Zach Coughlin, Esq. Reno, NV 89512 Self Representing ...docshare01.docshare.tips/files/23235/232351427.pdf · EMERGENCY MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE AND ... State Bar of Nevada received

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- 1/17 - EMERGENCY MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE AND REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION THEREOF

Zach Coughlin, Esq. NV Bar 9473 (temporarily suspended but authorized to practice on his own behalf in Reno Justice Court), license not suspended before the USPTO 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402 [email protected] Self Representing Attorney Defendant

IN THE RENO JUSTICE COURT COUNTY OF WASHOE; STATE OF NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA, PLAINTIFF vs. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN;

DEFENDANT ----------------------------------------------------/

))))))

RCR2013-072675 D5; reassigned to Hon. Judge Glasson

EMERGENCY MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE AND REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION THEREOF

I, Zachary Barker Coughlin declare pursuant to NRS 53.045, under penalty of perjury that the

following is true and correct and based upon my own first hand knowledge except those matters stated upon

information and belief (even where implicitly so stated), and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667

7402 [email protected]

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This communication is sent in further compliance with any duty to seek a continuance from

opposing counsel and or the court prior to the 11/6/13 sentencing hearing in RCR2013-072675.

Such is necessary for a variety of reasons, including the fact that just today Bailiff English

and Chief Bailiff Sexton indicated that any "documents" submitted by Coughlin via fax or facsimile

were not being filed in, nor were they being docketed. Both Bailiffs again reiterated the RJC's

position that Coughlin would not be permitted to obtain a copy of the dockets in his cases, despite

the fact that, as show in the 10/23/13 Sentencing Memorandum by WCDA DDA Amos R. Stege

(http://www.scribd.com/doc/181521981/10-23-13-Sentencing-Memorandum-72675-DDA-Stege-

ocrd-final-opt-printed-OCR-pdf (further, for his defense in RMC 13 CR 3913 and 3914, Coughlin

needs certified copies of various documents and the dockets in both RCP2012-000607 and

RCP2012-000599, with the Admin Orders in the RJC greatly prejudicing Coughlin’s ability to

defend therein both from a time constraint analysis in addition to the prohibitive expense of such

materials in certified form from the RJC, not to mention where Coughlin prohibited from have such

subpoenas personally served and cannot afford any service via certified mail under NRS 174.375.

Indeed, the proximity of the 11/6/13 sentencing hearing in the RJC, coupled with the 10/18/13

Motion to Remand and revoke Coughlins’ probation in 63341 and 65630 filed by the WCDA’s

Office, and the 11/7/13 trial dates in RMC 13 CR 3913 and 13 CR 3914 augers strongly for a

continuance of the 11/6/13 sentencing hearing.), the WCDA's Office is able to obtain dockets in any

of Coughlin's cases quite readily, and without filing anything in the way of a "motion" such as Chief

Bailiff Sexton and Bailiff English again indicated to Coughlin he would need file, "in compliance

with the "Administrative Orders", which they indicate would mean filing a "motion" and allowing

ten judicial days to pass for the WCDA to be afforded an opportunity to respond, then filing a

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Request for Submission. Of course, the WCDA's Office file no such motion seeking to obtain the

dockets attached to its 10/23/13 Sentencing Memorandum in RCR2013-072675.

Additionally, RJC Bailiff's (English, Ramsey, Hiebert, Sexton, Reyes, Medina) all continue to

refuse to indicate the names of the various clerks they reference as purportedly having provided to

these bailiffs the various rationale and excuses proffered to Coughlin as to why Coughlin is not

permitted to even purchase a docket in his various cases, why the cases do not have dockets

contained within the filed when Coughlin is finally permitted to view the files, why it is that

Coughlin is not permitted to pay for the audio transcripts in his criminal case (RCR2013-072675)

Please find attached the 4/4/13 filing faxed to the RJC Bailiff Station fax number (775 325 6591) in

accordance with the express direction that Coughlin may do so and that such would be filed in

provided to Coughlin by Chief Bailiff Sexton (notice the fax header and file stamp). Now, today,

Bailiff English and Chief Bailiff Sexton (whom attempted to watch the entirety of Coughlin's trial

in Reno Municipal Court 13 CR 3913 and 3914 (a TPO/EPO Workplace Harassment Protection

Order prosecution by the Reno City Attorney incident to the TPO/EPO in RCP2012-000607 that the

State Bar of Nevada received from RJC Chief Judge Pearson on 12/20/12, which Bailiff English

testified to having purportedy served Coughlin (though he admits that he had not looked at the

document he later purported to have served Coughlin) in the Department of Alternative Sentencing

room in the room the RJC shares with the Department of Alternative Sentencing on 12/26/12 during

Coughlin's check-in incident to his probationary terms) indicate that no faxes have been received

from Coughlin by the RJC in the last month, (which runs counter to the attached confirmations of

receipt), and that, even if any had, such would not be filed in by the RJC, as Chief Bailiff Sexton

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admits to making the decision himself that such is not an appropriate method of filing a document,

despite the fact that they RJC's criminal division holds itself out as accepting documents for filing

that are submitted via facsimile, and despite Sexton's previous indication to Coughlin that Coughlin

should send any fax filings to the RJC Bailiff's fax number, which Sexton then provided to

Coughlin as "(775) 325-6591", as sending such to the RJC Bailiff's fax number rather than the RJC

criminal division's fax number was required in light of the "Administrative Order".

Multiple Bailiffs have indicated to Coughlin that they do not know what Administrative Order

2012-01 (of 12/20/12, which was given a criminal case number on 3/6/13, RCR2013-071437) and

2013-06 (In the Matter of Zachary Barker Coughlin), actually provide. Please find copies of each

attached, noting that neither uses the words "fax" or "facsimile" anywhere therein.

Of course, NRS 4.230 and NRS 4.240 require Nevada's justice courts to maintain "dockets" in all

cases, and specify the form such dockets must adhere to, and that such present prima facie

evidence. It is a manifest injustice to allow the WCDA's Office to readily obtain dockets, and

attach such to the 10/23/13 Sentencing Memorandum, without making the WCDA comply in an

manner with either Administrative Order 2012-01 or 2013-06, whereas Coughlin has continued to

be denied his right to obtain copies of the dockets in his cases, particularly those involving his

liberty in the criminal arena, and where his Fourteenth Amendment property right (i.e., a license to

practice law) is greatly affected. Nonetheless, Coughlin has filed such "motions" for these dockets

(despite the fact that a "docket" is not a "document" in the sense the term "document" is used in

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either Administrative Order 2012-01 and 2013-06), and a subsequent Request for Submission, and

now, on the even of his 11/6/13 Sentencing hearing in RCR2013-072675, and where DDA Stege

filed on 10/18/13 Motions to Remand Coughlin and revoke two different 180 day suspended

sentences (in RCR2011-063341, and RCR2012-065630, which, like RCR2013-072675 involved an

allegation by the WCDA's Office that one whom manifestly is not a public officer (neither justice

court bailiffs, 911 dispatchers, nor City of Reno police officers are "public officers" under any of

the various definitions of such set forth in the NRS), pursuant to an SCR 111(6) "serious" crime

prosecution (NRS 199.280 "resisting a public officer") where Coughlin was both indigent and

denied court appointed counsel in violation of the 1/4/08 Indigent Defense Order in ADKT 0411

(incident to which Coughlin has a now pending Motion for Appointment of Counsel in RCR2013-

072675 that Judge Glasson (a 1983 graduate of McGeorge School of Law, just like the Judge

Clifton whom he replaced upon Chief Judge Pearson entering an 10/11/13 Order for Reassignment

(where Coughlin's Motions to Disqualify Judge Clifton had, again, gone without the response

required by NRS 1.235) purported to deny at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the 10/14/13 Trial

in 72675 (despite ADKT 0411 making clear that the presiding judge may not make such

determinations as to requests for the appointment of counsel and to proceed informa pauperis, but,

rather, that such determinations must be referred to one other than the presiding judge).

Especially where the RJC Bailiff's continue making discretionary decision incident to their

interpretations of, and, indeed, amendments and alterations to the Administrative Order (a past

practice which the RJC's Chief Judges have countenanced incident to Chief Bailiff Sexton telling

Coughlin to make telephone calls to the RJC Bailiff's telephone line to ask questions and for the

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purpose of scheduling times in which Coughlin may view his files...and, apparently, with respect to

RJC Bailiff Reyes amending the 12/20/12 Administrative Order 2012-01 such that Coughlin must

have an escort to be even within the "common areas" the RJC shares with at least six different

entities in the Lane Justice Center and that Coughlin must wait in the lobby near the security check

while waiting (sometimes, particularly when Reyes is involved, for more than an hour) for an RJC

Bailiff to return with stamped received copies of documents Coughlin has submitted for

filing. Neither Administrative Order by the RJC requires any such thing, but, the RJC Bailiffs have

taken it upon themselves to amend such orders.

To that extent, it hardly operates as an ameliorative measure for RJC Chief Judge Pearson to then,

in his 10/11/13 "ORDER FOR REASSIGNMENT" to reassign such 72675 case to Tahoe Justice of

the Peace Glasson (though for such case to still be tried in the RJC, and subject to the same

Administrative Orders that purport to require Coughlin to communicate with no RJC employees

other than its Bailiffs (whom are just that, employees, rather than "elected" or "appointed" public

officers under NRS 169.164, and NRS 281.005) to replace Judge Clifton in presiding over 72675

where the RJC Bailiff (especially given that 72675 involves a prosecution premised upon the idea

that an RJC Bailiff is a public officer and that Coughlin somehow "resisted" such bailiff in

indicating he was headed to the family court (ie, completely outside of the RJC's jurisdiction) in

response to Baiilff Reye's alleged command that Coughlin must "wait in the lobby" (which Reyes

indicated he ordered Coughlin to do for a variety of reasons, including Reyes contention that

Coughlin was somehow still engaged in the act of filing documents with first RJC Bailiff Ramsey,

then, in a later variation of his Bailiff Reyes' story, with Bailiff Hiebert.

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In Bailiff Reye's 5/24/13 Narrative of the events incident to Coughlins' 5/23/13 custodial

arrest, Bailiff Reyes, interestingly, makes no mention of the "documents" he would testify to (10:41

am mark of trial audio transcript) Coughlin's having provided to Bailiff Hiebert at the cafe

bench). Upon further cross-examination Bailiff Reyes was forced to admit that he merely

"assumed", that the "new set of documents" Reyes claims to have seen in Bailiff Hiebert's were

provided to Hiebert by Coughlin, at the cafe bench (which Reyes characterizes as an area both

"shared" and part of the "common areas" the RJC utilizes along with at least 6 other entities in the

Lane Justice Center, but also as that which falls under the heading of the "exclusive premises" of the

RJC and an area under the RJC's "exclusive control".

Reyes claims to have joined Coughlin and Hiebert in a discussion at the cafe bench (Hiebert

testified that he did not interact at all with Coughlin or Reyes at the cafe bench, but, rather, was in

the RJC's filing office the entire time Coughlin was seated at the cafe bench, only to witness Reyes

attempting to physically remove Coughlin from such bench upon Hiebert's exiting the RJC filing

office.

Strangely, despite Bailiff Reyes having, upon a second round of questioning, admitting that he

merely "assumed" the "new set of papers" in Bailiff Hiebert's hands at the cafe bench were provided

to Bailiff Hiebert by Coughlin, Reyes then, upon a third round of questioning, alleged that Bailiff

Hiebert verbally indicated to Bailiff Heibert "while passing each other in the hallway" that he Bailiff

Hiebert was then engaged in some business with Coughlin. So, Bailiff Reyes' story falls apart,

especially in consideration of what he wrote regarding such matters in his 5/24/13 Narrative:

"On 05/23/2013, at approx. 1620 Hrs., I went to the 1st floor in Reno Justice Court (RJC), to relieve Bailiff D.Hiebert near the front entrance to the building, directly adjacent to the "Sipriano's Cafe". Hiebert had been engaged in obtaining document requests from

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Zachary Coughlin, who had seated himself on one of the benches beyond the front security screening line. As I approached within approx. 20 Feet of Hiebert and Coughlin, Coughlin saw me...I asked Coughlin what he needed and he said he wanted to file a request for a report from RJC, so I asked him for the request. Coughlin refused to provide the request to me, then gave it to Ramsey, who went to the RJC Criminal Div....I became aware that Coughlin, without escort and of his own volition, had passed through the security screening moments after Bailiff Hiebert walked away to fulfill Coughlin's earlier request. According to Olympic Screening Services Officers A. Virgo and P. Perez, Coughlin had told them that he was going to the men's restroom, but instead, went straight to the bench and sat down, where I found him within the building unescorted. I asked Coughlin to walk back to the area designated for him in front of the security screening line, while waiting for his RJC requests, per RJC Administrative Order 2012-01 and past practice. Coughlin refused to do so,..."

Why no mention of this “new set of papers” in Reyes’ Narrative that Reyes testified to having

seen Bailiff Hiebert receive from Coughlin at the café bench? Reyes later softened in admitting he

merely “assumed” such papers he saw in Hiebert’s hands at the café bench were provided to Heibert

by Coughlin. Why no mention by Reyes in his Narrative of the alleged verbal communication he

received from Bailiff Hiebert in passing in the hallway as Reyes approached the café bench (which

Reyes testified apprised him of one of the only two basis that Reyes alleged provided him any

grounds to issue Coughlin a command to “wait in the lobby”, ie, that Hiebert was till engaged in

conducting some business with Coughlin subject to the Administrative Order)? Further, why did

Bailiff Reyes initially testify on direct that Coughlin had provided some request to Bailiff Ramsey at

the café bench sufficient to require Coughlin to wait in the lobby (which, again, is just a wrinkle the

RJC Bailiff have unilaterally added to the Administrative Order, as no such requirement exists

therein), only to later on in his testimony swear that there was only two basis for his allegedly

ordering Coughlin to wait in the lobby (ie, one, that Coughlin was still engaged in the act of filing

documents (which are, obviously, in writing) with Bailiff Hiebert sufficient to allegedly, under the

Administrative Order, require Coughlin to “wait in the lobby” for “stamped copies”, and, two, that

Coughlin was simply not permitted under the Administrative Order (“and past practice”) to be

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anywhere in any of the “shared” “common areas” of the Lane Justice Center without an escort (an

allegation by Reyes that is plainly undermined not just by the express terms of what is a rather short

Administrative Order 2012-01 (2013-06 was not yet in existence at the time of the 5/23/13 arrest in

72675), but also by the very statements in Deputy Turner’s Narrative included in Reyes’ own

bailiff’s report, which reads:

“It is my understanding that Mr. Coughlin enters the Mills Lane Justice building and informs the Court Security Officers that he needs to gain access to a restricted area of the building. At that time, Mr. Coughlin is required to wait for his escort provided by Reno Justice Court Bailiffs. However, Mr. Coughlin fails to wait for an escort, and proceeds to an unknown area located in the building. Court Control notifies law enforcement personnel in an attempt to locate Mr. Coughlin in the building. Upon our arrival, Mr. Coughlin is always located in an area where his movement is not restricted, and then he denies ever stating his desire to access a restricted area. On multiple occasions, I have made contact with Mr. Coughlin on concerns of accessing restricted locations. During these encounters with Coughlin, he has been very argumentative and border line disruptive, however, he was not located or proven to be in a restricted area.”

(as to such “and past practice” qualifier added by Reyes in his Narrative, where such qualifier

added by Reyes operates as an admission by the RJC Bailiff’s that they have amended and altered

the terms of the Administrative Order, the RJC Bailiff claims the Administrative Orders somehow

prevent Coughlin from utilizing the very filing by facsimile that all other litigants enjoy in the RJC,

and which the RJC holds itself out to the public as accepting as a means for filing documents.

