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Co_5799_2012 Russell Gray's Witness Statement
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1
CLAIM NO CO/5799/2012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE COURT IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO CLAIM JUDICIAL REVIEW BETWEEN:
THE QUEEN on the application of
RUSSELL GRAY
as representative Claimant on behalf of BERMONDSEY VILLAGE ACTION GROUP (BVAG)
Claimant
and
(1) LONDON BOROUGH OF SOUTHWARK (2) THE MAYOR OF LONDON
(3)THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(4) HISTORIC BUILDINGS AND MONUMENTS COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND
Defendants
and
(1) NETWORK RAIL (2) DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT
Interested Parties
WITNESS STATEMENT OF THE CLAIMANT
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Format
(1) This statement is presented in two sections. First it comprises a broadly
chronological narrative of the events from pre-application discussions to the issue of
the planning consents we challenge. In the second section I draw on documents
obtained under freedom of information laws that were not available to us until
more recently (and which are still somewhat lacking) to corroborate and
substantiate our perception of events that was initially a product of reasoned
analysis rather than documentary evidence. The consideration of disclosed
documents is divided into sections dealing with the roles of the different authorities
and potentially (by way of supplement) the collective approaches taken to each of
the different heritage assets we believe have been improperly authorised for
demolition. By this division of the statement into different threads I have aimed to
make it easier to illuminate the specific roles of the various parties. This approach
necessitates some repetition where certain events fall within different narrative
threads.
BVAG background
(2) I have worked in the area south of London Bridge and Tower Bridge, now
designated Bermondsey Village by Southwark Council, for the past 20 years. I have
also lived mostly in the same area since 1987. My Company, Shiva Ltd, owns and
operates a substantial site in Bermondsey St that comprises a collection of restored
Victorian industrial buildings now occupied by companies engaged in the creative
industries. The buildings were derelict when we acquired them and in the process
of their restoration I have become familiar with traditional building methods and
craftsmanship and experienced in preservation of the fabric of historic buildings in
refurbishment projects.
(3) BVAG was born out of an initial public meeting that I called to raise awareness
among local people of how planning policy for the area was being formulated with
scant regard to them. It has since focused on trying to influence policy towards
preservation of the character of the area immediately around London Bridge Station
and to the South of it.
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London Bridge Station
(4) BVAG’s first involvement specifically with London Bridge Station heritage came in
October 2010, following a meeting we hosted with Malcolm Woods, Area Adviser
of English Heritage. Following that meeting one of our members did some historical
research and produced information to support an application to English Heritage for
listing of the arcade fronting the railway viaduct in St Thomas St and Crucifix Lane.
This ornate brick arcade merges into the double-height arched wall of the train
shed, where the incoming London Bridge railway lines terminate. Our request for
listing followed a suggestion from Mr Woods that we ask English Heritage to
remove the ‘ambiguity’ as to where the already listed train shed met the then
unlisted but integral incoming viaduct arches. He had put that suggestion in writing
the day after our meeting (exhibit E.1). The ‘ambiguity’ of the demarcation of the
trainshed wall from the arcade is significant because English Heritage later resolve to
overlook it.
(5) The arches were eventually listed in July 2011 pursuant to the recommendation of
English Heritage (exhibit E.2). However, some while before this we received a copy
of a report that Network Rail had commissioned CgMs consultants to prepare
making a case against listing of the arches (exhibit E.3). This report caused some
consternation in our group as it adopted a condescending tone of independence and
objectivity. Furthermore, in commissioning it Network Rail had bypassed their own
in-house sponsored but semi-independent heritage adviser, Andy Savage, (aka The
Railway Heritage Trust) who was highly embarrassed at being short circuited. The
author of the CgMs report was Edward Kitchen. Although we did not know it at
the time, Mr Kitchen was already in discussions with Southwark planners on behalf
of Network Rail about extensive demolition of heritage at London Bridge to include
part of the St Thomas St. arcade itself.
(6) There was a lengthy delay between our application to English Heritage to list the
arches and their recommendation to DCMS to do so. At the time of writing this
statement English Heritage are refusing our EIR request for disclosure of internal
documents relating to all elements of the London Bridge heritage under threat on
the grounds that the request is ‘manifestly unreasonable’. Documents that might
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explain the delay therefore may be forthcoming in due course. What is obvious that
whilst English Heritage were considering our application for listing of the arcade
they were simultaneously agreeing demolition of part of it, and its continuation, the
trainshed wall, with Network Rail.
(7) BVAG became the focus of local opposition to the heritage destruction entailed in
Network Rail’s present proposals for redevelopment of London Bridge station.
The heritage under threat
Grade II listed train Shed (1864-7) and associated arches (1864-6) by
Charles Henry Driver (exhibit I.1)
(8) Charles Driver is best known for his work on the great London Victorian sewer
project under Joseph Bazalgette – particularly the pumping stations at Abbey Mills
and Crossness. He also worked extensively on the other great infrastructural
project of his era, the railways. He was a champion and an early master of the use
of cast iron in architecture.
(9) The train shed and arches at London Bridge have to be viewed to some extent in
terms of their different components. The southern flank wall of the shed in St
Thomas St is part of a continuous, elaborately arcaded, brick structure that
embraces the arches fronting the viaduct carrying the terminating lines originally
built by the London Brighton and South Coast, and latterly Southern, Railway. In
the double height section carrying the shed roof the arches at the upper level are all
blind and at ground floor level they are open. The single tier arches extend out to
the east along St Thomas St and Crucifix Lane and are all open, providing ornate
entrances to a labyrinthine series of abutting viaducts that are the result of
successive widenings of the original 1836 London & Greenwich line.
(10) The shed roof is comprised of a central crescent component of wrought iron
trusses supported on 24 distinctive (Driver-style) cast iron columns and spandrels.
There are two flat roof flanks carried on riveted lattice beams, extending the roofed
area out to the southern and northern flank walls. The question of the legitimacy of
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the conceptual and practical separation of the various components of the shed and
arches and the ironwork of the roof is central to BVAG’s challenge to the
justification advanced by Network Rail for its extensive proposed demolitions and
the planning authorities’ attempts to bring it within the scope of policy on
demolition of heritage assets.
The South Eastern Railway Offices (1897-1900) by Charles Barry Junior
(exhibit I.2, I.3)
(11) The South Eastern Railway Offices (SERO) on Tooley St is believed to be the last
building by Charles Barry junior, who is best known for his work in Dulwich,
particularly Dulwich College School.
(12) The SERO is in a conservation area and recognized as ‘making an important
contribution to the area’. This designation accords it similar protection to listed
buildings but gives developers slightly more leeway in how it may be treated. Once
it became known that Network Rail were seeking permission to demolish the
building, the Victorian Society made an application to English Heritage to list it.
Their listing application was submitted to EH on 13 June 2011. English Heritage
recommended to DCMS that the building should not be listed and on 25 July wrote
to the Vic Soc. Reporting the DCMS’s acceptance of their recommendation. The
Victorian Society, with some new information on the building, then sought a review
of the EH advice on 19 August 2011. On 15 December DCMS notified us that EH
had reaffirmed their position. Curiously, the EH review (exhibit E.4) was signed off
by the senior designation adviser concerned, Delcia Keate, on 11 October. Early
this year BVAG presented further new evidence on matters not considered by EH
in reaching their (non-) listing recommendation and requested a further review.
Again, we were notified by DCMS that EH would not revise their recommendation.
(13) The obvious quality of the SERO building as compared with other buildings by Barry
junior (almost all of which are listed) together with EH’s refusal to recommend
listing has angered and frustrated heritage organisations and interested individuals.
The general perception is that English Heritage did not act impartially in evaluating
6
the SERO and were under pressure not to frustrate Network Rail’s plans for
demolition of the building.
London Bridge proposals
(14) I do not remember precisely when the present redevelopment proposals came to
my attention, probably because of the long history of abortive plans going back
some 15 years and because early notice came only in the form of disparate sketchy
local rumours. These included the suggestions that the project was in stop-go limbo
because there was an issue over availability of Government funding for the project
and that the train shed roof was to be dismantled and fully restored off-site for
reassembly as part of the reconfigured station.
(15) I believe that a definitive go-ahead for the project was given by central government
at some time in 2010 and by early 2011 the proposals were beginning to be talked
about with greater certainty. By February 2011 Network Rail were doing some
sketchy presentations on their proposals. The first I attended was on 17 March
with the local Chamber of Commerce who hosted an open lunch at which Chris
Drabble of Network Rail presented some slides and gave an effusive but very
general explanation of the scheme. My questions to Mr Drabble after his
presentation focused on the seemingly insensitive approach to the Victorian heritage
of the station – often cited as the world’s oldest city-centre railway terminus.
