RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WAR PREPARATIONS AND USA ATTACK PROPHECIES

Russians Put New Satan Nuke Into Play

Russia, frustrated with anti-nuke talks with the United states has decided to put an end to the talks and move forward with its plans to upgrade its nuclear defensive and offensive systems, including the construction on a new and more powerful Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). Nicknamed Satan by Western intelligence, the new missile carries a 100-ton warhead. This giant ICBM will take its place at the head of an already impressive missile arsenal which includes the Yars, Topol-M and Bulava-class ballistic missiles sometime in 2015.

This announcement come on the heels of a US announcement that its last B-53 nuclear weapon has been dismantled. The B-53 was the largest bomb in the US arsenal.

Russian president Dimitri Medvedev walked out of talks with the United States back in November over US plans to set up a missile defense system in Europe. The European Phased Adaptive Approach plan is a intricate array of sea and land based missiles which were designed to be used against a missile attack from Iran. The US says that cooperation from Moscow is needed to help the shield work. Moscow on the other hand claims the talks were useless because the US refused to guarantee the missiles would not be aimed at Russia. At that point, Moscow decided to end their particiaption in the talks and shortly after announced it plans to build the Satan Nuke.

Washington claims that the real bone of contention was that Russia wanted access to the secret systems designs and locations, a huge problem for the US. The US legitimately feels that if they give the Russians access to the information, it will make its way to Iran rendering the system useless. The only positive being that both the US and Russia are still in contact and have both announced their desire to see the negotiations through.

Should Russia be given access to the US Missile Shield?

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RUSSIA'S UNDENIABLE NUCLEAR WAR PREPARATIONS

by J. R. Nyquist AUG 27 2007

Since 1998 I have publicly warned of Russias war preparations.

The idea of preparing for nuclear war is absurd for most Americans, because the idea of nuclear war makes no sense in a consumer society.

However that may be, Russias war preparations were as undeniable then as they are today. And Russia is not a consumer society.

In the late 1990s Russia was refurbishing huge nuclear war bunkers and building underground cities.

The only purpose such bunkers and cities could serve is in relation to a future nuclear war. For a country that was supposedly broke to be spending its precious resources on something so expensive, so far out of the way of normal expectations, seemed inexplicable.

Oh well, people would shrug.

The Russians are used to doing this sort of thing. It gives them psychological comfort. Let them do what they want. It neednt trouble us. The public missed the fact, however, that Russia was continuing to violate arms control agreements.

It was not admitting to all the nuclear warheads it possessed, and was not reliably disposing of them. It was developing new, deadly, biological and chemical weapons.

Why in the midst of peace, a few short years after the end of the Cold War, were the Russians adhering to this insane path? Were they anticipating a future war?

The answer must be yes.

And the answer continues to be yes. In the 1990s Russia forged an alliance with China that involved a growing series of joint military exercises.

Why would the Russians do this? Why would they seek to develop a joint military capability that would link Russian missile power with Chinese manpower?

For over a decade the Russians have been providing the Chinese with technology and weapons.

This is not merely a commercial transaction, as some would insist. These transactions are carefully considered strategic steps. Since the mid-1990s, Russia and China have initiated joint-armaments programs that further solidified their military partnership.

It is obsolete thinking to suppose Russia and China are enemies. It must be understood, as a practical matter, that Russia and China are underdog powers locked in a struggle for primacy with the United States.

The only sensible strategy, if Russia and China expect to emerge on top, is to unite against the Americans.

And that is what the two countries have been doing for the past decade.

A week ago today, on August 17, the Russians and Chinese conducted joint military exercises on Russian soil, in the southern Ural Mountains. These coincided with strategic air operations involving Russian nuclear bombers.

The combination of ground exercises with nuclear bomber exercises is a characteristic of Soviet nuclear war theory, which holds that troops must be used to follow up nuclear strikes.

President Putin and Chinas President Hu Jintao watched the exercises while holding a summit in Bishkek (the capital of former Soviet Kyrgyzstan).

While China and Russia insist that their preparations arent aimed at any specific power, only a simpleton would believe them. (I am sad to acknowledge that many Americans, in this regard, are simpletons.)

Last week, in an obvious upgrading of nuclear war readiness, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the resumption of long-range nuclear bomber patrols that had previously been suspended in 1992. I made the decision to restore flights of Russian strategic bombers on a permanent basis, said Putin.

Combat duty has begun. For some reason, Americans cannot digest Putins statement or his decision to resume bomber patrols. Why is this happening? Well, we say to ourselves, there is no reason other than the peculiar psychology of the Russians.

President Bush has not put U.S. strategic bombers on patrol.

And why should he? Russia isnt our enemy. We are all friends. We are all economic partners and allies in the war against terror.

In Washington the State Department spokesman, Sean McCormack, responded to the Russian announcement of permanent strategic bomber patrols by saying, Its interesting.

We certainly are not in the kind of posture we were with what used to be the Soviet Union. Its a different era. If Russia feels as though they want to take some of these old aircraft out of mothballs and get them flying again, thats their decision.

Its as if the Russian military had resumed stamp collecting or archery.

There is no strategic alarm, no threat, no difficulty and no discomfiture. Let them play with their obsolete toys.

We are living in a new era, and these activities no longer trouble us.

The Cold War ended and the animosity between the great powers is gone.

Say good-bye to it. Any evidence to the contrary is not evidence. Were living in a different era. Anyone who doesnt know this, even if they are the president of the Russian Federation, is out-of-step.

One might imagine Washingtons reaction to a Russian missile strike against U.S. targets. Its interesting, the State Department would purr. This is not the sort of missile strike we would have expected from the Soviet Union.

Of course, its a different era. If Russia feels that they want to launch some old, useless missiles, thats their decision.

Our lack of imagination, our inability to grasp our enemys thought process, leads us to dismiss what is obvious. The Russians are getting ready. Why isnt the American side responding?

Why arent the Americans getting ready?

We have been seduced by a series of comforting illusions. We are also absorbed in a struggle against Islamic terrorism (only we are at pains to admit the Islamic aspect of it).

The American shopping mall regime produces stupefaction and complacency.

The regime is predicated on economic optimism and entertainment. This optimism is about to be shattered. The Russians know this is going to happen, and they are preparing even as we fail to prepare.

Experts: U. S. unprepared for nuclear terror attack

"...attempting to evacuate could "put you on a crowded freeway where you'll be stuck in traffic and get the maximum radiation exposure." Yet, "...the only choice for most people would be to flee" because they are unprepared!

By Greg Gordon McClatchy Newspapershttp://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/16812686.htm Thu, Mar. 01, 2007

WASHINGTON - Although the Bush administration has warned repeatedly about the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack and spent more than $300 billion to protect the homeland, the government remains ill-prepared to respond to a nuclear catastrophe.

Experts and government documents suggest that, absent a major preparedness push, the U. S. response to a mushroom cloud could be worse than the debacle after Hurricane Katrina, possibly contributing to civil disorder and costing thousands of lives.

"The United States is unprepared to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear attack," Pentagon analyst John Brinkerhoff concluded in a July 31, 2005, draft of a confidential memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "We were unable to find any group or office with a coherent approach to this very important aspect of homeland security. ...

"This is a bad situation. The threat of a nuclear attack is real, and action is needed now to learn how to deal with one."

Col. Jill Morgenthaler, Illinois' director of homeland security, said there's a "disconnect" between President Bush's and Vice President Dick Cheney's nuclear threat talk and the administration's actions.

"I don't see money being focused on actual response and mitigation to a nuclear threat," she said.

