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CLAIM NO CO/5799/2012

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE COURT IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO CLAIM JUDICIAL REVIEW BETWEEN:

THE QUEEN on the application of

RUSSELL GRAY

as representative Claimant on behalf of BERMONDSEY VILLAGE ACTION GROUP (BVAG)

Claimant

and

(1) LONDON BOROUGH OF SOUTHWARK (2) THE MAYOR OF LONDON

(3)THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

(4) HISTORIC BUILDINGS AND MONUMENTS COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND

Defendants

and

(1) NETWORK RAIL (2) DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT

Interested Parties

WITNESS STATEMENT OF THE CLAIMANT

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Format

(1) This statement is presented in two sections. First it comprises a broadly

chronological narrative of the events from pre-application discussions to the issue of

the planning consents we challenge. In the second section I draw on documents

obtained under freedom of information laws that were not available to us until

more recently (and which are still somewhat lacking) to corroborate and

substantiate our perception of events that was initially a product of reasoned

analysis rather than documentary evidence. The consideration of disclosed

documents is divided into sections dealing with the roles of the different authorities

and potentially (by way of supplement) the collective approaches taken to each of

the different heritage assets we believe have been improperly authorised for

demolition. By this division of the statement into different threads I have aimed to

make it easier to illuminate the specific roles of the various parties. This approach

necessitates some repetition where certain events fall within different narrative

threads.

BVAG background

(2) I have worked in the area south of London Bridge and Tower Bridge, now

designated Bermondsey Village by Southwark Council, for the past 20 years. I have

also lived mostly in the same area since 1987. My Company, Shiva Ltd, owns and

operates a substantial site in Bermondsey St that comprises a collection of restored

Victorian industrial buildings now occupied by companies engaged in the creative

industries. The buildings were derelict when we acquired them and in the process

of their restoration I have become familiar with traditional building methods and

craftsmanship and experienced in preservation of the fabric of historic buildings in

refurbishment projects.

(3) BVAG was born out of an initial public meeting that I called to raise awareness

among local people of how planning policy for the area was being formulated with

scant regard to them. It has since focused on trying to influence policy towards

preservation of the character of the area immediately around London Bridge Station

and to the South of it.

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London Bridge Station

(4) BVAG’s first involvement specifically with London Bridge Station heritage came in

October 2010, following a meeting we hosted with Malcolm Woods, Area Adviser

of English Heritage. Following that meeting one of our members did some historical

research and produced information to support an application to English Heritage for

listing of the arcade fronting the railway viaduct in St Thomas St and Crucifix Lane.

This ornate brick arcade merges into the double-height arched wall of the train

shed, where the incoming London Bridge railway lines terminate. Our request for

listing followed a suggestion from Mr Woods that we ask English Heritage to

remove the ‘ambiguity’ as to where the already listed train shed met the then

unlisted but integral incoming viaduct arches. He had put that suggestion in writing

the day after our meeting (exhibit E.1). The ‘ambiguity’ of the demarcation of the

trainshed wall from the arcade is significant because English Heritage later resolve to

overlook it.

(5) The arches were eventually listed in July 2011 pursuant to the recommendation of

English Heritage (exhibit E.2). However, some while before this we received a copy

of a report that Network Rail had commissioned CgMs consultants to prepare

making a case against listing of the arches (exhibit E.3). This report caused some

consternation in our group as it adopted a condescending tone of independence and

objectivity. Furthermore, in commissioning it Network Rail had bypassed their own

in-house sponsored but semi-independent heritage adviser, Andy Savage, (aka The

Railway Heritage Trust) who was highly embarrassed at being short circuited. The

author of the CgMs report was Edward Kitchen. Although we did not know it at

the time, Mr Kitchen was already in discussions with Southwark planners on behalf

of Network Rail about extensive demolition of heritage at London Bridge to include

part of the St Thomas St. arcade itself.

(6) There was a lengthy delay between our application to English Heritage to list the

arches and their recommendation to DCMS to do so. At the time of writing this

statement English Heritage are refusing our EIR request for disclosure of internal

documents relating to all elements of the London Bridge heritage under threat on

the grounds that the request is ‘manifestly unreasonable’. Documents that might

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explain the delay therefore may be forthcoming in due course. What is obvious that

whilst English Heritage were considering our application for listing of the arcade

they were simultaneously agreeing demolition of part of it, and its continuation, the

trainshed wall, with Network Rail.

(7) BVAG became the focus of local opposition to the heritage destruction entailed in

Network Rail’s present proposals for redevelopment of London Bridge station.

The heritage under threat

Grade II listed train Shed (1864-7) and associated arches (1864-6) by

Charles Henry Driver (exhibit I.1)

(8) Charles Driver is best known for his work on the great London Victorian sewer

project under Joseph Bazalgette – particularly the pumping stations at Abbey Mills

and Crossness. He also worked extensively on the other great infrastructural

project of his era, the railways. He was a champion and an early master of the use

of cast iron in architecture.

(9) The train shed and arches at London Bridge have to be viewed to some extent in

terms of their different components. The southern flank wall of the shed in St

Thomas St is part of a continuous, elaborately arcaded, brick structure that

embraces the arches fronting the viaduct carrying the terminating lines originally

built by the London Brighton and South Coast, and latterly Southern, Railway. In

the double height section carrying the shed roof the arches at the upper level are all

blind and at ground floor level they are open. The single tier arches extend out to

the east along St Thomas St and Crucifix Lane and are all open, providing ornate

entrances to a labyrinthine series of abutting viaducts that are the result of

successive widenings of the original 1836 London & Greenwich line.

(10) The shed roof is comprised of a central crescent component of wrought iron

trusses supported on 24 distinctive (Driver-style) cast iron columns and spandrels.

There are two flat roof flanks carried on riveted lattice beams, extending the roofed

area out to the southern and northern flank walls. The question of the legitimacy of

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the conceptual and practical separation of the various components of the shed and

arches and the ironwork of the roof is central to BVAG’s challenge to the

justification advanced by Network Rail for its extensive proposed demolitions and

the planning authorities’ attempts to bring it within the scope of policy on

demolition of heritage assets.

The South Eastern Railway Offices (1897-1900) by Charles Barry Junior

(exhibit I.2, I.3)

(11) The South Eastern Railway Offices (SERO) on Tooley St is believed to be the last

building by Charles Barry junior, who is best known for his work in Dulwich,

particularly Dulwich College School.

(12) The SERO is in a conservation area and recognized as ‘making an important

contribution to the area’. This designation accords it similar protection to listed

buildings but gives developers slightly more leeway in how it may be treated. Once

it became known that Network Rail were seeking permission to demolish the

building, the Victorian Society made an application to English Heritage to list it.

Their listing application was submitted to EH on 13 June 2011. English Heritage

recommended to DCMS that the building should not be listed and on 25 July wrote

to the Vic Soc. Reporting the DCMS’s acceptance of their recommendation. The

Victorian Society, with some new information on the building, then sought a review

of the EH advice on 19 August 2011. On 15 December DCMS notified us that EH

had reaffirmed their position. Curiously, the EH review (exhibit E.4) was signed off

by the senior designation adviser concerned, Delcia Keate, on 11 October. Early

this year BVAG presented further new evidence on matters not considered by EH

in reaching their (non-) listing recommendation and requested a further review.

Again, we were notified by DCMS that EH would not revise their recommendation.

(13) The obvious quality of the SERO building as compared with other buildings by Barry

junior (almost all of which are listed) together with EH’s refusal to recommend

listing has angered and frustrated heritage organisations and interested individuals.

The general perception is that English Heritage did not act impartially in evaluating

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the SERO and were under pressure not to frustrate Network Rail’s plans for

demolition of the building.

London Bridge proposals

(14) I do not remember precisely when the present redevelopment proposals came to

my attention, probably because of the long history of abortive plans going back

some 15 years and because early notice came only in the form of disparate sketchy

local rumours. These included the suggestions that the project was in stop-go limbo

because there was an issue over availability of Government funding for the project

and that the train shed roof was to be dismantled and fully restored off-site for

reassembly as part of the reconfigured station.

(15) I believe that a definitive go-ahead for the project was given by central government

at some time in 2010 and by early 2011 the proposals were beginning to be talked

about with greater certainty. By February 2011 Network Rail were doing some

sketchy presentations on their proposals. The first I attended was on 17 March

with the local Chamber of Commerce who hosted an open lunch at which Chris

Drabble of Network Rail presented some slides and gave an effusive but very

general explanation of the scheme. My questions to Mr Drabble after his

presentation focused on the seemingly insensitive approach to the Victorian heritage

of the station – often cited as the world’s oldest city-centre railway terminus.