However, neither of the Administrative Orders reference filing by facsimile in any way, much less

operate to bar such practice. Further, even had such Admin Order so barred filing by facsimile, the

very “and past practice” qualifier that Bailiff Reyes mentions in his Narrative would operate to, in

conjunction with Chief Bailiff Sexton’s expressly indicating to Coughlin that he could so file by

facsimile (and, indeed, the very attached 4/4/13 filing by Coughlin (notice the fax header from

Coughlin to the RJC thereon) with the RJC’s applying a file stamping thereto further operating as an

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expression of assent as to Coughlin’s submitting filings via facsimile. The WCDA’s Office has once

again failed to oppose such filings by Coughlin, and DCR 13(3), by analogy, indicates the court may

take such as an admission of the merit of Coughlin’s contentions therein. The fact that the RJC

Bailiffs now indicate that they have not even received any such faxes (Chief Sexton admits he has

given Coughlin permission to tape record any and all interactions with the RJC Bailiffs, which is

strange, considering Chief Sexton’s only today making indication that, had the RJC even received

any faxes from Coughlin, such would not be filed in, which runs expressly counter to Chief Sexton’s

previously expressing indicating to Coughlin that Coughlin may fax file with the RJC by faxing

filings to the RJC Bailiff’s fax number, which Sexton then provided, and where such 4/4/13 filings

by Coughlin were then filed in and file stamped by the RJC. See Exhibit 1) from Coughlin, much

less filed them in operates to create great prejudice to Coughlin’s defense in this matter, as does

Coughlin’s inability so far to find counsel able to appear on his behalf at the 11/6/13 sentencing date,

(not to mention the fact that Coughlin, an, indigent whom most certainly did not fire the previously

court appointed counsel in this matter, contrary to Judge Glasson’s recitation of the procedural

posture of this case (Bruce Lindsay, Esq. filed a 7/18/13 Motion to Withdrawal which Coughlin did

not join in, and Judge Clifton expressly indicated on the record at such 7/18/13 hearing in this matter

that not only would the RJC continue to provide the indigent Coughlin the audio transcripts of all

hearings in this matter at public expense (as it had previously done in RCR2012-065630, and as has

sporadically been done in RCR2011-063341 (to Coughlin’s detriment, the very 4/12/13 unsigned,

unattributed rejection by an RJC Clerk indicating a basis for the refusal to provide Coughlin the

2/4/13 and 2/5/13 and other hearings absent the normal $35.00 fee being paid that ran counter to the

law of the case, and went beyond a ministerial decision (with such 4/12/13 unsigned, but typed, not

provided to Coughlin stapled to Coughlin’s 4/4/13 filing in RCR2011-063341 reading:

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“4/12/13 Mr. Coughlin: Re: RCR2011-063341, THE STATE OF NEVADA VS. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN ". The Appeal was filed and the Appeal process began on 12/3/2012. The Second Judicial District Court issued the Order Granting In Forma Pauperis on 1/9/13 as it pertained to Reno Justice Court Case Number RCR2011-063341, and thereafter Second Judicial District Court Case Number CR12-2025. The hearings held on 2/4/13 and 2/5/13, as requested in the Request for Audio Copy of Proceedings, were not included in the Appeal as filed.”)

The reference in such unsigned note is a complete non-sequitur as, prima facia evidence under

NRS 4.240 in the docket (an example of the utility of dockets) in 63341 demonstrates that,

regardless of whether the district court granted Coughlin informa pauperis status subsequent thereto,

the trial court had already done so, and Coughlin had been provided all other audio transcripts in

such case through the 11/20/12 trial date, with the RJC Clerk’s decision to bring an end to the law of

the case presented by such ruling going beyond that of a mere ministerial decision, and certainly, at

the very least, requiring a signature and an attribution as to whom it was making such

pronouncement.

(in his 10/29/13 sworn testimony in RMC 13 CR 3913, Bailiff English admitted that, at times,

the RJC Bailiffs affix the file stamping and or received stamping to Coughlin’s submission) (to

whatever extent they do not shift responsibility for their doing so to Court Administrator Steve

Tuttle, which in various situations the Bailiffs do, though in many instances the Bailiff proudly

proclaim that they have themselves, unilaterally made such alterations to the Adminstrative Order.

(NOTE: 21 CJS Courts Sec. 13 provides that “court attendants must act in accordance with the

judges’ directions (Merrill v. Phelps, 52 Ariz. 526, 84 P.2d 74 (1938) “E. Further than that, we think

it follows impliedly from the statute that the judge, when the attendants are provided, has the sole

and exclusive jurisdiction of determining how many these attendants shall be, and they must act in

accordance with his direction while in attendance upon the court, regardless of the instructions of

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any other person whatever,”), regardless of the instructions of any other person”. (ie, Court

Administrator Steve Tuttle or RJC Chief Bailiff Michael Sexton).

And see generally 21 C.J.S. Courts s. 142A, regarding ministerial officers, attendants and

assistants of the court which states that court attendants are a necessary adjunct to the due and

orderly administration of the business of a court but are ordinarily regarded as employees rather than

officers.

Why did Bailiff Ramsey testify that Coughlin provided him no such request at the cafe bench,

expressly contradicting Bailiff Reyes's story? If Coughlin had provided such a request to Ramsey at

the cafe bench, then why didn't the WCDA's Office produce any proof of such (be it video of such

alleged providing of a request by Coughlin to Ramsey, or some physical evidence of any such

request)? Further, why would Bailiff Reyes indicate that he himself asked Coughlin to provide

Reyes the "request for a report" that Reyes says Coughlin indicated at the cafe bench that he "wanted

to filed". Would not Reyes then be guilty of a violation of the Administrative Order in requesting a

filing from Coughlin at an area other than the security check-in point? Or, would such be yet

another instance of the RJC Bailiff's unilaterally amending the Admin Orders? Would that not then

make all the illegal Bailiff Ramsey's admission during his sworn testimony that he had thrown away

the documents Coughlin submitted for filing to him the day before, on 5/22/13? If, as DDA Amos

R. Stege alleges, justice court bailiff's are "public officers", how then, would such not be a violation

of NRS 281.340 by such a "public officer" in failing to faithfully carry out a duty imposed upon

them?

Why would Bailiff Reyes use the strangely vaugue and noncommittal description he chose in his

Narrative, where he wrote: "I became aware that Coughlin, without escort and of his own volition,

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had passed through the security screening moments after Bailiff Hiebert walked away to fulfill

Coughlin's earlier request.”?

Does not Bailiff Reyes' Narrative's initial indication that "Hiebert had been engaged in

obtaining document requests from Zachary Coughlin" (note the use of the past tense therein)

contradict Reyes' Narrative's subsequent indication that "Coughlin, without escort and of his own

volition, had passed through the security screening moments after Bailiff Hiebert walked away to

fulfill Coughlin's earlier request"? Why the use of the past tense (“had been engaged”) if

Hieberts was, purportedly still engaged in an attempt “to fulfill Coughlin’s earlier request”?

Just how was it that Bailiff Reyes "became aware" of such alleged events? Why does

Bailiff Reyes fail to indicate just how he "became aware", and from whom or what he allegedly

gleaned such information? Is "assuming" something a sufficient basis for Reyes to allege he

"became aware"? If it is, that's an awfully low standard for the probable cause finding of 5/24/13

made by RJC Judge Pierre Hascheff, whom sat on the very Board of Directors of Washoe Legal

Services that Coughlin named as a defendant in his wrongful termination lawsuits in CV11-01896

and CV11-01955. Judge Hascheff's failure to recuse himself where such a per se basis requiring

such existed is rather similar to 2JDC Judge Elliott's failure to do so as well in the same CV11-

01955 where Elliott served as the President of the Executive Board of CAAW, a named co-

defendant therein, were Elliott presided over such matter (even entering an attorney's fee award

against Coughlin based upon his review of the "merits" of a Complaint that Elliott dismissed on

sufficiency of service and process grounds only). Such failure to recuse himself by Judge Hascheff

requires a mistrial here as well.

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“I became aware that Coughlin, without escort and of his own volition, had passed through the security screening moments after Bailiff Hiebert walked away to fulfill Coughlin's earlier request. According to Olympic Screening Services Officers A. Virgo and P. Perez, Coughlin had told them that he was going to the men's restroom, but instead, went straight to the bench and sat down, where I found him within the building unescorted. I asked Coughlin to walk back to the area designated for him in front of the security screening line, while waiting for his RJC requests, per RJC Administrative Order 2012-01 and past practice. Coughlin refused to do so,..." Reyes wrote.

Is it not the fact that the Administrative Order expressly provides that the only requests the

RJC will receive from Coughlin are those made in writing that resulted in Bailiff Reyes remixing

his story near the end of his cross examination, in sharp contrast to his 5/24/13 Narrative and the

first portion of his sworn testimony at trial? Consider Reyes' Narrative combined with the videos

showing Bailiff Hiebert returning to Coughlin at the lobby bench stamped received copies of the

documents Coughlin had submitted earlier that day, at the lobby bench (with Bailiff Hiebert

thereafter leaving Coughlin at the lobby bench without Coughlin providing any further documents

to Hiebert), and no videos or evidence being provided by the WCDA's Office (despite Bailiff Reyes

clinging to his story that he had witnessed a video showing just such a thing) to support Reyes'

claim that Coughlin had provided documents for filing to Hiebert at the lobby bench, and almost

immediately thereafter proceeded through the security check point, without waiting for Hiebert to

return stamped copies of such to Coughlin in the lobby. Never mind the fact that the Administrative

Order does not contain anything in the way of a requirement that Coughlin wait in the lobby after

providing filings or requests to the RJC (especially where the Administrative Order mandates that

such will only be recognized where done in writing).

Bailiff Reyes' testimony of 10/14/13 between 9:30 to 11:30 am, his sworn testimony makes

ridiculously fraudulent his 5/24/13 Narrative. While Bailiff Reyes first failed to indicate that he

merely "assumed" some "new set of papers" he claims to have witnessed Bailiff Hiebert holding

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while interacting with Coughlin at the cafe bench, such is but a minor contradiction when

considering that Bailiff Reyes then claimed in his sworn testimony to have been verbally apprised

by Bailiff Heibert in passing Hiebert in the hallway that Hiebert was engaged in further business

with Coughlin. If, indeed, Bailiff Hiebert so apprised Bailiff Reyes of such continued business

with Coughlin, then why would Bailiff Reyes feel compelled to query Coughlin at the cafe bench in

the manner Reyes wrote of in his 5/24/13 Narrative? Reyes wrote: "I asked Coughlin what he

needed and he said he wanted to file a request for a report from RJC, so I asked him for the

request." Why would Couglhin need to "file a request" if Coughlin had, to hear Bailiff Reyes tell

it, just provided some "new set of papers" to Bailiff Hiebert at the cafe bench? Such gross

inaccuracies and the multitude of instances of incredibly implausible rationale and explanations

offered by Reyes for his purported command to Coughlin hardly operate to meet the "beyond a

reasonable doubt" burden of proof.

The audio transcript RJC Chief Bailiff Sexton continues to refuse to release to indigent

Coughlin (whom temporarily had court appointed counsel in Bruce Lindsay sufficient, according to

Judge Clifton, for the RJC to refuse to countenance or otherwise view as operative the filings

Coughlin (prisoner's mailbox rule) submitted from his cell incident to the two weeks in jail he spent

in connection with Bailiff Reye's fraudulent misconduct (charging Coughlin at all, much less

overcharging Coughlin with two felonies and two misdemeanors sufficient to required some

$16,000 in bail (where the WCDA's Office's failure to timely arraign Coughlin and or file its

Criminal Complaint until 5/31/13 (at which point Coughlin's bail was reduced to a bondable $750)

further extended Coughlin's jail stay) .

An example of Coughlin’s unsuccessful attempts to obtain counsel for the 11/7/13 sentencing hearing follows:

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“From: [email protected] To: [email protected] CC: [email protected] Subject: RE: looking to hire a criminal defense lawyer for 11/6/13 sentencing hearing in RJC before Judge Glasson Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 15:57:21 +0000 Zack: I will not be able to represent you on November 6th. If you can get the matter continued, I may be able to represent you... Thomas E. Viloria, Esq. Fahrendorf, Viloria, Oliphant & Oster, LLP 327 California Avenue Reno, NV 89509 P. O. Box 3677 Reno, NV 89505 (775) 348-9999 (775) 348-0540”

RJC Chief Judge Pearson’s very rationale provided for his 10/11/13 Order Reassigning Case mandates removing the RJC and its Bailiffs from all aspects of the case, not just replacing one 1983 McGeorge School of Law graduate Justice of the Peace with another, those choice of which and manner in which such selection was come done having yet to be at all elucidated, where such Order Reassigning Case reads: “then In order to avoid. The appearance of impropriety as outlined in the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, the Judges of the Reno Justice Court hereby disqualify themselves from this matter. An employee of the Court is a witness in this matter. By order of the Chief Judge of the Reno Justice Court, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is reassigned to be heard by the Honorable Richard Glasson, Justice of The Peace, Douglas County, State of Nevada. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the trial in this matter set for Monday, October 14, 2013, will be heard by Judge Glasson at 9:00 a.M. In the Justice Court of Reno Township, County of Washoe, State of Nevada. DATED this 11th day of October, 2013. /s/ SCOTT PEARSON CHIEF JUDGE RENO JUSTICE COURT "

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030 The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social security

number of any person. DATED 11/4/13

/s/ Zach Coughlin, signed electronically

Zach Coughlin Pro Per Self Representing Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I do hereby certify that, on this date, I, Zach Coughlin I deposited in the United States mail at Reno, Nevada, in a sealed envelope, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document and or electronically served (via electronic method of transmission previously given express permission to utilize by those with requisite authority to provide it, upon which Coughlin reasonably relied and or relies), Mikohn satisfactory, and NRS 178.590 facsimiled prior to 5 pm and personally delivered to wcda too:

AMOS R. STEGE, ESQ. ZACHARY N. YOUNG, ESQ. Washoe County DA Office Address: 1 South Sierra P.O. Box 30083 Reno, NV 89520 Phone Number: 775-328-3200 Fax number: 775-325-6703 Email: [email protected] DATED THIS: Dated this 11/4/2013

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Served upon whomever Coughlin is legally allowed to serve such upon by whatever means Coughlin is allowed to so serve such as to WCDA/WCPD in 599 and SBN in 607.

/s/ Zach Coughlin

Zach Coughlin, Defendant

INDEX TO EXHIBITS: Exhibit 1: Various relevant materials already propounded In disc form and found at skydrive links

Exhibit 1: 1. Exhibit 1: Various relevant materials on a cd/dvd/discovery already propounded

https://skydrive.live.com/redir?resid=43084638F32F5F28!9135


plus fifty two (52) pages of printed on paper portion of exhibit 1 following

immediately hereafter.

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

11/4/13 Phone or Fax

www.washoecounty.us/rjc/phone.htm 1/1

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11/4/13 Outlook Print Message

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Outbound fax report

From: Voxox ([email protected]) This sender is in your safe list.

Sent: Thu 10/31/13 4:47 PM

To: [email protected]

Hi zachcoughlin,

Your Fax was successfully sent to 11df3c14-7480-4a47-8c03-4eea464b570dgeneral693298 (17753256591).

Your Fax was delivered @ 11:47:10 PM on 2013-10-31.

xoxo,

The Voxox Team

This message was intended for [email protected]. Want to control which emails youreceive from Voxox? Get Voxox: http://download.voxox.com and adjust your Notifications in theSettings/Preferences window. 2013 Â© Voxox 9276 Scranton Road, Suite 300, San Diego, CA92121.