(16) At the time I don’t think it was clear that the plans involved the demolition of the
SERO. It was however clear that NR proposed to demolish the southern flank wall
of the train shed to create a new entrance in St Thomas St. As the building is listed
and since the flank wall comprises a whole arcade of arches at ground level, the
obvious question was why the arches were not simply being used to provide the
entrances required for the new concourse. (exhibit I.3, I.4) Mr Drabble’s response
was the memorable first warning that Network Rail was not going to play by the
book. He maintained, with unconvincing regret, that it was simply not possible. He
gave as a reason that the blind arches of the upper tier on the inside of the wall did
not coincide with those on the outside.
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(17) I have been working on Victorian buildings for more than 20 years and have had
many occasions to carry out brickwork repairs and reconstructions on similar
brickwork arches and details to those of the shed wall. It was entirely obvious to
me that subordinating the inner arches to the outer ones could be achieved with
little difficulty if required and, in any case, the opening up of the upper tier of blind
aches would not be essential but merely one of two alternative treatments that
would permit the retention and incorporation of the wall in the new station
entrance (exhibits I.7, I.9, I.10 illustrate the concept). The operation would indeed
be more involved than simply breaking out brick infill from an originally open arch
that had been bricked up. Nevertheless, it is a straightforward exercise that simply
requires some patience and competent bricklayers. I asked the contractors who
regularly carry out this kind of work for my Company to give me an informal
estimate of the cost. Their suggestion was that the works would cost no more than
£15 000 per bay. At that price they would be keen to do the work themselves.
(18) It is notable that this particular justification for demolishing the wall had been
completely abandoned by Network Rail when they came under pressure to explain
their proposed demolition some months later. It had however been maintained at
least until the applications were submitted on 27 June (exhibit E.5)
(19) It became obvious that getting straight answers from Network Rail was going to be
hard work. Mr Drabble had refined a response to any question about alternative
design solutions that essentially ran to the effect that no solution other than that
proposed by Network Rail is physically possible despite the best efforts of their
engineers and architects to find one. When asked to explain the alternatives
explored by Network Rail he would always refuse to answer.
(20) To raise local awareness of the issues involved in the London Bridge redevelopment
and in the hope that in a more critically focused forum we might make more
progress BVAG hosted its own briefing from Network Rail on 19 May. Mr Drabble
again gave the presentation, accompanied by his then PR man, Simon Brooks. At
the presentation Mr Drabble again ran through a collection of slides. The images
were almost exclusively what are sometimes referred to in the architectural
profession as ‘fluffies’ i.e. impressionistic renderings (exhibit E.6). Only one of the
8
slides presented gave a plan of the proposed concourse that could be used to
enable our team to evaluate Network Rail’s proposals in any detail and to consider
how any alternative design could meet the requirements of the brief.
(21) Mr Drabble’s presentation to BVAG had been well attended and there were many
varied questions put to him from local people with a wide variety of concerns. The
discussions had been of a very general nature and had not permitted any focused
discussion of the necessity for heritage losses or any alternatives to such losses. At
the end of the meeting I therefore requested a more focused meeting involving
specialists assembled by BVAG and Network Rail’s architects, Grimshaws. I can
remember Mr Drabble’s precise words in response, which were ‘We talk to
anyone’. He subsequently found himself having to retreat from those words.
(22) BVAG assembled a group of conservation and railway architecture specialists and
proposed a meeting at which it would be possible to look in some detail at the
possibilities for retention of some of the heritage at London Bridge, as against
Network Rail’s proposed wholesale demolition. Mr Drabble clearly thought it was
difficult to refuse such a meeting and he agreed, somewhat grudgingly, to schedule it
for 10 June. Our delegation was to comprise:
(1) Chris Williamson of Weston Williamson Architects
(2) Benedict O’Looney, Architect (formerly with Grimshaws) and Southwark
Conservation Areas Advisory Group chairman
(3) Paul Dobrazczyk, Architectural historian and specialist on the work of Charles
Driver
(4) Neil Marshall of the Transport Trust
(5) Chris Costelloe of the Victorian Society
(6) Edmund Bird, Heritage advisor for Transport for London
(7) BVAG members comprising Jennie Howells (local historian), myself and my
assistant, Liz Ruffell
(23) Mr Drabble started to become uncommunicative in the run up to this meeting (not
responding to our emails about the location etc.), giving the clear impression that he
regretted ever agreeing to it (exhibit E.7). Eventually, on the 7th of June, Mr Drabble
9
backed out of the meeting on the grounds that we had not submitted concrete plans
for alternative designs to him. This was obviously disingenuous as the meeting was
for the purpose of obtaining enough information and drawings upon which our team
could base our alternative design proposals. It is obviously not possible to put
forward meaningful design suggestions without survey drawings or a brief.
(24) Mr Drabble proposed to re-schedule the meeting but only for long after Network
Rail had submitted their planning applications, which they did on 27 June. In the
meantime he made approaches to certain of our delegation to invite them to
individual meetings and thereby divide them off from the group initiative BVAG had
instigated.
(25) This incident was a clear demonstration of the conflict that Network Rail had to
address between giving an impression of interest in consultation and consideration
of alternatives to the damage to the historic environmental entailed in their
proposals (as required by the EIA Directive) and in fact being uninterested in any
alternatives, (that would inevitably increase the cost of the project).
(26) After Mr Drabble’s cancellation of our meeting we sought an alternative way to
obtain sufficient information to produce some alternative proposals to save some of
the threatened heritage. We asked for a copy of the briefing images that had been
presented at the BVAG meeting with Mr Drabble so that we could use them to
make alternative proposals for Network Rail’s (and the planners’) consideration. If
we were provided with the concourse plan it would have been possible to produce
a sketchy proposal of how the retention of the wall was compatible with the general
plan. It was however necessary to have a copy of that plan at sufficient resolution
for it to be legible, as the version available to us was not. Our attempts to obtain a
useable copy of the proposed concourse plan are recorded in an email thread
(exhibit E.7a-d). By 23 June we were still being fobbed off with even more fluffy
images that Network Rail knew to be of no use to us (exhibit E.8).
(27) Our meeting at Grimshaws was eventually rescheduled for August 10 but some of
our delegation were then on holiday, others had been invited to private meetings by
Network Rail, and Edmund Bird was unable to attend having ‘discussed it with his
10
manager’. Edmund Bird’s job is funded by English Heritage. Those remaining, and
who duly attended, were Chris Williamson, Neil Marshall, Jennie Howells, myself
and Liz Ruffell. In any case, at the meeting it was obvious that so far as Network
Rail were concerned the designs were finalised and there was no question of any
changes being incorporated in response to consultation. We were shown the
project in slightly greater detail but not invited to propose any reconsideration of
any aspect of the designs proposed. For me, there were two memorable aspects of
the meeting. The first was that there was an obvious unstated concurrence by the
architects that the necessity to work around the London Dungeon had severely
compromised the design freedom they had been given. The second was seeing the
physical 3d model of the proposals that was on display in our meeting room at
Grimshaws’ offices. This made it very clear how readily the existing south wall of
the train shed could continue to serve its present purpose within the proposed new
treatment of the station. i.e. it could carry the proposed new roof over the
terminating platforms, just as it carries the present Victorian one, and it could
provide the entrances to the new concourse through the existing arches (exhibits
I.4, I.9, I.10 illustrate the principle)
(28) The possibility of demonstrating the compatibility of the existing south wall of the
train shed with the Grimshaw proposals was obvious. If we could have a
photograph of the model on display, working in Photoshop, in which several of our
members are skilled, we could produce images that would prove our point. This
plan was however again foiled by Network Rail.
(29) On 16 August we emailed the lead architect on the project at Grimshaws, Declan
McCafferty, who had been present at our meeting, asking if we might have some
photographs of the model. Mr Drabble was copied in on this request, which he
quickly refused. His explanation was dismissive and he was annoyed that we had
contacted Grimshaws (exhibit E.9).
(30) By this stage it had become clear that Network Rail was not about to cooperate in
any consideration of alternative plans to those they had submitted to LBS in their
applications. BVAG was thus only left with the option of making our case to
Southwark Council by way of representations and raising public awareness of the
11
scale of the threat to our local historic environment by the proposed heritage loss.
Unfortunately, we had experience of public consultation in planning matters being a
formality of which they would take no notice and so we were not optimistic that we
would be heard.
(31) It is an open secret that for any significant applications Southwark’s planning
committee is effectively subject to a party whip. (I only have any significant
experience of planning in Southwark but I have no reason to think it is different
elsewhere.) Together with the knowledge that there was no possibility of the
London Bridge plans being put forward to the committee with anything other than a
recommendation for approval this meant that there was not much that BVAG could
do to deflect the plans from their predictable passage. We also knew that the next
two stages of the approval process, the GLA and the Secretary of State, did not
hold out much better prospects of giving us a fair hearing. We nevertheless
continued raising public awareness of the heritage threat and stressing to Southwark
Council that there were alternatives that could avoid such damage to the historic
environment.