(16) At the time I don’t think it was clear that the plans involved the demolition of the

SERO. It was however clear that NR proposed to demolish the southern flank wall

of the train shed to create a new entrance in St Thomas St. As the building is listed

and since the flank wall comprises a whole arcade of arches at ground level, the

obvious question was why the arches were not simply being used to provide the

entrances required for the new concourse. (exhibit I.3, I.4) Mr Drabble’s response

was the memorable first warning that Network Rail was not going to play by the

book. He maintained, with unconvincing regret, that it was simply not possible. He

gave as a reason that the blind arches of the upper tier on the inside of the wall did

not coincide with those on the outside.

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(17) I have been working on Victorian buildings for more than 20 years and have had

many occasions to carry out brickwork repairs and reconstructions on similar

brickwork arches and details to those of the shed wall. It was entirely obvious to

me that subordinating the inner arches to the outer ones could be achieved with

little difficulty if required and, in any case, the opening up of the upper tier of blind

aches would not be essential but merely one of two alternative treatments that

would permit the retention and incorporation of the wall in the new station

entrance (exhibits I.7, I.9, I.10 illustrate the concept). The operation would indeed

be more involved than simply breaking out brick infill from an originally open arch

that had been bricked up. Nevertheless, it is a straightforward exercise that simply

requires some patience and competent bricklayers. I asked the contractors who

regularly carry out this kind of work for my Company to give me an informal

estimate of the cost. Their suggestion was that the works would cost no more than

£15 000 per bay. At that price they would be keen to do the work themselves.

(18) It is notable that this particular justification for demolishing the wall had been

completely abandoned by Network Rail when they came under pressure to explain

their proposed demolition some months later. It had however been maintained at

least until the applications were submitted on 27 June (exhibit E.5)

(19) It became obvious that getting straight answers from Network Rail was going to be

hard work. Mr Drabble had refined a response to any question about alternative

design solutions that essentially ran to the effect that no solution other than that

proposed by Network Rail is physically possible despite the best efforts of their

engineers and architects to find one. When asked to explain the alternatives

explored by Network Rail he would always refuse to answer.

(20) To raise local awareness of the issues involved in the London Bridge redevelopment

and in the hope that in a more critically focused forum we might make more

progress BVAG hosted its own briefing from Network Rail on 19 May. Mr Drabble

again gave the presentation, accompanied by his then PR man, Simon Brooks. At

the presentation Mr Drabble again ran through a collection of slides. The images

were almost exclusively what are sometimes referred to in the architectural

profession as ‘fluffies’ i.e. impressionistic renderings (exhibit E.6). Only one of the

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slides presented gave a plan of the proposed concourse that could be used to

enable our team to evaluate Network Rail’s proposals in any detail and to consider

how any alternative design could meet the requirements of the brief.

(21) Mr Drabble’s presentation to BVAG had been well attended and there were many

varied questions put to him from local people with a wide variety of concerns. The

discussions had been of a very general nature and had not permitted any focused

discussion of the necessity for heritage losses or any alternatives to such losses. At

the end of the meeting I therefore requested a more focused meeting involving

specialists assembled by BVAG and Network Rail’s architects, Grimshaws. I can

remember Mr Drabble’s precise words in response, which were ‘We talk to

anyone’. He subsequently found himself having to retreat from those words.

(22) BVAG assembled a group of conservation and railway architecture specialists and

proposed a meeting at which it would be possible to look in some detail at the

possibilities for retention of some of the heritage at London Bridge, as against

Network Rail’s proposed wholesale demolition. Mr Drabble clearly thought it was

difficult to refuse such a meeting and he agreed, somewhat grudgingly, to schedule it

for 10 June. Our delegation was to comprise:

(1) Chris Williamson of Weston Williamson Architects

(2) Benedict O’Looney, Architect (formerly with Grimshaws) and Southwark

Conservation Areas Advisory Group chairman

(3) Paul Dobrazczyk, Architectural historian and specialist on the work of Charles

Driver

(4) Neil Marshall of the Transport Trust

(5) Chris Costelloe of the Victorian Society

(6) Edmund Bird, Heritage advisor for Transport for London

(7) BVAG members comprising Jennie Howells (local historian), myself and my

assistant, Liz Ruffell

(23) Mr Drabble started to become uncommunicative in the run up to this meeting (not

responding to our emails about the location etc.), giving the clear impression that he

regretted ever agreeing to it (exhibit E.7). Eventually, on the 7th of June, Mr Drabble

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backed out of the meeting on the grounds that we had not submitted concrete plans

for alternative designs to him. This was obviously disingenuous as the meeting was

for the purpose of obtaining enough information and drawings upon which our team

could base our alternative design proposals. It is obviously not possible to put

forward meaningful design suggestions without survey drawings or a brief.

(24) Mr Drabble proposed to re-schedule the meeting but only for long after Network

Rail had submitted their planning applications, which they did on 27 June. In the

meantime he made approaches to certain of our delegation to invite them to

individual meetings and thereby divide them off from the group initiative BVAG had

instigated.

(25) This incident was a clear demonstration of the conflict that Network Rail had to

address between giving an impression of interest in consultation and consideration

of alternatives to the damage to the historic environmental entailed in their

proposals (as required by the EIA Directive) and in fact being uninterested in any

alternatives, (that would inevitably increase the cost of the project).

(26) After Mr Drabble’s cancellation of our meeting we sought an alternative way to

obtain sufficient information to produce some alternative proposals to save some of

the threatened heritage. We asked for a copy of the briefing images that had been

presented at the BVAG meeting with Mr Drabble so that we could use them to

make alternative proposals for Network Rail’s (and the planners’) consideration. If

we were provided with the concourse plan it would have been possible to produce

a sketchy proposal of how the retention of the wall was compatible with the general

plan. It was however necessary to have a copy of that plan at sufficient resolution

for it to be legible, as the version available to us was not. Our attempts to obtain a

useable copy of the proposed concourse plan are recorded in an email thread

(exhibit E.7a-d). By 23 June we were still being fobbed off with even more fluffy

images that Network Rail knew to be of no use to us (exhibit E.8).

(27) Our meeting at Grimshaws was eventually rescheduled for August 10 but some of

our delegation were then on holiday, others had been invited to private meetings by

Network Rail, and Edmund Bird was unable to attend having ‘discussed it with his

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manager’. Edmund Bird’s job is funded by English Heritage. Those remaining, and

who duly attended, were Chris Williamson, Neil Marshall, Jennie Howells, myself

and Liz Ruffell. In any case, at the meeting it was obvious that so far as Network

Rail were concerned the designs were finalised and there was no question of any

changes being incorporated in response to consultation. We were shown the

project in slightly greater detail but not invited to propose any reconsideration of

any aspect of the designs proposed. For me, there were two memorable aspects of

the meeting. The first was that there was an obvious unstated concurrence by the

architects that the necessity to work around the London Dungeon had severely

compromised the design freedom they had been given. The second was seeing the

physical 3d model of the proposals that was on display in our meeting room at

Grimshaws’ offices. This made it very clear how readily the existing south wall of

the train shed could continue to serve its present purpose within the proposed new

treatment of the station. i.e. it could carry the proposed new roof over the

terminating platforms, just as it carries the present Victorian one, and it could

provide the entrances to the new concourse through the existing arches (exhibits

I.4, I.9, I.10 illustrate the principle)

(28) The possibility of demonstrating the compatibility of the existing south wall of the

train shed with the Grimshaw proposals was obvious. If we could have a

photograph of the model on display, working in Photoshop, in which several of our

members are skilled, we could produce images that would prove our point. This

plan was however again foiled by Network Rail.

(29) On 16 August we emailed the lead architect on the project at Grimshaws, Declan

McCafferty, who had been present at our meeting, asking if we might have some

photographs of the model. Mr Drabble was copied in on this request, which he

quickly refused. His explanation was dismissive and he was annoyed that we had

contacted Grimshaws (exhibit E.9).

(30) By this stage it had become clear that Network Rail was not about to cooperate in

any consideration of alternative plans to those they had submitted to LBS in their

applications. BVAG was thus only left with the option of making our case to

Southwark Council by way of representations and raising public awareness of the

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scale of the threat to our local historic environment by the proposed heritage loss.

Unfortunately, we had experience of public consultation in planning matters being a

formality of which they would take no notice and so we were not optimistic that we

would be heard.

(31) It is an open secret that for any significant applications Southwark’s planning

committee is effectively subject to a party whip. (I only have any significant

experience of planning in Southwark but I have no reason to think it is different

elsewhere.) Together with the knowledge that there was no possibility of the

London Bridge plans being put forward to the committee with anything other than a

recommendation for approval this meant that there was not much that BVAG could

do to deflect the plans from their predictable passage. We also knew that the next

two stages of the approval process, the GLA and the Secretary of State, did not

hold out much better prospects of giving us a fair hearing. We nevertheless

continued raising public awareness of the heritage threat and stressing to Southwark

Council that there were alternatives that could avoid such damage to the historic

environment.