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respectfully submitting filings of 10 21 13 due to time and indigency exigency

From: Zach Coughlin ([email protected])

Sent: Mon 10/21/13 4:59 PM

To: [email protected] ([email protected])

2 attachments

10 21 13 72675 Supplemental Post-trial motions and supporting Declaration.pdf (118.0KB) , 10 21 13 faxed Motion for New Trial, Motion for Arrest Judgment, Declaration inSupport of Both 72675.pdf (423.5 KB)

Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 6677402 [email protected]

From: [email protected]: [email protected]: filings of 10 21 13Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2013 16:56:20 -0700

Dear RJC for rcr2013-072675While there is authority for the position that "telecommunication lines" included email per NRS178.589 and the RJC's stated rule leverage by other litigants that "a facsimile is an original", withhesitance, this being faxed, respectfully due to exigent time and indigency concerns.

Please realize there may have been/ was a problem in getting filed the previously faxed/serveddocuments purporting to be post-trial motions and declaration in support thereof. Please call toclarify any confusion.

ClosePrint

Outbound fax report


Sent: Mon 10/21/13 4:46 PM


Hi zachcoughlin,


mailto:[email protected]





xoxo,

The Voxox Team


Outbound fax report


Sent: Mon 10/21/13 4:39 PM


Hi zachcoughlin,

Your Fax was successfully sent to 18ff53cc-a121-4c3b-95aa-65913d1341c6general693298 (17753283844).


xoxo,

The Voxox Team


Outbound fax report


Sent: Mon 10/21/13 4:34 PM


Hi zachcoughlin,







xoxo,

The Voxox Team


Outbound fax report


Sent: Mon 10/21/13 4:33 PM


Hi zachcoughlin,



xoxo,

The Voxox Team


Outbound fax report


Sent: Mon 10/21/13 4:54 PM


Hi zachcoughlin,



xoxo,





The Voxox Team


Respectfully.Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 6677402 [email protected]



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FW: Outbound fax report


Sent: Thu 10/31/13 4:24 PM

To: [email protected] ([email protected]);[email protected] ([email protected]);[email protected] ([email protected]); [email protected]([email protected]); [email protected] ([email protected]);[email protected] ([email protected])

1 attachment

10 30 13 72675 Motion to Strike 10 23 13 Sentencing Memorandum, Motion for Mistrialand for Continuance of 11 6 13 Sentencing Hearing final.pdf (230.0 KB)


From: [email protected]: [email protected]: Outbound fax reportDate: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 16:21:46 -0700

Hi zachcoughlin,



xoxo,

The Voxox Team



." . •• " ... ~ •• ,." .. -.. ~ , - g ~u r . ~e". u . trOll: zilcncooqnl1n HH-13 4 : ~ 4~ p. 2 I)f 12

Case No. RCR 2011-06334 1

-----------,2-,-.b~u~t--J""uage Pearson might have now Department No. ________________ _

IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

State of Nevada EXPEDITED

Plaintiff,

vs.

REQUEST FOR AUDIO COPY OF PROCEEDINGS

Zach coughlin

Defendant. I

The Plaintiff x Defendant has requested an audio copy of proceedings of the following:

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2)

3)

4)

Hearing Date 2/4/13 10 am video arraingment

2/ 5/13 OSC 8 , 30 am Hear ing Date ______________________ _

Hearing Date

Healing Date

2/5/13 Reconsideration Hearing at around 8 :4 5am to 9 am or so in be tween two portions of tria l in r c r 12-065630

Date resubmitting 4/4/13 . 20. __ _

Zach Coughl in ~ ~ "~~~~------------1-4-7-1--E-.--9-t-h--S--t-:--~~ "

Addrr:.u Reno, NV 89512 Oty, S!::au., ZIp

tel and fax 949 667 7402 Q lIIt:act telephone number

Please ma il the CD to me if, no charge to, other wise, please fax

A $35.00 fee is due at the time ofthe request. or leav:e voicemail when ready thA'lms'\k>!!i<.ate ifl'Wl·ls&!I'!~a'l't~Ib~dlll!.l'V'e by I FP Order .

Call (775)325-6575 if you have any questions.

ALL FEES HAVE BEEN WAIVED BY ifp ord

4/12/13

Mr. Coughlin:

Re: RCR2011-063341, THE STATE OF NEVADA VS. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

The Appea l was filed and the Appeal process began on 12/3/2012. The Second Judicial District Court issued the Order Granting In Forma Pauperis on 1/9/13 as it pertained to Reno Justice Court Case Number RCR2011-063341, and thereafter Second Judicial District Court Case Number CR12·202S. The hearings held on 2/4/13 and 2/5/13, as requested in the Request for Audio Copy of Proceedings, were not included in the Appeal as filed.

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- 1/41 - MOTION TO STRIKE 10/23/13 SENTENCING MEMORANDUM,

Zach Coughlin, Esq. NV Bar 9473 (temporarily suspended but authorized to practice on his own behalf in Reno Justice Court), license not suspended before the USPTO 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402 [email protected] Self Representing Attorney Defendant

IN THE RENO JUSTICE COURT COUNTY OF WASHOE; STATE OF NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA, PLAINTIFF vs. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN;

DEFENDANT ----------------------------------------------------/ WASHOE COUNTY, APPLICANT (OBO WCPD) V. ZACH COUGHLIN, ADVERSE PARTY IN RCP2012-000599 …………………………………………/ STATE BAR OF NEVADA, APPLICANT V. ZACH COUGHLIN, ADVERSER PARTY IN RCP 2012-000607. ------------------------------------------------/

))))))

RCR2013-072675 D5 RCR2011-063341 D2, THEN D4 RCR2012-065630 D1, THEN D5 RCR2013-071437 D2, THEN D4 D5, then reassigned Rcp2012-000607 Rcp2012-000599

MOTION TO STRIKE 10/23/13 SENTENCING MEMORANDUM in rcr2013-072675, and to STRIKE MOTIONS TO REMAND IN RCR2011-063341 AND RCR2012-065630 (IS DDA STEGE

SUBSTITUTING IN FOR DDA YOUNG?), AND FOR CONTINUANCE OF 11/6/13 SENTENCING HEARING GIVEN COUGHLIN HAS BEEN UNABLE TO FIND COUNSEL WILLING TO ACCEPT

HIS CASE AND GOOD CAUSE INCIDENT TO FACT THAT COUGHLIN’S HAS CRIMINAL TRIAL IN THE RMC SET FOR DAY AFTER SENTENCING HEARING IN THE CASE AT BAR, AND

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT COUGHLIN AT ALL CRITICAL PHASES OF THIS CASE, WHERE SENTENCING IS JUST SUCH A CRITICAL PHASE; AND

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE OPPOSITION TO ALL MOTIONS TO REMAND, AND SENTENCING MEMORANDUM; MOTION TO VACATE OR MODIFY TPO AND EPO IN 599 AND

607 AND FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS DETAILED HEREIN.AND NOTICE OF APPEAL OF ALL ORDERS 599 AND 607 AND REQUEST TO PROCEED IFP THEREIN, IN APPEAL TO THE 2JDC;

motion to CONFLICT OUT WCDA’S OFFICE AND RJC AND ITS BAILIFFS

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I, Zachary Barker Coughlin declare pursuant to NRS 53.045, under penalty of perjury that the

following is true and correct and based upon my own first hand knowledge except those matters stated upon

information and belief (even where implicitly so stated), and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Coughlin is indigent, meeting numerous of the presumptive threshold standards in the 1/4/08

Indigent Defense Order set forth in ADKT 0411 (Coughlin’s yearly income is less than $8,000, well less

than the 200% of the 2013 Federal Poverty Guideline for a family of 1 (where such figure is $11,500,

therefore, twice thereof would be $23,000) in addition to the fact that Coughlin receives both food

stamps/SNAP, and has his medications and doctor’s visits paid for by Northern Nevada Adult Mental Health

(NNAMHS), Coughlin owns only a 1996 Honda Accord worth less than $500 (which has recently not

worked for one month), owns not stocks, bonds, or real property, and has not income, though is kept busy on

a full time basis defending himself against a raft of vindictive prosecutions, and in the appeal of the

recommendation to permanently disbar him in 62337 before the NSCT). Coughlin’s requests the

appointment of counsel in any and every case and every stage in which he is at all entitled to such under the

laws of the United States and the State of Nevada (where SCR 111(6) presents issue preclusion as to a NRS

199.280 charge being a “serious” crime, and the 1/4/08 Indigent Defense Orders established that Coughlin is

entitled to counsel for all “serious’ charges (states are permitted to go beyond the Scott v. Illinois federal

standard (Wegg v. Oregon) in providing greater protection to individual rights). The complete and utter

breakdown of the adversary system in this matter is well illustrated in DDA Stege’s purported 10/23/13

“Sentencing Memorandum”. Whereas Coughlin has had a large number of filings and requests for access to

his files in criminal cases and for dockets and audio transcripts rejected by the RJC, where such rejections

have been premised upon some application of JCRRT 10 and 11 via the implementation of the “Procedural

Rules Applicable to all Filings by Zachary Coughlin” set forth in Admin Order 2013-06 (which the RJC

purports applies even in criminal and landlord tenant/TPO/EPO matters despite JCRRT 2 making clear that

the JCRRT do not apply to such variety of proceedings and cases), DDA Stege’s 10/23/13 “Sentencing

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Memorandum” completely lackign in any “Points and Authorities” whatsoever, and contains numerous of

the very sort of RJC dockets that Coughlin has been denied (even where offering to pay for such), by the

RJC. While Judge Glasson seemed to indicate he did not see the utility of such types of dockets, NRS 4.240

and DDA Stege’s own use thereof provide support for the view that dockets, indeed, are useful, especially

in the justice court setting, and the the RJC, in violating Knox v. District Court, NRS 178.600, .610,

and .608 (by way of both Admin Order 2012-01 (RCR2013-071437) and Admin Order 2013-06), has

greatly prejudiced Coughlin’s ability to defend himself in this matter, particularly where the RJC has already

ruled Coughlin indigent in 72675 (else how could Bruce Lindsay, Esq. Possibly become appointed counsel

sufficient to justify (as he was “sole counsel” in Judge Clifton’s view) the RJC refusing to “file” or

recognized as filed Coughlin’s numerous filings prior to Lindsay’s requesting to be removed in his 6/17/13

Motion to Withdraw (which makes quite clear, as does the audio transcript of the 7/18/13 hearing in 72675,

that Coughlin did not move to have Lindsay removed (Lindsay did so before even conferring with Coughlin

at all, and the admitted direct appointment of Lindsay by the RJC is violative of ADKT 0411, which is

mandatory authority in Nevada, as have been the purported denials of Coughlin’s various Motions for

Appointed Counsel and to proceed Informa Pauperis by the RJC, Judge Glasson, and RJC Chief Bailiff

Sexton (and it is particularly inappropriate for Bailiff Sexton to be making such beyond ministerial

rejections of Coughlin’s requests for the audio of the trial, the hearings of 5/30/13, 6/6/13, and 9/24/13. The

RJC has already provided Coughlin the hearing of 7/18/13 in RCR2013-072675, which could not and would

not have been done absent a finding and ruling that Coughlin is indigent, further undermining the rationale

profferred by Chief Bailiff Sexton for refusing to release to Coughlin to audio transcript of the 10/14/13 trial

in 72675, which contains testimony by three different bailiffs Sexton is in charge of supervising and where

the subject matter of the charge in question (NRS 199.280 “resisting a public officer”, strongly implicate

Sexton’s performance (as does his bailiff Reyes’ fraudulent remixing of the names and subject matter of

Washoe County Code (WCC) 53.140, 53.200, where Reyes’ police report reveals the extent to which he

knows full well is is a “peace officer” (actually, a Class II police officer), an not a “public officer”, else why

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would Reyes originally remix the title of WCC 53.200 from “resisting a public officer” to

“resisting/obstructing/delaying officer” and remix WCC 53.140’s “disturbing the peace” to

“resisting/obstructing/delaying a peace officer” in his 5/28/13 police report (see Reyes’ Declaration of

Probable Cause and Arrest Report of 5/23/13 and the five page 5/28/13 report and Narrative therein by

Reyes in 72675).

This entirely inappropriate refusal by Sexton and the RJC (which accepts checks from some for

audio recordings but would not from Coughlin...even where no payment of any sort is required from

Coughlin) to release the various audio transcripts and dockets Coughlin seeks (and copies of the

submissions from Coughlin’s jail cell between 5/23/13 and 6/8/13 (speaking of which, the exhibit offered by

Stege from a totally different case in CR13-0614 should be stricken particularly where the placement of

such purported kited “letter” by Coughlin was place in such district court matter, rather than in the instant

case for strategic purposes by the WCDA’s Officer, RJC, and pre-trial services (all of which are adopting the

difficult position of attempting to justify the refusal to countenance the various filings by Coughlin from his

jail cell in 72675 and other matters, whilst selectively filing in CR13-0614 that which Stege offered as an

exhibit at Trial...where such rejections of Coughlin’s filings (they are filed according to the prisoner mailbox

rules upon Coughlin placing such in a position for pickup by deputies at the jail, regardless of any refusal to

place a file stamp thereon by the RJC (see Whitman, Donoho, Barnes, Sullivan, and other Nevada cases)

were integral to the approach taken by the RJC and Judge Clifton in refusing to allow Coughlin to make any

filings based upon the contention that Bruce Lindsay was Coughlin’s sole counsel at such time. Further,

such approach has now backfired where the purported rationale for refusing the indigent Coughlin counsel

in connection with yet another violation (presiding judges are not permitted to rule on applications for

appointment of counsel at public expense, such must be referred to another) of ADKT’s 0411 1/4/08

Indigent Defense Order (ie, the contention of 9/24/13 by Judge Clifton and of 10/14/13 by Judge Glasson)

that Coughlin has somehow fired Lindsay or refused counsel is clearly not supported by the record in this

matter (which, again, the RJC and Sexton are refusing to release, though Coughlin’s filing of a Notice of

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Appeal on 10/24/13, per NRS 189.030(1) now makes required that the transcript of all hearings and the trial

in this case be transcribed (typed...as NRS 189.030(3) makes clear merely transmitting the audio is not

sufficient under such statutory dictate, which a court of limited jurisdiction is not free to ignore).

I. COUGHLIN SEEKS A CONTINUANCE OF THE 11/6/13 SENTENCING HEARING

Further good cause now exists for continuing the 11/6/13 Sentencing Hearing where Coughlin has

been unable to find an attorney willing to accept his case despite making dilligent efforts to do so. Further,

Coughlin now has two trials scheduled for the day after the 11/6/13 sentencing hearing in 72675 in RMC 13

CR 3913, and RMC 13 CR 3914. The difficulty in preparing for all three of these trials in such close

proximity to one another is entirely prejudicial, particularly in conjunction with the rampant violations of

ADKT 0411’s 1/4/08 Indigent Defense Order’s dictates, particularly where an order by the RJC now

exposes Coughlin to criminal prosecution for merely attempting to have served a subpoena on a necessary

witness in RCP2012-000607, where Stege’s “Sentencing Memorandum” has now brought into play in this

case such matter wherein the State Bar of Nevada successfully obtained a Workplace Harassment Protection

Order against Coughlin from RJC Chief Judge Pearson on 12/20/12, the very same day of the issuance of

the Admin Order 2012-01 at issue in this matter. Further, the RJC’s continued refusal to release the audio

transcripts of all the hearings in RCR2011-063341 and RCR2012-065630 (with all the attendnat NCJC

Canon 2, Rule 2.15, Canon 1, Rule 1.1, and NRS 178.405 and extra judicial source rule violations at issue

therein) has further prejudiced both Coughlin’s defense at trial and ability to participate in the sentencing

hearing in a meaningful manner. Additionally, coughlin’s requests a stay of such sentencing hearing

pending the outcome of Coughlins’ Younger absention Motion for TRO in NVD 13 CV 539.

