party cells. The Mili

tary Affairs Comraittee decided to remedy this situation by

placing Party cells in all companies. By April, I96I, Party

branches were re-established in all niilitary companies while

eighty per cent of the platoons and over half of the squads

had Party cells. In November, 1961, the Chinese Communist

Party referred to the Party branches as

the basic-level organizaticnisj of the Party in the ar-ied forces, the basic transmission belt(s) between the Party and the T.asses, and the core of unified leadership and unity of companies.29

The importance of this was stated later by General Hsia Hua

on April 1, 1963:

^^John Gittings, "The 'Learn From the nrmy' Camnaign," The China (-quarterly. (/vpril-June , 1964) , r. 154.

^^Gittings, "The Role of the Chinese Army," OP. cit., p. 247.

148

The company is the basic combat unit. It must be tough in the battlefield. It cannot do this if it does not have the strong leadership of the Party or the practical work''of a Party branch . . . . The Quality of the work of a company depends on the work of its Party branch and on the role played by its Party members. The Party branch is the nucleus of leadership and unity of the company and is the company's fortress. 30

By this reorganization, the Party hoped to assure itself

that the military would be closely controlled by the Party

leadership.

Attention was also devoted to the young people in

the People Liberation Army, in order to secure the loyalty

of the rank and file soldier who comprised a significant

portion of the PLA. As Liu Chih-chien noted on May 3, 1961:

Since the revolutionary military service system v;as put into practice, all privates in our Army have been 3/ouths, and a considerable norticn of its basic level cadres have also been youths.^^

The young were further encouraged to ;ioin the Young Communist

League to interviev; veterans, read meraoirs of military heroes,

and to follow in the steps of model soldiers such as Lei Feng,

a young soldier of poor background who died in 1962 at the age

of twenty. Lei died, not in the battlefield, but in an acci

dent while carrying out his routine work. V-.hile his diary

was circulated among the soldiers, he was hailed for his

30lhid.

^-^Gittings, "The 'Learn From the Army' Ca-nraif n," OP. cit. , p. 155 .

149

dedication to the state, to his work, to Mao's writings, and

to his fellow comrades. According to John Gittings, Lei's

story was probably circulated more extensively than any

other story during the 1960's. Another lesser known m.artyr,

V/ang Chieh, was made a hero after he died in I965 by falling

on an explosive to protect his comrades.32

The hero question here is not so important for this

discussion as the fact that all these characters were young

and that the Party leadership emphasized the role of Mao's

thoughts-- in their diaries. In one respect one might con

clude that the real issue at stake was the survival of Mao's

"mass line" the system of elites and bureaucracy whose

leaders questioned Mao's leadership. Just as important was

the image of .-lao as a successful relicy rriaker.

Thus, while reorranizing the army, Mao made efforts to

extricate himself from the responsibilities for the bad eco

nomic situation in the country. To ^rotect his leadershin,

he blamed mistakes on influential bureaucrats and cadres,

men who opposed his policies. His efforts at justifyinr his

own policy positions nrcvided the background for taking a

"Learn From the Army" campaign to the masses.

32 Gray and Cavendish, op. c_rt. , p. 111.

150

The Campaign of "Learninp" From the Army"

Mao's intention to destroy the influential bureaucrats

was revealed in February, 1962. Commenting on the influence

of the cadres and promising that a "proletariat vanguard"

would isolate and replace the "revisionists," a People's

Daily editorial declared:

We cannot think that the people of various classes, forming 90 per cent of the population are walking the socialist road under their own motivation or that a small percentage could not under any circumstances enlarge their influence.

Thus it is very evident there must be a proletariat vanguard resolutely upholding the principles of Marxism-Leninism to unite the former in the direction of socialism and isolate the latter completely.33

It is obvious from this statement that the "small percentage"

were those who either opposed Mac within the Party or the

bureaucracy. V.'hatever the reason for these charges, tne

single most outstanding issue here seems to be the distri

bution of power. Those who were ousted from the Party had

challenged Mao's policies; and many other cadres, by virtue

of their place in a highly procedural bureaucracy, had ac

quired power. Both groups represented a threat to Mao's

influence within the Party, the military, and the masses.

Therefore, he "could not under any circumstances enlarge

their influence."

33"K3d China hotes Discord in Party," He v;_York JLki^s, February 7, 1962, p. 8, column 5.

151

In a communique issued on September 28, 1962, the

Central Committee made a strong attack on the "revisionists;"

blamed the failure of Mao's policies on the "opportunists;"

and announced the dismissal of two top military leaders,

General Huang Ko-cheng and General Tan Cheing, from the

Party Secretariate.34 Huang was Army Chief of Staff when

Marshal P'eng Teh-huai had been purged in September, 1959.

(Both officers supported P'eng's attack on the government's

policies and Mao's action was interpreted as a retaliation

for their support of P'eng.)35 The communique also charged

that "leading cadres" were incompetent.36

In 1962 Mao noticed that the country was still plagued

with unrest and dissidence while the army was marked by order

and discipline. After Red Flag admitted in September, 1962

that industry was in a sorry state,37 Mao decided to strengthen

3^The Central Committee Communicue was distributed by Hsinhua through the Chinese Communist Press Agency. Reported in "Peking Charges Key Aides Failed," New York Times, September 29, 1962, p. 2, Column 1, and September 30, p. 2, Column 3.

^Îbid.

3%bid.

' The government had previously admitted shortcomings in agriculture when labor was taken away from the industrial centers and sent to the rural areas. However, it had not admitted failure in industry until Sentember 29, 1962. K ned. Flag article said that "The process of realizing socialist industrialization can only be a gradual process,ând the process of improving working ecuipment, too, can on^y be a gradual process." The statement is a far cry from the tneory behind the Great Leap Forward, v/hMch was to acrteve moustry "better, faster, and'more economic." Cited in "i-el:inr :.helv3S Industrial Drive," Ivew York Times. SeptBi.iber 20, 196.-, r- 1, Column 5.

15

his political leadership by applying the methods and tech

niques of the PLA to the general Chinese society to carry

his campaign to the Chinese community, industries, trade

unions, government departments and rural cadres.38

By January, 1964, the Party leadership felt that

the reorganization and political indoctrination of the

army had reached a successful stage. A People's Daily

editorial declared on January 1 that

a great change has been brought about in the ideological aspect of the troops, the viewpoint of class and class struggle has become even more definite, the proletarian fighting will has become stronger, the concept of combat readiness has been strengthened, the revolutionary spirit of working hard and the fine communist quality has been further developed, and more and more heroes, models, good persons and good deeds have emerged.39

The "Learn From the Army" campaign in the Chinese

community was publicly announced by a People's Daily editorial

on February 1, 1964.^^ Political indoctrination of the peo

ple was not the only object of the campaign. A more important

object of this movement was to establish political departments

3^"Government Demands People Emulate Disciplined Army," New York Times. February 3, 1964, p. S, Column 5.

3^Gittings, £p. cit., p. 157.

^^Sditorial, "Learn From the Experience of the Peonle's Liberation Army in Political and Ideological V.ork," People's Daily. February 1, 1964. Translated in Survey of the China mainland Press. (Hong b.ong: U.S. Consulate-General), o. 315^. Cited in Gittings, Ibid.« p. 153.

153

following the example of the People Liberation Army v;ithin

the civilian population. In February, I964, the political

cadres of transportation, communications and industrial

departments of the party held a national conference in which

the creation of political cells to control the political

work of these departments was discussed. Later, these cadres

were directed to create organs for political v;ork in all the

provinces and regions.^-^

The Central Committee leadership also created other

political departments for finance and trade.42

It is doubtful whether the new political departments

would be as successful as they became in the army. As one

author stated the matter:

It is doubtful that non-material incentives that stimulated self-sacrifice in tre ar:r:ed services will be as effective in shops, factories, and banks.43

Although Mao did not destroy the old bureaucracy, he brought

it under closer Party control.

However successful Mao was in carrying out the campaign

to the people, the course of the camnaign was much more differ.

ent than that which he undertook in the PLA itself. This

^^Powell, op. cvt., op. 130-131.

^Îbid.. p. 131.

^3rbid., p. 137.