(32) On 25 August the GLA produced their Stage 1 report on the applications. It

included observations of significance to the effect that:

(1) They could not see why it was necessary to demolish the southern flank wall of

the train shed (paras 59-60)

(2) That they were disappointed that the new station would not have an overall

roof but merely shelters along the platforms that are otherwise open to the

weather (paras 50-55)

(3) The possibilities for incorporation of the SERO in the redevelopment had not

been considered (para. 49)

(33) We produced some Photoshop images to show how readily the southern flank wall

of the train shed and the SERO could be opened up to provide entrances to the

new station concourse (exhibits I.4, I.5, I.6). In the case of the flank wall no

significant modifications would be required as it already comprises open arches at

ground level. The upper tier could be opened up or not. With the SERO the bay

structure of the building also permits the ready opening up of double height

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openings with negligible injury to the building. Behind the facade of the SERO it

would then be necessary to hollow out the building in that part of the ground and

first floor that would become effectively an extension of the new concourse. These

images were widely circulated on our website, posted up in our office windows,

used on our flyers and shown in an exhibition of heritage under threat that we put

on in our information office to from the date of its opening on 17 October. There

was overwhelming general preference for this heritage-sensitive approach.

(34) The Leader of Southwark Council, Peter John, was invited to speak at the opening

of our office – which he did. He was shown around the exhibition and the heritage

loss involved in the Network Rail proposals and he was made very aware of our

members anger at the insensitivity of the plans to the heritage of London Bridge.

He was shown the images we had produced to demonstrate how readily the

heritage buildings could be incorporated into the new station design.

(35) Mr John was non-committal about his position on the heritage threat but he did say

that he was due to meet David Higgins, CEO of Network Rail, the following

Tuesday (25 October). Worryingly, from the point of view of BVAG’s broader

objectives as well as for the railway heritage campaign, Mr John was candid about his

aspiration to see high-rise buildings on the south side of St Thomas. His reasoning

was that such buildings would enable the Council to raise large sums of money from

developers that could then be used to improve housing in more deprived areas of

Southwark. This was worrying for our broader objectives as we have always

regarded St Thomas St as the front line in the preservation of the character of the

area now known as Bermondsey Village to the south of the railway lines into

London Bridge. It was worrying from the railway heritage standpoint since the

listed structures of the viaduct arches and the train shed wall must be taken into

account when planning applications in the immediate vicinity are being considered.

Hence, the more of the heritage that could be swept away by the station

redevelopment, the less the obstacle to Mr John’s high-rise plans for the south side

of St Thomas St.

(36) Some time later we enquired about the substance and the outcome of Mr John’s

meeting with Mr Higgins. First this was to the case officer, Gordon Adams and

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subsequently by direct enquiry to the Leader himself (exhibit E.10) but he did not

return my emails and therefore I eventually made the enquiry under the FOIA.

Ultimately we were told that the meeting had no agenda and that there were no

minutes or records of it. Later this chimed with similar contacts that occurred

between the Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, and Mr Higgins, details of which have

been equally impossible for us to obtain.

(37) At the end of 2011 (during December), I and numerous other BVAG volunteers

spent many hours on the street outside the SERO on Tooley Street and the train

shed on St Thomas St talking to passers by and raising a petition calling on

Southwark Council and the GLA to reject proposals for demolition of these

heritage assets (exhibit E.11). We were not optimistic that either Southwark

Council or the GLA would take any notice of the petition – as they did not.

However, it did give us a real insight into the attitudes of people on the street to

the demolitions proposed and provided us with a means of demonstrating popular

feeling for another day. We quickly raised 5 000 signatures and it was very apparent

that there were only two sentiments to be found among the public: indifference or

disapproval of the proposed demolitions. There was no significant support for the

demolitions proposed.

(38) Shortly before the Southwark Council planning committee meeting that approved

the London Bridge plans on 20 December a copy of the 5 000 signatures raised was

presented to Simon Blanchflower of Network Rail at their offices at Blackfriars and

to Southwark Council and the GLA.

(39) In addition to presenting our petition BVAG put together a short summary of our

objections to the proposals for the Southwark planning committee members, mainly

in the form of images, in a bound document which was sent to them by email and in

hard copy form (exhibit E.12).

(40) The officers report to the committee provided only entirely misleading or

unconsidered reasons for the demolitions proposed. The way that the proposed

demolitions were addressed by planning officers is examined in more detail later in

this statement along with other matters that became clearer following FOIA

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disclosures somewhat later. However, for coherence of this narrative it is

necessary to briefly address certain flaws in the report. Specifically it states:

of the demolition of the trainshed:

‘the removal is necessary a result of the new track alignment proposed, and essential to the

Thameslink scheme’.

and in particular its roof:

‘preservation of the building is best achieved through salvage’

(41) These statements are misleading in that the issue of preservation of the southern

flank wall of the train shed is circumvented by the implication that it must go for the

same reason as the roof. This inference is made despite there being numerous

references to the separability of the wall and the roof as conservation subjects

(exhibits E.13.b, E.14.a) including officers own emails (exhibit E.15), the comments in

the GLA Stage 1 report (exhibit 16, paras 59-60 ) and Network Rail’s own

application documents (exhibit E.5). Furthermore, the last approved (2008) scheme,

that followed two public inquiries that more fully considered conservation issues,

anticipated salvage for re-use of the roof but retention of most of the wall (Exhibit

E.17.b, E.18).

(42) The remarks on the salvage of the roof structure (referred to as ‘the building’) are

also wholly misleading given that the, less than transparent, legal obligation imposed

upon Network Rail as part of the consent is to save any or none of the ironwork of

the roof structure and supporting columns at their (or their contractors or

consultants) own discretion (E.19). This compares with the 2008 obligation to

salvage the roof structure and ironwork fully to enable the structure to be re-

erected in a new location.

Of the demolition of SERO:

‘demolition is necessary in order to achieve the large north-south concourse that has been

identified as vital to the scheme’.

(43) The statement that the demolition of the SERO is necessary to achieve the

proposed concourse is simply false. As the report itself later acknowledges, the

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SERO does not obstruct any element of the proposed new station. Its demolition is

proposed not to permit the erection of any other part of the new station but to

provide an open space in front of the Tooley St entrance. The preservation of the

SERO would not alter the proposals in that there would be no physical conflict

between the proposed and the existing but it would require a quite different

treatment of the Tooley Street entrance, whereby part of the existing building

would become a kind of vestibule or extension to the main concourse. Again,

contrary to what the report implies, the 2008 scheme entailed demolition of only

part of the SERO, namely the westernmost 6 bays (exhibit E.17.c)

Of the demolition of the westernmost arch of the listed arcade in St Thomas St:

‘some direct works to the Designated Heritage Asset of the Railway Viaduct Arches on St

Thomas St, listed at Grade II and the Joiner Street Bridge, listed at Grade II.’

(44) The proposed demolition of the westernmost arch of the St Thomas St arcade is

concealed by adoption of the euphemism ‘direct works’. The suggestion that this

demolition is ‘beneficial’ to the historic environment speaks for itself. This

obscurantist device was effective enough that even BVAG volunteers who had

followed the plans closely did not realise what was actually proposed for some

weeks. By concealment of the demolition of the last bay of arches in the arcade the

planners deflected attention from their avoidance of established procedure on

demolition of listed buildings. Oddly, on 1 July, when English Heritage’s listing

advice report was produced they apparently did not know of the proposed

demolition of the westernmost bay of the arcade. (exhibit E.2.g)

(45) It is also worth noting at this stage that there is some obvious tension in the

officers’ report. There are several references to officers disagreeing with the

Environmental Statement (ES) submitted by Network Rail. This is not a particularly

bold statement as would be difficult to agree with a document that describes

demolition of historic building as ‘beneficial’ to the historic environment and the

demolition of the train shed wall and its replacement with a modern entrance built

of pre-cast concrete with brick facing as ‘retention of ground floor arches of

external flank wall as part of new design’ (exhibit E.20). There is nothing in the

report to indicate that officers sought from Network Rail revision of the ES that

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would make it less of a mockery of the EIA process. Indeed, they go on elsewhere

to praise design elements of the proposals in florid terms (para. 167) and continue

to shield them from the scrutiny to which they should have been subjected under

established national and European policy on heritage assets with unconsidered

justification for the demolitions proposed. This conflict is illuminated somewhat by

the FOI disclosures we obtained subsequently and which are dealt with later in this

statement.

(46) The officers’ report makes no reference to financial considerations in relation to the

proposals - of which they were made aware through numerous documents and

emails. These are considered later along with other evidence disclosed subsequently

under FOI.