For both the 11/7/13 trials in RMC 3913 and 3914 and the sentencing hearing in 72675 Coughlin

need subpoena several individuals fromm the State Bar of Nevada, and the TPO/EPO in RCP2012-000607

now makes such impossible, particularly where RMC Judge W. Gardner has made clear that his view of the

TPO, at least, was that Coughlin was precluded from , in any manner whatsoever, submitted filing to the

SBN’s Clerk of Court Laura Peters during the pendency of such TPO (between 12/20/12 and 1/4/13...which

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makes all the more ridiculous Peters testimony that Coughlin had nothing pending before the SBN during

such time and no legitimate reason to contact the SBN, which is further undermined by Peters admission to

having lied at the 1/4/13 extension hearing TPO EPO in 607 to Judge Pearson in alleging she personally eye

witnessed Coughlin being present at or near the SBN’s Officers on 1/4/13, where Peters testimony of

10/29/13 in RMC 3913 and 3914 also make clear Peters was lying in her written police report where

alleging as much as well.

In the exercise of this discretion, a balance should be struck between the defendant's interest in being represented by chosen counsel against the convenience of the court, parties, and witnesses,[FN3] and the in-terests of the public in an efficient and effective judicial system.[FN4]

In deciding whether to grant a continuance in order to permit the substitution of new counsel, the trial court must consider several factors: (1) whether other continuances have been requested or granted; (2) the inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, and the court; (3) whether the request is dilatory or contrived; (4) the degree to which the defendant has contributed to the delay; (5) whether the defendant has attempted to arrange for competent additional counsel; (6) the degree of identifiable prejudice which would flow from the continuance; and (7) the complexity of the case.[FN5] Accordingly, a motion for a continuance based on the intended replacement of a particular counsel may be denied where it is groundless,[FN6] where the ac-cused has been ably represented,[FN7] or where the defendant's tactics are dilatory,[FN8] and even though as a result of the denial of a continuance, the accused is unrepresented at trial.[FN9] Likewise, such motion may be denied where the right to counsel has been waived.[FN10]

The exercise of the discretion of the trial court has been upheld even where such a motion is based on the asserted ineffective assistance of, or dissatisfaction with, counsel,[FN11] appointed by the court,[FN12] where the accused has not in fact retained another counsel,[FN13] and is unlikely to do so.[FN14] This is particularly so where the request for such a continuance is untimely.[FN15]

On the other hand, a proper exercise of the court's discretion may require the granting of a motion for a continuance where a replacement of counsel is required due to incompetence, demonstrable prejudice against the accused, or a conflict of interests,[FN16] or where a replacement of counsel is requested jointly by the accused and counsel.[FN17] Moreover, the trial court may be required to grant the defendant's mo-tion for a continuance to secure private counsel, where the defendant has not sought any other continuances, and nothing in the record indicates that a dilatory motive has precipitated the request, and a continuance would not significantly inconvenience the court, nor would it prejudice the state.[FN18] [FN1] Ga.-Blake v. State, 273 Ga. 447, 542 S.E.2D 492 (2001). - Ill.-People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2D 228, 244 Ill. Dec. 388, 725 N.E.2D 1275 (2000). - Minn.-State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2D 73 (Minn. 2005). - N.D.-State v. Schneeweiss, 2001 ND 120, 630 N.W.2D 482 (N.D. 2001). - R.I.-State v. Snell, 892 A.2D 108 (R.I. 2006). - A.L.R. Library Withdrawal, discharge, or substitution of counsel in criminal case as ground for continuance, 73 A.L.R.3D 725. [FN2] Cal.-People v. Rhines, 131 Cal. App. 3D 498, 182 Cal. Rptr. 478 (2D Dist. 1982). - Minn.-State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2D 73 (Minn. 2005). - Pa.-Com. V. Nicolella, 307 Pa. Super. 96, 452 A.2D 1055 (1982). - R.I.-State v. Snell, 892 A.2D 108 (R.I. 2006). - [FN3] U.S.-U.S. V. Studley, 783 F.2D 934 (9th Cir. 1986). - Mass.-Com. V. Ruiz, 442 Mass. 826, 817 N.E.2D 771 (2004). - Tex.-Brown v. State, 630 S.W.2D 876 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1982). Codefendant ready to proceed Del.-Hicks v. State, 434 A.2D 377 (Del. 1981). [FN4] U.S.-U.S. V. Mitchell, 777 F.2D 248 (5th Cir. 1985). - N.D.-State v. Schneeweiss, 2001 ND 120 (N.D., 2001). - Pa.-Com. V. Carroll, 306 Pa. Super. 152, 452 A.2D 260 (1982). - R.I.-State v. Snell, 892 A.2D 108 (R.I. 2006). - One-day continuance Neb.-State v. Denbeck, 219 Neb. 672, 365 N.W.2D 469 (1985). [FN5] D.C.-Pinkney v. U.S., 851 A.2D 479 (D.C. 2004). - [FN6] Ark.-Pickens v. State, 6 Ark.

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App. 58, 638 S.W.2D 682 (1982). - Kan.-State v. Galloway, 238 Kan. 415, 710 P.2D 1320 (1985). - Mich.-People v. Keith, 119 Mich. App. 699, 326 N.W.2D 612 (1982). - [FN7] U.S.-U.S. V. Bailey, 327 F.3D 1131, 61 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 853 (10Th Cir. 2003). - Ga.-Storey v. State, 162 Ga. App. 763, 292 S.E.2D 483 (1982). - Pa.-Com. V. Carroll, 306 Pa. Super. 152, 452 A.2D 260 (1982). - R.I.-State v. Cochrane, 443 A.2D 1249 (R.I. 1982). - Wyo.-Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, 76 P.3D 323 (Wyo. 2003). - [FN8] Del.-Waltman v. State, 840 A.2D 642 (Del. 2003). - Ga.-Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 609 S.E.2D 312 (2004). - Ind.-Lewis v. State, 730 N.E.2D 686 (Ind. 2000). - Minn.-State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2D 73 (Minn. 2005). - R.I.-State v. Snell, 892 A.2D 108 (R.I. 2006). - [FN9] U.S.-U.S. V. Studley, 783 F.2D 934 (9th Cir. 1986). - [FN10] Okla.-Bewley v. State, 1985 OK CR 11, 695 P.2D 1357 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). - R.I.-State v. Bruyere, 751 A.2D 1285 (R.I. 2000). - [FN11] Conn.-State v. Watson, 198 Conn. 598, 504 A.2D 497 (1986). - Ga.-Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 609 S.E.2D 312 (2004). - Ky.-Williams v. Com., 2005 WL 2045397 (Ky. 2005). - Me.-State v. Brown, 2000 ME 25, 757 A.2D 768 (Me. 2000). - Ohio-State v. Mur-phy, 91 Ohio St. 3D 516, 2001-Ohio-112, 747 N.E.2D 765 (2001). [FN12] Ga.-Clark v. State, 159 Ga. App. 438, 283 S.E.2D 666 (1981). - Me.-State v. Winchenbach, 501 A.2D 1282 (Me. 1985). - Pa.-Com. V. McCool, 311 Pa. Super. 536, 457 A.2D 1312 (1983). - [FN13] Ark.-Clay v. State, 290 Ark. 54, 716 S.W.2D 751 (1986). - Pa.-Com. V. Szuchon, 506 Pa. 228, 484 A.2D 1365 (1984). - [FN14] Ill.-People v. Free, 112 Ill. App. 3D 449, 68 Ill. Dec. 81, 445 N.E.2D 529 (4th Dist. 1983). - [FN15] U.S.-U.S. V. Hull, 792 F.2D 941 (9th Cir. 1986). - Conn.-State v. Myers, 193 Conn. 457, 479 A.2D 199 (1984). - Mich.-People v. Jack-son, 113 Mich. App. 620, 318 N.W.2D 495 (1982). - Neb.-State v. Keithley, 218 Neb. 707, 358 N.W.2D 761 (1984). - Nev.-Brinkley v. State, 101 Nev. 676, 708 P.2D 1026 (1985). - Pa.-Com. V. Carroll, 306 Pa. Super. 152, 452 A.2D 260 (1982). [FN16] Okla.-Henegar v. State, 1985 OK CR 56, 700 P.2D 659 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). - [FN17] Ohio-State v. Bronaugh, 3 Ohio App. 3D 307, 445 N.E.2D 262 (1st Dist. Ham-ilton County 1982). - Breakdown of attorney-client relationship The trial court abused its discretion in not allowing the defendant a continuance to obtain different counsel, in that the case was simple, the prosecutor joined the defense in asking for a continuance, there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the attorney-client relationship had broken down; furthermore, the attorney's method of attempting to withdraw from the case tended to undermine the attorney-client relationship since he essentially told the trial judge that his cli-ent was going to perjure himself. Alaska-Newcomb v. State, 651 P.2D 1176 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). [FN18] Mont.-State v. Garcia, 2003 MT 211, 317 Mont. 73, 75 P.3D 313 (2003). -

1. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL Basics � 5th amendment Miranda right to counsel vs. 6th am (14th DP) right to counsel � US v. Gonzales-Lopez (2006) – denial of right to either is structural error, per se reversible; Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) – must show “actual jail sentence” to have attorney appointed, which gives no guidance to judges when appointing attys � Scott v. IL (1979) – if

given fine only, no cons right to an atty � Nichols v. US (1994) – if didn’t get lawyer in past misdemeanor case that wasn’t fine only, can collaterally attack lack in past case if will affect current case � AL v. Shel-ton (2002) – I: does suspended sentence = jail time for right to atty o rule: even 1 day suspended jail sentence is enough to trigger right to atty in misdemeanor case; overrules Argersinger jail time

When does right to counsel attach? � generally, at “critical stage” of prosecution � Kirby v. IL – right to counsel attaches at “adversary judicial proceedings, whether by way of formal charge, pre-liminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment”

� US v. Moody – IEC challenge, when does right to counsel attach; H: happens at formal adversarial proceeding or during critical stage, not during pre-charge plea bargaining; Examples of critical stages � in-clude preliminary hearing, post-indictment plea bargaining, significant pre-trial

hearings, trial, jury selection, guilty plea hearing, sentencing � Mempa v. Rhay – critical stages in-clude sentencing, etc � Glover v. US – critical stages include sentencing, etc

Parole/probation cases � not automatic right to counsel � Gagnon v. Scarpelli – � Morrissey v. Brewer –

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Outright denial of right to counsel during critical stage � Prophylactic rule – presumption of prejudice to D, generally leads to automatic reversal of conviction, not subject to harmless error analysis

Waiver of right to counsel � Johnson v. Zerbst – see above � Farretta v. CA – right to proceed pro se in trial (can waive right to counsel in

trial) o rule: cons right to represent self, and if judge doesn’t allow it, that’s automatic reversible error on ap-

peal; need meaningful warning of dangers of representing self � IA v. Tovar – simpler waiver of right; if going to plead guilty, don’t need lawyer “Equality princi-

ple”/right to counsel on appeal 3 � Griffin v. IL (1956) – court requires free transcript of trial be given to people so can do pro se appeal

(don’t want to limit appeals to rich people) o rule: right to free copy of trial transcript for appeal purposes � Douglas v. CA (1963) – right to

lawyer on appeal; based on DP and incorporation clause, required to provide lawyer for first round of appeal � Halbert v. MI (2005) –� Ross v. Moffit (1974) – � Faretta v. CA – see above � McKaskle v.

Wiggins – standby counsel appointed over D’s objection; H: if standby tries to dominate D’s defense, that’s a constitutional violation (that is exactly what WCPD Jim Leslie did in RCR2011-063341 on 11/19/12 and 11/20/12)

� Ake v. OK – if can show expert is necessary to defense, and it comes under rules of E, then state may have to provide money for expert, b/c considered “basic tool for defense” (Coughlin requests money to hire mental health experts, judicial, prosecutorial and police misconduct experts, and other forensic experts, and constitutional law experts)

17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance III. Continuances in Criminal Cases § 51. --Factors considered in grant or denial of continuance § 52. Right to continuance; good cause standard § 53. Factors to be con-sidered Coughlin needs dockets in various matters (including the instant case) and to be able to subpoena and serve such subpoenas on witness whom have protection orders against Coughlin issued by the RJC (the Washoe County Public Defender and the State Bar of Nevada) that preclude Coughlin, or, obstensibly, his agents, from “contacting” (which the RCA and RMC has ruled includes mailing, having an agent do so, etc., etc.) such proposed witnesses, where even the certified mailing under NRS 174.375 would be tantamount to “contacting” and where indigent Coughlin cannot afford the cost of such mailing, etc., and where, given the exigencies of time deadlines and the RJC’s refusal to simply issue subpoenas and its claim that Coughlin (a licensed attorney authorized (indeed forced to) practice on his own behalf in the RJC) is not permitted to is-sue his own subpoenas…but rather, where the RJC takes weeks, if not months, (if not ever per the Cathy A. Reyes proposed subpoena in 72675 matter) to decide whether or not to issue Coughlin such subpoenas, a continuance is warranted.