Interviews by McClatchy Newspapers with more than 15 radiation and emergency preparedness experts and a review of internal documents revealed:

The government has yet to launch an educational program, akin to the Cold War-era civil defense campaign promoting fallout shelters, to teach Americans how to shield themselves from radiation, especially from the fallout plume, which could deposit deadly particles up to 100 miles from ground zero.

Analysts estimate that as many as 300,000 emergency workers would be needed after a nuclear attack, but predict that the radiation would scare many of them away from the disaster site.

Hospital emergency rooms wouldn't be able to handle the surge of people who were irradiated or the many more who feared they were.

Medical teams would have to improvise to treat what could be tens of thousands of burn victims because most cities have only one or two available burn-unit beds. Cham Dallas, director of the University of Georgia's Center for Mass Destruction Defense, called the predicament "the worst link in our health care wall."

Several drugs are in development and one is especially promising, but the government hasn't acquired any significant new medicine to counteract radiation's devastating effects on victims' blood-forming bone marrow.

Over the last three years, several federal agencies have taken some steps in nuclear disaster planning. The Department of Health and Human Services has drawn up "playbooks" for a range of attack scenarios and created a Web site to instruct emergency responders in treating radiation victims.

The Energy Department's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is geared to use real-time weather data, within minutes of a bombing, to create a computer model that charts the likely path of a radioactive fallout plume so that the government can warn affected people to take shelter or evacuate. The government also has modeled likely effects in blast zones.

Capt. Ann Knebel, the U. S. Public Health Service's deputy preparedness chief, said her agency is using the models to understand how many people in different zones would suffer from blast injuries, burns or radiation sickness "and to begin to match our resources to the types of injuries."

No matter how great the government's response, a nuclear bomb's toll would be staggering.

The government's National Planning Scenario, which isn't public, projects that a relatively small, improvised 10-kiloton bomb could kill hundreds of thousands of people in a medium-sized city and cause hundreds of billions of dollars in economic losses.

The document, last updated in April 2005, projects that a bomb denoted at ground level in Washington, D. C., would kill as many as 204,600 people, including many government officials, and would injure or sicken 90,800. Another 24,580 victims would die of radiation-related cancer in ensuing years. Radioactive debris would contaminate a 3,000-square-mile area, requiring years-long cleanup, it said.

Brinkerhoff, author of the confidential memo for the Joint Chiefs, estimated that nearly 300,000 National Guardsmen, military reservists and civil emergency personnel would be needed to rescue, decontaminate, process and manage the 1.5 million evacuees.

The job would include cordoning off the blast zone and manning a 200-mile perimeter around the fallout area to process and decontaminate victims, to turn others away from the danger and to maintain order. Brinkerhoff estimated that the military would need to provide 140,000 of the 300,000 responders, but doubted that the Pentagon would have that many. And the Public Health Service's Knebel cited studies suggesting that the "fear factor" would reduce civil emergency responders by more than 30 percent.

Planning for an attack seems to evoke a sense of resignation among some officials.

"We are concerned about the catastrophic threats and are trying to improve our abilities for disasters," said Gerald Parker, a deputy assistant secretary in Health and Human Services' new Office of Preparedness and Response. "But you have to look at what's pragmatic as well."

Dr. Andrew Garrett of Columbia University's National Center for Disaster Preparedness, put it this way: "People are just very intimidated to take on the problem" because "there may not be apparent solutions right now."

The U. S. intelligence community considers it a "fairly remote" possibility that terrorists will obtain weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium, which is more accessible, to build a nuclear weapon, said a senior intelligence official who requested anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the information. The official said intelligence agencies worry mainly about a makeshift, radioactive "dirty bomb" that would kill at most a few hundred people, contaminate part of a city and spread panic.

But concerns about a larger nuclear attack are increasing at a time when North Korea is testing atomic weapons and Iran is believed to be pursuing them. Al-Qaida's worldwide network of terrorists also reportedly has been reconstituted.

The 9/11 Commission's 2004 report rated a nuclear bombing as the most consequential threat facing the nation.

"We called for a maximum effort against the threat," Lee Hamilton, the panel's vice chairman, told McClatchy Newspapers. "My impression is that we've got a long ways to go. ... I just think it would overwhelm us."

Dr. Ira Helfand, a Massachusetts emergency care doctor who co-authored a report on nuclear preparedness last year by the Physicians for Social Responsibility, chided the administration for trying "to create a climate of fear rather than to identify a problem and address it." The doctors' group found the government "dangerously unprepared" for a nuclear attack.

Government officials say they have drafted playbooks for every sort of radioactive attack, from a "dirty bomb" to a large, sophisticated device.

But radiation experts and government memos emphasize the chaos that a bigger bomb could create. Emergency responders could face power outages, leaking gas lines, buckled bridges and tunnels, disrupted communications from the blast's electromagnetic pulse and streets clogged by vehicle crashes because motorists could be blinded by the bright flash accompanying detonation.

No equipment exists to shield rescue teams from radiation, and survivors would face similar risks if they tried to walk to safety.

Defense analyst Brinkerhoff proposed having troops gradually tighten the ring around the blast zone as the radiation diminished, but warned that the government lacks the hundreds of radiation meters needed to ensure that they wouldn't endanger themselves. He said those making rescue forays would need dosimeters to monitor their exposure.

Emergency teams would have no quick test to determine the extent of survivors' radiation exposure. They would have to rely on tests for white blood cell declines or quiz people about their whereabouts during the blast and whether they had vomited.

For those with potentially lethal acute radiation sickness, only limited medication is available, said Richard Hatchett, who's overseeing nearly $100 million in research on radiation countermeasures for the National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases.

The Department of Health and Human Services might commit to a limited purchase of one promising drug as early as this month. But currently federal health officials plan to fly victims of acute radiation sickness to hospitals across the country for bone marrow transplants.

The National Planning Scenario expressed concern that uninformed survivors of an attack could be lethally exposed to radiation because they failed to seek shelter, preferably in a sealed basement, for three to four days while radioactive debris decayed. Another big problem: Only a small percentage of Americans store bottled water, canned food and other essentials for an ordeal in a shelter.

Helfand said it would be too late to help most people near the blast, but that advance education could save many people in the path of the fallout.

Education is critical, he said, because attempting to evacuate could "put you on a crowded freeway where you'll be stuck in traffic and get the maximum radiation exposure."

California's emergency services chief, Henry Renteria, said it might be time "to re-establish an urban area radiation shelter program."

Brinkerhoff wrote that people could build their own radiation-proof shelters if the government engaged in "large-scale civil defense planning" and gave them meters and dosimeters to monitor the radiation.

Since there hasn't been "any enthusiasm to address this kind of preparedness," Brinkerhoff concluded, the only choice for most people would be to flee.

Medvedev: Russia may target missile defense sites

APWed, Nov 23, 2011

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev speaks at an award ceremony in the Gorki residence

MOSCOW (AP) Russia will deploy new missiles aimed at U.S. missile defense sites in Europe if Washington goes ahead with the planned shield despite Russia's concerns, President Dmitry Medvedev said Wednesday.

Russia will station missiles in its westernmost Kaliningrad region and other areas if Russia and NATO fail to reach a deal on the U.S.-led missile defense plans, he said in a tough statement that seemed to be aimed at rallying domestic support.

Russia considers the plans for missile shields in Europe, including in Romania and Poland, to be a threat to its nuclear forces, but the Obama administration insists they are meant to fend off a potential threat from Iran.