(47) At the planning committee meeting itself on the evening of 20 December a large

number of BVAG members and others objecting to the heritage loss at London

Bridge attended to make their feelings known. The Chairman of the Committee,

Nick Dolezal, exercised his discretion in treating the four Network Rail applications

as one and thereby limiting representations from objectors to a total of three

minutes between them. Simon Blanchflower of Network Rail spoke to the

committee for about 10 minutes commending his company’s proposals. His

justification for demolition of the SERO was put in terms of safety of railway

passengers but it was too vaguely expressed to evaluate its substance. He made

assertions about passenger numbers and pedestrian flows and their safety

implications that do not appear to be substantiated in any of the application

documents or in submissions to English Heritage in support of the proposed

demolition. He offered no justification for demolition of the train shed wall. The

objectors divided their time allowance between myself and Benedict O’Looney,

Chairman of the Southwark Conservation Areas Advisory Group. This gave us 90

seconds each to make our case. I focused on the train shed wall and Benedict

spoke about the SERO. There was of course great support for what we said from

the large group of objectors present but, as anticipated, only modest interest from

the minority Liberal Democrats on the committee and none whatsoever from any

of the Labour majority. The consent was duly approved subject to a ‘legal

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agreement’ to be concluded no later than 30 March and ‘referral to the GLA and

the SoS for Communities and Local Government’.

(48) Following the decision of the Southwark Planning Committee we did at least know

on what arguments the planners were going to peg their approval. This triggered an

inquiry into their substance since, as cited above, some of the reasoning was

perverse.

(49) At the end of December I started to question (by email) English Heritage on the

logic behind their decision to allow the loss of the south flank wall of the train shed

to go by default by treating it as being implied in the removal of the roof. This

dialog was terminated by Paddy Pugh, Head of the London Region of English

Heritage, when he ceased to respond to my questions that focused increasingly

specifically on the arbitrary (and floating) demarcation of convenience between the

trainshed wall and the viaduct arcade. (exhibit E.21).

(50) I also questioned Bridin O’Connor of Sothwark planners (again by email) about their

statement (At para. 186) that ‘A study into parts of the building that could be

accommodated in place has revealed that just one of the12 bays and a small portion

of the flank wall on St Thomas St could be salvaged but this represents less than

10% of the structure.’ (exhibit E.22)

(51) When English Heritage refused to respond to my emails I turned to the FOI/EIR

provisions for obtaining information from them. This attracted a less than

cooperative response. My requests were reinterpreted by them to exclude much of

the information I had requested and that which they did disclose was heavily

redacted. When I challenged this they refused to cooperate entirely, maintaining

that they were exempt from complying with my disclosure requests as they were

‘manifestly unreasonable’. As a result we have an outstanding complaint before the

Information Commissioner and still very limited disclosure from EH. However,

following correspondence with the Chair of EH, Baroness Andrews, which included

a suggestion that their stance at London Bridge may be susceptible to judicial

review, limited email communication was resumed with Mr Woods.

18

(52) My questioning of both Bridin O’Connor and Malcolm woods (exhibit E.23) led both

to ultimately admit that they knew of no necessity to demolish the south wall of the

train shed. I also questioned the case officer at Southwark, Gordon Adams as to

the whereabouts of the ‘study’ that established the necessity for demolition of the

south wall. He would only ever say that it was all in the papers but, told that I

couldn’t find it, he refused to say where. I was not the only one who couldn’t find

the justification for the demolition as Giles Dolphin, Head of Planning Decisions at

the GLA, told me he could not find it either.

(53) On 12 January I spoke to Mr Dolphin who was, unfortunately, due to retire the

following day. He thought that the proposed demolition of the train shed wall was

unnecessary and that the comment in the GLA Stage 1 report that it was ‘not clear

why’ demolition was said to be necessary had not been answered. He told me that

he had just written to Network Rail asking for a justification for the demolition of

the wall (exhibit E.24). Knowing of the existence of this request, after he left, I

sought disclosure of both Mr Dolphin’s question and Network Rail’s answer (exhibit

E.25)

(54) By this stage the application was with the Mayor of London for his consideration

pursuant to his powers to refuse the application or to determine it himself if he saw

fit.

(55) The Mayor’s decision is required to take place within fourteen days of the

application being referred to him but it was delayed several times. We were not

able to obtain a clear explanation for the delay. We were told on at least one

occasion that it was because Southwark Council had ‘withdrawn’ the application but

if this was the case it was immediately re-submitted. Although we had not thought

it likely, BVAG began to think it possible that the Mayor would balk at the heritage

loss being proposed, perhaps even having taken a closer look following a

demonstration that our group had organized outside County Hall. That

demonstration, timed to coincide with the meeting at which he was supposed to

make a decision, on 1 February, resulted in a lucky (for us) encounter with the

Mayor himself who was taking a photo-call on the lawn outside the GLA building.

This enabled us to ‘ambush’ him, as the local news website put it. As a result of this

19

opportune ambush we were able to put our case against the heritage destruction far

more thoroughly and forcefully than we had expected to be able to with just

placards and a megaphone outside County Hall.

(56) The chance meeting with Boris Johnson enabled us to spend some time making our

point as he remained talking to us for some while. At one point, as the local news

site reported (exhibit E.26), he told us: ‘I don’t mind ending up in court, I’d love to

stop this bloody thing.’ ‘I cycle past that thing (SERO) every day and it infuriates me

that we could lose it.’ Less encouragingly, he also said he had been advised by

lawyers that it would be costly to the GLA to save the buildings. We did not know

what cost he was referring to but another of our supporters who had approached

him at a public engagement he had been attending had been told the same thing so

we considered there was obviously something to it. As he left I told Mr Johnson

that there were a bundle of papers that we had already submitted to his planning

officers (exhibit E.27) that he should consider as they made clear that a decision to

allow the applications would be vulnerable to legal challenge. In the event the

Mayor did not make a decision at that meeting and it was again postponed.

(57) On 14 February I had received by way of response to my FOI request (made on 16

January) a copy of Mr Dolphin’s email to Network Rail (exhibit E.24) calling for a

justification of the proposed demolition of the train shed south wall. The response

to Mr Dolphin’s email, which was from Network Rail’s consultant Erica Mortimer of

CgMs was forthcoming later, on 16 February. This was a patronising document

(exhibit E.25) that gave numerous unsustainable justifications for the proposed

demolition and various blunt assertion of the necessity for it. None is valid. One

was that such demolition was already approved as a result of a previous application.

Apart from being irrelevant to the consideration of a new application which must be

considered on its own merits and in relation to prevailing policy, this statement was

untrue. In fact the 2008 application included a Design and Access Statement

(exhibit E.17.b) that reads: ‘The south wall of the listed trainshed, which is of some

interest and contributes positively to the streetscape, will be largely retained and

incorporated into the new station.’ (para. 7.1). It seems the partial demolition of

the wall proposed was to facilitate a widely mocked element of the 2008 scheme:

the construction of an ‘air rights’ office block over the railway lines that was no

20

doubt a product of the economic euphoria prevailing when the scheme was

conceived (exhibit E.18).

(58) As it was clearly possible to preserve the flank wall in 2008, it was impossible to

explain why it was not possible today. So CgMs re-wrote history on behalf of their

clients, Network Rail.

(59) The other justification for the demolition was illustrated with a photograph of a long

steel beam on the trailer of an articulated lorry. This was to assist planning officers

in understanding the proposition that long steel beams would be used to carry the

tracks over the hollowed-out viaduct below to create the wide street-level

concourse. As I had already explained to the case officer at the GLA, Matt Carpen,

beams that can be put in in one piece can also be spliced and put in in smaller

sections. I told him that if he didn’t think this was obvious but rather that it was a

matter for an engineer I could provide him with such confirmation from a structural

engineer.

(60) I had also emailed Nick Gray, ‘Principal Programme Sponsor’ of the London Bridge

project at Network Rail, on 20 February (exhibit E.28) challenging him to explain

the specious justification provided for demolition of the south wall by Ms Mortimer

of CgMs. He responded on 27 February (exhibit E.29). His words are carefully

chosen but he does not contradict my assertion and explanations as to why both of

Ms Mortimer’s justifications were unfounded. Mr Gray also confuses the 2003

scheme with that of 2008. This is indicative of how the claim that the principle of

the demolition of the train shed wall had been established became a mantra for the

planners, for English Heritage and for Network Rail in their advocacy of the present

proposals. It appears that many of the parties relying on this false assertion did so

by repetition and on the basis of no knowledge of the reality.

(61) Mr Carpen had been copied in on Mr Gray’s letter. Following the three

postponements, the Mayor’s decision was now due to be made on 1 March. To

make sure that there could be no excuse of not receiving or not understanding our

representations when it came to considering whether there was any necessity for

demolition of the south wall of the trainshed I had a long conversation with Mr

21

Carpen on the phone and emailed him with confirmation that he could not rely on

long beams or planning precedent to justify the demolition (exhibit E.30)

(62) Eventually the Mayor’s decision was made on 1 March. It came under the signature

of his deputy, Sir Edward Lister. The Stage II report (exhibit E.63) that gives the

reasons for the decision was emailed to BVAG on 2 March. Knowing that the

demolition of the south wall was unjustifiable I was keen to see how Mr Carpen had

dealt with the problem in the report.

(63) His solution is exemplary of the planning officer’s craft. At para. 60 of the

the Stage II report he records that the GLA has not been provided with a copy of a

‘construction logistics study’ that had been requested to justify the demolition. At

para. 61 he recites the policy requirement that necessity for demolition of the wall

must be established. At para. 62 he acknowledges that it is possible to build the

station without demolition of the wall and then goes on to assert the opposite.