154

difficulty is evident in the outcome of the campaign which

resulted in creating the "revolution" in culture and the

"Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution." The cause for the

campaign's difficulty lies in the fact that Mao had much

greater opposition within the bureaucracy than within the

PLA.

The "Revolution" in Culture. 1964-1970

The "revolution" in culture, which began in 1964,^^

refers to Mao's attack on influential intellectuals within

the Chinese Communist Party. Although, Mao claims that the

campaign was launched because of his concern for the Chinese

youth— to protect them from the influence of the "revision

ists"— his actual rationale was. that which he voiced in a

secret speech to the Tenth Plenum of the Party in September,

1962 and which according to Philip Bridgham was to

explain failures and criticism 01 party policies as largely the handiwork of 'foreign and domestic class enemies' against v;hom it was now necessary to launch a nation-wide 'class struggle' camnaign.^-^

^Viao's attack which resulted in ousting university profassors, revising the textbooks and closing several technical universities did not ease the pressure until July 22, 1970. According to some party leaders the "lack of teachers and of technical training has hampered industrial develon.nent and production in recent years." Reported in "China Softens Attitude on Profs, School Policy," The vVashington Post, July 23, 1970, p. A12.

^^Bridgham, 0£. cj^. , p. 8. H comnlete text ol .-lao speech has never been published. The only knov;leri_-? ci its contents comes from excerpts quoted by other party leacers.

s

5

In this speech, Mao warned against the effects of the

criticisms of intellectual dissidents by saying

that a number of people were making use of the writing of novels to carry out anti party activities and were creating a climate' in publ,ic opinion for the restoration of capitalism.4o

Official concern was first openly voiced by a Red Flag

article on March 21, I964. The article

urged older party members to educate future leaders in revolutionary traditions so that they will not abandon the principles of the present regime.47

Mao's campaign against intellectual dissidents re

vealed some important sympathizers for P'eng Teh-huai

within the Party. Among the first three writers singled

out by Mao were Yang Hsien-chen, Feng Tinn", and Chou Ku-

ch'eng. Yang, probably the most important of the three,

was the president of the Peking Higher Party School until

1961 when he v;as purged on September 13, 1964, he was a

member of the Central Committee, H September Red Fla?

article accused him of misinterpreting the basic law of

social development. Yang had ar? ued that things ''units two

^^This Guote from Mao's speech v:a5 first retorted by the r ew China Kev/s Agency on July 30, 1966. Cited in Bridgham, Ibid., p. 8.

' "China Fears V. st Influences Youths' Moves to Bolster the keal of Future Red Leaders," N-w York Tiir.es, March 22, 196/., p. 13, Column 1.

156

into one,"48 ^^^ according to Mao's essay On Practice and On

Contradictions of 1937, forces clash rather than unite.

Feng Teng was also a Moscow graduate of Philosophy and

was the Deputy Chairman of the philosophy department at Peking

University. He, like Yang, was blamed for following the

U.S.S.R. Feng's mistake according to his critics, was that

he did not introduce class struggle with his arguments.49

Chou Ku-cheng, a well-known historian of Lenin,

government official, and member of the presidium of the

minority Peasants and vjorkers Democratic Party, was accused

of associating himself with Yang on the issue of contradiction

Chou was accused of claiming that art transcends the realm of

conflict. The Red Flag article of September 13 compared the

development of the arguments among these three authors to

the development of Trotsky's arguments in Russia during the

1920's.5^

Three other authors linked to Yang were also purged:

Li Ming, a philosophy lecturer; and Ai Heng-wu and Lin Ching-

shan, co-authors of an article elaborating Yang's views.5

^^"Peking is Purging Chinese Backers of Soviet Policy," New York Times. September 14, 1964, P* 1> Column 5.

^^"Feking Denounces Another Intellectual in Party," New York Times. October 6, 1964, p. 6, Column 4.

^^"Peking is Purging Chinese Backers of Soviet Policy," op. cit.

51 Ibid.

157

Another celebrated author and Party official purged

in June, 1966, was VJu Han, an opera writer, who had been a

Vice Mayor of Pgking under Peng Chen. 'vVu, however, had been

criticized earlier in I964 and 1965 for his opera The Dis

missal of hai Fui written in I96O-I96I. He was accused of

writing sympathetic defense of the Minister of Defense

after the dismissal of P'eng Teh-huai. Furthermore, he

was accused of showing conflict between peasants and officials

in the opera to humiliate Mao's agrarian policies.^^ On

December 20, I965 People's Daily carried an article of self-

criticism by Vvu Han and the Peking Daily carried a similar

article on January 12, I966.

V/u Han had been writing a rticles since 1961 under the

series "The Three Family Village"53 for the Peking Front Line.

Two other Peking politicians and authors of the series, Teng

T'o and Liao Mo-sha, were also severely criticized. Teng

was a secretary of the Peking Municipal Party Com.mittee, the

editor of Front Line . and a subordinate of the Mayor of

Peking, Pen Chen.

On May 8, 1966, an "onen fire" attack by the Liberation

^ Yao vVsn-vuan of the Shanghai . en Hui Pao accuded :u Han of using the "nast to ridicule the present," in anârticle on Hovember^'lO, I965. Cited by Stephen u'halley, "The -ultural Revolution and the attack on the 'Tlree Family'.illage .ihe. China Quarterly, (July-S^ntember, 19o6), p. 149.

53 Ibid.. pp. I54-I56.

158

Army Daily criticized all three authors.54 Teng was accused

of deliberately attacking Chairman Mao by criticizing his

policies in I96I and 1962. In June the government continued

its extensive attack on the "Three Family Village" series.

A typical article by the three authors was the "Great Empty

Talk," published in Front Line in I96I. It referred to the

young generation which was taught big things that had no

meaning. Such "Great Empty Talk" was the following poem:

The heaven is our father. The earth is our mother. The sun is our governess. The east wind is our benefactor.

The west wind is our enemy.55

In June, 1966,'the three authors were ousted from their

offices along with the Mayor of Peking, P'eng Chen, who was

also a member of the ruling Politburo.5°

The next target of the Party leadership was the

university system. Lu P'ing, the president of Peking

University and a secretary of its Party cell and Sung Shuo,

the deputy director of the University Department of the

Municipal Party Committee, were ousted "for shielding dis

graced intellectuals."37 Another official of Peking

^^"Yugoslav Press Reports China Has Dismissed Two Major Figures," New York Times. May 29, 1966, p. 4, Column 2.

"Bridgham, op. cit. , P. 155.

^^Seymour Topping, "Peking Confirms Key Aide's Ouster From Party Post," New York Times, June 4, 1966, p. 1, Column 6.

^Vlbid.

159

University, P'ing Pei-yun, was ousted for the same reason.

The president of Nanking University, Kuan Ya-ming was also

ousted in June because of a "villainous conspiracy to supp

ress the revolutionary movement."5°

When several leaders from Burma visited Communist

China on June 18, 1966, they asked the Chinese officials

the meaning of these purges. The reply from Chou En-lai

was that the purges were the result of the "Cultural Revo

lution."59 If we conclude here by accepting Chou's con

clusion we might miss the whole issue involved-- that of

the challenge to Mao's authority by members of the Party

elite. Mao was really after P'eng Chen as a political

deviate who had supported P'eng Teh-huai. It is apparent

from the previous discussion that P'eng had actually obtained

considerable support, if not for him, at least for views

which he advocated in the Lushan meeting of 1959. His support,

which was in opposition to Mao, was centered mainly in two

party organizations, the Central Committee of the Chinese

Communist Party and the Peking Municipal Party Committee.60

^^"University Chief Ousted by Peking," Ngw York Times. June 17, 1966, p. 8, Column 3.

^^"Chou Describes Purge as 'Cultural Revolution'," Krw York Times, June 19, 1966, p. 18, Column 6.

^^Harry Gelman, "Mao and the Permanent Purge," Problem of Communism. Vol. 15, (November-December, 1966), pp. 2-14.

160

Mao's attack on the intellectuals did not end his

efforts to restore confidence in his political leadership.

It rather started an extensive political crisis that en

gulfed every province and resulted in the ouster of many

provincial leaders. These crises will be discussed in the

following chapter when we consider the political aspects of

the "Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution" of 1966.

