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Noble Rhetoric, the Order of the Soul, and the Socratic Thesis 127

what Socrates has in mind by speaking of it. Is Socrates calling for its

creation? If Socrates has returned to the question of rhetoric for the

sake of Gorgias as much as for the sake of Callicles (see again 500a7–

b5, 501c7–d2), is Socrates pointing to a better use that could be made

of Gorgias’ powers? And might Socrates even have wanted to send

a certain message to Gorgias by weaving his return to the theme of

rhetoric together with his reminder of Callicles’ attack on philosophy?

These questions are difficult to answer at this point, since we have

not learned much about the character of “noble rhetoric” or why it

might be needed. But we can say that we have seen the first steps

in a restoration or rehabilitation of rhetoric – and we may wonder

whether this does not bring us closer to Socrates’ unacknowledged

but true purpose in the remainder of the dialogue.

NOBLE RHETORIC, THE ORDER OF THE SOUL,

AND THE SOCRATIC THESIS (502d10–508c3)

In laying out the criticism of rhetoric that led to the suggestion that

rhetoric is double, with a shameful form and a noble form (see again

503a5–b1), Socrates based his argument and thus this distinction on

the difference between aiming at pleasure and struggling to make the

souls of the citizens as good as possible. He complicated matters, how-

ever, by adding the further objection that ordinary rhetoricians act “for

the sake of their own private interest, giving little thought to the com-

mon good” (502e6–7). In other words, Socrates’ criticism highlighted

not only the lowness of what ordinary rhetoricians provide but also the

selfishness of their motives. This is important because it is the latter

point more than the former that provokes a protest from Callicles that

leads to the next stage of the conversation. Callicles is bothered less

by the thought that ordinary rhetoricians provide mere pleasure than

by the suggestion that they are simply out for themselves (consider

503a2–4). He does not think that is true in all cases. He insists that

it is not true of the great Athenian statesmen Themistocles, Cimon,

Miltiades, and Pericles (503c1–3).


128 Socrates’ Situation and the Rehabilitation of Rhetoric

In Callicles’ protest here we can see something about Callicles’ char-

acter and convictions that was visible but perhaps not fully clear ear-

lier. Callicles’ deepest admiration is reserved for men who, in his view,

performed great acts of public service for Athens. Great Athenians

such as Pericles hold a higher place in his esteem than foreign tyrants

of the likes of Xerxes (consider again 483c7–484c3). And insofar as

the political figures he admires were rhetoricians, he speaks up on

their behalf against Socrates’ criticism, insisting that they should be

regarded as noble rhetoricians, unlike those of the current generation

(503b4–c3).4 Callicles’ protest here sounds almost as if it could come

from a patriotic young American looking back with reverence to the

time of Washington, Jefferson, and Adams. It is true that, in defending

especially Pericles but also Themistocles and Cimon, he is defending

the architects of Athenian imperialism, who built Athens into a great

power at the expense of the freedom of other Greek cities. But Callicles

can tell himself that, in building and asserting Athenian strength, these

leaders were acting in accordance with the “justice of nature” that dic-

tates that the strong ought to dominate the weak. In fact, not only is

4. It is important to know the most famous accomplishments of the men whomCallicles praises. Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles were all cel-ebrated leaders of Athens whose careers collectively spanned the period ofAthens’ rise to great power. Miltiades, the earliest of the “great four,” led theAthenians in their famous victory against the invading forces of the Persianking Darius at Marathon in 490 B.C. Themistocles helped, roughly ten yearslater, to defeat the second Persian invasion, led by Xerxes. Themistoclesdefeated the Persian navy in a crucial battle at Salamis, and he contributedto the rise of the Athenian empire by building up the Athenian navy. Cimoncarried Themistocles’ work further by dealing a final defeat to the Persiannavy and by leading Athens during much of the period in which it trans-formed itself from one of the leading cities in the Greek alliance againstPersia into an imperial power in its own right. Pericles, of course, is themost famous of all Athenian leaders of this period. He led the Atheniansat the peak of their strength and helped lead them into the PeloponnesianWar. For more extensive discussions of the careers of these four men, see, inaddition to the accounts of Herodotus and Thucydides, Seung, Plato Redis-covered, 2–3, and Dodds, Gorgias, 325–6, 356–9.