Ultimately he relies on the long beams argument that he knows to be unsustainable.

On the telephone Mr Carpen had not challenged my assertion that it is obvious that

long beams can be achieved by splicing together shorter ones. Nor had he taken

me up on my offer to provide an engineer’s report proving that it would be possible

in this case. I have since challenged Mr Carpen on his self-contradictory comments

in the report but he has declined to answer the questions I put to him (exhibit E.30)

(64) This is just the most obvious example of how the London Bridge proposals were

approved without proper scrutiny of the proposed loss to the historic environment.

Throughout the planning process BVAG was watching the planners more closely

than they are used to. It became obvious that the plans were sanctioned at a higher

level and planning officers would simply be required to accept that policy would

have to be circumvented and they would be expected to do the best job they could

of pretending there was compliance. The obvious supposition was that the

demolition-minded approach to the redevelopment was driven by financial

considerations. This is corroborated by the various FOI disclosures we obtained

subsequently in which there are frequent references to cash constraints on the

project (addressed more fully later in this statement). There is no reference

whatever to cash constraints in any of the public documents. This obviously means

22

that planning officers knew that they were expected to operate in a regime of

secrecy in this respect.

(65) In accordance with all the planning documents going before, BVAG, believed that,

following clearance from the GLA, the proposals would be referred to the secretary

of State. When the Mayor’s decision to leave Southwark Council to determine the

applications was sent to us on 2 March I was away. It was therefore another

member of our Group, Amy Blier-Carruthers who made enquiries of Southwark

Council and the DCLG as to the progress of the application until I returned. Amy

reported difficulty in getting a response to her inquiries and general evasiveness as

to if and when the application had been referred to the SoS.

(66) When I came back to the UK on 12 March I took up the issue alongside Amy. My

experience was identical to that which she had reported whilst I was away. For the

DCLG’s part I was required to deal with a Ms Michelle Peart who was clearly a not

a very senior official in the Planning Casework Unit. It was very clear that Ms Peart

was being closely directed from above. Telephone conversations (and email

communications) with her were difficult as she seemed to be working from a tight

script. The last time I had occasion to deal with the DCLG on a referred

application in which BVAG was interested I had been able to engage much more

meaningfully and with someone obviously more senior and experienced. It was odd

that for a much more important application I was only able to make contact at a

much more junior level.

(67) Eventually it became clear that, contrary to what all the planning authorities’

documents had stated, there was to be no referral of the applications to the SoS by

Southwark Council. It is presently not clear how it happened that the stated

intention to refer the applications to the SoS was abandoned.

(68) In any case, again knowing that current policy on call-ins is to avoid them, we made

our appeal to the SoS regardless (exhibit E.31). It became very apparent from our

contacts with DCLG that declining to call-in the London Bridge proposals would be

a formality. This was subsequently illustrated by the FOI disclosures obtained on 27

April (Exhibit E.32), again considered in more detail later. Another BVAG member

23

had however identified a requirement under the Planning (Listed Buildings and

Conservation Areas) Act to refer listed building applications to the SoS where they

are for works involving a Transport and Works Act Order. It seemed clear that the

listed building consents required in this case therefore had to be referred as a

matter of law.

(69) I pointed out this apparent legal obligation to Ms Peart and told her that in her

department there must be lawyers specialised enough to give an immediate

response to our interpretation of the legal position and asked her to obtain such

advice. She was in contact with Southwark Council and clearly there had been

consultation between the Council and DCLG about the legality of the decision not

to refer the applications. By way of a response to my request to know the DCLG’s

own position on the matter I received a copy of an email from Bridin O’Connor of

Southwark Council to Ms Peart (Exhibit E.33) giving the interpretation of the law on

which she relied for not referring the applications to the SoS. This was unclear – to

put it mildly – and hence I was not persuaded that the legal position is not as it

appears on its face.

(70) Although they did not tell me, DCLG officials did obtain the advice of their lawyers

on the effect of the Planning (LB&CA) Act. A copy of the email in which this

appears was disclosed in response to my FOI request (exhibit E.32.g) but it has been

redacted on grounds of privilege. I have requested its disclosure in un-redacted

form as a matter of public interest and pursuant to these proceedings but it has

been refused again.

(71) From the FOI disclosure from DCLG it is clear that the Department for Transport

lobbied for a swift dismissal of our call-in application in the form of a briefing on the

London Bridge proposals (exhibit E.32pp). There are references in the disclosed

internal emails to the necessity to dispose of the matter urgently in order to meet a

deadline for the signing a legal agreement with Southwark Council and also to avoid

the cost of the Community Infrastructure Levy being imposed following its

introduction on 1 April. It appears clear from the documents that these

considerations are what determined the SoS’s approach to our call-in request.

24

(72) The DCLG issued their Non-intervention notice on 29 March and Southwark

Council responded immediately by granting consent for the proposals on the same

day.

(73) At this point we were left only with the option of considering challenging the

decisions leading to the grant of planning consents in the Courts. We therefore

proceeded to pursue disclosure of documents under FOIA/EIR. The impression

throughout the planning process was that the approach to the redevelopment of

London Bridge had been determined long before any planning application was made

in the knowledge that the planning procedure would be a formality. Given that the

plans involved wholesale destruction of the railway heritage of London Bridge it was

clear from the start that the compliance of the planning officers of Southwark

Council and the GLA, as well as English Heritage would have to be assured. Our

FOI requests were made in this context.

Further consideration of FOI disclosures

(74) The earliest documents that have been released to us regarding the current

proposals start from October 2010. By that time a core team of people has been

established for discussing the plans with Network Rail that consists of Southwark

planning officers, the Case Officer from the GLA, the Area Adviser from English

Heritage, Malcolm Woods and Network Rail’s planning consultants, CgMs.

(75) Of course, Southwark planners, the GLA and English Heritage are all required to be

on board if Network Rail are to succeed in obtaining consent for demolishing what

is effectively all of London Bridge Station’s visible Victorian Heritage. The process

will require the LPA and the GLA to take a flexible approach to the application of

local, national and European policy on protection of the historic environment. A

key element in persuading the planning officers to take such a flexible approach to

policy is the support of English Heritage, who are therefore central to the whole

process.

25

(76) Taking the parties in turn, our FOI requests have revealed further information and

evidence in support of our Claim:

English Heritage

(77) North Southwark has a long and rich history. Heritage and the historic

environment are however a demonstrably low political priority for Southwark

Council. The planning process is unreceptive to heritage interests and the historic

environment has only English Heritage as a potentially effective advocate.

(78) In the case of the London Bridge proposals the failure of English Heritage to act in

defence of heritage assets was crucial. The perverse decisions and advice of English

Heritage regarding the proposed damage to the London Bridge historic

environment infected the decisions by all three statutory planning authorities to

permit the redevelopment.

(79) English Heritage have not been cooperative in response to our FOIA/EIA disclosure

requests (exhibits E.34). The Information Commissioner is presently considering a

complaint from BVAG against EH’s refusal to give information on the grounds that it

is ‘manifestly unreasonable’. The limited disclosure they did give us prior to their

blanket refusal has been heavily redacted. The more important documents

demonstrating the position of English Heritage were, furthermore, not included in

their disclosures but have come from disclosures obtained from other bodies.

(80) There are conflicts between what EH’s Area Adviser, Malcolm Woods says to

different people at different times, particularly in response to my questions to him

posed sequentially by email (exhibit E.23)

On cost

(81) One document that EH had disclosed to us revealed that Network Rail had told Mr

Woods that preservation of the SERO would add £100 - £150 million to the cost of

the London Bridge redevelopment (exhibit E.35). On 5 April (exhibit E.36) I asked

26

Mr Woods about any other discussions that EH had on financing of the proposals.

On 10 April he responded that ‘There were no other discussions regarding the

financing of the scheme so there are no further details to give I’m afraid.’ (exhibit

E.37)

(82) This statement is inconsistent with documents revealing how Mr Woods had himself

expressed the position of English Heritage with regard to the financial constraints

on the project and how he and the planning authorities had been pressurised by

Network Rail over the cost of preserving heritage assets. Mr Woods’ references to

such financial constraints in the documents long pre-date the discussions regarding

financing that he acknowledges.

(83) In an email exchange with Gordon Adams and others at Southwark on 11 July 2011

(exhibit E.38), Mr Woods addressed himself to the financing of the London Bridge

plans, improperly taking account of cost issues in presenting the position and advice

of EH. He says: ‘First we are told that Network Rail is already struggling to fund this

project from the funding granted it by HM Treasury’ and ‘I recognize that cost is not

normally a consideration when assessing heritage benefit, etc but I am wary of

jeopardizing this project if it comes down to saving perhaps part of a fragment –

albeit quite a significant fragment – of the grade 2 listed train shed.’