Conclusion

Mao's failure in domestic and foreign policies created

opposition within his leadership. This was evident in a

speech Mao delivered on July 23, 1959, before a conference of

Party members. He said:

I was not in a hurry to speak, and have endured it by stiffening my scalp. For 20 days I have shown my forbearance, and now the conference will soon be adjourned.

You have said what you wanted to say, and the minutes attest to that. If you have caught me in the wrong, you can punish me.61

A significant manifestation of opposition to Mao was the re

fusal of Liu Shao-chi to support Mao Tse-tung in the "Cultural

Revolution." According to the New York Times. "It is Mao's

^^"Speeches and Letters of Mao Tse-tung," New_Ypr:k_Time_s, March 1, 1970, p. 1, Column 5. The speech which was_delivered at an undisclosed conference was recently acouired v;ith other important documents by the United States government.

161

blunders in the last decade that changed Liu and created

questions in Liu's head."62

Similarly, since the failure of the Great Leap Forward,

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, General Secretary of the Party, must have

felt a deep resentment toward Mao. According to Mao himself

in 1966,

There were many things about which they did not consult with me. These things should have been discussed by the Central Committee and decisions taken on them. Teng Hsiao-p'ing never consulted with me. He has never consulted with me about anything since 1959.63

These highly-placed opponents of Mao and their influence

in China's governmental bureaucracy caused Mao to launch a

campaign against the bureaucracy. Mao's aim was to destroy

the old bureaucracy and to bring it under the Party super

vision. He started with the People Liberation Army because

that was the origin of the strongest opposition; and he probably

reasoned that after being purged, the PLA would be a powerful

ally in destroying other opposition within the powerful bur

eaucracy outside the PLA.

By appealing to the young, he directed his campaign

at the most susceptable ground to absorb his ideas. To do

^^Sditorial, "Climax in Peking," New York Tim^s. December 18, I966, p. 12, Column 1.

^3"Speeches and Letters of Mao Tse-tung," New York Timesy op. cit.

162

t h i s i t was e s s e n t i a l t o him t o remove a l l of the w r i t e r s

and p ro fesso r s who questioned the s a n c t i t y of h i s thought .

In conc lus ion , although Mao pretended to p ro tec t

the young from "Revisionism" and cap i t a l i sm, h i s main pur

pose v;as r e s t o r a t i o n of conficence in h i s leadersh ip by

destroying overt and covert opposi t ion in the bureaucracy.

Thus the campaign was a s t ruggle for power r a the r than a

"Cul tura l Revolut ion" or a spontaneous erupt ion of even t s .

This s t ruggle centered mainly on Mao's e f f o r t s to regain

the inf luence and power he had had before China had under

taken the t a sk of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n under the rule of the

Chinese Communist P a r t y .

CHAPTER VII

THREATS TO THE PARTY'S POLITICAL INTEGRATION

1966-1967

Additional threats to the political integration of

the Chinese Communist Party elite resulting from Mao's

failures in domestic and foreign policies can be realized

from studying events in the I966-I967 period when Mao

sought to regain political control by ousting and humil

iating his opponents.

By political disintegration, I mean the division of

the elite into several disunited groups, the breakdown of

normal procedures among the party elites, and a China in

tumult which posed uncertain and unexpected threats to all

influential party leaders, including Mao's wife, Chiang

Ch'ing,

One of the most important factors in the political

upheaval of I966-I967 was the Red Guards organization. The

Red Guards were important for two reasons: One, their

creation and use shows us that Mao was unable to use the

Central Committee and the party machinery to oust his

opponents in the various provinces; and, two. Red Guard

activities overshadowed almost every other political act

ivity in China in I966-I967.

163

164

The Red Guards «

An often-cited proof of Mao's zeal for political

upheavals to achieve success is in his report on the

Peasant Movement in Hunan in 1927:

A revolution is not the same as inviting people to dinner or writing an essay or painting a picture or embroidering a flower; it cannot be anything so refined, so calm and gentle, or so 'mild, kind, courteous, restrained, and magnanimous.' . . . To put it bluntly, it was necessary to bring about a brief reign of terror in every rural area, else one could never suppress the activities of the counterrevolutionaries in the countryside or overthrow the authority of the gentry.-•-

According to Hans Granquist, the ideas expressed in this

paragraph have been used twice during the period since the

Communist take-over— in 1950, against the landowners in

the countryside, and in 1966, against Mao's opponents. Be

tween these two periods of violence, the emphasis was on

persuasion, re-education, and "thought reform." Mao's ideas

on violence in this quotation were repeated in his July 13,

1966^ instructions to the Red Guards:

They really created a disturbance on the streets of Nanking. The more I saw, the happier I felt.

Do not be afraid to make trouble. The more trouble you make and the longer you make it last the better.

Granquist, £0. cit. , p. 26.

^"Speeches and Letters of Mao Tse-tung," OP. CU..

165

Confusion and trouble are always noteworthy. It can clear things up. The more you are afraid of ghosts the more you will encounter them. However, do not fire your guns. It is never good to open fire.-

A second factor behind the chaotic activities of the

Red Guards stemmed from student unhappiness with the "class

enemies" in the schools and Party. There was growing dis

illusionment with both among the students of poor back

grounds. This disillusionment started with the Party's

insistence on removing the distinction between the illit

erate masses and the intellectual aristocracy. A majority

of the students from poor backgrounds supported the Party's

move but students from miiddle class backgrounds objected to

this and objected to having to work in the countryside.

Furthermore, poor students who v/ere looking forv/ard to a

Utopia professed by the Party leadership, iret opposition

from the professional cadres in the countryside, who were

apt to protect their positions against students' indifference."*

By 1965, according to John Israel, the majority of the

students who were born after 1945 realized that although the

educational system granted them preferential treatment "the

system is really designed not for Cthem], but for the better,

prepared children of the bourgeoise." The first action taken

Îbid.

^John Israel, "The Red Guards in Historical P-rsr3Ctiv' Continuity and Change ir the Chinese Youtt H.GV-ment," ^_i China L.uarterly. (April..June, 1967), PP* --4«

166

by poorer students against the "bourgeoise class"5 was to

support Mao's purge of school officials in the summer of

1965. Student hatred was revealed in a student pamphlet

of July 20, 1965:

For 17 years our school has been ruled by the bourgeois c l a s s . VJe s h a l l not t o l e r a t e t h i s any longer' . . . . Old and young gentlemen, we t e l l you f rankly , you a l l s t ink and you are nothing but r o t t e n t r a s h . . . Formerly you were in a p r iv i l eged p o s i t i o n , sat on our heads and l e t your excrement f a l l on us to show tha t you were s u p e r i o r . Today you are under d i c t a t o r s h i p and you su f fe r .6

In November, s tuden t s moved to press the "bourgeoise" leader

ship of the Young Communist League, to allow grea te r l eader

ship o p p o r t u n i t i e s for the s tudents themselves in the.League

and the Pa r ty .

Mao's idea of p o l i t i c a l upheaval and the d i s i l l u s i o n

ment of poorer s tuden ts with the p robab i l i t y of facing a

glorious future provided two f ac to r s for a chaotic p o l i t i c a l

s i tua t ion within the Chinese community.

The 1966 Plenum of the Centra l Committee

On Sugust 1-12, 1966 the Central Committee held i t s

f i r s t "plenary sess ion" since 1962. The meeting revealed

widespread oppos i t ion within the par ty e l i t e s and led to the

creat ion of the Red Guards.

A l i s t of 201 top Chinese Communist leaders issued on

^ I b i d .

% b i d .

167

August 19 over Peking radio revealed some important changes

in the ranks of the Chinese elite." Liu Shao-chi, once Mao's

heir-apparent was listed third, after Lin Piao. Further,

more than 100 regular and alternate members of the Central

Committee were missing from the list. Among those missing

were two military members of the Politburo, Liu Pe-cheng

and Li Ching-chuan. Deputy Premier Nieh Jung-chen, a

member of the Central Committee was also the Deputy Chair

man of the National Defense Council. Also missing was

Chang Chih-chung, Deputy Chairman of the Defense Council,

and the following ministers: Tiao Lu-yen of Agriculture,

Liu VJen-hui of Forestry, Chiang Nan-hsiang of Higher Edu

cation, and Kao Yang-min of Chemical Industry. The list

also revealed that the Party's top organ of the Standing

Committee, had been enlarged from seven to ten membars

(Table VII-1) . Two of the three new members who were close

friends of Mao were given important political posts. Tao

Chu was named head of the Central Committee and Chen Po-ta

was placed in charge of the "Cultural Revolution."