Moscow has agreed to consider NATO's proposal last fall to cooperate on the missile shield, but the talks have been deadlocked over how the system should operate. Russia has insisted that the system should be run jointly, which NATO has rejected.

Medvedev also warned that Moscow may opt out of the New START arms control deal with the United States and halt other arms control talks if the U.S. proceeds. The Americans had hoped that the treaty would stimulate progress further ambitious arms control efforts, but such talks have stalled over tension on the missile plans.

"The United States and its NATO partners as of now aren't going to take our concerns about the European missile defense into account," a stern Medvedev said, adding that if the alliance continues to "stonewall" Russia it will take retaliatory action.

The U.S. plan calls for placing land- and sea-based radars and interceptors in European locations over the next decade and upgrading them over time.

Medvedev warned that Russia will deploy short-range Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, a Baltic Sea exclave bordering Poland, and place weapons in other areas in Russia's west and south to target U.S. missile defense sites.

Medvedev added that prospective Russian strategic nuclear missiles will be fitted with systems that would allow them to penetrate prospective missile defenses.

He and other Russian leaders have made similar threats in the past, and the latest statement appears to be aimed at domestic audience ahead of Dec. 4 parliamentary elections.

Medvedev, who is set to step down to allow Prime Minister Vladimir Putin reclaim the presidency in March's elections, leads the ruling United Russia party list in the parliamentary vote.

A sterm warning to the U.S. and NATO issued by Medvedev seems to be directed at rallying nationalist votes in the polls.

Putin not able to track all nukes

By The Washington Times

Tuesday, May 1, 2007

Russian President Vladimir Putin told President Bush he could not account for all of Moscows nuclear weapons at the same time al Qaeda was seeking to purchase three Russian nuclear devices on the black market, former CIA Director George J. Tenet said.

In his new book, Mr. Tenet states that shortly after the September 11 attacks, Mr. Bush briefed Mr. Putin about a Pakistani nongovernmental group, Umma Tameer-e-Nau. The group, whose members included extremist nuclear scientists, was helping the Taliban and al Qaeda develop nuclear arms.

The president asked Putin point blank if Russia could account for all of its [nuclear] material, he states in his book, At the Center of the Storm.

Choosing his words carefully, the Russian president said he was confident he could account for everything under his watch, Mr. Tenet stated, noting that the deliberately ambiguous response tended to confirm reports of nuclear smuggling shortly after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Tenet said the CIA informed Russian intelligence about former Soviet nuclear scientists who were working with al Qaeda.

Russian officials refused to delve into any matters related to the security of their nuclear facilities and nuclear weapons, including reports sourced to Russian officials concerning possible theft of Russian suitcase nukes, Mr. Tenet stated.

The comments contradict Russian government claims for the past 16 years that no nuclear arms were missing.

Alexander Lebed, a former Russian national security adviser, stated in 1997 that Russia could not account for about 80 portable nuclear weapons, a claim later denied by Moscow.

Mr. Tenet disclosed the presidential exchange in explaining detailed intelligence reports from late 2002 to spring 2003 stating that senior al Qaeda leaders were negotiating for the purchase of three Russian nuclear devices.

The former CIA chief identified the al Qaeda nuclear procurement group as including No. 2 leader Ayman al-Zawahri and Abdel al-Aziz al-Masri, who is described as the nuclear chief for the terrorist group.

The disclosures in Mr. Tenets book are generating criticism from people who say some meetings and dates described in the book are inaccurate.

Kenneth deGraffenreid, a former senior intelligence official, said the book cannot be gauged for accuracy because the CIA continues to withhold a critical inspector-general report on the agencys pre-September 11 activities.

Michelle Van Cleave, a former high-ranking counterintelligence coordinator, said Mr. Tenets book and its kiss and tell format are more than bad manners.

Insights into how decisions are made the thought processes and confidences and personal traits of our senior leaders are real intelligence jewels, she said. Our enemies hunger for these kinds of insights. Of all people, George Tenet knows that. He at least could have waited until the president was out of office before baring his soul.

Intelligence officials said the book inaccurately quoted Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Tina Shelton during an August 2002 meeting at the CIA, falsely claiming that Miss Shelton said connections between Iraq and al Qaeda were an open-and-shut case.

Officials who were present at the meeting said the statement was never made.

CIA spokesman Mark Mansfield praised the book as an accurate depiction of Mr. Tenets service and leadership at the CIA during a time of great intensity and challenge.

Saturday 24 November 2007

Top police officer warns that nuclear attack is inevitable

Scotland must prepare for absolute terror

Rob Edwards, Environment Editor

Custom Disqus identifier:

http://www.heraldscotland.com/archive/

A nuclear attack by terrorists causing widespread panic, chaos and death is inevitable and will happen soon, a senior Scottish police officer has warned.

Efforts to prevent terrorist groups from obtaining materials that could be made into radioactive dirty bombs - or even crude nuclear explosives - are bound to fail, he said. And the result will be horror on an unprecedented scale.

"These materials are undoubtedly out there, and undoubtedly will end up in terrorists' hands, and undoubtedly will be used by terrorists some time soon," he declared. "We must plan for failure and prepare for absolute terror."

Dickinson is assistant chief constable with Lothian and Borders Police, and has responsibility through the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland for protecting Scotland from chemical and nuclear attacks. He has been closely involved in co-ordinating the country's counter-terrorism response.

He said: "An incident will continue for days and all the public will see is people dying without reason. What will we do when our children come home from school with blisters on their skin and their parents don't know what to do?

"What happens if 10 deaths, 50 deaths, 100 deaths start occurring in an unconnected and random way all over the country? The public will be rightly and understandably terrified."

Casualties caused by radiation, which most people don't understand, would trigger widespread "panic and fear", said Dickinson. And the response of the emergency services "would be chaotic" because of a shortage of resources.

The police capability for dealing with the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threat - known as CBRN - needs to be increased, he argued. "I haven't got as many officers with protective equipment as I would like," he added. "We must prepare for the worst."

Dickinson delivered his dire warnings to an international conference in Edinburgh last week. More than 300 experts from 70 countries were taking part in a high-level meeting organised by the UN International Atomic Energy Agency on the risks of nuclear terrorism.

The police response to a CBRN incident when it happened would have a "profound effect on our communities which should not be underestimated", he said. The protective clothing that officers would have to wear would look "terrifying".

As Dickinson made the point in his speech on Wednesday, one of his fellow police officers appeared dramatically on the stage dressed head to toe in a regulation black protection suit. With his face completely obscured by a gas mask, the officer then walked slowly through the delegates seated in the Edinburgh International Conference Centre.

Decontamination after a radiation attack would be an "enormous cost", Dickinson contended. It would far exceed the multi-million pound bill for cleaning up the 50 premises contaminated with polonium-210 after the poisoning of the former KGB agent, Alexander Litvinenko, in London last year.

There would also be a huge drain on resources from having to reassure many people who were unharmed but worried. The additional monitoring and clean-up work would be "a major problem", he said.

Worldwide efforts to stem the spread of radioactive materials by the governments represented at the conference were vital, Dickinson concluded. "But the sad fact is that your work will fail."

Dickinson's nightmare analysis was backed up by Dr Frank Barnaby, a nuclear consultant who used to work at the Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Establishment in Berkshire. "The amazing thing is that this hasn't happened already," he told the Sunday Herald.

"We should expect it any minute. It's an obvious thing for a terrorist to do. A primitive nuclear explosion would simply eliminate the centre of a city like Glasgow or Edinburgh."

The Edinburgh conference heard a series of other warnings about the risks of radioactive materials being stolen and used to cause devastation.