2. Absence, Death or Disability of Party, Witness, or Evidence a. In General § 56. Relevancy and materiality of evidence or testimony § 57. Competency and credibility of evidence or testimony § 58. Cu-mulative evidence § 59. Probability of securing desired evidence or testimony § 60. Documents or papers b. Diligence in Attempting to Obtain Evidence or Testimony § 61. Generally § 62. Issuance of subpoena or other process § 63. Depositions of absent witnesses c. Admissions to Avoid Continuance § 64. Generally § 65. --Effect of constitutional right to compulsory process § 66. --Truth of testimony of witness § 67. --Conclusiveness and effect of admissions 3. Absence, Death, or Disability of Counsel § 68. Generally § 69. Withdrawal, discharge, or substitution of counsel; constitutional limitations … § 71. Opportunity to select new counsel § 72. Time for preparation by new counsel § 73. Illness or death of counsel or counsel's rela-tive § 74. --Representation by other counsel § 75. Counsel engaged elsewhere in professional capacity § 76. Counsel in attendance upon legislature 4. Surprise; Amendment of Pleadings (the WCDA’s Office’s 5/31/13 Criminal Complaint failed to plead much of anything in the first place, as such everything presented at trial (and all that contained in the Sentencing Memorandum in 71437, and the utter paucity of any actual “Points and Authorities” in the Motion to Remand in RCR2011-063341 and RCR2012-065630) dictate a

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continuance) or Change of Parties § 77. Generally § 78. Amendment of indictment or information § 79. Un-expected evidence, testimony, or witness 5. Mental or Physical Illness or Incapacity of Accused or Others (2JDC Judge Stiglich, according to Richard Cornell, Esq., spoke with Cornell for an hour on 9/27/13 to at-tempt to get Cornell to take on Coughlin’s cases and get him into Mental Health Court, presenting a NRS 178.405 issue requiring the suspension of all proceedings in all departments). § 80. Generally § 81. Pro-spects for improvement § 82. Mental disability (the voluminous vindictive arrests, prosecutions, and expo-sure to legion instances of judicial misconduct has exacerbated Coughlin’s Major Depressive Disorder and ADD/ADHD, the effect thereof being heightedned by Coughlin’s indigency and the judicial misconduct in-cident to the complete and utter affront to ADKT 0411’s Indigent Defense Order of 1/4/08). 6. Other Grounds § 83. Want of time for preparation of case (as RMC Judge Dilworth admitted on the record in 13 CR 3913 on 8/14/13, the RJC has attempted to conspire with the RJC in exorting the RMC to enter a copy cat Admin Order (which the RMC did in its AO13-01 of 1/16/13, which was served on Coughlin purport-edly in the RJC’s “horseshoe”, and RJC Chief Bailiff Sexton attempted to watch Coughlin’s entire trial on 10/29/13 in the RMC in 13 CR 3913, and 3914, which absolutely creates the appearance of improprie-ty…funny, the 10/11/14 Order Reassigning the case to Judge Glasson has not resulted in any reassign-ment of the duties of the RJC Bailiff’s incident to the Admin Orders in the RJC (AND, CORRECTION, COUGHLIN WAS WRONG to whatever extent he has previously indicated the rjc provided the audio tran-script of the 7/18/13 hearing in rcr2013-072675, as it was only the 7/16/13 hearing in 63341 that has been provided (where the providing of such makes the 4/12/13 puported basis for refusing to provide Coughlin other hearings in 63341 post-conviction baseless (ie, Coughlin reiterates his request for copies of the audio of all ccp court hearings etc (including that of 5/23/13 wherein the grandstanding and falsehoods told by Sgt. Mullens have become at issue in 72675).…and in the RMC, an 8/14/13 recusal by Judge Dilworth has not prevented RCA Wong and Dilworth’s replacement, Judge W. Gardner from attempting to apply whole-sale an earlier Order Granting RCA Wong’s Motion in Limine seeking to apply the Truesdale decision to preclude collateral attack on the “validity” of the Workplace Harassment TPO EPO in RCP2012-000607…despite the fact that, one, such order should be vacated given the recusal occurred so soon after its issuance, and two, neither the order nor Truesdale precludes a collateral attack on such orders as to whether they are “void” or “voidable” which are legally distinct concepts in comparision to whether such are “valid” or “invalid”) § 84. --Factors considered § 85. --Accused's lack of diligence or neglect § 86. --Tardily dis-closed evidence § 87. Popular excitement or prejudice; pretrial publicity § 88. --Alternative means of pro-tection IV. Procedure A. Application Research References § 89. Generally; form of application § 90. Sup-porting affidavits § 91. Who may apply § 92. --Strangers to proceedings § 93. Time for application § 94. --Stage of trial or proceedings § 95. Second or further continuance B. Hearing and Order Research References § 96. Hearing; evidence § 97. --Opposing motion § 98. Order of court; operation and effect § 99. --Period of continuance § 100. Continuances granted upon conditions § 101. --Imposing costs and expenses

2 5 13 hearing in RCR2011-063341(first of two of that date) 020513coughlin http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Ib70ldGUQw

an NRS 178.405 order at 8:45 am in rcr2011-063341, and Judge Clifton’s immediately thereafter being served notice in writing and a copy of Judge Pearson’s 2/5/13 Order for Competency Evaluation in RCR2011-063341 stamped 8:50 a.m. makes all that occurred thereafter in 65630 and 63341 illegal, a NCJC Canon 1, Rule 1.1 and Canon 2, Rule 2.15 violation, etc., etc. (not to mention indicative of numerous viola-tions of the RPC by DDA Zachary Norman Young, Esq.)

2 5 13 hearing in rcr2012-065630 part 1 0205131: http://youtu.be/3dq2LNYJb5E 2 5 13 hearing in rcr2012-065630 part 2 0205132: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=02w5JV8sxJo 020513coughlin2ndhearing in RCR2011-063341 in violation of NRS

178.405: http://youtu.be/JZhLYqdibAE 2 5 13 hearing part 3 in 65630 020513 part 3: http://youtu.be/eU8tTqsVQN8

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Continuance III. Continuances in Criminal Cases B. Grounds 3. Absence, Death, or Disability of Coun-sel § 72. Time for preparation by new counsel Criminal Law 590(2), 593 A.L.R. Library Withdrawal, dis-charge, or substitution of counsel in criminal case as ground for continuance, 73 A.L.R. 3D 725 Forms Affi-davit in support of motion for continuance—By counsel—New counsel on complex case. Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Continuance § 72 Affidavit—In support of motion for continuance—Complexity of case; new defense counsel. Federal Procedural Forms, L. Ed. § 20:659 Once the trial court has determined that a change in counsel is to be permitted, the new counsel must be accorded sufficient time to prepare for trial,[FN1] and it may be an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance to allow new counsel adequate time to prepare.[FN2] Even a last-minute change in counsel may occasion or require a continuance in order to give the attorney time to prepare.[FN3] If a change of counsel would require the postponement of a trial be-cause of inadequate time for the new attorney to properly prepare the defendant's case, a court may consider such factors as the reasons for the change, whether other counsel has already been identified, whether the defendant has acted diligently in seeking the change, and whether the denial is likely to result in any preju-dice to the defendant.[FN4] The benefit of prior counsel's preparation is a factor in favor of refusing a con-tinuance.[FN5] Further, the fact that the new or substituted counsel had been involved in the case for a suffi-cient time may dictate that the defendant is not entitled to a continuance for inadequate time to pre-pare.[FN6] Likewise, a de- 17 Am. Jur. 2D Continuance § 72 fendant in a criminal case may not be entitled to a continuance for the purpose of permitting new counsel additional time to prepare for trial if the original counsel was discharged by the defendant without sufficient grounds or withdrew for reasons attributable to the defendant.[ FN7] [FN1] Greene v. State, 335 Ark. 1, 977 S.W.2D 192 (1998). New counsel must be af-forded an opportunity to prepare properly. Sharp v. State, 786 So. 2D 372 (Miss. 2001). As to the want of time for preparation of a criminal case as grounds for a continuance, generally, see §§ 83 to 85. [FN2] Butler v. State, 339 Ark. 429, 5 S.W.3D 466 (1999). [FN3] Butler v. State, 339 Ark. 429, 5 S.W.3D 466 (1999). As to last-minute changes of counsel, see § 70. [FN4] Edwards v. State, 321 Ark. 610, 906 S.W.2D 310 (1995). [FN5] Carter v. State, 686 N.E.2D 1254 (Ind. 1997). [FN6] Goins v. State, 318 Ark. 689, 890 S.W.2D 602 (1995), cert. Denied, 2001 WL 729314 (Ark. 2001); State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328, 45 P.3D 384 (2002); State v. Lund, 168 Vt. 102, 718 A.2D 413 (1998). [FN7] Fry v. State, 165 Ind. App. 1, 330 N.E.2D 367 (3d Dist. 1975); People v. DeChiaro, 48 A.D.2D 54, 367 N.Y.S.2D 353 (3d Dep't 1975); Yeargain v. State, 1975 OK CR 84, 535 P.2D 693 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975). AMJUR CONTIN § 72

Continuance III. Continuances in Criminal Cases B. Grounds 3. Absence, Death, or Disability of Coun-sel § 69. Withdrawal, discharge, or substitution of counsel; constitutional limitations Criminal Law 593 A.L.R. Library Withdrawal, discharge, or substitution of counsel in criminal case as ground for continuance, 73 A.L.R. 3D 725 It is within the trial court's discretion to grant or refuse a motion for continuance where the accused's counsel withdraws from the case or is discharged therefrom.[FN1] Likewise, the decision whether to grant a continuance based upon a desire to change or substitute counsel rests soundly within the trial court's discretion,[FN2] and the decision will not be overturned absent a showing of abuse.[FN3] A de-fendant need not raise a claim of ineffective assistance to establish an abuse of discretion in denying a con-tinuance request to obtain new counsel, as the defendant's burden on appeal is to show that the trial court acted arbitrarily in light of the information available at the time of its decision and thereafter, if an abuse of discretion has been established, that the defendant's ability to defend himself or herself has thereby been demonstrably prejudiced.[FN4] The discretion of the trial court in granting or denying a continuance upon the withdrawal or discharge of the defendant's counsel is limited by the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which provides a federal criminal defendant with the right to have the assistance of counsel for his or her own defense[FN5] and by the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees the same right to a de-fendant charged with a state crime.[FN6] This right includes a fair opportunity to secure counsel of the de-fendant's own choice[FN7] and encompasses the right to the appointment of different counsel when a legit-imate difference of opinion develops between a defendant and appointed counsel as to a fundamental trial tactic.[FN8] However, the accused's right to counsel of one's choice is not absolute and may not be used to frustrate the inherent power of a court to command the orderly, efficient, and effective administration of jus-

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tice.[FN9] Therefore, in determining whether to grant a continuance due to the with- 17 Am. Jur. 2D Con-tinuance § 69 drawal or discharge of counsel, the court must attempt to strike a proper balance between the accused's right to counsel and the requirement of prompt administration of justice.[FN10] Observation: A defendant who elects to proceed pro se while assisted by standby counsel is not entitled to a continuance when he or she agrees, on the morning of trial, to be represented by standby counsel, and the standby coun-sel is not prepared to try the case, and a trial judge does not abuse his or her discretion in deciding to pro-ceed with trial, especially when the defendant has had two lawyers assigned previously removed and waits until the morning of trial to request counsel to represent him or her.[FN11] Inconvenience alone is an insuf-ficient reason for denying a motion for continuance in the substitution of new counsel, where no inquiry is made as to the length of the continuance needed and where no specific finding is made that the defendant's motion is an attempt to thwart the administration of justice.[FN12] CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: District Court's denial of defendant's motion for a continuance so that substitute counsel could prepare for trial deprived defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, in prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm; continuance requested was for 30 days which would not have de-layed trial unreasonably, there were no other continuances in the case, government did not allege any incon-venience for itself or its witnesses if continuance were granted, delay was not purposeful or caused by de-fendant, and without the continuance, defense counsel did not have enough time to investigate and pursue the only defense available to defendant. U.S. V. McClendon, 146 Fed. Appx. 23, 2005 FED App. 0707N (6th Cir. 2005). Trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a substitution of retained counsel and a contin-uance was arbitrary and violated due process and defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice in prosecution for sexual assault of a child; although the trial court cited administration problems and juvenile complainant's needs, the case was a simple one to try, only requiring three witnesses, defendant had already retained new counsel, did not seek a lengthy continuance, and was clearly not simply trying to delay his tri-al, as he would have remained in custody during the delay, nothing suggested that a continuance would have harmed or even inconvenienced the complainant, and complainant's initial complaint came four to six years after alleged assaults, and thus he would not have appeared at risk for forgetting information a few months later. Carlson v. Jess, 526 F.3D 1018 (7th Cir. 2008). Trial court's erroneous denial of defendant's motion for a substitution of retained counsel and a continuance had an adverse effect on the presentation of his case, as required for reversal of sexual assault conviction; new counsel would have pursued a reasonable alternative defense, including exploring complainant's motives for making the allegations, complainant's prior incon-sistent statements, and engaging an expert. Carlson v. Jess, 526 F.3D 1018 (7th Cir. 2008). Denial of de-fendant's motion for continuance for the purpose of substituting trial counsel was warranted, in prosecution for possession of child pornography; although case was complex because of the nature of the computer evi-dence involved and the theory that the defense sought to present, that the pornographic images were on de-fendant's computer because of network intrusions, counsel was retained 10 months before trial started, counsel had access to computer data necessary to prepare the defense for several months before trial started, defendant requested continuance based on his purported dissatisfaction with counsel only two weeks before trial, despite being aware of counsel's alleged shortcomings for months, there was no showing when substi-tute counsel would be ready for trial, and although defendant was dissatisfied that his computer expert did not have access to the data until shortly before trial, the prosecution was not at fault, and there was no show-ing that continuance would have resulted in successful defense. U.S. V. Cordy, 560 F.3D 808 (8th Cir. 2009), Cert. Denied, 130 S. Ct. 271 (2009). Refusing to grant defendant's third motion for continuance, so as to permit defendant to be represented solely by newly hired counsel, was not abuse of discretion that vio-lated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel of his choice, given that district court did not deny continuance for unreasonable or arbitrary concerns, that age of case was concern, as was its in-volvement of multiple instances of fraud, which required testimony of numerous witnesses, and that defend-ant did not show how denial of continuance affected his trial preparation or strategy, or that his defense was negatively affected by his hybrid representation by appointed and retained counsel. U.S. V. Flanders, 491 F.3D 1197 (10th Cir. 2007). Trial court's denial of counsel's motion for a continuance and effective denial of

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potentially new counsel's representation of defendant did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel; potentially new counsel filed the motion for a four-month continuance two hours after the jury had been sworn in and up to that point defendant had never expressed any concerns about his court-appointed counsel, and, the trial court balanced defendant's right to choose counsel against the hardships the parties, witnesses, and jury would have to endure if it granted counsel's request for a four-month continuance. Jones v. Bradshaw, 489 F. Supp. 2D 786 (N.D. Ohio 2007). [END OF SUPPLEMENT] [FN1] Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S. Ct. 841, 11 L. Ed. 2D 921 (1964). [FN2] Blake v. State, 273 Ga. 447, 542 S.E.2D 492 (2001); People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2D 228, 244 Ill. Dec. 388, 725 N.E.2D 1275 (2000); State v. Schneeweiss, 2001 ND 120, 630 N.W.2D 482 (N.D. 2001). [FN3] Edwards v. State, 321 Ark. 610, 906 S.W.2D 310 (1995); People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2D 228, 244 Ill. Dec. 388, 725 N.E.2D 1275 (2000). [FN4] State v. Hamilton, 228 Conn. 234, 636 A.2D 760 (1994). [FN5] U.S. V. Harris, 2 F.3D 1452 (7th Cir. 1993). [FN6] Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S. Ct. 1, 99 L. Ed. 4 (1954). [FN7] Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S. Ct. 1, 99 L. Ed. 4 (1954). A district court's denial of a defendant's request for a continuance so that the defendant could obtain a new attorney after the defendant had discharged four attorneys, the last on the morning of trial, did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel where the only reason for the delay was the defendant's persistent inability to get along with his attorneys. U.S. V. Harris, 2 F.3D 1452 (7th Cir. 1993). [FN8] People v. Williams, 386 Mich. 565, 194 N.W.2D 337 (1972); Com. V. Atkins, 233 Pa. Super. 202, 336 A.2D 368 (1975). [FN9] Roseby v. State, 329 Ark. 554, 953 S.W.2D 32 (1997) (overruled on other grounds by, MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2D 293 (1998)). A defendant may not demand a continuance to delay the proceedings or by arbitrarily attempting to substitute another at-torney at the time of trial. State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2D 270 (Minn. 1998). [FN10] Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S. Ct. 841, 11 L. Ed. 2D 921 (1964). [FN11] Com. V. Johnson, 424 Mass. 338, 676 N.E.2D 1123 (1997). [FN12] People v. Young, 207 Ill. App. 3D 130, 152 Ill. Dec. 67, 565 N.E.2D 309 (4th Dist. 1990). AMJUR CONTIN § 69

071613coughlin rcr2011-063341 2013 07 16 08 45 42 000 1: http://youtu.be/zV5xspJEP7w Coughlin declares under penalty of perjury all materials linked to herein are true and correct copies of

that which they purport to be. Continuance III. Continuances in Criminal Cases B. Grounds 3. Absence, Death, or Disability of Coun-

sel § 75. Counsel engaged elsewhere in professional capacity Criminal Law 593 Forms Affidavit in support of motion for continuance when counsel engaged elsewhere in professional capacity. Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Continuance §§ 73, 75 Affidavit—In support of motion for continuance—Calendar conflict with state criminal proceedings where attorney appointed counsel Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Federal Criminal Procedure § 145 Affidavit—In support of motion for continuance—Calendar conflict with state proceedings involving incarcerated defendant; federal defendant on bail. Federal Procedural Forms, L. Ed. § 20:656 Affidavit—In support of motion for continuance—Unexpected unavailability of retained coun-sel; counsel presently engaged in trial of unexpected length. Federal Procedural Forms, L. Ed. § 20:661 Mo-tion—By defendant for continuance based on prior engagement of defense counsel. Federal Procedural Forms, L. Ed. § 20:662 Affidavit—By defense counsel in support of motion for continuance based on coun-sel's prior engagement. Federal Procedural Forms, L. Ed. § 20:663 Order—Granting continuance based on prior engagement of defense counsel. Federal Procedural Forms, L. Ed. § 20:664 A trial court has discretion to allow a continuance of criminal proceedings because of the absence of counsel while occupied in another court.[FN1] Under some circumstances, 17 Am. Jur. 2D Continuance § 75 however, the refusal of a continu-ance sought on this ground may amount to an abuse of discretion.[ FN2] In determining whether the court has abused its discretion, the reviewing court may consider the nature of the charge, the evidence, and the complexity of the case.[FN3] For example, a continuance is properly denied where the crime charged is not complicated or difficult to analyze and any defenses the accused may have are immediately obvious to any lawyer, requiring no more than a few days at most by way of preparation.[FN4] [FN1] Majeske v. U.S., 266 F.2D 947 (9th Cir. 1959); Gilmore v. U.S., 273 F.2D 79 (D.C. Cir. 1959). [FN2] People v. Kerber, 172 A.D. 755, 159 N.Y.S. 215 (1St Dep't 1916); State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346, 181 S.E. 217 (1935). Not only the

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convenience of the court and prosecution but also the rights of persons accused of a crime must be consid-ered, and the trial court should exercise care not to handicap to his or her prejudice a defendant who is not responsible for the fact that counsel is engaged in the trial of another case. People v. Manchetti, 29 Cal. 2D 452, 175 P.2D 533 (1946). [FN3] Gilmore v. U.S., 273 F.2D 79 (D.C. Cir. 1959). [FN4] Gilmore v. U.S., 273 F.2D 79 (D.C. Cir. 1959). AMJUR CONTIN § 75.