(84) On 26 May 2011 Edward Kitchen of CgMs wrote a six page letter to Malcolm

Woods of English Heritage (exhibit E.39) quoting £30-40 million as an estimate of

the cost of saving the train shed ironwork, supporting structure and roof by

dismantling for storage and re-erection. (These figures don’t correspond with other

figures for the same works presented to Southwark Council by Network Rail’s own

‘Railway Heritage Trust’ (exhibit E.40). Saving the ironwork had been a condition

of the previous consent for demolition of the roof in 2008 that Network rail now

wanted dropped. Mr Kitchen asked EH to consider whether such an obligation was

a ‘prudent and effective use of public money in the current economic climate.’

Council officers continued to argue for retention of the roof but without EH’s

support their position was abandoned. Network Rail got their way and the story of

how Southwark Council progressively and furtively abandoned any requirement to

preserve the structure, or any part of it, is a long story of its own.

27

(85) On 30 November 2011 Mr Woods wrote to Chris Drabble of Network Rail

(exhibit E.41): ‘Hi Chris. I am not nagging but if you are able to let me have the

statement of case we spoke of – i.e. briefly why Network Rail believes the

demolition of the Tooley Street building is necessary and what would be the

consequences, including financial (broad figures are just fine), if it had to be retained

– before then that would be extremely helpful.’

(86) It was in response to this email Mr Drabble emailed Mr Woods on 1 December

(exhibit E.35b) and again on 8 December (exhibit E.35a ) stating that, the impact of

the retention of the SERO would be ‘unaffordable’ and estimating that ‘the cost to

the scheme and ultimately the public purse could range between £100m to £150m.

He concludes: ‘Obviously any decision to retain 64-68 Tooley St is not something

that Network Rail could support.’

(87) To put Mr Drabble’s cost estimate into context, English Heritage’s call on public

funds in 2010-11 was £130m. Although the figure quoted by Mr Drabble is

obviously a gross exaggeration, it would lay EH open to the charge that they had

doubled their annual cost to the taxpayer merely by insisting on preservation of

then SERO.

(88) As early in the pre-application process as 19 October 2010, a meeting of

Southwark’s ‘Heritage and Design working Group’ was told by Network Rail that

‘The whole station scheme at London Bridge is on a funding knife edge (exhibit

E.42b). Although not present at that meeting it is inconceivable that Mr Woods was

excluded from this information.

Precedent and justification for demolition of the south wall of the train shed

(89) On 10 April Mr woods wrote: ‘We knew that the previous scheme included the

retention of part of the south wall of the listed train shed’

(90) This statement is at odds with what Mr Woods said in his letter to Edward Kitchen

of CgMs on 31 August 2011 (exhibit E.43): ‘As with the consented scheme, the

28

current proposals to redevelop the station call for the complete demolition of the

grade II listed train shed that encloses platforms 9-16 of the station.’ His letters to

Southwark Council of 13 December 2011 (exhibit E.44) and DCLG of 5 January

(exhibit E.45) are similarly misleading. In the latter he refers to a scheme proposed

in 2000. We are still seeking details of that scheme from Southwark Council but, in

any case, Mr Woods was fully aware that that scheme was superseded, following

two public inquiries, by the 2008 scheme which preserved most of the train shed

flank wall and the entire roof structure (albeit through salvage for re-erection).

(91) On 4 April he had written: ‘retaining just the south wall – whether in whole or in

part - was not something that we would set as a condition of any consent that

might be granted.’ and ‘We did not consider the south wall as a separate entity and

apply a necessity test to it alone.’

(92) The suggestion that EH did not consider the south wall in its own right as a

structure worthy of retention is at odds with its own previous position from earlier

public inquiries (exhibit E. ), with the opinions of both planning authorities (exhibits

E.24, E.46, E.47), with architects of the previous and current schemes (exhibits E.17,

E.5), with the report of Network Rail’s own planning consultants (exhibit E.3e) and

with the overwhelming opinion of conservationists and the public. It is also at odds

with the physical reality of the continuity of the train shed flank wall and the

separately listed St Thomas St arcade that represent one continuous façade (exhibit

I.1, E21a). For these reasons, identification of the flank wall with the ironwork of

the train shed is an untenable and perverse position for EH to have taken. It can

only be explained by a desire to release Network Rail from the presumption in

favour of retention of heritage assets that planning policy entails.

On demolition of the westernmost bay of arches in the St Thomas St arcade

(93) Although relatively minor in the overall scale of heritage loss proposed in the ondon

Bridge redevelopment, the demolition of the westernmost arch of the recently

listed St Thomas St arcade is instructive. It illustrates how fully the planning

process followed a pattern of acceptance of the premise that Network Rail would

be at liberty to demolish whatever they chose and the planners and English Heritage

29

would have to make it fit with conservation policy by whatever means they could.

In the case of the westernmost bay of the arcade this involved particularly

convoluted and inconsistent approaches by the various parties.

(94) The listing of the St Thomas St arcade in July 2012 had necessitated a new listed

building consent application to augment the June applications. As I explained earlier

in this statement (para. 4), Mr Woods was well aware of the unity of the train shed

and the St Thomas St arcade as it was he who had invited BVAG to propose

removing the ambiguity about where the one stopped and the other started. The

listing of the arches had effectively made the arcade and the train shed wall one

continuous listed structure, albeit listed under two separate reference numbers.

(95) The continuity of the shed wall with the arcade makes it impossible to demarcate

between the two structures. EH had removed themselves from the obligation to

defend preservation of the shed wall by maintaining that it was unworthy of

preservation once the principle of the removal of the roof structure was accepted.

As explained above, this position is untenable and at odds with all other parties

views, including EH’s own in the past. However, it also produced another problem

as a result of the continuity of the building with the newly listed arcade. I explored

this difficulty in EH’s abandonment of the shed wall as a conservation issue in an

email thread with Mr Woods’ superior, Paddy Pugh, at English Heritage in

December and January 2011/12 (exhibit E.21). I pressed Mr Pugh on how EH

thought a demarcation could be drawn between the train shed and the arcade.

When he refused to respond I sent him a photograph of the conjunction of the two

and asked him to select between four different options marked with different

coloured dotted lines. (exhibit E.21a). Mr Pugh eventually refused to respond to me

entirely without answering the question.

(96) The problem of the last bay of the arcade also prompted different responses from

different parties. Southwark Council did not refer to the proposed demolition of

the bay in the listed building consent application description (exhibit E.48) and

obscured it in the officers report to the planning committee by referring to ‘direct

works’ rather than demolition. The drawings submitted by Network Rail in that

application misstated the extent of the listed arches to exclude the bay of three

30

proposed for demolition (exhibit E.49). By these means Southwark Council

concealed their decision not to refer the proposed demolition of the last of the

newly listed arcade bays to English Heritage and the Secretary of State. This was

done with the knowledge and support of Mr Woods (exhibit E.50) although he

distances himself from the decision in his email to DCLG (E.32)

(97) Recognising the integral nature of the arcade to the shed wall would have made the

EH position that the wall did not merit conservation impossible to propose.

Effectively, they would have to maintain that the wall was not just continuous with

the ironwork of the roof but that it was discontinuous with the arcade. Manifestly,

as was recognized in the consented 2008 scheme, the reverse is the case.

Listing of SERO

(98) On 12 December 2011, English Heritage submitted their advice to DCMS on the

review of their recommendation not to list the SERO pursuant to a request from

the Victorian Society made on August 19 (exhibit E.51). The review had been

signed off by the EH area Designation Adviser, Patience Trevor, on 29 September

2011 and by her superior, Delcia Keate, on 11 October. Recently I enquired of the

DCMS if they knew why it had taken two months for the review to reach them, but

they did not.

(99) Obviously, the applicants, The Victorian Society, other heritage groups, interested

individuals and BVAG members were disappointed (and dismayed) that EH had

reaffirmed their position on SERO. In exasperation we researched the EH listings of

other buildings by Charles Barry & Sons and other listed buildings in the immediate

vicinity of SERO. In addition I called Ms Trevor of English Heritage to ask her about

a unique feature of the SERO building that I wondered about, but that her report

did not mention. I also asked her about her unfavourable comparison of the

building with the North Eastern Railway Offices in York. I was concerned that

when I asked her whether the unique chequerboard relief on the upper levels of the

building’s exterior were executed in red brick or in terracotta she told me she

didn’t know as nobody had asked her to look at it. Similary, when I asked her

31

where in York I could see the North Eastern Railway offices for myself for

comparison, it was obvious she didn’t know.

(100) We discovered that English Heritage in the past have listed almost all of Charles

Barry junior’s other buildings, many of which are very modest in comparison with

the SERO. An obvious example is Dulwich College Prep School (exhibit I. 16, E.52).

All these factors contributed to a widespread belief among heritage groups that

English Heritage had been influenced by the Network Rail proposals for London

Bridge in their recommendation to DCMS on the importance of the SERO.