(32) On 25 August the GLA produced their Stage 1 report on the applications. It
included observations of significance to the effect that:
(1) They could not see why it was necessary to demolish the southern flank wall of
the train shed (paras 59-60)
(2) That they were disappointed that the new station would not have an overall
roof but merely shelters along the platforms that are otherwise open to the
weather (paras 50-55)
(3) The possibilities for incorporation of the SERO in the redevelopment had not
been considered (para. 49)
(33) We produced some Photoshop images to show how readily the southern flank wall
of the train shed and the SERO could be opened up to provide entrances to the
new station concourse (exhibits I.4, I.5, I.6). In the case of the flank wall no
significant modifications would be required as it already comprises open arches at
ground level. The upper tier could be opened up or not. With the SERO the bay
structure of the building also permits the ready opening up of double height
12
openings with negligible injury to the building. Behind the facade of the SERO it
would then be necessary to hollow out the building in that part of the ground and
first floor that would become effectively an extension of the new concourse. These
images were widely circulated on our website, posted up in our office windows,
used on our flyers and shown in an exhibition of heritage under threat that we put
on in our information office to from the date of its opening on 17 October. There
was overwhelming general preference for this heritage-sensitive approach.
(34) The Leader of Southwark Council, Peter John, was invited to speak at the opening
of our office – which he did. He was shown around the exhibition and the heritage
loss involved in the Network Rail proposals and he was made very aware of our
members anger at the insensitivity of the plans to the heritage of London Bridge.
He was shown the images we had produced to demonstrate how readily the
heritage buildings could be incorporated into the new station design.
(35) Mr John was non-committal about his position on the heritage threat but he did say
that he was due to meet David Higgins, CEO of Network Rail, the following
Tuesday (25 October). Worryingly, from the point of view of BVAG’s broader
objectives as well as for the railway heritage campaign, Mr John was candid about his
aspiration to see high-rise buildings on the south side of St Thomas. His reasoning
was that such buildings would enable the Council to raise large sums of money from
developers that could then be used to improve housing in more deprived areas of
Southwark. This was worrying for our broader objectives as we have always
regarded St Thomas St as the front line in the preservation of the character of the
area now known as Bermondsey Village to the south of the railway lines into
London Bridge. It was worrying from the railway heritage standpoint since the
listed structures of the viaduct arches and the train shed wall must be taken into
account when planning applications in the immediate vicinity are being considered.
Hence, the more of the heritage that could be swept away by the station
redevelopment, the less the obstacle to Mr John’s high-rise plans for the south side
of St Thomas St.
(36) Some time later we enquired about the substance and the outcome of Mr John’s
meeting with Mr Higgins. First this was to the case officer, Gordon Adams and
13
subsequently by direct enquiry to the Leader himself (exhibit E.10) but he did not
return my emails and therefore I eventually made the enquiry under the FOIA.
Ultimately we were told that the meeting had no agenda and that there were no
minutes or records of it. Later this chimed with similar contacts that occurred
between the Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, and Mr Higgins, details of which have
been equally impossible for us to obtain.
(37) At the end of 2011 (during December), I and numerous other BVAG volunteers
spent many hours on the street outside the SERO on Tooley Street and the train
shed on St Thomas St talking to passers by and raising a petition calling on
Southwark Council and the GLA to reject proposals for demolition of these
heritage assets (exhibit E.11). We were not optimistic that either Southwark
Council or the GLA would take any notice of the petition – as they did not.
However, it did give us a real insight into the attitudes of people on the street to
the demolitions proposed and provided us with a means of demonstrating popular
feeling for another day. We quickly raised 5 000 signatures and it was very apparent
that there were only two sentiments to be found among the public: indifference or
disapproval of the proposed demolitions. There was no significant support for the
demolitions proposed.
(38) Shortly before the Southwark Council planning committee meeting that approved
the London Bridge plans on 20 December a copy of the 5 000 signatures raised was
presented to Simon Blanchflower of Network Rail at their offices at Blackfriars and
to Southwark Council and the GLA.
(39) In addition to presenting our petition BVAG put together a short summary of our
objections to the proposals for the Southwark planning committee members, mainly
in the form of images, in a bound document which was sent to them by email and in
hard copy form (exhibit E.12).
(40) The officers report to the committee provided only entirely misleading or
unconsidered reasons for the demolitions proposed. The way that the proposed
demolitions were addressed by planning officers is examined in more detail later in
this statement along with other matters that became clearer following FOIA
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disclosures somewhat later. However, for coherence of this narrative it is
necessary to briefly address certain flaws in the report. Specifically it states:
of the demolition of the trainshed:
‘the removal is necessary a result of the new track alignment proposed, and essential to the
Thameslink scheme’.
and in particular its roof:
‘preservation of the building is best achieved through salvage’
(41) These statements are misleading in that the issue of preservation of the southern
flank wall of the train shed is circumvented by the implication that it must go for the
same reason as the roof. This inference is made despite there being numerous
references to the separability of the wall and the roof as conservation subjects
(exhibits E.13.b, E.14.a) including officers own emails (exhibit E.15), the comments in
the GLA Stage 1 report (exhibit 16, paras 59-60 ) and Network Rail’s own
application documents (exhibit E.5). Furthermore, the last approved (2008) scheme,
that followed two public inquiries that more fully considered conservation issues,
anticipated salvage for re-use of the roof but retention of most of the wall (Exhibit
E.17.b, E.18).
(42) The remarks on the salvage of the roof structure (referred to as ‘the building’) are
also wholly misleading given that the, less than transparent, legal obligation imposed
upon Network Rail as part of the consent is to save any or none of the ironwork of
the roof structure and supporting columns at their (or their contractors or
consultants) own discretion (E.19). This compares with the 2008 obligation to
salvage the roof structure and ironwork fully to enable the structure to be re-
erected in a new location.
Of the demolition of SERO:
‘demolition is necessary in order to achieve the large north-south concourse that has been
identified as vital to the scheme’.
(43) The statement that the demolition of the SERO is necessary to achieve the
proposed concourse is simply false. As the report itself later acknowledges, the
15
SERO does not obstruct any element of the proposed new station. Its demolition is
proposed not to permit the erection of any other part of the new station but to
provide an open space in front of the Tooley St entrance. The preservation of the
SERO would not alter the proposals in that there would be no physical conflict
between the proposed and the existing but it would require a quite different
treatment of the Tooley Street entrance, whereby part of the existing building
would become a kind of vestibule or extension to the main concourse. Again,
contrary to what the report implies, the 2008 scheme entailed demolition of only
part of the SERO, namely the westernmost 6 bays (exhibit E.17.c)
Of the demolition of the westernmost arch of the listed arcade in St Thomas St:
‘some direct works to the Designated Heritage Asset of the Railway Viaduct Arches on St
Thomas St, listed at Grade II and the Joiner Street Bridge, listed at Grade II.’
(44) The proposed demolition of the westernmost arch of the St Thomas St arcade is
concealed by adoption of the euphemism ‘direct works’. The suggestion that this
demolition is ‘beneficial’ to the historic environment speaks for itself. This
obscurantist device was effective enough that even BVAG volunteers who had
followed the plans closely did not realise what was actually proposed for some
weeks. By concealment of the demolition of the last bay of arches in the arcade the
planners deflected attention from their avoidance of established procedure on
demolition of listed buildings. Oddly, on 1 July, when English Heritage’s listing
advice report was produced they apparently did not know of the proposed
demolition of the westernmost bay of the arcade. (exhibit E.2.g)
(45) It is also worth noting at this stage that there is some obvious tension in the
officers’ report. There are several references to officers disagreeing with the
Environmental Statement (ES) submitted by Network Rail. This is not a particularly
bold statement as would be difficult to agree with a document that describes
demolition of historic building as ‘beneficial’ to the historic environment and the
demolition of the train shed wall and its replacement with a modern entrance built
of pre-cast concrete with brick facing as ‘retention of ground floor arches of
external flank wall as part of new design’ (exhibit E.20). There is nothing in the
report to indicate that officers sought from Network Rail revision of the ES that
16
would make it less of a mockery of the EIA process. Indeed, they go on elsewhere
to praise design elements of the proposals in florid terms (para. 167) and continue
to shield them from the scrutiny to which they should have been subjected under
established national and European policy on heritage assets with unconsidered
justification for the demolitions proposed. This conflict is illuminated somewhat by
the FOI disclosures we obtained subsequently and which are dealt with later in this
statement.
(46) The officers’ report makes no reference to financial considerations in relation to the
proposals - of which they were made aware through numerous documents and
emails. These are considered later along with other evidence disclosed subsequently
under FOI.