Placing Chen Po-ta, the editor of Red Flag and a close

ally of Lin Piao, at the head of the "Cultural Revolution"

which introduced the Red Guards represented a move toward

political violence. It also signaled Mao's dissatisfaction

' "Red China Hints Purge Hits More TOP Leaders," Nejv York Times. August 2, 1966, p. 4, Column 3.

168

TABLE V I I - 1

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY STANDING COMIvlITTES

AUGUST 12, 1966

Mao T s e - t u n g Teng H s i a o - p ' i n g

Lin P iao Kang Sheng^^

Chou E n - l a i Liu Shao-chi

Tao Chu*: Chu Teh

Chen P o - t a Li Fu-chen*

* New member.

Source : New York Times, August 18, 1966, p . 2 , and November 17 , 1966, p . 9 .

with the " C u l t u r a l Revo lu t ion" as "a modest r e c t i f i c a t i o n

campaign" under the l e a d e r s h i p of Liu Shao-chi and the

normal p rocedures of t he P a r t y a p p a r a t u s . ° According t o

W. F . D o r r i l l ,

. . . , Mao, f r u s t r a t e d by the f a i l u r e of the i d e o l o g i c a l r e v o l u t i o n t o keep up with h i s r i s i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s , sought an e x p l a n a t i o n , or r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , in the hidden motives of those he had e n t r u s t e d with i t s l e a d e r s h i p - -mot ives t o be g leaned from a t o r t u o u s , a r b i t r a r y , and a t t i m e s pa rano id r e i r v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e i r p r e v i o u s l y accep ted s t a t emen t s and a c t i o n s . ^

I s r a e l , op . c i t . , p . 9 .

Êmphasis a r e mine. D o r r i l l , £ 0 . p i t . , p . 1/*1.

169

A most significant act of the "plenary session" was

the adoption on August 8, I966, of a sixteen-point "Decision

Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."^0

The decision described the movement in progress as "a great

revolution that touches people to their very soul-"-'-- the

decision also accused "bourgeoisie," who had been over

thrown earlier, of

Still trying to use old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes [the four oldsj to corrupt their minds, and endeavor to stage a comeback.1^

The document called upon the masses to throw away

the "four olds" and to adopt the "four news" [new traditions,

ideas, culture, and habitsU "to change the mental outlook of

the whole society."-^3

In essence, the sixteen points called for the masses

to defeat the "class enemy" of "bourgeoise" persons "in leading

^^David Oancia, "Red China is Torn by Policy D-bate," New York Times, August, 1966, p. 1, Column I6.

-"- Quoted in Dorrill, _op. cit., p. 142.

^^Quoted in Dorrill, 0£. cit., p. 142. The decision may or may not be referring to a coup to oust Mao in the previous two months. According to a press dispatch from Peking— published in the Yugoslav journal Politica-- Liu Shao-chi was planning to call a plenary session, on July 21, to oust Mao Tse-tung and to bring back to power P'eng Chen. I have discounted the validity of this dispatch for lackôf significant support by several authors. For a contrary view on the dispatch see Gene T. Hsiao, Asian Survey. (June, 19o7J.

13 ^Dorrill, o£. cit. , p. 143.

170

positions who have gained a foothold in the Party and have

set out on the capitalist path."14

In conclusion, this plenary session which brought

about the far-reaching changes in the Party leadership was

obviously manipulated by Mao to serve his ends. The absence

of half of the top leaders from the meeting and the presence

of "revolutionary students and teachers from Peking instit

utions" as participants provide that Mao was definitely

suffering from a lack of sufficient support within the elite

group. The existence of opposition to Mao, although not

united, is evident in a Red Flag article published on August

12. Without naming names, the editorial criticized leaders

who were behind the masses (behind the Cultural Revolution).

They think they are aristocrats away above the lower classes. They are accustomed to monopolizing all activities, to giving and to turning the masses into a dreary state.16

The Red Guard. Mao's Instrument

It is not clear when Mao first decided to use the

Chinese youth as an instrument of the Cultural Revolution.

^Granquist, OP. cit. . p. 100.

^Îbid.

-^Ôancia, "Red China is Torn by Policy Debate." It is not clear who was behind this editorial, or how it could hav^ escaped the chief editor Chen Po-ta. Piowev r, accordirg to I'.r Oancia, the Red Flag issue was late nin^ hours iue to a late decision to removj .lao's picture fro:!i th.e par^r.

171

We know t h a t Mao t o l d the l eaders of the Cul tural Revo

lu t ion on Ju ly 22, 1966, t h a t they had f a i l e d .

The r evo lu t i on has been imposed on you people because you did not carry out the r e v o l u t i o n yourse lves .

During the session those comrades who have come t o a t tend the conference should go t o Peking Un ive r s i t y and the Broadcasting College t o read the b ig -charac te r pos t e r s .

When you go there you should be surrounded by s t u d e n t s . More than 100 people have been a s sau l t ed a t the Broadcasting College. In t h i s era of ou r s , i t i s a good th ing to have the l e f t i s t s a s sau l t ed by the r i g h t i s t s because the l e f t i s t s are tempered in t h i s way.17

The f i r s t unve i l ing of the Red Guards took place on

July 29, 1966, two days before the opening of the Eleventh

Plenum. On t h a t day, a s tudent group represent ing various

Peking schools met with Mao Tse-tung and Chou E n - l a i . I t i s

l i ke ly t ha t the name "Red Guards" was adopted during t h i s

meeting. 1*7 On August 16, a gathering of s tudents frcm a l l

the provinces was addressed by the recent ly appointed head of

the Cul tu ra l Revolut ion, Chen Po- ta , and two days l a t e r , an

" o f f i c i a l debut" of the Guards was held at a Peking Rally in

the presence of Mao. Hsinhua, the Chinese news agency des

cribed the youths ' f e e l i n g s as follows:

•'-^"Speeches and L e t t e r s of Mao Tse-tung," or . 211-Address to Regional S a c r e t a r i e s and Members of the Cul tural Revolution Group, Ju ly 22, 1966.

1 ' I s r a e l , £p . c i t . , p . 11 .

172

'Red Guards' down below shouted joyfully: "Look, Chairman Mao is wearing our red arm band. He approves of our 'Red Guards'." They cheered: "Long live Chairman Mao'. Long life long life to Chairman Mao I"18 '

In theory, the Red Guards were organized in a series

of chain commands reaching up to the leaders of the "Cultural

Revolution." For instance, Party work teams were sent to

schools and provinces to organize the work of the Guards.

But in practice there was no distinction between the Red

Guards or the students who were members of the Youth League

or the Party itself. In general, most Red Guard activities

were carried out without control from the Party leaders,

but with encouragement from Mao himself. By September, 1966,

according to a defecting Red Guard leader, '//ang Ch'ao-t'ian,

work teams left the schools and the Guards were thereby free

to interpret the official articles and act upon their inter

pretation.1^ School officials and Party cadres were purged

by the students, thus leaving school buildinfrs and govern

ment offices in the hands of the students.

It is possible that the work teams left the students

to act alone because of pressure from Mao himself. On August

23, 1966, Mao delivered a speech before the Central Committee

Work Conference in which he said:

lÎbid.

19ibid.

173

The principle question is what policies we should adopt regarding the problem of disturbances in various areas. My views are as follows: I firmly believe that a few months of disturbances will be mostly for the good and that little bad will result from these disturbances.

If the students want to be on the streets, let them. V/hat is wrong with their putting up big-character posters in the streets?20

An important indicator of Mice's approval of the Red

Guards was the facilities provided the youth by the govern

ment. According to Wang Ch'ao-t'ien, some 6,000 army veh

icles were put at their disposal and they exhausted one-fifth

of China's annual transportation budget in two months. All

this was done in the name of "exchanging revolutionary ex

perience," but the most widely known activities of the stu

dents were public rallies that repeated Mao's words and

criticized Mao's opponents through sP3eches and wall posters.