"As the terrorists look for the next spectacular attack, we know that al-Qaeda in Iraq is calling on nuclear scientists to join in the jihad," said William Nye, director of counter-terrorism and intelligence at the Home Office in London.

Richard Hoskins, from the International Atomic Energy Agency's Office of Nuclear Security in Vienna, revealed that there had been 1266 confirmed incidents in which radioactive materials had been stolen or lost around the world since 1993.

Most involved radiation sources that could be made into dirty bombs, although in 18 instances small amounts of bombs-grade uranium or plutonium had been seized.

Russia to deploy monsterous Satan nuclear weapon inarsenal

Posted on December 21, 2011 by The Extinction Protocol

December 21, 2011 MOSCOW Russia, frustrated with anti-nuke talks with the United States has decided to put an end to the talks and move forward with its plans to upgrade its nuclear defensive and offensive systems, including the construction on a new and more powerful Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).Nicknamed Satan by Western intelligence, the new missile carries a 100-ton warhead.This giant ICBM will take its place at the head of an already impressive missile arsenal which includes the Yars, Topol-M and Bulava-class ballistic missiles sometime in 2015. This announcement comes on the heels of a US announcement that its last B-53 nuclear weapon has been dismantled. The B-53 was the largest bomb in the U.S. arsenal. Russian president Dimitri Medvedev walked out of talks with the United States back in November over U.S. plans to set up a missile defense system in Europe. The European Phased Adaptive Approach plan is an intricate array of sea and land based missiles which were designed to be used against a missile attack from Iran. The U.S. says that cooperation from Moscow is needed to help the shield work. Moscow on the other hand claims the talks were useless because the U.S. refused to guarantee the missiles would not be aimed at Russia. At that point, Moscow decided to end their participation in the talks and shortly after announced it plans to build the Satan Nuke. Inquisitor

Russia upgrading nuclear arsenal with new 'Satan' ICBM

By JohnThomas Didymus

Dec 21, 2011 in World

1 comment

By JohnThomas Didymus.

Moscow - Russia has reacted to what it says is the security threat the new U.S. defense system in Europe poses. Russia says it's upgrading the old RS-36 Voyevoda ICBM, known in the West as the "Satan missile," by building a new 100-ton ICBM.

According to the English Pravda, Sergei Karakaev, commander of the missile troops said: "The decision about the creation of the new silo-based missile system with a liquid-fuel heavy missile has been made. The complex will have increased possibilities in overcoming the prospective missile defense system of the United States."

Pravda reports further that the new missile will go into service in 2015.

The Russian government said it was building the new ballistic missile to "preserve parity in the field." Business Insider reports that Russia's Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) will be renovating their Topol-M and Yars RS-24 missile systems and constructing an enormous new 100-ton ballistic missile. According to the official Russian Pravda, "Russia does not stand against the US missile defense system. Russia stands against the creation of the missile defense system, which would be directly aimed against Russia to potentially reduce the possibilities of the Russian nuclear containment forces."

Analyst see the latest move by Russia as in protest of the European Missile Defense Shield being built by the U.S. Digital Journal reported in November that the,

"Russian President threatened that if the U.S. proceeds with the planned European missile shield system, Russia will deploy Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad border area between Poland and Lithuania to strike against the system."

The Russian president , according to Digital Journal, said that:

"I have given the armed forces the task of drawing up plans to destroy the information and command and control systems of the (US/NATO) anti-missile shield...Our NATO partners are not for now showing any readiness to take our concerns about the architecture of the European missile shield into account, something which convinces us that their plans are aimed at Russia."

The Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, also said that Russia may pull out of any disarmament treaties it has made with the U.S.

Business Insider reports that the Russian Ria Novosti said the Russians have successfully carried out short-range interceptor missile test and are developing their own missile defense shield.

The Inquisitr reports that the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, abandoned talks with the U.S. in November over its new European missile defense system. The Russians abandoned the talks after they accused the U.S. of refusing to guarantee that the defense system will not be used against Russia. The U.S., however, alleged that Moscow's demand was to access the secret system's designs and locations, which it cannot allow. The U.S. says that the Russians may share the information with Iran against which the U.S.missile defense system is being deployed.

Read more: http://digitaljournal.com/article/316513#ixzz1jB4eIw9t

SS-18 Mod 4

Country:

Russian Federation

Alternate Name:

Satan, RS-20V

Class:

ICBM

Basing:

Silo Based

Length:

34.30m

Diameter:

3.00m

Launch Weight:

211,100kg

Payload:

10 MIRV warheads

Warhead:

Nuclear 500 kT (x10 MIRV)

Propulsion:

2-stage liquid

Range:

11000km

Status:

Operational

In Service:

1982-?

Details

Russian Designation: RS-20VThe SS-18 is an intercontinental-range, silo-based, liquid propellant ballistic missile deployed by the Soviet Union. It is the largest of the fourth generation Soviet intercontinental-range missile and the only heavy missile allowed under the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). A total ofsix versions are known to exist. The SS-18 was extremely similar in design to its predecessor, the SS-9.The SS-18 Mod 4 is an extremely powerful strategic weapon. It carries Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads, each with a nuclear yield greater than that of many contemporary missiles. It has range such that all major targets within the continental United States could be attacked. The SS-18 Mod4 is simply an upgraded version of the SS-18 Mod 3. The Mod 3may have beeninsufficient for an effective anti-silo attack, but the upgrades for the Mod 4 make the missile a likely candidate for an attack against hardened targets. An SS-18 Mod 4 warhead has a decent chance at destroying a US silo and the probability of a successful strike can be significantly increased by aiming multiple MIRV at a single silo. The MIRV warheads could also be used to destroy population centers, making the SS-18 Mod 4 a viable asset for counter-value targets.The SS-18 Mod 3 and 4 have the same general design; the only difference is MIRV accuracy. Whether the Mod 4 brought accuracy to 650 m CEP or improved upon this accuracy is unclear. The missile uses an inertial navigation system with digital computer guidance and control. The missile is a massive 211,100 kg, with a length of 34.3 m and a 3.0 m diameter. It uses a two-stage liquid propellant engine.The SS-18 Mod4 can deploy its 10 MIRV warheads up to a range of 11,000 km. Each MIRV warhead has a yield of 500 kT. The SS-18 entered development in 1969 as a replacement for the SS-9 missile. It was essentially a redesigned, modernized SS-9. The flight tests started in 1973 and the Mod 1 version of the missile was first deployed operationally in 1975 within converted SS-9 missile silos and launch complexes. The SS-18 Mod 2 entered service in 1978, with the Mod 3 and Mod 4 entering service in 1980 and 1982 respectively. By 1991, there were 308 SS-18 missiles in silos grouped among six major launch sites.The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) required the number of SS-18 missiles to be reduced to 154 by 2003. As a result, the early versions of the SS-18 were removed from service to maintain the more advanced models; all Mod 1 missiles were removed by 1994 while the Mod 2 missiles were removed by 2001. The requirement of the START I has been fulfilled, as only 145 SS-18 missiles remained in service by the end of 2002. This was accomplished by destroying or converting the missiles into satellite launch vehicles. Therewerebelieved to be about58 Mod4 missiles still in service in 2001. As the project to deconstruct SS-18 missiles is still underway, it is believed that only 70 of the missiles were operational in July 2008.The Mod 5 and 6 missiles were first launched in 1988. These models have improved accuracy, a similar first and second stage motor, similar accuracy and a similar payload.Due to an extended life program they will be in service until 2020.(1)

Footnotes

1. Janes Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue50, ed. Duncan Lennox,(Surrey: Janes Information Group, January 2009), 167-69.