Coughlin respectfully submits this seeking an extension of time to file his objections, citing

good cause for so granting relative to the enormously challenging and disorienting effects of being

wrongfully arrested at least 21 times since August 20, 2011, and the lack of anything in the way of a

just response by the state court judiciary in Washoe County, which is entirely beholden to local law

enforcement and prosecutors, punishing Coughlin for the misconduct of each, as its just the easier

softer way for these judges, as opposed to doing anything just. The attached materials in Exhibit 1

are incorporated herein by reference in further establishing showing of good cause for granting an

extension of time to file Coughlins’ objections to the Report and Recommendation by the

Honorable Magistrate Judge Cobb. Coughlin does greatly appreciate Judge Cobb’s granting his

various informa pauperis motions, noting that Coughlin has had no less than six recent instances of

such IFP motions and requests for the appointment of counsel rejected by state court judges (muni,

justice, and Second Judicial District Court, all in violation of ADKT 0411, the Nevada Supreme

Court’s 1/4/08 Indigent Defense Order etc.) in even criminal matters.

Of late Coughlin has been forced to defend himself in three criminal trials, (one on 10/14/13

in RCR2013-072675 in the RJC (denied counsel despite his indigency and the “serious” crime of

NRS 199.280 as defined in SCR 111(6), with a sentencing hearing for such wrongful conviction (a

justice court bailiff is neither “elected” nor appointed” sufficient to qualify as a “public officer” that

one might “resist or obstruct” under NRS 169.164, 193.019, nor NRS 281.005) set for 11/6/13

(Coughlin has been denied counsel in the sentencing phase of such, in addition to incident to the

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trial, and has no reason to believe he will not be similarly denied counsel in response to the

WCDA’s Office’s Motion to Remand Coughlin in RCR2011-063341 and RCR2012-065630 (where

the WCDA seeks to revoke two different 180 suspended sentences incident to the recent conviction

in a matter wherein Coughlin was denied court appointed counsel, RCR2013-071437, which

prosecution was premised upon the illegal Admin Order 2012-01 (RCR2013-071437). Further, in a

raft of appeal of criminal convictions in which Coughlin has been forced to defend himself, the

district court judge before whom all those matters were transferred to en masse has now purportedly

taken to seeking to entice Coughlin into dropping all of his various civil actions (including,

obviously, those in federal court 13 CV 446, 474, 484, 539, etc) in exchange for Coughlin entering

mental health court. Coughlin has absolutely no problem participating in mental health court and

simply wants to move forward in life

Additionally, Coughlin had two trials on 10/29/13 lasting most of the day (in RMC 13 CR

3913 and 3914) that will be continuing on 11/7/13. 3913 and 3914 featured RMC Judge W.

Gardner admitting to Coughlin he would rule as “contacting” the State Bar of Nevada sufficient to

amount to a violation of the 12/20/12 Workplace Harassment Protection Order the SBN obtained

against Coughlin from the RJC in RCP2012-000607, Coughlin’s having submitted a tolling motion

in response to the fraudulent 12/14/12 NNDB Panel’s Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law (which

seeks to permanently disbar Coughlin, and which is now on appeal in 62337 before the NSCT) by

any modality or means whatsoever (carrier pigeon, facsimile, USPS mailing, courier, personal

delivery). Such brazen deprivation of due process are completely beneath the judiciary and this tag

team by the RJC, RMC, WCDA’s Office, RPD, WCSO, and Reno City Attorney’s Office is exactly

the sort barbaric spectacle our founding fathers knew the principles of federalism must address.

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Coughlin seeks the appointment of counsel to assist him in this matter, and, with a promise to utilize

such judiciously, seeks at least some door being left open to at least a few subpoenas at public

expense being permitted.

For context, it is important to point out that the first of a strong of 21 wrongful arrests of

Coughlin occurred on August 20th, 2011, by RPD Officer Nicholas Duralde. At the 10/29/13 trials

in the RMC in 13 CR 3913 and 3914, Coughlin was rebuked for even seeking to put on evidence or

ask questions of RPD Detective Yturbide, whom fraudulently had Coughlin arrested and

overcharged with a felony and gross misdemeanor where, even had Coughlin violated the

Workplace Harassment Protection Order the SBN obtained, such would have only been a felony.

The fact that the purported violations consisted of nothing more than Coughlin allegedly seeking to

file tolling motions in his disciplinary proceeding then pending before the State Bar of Nevada and

otherwise address issues involving the record (see 62337) makes such prosecution a complete

affront to out system of justice that must not be countenanced. Where RPD Detective Yturbide’s

wife is an ECOMM 911 dispatcher, and Yturbide ordered Coughlin arrested on 2/8/13 (which

involved the RPD pointing a loaded gun at Coughlin’s head from four feet away after entering his

back yard unannounced), and the “misuse of 911” trail in RCR2012-065630 was to resume on

2/12/13 (which the WCDA’s Office plead down for SCR 111(6) leveraging to a NRS 199.280

“resisting a public officer” (a 911 operator is not a public officer either), and Coughlin’s Brief in the

appeal of the recommendation to permanently disbar him was due on 2/14/13, and such

overcharging resulted in $5,000 worth of bail, and where the same RPD Officer Duralde was to be

cross-examined (an ultimately was) in that 065630 case (which included a 1/13/12 pulling over of

Coughlin by Duralde and the same Sargent McCauley whom approved of the 2/8/13 arrest by

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Yturbide, along with four other officers pulling Coughlin over that night just an hour after Coughlin

bailed out of jail incident to a custodial arrest for jaywalking on 1/12/12…)…that same Officer

Duralde’s wife is also an ECOMM 911 dispatcher….None of that is “relevant” to the RMC’s Judge

W. Gardner…The Wal-Mart arrest occurred just 9 days after Coughlin was released from a 7 day

jail stay incident to the wrongful arrest by Duralde, during which Coughlin was denied his

medications.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/178700319/10-23-13-submission-of-Petition-for-Cert-or-Mandamus-re-Merliss-1708-03628-

61383-receipt-pending-eFlex-pdf

There are three exceptions to Younger abstention:

1. Where the prosecution is in bad faith (i.e. the state knows the person to be innocent); or

2. Where the prosecution is part of some pattern of harassment against an individual; or

3. Where the law being enforced is utterly and irredeemably unconstitutional (e.g., if the state were to pass a law making it a

crime to say anything negative about its governor under any circumstances).

The arrest underlying

Attorney discipline—Abstention found unwarranted: The courts in the following cases

ruled that abstention under the Younger doctrine was not warranted with regard to claims relating to

state attorney disciplinary proceedings or challenges to disciplinary rules or rules of professional

conduct under the particular facts and circumstances.

The court in Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 546 F. Supp. 1251

(D.P.R. 1982), held that abstention was not appropriate in the attorneys' federal action, purportedly

challenging the constitutional validity of commonwealth laws providing for an integrated bar

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association and mandatory dues, alleging civil rights and constitutional violations. The original

action in the case, a state court action, was related to issues that gave rise to disbarment proceedings

against the two attorneys, commenced by the Puerto Rican bar association (the "Colegio") for the

nonpayment of the annual dues. Upon the attorneys' failure to pay the dues owed, a Puerto Rican

court ordered their disbarment. The attorneys later filed the federal action, seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief, as well as damages, against the defendants. The defendants argued that the court

had been asked to intervene in an ongoing judicial proceeding in violation of the Younger doctrine.

The district court noted that the Puerto Rican court unequivocally stated that its judgment was "final

and unappealable," and thus, the attorneys' rights as to the past dues had been finally adjudicated.

Those rights, however, were not before the court in the federal action, the court determined,

observing that the attorneys sought only to prevent prospective enforcement of the statutes

providing for an integrated bar association and annual dues as interpreted by the Puerto Rican court.

The court thus concluded there was no ongoing state disbarment proceeding involving that issue so

Younger abstention was not applicable.

The court in Bishop v. State Bar of Texas, 736 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1984), held that

abstention was not appropriate where an attorney filed a federal complaint alleging that the state bar

had prosecuted disciplinary proceedings against him for many years and that such proceedings had

been taken in bad faith and had violated due process. The district court dismissed the complaint

without prejudice on the ground that injunctive relief against pending bar disciplinary proceedings

was barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. The court on appeal stated that although the factors

for Younger abstention were present, that did not end the analysis. Other courts had recognized that

a showing of "bad faith, harassment or other exceptional circumstances" might justify federal

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intervention, the court explained, noting that courts had applied Younger's exception for "bad faith

prosecutions" in two major circumstances: (1) when a State commences a prosecution or proceeding

to retaliate for or to deter constitutionally protected conduct and (2) when the prosecution or

proceeding is taken in bad faith or for the purpose to harass. In either case, said the court,

irreparable injury under Younger is established by a sufficient showing of retaliatory or bad-faith

prosecution, and a federal injunction may issue. The court observed that the attorney alleged that

the State Bar's efforts to discipline him had proceeded for many years and that they had been taken

"in bad faith and for an improper motive." As the court was ruling on a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12 and had to take the attorney's allegations as true, the court found that the attorney stated a claim

for injunctive relief. The court thus reversed the dismissal of the attorney's complaint by the district

court and remanded for further proceedings.

The court in Leaf v. Supreme Court of State of Wis., 979 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1992), held

that the time for abstention had expired, and thus, it would not affirm, under the Younger abstention

doctrine, the district court's dismissal of the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where an

attorney and the attorney's nonlegal associate brought a civil-rights action arising from state

attorney disciplinary proceedings. The Board of Attorneys' Professional Responsibility's

investigation of the attorney had already begun at the time the federal complaint was filed. Because

of the ongoing investigation and proceeding in the state court, the district court entered an order to

abstain and stay proceeding under Younger. The district court ordered the case closed for statistical

purposes, but the district court indicated that either party could reopen the case at any time by

advising the court and opposing counsel that the party was ready to proceed with the case and that

the state proceedings had reached a final resolution. The attorney later moved to reinstate the cause

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of actions and for leave to file an amended complaint. The district court denied the motion for

reconsideration indicating that it should have dismissed the case in the first instance under Younger.

On appeal the defendants argued that the court should affirm under the Younger abstention doctrine.

The court, however, stated it could not affirm on this basis because the abstention doctrine only

applies when there is an ongoing state proceeding—and the state proceedings terminated before the

district court's dismissal and before the current decision. Therefore, the court concluded that the

time for abstention had expired.

The court in Adams v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Com'n of Supreme Court

of Illinois, 600 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1984), held that abstention was not appropriate where the

federal court was unable to remand the declaratory action to the state court and there could be no

state court proceedings. A declaratory judgment action was brought for a determination of the

constitutionality of an attorney disciplinary rule. Following removal of that action from state court,

a motion to remand and to dismiss was filed. The court stated that because it was unable to remand

the declaratory action to state court, abstention was not appropriate and there was no state

proceeding towards which the court could show deference. It could be argued that the court could

conceivably stay the federal action to allow the defendant to bring a state action seeking prospective

relief against the attorneys based upon the disciplinary rule in question, the court pointed out,

observing that the United States Supreme Court had only applied Younger in cases where a state

enforcement proceeding followed an alleged violation of a state statute or rule even if only in civil

proceedings. The court added that the Seventh Circuit had explicitly required some sort of violation

and the existence of subsequent enforcement proceedings for a Younger abstention to be allowed. In

the present case, the court indicated, the attorneys chose to litigate their constitutional claims in the

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federal court; they had not, at the time of filing, violated the disciplinary rule; and after a hearing,

enforcement of the rule against them was deferred. The court concluded that in the Seventh Circuit

at least, the State could not now bring an enforcement action that would require the court to abstain.

The court in Canatella v. State of California, 304 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2002), held that

dismissal of the federal action was not warranted on Younger abstention grounds where a state bar

had initiated a disciplinary investigation into multiple sanctions orders entered against an attorney,

and in response, the attorney sued the State, the Board of Governors for the State Bar, and related

entities and individuals in federal court under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, challenging the constitutionality

of state bar statutes and one state rule of professional conduct. The district court dismissed the

claims on Younger abstention grounds. Pending appeal, the state bar filed formal charges against the

attorney. The attorney filed a second § 1983 action; the district court dismissed the attorney's

complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine[FN16] and on Younger abstention grounds; and the

attorney appealed. The court, on appeal, initially noted that a district court must abstain and dismiss

a suit on the basis of Younger where: (1) state proceedings are ongoing; (2) important state interests

are involved; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims in the state

proceedings. The court saw the relevant issue as whether the attorney was involved in an ongoing

proceeding for purposes of Younger and thus looked to whether the state court proceedings were

ongoing as of the time when the federal action was filed. At the time the attorney filed his federal

complaint, said the court, the magistrate judge's sanctions order had issued, and thus, the court had

to decide whether the attorney's act of reporting to the State Bar the sanctions order, as required

under the terms of his stipulation, gave rise to ongoing judicial proceedings for Younger purposes.

The court observed that no affirmative action had been taken by the state bar against the attorney at

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the initiation of the federal suit. In fact, the court pointed out, the attorney successfully secured an

order from the magistrate judge staying any state bar disciplinary proceedings pending the outcome

of the attorney's direct appeal of the sanctions order to the court, and the only procedural step that

had occurred at the time when the federal complaint was filed was the attorney's act of self-

reporting. The court next noted that the filing of an initial pleading commenced a state bar court

proceeding, which is a "notice of disciplinary charges." A preliminary investigation before issuing a

notice of disciplinary charges or a mere complaint to the bar does not commence a disciplinary

action, said the court, nor would a mere report of sanctions by the attorney. Thus, the court

concluded that there was no ongoing disciplinary proceeding to which Younger abstention would

apply.