Callicles’ patriotism compatible with his earlier argument about jus-

tice, but his admiration of the architects of Athenian imperialism even

suggests that a patriotic concern to vindicate Athens may have played

a role in leading him to defend a view of justice according to which

Athenian imperialism would be an example of natural justice, not a

violation of right.5

Callicles’ protest against Socrates’ present suggestion is guided, to

repeat, more by the belief that his heroes served Athens than by a

conviction that their service consisted in improving the souls of the

Athenians. It is only by combining these standards such that their

difference becomes blurred that Socrates is able to provoke Callicles

into defending his heroes as noble rhetoricians. But Callicles’ response

then allows Socrates to turn to the question of the true task of noble

rhetoric and to sketch out what its aim should be (consider 504c4–e1).

Socrates’ procedure here may serve several purposes at once. Most

obviously, Socrates intends to establish a standard by which Callicles’

heroes can be criticized (see 503d5–6). In addition, and as an extension

of the same effort, Socrates will press Callicles himself to turn his

attention away from the simple fact that his heroes served Athens and

to focus instead on the character of their service. Callicles’ position, as

it appears here, has the mixed or ambiguous character of patriotism,

which puts service to the city above all else without being too morally

strict about the end that the city itself serves.6 In pressing Callicles,

Socrates will challenge the adequacy of this position – a position that

in a way affirms the primacy of virtue (as service of the individual to the

common good) but in another way fails to (as the end to which the city

should be devoted). Since any defender of such a view, precisely as a

5. In support of this suggestion, consider Callicles’ opening remark at 481b10–c4, where Callicles speaks in defense of the present order of things, andexpresses his concern that Socrates’ extreme arguments about justice wouldturn everything upside down.

6. It is worth comparing, in this connection, a famous passage from the fore-most of Callicles’ heroes. See 2.41–43 of Pericles’ Funeral Oration in Thucy-dides.



devotee of virtue and the city, would find it hard to concede that the city

should be devoted to low ends, Socrates is justified in pressing Callicles

toward greater rigor and consistency. Finally, Socrates’ procedure will

also allow him to begin to sketch something of the character of noble

rhetoric and its aims.

Socrates begins his description of the noble rhetorician – “the good

man, who speaks with a view to the best” – by comparing him to the

other craftsmen, who do not perform their tasks at random but instead

“look away” to something, namely, to whatever their work (ergon) hap-

pens to be and to the form (eidos) into which they are trying to mold

whatever they are working on (503e1–5). (The important Platonic term

“form” – eidos – makes its appearance here as an image or pattern that

would seem to exist in the mind’s eye of a craftsman and then later

in the result of his work.) Socrates gives the examples of painters,

house builders, and shipwrights, all of whom are typical craftsmen in

the sense that they put the materials of their work into a certain order

until they have formed an arranged and ordered whole (503e5–504a2).

The same is true, according to Socrates, even of gymnastic trainers

and doctors, who work on the body (504a3–5). As for the character

and goodness of the final order aimed at by each of the craftsmen,

that would seem to be established by the use to which the craftsman’s

work is to be put. For instance, the order of a ship is dictated and

vindicated, so to speak, by the needs of sailing, just as the order of a

house is dictated and vindicated by the needs of daily life. It is hard to

deny that an ordered ship, an ordered house, or even an ordered body

is preferable to a disordered one (504a8–b3).