(101) As cited above under Cost, on 1 December and 8 December 2011 Mr Drabble

emailed Mr Woods and informed him that saving the SERO was unaffordable as it

would cost £100 – 150 million. There is no suggestion that the building could not

be saved and incorporated in the new station proposals. Shortly after this English

Heritage confirmed their recommendation to DCMS that the building should not be

listed. Clearly, to have recommended otherwise would have been to put them in

direct confrontation with Network Rail. In order to properly make out our case

we require proper disclosure from EH that they continue to resist.

(102) Ultimately, EH did not entirely concede on demolition of the SERO, maintaining that

the case was not made out (exhibit E.44), but by not recommending the building for

listing and by failing to maintain any objection to the decision of Southwark to

permit demolition they effectively turned a blind eye to its loss. This stance is

illustrated by an email of 25 November 2011 (exhibit E.53) from Mr Woods to

Gordon Adams. He says, ‘we are struggling to get a compelling case out of

CgMs/Network Rail to justify the demolition of the Tooley St building: Edward

Kitchen’s latest letter following our meeting was not what we hoped for.’ He also

seeks to agree a form of words that preserves for English Heritage some claim to

integrity but ensures any obstacle to Networks Rail’s demolition plans and

Southwark planners’ freedom to recommend approval to their planning committee

is minimised.

32

(103) In summary, there is persuasive evidence, even from the limited disclosure EH have

given, that they acted with regard to commercial and political factors that were

outside their remit and they thus failed in their legal duty to ‘secure preservation of

historic buildings’.

Southwark Council

(104) In the early pre-application discussions between Southwark Planners and Network

Rail’s consultants the planning officers show belief in the application of established

policy to the London Bridge proposals. On 29 November 2010 the case officer,

Gordon Adams, in an exchange of emails with Malcolm woods of English Heritage

(Exhibit E.54) is having to make the case for retention of the south wall of the train

shed against apparent opposition from Mr Woods. He concludes the exchange with

an announcement of a ‘shot across the bow’ of Network Rail to put them on notice

that there are ‘fundamental concerns’ with their proposal. It is particularly relevant

to subsequent developments that the issue of previous planning consents and what

precedent there is for demolition of the wall is canvassed. Subsequently there

appears to evolve a consensus to adopt the pretence that there is persuasive

precedent for total demolition of the wall. Mr Woods even acknowledges that the

whole of the train shed wall could be retained but he says that this would not be the

preference of English heritage, or at least, they would not be ready to express such

a preference.

(105) On 30 November 2011 Bridin O’Connor writes what is presumably the ‘shot across

the bows’ referred to by Mr Adams (exhibit E.46). This includes the demand:

‘More importantly evidence will be required to demonstrate that all options have

been considered for the retention of any listed or conservation area structure that

is proposed for demolition.’

(106) Considerably later, in an email of 12 July 2011 (exhibit E.55) Mr Adams writes:

‘What is being put forward is taking a substantial amount of heritage fabric and

there will be very little of early elements of London’s oldest mainline rail station left;

accordingly we will continue to try and salvage what we can.’

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(107) This was in response to an email from Malcolm Woods of English Heritage (see

under EH section) that referred to the financial considerations with which he was

concerning himself. In response to that point Mr Adams says: ‘And on the funding,

chris Drabble was at pains to point out that the recent NR £1.2bn profit was

reinvested in the railways – perhaps they could invest a bit more in the London

Bridge Scheme.’

(108) His P.S. is equally telling: ‘Apologies if I am coming over a little negatively but I just

come back from a tour of Kings Cross station which is more in line with the high

aspirations we had for London Bridge.’

(109) These exchanges illustrate the way that fighting talk from the planning officers

regarding conservation obligations in the early stages start to become tempered by

resignation. The obvious inference is that, in this case, cash considerations will

trump conservation policy.

(110) By the time the proposals go before the planning committee – and following a

personal meeting between David Higgins of Network Rail and Peter John (of which

we have been unable to obtain any minutes) there is no remaining concern

expressed about reconciling the proposals with conservation policy. Neither is

there any mention of monetary factors in the report to the planning committee.

(111) This would of course be understandable if Network Rail had produced evidence to

support the ‘necessity’ for demolition of the heritage assets concerned. For this

reason I continually questioned both Southwark Council, the GLA and English

Heritage about the production of such evidence. This always drew the evasive

response ‘its all in the application documents’ as Giles Dolphin of the GLA also

reported having been told. It is evident that Network Rail did not think it necessary

to satisfy the conditions that would attach to any normal application for such large

scale heritage demolition. There is therefore a missing link in the chain of events,

which is how, without any significant changes to the proposals or consideration of

alternatives that would reduce destruction of the historic environment, the defence

of heritage assets in accordance with established policy was abandoned by planning

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officers. We know that behind the scenes the cash card was being played fully by

Network Rail (exhibits E.35, E.38, E.42, E.56c) but not how it became so effective in

overcoming the planning officers’ objections.

The GLA

(112) As part of the troika that would be required to facilitate the London Bridge plans

along with Southwark Council and English Heritage, the GLA was involved from the

early stages of the pre-application process. Indeed, the case officer at Southwark,

Gordon Adams, worked on an exchange basis with the GLA, spending part of his

time in one job and part in the other. Of course he would not work on the same

cases in both capacities but the interrelationship between Southwark as LPA and the

GLA next door on a major public infrastructure project is obvious. Inevitably the

approach taken to the applications was substantially agreed between the key parties.

(113) The difference between the GLA’s role and that of Southwark Council, as emerges

from disclosure we have obtained, from BVAG’s perspective is therefore limited to

a few issues. By the time of the GLA decision we had also had some time to probe

the justifications (such as they were) relied upon by Southwark’s planning officers in

their report and to obtain some FOI disclosure. It was therefore easier to pin

down the GLA on specifics prior to the Mayor’s decision. The GLA responded

accordingly to try to ensure their approval was ‘JR-proof’.

(114) As recounted above, I had talked to Giles Dolphin, former Head of Planning

Decisions at the GLA, on 12 January, the day before his retirement. I had previously

talked to him on the same subject and I knew that in his opinion there was a most

obvious lack of justification in the Network Rail proposals for the demolition of the

St Thomas St. train shed wall. This point had been made clearly in the GLA’s Stage I

report at para. 60 (exhibit E.16b): ’Figure 7.8 and 7.10 of the Heritage Statement

suggests that part of the wall needs to be removed; however it is not clear why.

The configuration of the new concourse should therefore be shown testing

retention of the train shed wall as part of the clear and convincing justification for

the loss of heritage assets.’

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(115) Mr Dolphin told me that he had ‘just written to Network Rail’ seeking such

justification and that he thought in the absence of a satisfactory response the

approval that he anticipated would be forthcoming would not be ‘JR-proof’. Once

he retired we no longer had Mr Dolphin as a point of contact at the GLA but we

pursued the trail of enquiries and disclosure applications that he had commenced.

This ultimately led to the exchange of letters with Nick Gray of Network Rail and

emails with Matt Carpen (exhibits E.28, E.29) that forced the self contradictory para.

62 in the Stage II report. The whole section of that report on retention options of

the ‘listed trainshed and trainshed wall’ (paras 58-67) is the product of a post hoc

justification that became necessary because BVAG had put the GLA on notice that

there was no adequate justification in the proposals as submitted and that

alternative treatments that preserved the buildings had not been explored. It is

fundamentally flawed in that it considers the compatibility of the proposed designs

with retention of the building. The correct approach is obviously to consider

designs that follow from the premise of retention of the heritage assets rather than

to test the retention against designs conceived on the assumption of their

demolition. This is no doubt why, several months before, Network Rail were so

keen to prevent heritage minded design treatments being produced by the BVAG

group of architects and heritage specialists.

(116) The justification for the demolition of the SERO is a product of the same inverted

logic. Obviously a design conceived on the basis of its demolition is not compatible

with the retention of the building. Hence the necessity under the EIA directive for

early and effective consultation and consideration of other options that would

reduce damage to the historic environment.

(117) On 20 October 2011, a sparingly minuted meeting took place between Network

Rail executives and Deputy Mayor, Sir Ed Lister, Giles Dolphin and Matt Carpen of

the GLA (exhibit E.58) This is significant because the relevant documents were not

disclosed in response to our first FOI request but the documents that were

disclosed gave us knowledge that such a meeting took place and we therefore made

a further application for disclosure specifically in relation to that meeting. This in

turn revealed Network Rail’s anxiety to conceal the extent of the monetary

considerations behind the London Bridge scheme. Under FOI procedure a third

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party has to be notified of disclosure prior to it being given. When we received

disclosure in relation to the meeting in which we were interested it had some

inclusions that I did not understand. It turned out that this was an amendment to

the limited minute of the meeting that had cited cost as the reason given by

Network Rail for not providing a full roof cover on the new station. Network Rail

had insisted on an amendment that stated that a full roof cover was ‘not appropriate

for London Bridge from a design concept and operational point of view. Cost was

only one part of the overall consideration about the roof.’ (exhibit E.59).