(47) At the planning committee meeting itself on the evening of 20 December a large
number of BVAG members and others objecting to the heritage loss at London
Bridge attended to make their feelings known. The Chairman of the Committee,
Nick Dolezal, exercised his discretion in treating the four Network Rail applications
as one and thereby limiting representations from objectors to a total of three
minutes between them. Simon Blanchflower of Network Rail spoke to the
committee for about 10 minutes commending his company’s proposals. His
justification for demolition of the SERO was put in terms of safety of railway
passengers but it was too vaguely expressed to evaluate its substance. He made
assertions about passenger numbers and pedestrian flows and their safety
implications that do not appear to be substantiated in any of the application
documents or in submissions to English Heritage in support of the proposed
demolition. He offered no justification for demolition of the train shed wall. The
objectors divided their time allowance between myself and Benedict O’Looney,
Chairman of the Southwark Conservation Areas Advisory Group. This gave us 90
seconds each to make our case. I focused on the train shed wall and Benedict
spoke about the SERO. There was of course great support for what we said from
the large group of objectors present but, as anticipated, only modest interest from
the minority Liberal Democrats on the committee and none whatsoever from any
of the Labour majority. The consent was duly approved subject to a ‘legal
17
agreement’ to be concluded no later than 30 March and ‘referral to the GLA and
the SoS for Communities and Local Government’.
(48) Following the decision of the Southwark Planning Committee we did at least know
on what arguments the planners were going to peg their approval. This triggered an
inquiry into their substance since, as cited above, some of the reasoning was
perverse.
(49) At the end of December I started to question (by email) English Heritage on the
logic behind their decision to allow the loss of the south flank wall of the train shed
to go by default by treating it as being implied in the removal of the roof. This
dialog was terminated by Paddy Pugh, Head of the London Region of English
Heritage, when he ceased to respond to my questions that focused increasingly
specifically on the arbitrary (and floating) demarcation of convenience between the
trainshed wall and the viaduct arcade. (exhibit E.21).
(50) I also questioned Bridin O’Connor of Sothwark planners (again by email) about their
statement (At para. 186) that ‘A study into parts of the building that could be
accommodated in place has revealed that just one of the12 bays and a small portion
of the flank wall on St Thomas St could be salvaged but this represents less than
10% of the structure.’ (exhibit E.22)
(51) When English Heritage refused to respond to my emails I turned to the FOI/EIR
provisions for obtaining information from them. This attracted a less than
cooperative response. My requests were reinterpreted by them to exclude much of
the information I had requested and that which they did disclose was heavily
redacted. When I challenged this they refused to cooperate entirely, maintaining
that they were exempt from complying with my disclosure requests as they were
‘manifestly unreasonable’. As a result we have an outstanding complaint before the
Information Commissioner and still very limited disclosure from EH. However,
following correspondence with the Chair of EH, Baroness Andrews, which included
a suggestion that their stance at London Bridge may be susceptible to judicial
review, limited email communication was resumed with Mr Woods.
18
(52) My questioning of both Bridin O’Connor and Malcolm woods (exhibit E.23) led both
to ultimately admit that they knew of no necessity to demolish the south wall of the
train shed. I also questioned the case officer at Southwark, Gordon Adams as to
the whereabouts of the ‘study’ that established the necessity for demolition of the
south wall. He would only ever say that it was all in the papers but, told that I
couldn’t find it, he refused to say where. I was not the only one who couldn’t find
the justification for the demolition as Giles Dolphin, Head of Planning Decisions at
the GLA, told me he could not find it either.
(53) On 12 January I spoke to Mr Dolphin who was, unfortunately, due to retire the
following day. He thought that the proposed demolition of the train shed wall was
unnecessary and that the comment in the GLA Stage 1 report that it was ‘not clear
why’ demolition was said to be necessary had not been answered. He told me that
he had just written to Network Rail asking for a justification for the demolition of
the wall (exhibit E.24). Knowing of the existence of this request, after he left, I
sought disclosure of both Mr Dolphin’s question and Network Rail’s answer (exhibit
E.25)
(54) By this stage the application was with the Mayor of London for his consideration
pursuant to his powers to refuse the application or to determine it himself if he saw
fit.
(55) The Mayor’s decision is required to take place within fourteen days of the
application being referred to him but it was delayed several times. We were not
able to obtain a clear explanation for the delay. We were told on at least one
occasion that it was because Southwark Council had ‘withdrawn’ the application but
if this was the case it was immediately re-submitted. Although we had not thought
it likely, BVAG began to think it possible that the Mayor would balk at the heritage
loss being proposed, perhaps even having taken a closer look following a
demonstration that our group had organized outside County Hall. That
demonstration, timed to coincide with the meeting at which he was supposed to
make a decision, on 1 February, resulted in a lucky (for us) encounter with the
Mayor himself who was taking a photo-call on the lawn outside the GLA building.
This enabled us to ‘ambush’ him, as the local news website put it. As a result of this
19
opportune ambush we were able to put our case against the heritage destruction far
more thoroughly and forcefully than we had expected to be able to with just
placards and a megaphone outside County Hall.
(56) The chance meeting with Boris Johnson enabled us to spend some time making our
point as he remained talking to us for some while. At one point, as the local news
site reported (exhibit E.26), he told us: ‘I don’t mind ending up in court, I’d love to
stop this bloody thing.’ ‘I cycle past that thing (SERO) every day and it infuriates me
that we could lose it.’ Less encouragingly, he also said he had been advised by
lawyers that it would be costly to the GLA to save the buildings. We did not know
what cost he was referring to but another of our supporters who had approached
him at a public engagement he had been attending had been told the same thing so
we considered there was obviously something to it. As he left I told Mr Johnson
that there were a bundle of papers that we had already submitted to his planning
officers (exhibit E.27) that he should consider as they made clear that a decision to
allow the applications would be vulnerable to legal challenge. In the event the
Mayor did not make a decision at that meeting and it was again postponed.
(57) On 14 February I had received by way of response to my FOI request (made on 16
January) a copy of Mr Dolphin’s email to Network Rail (exhibit E.24) calling for a
justification of the proposed demolition of the train shed south wall. The response
to Mr Dolphin’s email, which was from Network Rail’s consultant Erica Mortimer of
CgMs was forthcoming later, on 16 February. This was a patronising document
(exhibit E.25) that gave numerous unsustainable justifications for the proposed
demolition and various blunt assertion of the necessity for it. None is valid. One
was that such demolition was already approved as a result of a previous application.
Apart from being irrelevant to the consideration of a new application which must be
considered on its own merits and in relation to prevailing policy, this statement was
untrue. In fact the 2008 application included a Design and Access Statement
(exhibit E.17.b) that reads: ‘The south wall of the listed trainshed, which is of some
interest and contributes positively to the streetscape, will be largely retained and
incorporated into the new station.’ (para. 7.1). It seems the partial demolition of
the wall proposed was to facilitate a widely mocked element of the 2008 scheme:
the construction of an ‘air rights’ office block over the railway lines that was no
20
doubt a product of the economic euphoria prevailing when the scheme was
conceived (exhibit E.18).
(58) As it was clearly possible to preserve the flank wall in 2008, it was impossible to
explain why it was not possible today. So CgMs re-wrote history on behalf of their
clients, Network Rail.
(59) The other justification for the demolition was illustrated with a photograph of a long
steel beam on the trailer of an articulated lorry. This was to assist planning officers
in understanding the proposition that long steel beams would be used to carry the
tracks over the hollowed-out viaduct below to create the wide street-level
concourse. As I had already explained to the case officer at the GLA, Matt Carpen,
beams that can be put in in one piece can also be spliced and put in in smaller
sections. I told him that if he didn’t think this was obvious but rather that it was a
matter for an engineer I could provide him with such confirmation from a structural
engineer.
(60) I had also emailed Nick Gray, ‘Principal Programme Sponsor’ of the London Bridge
project at Network Rail, on 20 February (exhibit E.28) challenging him to explain
the specious justification provided for demolition of the south wall by Ms Mortimer
of CgMs. He responded on 27 February (exhibit E.29). His words are carefully
chosen but he does not contradict my assertion and explanations as to why both of
Ms Mortimer’s justifications were unfounded. Mr Gray also confuses the 2003
scheme with that of 2008. This is indicative of how the claim that the principle of
the demolition of the train shed wall had been established became a mantra for the
planners, for English Heritage and for Network Rail in their advocacy of the present
proposals. It appears that many of the parties relying on this false assertion did so
by repetition and on the basis of no knowledge of the reality.
(61) Mr Carpen had been copied in on Mr Gray’s letter. Following the three
postponements, the Mayor’s decision was now due to be made on 1 March. To
make sure that there could be no excuse of not receiving or not understanding our
representations when it came to considering whether there was any necessity for
demolition of the south wall of the trainshed I had a long conversation with Mr
21
Carpen on the phone and emailed him with confirmation that he could not rely on
long beams or planning precedent to justify the demolition (exhibit E.30)
(62) Eventually the Mayor’s decision was made on 1 March. It came under the signature
of his deputy, Sir Edward Lister. The Stage II report (exhibit E.63) that gives the
reasons for the decision was emailed to BVAG on 2 March. Knowing that the
demolition of the south wall was unjustifiable I was keen to see how Mr Carpen had
dealt with the problem in the report.