So far so good. But what about the soul? Is it true in that case, too,

that arrangement and order render it useful, whereas disorder has

the opposite effect? Socrates puts this question to Callicles, and Cal-

licles assumes, in the wake of the preceding examples, that it is also

necessary to agree to this (see 504b3–6). And perhaps it does make

sense to assume that an ordered soul, even if its order is more compli-

cated than that of a ship or a house, is more useful than a disordered

one. But a more questionable step comes next. For after reminding



Callicles that there is a name or a couple of names for that which

comes about in the body through arrangement and order – namely,

health and strength – Socrates asks about that which comes to be in

the soul from arrangement and order (504c1–3). Callicles’ unwilling-

ness to respond – “Why don’t you say it yourself, Socrates?” (504c4) –

enables Socrates to declare that the names of the arrangement and

order of the soul are “the lawful” and “the law.” From these, he claims,

souls become lawful and orderly; and lawfulness and orderliness in the

soul are justice and moderation (504d1–3). Callicles’ response at this

point – “Let it be” (504d4) – indicates that he senses a problem with

Socrates’ argument. But what problem does Callicles sense? What is

questionable here?

To begin with the structure of the argument, Socrates does not work

in the case of the soul, as he did in the preceding analogies of the prod-

ucts of the craftsmen, from the notions of work or use. His statement

about the soul seems closer in this respect to the analogy of the body

(consider 504b4–c3). Yet it is much less disputable to claim that the end

or product of the proper arrangement and order of the body is health

and strength, and therefore that the order itself should be called “the

healthy” (see 504c7–8), than it is to claim that the arrangement and

order of the soul ought to be called “the lawful” and “law,” and then

to conclude that from these arise lawfulness and orderliness, which

in turn ought to be called justice and moderation (compare 504b7–

c8 with 504d1–3). What is the basis for calling the arrangement and

order of the soul “the lawful” and “law”? And how do we know that

the lawful and the law produce states of lawfulness and orderliness

that truly deserve the names of the virtues justice and moderation?

Perhaps we do in some sense “know” this, insofar as the law is com-

monly held to be the source of lawfulness and orderliness, and such

lawfulness and orderliness are commonly taken to be justice and mod-

eration. Looked at in this way, however, Socrates’ argument does little

more than appeal to a common opinion without providing a genuine

defense of that opinion. Or, to be more precise, Socrates’ argument

gives the impression of demonstrating that the lawful and law have a



rationality that is as straightforward as that found in the works of the

craftsmen, and a goodness that is as unquestionable as that of bodily

health and strength. But this impression of demonstrating that there is

a perfect harmony between law, virtue, and rationality serves to cover

over the problem that the argument really rests on a mere assertion –

an assertion, moreover, that avoids the difficult questions that would

be involved in a truly serious effort to discover the arrangement and

order of the soul. After a series of initial steps that give the appearance

of perfect soundness and clarity, Socrates reaches his conclusion by a

nimble and well disguised leap.7

That Socrates does not offer a sound argument here should make

us wonder whether we are not seeing a rhetorical presentation of the

task of rhetoric. According to Socrates’ account, the rhetorician – that

is, the artistic and good one – will look when he speaks and acts to the

inculcation of justice, moderation, and the rest of virtue in the souls

of his fellow citizens, and to the removal of injustice, intemperance,

and the rest of vice (504d5–e4). This will benefit the citizens, since,

just as it is of no benefit “according to the just speech” to give a sick

and corrupted body all sorts of food and drink, so must a thought-

less, intemperate, unjust, and impious soul be kept away from the

objects of its desires and directed toward those things from which it

will be made better (504e5–505b7). Such restriction involves a cer-

tain kind of punishment, namely, the punishment of keeping the sick

soul away from the objects of its desires. But to be punished, Socrates

insists, is better for the soul than to remain immoderate. And Socrates

urges Callicles, who objects to this suggestion, to endure the benefit

he himself is receiving by submitting to the punishment he is getting

(504b9–c4).

7. The flaw in Socrates’ argument is missed by some commentators. See, e.g.,Jaeger, Paideia, 2:145; Friedlander, Plato, 2:268–69. For other commentatorswho raise objections to Socrates’ argument, see Grote, Plato, and the OtherCompanions of Sokrates, 2:375–75; Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 273–4;Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 142–4; Newell, Ruling Passion, 31, 7.