On reconsideration of a previous decision, the court in Miller v. Washington State Bar

Ass'n, 691 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1982), held that abstention was not appropriate where an attorney

brought a civil-rights action claiming that a letter of admonition received from the Disciplinary

Board of the State Bar interfered with the exercise of his First Amendment rights. The district court

dismissed the action, and the attorney appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The

State Bar filed a petition for rehearing, asking the court to reconsider its opinion in this matter in

light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v.

Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 73 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1982), discussed in § 6,

which was decided after the court's opinion had been submitted for filing. The court observed that

when the attorney filed his federal action, the State Bar had completed its proceedings, and the

attorney was without any right to obtain review by the state supreme court. The court thus found

that the case involved no intrusion into ongoing state proceedings nor was there an adequate

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opportunity for state court review. The court determined that Younger abstention was, therefore, not

appropriate in the case.

The court in Rapp v. Disciplinary Bd. of Hawaii Supreme Court, 916 F. Supp. 1525 (D.

Haw. 1996), held that Younger abstention was not appropriate where an attorney brought a federal

action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that the State Rule of Professional Conduct

barring ex parte communications with jurors "except as permitted by law" was an unconstitutional

prior restraint on his free-speech rights. The attorney, as a pro se plaintiff in a state case, desired to

speak with the jurors after they rendered their verdict but was precluded by the judge in that case

from doing so. The attorney believed that members of the jury would be willing to speak with him

but that he could not talk with them because of the threat of suspension or disbarment from the state

bar, leading him to challenge the rule in federal court. The defendants argued that the court should

abstain from adjudicating the merits of the attorney's action under the Younger abstention doctrine.

The court explained that before Younger abstention can be applied to dismiss a federal claim, three

requirements must be met:

(1) there must be ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the state judicial proceedings must implicate

important state interests; and (3) the state judicial proceedings must afford the federal plaintiff an

adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims. The court observed that abstention was

improper in the case because there were no ongoing state judicial proceedings. The court was

unaware of any pending disciplinary proceedings against the attorney in connection with the federal

case. Rather, there was only the potential for the institution of disciplinary proceedings against the

attorney, which the court found was insufficient for abstaining under Younger

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Coughlin requests the RJC issue subpoenas for the State Bar of Nevada’s Laura Peters and Patrick

King, as well as SBN Execu Director Kimberly Farmer and then President Francis Flaherty for any

and all sentencing and remand hearings, including that of 11/7/13, as well as for WCPD Biray

dogan, and Jim Leslie, and WCDA’s Office D. Watts-vial, and modify the TPO/EPO in rcp2012-

000607 and rcp2012-000699 to allow for Coughlin to embrace his rights to subpoena witnesses and

compulsory process without the constant threat of arrest and abuse of the contempt power.

NRS 4.370(n) provided the RJC’s Chief Judge Pearson jurisdiction: “(n) In an action for the

issuance of a temporary or extended order for protection against harassment in the workplace

pursuant to NRS 33.200 to 33.360, inclusive.”.

Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 20. Restraints on exercise of legal or constitutional rights

Injunction 1, 3, 9, 13

Courts have no discretion to grant injunctive relief violative of constitutional rights.1 Furthermore,

a person generally may not be enjoined from performing a lawful act designed to protect or enforce

the person's personal or property rights,2 even though the action may damage another,3 unless the

conduct was clearly engaged in maliciously to annoy or injure another.4

The carrying on of a lawful business that injures another will not be restrained any further than is

necessary to protect the rights of the complainant.7

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Footnotes: 1 Operation Rescue-National v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas,

Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998). 2 Crouch v. Central Labor Council of Portland and Vicinity, 134

Or. 612, 293 P. 729, 83 A.L.R. 193 (1930). 3 Saulsberry v. Coopers' International Union, 147 Ky.

170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912).

4 Hasselbring v. Koepke, 263 Mich. 466, 248 N.W. 869, 93 A.L.R. 1170 (1933). 7 Strickler v.

Schaaf, 199 Wash. 372, 91 P.2d 1007, 123 A.L.R. 226 (1939).” 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 20.

Am. Jur. Injunctions § 16. Court's discretion—Constraints on exercise thereof:

Injunction 1, 9, 21

“Although generally exercised as a matter of discretion, the power to grant or deny injunctive

relief is not arbitrary or unlimited but must be exercised with the guidance of established principles

of equity jurisprudence.[FN1] A court's inherent authority over litigation matters does not free the

court from procedural requirements regarding injunctions. [FN2] (NOTE: in 607 the RJC erred

in issuign a TPO without the posting of the jurisdictional prerequisite bond (failing to post even the

mandatory minimum set by the AOC). Further, King, and employee of the SBN, applied for and

advocated for a protection order that he admits was sought to, in part, protect himself, which is

impermissible under Nevada law (ie, the employer must apply for such an order for the employee

(where Peters originally filled out the application then whited out her name, such is the functional

equivalent thereof as to Peters impermissibly so applying for a TPO for herself as well. Further, by

statute under NRS 33.270, a separate EPO application is required for an EPO, and the SBN failed to

provide any such separate EPO application).

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Additionally, the purported service of the TPO (especially where such TPO expressly provides

which law enforcement entities may serve the TPO, and not listed thereamong are the RJC’s Bailiffs

(likely due to the appearance of partiality and impropreity attendant to the RJC Bailiff’s continually

harassing Coughlin by purporting to serve him various Admin Order’s, this TPO, another in

RCP2012-00599, etc., etc., while Coughlin was either inside the court house going to or leaving

court, or accessing the filing office or DAS) upon Coughlin was purportedly done by the RJC’s

Bailiff Anthony English, whom is not authorized to do such given Washoe County has less than

700,000 population and as such NRS 4.353(6) is not availing as a basis for such action,

furthermore, the TPO itself (which, without which, given such was the only purported notice to

Coughlin of the EPO hearing of 1/4/13 beyond RJC Chief Judge Pearson denying (without

specifying the date set for the extension hearing) Coughlin’s 12/20/12 Emergency Ex Parte

Telephonic Motion for an Emergency Teleconference or Hearing (with Coughlin seeking to have

the SBN a party to such) to Dissolve or Modify the TPO in 607 given the exigencies of SCR 105(4)

and SCR 119(3)’s incorporation of NRCP 52, 59, 60, and DCR 13(7), WDCR 12(6), etc.). During

such Ex Parte Teleconference with Judge Pearson, Chief Judge Pearson indicated to Coughlin that

Coughlin’s filing of any documents in his formal disciplinary proceeding, by whatever means,

would not fall within the purview of “contacting” the SBN, of course, given such is plainly a lawful

act under NRS 33.360(2)).

In granting or denying injunctive relief, a court abuses its discretion when it lacks

jurisdiction,[FN3] fails to consider and make a record of the factors relevant to its determination,

(Pearson, whilst, to his credit, putting the question to King at least, committed clear error in

accepting from King a vague and meritless explanation as to whether Coughlin has any lawful right

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to “contact” the SBN (notice that Judge Pearson, of course, did not deign to extend his jurisdiction

to in any way limit Coughlin’s right to file documents in NG12-0204, etc., his then pending formal

disciplinary proceeding in the SBN (especially where the SBN’s King and Peters lied in asserting

that Peters was merely the “Paralegal/Investigator” for the SBN (whereas at other times they hold

Peters out to Respondent’s in disciplinary hearings as the SBN’s “Clerk of Court” (something she

fraudulently failed to mention to RPD Detective Yturbide as well, in addition to Peters lying during

the 1/4/13 extension hearing in alleging, under oath, that she saw Coughlin in what Peters alleges is

Coughlin’s vehicle on 1/3/13 in connection with the purported violation of the TPO) despite Peters

indicating to Detective Yturbide that she did not see Coughlin in the vehicle on 1/3/13). [FN4] relies

on clearly erroneous factual findings, (NOTE: it was clearly erroneous for Judge Pearson to deem

an alleged email from Coughlin to the WCPD’s Officer (addressed to Jim Leslie, Esq.) as a threat

(either direct or indirect) to the SBN (whom were cc’d on such email), especially where the SBN’s

King lied under oath (whilst violating RPC 3.7, attorney as witness) in alleging the link contained

within the first paragraph of such email was to a “violent” “video” showing a character in a movie

whom has just shot his public defender (especially where such patently does not occur at any point

in the movie purportedly linked to (though the purported link was a mere audio clip related to

learning, reading, and philosophy, containing nothing in the way of a threat of violence whatsoever)

[FN5] considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors, (it was clearly error for Judge Pearson to

allow and consider King’s testimony as to what “we read about in that newspapers” and “who

knows what Coughlin is capable of” and King’s non-expert opinion as to Coughlin’s “mental state”

and other speculation) (NOTE: it was clearly inappropriate to excuse SBN Clerk of Court from

providing sworn testimony at the 1/4/13 hearing in RCP2012-000607, but rather, to allow the

SBN’s Pat King (whom is not able to appear as an attorney in that matter, but did (violating RPC

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3.7 (attorney as witness) as well) where he admitted he was seeking the TPO/EPO, in part, for his

own protection (under NRS 33.370 an employer, not the employee, must apply for a Workplace

Harassment TPO/EPO) [FN6] gives too much weight to one factor,[FN7] relies on erroneous

conclusions of law or equity,[FN8] or misapplies its factual or legal conclusions.[FN9]

Courts have no discretion to grant injunctive relief violative of constitutional guarantees

[FN10] or injunctions compelling the performance of an unlawful act.[FN11]

A trial court abuses its discretion in granting or denying injunctive relief if its ruling is

based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. West's Ga.Code Ann. § 9–5–8. Georgia Soc.

of Ambulatory Surgery Centers v. Georgia Dept. of Community Health, 309 Ga. App. 31, 710

S.E.2d 183 (2011). 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 16

[FN1] § 13. [FN2] Rosen v. Siegel, 106 F.3d 28, 36 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1222 (2d Cir. 1997).

[FN3] § 216. [FN4] Hoffmann v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 2003 WI 64, 262 Wis. 2d 264, 664

N.W.2d 55 (2003). [FN5] Cargill, Inc. v. U.S., 173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999); Fogie v. THORN

Americas, Inc., 95 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 1996); Tri-County Funeral Service, Inc. v. Eddie Howard

Funeral Home, Inc., 330 Ark. 789, 957 S.W.2d 694 (1997); Teachers' Retirement System

of State of Ga. v. Forehand, 234 Ga. App. 437, 506 S.E.2d 913, 130 Ed. Law Rep.

1347 (1998); Musgrave v. Brookhaven Lake Property Owners Ass'n, 990 S.W.2d 386

(Tex. App. Texarkana 1999).

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[FN6] Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196, 36 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 23 (7th Cir.

1996); Hoffmann v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 2003 WI 64, 262 Wis. 2d 264, 664

N.W.2d 55 (2003). [FN7] Hoffmann v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 2003 WI 64, 262 Wis. 2d 264,

664 N.W.2d 55 (2003). [FN8] Cargill, Inc. v. U.S., 173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999); Tri-County Funeral

Service, Inc. v. Eddie Howard Funeral Home, Inc., 330 Ark. 789, 957 S.W.2d 694 (1997); Branch v.

Occhionero, 239 Conn. 199, 681 A.2d 306 (1996); Teachers' Retirement

System of State of Ga. v. Forehand, 234 Ga. App. 437, 506 S.E.2d 913, 130 Ed. Law

Rep. 1347 (1998). [FN9] Cargill, Inc. v. U.S., 173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999); Hayworth v. Schilli

Leasing, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 165 (Ind. 1996); Oklahoma Sports Properties, Inc. v. Independent

School Dist. No. 11 of Tulsa County, Okl., 1998 OK CIV APP 40, 957 P.2d 137, 126

Ed. Law Rep. 486 (Div. 1 1998); Musgrave v. Brookhaven Lake Property Owners

Ass'n, 990 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App. Texarkana 1999).

[FN10] § 20. [FN11] Hutchins v. Carrillo, 27 Va. App. 595, 500 S.E.2d 277 (1998).

[FN12] Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 128 Ed. Law Rep. 624 (7th Cir. 1998),

judgment rev'd on other grounds, 529 U.S. 217, 120 S. Ct. 1346, 146 L. Ed. 2d 193,

142 Ed. Law Rep. 624 (2000).

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NRS 33.360: “Limitations on effect of provisions The provisions of NRS 33.200 to 33.360,

inclusive, do not:...2. Prohibit a person from engaging in any constitutionally protected exercise of

free speech...;”.

Pursuant to NV JCRCP 81, the RJC, a court of limited jurisdiction, does not have the inherent

authority, nor the discretion, to issue TPO’s or EPOS under NRS 33 (given the express statutory

scheme enaced by the Legislature

42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 21 Restraints on exercise of legal or constitutional rights—

Freedom of speech; 1, 3, 9, 13: A preliminary injunction is a prior restraint, and a party seeking to

justify a prior restraint on speech carries a heavy burden of justifying the restraint.1 To obtain a

temporary restraining order involving a prior restraint on pure speech, the speech must threaten an

interest more fundamental than the First Amendment itself.2 Freedom of speech may not be

suppressed by injunction on the ground that its exercise may incidentally lead to a tort or breach of

contract.3 There are, however, exceptions to the general principle that forbids the issuance of

injunctions impinging on First Amendment rights.4 Preliminary injunctions restricting the activities

of protesters may or may not be lawful, depending on the particulars of the order and the degree

of restrictiveness of the order. (NOTE: clearly the Reno City Attorney’s alleged interpretation it

seeks this Court to adopt (ie, that “contacting” means Coughlin submitting filings in his disciplinary

matter to the SBN even by USPS mailing, faxing, or having a third party (whether an independent

contractor, an employee, or an agent, or some sort of courier) is compltely unsupportable. Were that

how Judge Pearson or the RMC’s Judge W. Gardner to now interpret such TPO, such would have

precluded Coughlin from (especially in light of Judge Pearson’s refusal to grant Coughlin an

hearing on Coughlins’ motion to vacate, modify, or dissolve the TPO (made via telephone on

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12/20/12) submitting even by USPS mail to the SBN an filings in his disciplinary matter, much less

the typical correspondences incident to litigation (which, say in the case of SCR 105(3)’s dictates

respecting the record and appendix (by way of NRAP 10, 11, 28, 30, and 32, or the rules associated

with seeking continuances, were acts required of Coughlin) 5

Footnotes: 1 Paradise Hills Associates v. Procel, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1528, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514 (4th

Dist. 1991), opinion modified on other grounds, (Dec. 11, 1991) (holding that the deprivation of

rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, even for minimal periods, constitutes irreparable harm

in the context of an action for injunctive relief). 2 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78

F.3d 219, 1996 FED App. 0076P (6th Cir. 1996), opinion clarified on other grounds, (May 8, 1996).

3 Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup 1977). 4 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.

v. F.C.C., 507 U.S. 1301, 113 S. Ct. 1806, 123 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1993). 5 Schenck v. Pro-Choice

Network Of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 117 S. Ct. 855, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1997). Political

protesters failed to allege any threat of imminent injury, and thus, they lacked standing to sue the

Director of the United States Secret Service for injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the

Secret Service from establishing protest zones and thereby interfering with their exercise of First

Amendment rights at future political events, although they alleged that the Secret Service had

violated their rights at an earlier protest during a political event which the president had attended,

where they did not allege that the president was scheduled to return for an appearance at the same

venue where the earlier protest was held, and they did not allege any unlawful conduct at a

presidential appearance since the incident at the earlier protest. Elend v. Sun Dome, Inc., 370 F.