(63) His solution is exemplary of the planning officer’s craft. At para. 60 of the
the Stage II report he records that the GLA has not been provided with a copy of a
‘construction logistics study’ that had been requested to justify the demolition. At
para. 61 he recites the policy requirement that necessity for demolition of the wall
must be established. At para. 62 he acknowledges that it is possible to build the
station without demolition of the wall and then goes on to assert the opposite.
Ultimately he relies on the long beams argument that he knows to be unsustainable.
On the telephone Mr Carpen had not challenged my assertion that it is obvious that
long beams can be achieved by splicing together shorter ones. Nor had he taken
me up on my offer to provide an engineer’s report proving that it would be possible
in this case. I have since challenged Mr Carpen on his self-contradictory comments
in the report but he has declined to answer the questions I put to him (exhibit E.30)
(64) This is just the most obvious example of how the London Bridge proposals were
approved without proper scrutiny of the proposed loss to the historic environment.
Throughout the planning process BVAG was watching the planners more closely
than they are used to. It became obvious that the plans were sanctioned at a higher
level and planning officers would simply be required to accept that policy would
have to be circumvented and they would be expected to do the best job they could
of pretending there was compliance. The obvious supposition was that the
demolition-minded approach to the redevelopment was driven by financial
considerations. This is corroborated by the various FOI disclosures we obtained
subsequently in which there are frequent references to cash constraints on the
project (addressed more fully later in this statement). There is no reference
whatever to cash constraints in any of the public documents. This obviously means
22
that planning officers knew that they were expected to operate in a regime of
secrecy in this respect.
(65) In accordance with all the planning documents going before, BVAG, believed that,
following clearance from the GLA, the proposals would be referred to the secretary
of State. When the Mayor’s decision to leave Southwark Council to determine the
applications was sent to us on 2 March I was away. It was therefore another
member of our Group, Amy Blier-Carruthers who made enquiries of Southwark
Council and the DCLG as to the progress of the application until I returned. Amy
reported difficulty in getting a response to her inquiries and general evasiveness as
to if and when the application had been referred to the SoS.
(66) When I came back to the UK on 12 March I took up the issue alongside Amy. My
experience was identical to that which she had reported whilst I was away. For the
DCLG’s part I was required to deal with a Ms Michelle Peart who was clearly a not
a very senior official in the Planning Casework Unit. It was very clear that Ms Peart
was being closely directed from above. Telephone conversations (and email
communications) with her were difficult as she seemed to be working from a tight
script. The last time I had occasion to deal with the DCLG on a referred
application in which BVAG was interested I had been able to engage much more
meaningfully and with someone obviously more senior and experienced. It was odd
that for a much more important application I was only able to make contact at a
much more junior level.
(67) Eventually it became clear that, contrary to what all the planning authorities’
documents had stated, there was to be no referral of the applications to the SoS by
Southwark Council. It is presently not clear how it happened that the stated
intention to refer the applications to the SoS was abandoned.
(68) In any case, again knowing that current policy on call-ins is to avoid them, we made
our appeal to the SoS regardless (exhibit E.31). It became very apparent from our
contacts with DCLG that declining to call-in the London Bridge proposals would be
a formality. This was subsequently illustrated by the FOI disclosures obtained on 27
April (Exhibit E.32), again considered in more detail later. Another BVAG member
23
had however identified a requirement under the Planning (Listed Buildings and
Conservation Areas) Act to refer listed building applications to the SoS where they
are for works involving a Transport and Works Act Order. It seemed clear that the
listed building consents required in this case therefore had to be referred as a
matter of law.
(69) I pointed out this apparent legal obligation to Ms Peart and told her that in her
department there must be lawyers specialised enough to give an immediate
response to our interpretation of the legal position and asked her to obtain such
advice. She was in contact with Southwark Council and clearly there had been
consultation between the Council and DCLG about the legality of the decision not
to refer the applications. By way of a response to my request to know the DCLG’s
own position on the matter I received a copy of an email from Bridin O’Connor of
Southwark Council to Ms Peart (Exhibit E.33) giving the interpretation of the law on
which she relied for not referring the applications to the SoS. This was unclear – to
put it mildly – and hence I was not persuaded that the legal position is not as it
appears on its face.
(70) Although they did not tell me, DCLG officials did obtain the advice of their lawyers
on the effect of the Planning (LB&CA) Act. A copy of the email in which this
appears was disclosed in response to my FOI request (exhibit E.32.g) but it has been
redacted on grounds of privilege. I have requested its disclosure in un-redacted
form as a matter of public interest and pursuant to these proceedings but it has
been refused again.
(71) From the FOI disclosure from DCLG it is clear that the Department for Transport
lobbied for a swift dismissal of our call-in application in the form of a briefing on the
London Bridge proposals (exhibit E.32pp). There are references in the disclosed
internal emails to the necessity to dispose of the matter urgently in order to meet a
deadline for the signing a legal agreement with Southwark Council and also to avoid
the cost of the Community Infrastructure Levy being imposed following its
introduction on 1 April. It appears clear from the documents that these
considerations are what determined the SoS’s approach to our call-in request.
24
(72) The DCLG issued their Non-intervention notice on 29 March and Southwark
Council responded immediately by granting consent for the proposals on the same
day.
(73) At this point we were left only with the option of considering challenging the
decisions leading to the grant of planning consents in the Courts. We therefore
proceeded to pursue disclosure of documents under FOIA/EIR. The impression
throughout the planning process was that the approach to the redevelopment of
London Bridge had been determined long before any planning application was made
in the knowledge that the planning procedure would be a formality. Given that the
plans involved wholesale destruction of the railway heritage of London Bridge it was
clear from the start that the compliance of the planning officers of Southwark
Council and the GLA, as well as English Heritage would have to be assured. Our
FOI requests were made in this context.
Further consideration of FOI disclosures
(74) The earliest documents that have been released to us regarding the current
proposals start from October 2010. By that time a core team of people has been
established for discussing the plans with Network Rail that consists of Southwark
planning officers, the Case Officer from the GLA, the Area Adviser from English
Heritage, Malcolm Woods and Network Rail’s planning consultants, CgMs.
(75) Of course, Southwark planners, the GLA and English Heritage are all required to be
on board if Network Rail are to succeed in obtaining consent for demolishing what
is effectively all of London Bridge Station’s visible Victorian Heritage. The process
will require the LPA and the GLA to take a flexible approach to the application of
local, national and European policy on protection of the historic environment. A
key element in persuading the planning officers to take such a flexible approach to
policy is the support of English Heritage, who are therefore central to the whole
process.
25
(76) Taking the parties in turn, our FOI requests have revealed further information and
evidence in support of our Claim:
English Heritage
(77) North Southwark has a long and rich history. Heritage and the historic
environment are however a demonstrably low political priority for Southwark
Council. The planning process is unreceptive to heritage interests and the historic
environment has only English Heritage as a potentially effective advocate.
(78) In the case of the London Bridge proposals the failure of English Heritage to act in
defence of heritage assets was crucial. The perverse decisions and advice of English
Heritage regarding the proposed damage to the London Bridge historic
environment infected the decisions by all three statutory planning authorities to
permit the redevelopment.
(79) English Heritage have not been cooperative in response to our FOIA/EIA disclosure
requests (exhibits E.34). The Information Commissioner is presently considering a
complaint from BVAG against EH’s refusal to give information on the grounds that it
is ‘manifestly unreasonable’. The limited disclosure they did give us prior to their
blanket refusal has been heavily redacted. The more important documents
demonstrating the position of English Heritage were, furthermore, not included in
their disclosures but have come from disclosures obtained from other bodies.
(80) There are conflicts between what EH’s Area Adviser, Malcolm Woods says to
different people at different times, particularly in response to my questions to him
posed sequentially by email (exhibit E.23)
On cost
(81) One document that EH had disclosed to us revealed that Network Rail had told Mr
Woods that preservation of the SERO would add £100 - £150 million to the cost of
the London Bridge redevelopment (exhibit E.35). On 5 April (exhibit E.36) I asked
26
Mr Woods about any other discussions that EH had on financing of the proposals.
On 10 April he responded that ‘There were no other discussions regarding the
financing of the scheme so there are no further details to give I’m afraid.’ (exhibit
E.37)
(82) This statement is inconsistent with documents revealing how Mr Woods had himself
expressed the position of English Heritage with regard to the financial constraints
on the project and how he and the planning authorities had been pressurised by
Network Rail over the cost of preserving heritage assets. Mr Woods’ references to
such financial constraints in the documents long pre-date the discussions regarding
financing that he acknowledges.
(83) In an email exchange with Gordon Adams and others at Southwark on 11 July 2011
(exhibit E.38), Mr Woods addressed himself to the financing of the London Bridge
plans, improperly taking account of cost issues in presenting the position and advice
of EH. He says: ‘First we are told that Network Rail is already struggling to fund this
project from the funding granted it by HM Treasury’ and ‘I recognize that cost is not
normally a consideration when assessing heritage benefit, etc but I am wary of
jeopardizing this project if it comes down to saving perhaps part of a fragment –
albeit quite a significant fragment – of the grade 2 listed train shed.’