As this last remark to Callicles indicates, Socrates is not only describ-

ing a kind of punishment in this section but also practicing it on Cal-

licles. This fits with the suggestion that he is not only describing a

certain sort of rhetoric but also practicing it. But rhetoric of what

sort? As it appears here, the rhetoric that Socrates is at once describ-

ing and practicing combines exhortation and a kind of chastisement

that can plausibly be called punishment, although this “punishment”

involves no physical violence and would seem to work together with

the inspiring effects of exhortation. It may be worth noticing, in this

connection, that Socrates compares what he is doing in this section to

the telling of myths (see 505c10–d3). Is Socrates exhorting Callicles to

a view that somehow has the character of a myth? This question can-

not yet be answered, since, as Socrates puts it, the argument still does

not have a head (505d2–3).8 Let it suffice for now to say that Socrates

is presenting what appears to be a doctrine of virtue, a doctrine to the

truth of which he does not quite attest (consider 506a1–5), but one

that he is willing to spell out at least in part because Gorgias steps in

to express his wish to hear Socrates go through “the remaining things”

(see 506a8–b3).

The exchange in which Gorgias urges Socrates to continue even

as Callicles withdraws from the discussion leads to the strange spec-

tacle of Socrates speaking for an extended section in a mode that

combines dialectical questioning and extended monologue. That is,

Socrates accepts Callicles’ temporary withdrawal and proceeds on his

own, but he continues to speak as if he were engaged in a back and

forth exchange, taking on the roles of both questioner and respondent

(see 506b4ff.). Socrates’ argument thus becomes, in its very form or

method, a blend of Socratic dialectics and a kind of rhetoric. And this

form may give us a clue to the character of the content of Socrates’

extended monologue. In keeping with this, Socrates also suggests that

8. On this odd expression and Socrates’ use of the word muthos in this passage,see Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker, 60.



his monologue is replacing a more strictly dialectical attempt to give to

Callicles “the speech of Amphion in response to the speech of Zethus”

(506b4–c1).9 This indication that Socrates is no longer arguing in the

strictest dialectical manner, even as he preserves something of the form

of dialectics, suggests that whatever we may see in Socrates’ mono-

logue, it will not be the truest or deepest response to Callicles’ attack

on his way of life. Instead, Socrates is completing what he calls “the

speech” (ton logon) or “the just speech” (ton dikaion logon), a speech

or an account that he has already given us reason to suspect may have

something of the character of a myth.

With an exhortation of his audience to “listen,” Socrates returns

to “take up the speech from the beginning” (506c5). The beginning,

apparently, is the distinction between the pleasant and the good, and

Callicles’ agreement as to the superiority of the good (506c6–9). But

after repeating these steps, Socrates now says more than he did earlier

about the character of the good. Just as the pleasant is that through

which, by its presence, we are pleased, so the good is that through

which, by its presence, we are good (506c9–d2). But we are good when

some virtue is present (506d2–4). With these steps, Socrates turns the

acknowledgment of the superiority of the good into a case for virtue,

or, in other words, he brings out the implication that virtue should

be our highest concern. Next, he describes virtue in such a way that

arrangement and order, the principles he has been emphasizing, are its

distinguishing marks and even its sources (see 506d5–e2). Once again,

Socrates does not speak in the case of virtue, as he did earlier when

speaking of the products of the craftsmen, of any use or end from

which the arrangement and order in question take their bearings.10

Instead, he speaks simply of an order that, when present, makes a

given being good; and he claims that, when this being is the soul, the

orderly soul is better than the disorderly one (506e2–6).