Supp. 2d 1206 (M.D. Fla. 2005), aff'd on other grounds, 471 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2006).

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Any such interpretation of either the TPO or EPO as to somehow impinge upon the means with

which Coughlin may submit filings in his disciplinary matter to the SBN would clearly be an

imperssible infringement upon not just Coughlin’s right to free speach, guaranteed under the state

and federal constitutions, but also Coughlin’s right to access the courts (where the SBN serves as

the situs of either a court or administrative tribunal and holds Peters out at its “Clerk of Court) and

protect what has been declared a protected property right under the Fourteenth Amendment (ie, his

law license).

42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 25. Injunctions specifically authorized by statute Injunction 1, 3,

6

A statute may impose upon a court the positive duty to grant injunctive relief under specified

conditions.1 A statutory request for injunctive relief is governed by the requirements of the statute,

and express statutory language supersedes common-law requirements.2 ..

Courts should not seek to apply their equitable discretion to grant an injunction when such

discretion is explicitly precluded by use of word "shall" or similarly prescriptive statutory

language.6 (NOTE: there are appearances of just this sort of mandatory language in NRS 33.280,

33.250, 33.270, etc., all of which were violated by Judge Pearson’s TPO and EPO) If the statute

does not expressly or implicitly limit the court's equity jurisdiction, however, the issuance of

injunctive relief remains within the court's discretion.7

Footnotes 1 Worthington v. Kenkel, 684 N.W.2d 228 (Iowa 2004); Pinnacle Gas Resources, Inc. v.

Diamond Cross Properties, LLC, 2009 MT 12, 349 Mont. 17, 201 P.3d 160 (2009); Levisa Coal Co.

v. Consolidation Coal Co., 276 Va. 44, 662 S.E.2d 44 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2158, 173 L.

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Ed. 2d 1156 (2009); Timberline Four Seasons Resort Management Co., Inc. v. Herlan, 223 W. Va.

730, 679 S.E.2d 329 (2009). 2 Henderson v. Burd, 133 F.2d 515, 146 A.L.R. 714 (C.C.A. 2d Cir.

1943); Stone v. Kerr, 194 Miss. 646, 10 So. 2d 845 (1942); Recon Exploration, Inc. v. Hodges, 798

S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App. Dallas 1990). The legislature may impose a duty to grant an injunction by

specifying conditions in a statute; when this is done, the conditions specified in the statute

supersede the traditional equitable requirements. Max 100 L.C. v. Iowa Realty Co., Inc., 621

N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 2001).

3 In re Bradshaw, 233 B.R. 315 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1999). However, where injunctions are creatures of

statute, all that need be proven is a statutory violation. Burnett v. Gloucester County Bd. of Chosen

Freeholders, 409 N.J. Super. 219, 976 A.2d 444 (App. Div. 2009).

4 In re Bradshaw, 233 B.R. 315 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1999). Where an injunction is authorized by

statute, the traditional equity grounds for injunctive relief need not be proven; it is sufficient if the

statutory conditions are satisfied. U.S. v. Pugh, 2010-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 50445, 105

A.F.T.R.2d 2010-2662, 2010 WL 2266069 (E.D. N.Y. 2010). A showing of irreparable harm is

required for preliminary injunctive relief under the False Claims Act; the statutory language

supports the position that customary equitable considerations should apply. Bedrossian v.

Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 409 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2005).

5 Wadena Implement Co. v. Deere & Co., Inc., 480 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).

6 Waterfront Com'n of New York Harbor v. Construction and Marine Equipment Co., Inc., 928 F.

Supp. 1388 (D.N.J. 1996).

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7 U.S. v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329 (5th Cir. 1996); Ross v. Federal Highway Admin.,

972 F. Supp. 552 (D. Kan. 1997), decision aff'd on other grounds, 162 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1998).

8 Summit Water Distribution Co. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, 123 P.3d 437 (Utah 2005).

The plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief under the Housing Act provision that Congress

suspended 17 days prior to the date on which the plaintiff was granted a judgment under the

provision. Nielsen v. Stepping Stones Associates, L.P., 930 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. N.Y. 1996) (referring

to United States Housing Act of 1937 § 8(t), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(t)).

Both the TPO and EPO in RCP2012-000607 are lacking in that which is mandated by statute,

and were issued in error where jurisdictional prerequisites required to be present by statute were

missing from both the orders and application at issue.

NRS 33.250. Verified application for temporary order; contents of application 1. An employer

or an authorized agent of an employer who reasonably believes that harassment in the workplace

has occurred may file a verified application for a temporary order for protection against harassment

in the workplace against the person who allegedly committed the harassment.

2. The verified application must include, without limitation: (c) A detailed description of the

events that allegedly constituted harassment in the workplace and the dates on which these events

occurred.

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NRS 33.280. Effect of temporary or extended order; court may not issue order against

more than one person; contents of order...”2. A court may not issue a temporary or extended

order for protection against harassment in the workplace that is against more than one person.”

Clearly, the charge in 13 CR 3913 is violative of RPC 3.8 where such is premised upon the

contention that one other than Coughlin purportedly submitting a filing to the SBN in person was

someone violative of the TPO.

NRS 33.280 continues: “3. A temporary or extended order for protection against harassment

in the workplace must: (c) State the reasons for granting the order; and 4. In addition to the

requirements of subsection 3, if the court granted a temporary order for protection against

harassment in the workplace without notice, the order must: (a) Include a statement that the

person who allegedly committed the harassment is entitled to a hearing on the order pursuant

to NRS 33.270;...(e) Define the irreparable injury, loss or damage resulting from the harassment and

state why it is irreparable; (NOTE: the TPO and EPO in 607 both fail to meet this standard) and (f)

Set forth the reasons for granting the order without notice.

Judge Pearson’s refusing to grant Coughlin a hearing on the TPO, incident to Coughlin’s

application for such on 12/20/12 was violative of the requirement that one be afforded Coughlin

(beyond the 1/4/13 hearing to determine whether to extend the TPO in granting an EPO) for just the

sort of reasons that arose in this matter (ie, the chance of irreparable harm to Coughlin by the

granting of such an order given the exigencies of deadlines involved in a pending disciplinary

matter involving Coughlin’s Fourteenth Amendment protected property right, his law license).

Judge Pearson did, in fact, grant the TPO in 607 without notice to Coughlin.

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Further, such 12/20/12 TPO was violative of NRS 33.280(3)(c),4(f) in that, beyond a boilerplate

copying fo the plain language of such statutory subsection, there is nothing in such order

approaching the sort of specifity required therein as to the reasons for granting the order, much less

the reasons for doing so without notice to Coughlin (especially where any purported notice to

Coughlin consisted of an alleged emailing or faxing of the TPO application from Peters to

Coughlin, where the SBN then turns right around and claims any emailing or faxing by Coughlin of

even a filing in his disciplinary matter would somehow be tantamount to a harassing violating of a

TPO or EPO.

Additional mandatory language Judge Pearson’s TPO and EPO failed to comply with (making such

void and voidable, which is a legally distinct characterization from the test set forth in Truesdale as

to whether such an order’s “validity” or “invalidity” may be collaterally attacked) is contained in

NRS 33.270. Requirements for issuance of temporary or extended order; expiration; right to

challenge temporary order; award of costs and attorney's fees to prevailing party; interlocutory

appeal of extended order

1. The court may issue a temporary order for protection against harassment in the workplace if it

appears to the satisfaction of the court from specific facts shown by a verified application (NOTE:

the one application involved in 607 is not verified and contains no specific facts whatsoever,

especially where the materials included in the exhibit 1 et seq thereto are not incorporated by

reference, and not made on or in connection with the mandatory form 4 applicants are required to

use in connection therewith) filed pursuant to NRS 33.250 that harassment in the workplace has

occurred.

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2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 4, a temporary order for protection against

harassment in the workplace must not be issued without notice to the person who allegedly

committed the harassment. A temporary order for protection against harassment in the workplace

must not be issued without the giving of security by the employer ...” (NOTE: no such security was

given by the SBN, and Judge Pearson did not in any way address or waive such statutory

requirement (nor could he pursuant to NV JCRCP 81 and NRS 33.270).

4. A court may issue a temporary order for protection against harassment in the workplace without

written or oral notice to the person who allegedly committed the harassment or the person’s attorney

only if:(a) A verified application is accompanied by an affidavit that contains specific facts which

clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the employer, an

employee of the employer while the employee performs the duties of the employee’s employment

(NOTE: the SBN’s 12/20/12 TPO application was neither verified not accompanied by an affidavit,

(or even a Declaration containing “specific facts” of the required showing) ... (b) The employer and

the employer's attorney, if any, set forth in the affidavit:(1) The efforts, if any, that have been made

to give notice to the person who allegedly committed the harassment; and (2) The facts supporting

waiver of notice requirements...(NOTE: the SBN’s 12/20/12 application contains neither an

affidavit nor even a declaration in lieu thereof setting forth either of that required in NRS

33.270(4)(b)(1)-(2)).

6. If a temporary order for protection against harassment in the workplace is granted, with or

without notice, the employer or the employer’s authorized agent may apply for an extended order

for protection against harassment in the workplace by filing a verified application for an extended

order for protection against harassment in the workplace. If such an application is filed, the

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temporary order remains in effect until the hearing on the application for an extended order is held.

The application must:

(a) In addition to the information required by subsection 2 of NRS 33.250, set forth the facts that

provide the basis for granting an extended order for protection against harassment in the

workplace;

(b) Be filed before the expiration of the temporary order for protection against harassment in the

workplace;...

7. At the hearing on an application filed pursuant to subsection 6, the employer must present

evidence sufficient to support the granting of the application for an extended order for protection

against harassment in the workplace. ...

9. Upon 2 days' notice to an employer who obtained a temporary order for protection against

harassment in the workplace without notice or on such shorter notice to the employer as the court

may prescribe, the person who allegedly committed the harassment may appear and move the

dissolution or modification of the temporary order for protection against harassment in the

workplace...

11. If a court issues an extended order for protection against harassment in the workplace, an

interlocutory appeal lies to the district court, which may affirm, modify or vacate the order in

question...”

On at least two occasions, including on or about 7/26/13 Coughlin filed a Notice of Appeal as

to both the TPO and EPO in RCP2012-000607, which the RJC has refused to transmit to the

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District Court in violation of NV Const Art. 4. Sec. 21 and Knox v. District Court’s express

prohibition against courts of limited jurisdiction creating special rules that only apply to certain

people (especially where the 8/14/13 Admin Order 2013-06 that the RJC has now put in place was

not in existence at such time and where JCRRT 2 makes clear that the JCRRT (especially JCRRT 10

and its formatting requirements) do not apply to these protection order matters.

B. Procedural Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against the deprivation of liberty or property by the

government without due process. Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th

Cir.1993). Procedural due process claims require proof of two elements: (1) a protectable liberty or

property interest; and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections. Thornton v. City of St. Helens,

425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir.2005). As noted, Coughlin has asserted a protectable liberty interest on

the basis of his allegations.

Property interests are not created by the Constitution, but by “existing rules or understandings from

an independent source such as state law rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that

support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id. (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v.

Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). (NOTE: SCR 105 and SCR 119, in addition to NRCP 52, 69, 60,

and WDCR 12 and DCR 13 provide just such a set of rules here). To have a property interest in a

benefit, a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. A benefit

is not a protected entitlement where government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.

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Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005); Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson,

490 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1989). Protected entitlements “arise only when the relevant state law

provisions truly make the conferral of the benefit mandatory.” Or. Entm't Corp. v. City of Beaverton,

233 Fed. App'x 618, 619 (9th Cir.2007) (unpublished disposition).

Whether a substantive interest created by an independent source such as state law “constitutes a

property interest for purposes of the 14th Amendment is ultimately a question of federal

constitutional law.” Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 757. The analysis is two-pronged: first, the

court determines what the state law provides; and second, if state law provides an entitlement, the

court determines whether that entitlement rises to the level of a property interest for the purposes of

the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 757, 766-67.

A. Due Process

Fourteenth Amendment due process falls into one of two classes: (1) substantive due process; and

(2) procedural due process. To prove a violation of either substantive or procedural due process, the

plaintiff must show a deprivation of a cognizable liberty or property interest protected by the

Constitution. Williby v. City of Oakland, 2008 WL 686014, at *4 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 13, 2008).

Coughlin alleges that both due process, ie, those that are procedural or substantive were violated in

607.

i. Substantive Due Process

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Substantive due process protects individuals from arbitrary deprivation of their life, liberty, or

property by the government. Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir.2006). “Only the most

egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in a constitutional sense.” Id. (quoting County

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)). To establish this claim, a plaintiff must show

both (1) a deprivation of life, liberty, or property, and (2) “conscience shocking behavior by the

government.” Id.

Any interpretation of the TPO here (especially in conjunction with RJC Chief Judge Pearson’s ex

parte refusal to grant Coughlin a hearing on the TPO or even an emerency teleconference with the

SBN under NRS 33.270(9), and denying outright Coughlin’s motion to vacate, modify, or dissolve

such TPO) that interprets the order and its reference to “contacting” the SBN to preclude Coughlin

from in any way, via any manner, submitting filings to the SBN in his formal disciplinary hearing

would clearly be violative of both substanive and procedural due process, especially as to Coughlin’s

Fourteenth Amendment protected property right (his law license) and his consitutional right to free

speech and to access the courts.

Further, the SBN and Judge Pearson had judicial notice of Coughlin’s indigency at the time in

question (see RCR2012-001048, RCR2011-063341) precluding any interpretation of the allusion to

“contacting” the SBN that would operate to place a greater burden on Coughlin to file documents

with the SBN (especially where the SBN had never instructed or ordered Coughlin not to fax it, but

rather, Clerk of Court Peters expressly indicated to Coughlin that he may submit filings and serve

such on the SBN via facsimile).

Am. Jur. Injunctions § 24. Difficulty or impossibility of performance or enforcement; lack of

benefit to complainant—Effect of defendant's financial condition

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AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social security

number of any person. DATED 10/30/13

/s/ Zach Coughlin, signed electronically

Zach Coughlin Pro Per Self Representing Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I do hereby certify that, on this date, I, Zach Coughlin I deposited in the United States mail at Reno, Nevada, in a sealed envelope, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document and or electronically served (via electronic method of transmission previously given express permission to utilize by those with requisite authority to provide it, upon which Couglin reasonably relied and or relies), Mikohn satisfactory, and NRS 178.590 facsimiled prior to 5 pm and personally delivered to wcda too:

AMOS R. STEGE, ESQ. ZACHARY N. YOUNG, ESQ. Washoe County DA Office Address: 1 South Sierra P.O. Box 30083 Reno, NV 89520 Phone Number: 775-328-3200 Fax number: 775-325-6703 Email: [email protected] DATED THIS: Dated this 10/30/2013

Served upon whomever Coughlin is legally allowed to serve such upon by whatever means Coughlin is allowed to so serve such as to WCDA/WCPD in 599 and SBN in 607.

/s/ Zach Coughlin

Zach Coughlin, Defendant

INDEX TO EXHIBITS: Exhibit 1: Various relevant materials already propounded In disc form and found at skydrive links

Exhibit 1: 1. Exhibit 1: Various relevant materials on a cd/dvd/discovery already propounded







Sent: Thu 10/31/13 4:24 PM


1 attachment




Hi zachcoughlin,



xoxo,

The Voxox Team







Sent: Thu 10/31/13 4:24 PM


1 attachment




Hi zachcoughlin,



xoxo,

The Voxox Team