(84) On 26 May 2011 Edward Kitchen of CgMs wrote a six page letter to Malcolm
Woods of English Heritage (exhibit E.39) quoting £30-40 million as an estimate of
the cost of saving the train shed ironwork, supporting structure and roof by
dismantling for storage and re-erection. (These figures don’t correspond with other
figures for the same works presented to Southwark Council by Network Rail’s own
‘Railway Heritage Trust’ (exhibit E.40). Saving the ironwork had been a condition
of the previous consent for demolition of the roof in 2008 that Network rail now
wanted dropped. Mr Kitchen asked EH to consider whether such an obligation was
a ‘prudent and effective use of public money in the current economic climate.’
Council officers continued to argue for retention of the roof but without EH’s
support their position was abandoned. Network Rail got their way and the story of
how Southwark Council progressively and furtively abandoned any requirement to
preserve the structure, or any part of it, is a long story of its own.
27
(85) On 30 November 2011 Mr Woods wrote to Chris Drabble of Network Rail
(exhibit E.41): ‘Hi Chris. I am not nagging but if you are able to let me have the
statement of case we spoke of – i.e. briefly why Network Rail believes the
demolition of the Tooley Street building is necessary and what would be the
consequences, including financial (broad figures are just fine), if it had to be retained
– before then that would be extremely helpful.’
(86) It was in response to this email Mr Drabble emailed Mr Woods on 1 December
(exhibit E.35b) and again on 8 December (exhibit E.35a ) stating that, the impact of
the retention of the SERO would be ‘unaffordable’ and estimating that ‘the cost to
the scheme and ultimately the public purse could range between £100m to £150m.
He concludes: ‘Obviously any decision to retain 64-68 Tooley St is not something
that Network Rail could support.’
(87) To put Mr Drabble’s cost estimate into context, English Heritage’s call on public
funds in 2010-11 was £130m. Although the figure quoted by Mr Drabble is
obviously a gross exaggeration, it would lay EH open to the charge that they had
doubled their annual cost to the taxpayer merely by insisting on preservation of
then SERO.
(88) As early in the pre-application process as 19 October 2010, a meeting of
Southwark’s ‘Heritage and Design working Group’ was told by Network Rail that
‘The whole station scheme at London Bridge is on a funding knife edge (exhibit
E.42b). Although not present at that meeting it is inconceivable that Mr Woods was
excluded from this information.
Precedent and justification for demolition of the south wall of the train shed
(89) On 10 April Mr woods wrote: ‘We knew that the previous scheme included the
retention of part of the south wall of the listed train shed’
(90) This statement is at odds with what Mr Woods said in his letter to Edward Kitchen
of CgMs on 31 August 2011 (exhibit E.43): ‘As with the consented scheme, the
28
current proposals to redevelop the station call for the complete demolition of the
grade II listed train shed that encloses platforms 9-16 of the station.’ His letters to
Southwark Council of 13 December 2011 (exhibit E.44) and DCLG of 5 January
(exhibit E.45) are similarly misleading. In the latter he refers to a scheme proposed
in 2000. We are still seeking details of that scheme from Southwark Council but, in
any case, Mr Woods was fully aware that that scheme was superseded, following
two public inquiries, by the 2008 scheme which preserved most of the train shed
flank wall and the entire roof structure (albeit through salvage for re-erection).
(91) On 4 April he had written: ‘retaining just the south wall – whether in whole or in
part - was not something that we would set as a condition of any consent that
might be granted.’ and ‘We did not consider the south wall as a separate entity and
apply a necessity test to it alone.’
(92) The suggestion that EH did not consider the south wall in its own right as a
structure worthy of retention is at odds with its own previous position from earlier
public inquiries (exhibit E. ), with the opinions of both planning authorities (exhibits
E.24, E.46, E.47), with architects of the previous and current schemes (exhibits E.17,
E.5), with the report of Network Rail’s own planning consultants (exhibit E.3e) and
with the overwhelming opinion of conservationists and the public. It is also at odds
with the physical reality of the continuity of the train shed flank wall and the
separately listed St Thomas St arcade that represent one continuous façade (exhibit
I.1, E21a). For these reasons, identification of the flank wall with the ironwork of
the train shed is an untenable and perverse position for EH to have taken. It can
only be explained by a desire to release Network Rail from the presumption in
favour of retention of heritage assets that planning policy entails.
On demolition of the westernmost bay of arches in the St Thomas St arcade
(93) Although relatively minor in the overall scale of heritage loss proposed in the ondon
Bridge redevelopment, the demolition of the westernmost arch of the recently
listed St Thomas St arcade is instructive. It illustrates how fully the planning
process followed a pattern of acceptance of the premise that Network Rail would
be at liberty to demolish whatever they chose and the planners and English Heritage
29
would have to make it fit with conservation policy by whatever means they could.
In the case of the westernmost bay of the arcade this involved particularly
convoluted and inconsistent approaches by the various parties.
(94) The listing of the St Thomas St arcade in July 2012 had necessitated a new listed
building consent application to augment the June applications. As I explained earlier
in this statement (para. 4), Mr Woods was well aware of the unity of the train shed
and the St Thomas St arcade as it was he who had invited BVAG to propose
removing the ambiguity about where the one stopped and the other started. The
listing of the arches had effectively made the arcade and the train shed wall one
continuous listed structure, albeit listed under two separate reference numbers.
(95) The continuity of the shed wall with the arcade makes it impossible to demarcate
between the two structures. EH had removed themselves from the obligation to
defend preservation of the shed wall by maintaining that it was unworthy of
preservation once the principle of the removal of the roof structure was accepted.
As explained above, this position is untenable and at odds with all other parties
views, including EH’s own in the past. However, it also produced another problem
as a result of the continuity of the building with the newly listed arcade. I explored
this difficulty in EH’s abandonment of the shed wall as a conservation issue in an
email thread with Mr Woods’ superior, Paddy Pugh, at English Heritage in
December and January 2011/12 (exhibit E.21). I pressed Mr Pugh on how EH
thought a demarcation could be drawn between the train shed and the arcade.
When he refused to respond I sent him a photograph of the conjunction of the two
and asked him to select between four different options marked with different
coloured dotted lines. (exhibit E.21a). Mr Pugh eventually refused to respond to me
entirely without answering the question.
(96) The problem of the last bay of the arcade also prompted different responses from
different parties. Southwark Council did not refer to the proposed demolition of
the bay in the listed building consent application description (exhibit E.48) and
obscured it in the officers report to the planning committee by referring to ‘direct
works’ rather than demolition. The drawings submitted by Network Rail in that
application misstated the extent of the listed arches to exclude the bay of three
30
proposed for demolition (exhibit E.49). By these means Southwark Council
concealed their decision not to refer the proposed demolition of the last of the
newly listed arcade bays to English Heritage and the Secretary of State. This was
done with the knowledge and support of Mr Woods (exhibit E.50) although he
distances himself from the decision in his email to DCLG (E.32)
(97) Recognising the integral nature of the arcade to the shed wall would have made the
EH position that the wall did not merit conservation impossible to propose.
Effectively, they would have to maintain that the wall was not just continuous with
the ironwork of the roof but that it was discontinuous with the arcade. Manifestly,
as was recognized in the consented 2008 scheme, the reverse is the case.
Listing of SERO
(98) On 12 December 2011, English Heritage submitted their advice to DCMS on the
review of their recommendation not to list the SERO pursuant to a request from
the Victorian Society made on August 19 (exhibit E.51). The review had been
signed off by the EH area Designation Adviser, Patience Trevor, on 29 September
2011 and by her superior, Delcia Keate, on 11 October. Recently I enquired of the
DCMS if they knew why it had taken two months for the review to reach them, but
they did not.
(99) Obviously, the applicants, The Victorian Society, other heritage groups, interested
individuals and BVAG members were disappointed (and dismayed) that EH had
reaffirmed their position on SERO. In exasperation we researched the EH listings of
other buildings by Charles Barry & Sons and other listed buildings in the immediate
vicinity of SERO. In addition I called Ms Trevor of English Heritage to ask her about
a unique feature of the SERO building that I wondered about, but that her report
did not mention. I also asked her about her unfavourable comparison of the
building with the North Eastern Railway Offices in York. I was concerned that
when I asked her whether the unique chequerboard relief on the upper levels of the
building’s exterior were executed in red brick or in terracotta she told me she
didn’t know as nobody had asked her to look at it. Similary, when I asked her
31
where in York I could see the North Eastern Railway offices for myself for
comparison, it was obvious she didn’t know.
(100) We discovered that English Heritage in the past have listed almost all of Charles
Barry junior’s other buildings, many of which are very modest in comparison with
the SERO. An obvious example is Dulwich College Prep School (exhibit I. 16, E.52).
All these factors contributed to a widespread belief among heritage groups that
English Heritage had been influenced by the Network Rail proposals for London
Bridge in their recommendation to DCMS on the importance of the SERO.