Soon after the Red Guards went out into the streets,

signs of opposition to their activities becamie evident. A

People's Daily editorial of September 11 marked the first

time a government spokesman admitted the existence of a con

flict between the government officials and the Red Guards.^1

The editorial warned that officials should neither organize

opposition to the Red Guards nor feud with them; it also

20TT Speeches and Letters of Mao Tse-tung," on. cU..

^^"Red Guard Foes '/-arned by Peking," New York Timis, September 12, 1966, p. 1, Column 7.

^

174

acknowledged that "certain officials" were "using various

pretexts to put pressure"22 on the activities of the Red

Guards.

In summary, the Red Guards were started by Mao as a

radical group in an effort to purge his opponents and to

further spread his influence throughout the Country. Mao's

use of the Red Guard bypassed Party apparatus, evident in

a Red Flag article published in August, 1966. Commenting

on the sixteen-point directive of the Eleventh Plenum, the

paper said:

Experience has shown that each unit must carry out the work of the Cultural Revolution by relying on its own masses and should not depend on arrangements made by upper-level organs , .• . Each unit should carry out its work without the help of work-teams dispatched by upper-level organs.23

The Political Crisis

The struggle which was carried out by Mao to reshape

his Party and leadership took place in three areas: in the

streets, the provinces and the Central Committee. In all

three areas, the Red Guard was the main instrument, although

often supported by the People Liberation Army.

The streets provided a public arena for the humiliation

of top Party leaders. From August, 1966 to January, 1967

^Îbid.

^Gray and Cavendish, op. c_it_., p. 1-3.

175

every member of the Cent ra l Committee, except Mao and Lin

Piao, was c r i t i c i z e d . Some were publ ic ly humiliated by

having t o confess t h e i r " e r r o r s " before public meetings.^^

On September.14, 1966, the Red Guards c r i t i c i z e d Liu

Shao-chi for defending the Peking branch of the Par ty ; and

c r i t i c i z e d Li Ching-chuan, the F i r s t Secretary of the P a r t y ' s

Southwest Bureau (the provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow, Yunnan,

and the autonomous region of T i b e t ) . Wang Fen, the F i r s t

Secretary of the Kansu Par ty was a l so c r i t i c i z e d . ^ 5 Party

General Secre ta ry Teng Hsiao-p ' ing and the Chief of the

Peking Municipal Committee, Li Hsueh-feng, and h i s Deputy

Wu Teh were c r i t i c i z e d by Red Guard pos te r s , on October 27,

apparently for t h e i r close assoc ia t ion with the ousted P'eng

Chen.26

On November 22, 1966, Red Guard posters announced the

dismissal of a t l e a s t twenty members of the Pa r ty ' s Propa

ganda Department. Among those who were purged were wang

Kuang, the propaganda chief for five provinces of cen t ra l

and south China, and Tseng Tun, the propaganda chief for the

24 Ibid. ^^David Oancia, "Troops Moved into Peking," "ew York

Times. September 15, 1966, p. 19, Column 1.

26David Oancia, "Red Guards Start ^ Peking Uxodus," New York Times. October 28, 1966, p. 19, -olumn i.

176

Hupeh p r o v i n c e . More than h a l f of the t o t a l members of the

P a r t y ' s propaganda organ were purged.27

C r i s i s i n the P r o v i n c e s . 1Q67

At l e a s t s i x t e e n of the twenty- f ive provinces were

involved i n p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s . (Table V I I - 2 ) . Some top

p rov inc i a l o f f i c e r s were ous t ed , many c r i t i c i z e d and a few

were p u b l i c l y b e a t e n . Red Guards were met with s t rong

opposi t ion from p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c e r s for two r e a s o n s . One,

the d i s t a n c e from Peking minimized Mao's immediate p r e s s u r e .

And two, perhaps more impor tan t was the s t r u c t u r e of power

within each p r o v i n c e . Each province as well as each major

c i t y was c o n t r o l l e d by a p r o v i n c i a l committee of the Chinese

Communist P a r t y with more power than the loca l government

o f f i c e r s . Above t h e s e committees were s i x r eg iona l Par ty

bureaus with s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l con t ro l independent of

Peking. I t was a g a i n s t these pow3rs t h a t Mao d i r e c t e d h i s

a t tack i n the p r o v i n c e s . And i t i s because of the s t r eng th

of these power c e n t e r s t h a t Mao used m i l i t a r y fo rce .^^

On Janua ry 22, Kiangsi Province was the scene oi

m i l i t a r y c l a s h e s and the ob jec t of government c r i t i c i s m .

Denounced by the government were Deputy Governor of K i rngs i ,

27"Some Chief P ropagand i s t s Purged," N v; Yo -k Tim^n, November 23 , 1966, p . 5 , Column 1.

2^"China Strug,~les A.'^3ipst I t s e l f , " !Liw_Yc:n vjIUjni s. f'abruary 5 , 1967, Sec . IV, p . 2, Jo ln -n 1.

177

TABLE VII -2

CIVIL STRIFE IN THE PROVINCES

Region Reported Province s t r i f e

Southern Region

Kiangsu

Anhwei

Region Reported Province s t r i f e

Northern Region

Hopeh

Shansi

X

X

Chekiung

Fukien

Hupeh

Hunan

Kiangsi

Kwangtung

Kwangsi

Szechwan

Dweichow

Yunnan

X

X

X

X

X

Liaoning

Kirin

Heilungking

Shensi

Shantung

Honan

Western Region

Inner Mongolia

Kansu and Nanghsia

Tsignhai

Sinkiang

Tibet

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

178

Li Chieh-yung; Deputy Mayor of Nanchang, Kao Ksiao-yao; and

Lo Meng-wen, a c l o s e fr iend of Liu Shao-chi and a member of

the Prov inc ia l Communist Party Committee. The radio denoun-

ciat ion warned s i m i l a r o f f i c i a l s that mi l i tary force would

be used i f necessary to unseat undesirable leaders .29

Similar c r i s e s were reported in the provinces of

Anhwei, Shansi , Szechwan, and Kv/eiyang. On January 29

wall pos ters reported tvjelve dead in mi l i tary struggles in

these as a r e s u l t of skirmishes between Mao's forces and o n

the provincial forces.-^^

On January 30, Peking radio claimed that the city

of Kweiyang, the capital of Kweichow, was in x Iaoist hands.31

Similar report claimed victory in Sinkiang and in the Pro

vince of Heilunghiang. The Secretary of the Northeast China

bureau of the Party's Central Committee Sun Jen-chiung was

forced to publicly admit making errors against the Party. At

the same tine wall posters criticized Li Ching-chuan, a mem

ber of the Party's Politburo and the responsible official of

Southeast China, which included Kweichow, Szechwan, Yunnan

'Radio in Red China Tells of Unrest in Kiangsi Region, -imes. January 21, 1967, p. 1, Column 1. ...so in New York T

January 2 3 , 19^7, p . 3 , Column 2. 30joseph L e l y v e l d , " . n t i - M . o i s t s . r e . e r o r t e n - ' ^ - i - l e d

in S i n k i a n g , " New York Times, o^.nuary ^ 0 , 196. , .... ^ , -oiumn. 4-6. '

^ ^ " F i f t h Chinese C i ty Clai::ied by - b o i s t s , " I^-wJlllJi Times. February 1, 1967, p . 1, Column .-.

•t

1

179

and T i b e t . The p o s t e r s a s s o c i a t e d him with P 'eng Chen.32

In S ink iang Wang En-mao, t he m i l i t a r y commander, was ousted

a f t e r c l a s h e s wi th Mao 's t r o o p s . And in Ju ly Li Ching-chuan

was r e p o r t e d ous ted from h i s p o s i t i o n . 3 3

D i v i s i o n i n t he P a r t y Hiera rchy

Although Mao was met with oppos i t ion from the p ro

vinces and members of t he C e n t r a l Committee, t h i s oppos i t ion

was not u n i t e d . P a r t y l e a d e r s h i p was divided i n to th ree

separate g r o u p s . One, the group behind Mao Tse-tung was

headed by Lin P iao and f ive m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . Three of the

o f f i c e r s were members of the P o l i t b u r o . They were Marshals

Hsu K s i a n g - c h i e n , Nieh Jung-chen , and Yeh Chien-yin? . The

other two were Hsiao Hua, D i r e c t o r of the General P o l i t i c a l

Department and Yang Cheng-wu, Acting Chief of Staff , who was

l a t e r purged in Feb rua ry , 1968.34

A second group headed by Chou i n - l a i des i red more

moderation but d id not a t t a c k the C u l t u r a l Revolut ion. This

group inc luded Chen Yi , the Foreign M i n i s t e r , and Li Hsien-

nien, the Finance M i n i s t e r and a few vice premiers .