Russia Developing a New ICBM

January 20, 2011::The Telegraph::News

The head of Russian General Engineering (Rosobshemash), a Russian military contractor, has told the ITAR-TASS news agency that a replacement for the mainstay of Russia's ICBM nuclear deterrent, the SS-18, may be completed as early as 2017.

The SS-18, the only 'heavy' (she weighs wellover 200 tons) ICBM allowed to Russia under the original Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, has a range (depending on modifications) of 11,000-16,000 km, putting all of the continental United States easily within range. The replacement now under development, brags the head of Rosobshemash, will be unstoppable by either U.S. missile defenses or the NATO missile shield now being developedfor Europe.(Article, Link)

Missile details: SS-18 Mod 4

New RS-24 Missiles to Replace Older Russian Systems

June 12, 2007::Interfax::News

At a press conference, Commander Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov confirmed that Russia's new RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) will replace older missiles as they are retired over the coming years, Interfax-AVN reported on June 12. Specifically, the RS-24s will replace the RS-18s (SS-19, Stiletto) and the RS-20s (SS-18, Satan), which carry six and ten warheads respectively.(Article, Link)

More stories on: Russia

Missile details: SS-18 Mod 3, SS-18 Mod 4, SS-19 Mod 2

Russias Strategic Missile Troops Holding War Game

March 16, 2006::RIA-Novosti::News

Russias Strategic Missile Troops are conducting wargames that include the deployment of mobile ground-based missile systems, according to Russian news sources. Over 2,000 troops and 400 pieces of equipment are taking part in the exercise, which will include the deployment of SS-25 Sickle missile systems and SS-18 Satan heavy missiles. According to the SMT, the purpose of the exercise is to improve cooperation between command and control elements while fighting off an enemy attack. The wargames will run from March 14 through 18.(Article, Link)

More stories on: Russia

Missile details: SS-18 Mod 4, SS-N-5

Russia Tests SS-18

December 22, 2004::Itar-Tass::News

Russia today tested its SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile, which it test fired from the Dombarovsky missile base in the Odenberg region of Russia, traveling some 6,000km to the Kura testing ground on the far eastern Kamchatka peninsula. This was the first test of a missile being launched from within Russia proper since 1991, reports Interfaxmost test launches of the SS-18 take place from Kazakhstan. The missile in question was described as the RS-20V (R-36M2) Voyevoda, which has been in service for some 16 years, and which will remain in service for another ten or 15 years. It is known as the SS-18 or as Satan in the West. Of the two versions or modifications of SS-18s currently deployed, this was probably the SS-18 Mod 4. Russia reportedly has about 40-50 of these missiles currently in service. Russia is expected to test one more missile in 2004, the Topol-M, this Friday, December 24.(More )

RIA Novosti on SS-18, upcoming Topol-M, tests

Podvig on SS-18 launch

More stories on: Russia, Testing - Foreign

Missile details: SS-18 Mod 3, SS-18 Mod 4

Two More Russian Missile Tests in 2004

November 9, 2004::Interfax::News

Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced today, during a meeting with Russian President Putin, that Russia will conduct an additional two launches of ballistic missiles in 2004, of the silo-launched SS-18 (RS-20) heavy missile, and of the mobile Topol-M, the last test of the Topol-M before it is more fully adopted for service. At the meeting, Ivanov apparently referred to the SS-18 by its Western name, Satan, prompting Putin to call the missiles by the Russian name, saying, Please use our own names, there is no need to say Satan and the like, and Let those people over there who have objections use the NATO terminology, according to press reports.(Article, Link)

More stories on: Russia

Missile details: SS-18 Mod 4, SS-27

Status of Russian Strategic Forces

October 20, 2004::News

Pavel Podvig, editor of Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, reports that exchange data under the START Treaty was released earlier this month, updating the number and type of Russias deployed ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads. Currently, Russia is said to have some 874 delivery platforms, fielding some 3885 large, strategic, nuclear warheads. Some 315 SS-25 (Topol) road-mobile missiles are now deployed, though their numbers will be diminishing. Some 15 SS-24 rail-mobile missiles are said to have been decommissioned in the past year, as well as a few heavy SS-18s. While the older missiles are phased out, newer ones replace them. Most importantly the new and advanced SS-27 (Topol-M) missiles continue to be deployed in silos. Four SS-27s are expected to be deployed in December 2004, and an additional ten in 2005-2006.(Article, Link)

More stories on: Russia

Missile details: SS-18 Mod 4, SS-24, SS-25, SS-27

Russia Tests SS-N-23 and SS-18 Ballistic Missiles

June 29, 2004::Express India::News

Russia today successfully tested a submarine launched RSM-54 (SS-N-23 or Skiff) ballistic missile from the Yekaterinburg Delta IV-class missile submarine submerged in the Barents Sea. The missile traveled some 7,000 km before reaching its target, the Kura testing ground on the Kamchatka Peninsula, located on Russias Pacific coast. The missiles flight across Russia lasted only some 28 minutes. The SS-N-23 missile tested today was the same type as those which failed to launch during naval exercises attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin in February. In addition, Russia also launched an SS-18, or RS-20, intercontinental ballistic missile. The SS-18 or Satan missile was launched from the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan.(Article, Link)

More stories on: Russia, Testing - Foreign

Missile details: SS-18 Mod 4, SS-N-23

Russia Extending Life of ICBMs

May 6, 2004::Itar-Tass::News

Speaking to journalists, Russian Strategic Missile Troops commander Col.-Gen. Nikolay Solovtsov said that the service life of Russian ICBMs would be extended an additional 10-15 years, for a total of 25-30 years, reports ITAR TASS. Though Solovtsov did not specify which missiles were being extended, he was likely referring to SS-18 and SS-19s. He attributed the extension of the missiles usability to good maintenance. Equally relevant, however, is the cash-strapped nature of the advanced Topol-M (SS-27) missile deployment, which continues to proceed but is currently behind schedule in producing replacing older ICBMs. Solovtsov seemed to indicate that the Topol-M deployments would be largely complete in 10 years: After 2015, the mainstay of the SMT group will be the Topol-M missile systems, both silo-based and mobiles ones, with various armaments.(Article, Link)

More stories on: Russia

Missile details: SS-18 Mod 4, SS-19 Mod 2, SS-27

Home::Missiles of the World

R-36 (missile)

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R-36; NATO reporting name: SS-18 Satan

Type

Intercontinental ballistic missile

Placeoforigin

USSR

Service history

Inservice

1967 - Present

Usedby

Soviet and Russian Strategic Rocket Forces

Production history

Manufacturer

Yuzhny Machine-Building Plant

Specifications

Weight

209,600 kg (462,000 lb)

Length

32.2m (106ft)

Diameter

3.05m (10.0ft)

Warhead

Three stage fission-fusion-fission, over 20 Mt of TNT

Detonationmechanism

Airburst

Engine

Two-stage liquid propellant

Operationalrange

10,20016,000 km (depending on R-36M missile variants)

Speed

up to 7.9 km/s

Guidancesystem

Inertial, autonomous

Accuracy

220700 m CEP (depending on R-36M missile variants)

Launchplatform

Silo

The R-36, (Russian: -36) is a family of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and space launch vehicles designed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The original R-36 was produced under the Soviet industry designation 8K67 and was given the NATO reporting name SS-9 Scarp. The later version, the R-36M was produced under the GRAU designations 15A14 and 15A18 and was given the NATO reporting name SS-18 Satan. This missile was viewed by certain U.S. analysts as giving the Soviet Union first strike advantage over the U.S., particularly because of its very heavy throw weight and extremely large number of re-entry vehicles. Some versions of the R-36M were deployed with 10 warheads and up to 40 penetration aids and the missile's high throw-weight made it theoretically capable of carrying more warheads or penetration aids. Contemporary U.S. missiles, such as the Minuteman III, carried up to three warheads at most.