9. This phrase refers, of course, to Callicles’ earlier allusion to Euripides’Antiope. See footnote 10 in Chapter 3.

10. Cf. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 85.



As Socrates spells out his account of virtue, we begin to see the sig-

nificance of his emphasis on order: moderation comes to sight as the

highest virtue. Socrates argues that since the orderly soul is moderate,

the moderate soul is good, and the soul that experiences “the opposite

to the moderate” is bad (506e6–507a7). The soul that experiences the

“opposite to the moderate,” according to Socrates, is the foolish and

intemperate soul (see he aphron te kai akolastos at 507a6–7). By men-

tioning two opposites of moderation – foolishness in addition to intem-

perance – Socrates suggests that at least one meaning of moderation

here is a kind of sensibleness or even a kind of wisdom.11 This, in turn,

can help us to grasp the most remarkable feature of Socrates’ present

account of virtue: at least at the beginning of this account, he presents

all of the other virtues as derivative from moderation (507a5–c7).12

For this to make sense, it would seem that moderation must incor-

porate a kind of wisdom that is able to discern “the fitting things,”

since it is out of his concern to do “the fitting things” that the mod-

erate man as Socrates here describes him can be relied on to do the

just things toward human beings, to act piously toward the gods, and

to be courageous (see 507b1–5). The virtuous man, because he does

the deeds of justice, piety, and courage, can be said to be just, pious,

and courageous; but the spirit of his actions would seem to be that of a

sensible concern not to make foolish mistakes (consider 507b5–c5). By

presenting virtue in this way, Socrates makes it easy to defend virtue

as conducive to the happiness of the moderate man – and he even

adds that he himself is convinced that moderation is the path to hap-

piness (see 507b8–d1). But one could wonder how closely the virtue

11. On the two opposites of moderation, see Dodds, Gorgias, 336. As Doddspoints out, the more common opposition is sophron-akolastos (moderate-intemperate). But for the opposition sophron-aphron (moderate-foolish) andthe broader meaning of moderation implied by that opposition, see Protago-ras 332a4–335b5; Laws 710a3–8; Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1.16, 1.3.9.

12. Cf. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 61: “Moderationbecomes the single virtue into which even justice is absorbed.” See also85, 90.



that Socrates is describing and defending here resembles the kind of

virtue that most people admire and would like to see defended. What,

for instance, is its relationship to the lawfulness that Socrates spoke

of just moments ago? Would such virtue merit the name “the lawful”?

Or is it closer to the kind of virtue that Socrates speaks of, for example,

in Book Four of the Republic, where he defines justice as the proper

order of the soul? That definition of justice, like Socrates’ current

description of moderation, makes virtue appear to be something that

would clearly be good for an individual to possess, but it departs quite

far from any ordinary notion of virtue.13

If Socrates’ description transforms virtue into something that most

people would find hard to recognize, he does not continue very far

down this path before turning back toward a view that does not give

such pride of place to moderation. Socrates’ “retreat” begins when he

returns to the theme of punishment – punishment not just of oneself

but also of “one’s own” – and when he speaks of the city (see 507d4–6).

Once the primary object of concern ceases to be one’s own soul, as it

seemed to be while Socrates was praising moderation, justice returns

to reclaim at least equal status with moderation. In the second half of

Socrates’ account of virtue, justice is no longer presented as a subor-

dinate and derivative virtue (compare 507d4–508b2 with 507a5–d3).

It also is striking that the reemergence of justice from subordinate to

at least equal status with moderation brings with it a transformation

in the character of Socrates’ case for the goodness of virtue. On the

one hand, the straightforward case for the goodness of virtue that was

presented in the section that elevated moderation casts its glow, so to

speak, over Socrates’ whole account of virtue, especially since Socrates

does not call attention to the important shift in the account. But, on the

13. See, in particular, Republic 443b7–444a2. On the difference between“Socratic temperance” and “Socratic justice,” on the one hand, and “com-monly recognized temperance” and “commonly recognized justice,” on theother, see Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory, 125–6. Compare Santas, Socrates, 295–301.



other hand, Socrates now moves away from the view that the sensible

actions of the moderate man produce benefits that flow directly from

the actions themselves by suggesting, instead, that moderation and

justice are good because they enable the virtuous to unite in friend-

ship and community with other human beings and with the gods (see

507d6–e6). Socrates’ speech culminates in a vision of the cosmos – of

heaven, earth, gods, and men – bound together by the ties of commu-

nity, friendship, orderliness, moderation, and justice (507e6–508a2).