^^"Take Over i n Hei lungkiang P rov ince , " N w York T ines , February 2 , 1967, p . 4 , Column 2 .

33Til lman Durd in , "Maoist demonst ra tors in Peking Use Balloons and S t r eamers t o A s s a i l L i u , " L-w /ork . i . . . . ^ , ^ ^ 1 / i ^ , 1967, p . 1 1 , Column 1 .

^^Char l e s Mohr, "Power ^^lite in Zîj^ i^ 'l'''\^^:^^V[^'^ By P u r g e , " New York Times, Febi'uary 1 - , - L / ^ ' . i* »

180

The t h i r d group i s divided in to two sub-groups. One,

those who had been purged such as Lo Jui-ching, the Army

Chief of Staff , and Liu Ting-y i , head of the Propaganda De

partment and h i s Deputy, Chou Yang, and Yang Shang-kun, an

a l te rna te member of the Par ty s e c r e t a r i a t . The second sub

group was headed by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-p' ing and

represented those who were c r i t i c i z e d and humiliated by the

Red Guards.3^

Mao's most sus ta ined a t t acks were directed at Liu

Shao-chi and Teng H s i a o - p ' i n g . The breakdown of harmony

within the Cu l tu ra l Revolution group i t s e l f and the Party

i l l u s t r a t e s the break-up of the normal procedures of the

Par ty ' s funct ions a t the top leve l by allov/ing the Red Guard

and t h e i r pos t e r s t o provide the arena of discussions instead

of tha t in the Cent ra l Committee.

As repor ted by Red Flag. Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-

p'ing t r i e d to r e s t r a i n the Red Guards by control l ing the i r

a c t i v i t i e s and thus p ro tec t ing the Party organizat ion.3° On

December 16, 1966, the P a r t y ' s t heo re t i ca l organ, the Red Flag.

declared t h a t the Red Guards were necessary in order to control

the P a r t y ' s appara tus . The a r t i c l e , appar:)ntly r e f e r r i n - to

35 I b i d .

3^"Red Guard Viewed As Ear t o a Coup," :: w York Tir-es, December 17 , 1966, p . 1, Column 8.

181

Liu and Teng, claimed that a handful in the leadership "could

start a coup if given a chance."37

On December 23 the Army Chief of Staff, who was a

close friend of Liu and Teng, was arrested. The announcement

of his arrest also said that a rally against Liu and Teng

would be held on December 25.3^ Two days later reports from

Peking admitted that Liu had confessed to committing errors

against the Party. On January 1, 1967, wall posters de

clared that Liu, his wife, Wang Hsiao-ping and Teng admitted

to having committed ideological error against Mao's teach

ings. Two weeks later, however, Liu withdrew his confession

and claimed that he had been correct all along and asked that

the Party allow him to withdraw his self-criticism. Mean

while wall posters were continuously criticizing Teng. On

February 6, it was announced that Liu and Teng had been re

lieved of their positions, but not their Party membership.

The attack on top Party officials was complicated when

members of Mao's own group were criticized. Tao Chu, who was

placed as the head of the Propaganda Department of the Cen

tral Committee in September, 1966, was denounced for acting

without consulting Mao and was ousted.39

^ 7 l b i d .

3^"Liu Confesses to Er ro r , " Now York Times. December 27, 1966, p . 1, Column 5.

39"Tao Chu Openly Attacked," New York Times, July 22, 1967, p . 4 , Column 3 .

i^tiibZ

182

I n J a n u a r y , 1967, high ranking o f f i c i a l s wi th in the

Cu l tu ra l Revo lu t ion Committee were a t t a c k e d . Three members

were accused of t r y i n g t o form a s epa ra t e c o n t r o l l i n g organ

i z a t i o n w i t h i n the movement. They included Lu Chih-chien

deputy head of the P o l i t i c a l Department of the PLA, and

Wang Jen-chung and Chang P ' i ng -huan of the Propaganda De

partment of the C e n t r a l Committee. Min i s t e r of Foreign

Af fa i r s , Ch 'en Yi , was accused of "minimizing the mistakes

of the work- teams."40 The M i n i s t e r of Public Secur i ty

Ksieh Fu-chih was c r i t i c i z e d by Mao's wife of having " se t

himself above t he P a r t y and t he people."^-'-

By t h e 'end of 1967 most of the Red Guards had re turned

to t h e i r s c h o o l s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , in March, 1968, wall pos te r s

declared t h a t Yang Cheng-wu, new Chief of Staff ( rep lac ing

Lu J u i - c h i n g ) , Yu L i - c h i n ( the p o l i t i c a l commissar of the

Air F o r c e ) , and Fu Chung-pi (commander of the Peking g a r r i

son) were d i s m i s s e d . 4 2 i n May, Chen T s a i - t a u , the Lushan

region M i l i t a r y Commander, was imprisoned for a l l e g e d l y having

^^Gray and Cavendish , op. c U . . , p . 131.

^ ^ I b i d . , pp . 131-132.

^2"K3w Army Chief Hamed in China," ? ew YopK March 30, I 9 6 8 , p . 9 , Column 1.

i ^

183

held two of Mao 's men in p r i s o n in the previous year.43

And f i n a l l y , t he C e n t r a l Committee formally expelled Liu

Shao-chi from t he Chinese Communist Pa r ty .44

I t i s imposs ib l e t o s t a t e a l l of the names and t o t a l

number of t h o s e who were d ismissed without checking the per

sonnel in each of the depar tments of the Chinese Communist

Party. Such a s tudy has been done on one such group by

Richard K. Diao.^5 He s t u d i e d the inf luence of the Cultural

Revolution on t he economic e l i t e of the Chinese government.

And h i s f i n d i n g s seem t o suppor t t h i s study (Table \ r [ I - 3 ) ,

I f we add the t o t a l number of those presumed purged in the

f i r s t two groups of Table V I I - 3 , the average would equal 53.3

per cent presumed purged out of the top 30 o f f i c i a l s in the

^3"i4ao Reported t o Have Escaped During Attempted Coup Last July i n V/uhan," New York Times. M^y 10, 1968, p . 22, Column 3 . According t o vâll p o s t e r s Mao and Lin Piao and two top c u l ture r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a r r i v e d in Vjuhan on July 15, 1967 along with Chao E n - l a i . The p o s t e r s claimed t h a t Mao, Lin, and ^hao escaped the coup a t t emp t by the r eg iona l m i l i t a r y commander Chen T s a i - t a o . 'Bu t t he two r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were imprisoned in Wuhan, the c a p i t a l of Huneh'. On July 25, 1967, the two men Vice-Premier Hsieh Fu -ch i and '.Vang Li re turned to Peking ana were h a i l e d in a Peking r a l l y on t h e i r "safe r e tu rn from Wuhan." See "Peking Repor t s Ral ly t o Onpose v 'uhan J i s s i d e n c e , New York Times, J u l y 26, 1967, p . 4 , Column 3 .

^^"Chinese Reds S x o e l l Liu From the P a r t y , " le'^' ^-ork Times, November 2 , 1968, p . 1, Column 2. Hong Kon^ newsrarer .ênhui D;îly r e p o r t e d t h a t the Cen t ra l lom^T.ittee which ex-palled Liu was "packed" with p r o v i n c i a l l eaders nios^ ol y.r.om ware m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s . See Tillman J u r d i n , ^"^^ ioists hacr.?a a Party M e e t i n g , " New York Times, December 9, Ivo^:, p . i . , Column 1 .

^^Richard K. Diao , "The Imnact of the Cul t ' . ra l ' - v o lu t ion on C h i n a ' s :^conomic S l i t - , " lli^LjliaL^':-^!!^-!^^^' (April-June, 1970) , pp . 65 -80 .