Contents

1. 1 Description

1. 2 R-36M (SS-18) variants

1. 2.1 Deployed variants of R-36M missiles[2][3]

1. 3 Development

1. 4 Multiple warheads

1. 5 Deployment

1. 6 R-36ORB

1. 7 Elimination

1. 8 Derivatives

1. 9 Operators

1. 10 See also

1. 11 References

1. 12 External links

Description

The R-36 (SS-9) is a two-stage rocket powered by a liquid bipropellant, with UDMH as fuel and nitrogen tetroxide as an oxidizer. It carries one of three types of re-entry vehicles (RVs) developed especially for this missile:

1. The Mod 1 and Mod 2 carried single nuclear warheads of 18 and 25 megatons (mt) of TNT yield respectively.

1. The Mod 4 carried three multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV).

An additional version, the Mod 3, was proposed (it was to be a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), a missile that travels through space in a low-earth orbit), but was not adopted due to the Outer Space Treaty.

The R-36P missile was developed to carry the Mod 4 warhead, while the R-36O (the letter O) was to be for the Mod 3 FOBS. R-36 and R-36P missiles were hot launched from their silos.

The R-36M (SS-18) is similar to the R-36 in design, but has the capacity to mount a MIRV payload of 10 warheads, each with a 550750 kt yield, or a single warhead of up to 20 mt. Throw-weight of the missile is 8,800kg. This makes the Soviet R-36 the world's heaviest ICBM; for comparison, the heaviest US ICBM (the retired LGM-118 Peacekeeper, that carried 10 warheads of 300 kT each) had less than a half of this at 4,000kg. The R-36M has two stages. The first is a 460,000 kgf (4.5 MN) thrust motor with four combustion chambers and nozzles. The second stage is a single-chamber 77,000 kgf (755 kN) thrust motor.

R-36M (SS-18) variants

1. R-36M (SS-18 Mod 1): The SS-18 Mod 1 carried a single large reentry vehicle, with a warhead yield of 18-25 MT, a distance of about 6000nm. In January 1971, cold-launch tests began during which the mortar launch was perfected. The actual flight tests for the single-RV Mod 1 began on 21 February 1973, though some sources suggest that testing began in October 1972. The testing phase of the R-36M with various different types of warheads was finished in October 1975 and on 30 December 1975 deployment began (though some Western sources suggest that an initial operational capability was reached in early 1975). A total of 56 were deployed by 1977, though all were replaced by Mod 3 or Mod 4 missiles by 1984. These high-yield weapons were assessed in the West as possibly developed to attack American Minuteman ICBM launch control centers. Tom Clancy described this potential tasking as the ability to 'turn Cheyenne Mountain into Cheyenne Lake.'[1]

1. R-36M (SS-18 Mod 2): The SS-18 Mod 2 included a post-boost vehicle and up to eight reentry vehicles, each with a warhead yield estimated at between 0.5 to 1.5 MT, with a range capability of about 5500nm. The MIRVs were placed in pairs, and a post boost vehicle with a command structure and a propulsion system were contained in the nose cone of the R-36M. The flight tests of the MIRVed Mod 2 began in September 1973 (though some Western sources suggest that the initial flight test of the Mod 2 MIRV version occurred in August 1973), with IOC in 1975. Approximately 132 were deployed by 1978, but the post-boost vehicle design was seriously flawed, and the Mod 2 missiles were all replaced by the Mod 4 variant by 1983.

1. R-36M (SS-18 Mod 3): The SS-18 Mod 3 carried a single large reentry vehicle that was an improved version of the SS-18 Mod 1. On 16 August 1976, a few months after the R-36M entered service, the development of an improved modification of the R-36M (15A14) was approved. This missile subsequently received the designation R-36MUTTh (15A18) and was developed by KB Yuzhnoye (OKB-586) through December 1976. The R-36MUTTh was capable of carrying two different nose cones. On 29 November 1979, deployment of the improved R-36M with a single reentry vehicle carrying a 18-25 MT warhead (SS-18 Mod 3) began.

1. R-36MUTTh (SS-18 Mod 4): The SS-18 Mod 4 was probably designed to attack and destroy ICBMs and other hardened targets in the US. Its increasing accuracy made it possible to reduce the yield of the warheads and allowed an increase in the number of warheads from 8 to 10. According to some Western estimates, evidence suggested that the Mod 4 may be capable of carrying as many as 14 RVs (this may reflect observation of the deployment of countermeasures intended to overcome a ballistic missile defense, or to confuse American attack characterization systems). The flight-design tests of the R-36MUTTh began on 31 October 1977 and in November 1979 the flight tests of the MIRVed missile were completed. The first three regiments were put on alert on 18 September 1979. During 1980 a total of 120 SS-18 Mod 4 missiles were deployed, replacing the last remaining R-36 (SS-9) missiles. In 19821983 the remaining R-36M missiles were also replaced with the new R-36MUTTh and the total number of deployed missiles reached the maximum 308 ceiling established in the SALT-1 treaty. The SS-18 Mod 4 force had the estimated capability to destroy 65 to 80 percent of US ICBM silos using two nuclear warheads against each. Even after this type of attack, it was estimated that more than 1000 SS-18 warheads would be available for further strikes against targets in the US. After 2009, the SS-18 Mod 4s were all eliminated in favor of the newer SS-18 Mod 5.

1. R-36M2 Voivode (SS-18 Mod 5): The newer, more accurate SS-18 Mod 5 version placed in converted silos allowed the SS-18 to remain the bulwark of the SRF's hard-target-kill capability. The Mod 5 carries 10 MIRVs, each having a higher yield than the Mod 4 warheads. The Mod 5 warheads have nearly twice the yield of the Mod 4 (approximately 750 KT to 1 MT) according to Western estimates, though Russian sources suggest a yield of 550-750 KT each. The increase in the Mod 5's warhead yield, along with improved accuracy, would, under the START treaty, help allow the Russians to maintain their hard-target-kill wartime requirements even with the 50 percent cut in heavy ICBMs the START agreement required. The technical proposals to build a modernized heavy ICBM were made in June 1979. The missile subsequently received the designation R-36M2 Voivode and the industrial index number 15A18M. The design of the R-36 M2 Voivode was completed in June 1982. The R-36M2 consisted of a series of new engineering features. The engine of the second stage is completely built in the fuel tank (earlier this was only used on SLBMs) and the design of the transport-launching canister was altered. Unlike the R-36M, the 10 warheads on the post-boost vehicle are located on a special frame in two circles. The flight tests of the R-36M2 equipped with 10 MIRVs began in March 1986 and were completed in March 1988. The first regiment with these missiles was put on alert on 30 July 1988 and was deployed on 11 August 1988.

1. R-36M2 Voivode (SS-18 Mod 6): The flight tests of the R-36M2 missile carrying a single warhead (SS-18 Mod 6) with a yield of 20 MT were completed in September 1989 and deployment began in August 1991. Ten Mod 6 missiles were deployed. One intended use of these large warheads was high altitude detonation to incapacitate electronics and communications through a very large electromagnetic pulse. The SS-18 Mod 6 missiles were all decommissioned by late 2009.