“This is why,” he tells Callicles, “they call this whole a cosmos, not dis-

ordered or intemperate.”14 Socrates tells Callicles that he fails to see

the cosmic power of “geometrical equality”: “You seem to me not to

apply your mind to these things, and, wise though you are about them,

you do not realize that geometrical equality has great power among

gods and human beings, but you think that one must practice taking

more, since you neglect geometry” (508a3–8).15

Now, Socrates seems to be serious here in urging Callicles to

embrace the view that he sets forth. He certainly addresses him directly

by name (see 507c1, e6, 508b4). And if we recall our earlier suggestion

that Callicles is troubled by doubts about whether the virtuous receive

14. The Greek word kosmos (translated above as “cosmos”) is the same wordthat I have been translating as “order.” To call “this whole” a kosmos is toclaim that it is orderly. As for who “they” are who call this whole a kosmos,that may refer either to people in general or to “the wise” mentioned bySocrates at 507e6.

15. “Geometrical equality” refers to what is more often called “proportionalequality,” the equality of ratios in a geometrical progression. This is thekind of equality that provides the standard for Aristotle’s famous account ofdistributive justice (see Nicomachean Ethics 1131a10–b22). Socrates’ sug-gestion here that such equality somehow has force throughout the universemay have Pythagorean origins (see Dodds, Gorgias, 338–9; see also Olym-piodorus, Commentary on Plato’s Gorgias, Lecture 35). Whether or not ithas such origins, the vision Socrates here holds out of an ordered whole,supportive of virtue, has drawn the attention of many commentators, someof whom place considerable weight on this passage. See, e.g., Friedlander,Plato, 2:269; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:146–7; Voegelin, Plato, 36–37; Kahn, “Dramaand Dialectic in Plato’s Gorgias,” 96, 119; Newell, Ruling Passion, 32, 38.



the happiness they deserve, Socrates’ speech here in praise of virtue

can be seen as an effort to help Callicles by assuaging his doubts. We

see Socrates here in the role of an exhorter, punisher, and helper. Or,

to use an earlier analogy that will reappear before the conversation

is finished, Socrates seems to be acting like a doctor giving Callicles’

soul the medicine that it needs. But does that mean that we should

accept what Socrates says in his account of virtue also as an expres-

sion of his own deepest views? A number of difficulties stand in the

way of drawing that conclusion. First, Socrates has not given a com-

pletely sound defense of virtue. In fact, his speech, by moving from

an (unconventional) understanding of virtue as a kind of wise mod-

eration to a (more conventional) understanding of it as justice and

moderation, even raises a troubling question about the unity of virtue

and the harmony between wisdom and justice. To be sure, the surface

of Socrates’ speech affirms the unity of virtue and the harmony of its

parts. But that surface is not supported by an adequate argument.16

Perhaps as an acknowledgment of this, immediately after delivering

his speech, Socrates presents its results in a way that quietly undercuts

the conviction with which he seemed to be speaking: “Either this argu-

ment [logos], then, must be refuted by us – by showing that it is not

by the possession of justice and moderation that the happy are happy,

and by the possession of vice that the miserable are miserable – or else,

if this argument is true, we must consider what follows” (508a8–b3).

Why does Socrates hold out, even if only as one of two alternatives,

the possibility of a refutation of his argument?

Since Socrates goes on at once to connect his defense of virtue

with the Socratic thesis about justice that he has been defending since

the beginning of his discussion with Polus, it may seem mistaken to

raise doubts about his conviction (see 508b3–e6). But after referring

back to the Socratic thesis, Socrates then goes on to speak directly

16. Compare the similar objection of Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory, 125–6, 129–30.Irwin’s critical analysis should be contrasted with Friedlander, Plato, 2:269;Jaeger, Paideia, 2:146; Voegelin, Plato, 36.



about that thesis, and what he says forces us to confront an even

more far-reaching question about the true character of his views. For

Socrates says unobtrusively but clearly that even his defense of the

Socratic thesis should be understood, not as a defense of a view that

he knows to be true, but only as a defense of a view that no one he

encounters can deny without becoming ridiculous. Speaking of that

thesis, he says to Callicles:

These things that came to sight for us up there in the earlier speeches,

are, as I say, held down and bound – if I may put it in a rather rude way –

by iron and adamantine arguments [logois], as it would seem at any rate.