(118) We know there was direct contact between the CEO of Network Rail, David

Higgins and the Mayor. In response to disclosure applications we have been told

that there are no records of the exchange(s) save for the note referred to in

exhibit: ‘After the meeting, the Mayor spoke to David Higgins about the

redevelopment of London Bridge Station and he set out his concerns with the

design of the roof. David Higgins explained the nature of the design and the

potential delay and extra costs changes would make’.

(119) It is therefore clear that the GLA knew cost constraints were being relied upon for

justification of the design treatment (and hence the loss of heritage assets) in the

proposals and that reasons advanced for the demolition of the train shed were not

the real reasons.

Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

(120) On behalf of BVAG, I wrote to the SoS on 14 March and 29 March (exhibits E.31)

requesting that he call-in the London Bridge proposals. I pointed out in those

letters that there were serious concerns about the planning procedure as it had

been applied by Southwark Council to the proposed redevelopment, specifically in

relation to the proposed loss of heritage assets.

(121) I pointed out how we considered that EIA regulations and national planning policy

had been breached in the processing of the applications and how various of the

‘Caborn criteria’ for call-in appeared to apply and the proposals would therefore

need to be considered carefully against those criteria. I also relied on the fact that

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the proposals were for a major public infrastructure project lasting for many years

at a cost running to billions of pounds and that they entailed almost complete

destruction of the remaining visible railway heritage at London Bridge.

(122) For these reasons I expected that the SoS would be taking a close look at the

applications. I followed up my letters with telephone calls and email enquiries but

both I and others in our Group found it difficult to engage with anyone in DCLG.

We were not allowed to talk to anyone senior and Ms Michelle Peart, who was our

only available contact, was uncommunicative and was clearly tightly constrained in

what she was allowed to say to us by orders from above. It was very obvious that

DCLG was keen to keep as well clear of the issue as possible and they were quite

happy with Southwark failing to refer it to them.

(123) Following the predictable NI (non-intervention) letter dated 29 March I requested

details of how the London Bridge project had been evaluated against four specific

call-in considerations and disclosure of all relevant material to call-in requests

(exhibit E.60). We knew that there was at least one other call-in request, from

David Campbell-Bannerman, MEP for the East of England. On 27 April I received a

reply from John Oakes at DCLG (exhibit E.32) that did not an explain how the

evaluation process had been undertaken but responded to the disclosure request,

suggesting that the documents told their own story. Very largely, they do.

(124) The entire disclosure given by DCLG is included at exhibit E32.

(125) I have sought further information that DCLG have only agreed to provide by 21

June but I rely on the following documents already in hand:

Standard form for completion in relation to planning applications (exhibits E32c-f).

(126) This document indicates how our call-in request was treated and what little regard

the SoS had to the scale of the proposed redevelopment and how he failed to have

regard to the large-scale heritage loss it involved. This may have been as a result of

the misleading information provided to him (see EH section above) by English

Heritage to the effect that the heritage loss occasioned by the new scheme was no

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different from what had been previously consented. In any event, despite being

given enough information in BVAG’s call-in request to alert him to the need to

consider the applications thoroughly, he did not.

Blacked out legal advice regarding the applicability s.12(3A) of the Planning (Listed Buildings

and Conservation Areas) Act 1990. (exhibit E.32g)

(127) The SoS’s NI letter fails to explain on what basis he declined to direct referral to

himself of applications apparently caught by the Planning (Listed Buildings and

Conservation Areas Act). We have sought disclosure of the un-redacted legal

advice but the Treasury Solicitors have declined on behalf of the SoS

The briefing ‘Note for DCLG’ from the Department for Transport (exhibit E32pp,ss)

(128) This briefing indicates how the SoS was subject to influence from the Department

for Transport calling on him to expedite a decision not to call-in the applications

and effectively not to adequately consider the call-in applications on the basis of

urgency. This urgency was expressed partially in terms of the costs that would arise

if the applications were not granted before 1 April because of the impending

Community Infrastructure Levy payable thereafter,

Email with sender and recipients names redacted regarding consequences of delay in issuing

NI letter (exhibit E32p,q)

(129) This also indicates what considerations drove the approach to the call-in request.

Email from ‘PSBobNeil’ (exhibit E32dd)

(130) ‘Could we light a fire under this one??’ indicates SoS officials attitude to our call-in

request and that it was not given due consideration given the important issues

raised.

Email exchange with Mr Woods of English Heritage (exhibit E.32h)

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(131) This email exchange put the SoS on notice that there was an anomaly in the

treatment of a listed building consent application (AP-11-3423) that had not been

referred to him. In haste it appears no further consideration of this matter

occurred.

(132) Taken together, these documents and the misleading advice from English Heritage

show that the SoS failed to properly consider the requests for call-in of the

applications and failed to require Southwark Council to comply with their legal

obligation to refer the listed building consent applications to him under the Planning

(Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act.

Costs

(133) In relation to costs I would say as follows:

EIA issues

(134) This claim involves important issues for the Historic Environment of London Bridge.

Specifically the claimant maintains that Article 6, para. 4 and Article 5 para. 3.(d) of

the EIA Directive have not been complied with.

(135) These provisions require that development with significant environmental effects is

subject to adequate consultation and that, where environmental damage is entailed,

there is adequate consideration of alternatives by the developer.

(136) There is no doubt that the development proposed entails large scale damage to the

historic environment in that it requires demolition of virtually all the remaining

Victorian heritage of London’s oldest rail terminus. Previous proposals for

essentially the same redevelopment have been the subject of two public inquiries.

Following those inquiries a consented scheme of 2008 entailed less than half the

damage to the historic environment entailed by the current proposals. In particular

it provided for physical preservation of some or all of the three main heritage assets

that are all now proposed for total loss. In contrast to the previous scheme, the

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present proposals have not been subject to detailed public scrutiny despite the

much increased environmental damage they entail.

(137) This statement includes a detailed account of how the developer, acting in

collaboration with the LPA, not only failed to consider obvious alternatives to the

large-scale damage to the historic environment but also resisted community

initiatives to produce such alternatives.

Public interest

(138) It is beyond doubt that the public interest is served by proposals involving such

extensive environmental damage being subject to the right of appeal anticipated in

the EIA Directive. The Directive requires that such appeals should be available to

the public concerned at a cost that is not prohibitive.

(139) I am acting as a representative claimant on behalf of Bermondsey Village Action

Group (BVAG), a community group and an unincorporated association. I stand to

derive no personal benefit from the success of our Claim. Indeed, it is often put to

me that BVAG’s activities in resisting the erosion of the character of our

neighbourhood is contrary to my own interests as the high-rise, corporate

environment that we resist would increase land values to my financial advantage.

BVAG assets

(140) As an unincorporated association BVAG holds no assets in its own right. It does

maintain a bank account into which donations and subscriptions are paid. The

donors to the Group’s funds have been companies or individuals supportive of the

Group’s local heritage preservation initiatives including myself. BVAG’s account

balance stands at about £2000. On behalf of the Group I would only anticipate it

being possible to raise a few thousand pounds by way of a legal fund to bring the

present Claim. Hence it is unrealistic to expect to be able to fund the Claim from

BVAG’s resources.

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Claimant’s financial resources

(141) My own resources are adequate to support a family and a comfortable lifestyle. My

income is modest but this is augmented by occasional realisation of capital assets.

My assets are almost entirely in the form of a private house and shares in Shiva Ltd,

the private company that I run. I could not consider funding the Claim from my

personal income although I could, on paper afford to fund it if I were to sell some of

the illiquid assets I hold. It is difficult to say how easily I could realise such assets or

how long it might take. Given the volume of papers involved in our Claim and the

number of defendants and interested parties it is easy to imagine that the total costs

in the case could be very substantial. In the event of a costs order against me

following a full hearing of the Claim I would very likely face a costs liability beyond

what I would be able and willing to meet. Hence I do not believe it will be possible

for me to proceed with the Claim without there being a protective cost order in

place limiting my potential personal liability for costs.

Claimant’s costs

(142) I have a very extensive knowledge of the factual background to our Claim as a result

of direct engagement in the issues over many months and spent hundreds of hours

engaged in research and investigation. I am therefore in a position to present our

claim to the Court very comprehensively in person and we do not believe that we

will be disadvantaged by following that route. We do however need specialist legal

advice on planning law issues involved in our claim and procedural aspects of the

judicial review process. For these purposes we have both specialist solicitors and

Counsel who are acting predominantly on a pro-bono basis and, in so far as they

cannot do so, on discounted rates. By this cost-efficient approach to bringing our

Claim I expect that, with possibly a modest donation from me personally to

supplement what the Group might be able to raise by way of a legal fund, BVAG will

be able to fund its own limited legal costs adequately to ensure all necessary

specialist advice is available to us.

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Statement of Truth I believe that the facts stated herein are true. Full Name Signed Position or office held