At full deployment, before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, 308 SS-18 launch silos were operational. After the breakup of the USSR, 204 of these were located on the territory of the Russian Federation and 104 on the territory of newly independent Kazakhstan. The dismantling of 104 launchers located in Kazakhstan was completed in September 1996. The START II treaty was to eliminate all SS-18 missiles but it did not enter into force and the missiles remained on duty. Russia has steadily decreased the number of operational SS-18s and by July 2009, only 59 (all of the 10 MIRV Mod 5 version) remain. About 40 missiles will have their service lives extended so that they remain in service until about 2020. With the retirement of the 20 megaton SS-18 Mod 6 warheads, the highest yield weapon in service with any nation is the estimated 5 MT Chinese Dong Feng 5 (DF-5) ICBM (CSS-4) warhead.

All R-36 variants were designed to be launched from silos in dispersed and hardened locations. The R-36M is placed into its 39 m deep silo in a tubular storage/launch container. Upon launch the missile is shot out of the tube, mortar-fashion, by a piston, driven by the expansion of gases from a slow-burning black powder charge inside the piston. The missile's main engine is ignited tens of metres above the ground, preventing any damage to the internal equipment of the silo itself from the rocket engine's fiery efflux.[citation needed]

Deployed variants of R-36M missiles[2][3]

System:

R-36M

R-36M

R-36M

R-36MUTTH

R-36MUTTH

R-36M2

Treaty-designation:

RS-20A

RS-20A1

RS-20A2

RS-20B

RS-20B

RS-20V

GRAU-designation:

15A14

15A14

15A14

15A18

15A18

15A18M

NATO-designation:

SS-18 Satan Mod 1

SS-18 Satan Mod 2

SS-18 Satan Mod 3

SS-18 Satan Mod 4

SS-18 Satan Mod 5

SS-18 Satan Mod 6

Deployment:

19741983

19761980

19761986

19792005

19862009

1988Present

Maximum deployed number:

148

10

30

278

30

58

Length:

32.6 m

32.6 m

32.6 m

36.3 m

36.3 m

34.3 m

Diameter:

3.00 m

3.00 m

3.00 m

3.00 m

3.00 m

3.00 m

Launch weight:

209,600kg

209,600kg

210,000kg

211,100kg

211,100kg

211,100kg

Number of warheads:

8

10

1

10

1

10

Warhead yield:

4 x 1.0 MT + 4 x 0.4 MT

0.4 MT

20 MT

0.5 MT

20 MT

0.8 MT

Range:

11,200km

10,200km

16,000km

11,000km

16,000km

11,000km

CEP:

700 m

700 m

700 m

370 m

370 m

220 m

Development

Rocket nozzles of SS-9 Scarp R-36

Development of the R-36 was begun by OKB-586 (Yuzhnoye) in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine in 1962, and built upon the work of the R-16 program. The Chief Designer was Mikhail Yangel. Initial development was of light, heavy, and orbital versions, with flight testing from 1962 through 1966, at which time initial operational capability was achieved. News of the development of the orbital version caused alarm in the West with the possibility that the Soviets would be able to launch a large number of nuclear weapons into orbit where there was no capability to intercept them. The prospect of orbital nuclear weapons led both sides to agree a treaty banning the use of weapons of mass destruction in space.

In 1970, development of a fourth version, capable of delivering multiple warheads, was developed, and test flown the next year.

Further improvement of the R-36 led to the design of the R-36M, which provided a theoretical first-strike capabilitythe ability to destroy the United States' LGM-30 Minuteman ICBM silos and launch control centers before they could retaliate. However, neither the Soviet Union nor the Russian Federation have ever publicly delineated the missile's particular role in their arsenal. The initial design of the R-36M called for a single massive 12-Mt warhead to be delivered over a range of 10,600km. The missile was first tested in 1973 but this test ended in failure. After several delays the R-36M was deployed in December of 1975. This Mod-1 design was delivered with a single 1820 Mt warhead and a range of just over 11,000km. This new version was given a new identity by NATO: SS-18 Satan.

The SS-18 has gone through six separate modifications, with the first modification (Mod-1) being phased out by 1984. The final modification (Mod-6) designated R-36M-2 Voevoda was deployed in August of 1988. This missile could deliver the same 1820 Mt warhead 16,000km. Modifications prior to Mod-6 mainly introduced MIRV (Multiple independent reentry vehicles) warheads. These missiles (Mods-2, 4, and 5) surpassed their western counterpart the US LGM-118 Peacekeeper in terms of megatons delivered, range, and survivability, but were inferior in terms of accuracy (CEP).

Control system for this rocket was designed at NPO "Electropribor"[4] (Kharkiv, Ukraine).

Multiple warheads

Missiles of the R-36M/SS-18 family have never been deployed with more than ten warheads, but given their large throw-weight (8.8 tonnes as specified in START), they have the capacity to carry considerably more detonation power. Among the projects that the Soviet Union considered in the mid-1970s was that of a 15A17 missilea follow-on to the R-36MUTTH (15A18).[5] The missile would have had an even greater throw-weight9.5 tonnesand would be able to carry a very large number of warheads. Five different versions of the missile were considered. Three of these versions would carry regular warheads38 250 kt yield, 24 500 kt yield, or 1517 1 Mt yield. Two modifications were supposed to carry guided warheads (upravlyaemaya golovnaya chast)28 250 kt or 19 500 kt.[5] However, none of these upgraded models were ever developed. The SALT II Treaty, signed in 1979, prohibited increasing the number of warheads ICBMs could carry. Equally, from a strategic point of view, concentrating so many warheads on silo-based missiles was not seen as desirable, since it would have made a large proportion of the USSR's warheads vulnerable to a counterforce strike.

The operational deployment of the R36M/SS-18 consisted of the R-36MUTTH, which carried ten 500 kt warheads, and its follow-on, the R-36M2 (15A18M), which carried ten 800 kt warheads (single-warhead versions with either 8.3 Mt or 20 Mt warhead also existed at some point). To partially circumvent the treaty, the missile was equipped with 40 heavy decoys to utilize the capacity left unused due to the 10-warhead limitation,.[6] These decoys would appear as warheads to any defensive system, making each missile as hard to intercept as 50 single warheads, rendering potential anti-ballistic defense ineffective.

Deployment

Dnepr inside silo

At full deployment, before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, 308 R-36M launch silos were operational. After the breakup of the USSR, 204 of these were located on the territory of the Russian Federation and 104 on the territory of newly independent Kazakhstan. Part of the missiles in Kazakhstan (54 of them) were under the 57th Rocket Division at Zhangiz-Tobe (Solnechnyy), Semipalatinsk Oblast.[7] The other R-36 establishment in Kazakhstan was the 38th Rocket Division at Derzhavinsk, Turgay Oblast.[8] In the next few years Russia reduced the number of R-36M launch silos to 154 to conform with the START I treaty. The missiles in Kazakhstan were all deactivated by 1995. The subsequent START II treaty was to eliminate all R-36M missiles but it did not enter into force and the missiles remained on duty.

R-36ORB

The development of the R-36 missile complex for use with the 869 fractional-orbit missile ("FOBS") began on April 16, 1962. Such a missile provides some advantages over a conventional ICBM. The range is limited only by the parameters of the orbit that the re-entry vehicle has been placed into, and the re-entry vehicle may come from either direction, compelling the enemy to build considerably more expensive anti-missile systems. Due to the possibility of placing the warhead in orbit and keeping it there for some time, it is possible to reduce the time required to strike to just a few minutes. It is also much more difficult to predict where the warhead will land, since while the re-entry vehicle is on orbit, it is a very small object with few distinguishing marks and is hard to detect; moreover, since the warhead can be commanded to land anywhere along the orbit's ground track, even detecting the warhead on orbit does not allow accurate prediction of its intended target.