(101) As cited above under Cost, on 1 December and 8 December 2011 Mr Drabble
emailed Mr Woods and informed him that saving the SERO was unaffordable as it
would cost £100 – 150 million. There is no suggestion that the building could not
be saved and incorporated in the new station proposals. Shortly after this English
Heritage confirmed their recommendation to DCMS that the building should not be
listed. Clearly, to have recommended otherwise would have been to put them in
direct confrontation with Network Rail. In order to properly make out our case
we require proper disclosure from EH that they continue to resist.
(102) Ultimately, EH did not entirely concede on demolition of the SERO, maintaining that
the case was not made out (exhibit E.44), but by not recommending the building for
listing and by failing to maintain any objection to the decision of Southwark to
permit demolition they effectively turned a blind eye to its loss. This stance is
illustrated by an email of 25 November 2011 (exhibit E.53) from Mr Woods to
Gordon Adams. He says, ‘we are struggling to get a compelling case out of
CgMs/Network Rail to justify the demolition of the Tooley St building: Edward
Kitchen’s latest letter following our meeting was not what we hoped for.’ He also
seeks to agree a form of words that preserves for English Heritage some claim to
integrity but ensures any obstacle to Networks Rail’s demolition plans and
Southwark planners’ freedom to recommend approval to their planning committee
is minimised.
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(103) In summary, there is persuasive evidence, even from the limited disclosure EH have
given, that they acted with regard to commercial and political factors that were
outside their remit and they thus failed in their legal duty to ‘secure preservation of
historic buildings’.
Southwark Council
(104) In the early pre-application discussions between Southwark Planners and Network
Rail’s consultants the planning officers show belief in the application of established
policy to the London Bridge proposals. On 29 November 2010 the case officer,
Gordon Adams, in an exchange of emails with Malcolm woods of English Heritage
(Exhibit E.54) is having to make the case for retention of the south wall of the train
shed against apparent opposition from Mr Woods. He concludes the exchange with
an announcement of a ‘shot across the bow’ of Network Rail to put them on notice
that there are ‘fundamental concerns’ with their proposal. It is particularly relevant
to subsequent developments that the issue of previous planning consents and what
precedent there is for demolition of the wall is canvassed. Subsequently there
appears to evolve a consensus to adopt the pretence that there is persuasive
precedent for total demolition of the wall. Mr Woods even acknowledges that the
whole of the train shed wall could be retained but he says that this would not be the
preference of English heritage, or at least, they would not be ready to express such
a preference.
(105) On 30 November 2011 Bridin O’Connor writes what is presumably the ‘shot across
the bows’ referred to by Mr Adams (exhibit E.46). This includes the demand:
‘More importantly evidence will be required to demonstrate that all options have
been considered for the retention of any listed or conservation area structure that
is proposed for demolition.’
(106) Considerably later, in an email of 12 July 2011 (exhibit E.55) Mr Adams writes:
‘What is being put forward is taking a substantial amount of heritage fabric and
there will be very little of early elements of London’s oldest mainline rail station left;
accordingly we will continue to try and salvage what we can.’
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(107) This was in response to an email from Malcolm Woods of English Heritage (see
under EH section) that referred to the financial considerations with which he was
concerning himself. In response to that point Mr Adams says: ‘And on the funding,
chris Drabble was at pains to point out that the recent NR £1.2bn profit was
reinvested in the railways – perhaps they could invest a bit more in the London
Bridge Scheme.’
(108) His P.S. is equally telling: ‘Apologies if I am coming over a little negatively but I just
come back from a tour of Kings Cross station which is more in line with the high
aspirations we had for London Bridge.’
(109) These exchanges illustrate the way that fighting talk from the planning officers
regarding conservation obligations in the early stages start to become tempered by
resignation. The obvious inference is that, in this case, cash considerations will
trump conservation policy.
(110) By the time the proposals go before the planning committee – and following a
personal meeting between David Higgins of Network Rail and Peter John (of which
we have been unable to obtain any minutes) there is no remaining concern
expressed about reconciling the proposals with conservation policy. Neither is
there any mention of monetary factors in the report to the planning committee.
(111) This would of course be understandable if Network Rail had produced evidence to
support the ‘necessity’ for demolition of the heritage assets concerned. For this
reason I continually questioned both Southwark Council, the GLA and English
Heritage about the production of such evidence. This always drew the evasive
response ‘its all in the application documents’ as Giles Dolphin of the GLA also
reported having been told. It is evident that Network Rail did not think it necessary
to satisfy the conditions that would attach to any normal application for such large
scale heritage demolition. There is therefore a missing link in the chain of events,
which is how, without any significant changes to the proposals or consideration of
alternatives that would reduce destruction of the historic environment, the defence
of heritage assets in accordance with established policy was abandoned by planning
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officers. We know that behind the scenes the cash card was being played fully by
Network Rail (exhibits E.35, E.38, E.42, E.56c) but not how it became so effective in
overcoming the planning officers’ objections.
The GLA
(112) As part of the troika that would be required to facilitate the London Bridge plans
along with Southwark Council and English Heritage, the GLA was involved from the
early stages of the pre-application process. Indeed, the case officer at Southwark,
Gordon Adams, worked on an exchange basis with the GLA, spending part of his
time in one job and part in the other. Of course he would not work on the same
cases in both capacities but the interrelationship between Southwark as LPA and the
GLA next door on a major public infrastructure project is obvious. Inevitably the
approach taken to the applications was substantially agreed between the key parties.
(113) The difference between the GLA’s role and that of Southwark Council, as emerges
from disclosure we have obtained, from BVAG’s perspective is therefore limited to
a few issues. By the time of the GLA decision we had also had some time to probe
the justifications (such as they were) relied upon by Southwark’s planning officers in
their report and to obtain some FOI disclosure. It was therefore easier to pin
down the GLA on specifics prior to the Mayor’s decision. The GLA responded
accordingly to try to ensure their approval was ‘JR-proof’.
(114) As recounted above, I had talked to Giles Dolphin, former Head of Planning
Decisions at the GLA, on 12 January, the day before his retirement. I had previously
talked to him on the same subject and I knew that in his opinion there was a most
obvious lack of justification in the Network Rail proposals for the demolition of the
St Thomas St. train shed wall. This point had been made clearly in the GLA’s Stage I
report at para. 60 (exhibit E.16b): ’Figure 7.8 and 7.10 of the Heritage Statement
suggests that part of the wall needs to be removed; however it is not clear why.
The configuration of the new concourse should therefore be shown testing
retention of the train shed wall as part of the clear and convincing justification for
the loss of heritage assets.’
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(115) Mr Dolphin told me that he had ‘just written to Network Rail’ seeking such
justification and that he thought in the absence of a satisfactory response the
approval that he anticipated would be forthcoming would not be ‘JR-proof’. Once
he retired we no longer had Mr Dolphin as a point of contact at the GLA but we
pursued the trail of enquiries and disclosure applications that he had commenced.
This ultimately led to the exchange of letters with Nick Gray of Network Rail and
emails with Matt Carpen (exhibits E.28, E.29) that forced the self contradictory para.
62 in the Stage II report. The whole section of that report on retention options of
the ‘listed trainshed and trainshed wall’ (paras 58-67) is the product of a post hoc
justification that became necessary because BVAG had put the GLA on notice that
there was no adequate justification in the proposals as submitted and that
alternative treatments that preserved the buildings had not been explored. It is
fundamentally flawed in that it considers the compatibility of the proposed designs
with retention of the building. The correct approach is obviously to consider
designs that follow from the premise of retention of the heritage assets rather than
to test the retention against designs conceived on the assumption of their
demolition. This is no doubt why, several months before, Network Rail were so
keen to prevent heritage minded design treatments being produced by the BVAG
group of architects and heritage specialists.
(116) The justification for the demolition of the SERO is a product of the same inverted
logic. Obviously a design conceived on the basis of its demolition is not compatible
with the retention of the building. Hence the necessity under the EIA directive for
early and effective consultation and consideration of other options that would
reduce damage to the historic environment.
(117) On 20 October 2011, a sparingly minuted meeting took place between Network
Rail executives and Deputy Mayor, Sir Ed Lister, Giles Dolphin and Matt Carpen of
the GLA (exhibit E.58) This is significant because the relevant documents were not
disclosed in response to our first FOI request but the documents that were
disclosed gave us knowledge that such a meeting took place and we therefore made
a further application for disclosure specifically in relation to that meeting. This in
turn revealed Network Rail’s anxiety to conceal the extent of the monetary
considerations behind the London Bridge scheme. Under FOI procedure a third
36
party has to be notified of disclosure prior to it being given. When we received
disclosure in relation to the meeting in which we were interested it had some
inclusions that I did not understand. It turned out that this was an amendment to
the limited minute of the meeting that had cited cost as the reason given by
Network Rail for not providing a full roof cover on the new station. Network Rail
had insisted on an amendment that stated that a full roof cover was ‘not appropriate
for London Bridge from a design concept and operational point of view. Cost was
only one part of the overall consideration about the roof.’ (exhibit E.59).