And if you or someone younger than you does not loosen them, it will

be impossible for anyone saying something different from what I’m now

saying to speak nobly. For to me at least, the speech [logos] is always the

same – that I do not know how these things stand, but of those I meet up

with, as now, no one who says something different is able to avoid being

ridiculous. (508e6–509a7)

In this statement, Socrates suggests that in defending the Socratic

thesis he is giving voice to a view that has greater power in people’s

souls than many realize. But he stops short of affirming that he him-

self is convinced of the truth of this view, and he even suggests that

the “iron and adamantine arguments” holding this view in place, “as

it would seem at any rate,” might be loosened by Callicles or by some-

one younger than him (see also 506a1–5, 508a8–b3). We should be

reminded in this connection of another important statement that we

considered earlier in which Socrates made a similar suggestion. For

Socrates virtually began his exchange with Callicles by telling him that

he will never attain consistency – that he will go through life in dis-

agreement with himself – unless he refutes the Socratic thesis (see

again 482a4–b6). The most surprising aspect of that statement, espe-

cially since it came immediately after Socrates’ defense of the Socratic

thesis in the Polus section, is one that I did not call attention to earlier:

Wouldn’t one have expected Socrates to say that Callicles must accept

the Socratic thesis as the only way to achieve genuine consistency?



Does Socrates mean to indicate that he thinks this view is refutable?

To be sure, his statements suggest that a refutation of this view would

be far more difficult than people like Callicles think. In fact, it would

be so difficult that Socrates is able to claim never to have encoun-

tered anyone who was able to avoid becoming ridiculous when argu-

ing against the Socratic thesis. But does the great difficulty of refuting

this view amount to an impossibility? Would it be possible for some-

one of sufficient strength to achieve consistency by loosening the iron

and adamantine bonds?17

SOCRATES’ SITUATION, THE QUESTION OF ASSIMILATION,

AND THE ISSUE OF SELF-PROTECTION (508c4–513d1)

Whatever indications Socrates gives that he may have doubts about

the position he is defending, they do not prevent him from urging

17. On this last question, consider Socrates’ statement about himself at 482b7–c3 in light of his preceding remark about Callicles. On the general questionof this paragraph, while Socrates’ statements that he does not know whetherthe Socratic thesis is true are sometimes noted by other commentators, thesestatements are usually not taken very seriously. See, for instance, Jaeger’sclaim, after noting “what looks like the logical indecision of [Socrates’] con-versations,” that nonetheless “there glows the relentless moral conviction ofhis life, sure of its ultimate aim, and therefore possessing that hotly soughtfor knowledge which renders any faltering of will impossible” (Paideia,2:150; see also 146–7). Or consider Kahn’s claim: “There is no doubt thatSocrates regards the doctrine of the paradoxes as established by the refuta-tions of Polus and Callicles” (“Drama and Dialectic in Plato’s Gorgias,” 110,the emphasis is Kahn’s; see also 111–13, 118–19; in his quotation on page111 of Socrates’ crucial statement at 508e6–509a7, Kahn omits Socrates’claim that he does not know whether his thesis is true). Similar to Kahn’sinsistence that “there is no doubt” that Socrates thinks his thesis has beenestablished is McKim’s insistence that Socrates “of course” believes in theposition he defends, a position whose truth, according to McKim, is “beyondargument” (see “Shame and Truth in Plato’s Gorgias,” 47, 48; see also 39–46).Consider also Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 4–5, 214–32;Brickhouse and Smith, Plato’s Socrates, 30–41, 127–8. Somewhat closer tomy own analysis is Kastely, “In Defense of Plato’s Gorgias,” 97.