TABLS VII-3

IMPACT OF PURGE OK CHINA'S ECONOMIC ELITE

184

Size of

group No.

Presumed purged

2 14 26 55

Party members' * Group 1 8 Group 2 22 Group 3 69 Group 4 195

Non-Party Group 5 18 1

Total Party groups

294 97 Total of

a l l groups 312 98

25 64 38 28

33

31

10

71

81

Presumed s t i l l in off ice

No.

6 8

29 28

75 36 42 14

56

24

26

S t a tu s unknown

No. %

14 112

126

133

20 57

39

43

43

Source: Diao, p . 6 8 .

* Group 1 r e p r e s e n t s the h ighes t economic command; Group 2 r e p r e s e n t s t he 22 h igh-ranking Par ty mem

bers of t he P o l i t b u r o ; Group 3 c o n s i s t s of the 69 o f f i c i a l s a t the deputy-

minister l e v e l ; Group 4 c o n s i s t s of the 195 Par ty o f f i c i a l s , two of

whom were a s s i s t a n t m i n i s t e r s , but the o ther 193 were of depu ty -min i s t e r l e v e l and above but did not hold any o ther p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e .

185

Chinese economy. Ce r t a in ly t h i s i s a high figure and would

const i tu te a d i s i n t e g r a t e d group. I f h i s findings are

correct t h a t 31 per cent of a l l the economic e l i t e were

purged t h i s would c o n s t i t u t e a s t a t e of p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e

grat ion.

Conclusion

The 1966-1967 breakdown of the Party forced the e l i t e

to be on the defensive side against Mao and his Red Guards.

The e l i t e ceased t o dominate t h e i r own national and i t s

provincial Par ty organs.

O f f i c i a l s who were ousted from t h e i r posi t ions and

those who were c r i t i c i z e d cons t i tu ted a ma lor i tv of the

Chinese Communist Par ty e l i t e . The fact tha t these of f ic ia l s

were prevented from car ry ing out t h e i r functions according to

the ru les of the Par ty cons t i tu t ed a s ta te of disharmony im-

posed by the t h r e a t of Mao and h is Cultural Revolution.

Geographical ly, Par ty machinery was crinpled by the

PLA's e f f o r t s a t subduing the r ebe l l ious o f f i c i a l s in the

provinces. The s ix teen provinces which faced c i v i l s t r i f e

represented 64 per cent of the t o t a l number of rrevinces

(Table V I I - 2 ) .

The scope and nature of the c r i s e s seem to l^r.d support

to the t h e s i s t h a t the e l i t e of the Chinese Co. r.munist Pr=rty

had reached a s t a t e of p o l i t i c a l c i s in tegra t ion by 1^,-00-1067.

CHAPTER VIII

SUI '.IARY AND CONCLUSION

This s tudy has a t tempted t o t r a c e three important

developments i n the Chinese Communist system which began

in 1958. They a re t h e Great Leap Forward, the Commune

System, and the S i n o - S o v i e t c o n f l i c t . The emphasis was

placed on the i n f l u e n c e t h e s e developments had on the

p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n of the Chinese Communist e l i t e in

an at tempt t o prove t h a t t h e s e developments have caused a

widespread p o l i t i c a l d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n which resu l t2d in the

p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the e l i t e .

I n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , the inf luence of each of these

events i s b e t t e r e v a l u a t e d as a pa r t of the broader , t o t a l

effect of t h e s e t h r e e e v e n t s . Since the three developments

occurred almost s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , i t i s l o g i c a l to conclude

that widespread economic d i s l o c a t i o n and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n

resu l ted from the combined e f f e c t of the th ree devBlon-ents

ra ther than from each a s an i s o l a t e d event . For i n s t ance ,

a l l t h i n g s being e q u a l , the f a i l u r e of the Com:.rune System

alone did not cause p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . I t i s only

necessary t o po in t out t h a t each of the th ree dev ^ l o r . - n i s

cont r ibuted d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t u l t i : n^ te ly r e su l t ed :n

p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n .

I r 6

187

I t was equa l ly necessary to show tha t the Party

e l i te was p o l i t i c a l l y in tegra ted in the ear ly 1950»s in

order to prove t h a t p o l i t i c a l d i s in t eg ra t ion resul ted from

events which began in 1958. Chapters I and II showed that

the Chinese l eade r sh ip enjoyed an outstanding level of

po l i t i ca l i n t e g r a t i o n between 1949 and 1957:

The Chinese e l i t e had manifested throughout these years a remarkable cont inui ty of membersh ip , with the only major exception being the purge of the " a n t i - p a r t y bloc" of Kao Kane and Jao Shu-shih in 1954.1 ^

The f a i l u r e of Mao's p o l i c i e s a f te r that period stemmed

from the inadequacies of h i s own leadership . Mao's leader

ship, with i t s i deo log i ca l commitment oriented in the back

ward v i l l ages of r u r a l China, lacked the educational and

tachnical knowledge to d i r e c t a system of modern indus t r i a l

development.2 The consequences of Mao's fa i lures were wide

spread d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n within the Chinese Communist Party

(Chapters I I I -V) . The s ingle most important evidence of

•^Robert H. Donaldson and Derek J . Waller, The 1956 Central Committees of the Chinese and Soviet Communist Par t i es ; A Comparative Analysis of E l i t e Composition and Change. (Vander-bi l t Univers i ty , 1970), p . 5. (Read at a professional meeting).

Mao i s repor ted to have said on July 23, 1959, that I t i s b a s i c a l l y impossible to an t i c ipa te some th ings . Coal

and iron could not walk by themselves, and had to be t ransported by r o l l i n g s tock , I did not an t ic ipa te t h i s point —

êing not versed in cons t ruc t i on , I knew nothing about industr ial p lanning ." New York Times, M?:rch 1, 1970, p . 1.

188

t h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n was P»eng Teh -hua i ' s a t t a c k on Mao's

p o l i c i e s and h i s subsequent purge by Mao Tse- tung. Because

of the s e c r e c y t h a t sur rounds the a c t i v i t i e s of the Chinese

l e ade r sh ip , the f u l l na tu re of t h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n remains

unknown. But t he p o l i t i c a l upheaval which followed t h i s

period of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n (1958-1966) po in t s a t a more

ser ious s t a t e t han one of d i s c o n t e n t . V/e know, a t l e a s t

of one member of the e l i t e , Teng H s i a o - p ' i n g , who stopped

consul t ing with Mao Tse- tung about Par ty p o l i c i e s a f t e r

1958.3 Cons ide r ing the c lose t i e s and f r i endsh ip of the

e l i t e group which da ted from the 1920 ' s , Teng's ac t ion may

indica te more than d i s c o n t e n t . No one in the Vi/est has

doubted the l o y a l t y of Liu S h a o - c h ' i , P'eng Teh-huai , or

Teng H s i a o - P ' i n g t o the Chinese Communist Pa r ty . Yet we

find in the a t t a c k on them re f e r ences to t h e i r " taking the

c a p i t a l i s t r o a d . " 4 Mao's a c t i o n may be i n t e rp re t ed as the

a r t i f i c i a l c r e a t i o n of i s s u e s as a means of maintaining

power.5 Thus, when s igns of d i scon ten t and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n

become ev iden t w i t h i n the ranks of the Communist e l i t e , one

•^See Chapter VI , note 63 .

^ " Q u a r t e r l y Chron ic le and Documentation," The ^hina Cduarterly, ( Ju ly -Sep tember , 1969), P» 1^7.

^George Met. Kahin, Guy J . Pauker, -md L;:cian ... . y - , "Comparative P o l i t i c s of ricn-V.estern dountriBS, •^''•"^- -• P o l i t i c a l Science Review, XLIA (1955), 1^35-

may conclude that actually there exists a more serious state

of political disorder.

Furthermore, the overwhelming criticisms directed at

Mao and his teachings by university officials and writers

who received the support of important party officials (1960-

1963) indicate that Mao's control over his party leadership

had weakened.6 Mao's attempt to go outside the party to

gather political support by employing the Red Guards as an

instrument to purge his enemies is a clear indication that

he lacked support within the party to implement his wishes.