(118) We know there was direct contact between the CEO of Network Rail, David
Higgins and the Mayor. In response to disclosure applications we have been told
that there are no records of the exchange(s) save for the note referred to in
exhibit: ‘After the meeting, the Mayor spoke to David Higgins about the
redevelopment of London Bridge Station and he set out his concerns with the
design of the roof. David Higgins explained the nature of the design and the
potential delay and extra costs changes would make’.
(119) It is therefore clear that the GLA knew cost constraints were being relied upon for
justification of the design treatment (and hence the loss of heritage assets) in the
proposals and that reasons advanced for the demolition of the train shed were not
the real reasons.
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government
(120) On behalf of BVAG, I wrote to the SoS on 14 March and 29 March (exhibits E.31)
requesting that he call-in the London Bridge proposals. I pointed out in those
letters that there were serious concerns about the planning procedure as it had
been applied by Southwark Council to the proposed redevelopment, specifically in
relation to the proposed loss of heritage assets.
(121) I pointed out how we considered that EIA regulations and national planning policy
had been breached in the processing of the applications and how various of the
‘Caborn criteria’ for call-in appeared to apply and the proposals would therefore
need to be considered carefully against those criteria. I also relied on the fact that
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the proposals were for a major public infrastructure project lasting for many years
at a cost running to billions of pounds and that they entailed almost complete
destruction of the remaining visible railway heritage at London Bridge.
(122) For these reasons I expected that the SoS would be taking a close look at the
applications. I followed up my letters with telephone calls and email enquiries but
both I and others in our Group found it difficult to engage with anyone in DCLG.
We were not allowed to talk to anyone senior and Ms Michelle Peart, who was our
only available contact, was uncommunicative and was clearly tightly constrained in
what she was allowed to say to us by orders from above. It was very obvious that
DCLG was keen to keep as well clear of the issue as possible and they were quite
happy with Southwark failing to refer it to them.
(123) Following the predictable NI (non-intervention) letter dated 29 March I requested
details of how the London Bridge project had been evaluated against four specific
call-in considerations and disclosure of all relevant material to call-in requests
(exhibit E.60). We knew that there was at least one other call-in request, from
David Campbell-Bannerman, MEP for the East of England. On 27 April I received a
reply from John Oakes at DCLG (exhibit E.32) that did not an explain how the
evaluation process had been undertaken but responded to the disclosure request,
suggesting that the documents told their own story. Very largely, they do.
(124) The entire disclosure given by DCLG is included at exhibit E32.
(125) I have sought further information that DCLG have only agreed to provide by 21
June but I rely on the following documents already in hand:
Standard form for completion in relation to planning applications (exhibits E32c-f).
(126) This document indicates how our call-in request was treated and what little regard
the SoS had to the scale of the proposed redevelopment and how he failed to have
regard to the large-scale heritage loss it involved. This may have been as a result of
the misleading information provided to him (see EH section above) by English
Heritage to the effect that the heritage loss occasioned by the new scheme was no
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different from what had been previously consented. In any event, despite being
given enough information in BVAG’s call-in request to alert him to the need to
consider the applications thoroughly, he did not.
Blacked out legal advice regarding the applicability s.12(3A) of the Planning (Listed Buildings
and Conservation Areas) Act 1990. (exhibit E.32g)
(127) The SoS’s NI letter fails to explain on what basis he declined to direct referral to
himself of applications apparently caught by the Planning (Listed Buildings and
Conservation Areas Act). We have sought disclosure of the un-redacted legal
advice but the Treasury Solicitors have declined on behalf of the SoS
The briefing ‘Note for DCLG’ from the Department for Transport (exhibit E32pp,ss)
(128) This briefing indicates how the SoS was subject to influence from the Department
for Transport calling on him to expedite a decision not to call-in the applications
and effectively not to adequately consider the call-in applications on the basis of
urgency. This urgency was expressed partially in terms of the costs that would arise
if the applications were not granted before 1 April because of the impending
Community Infrastructure Levy payable thereafter,
Email with sender and recipients names redacted regarding consequences of delay in issuing
NI letter (exhibit E32p,q)
(129) This also indicates what considerations drove the approach to the call-in request.
Email from ‘PSBobNeil’ (exhibit E32dd)
(130) ‘Could we light a fire under this one??’ indicates SoS officials attitude to our call-in
request and that it was not given due consideration given the important issues
raised.
Email exchange with Mr Woods of English Heritage (exhibit E.32h)
39
(131) This email exchange put the SoS on notice that there was an anomaly in the
treatment of a listed building consent application (AP-11-3423) that had not been
referred to him. In haste it appears no further consideration of this matter
occurred.
(132) Taken together, these documents and the misleading advice from English Heritage
show that the SoS failed to properly consider the requests for call-in of the
applications and failed to require Southwark Council to comply with their legal
obligation to refer the listed building consent applications to him under the Planning
(Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act.
Costs
(133) In relation to costs I would say as follows:
EIA issues
(134) This claim involves important issues for the Historic Environment of London Bridge.
Specifically the claimant maintains that Article 6, para. 4 and Article 5 para. 3.(d) of
the EIA Directive have not been complied with.
(135) These provisions require that development with significant environmental effects is
subject to adequate consultation and that, where environmental damage is entailed,
there is adequate consideration of alternatives by the developer.
(136) There is no doubt that the development proposed entails large scale damage to the
historic environment in that it requires demolition of virtually all the remaining
Victorian heritage of London’s oldest rail terminus. Previous proposals for
essentially the same redevelopment have been the subject of two public inquiries.
Following those inquiries a consented scheme of 2008 entailed less than half the
damage to the historic environment entailed by the current proposals. In particular
it provided for physical preservation of some or all of the three main heritage assets
that are all now proposed for total loss. In contrast to the previous scheme, the
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present proposals have not been subject to detailed public scrutiny despite the
much increased environmental damage they entail.
(137) This statement includes a detailed account of how the developer, acting in
collaboration with the LPA, not only failed to consider obvious alternatives to the
large-scale damage to the historic environment but also resisted community
initiatives to produce such alternatives.
Public interest
(138) It is beyond doubt that the public interest is served by proposals involving such
extensive environmental damage being subject to the right of appeal anticipated in
the EIA Directive. The Directive requires that such appeals should be available to
the public concerned at a cost that is not prohibitive.
(139) I am acting as a representative claimant on behalf of Bermondsey Village Action
Group (BVAG), a community group and an unincorporated association. I stand to
derive no personal benefit from the success of our Claim. Indeed, it is often put to
me that BVAG’s activities in resisting the erosion of the character of our
neighbourhood is contrary to my own interests as the high-rise, corporate
environment that we resist would increase land values to my financial advantage.
BVAG assets
(140) As an unincorporated association BVAG holds no assets in its own right. It does
maintain a bank account into which donations and subscriptions are paid. The
donors to the Group’s funds have been companies or individuals supportive of the
Group’s local heritage preservation initiatives including myself. BVAG’s account
balance stands at about £2000. On behalf of the Group I would only anticipate it
being possible to raise a few thousand pounds by way of a legal fund to bring the
present Claim. Hence it is unrealistic to expect to be able to fund the Claim from
BVAG’s resources.
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Claimant’s financial resources
(141) My own resources are adequate to support a family and a comfortable lifestyle. My
income is modest but this is augmented by occasional realisation of capital assets.
My assets are almost entirely in the form of a private house and shares in Shiva Ltd,
the private company that I run. I could not consider funding the Claim from my
personal income although I could, on paper afford to fund it if I were to sell some of
the illiquid assets I hold. It is difficult to say how easily I could realise such assets or
how long it might take. Given the volume of papers involved in our Claim and the
number of defendants and interested parties it is easy to imagine that the total costs
in the case could be very substantial. In the event of a costs order against me
following a full hearing of the Claim I would very likely face a costs liability beyond
what I would be able and willing to meet. Hence I do not believe it will be possible
for me to proceed with the Claim without there being a protective cost order in
place limiting my potential personal liability for costs.
Claimant’s costs
(142) I have a very extensive knowledge of the factual background to our Claim as a result
of direct engagement in the issues over many months and spent hundreds of hours
engaged in research and investigation. I am therefore in a position to present our
claim to the Court very comprehensively in person and we do not believe that we
will be disadvantaged by following that route. We do however need specialist legal
advice on planning law issues involved in our claim and procedural aspects of the
judicial review process. For these purposes we have both specialist solicitors and
Counsel who are acting predominantly on a pro-bono basis and, in so far as they
cannot do so, on discounted rates. By this cost-efficient approach to bringing our
Claim I expect that, with possibly a modest donation from me personally to
supplement what the Group might be able to raise by way of a legal fund, BVAG will
be able to fund its own limited legal costs adequately to ensure all necessary
specialist advice is available to us.
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Statement of Truth I believe that the facts stated herein are true. Full Name Signed Position or office held