At that point in time, the machinery of the Chinese Central

Committee was crippled. If Central Committee meetings issued

statements condemning officials who took "the capitalist road,

this came only after the committee was "nacked" v;ith military

officers exercising their rights as Central Committee members.

When the military was used to coerce provincial leaders and

the Red Guard was used to humiliate the elite of the Party,

the party machine was no longer integrated as in 1949-1957.

The state of disintegration vMthin the elite group is

evident not only from the breakdown of party maohinery de

scribed above but also from oh:e disagreement v/ithin the

party elite expressed by P'eng Teh-huai's attack, by P'eng

^See Chapter VI.

1 on

Chen's ouster, by the dissatisfaction voiced by the univ

ersity presidents, by Liu Shao-chi's objections to the

Cultural Revolution and by Chou 5n-lai's refusal to support

this "Revolution." A further manifestation of this dis-

integration was the disorganized nature of Mao's opposition.^

The relationship of agreement on decision-making to political

disintegration is stated by Lester G. Seligman. He argues

that agreement among decision-makers on decision-making

methods and acceptance of these methods "will depend upon the

integration among the elites.""

The relationship of political harmony in a society

to political integration of the elite is stated by Raymond

Aron:

The composition of the governing elipe may be progressively altered, ~he relative i.noorpance of the various groups in the elite may be changed, but a society can only survive '-ir.c rrosoer if there is true collaboration between those groups. In one way or another, there must be unity of orinion and action on essential points in the elite.^

A final testament to what has been discussed in this

report is the outcome of the Ninth Congress of April 1-2/i,

1969. The Congress showed that the Cultural Revolution v/as

actually directed against an elite faction of the Chinese

' See Chapter VII.

^ L e s t e r G. Seliginan, "f^l i te Recru i tment and P o l i t i c a l Development ," J o u r n a l of } c l i t i c s , XXVI C u g u s t , I96/4), 61 / . .

^Ci ted by Celigraan, Ib i d.

191

Communist Party. According to a speech at the Congress by

Lin Piao, a struggle started in 1957 betv;een two groups

within the Party, those who supported Mao and those who

opposed him. The conflict, according to Lin, had been in

progress since then. At the opening of his report he traced

the "inevitability of the Cultural Revolution" by citing

the "crimes" of Liu Shao-ch'i since the 1920's. On the

Party struggle Lin said:

From the struggle against the bourgeois rightists in 1957 to the struggle to uncover P'eng Teh-huai's anti-Party clique at the Lushan Meeting in 1959, from the great debate of the general line of the Party in building socialism to the struggle between the two lines in th.e socialist education movement--the focus of the struggle v/es the question of whether to take the socialist road or to take thie capitalist road, whether to uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat or to restore the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

3very single victory of Chairr.an Mac's tro-letarian revolutionary line, every victory in every major canioaign launched by the rarty a~3inst the bourgeoisie, v/as gained only ait3r smashing the revisionist line renresented by Liu Shao-ch'i, v/hich v;as Right or [if itj was -eit' m icrTi, it was Right in essence.-0

Commenting on the 1966-1967 crisis, Lin niade it clear that

Liu's supporters were the main target:

After Liu Shao-ch'i's dcv/nfall, his revisionist clique and his accents in various rlaoes changed their tactics tirrie and again, putting forward slogans v/hich were "Left" in form but Right in essence such as "suspecting all" and "overthrowing all," in a futile attempt to go on hitting

"Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," ££. cit.

1 2

hard at the many and protecting their own handful. Moreover, they created splits among the revolutionary massjs and hoodwinked a section of the masses so as to protect themselves. When these schemes v/ere shattered by the proletarian revolutionaries, they launched another frenzied counterattack, and that is the adverse current lasting from the winter of I966 to the spring of 1967.li '

Although speaking from a point of strength, Lin did not de

clare a victory had been achieved by Mao nor did he announce

an end to the Cultural Revolution. Hov;ever, in a conciliatory

tone, he proposed that "we should continue to help" those who

committed errors against the Party:

V/ith regard to good people who committed the errors characteristic of the capitalist-readers in power but have now raised their political consciousness and gained the understanding of the masses, they should be nromntly "liberated," assigned to suitable work and encouraged to go among the masses of the worKers and peasants to remould their -/vorld outlook. As for those v/no have made a little progress and becorr to some extent av/akened, v/e should continue to heln them, proceeding from the viev/point of unity. 12

Elite Membership of the ilinth Congress

The outcome of the liinth Congress revealed some impor

tant facts about the new Chinese Communist Party elite. Al

though the Congress indicated Mao had won a victory, a revised

lllbid.

^Îbid., pp. 148-149.

193

membership on the Central Committee revealed that certain

compromises were made. For instance only a "few Red Guards

or radioals"13 were elected. Nieh Yuan-tzu, the author of

a famous poster criticizing the president of Peking Univer

sity, was made only an alternate member of the Central

Committee. Nevertheless, Mao's strength was evident. Only

forty-two of the 97 members of the previous Central Committee

had survived while about forty per cent of the elected mem

bers of the Committee are active military personnel. The

Ninth Congress enlarged Committee membership from 97 to 170.

The Politburo was also enlarged from 17 to 21 (Table VIII-1).

Ten of the new members are military men. But the new Standing

Committee of the Party v/hich new Party constitution created,

was reduced from seven to five members. Its membership in

cluded Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Ch'en ?o-ta, Chou Sn-lai and

K'ang Sheng. The two new members Ch'en Po-ta and K'ane: Shen?

were the leaders responsible for the Cultural Revolution.

The four members who were drooned were Teng Hsiao-p'in?,

Ch'en Yun, Chu Te , and Liu Shao-ch'i, all of whom were

attacked for criticizing Mao's policies.

Finally, a useful comparison of tie political orisis

in China with the political crisis in the Soviet Union can

be carried out to show the similarities of political upheaval

- Ibid. , p. 145.

o/

TABL ; V I I I - 1

POLITBURO i'iSMB. RS OF THE 9TH C0r^GR5SS THE CHIKJ^SS COMiUhlST. PARTY

^ Mao T s e - t u n g

- L i n P i a o

"I' C h ' e n P o - t a

'^ Chou E n - l a i

' K ' a n g Sheng

Yeh Chun (wi fe of L i n P i a o )

O" 'O Yeh Chien-yin;

Liu Po-cheng

Chiang Ching (wife of Mao)

Chu Teh

Hsu Shih-yu

Chen Hsi-lien

Li Hsien-nien

Li Tso-peng

Wu Fa-hsien

Chang Chun-chiao

Chiu Hui-tso

Yao vVeh-yuan

Huang Yung-sheng

Tung Pi-wu

Hsieh Fu-chih

' Members of the Standing Coimnittee

Source: New York Times, "Top Party Croup, Politburo and Steering Body Named in ^nina," April 29, 19*69, p. 12, Column 1.

195

caused by the process of industrialization. In I958-I966

Mao faced similar problems to those faced by Stalin in the

1930's. Both leaders were faced with unskilled leadership

to undertake the process of industrial development. In both

countries the crisis caused disintegration of the ruling

elite. Mao's actions to reintegrate his Party's elite were

similar yet different in some respects from those of Stalin.

In the Soviet Union in the 1930's, as in Communist China in

the 1960's, political upheaval affected students, the in

tellectuals, workers in the industrial and the urban sectors

and the military organization as well. Mao used the Red

Guards to purge his victims while Stalin used military courts.

Both leaders accused their opponents of counter-revolutionary

activities.14 Political disintegration of the Soviet Commu

nist Party in 1936-1938 was similar to the disintegration of

the Chinese Communist Party. As revealed by Khrushchev's

speech to the Twentieth Party Congress,

Of the 139 members and candidates of the Party's Central Committee who were elected at the Seventeenth Congress, 98 were arrested and shot mostly in 1937-38 .15

l^Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, /.'orId Revolutionary Elite: Studies in Coercive Ideological l-iovem nts, (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 114.

l^Treadgold, op. cit., p. 53.

196

However, a major difference in the outcome of the two purges

in both countries is that in the Soviet Union "the technical

intelligentsia" assumed a more important role within the

Party hierarchy, while in China the leadership of the Party

continued to emphasize the significance of "politics in

command," and "red then expert" slogans.

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