The structure and design of the fractional-orbit bombardment system were similar to a conventional P-36 ICBM system. A two-stage rocket was equipped by the liquid rocket engines using storable propellants. The silo launcher and command point were hardened against a nuclear explosion. The basic difference from a conventional ICBM consists of the design of the re-entry vehicle, which is fitted with a single 2.4Mt warhead, de-orbit engine and control block. The control system uses independent inertial navigation and radar-based altimeter which measures orbit parameters twicein the beginning of an orbital path and just before de-orbiting engine firing.

Flight testing consisted of 15 successful launches and four failures. During test launch #17, the warhead was retrieved with a parachute. Flight tests of a rocket have been completed by May 20, 1968 and on November 19 of the same year it entered service. The first (and the only) regiment with 18 launchers was deployed on August 25, 1969.

The R-36orbs (869) were retired from service in January, 1983 as a part of SALT II treaty (they were considered "space-based" nuclear weapons).

The Tsyklon series of civilian space launchers is based on the R-36orb (869) design.

Elimination

Senator Richard Lugar inspects an SS-18 ICBM being readied for decommission under the Nunn-Lugar Program

In the last decade Russian armed forces have been steadily reducing the number of R-36M missiles in service, withdrawing those that age past their designed operational lifetime. About 40 missiles of the most modern variant R-36M2 (or RS-20V) will remain in service until 2019[9] and will be then replaced by newer MIRV version of Topol-M.[10] In March 2006 Russia made an agreement with Ukraine that will regulate cooperation between the two countries on maintaining the R-36M2 missiles. It was reported that the cooperation with Ukraine will allow Russia to extend the service life of the R-36M2 missiles by at least ten to 28 years.[11]

In December 2008 Strategic Rocket Forces had 75 R-36MUTTH/R-36M2 operational missiles.

The commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces Lt. Gen. Andrei Shvaichenko announced on December 16, 2009, that Russia planned to "develop a new liquid-propellant ICBM to replace the Voyevoda (SS-18 Satan), capable of carrying 10 warheads, by 2016."[12]

Derivatives

Several remaining SS-18 missiles have been modified for surface launch and now carry lightweight satellites to Low Earth Orbit (LEO), including many foreign payloads.

Operators

Soviet Union and Russia

The Strategic Rocket Forces have been the only operator of the R-36.

57th Rocket Division at Zhangiz-Tobe (Solnechnyy), Semipalatinsk Oblast;

38th Rocket Division at Derzhavinsk, Turgay Oblast

other Rocket Divisions

See also

1. List of missiles

1. List of military rockets

References

0. ^ Clancy, Tom (1991). The Sum of All Fears. Putnam. ISBN0-399-13615-0.

0. ^ Pavel Podvig: The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn't: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s--A Research Note. International Security, Summer 2008, Vol. 33, No. 1: 118138

0. ^ Nuclear Notebook: U.S. and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, 19592008

0. ^ Krivonosov, Khartron: Computers for rocket guidance systems

0. ^ a b Multiple (as in up to 38) warheads - Blog - Russian strategic nuclear forces

0. ^ "Moscow extends life of 144 cold war ballistic missiles". The Guardian (London). 2002-08-20. http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,2763,777379,00.html. Retrieved 2006-10-24.

0. ^ "57th Missile Division". Ww2.dk. http://www.ww2.dk/new/rvsn/57md.htm. Retrieved 2011-09-26.

0. ^ "38th Missile Division". Ww2.dk. http://www.ww2.dk/new/rvsn/38md.htm. Retrieved 2011-09-26.

0. ^ "Russia to test launch 14 ICBMs in 2009 - missile forces chief | Russia | RIA Novosti". En.rian.ru. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090410/121052406.html. Retrieved 2011-09-26.

0. ^ "New RS-24 Missiles to Replace Older Russian Systems". MissileThreat. 2007-06-12. http://www.missilethreat.com/archives/id.5373/detail.asp. Retrieved 2011-09-26.

0. ^ Russia and Ukraine will maintain R-36M2 missiles - Blog - Russian strategic nuclear forces

0. ^ Russia says destroyed 9 ICBMs in 2009 under START 1 arms pact, by RIAN

1. Podvig, Pavel (2001). Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: R-36

1. [1]

1. [2]

1. [3]

1. [4]

1. Russia's nuclear forces - 2006, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2006

1. Yuzhnoe Design BureauEnglish-language home page

1. Strategic Rocket ForcesRussian strategic nuclear forces

1. R-36Federation of American Scientists

1. Strategic Missile Forces museum (photos)

Strategic Missile Forces museum is a former central battle front position missile. There are many exhibits related to nuclear weapon, underground postern, missile engines, protection facilities, underground unified command post.

1. Entrance

1. Tanks on the museum grounds

1. Special car for refueling of missle

1. Specialised car to transport container with a missile and its load in silos

1. Automotive equipment, Silo-launcher facility and Warhead of missile SS-24 'Scalpel'

1. omplex of protective structures

1. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) SS-18 'Satan'

1. Ukrainian military bus Blue Bird

1. The place of chief officer on duty squad

1. Scheme

1. Samples of missile engines

1. Billboard

Strategic Rocket Forces

Strategic Rocket Forces is a separate branch of the Russia's Armed Forces, subordinated directly to the General Staff. The Strategic Rocket Forces were demoted to this status from the status of a separate service of the Armed Forces by a presidential decree of 24 March 2001. The current commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces -- Lt.-General Sergei Karakayev -- was appointed to this post by a presidential decree of 22 June 2010.

At the end of 2010, the Strategic Rocket Forces were estimated to have 375 operational missile systems of four different types. Intercontinental ballistic missiles of these systems could carry 1259 warheads.

Number of systems

Total warheads

Missile system

Warheads

Deployment

R-36MUTTH/R-36M2 (SS-18)

58

10

580

Dombarovsky, Uzhur

UR-100NUTTH (SS-19)

70

6

420

Kozelsk, Tatishchevo

Topol (SS-25)

171

1

171

Yoshkar-Ola, Nizhniy Tagil, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, Barnaul, Vypolzovo

Topol-M silo (SS-27)

52

1

52

Tatishchevo

Topol-M mobile (SS-27)

18

1

18

Teykovo

RS-24 mobile

6

3

18

Teykovo

Total

375

1259

Strategic Rocket Forces units

Strategic Rocket Forces include three missile armies: the 27th Guards Missile Army (headquarters in Vladimir), the 31st Missile Army (Orenburg), the 33rd Guards Missile Army (Omsk). The 53rd Missile Army (Chita) was disbanded in 2002. It appears that the 31st Missile Army (Orenburg) will be liquidated by 2016.

As of the end of 2010, the missile armies included 11 missile divisions with operational ICBMs.

Number of missiles

Missile division

Missile system

27th Guards Missile Army (Vladimir)

Tatishchevo: 60th MD (Tatishchevo-5, Svetlyy)

41

UR-100NUTTH (SS-19)

52

Topol-M silo (SS-27)

Kozelsk: 28th GMD

29

UR-100NUTTH (SS-19)

Vypolzovo: 7th GMD (Ozernyy, Bologoye-4)

18

Topol (SS-25)

Teykovo: 54th GMD (Krasnyye Sosenki)

6

RS-24 mobile

18

Topol-M mobile (SS-27)

Yoshkar-Ola: 14th MD

27

Topol (SS-25)

31st Missile Army (Rostoshi, Orenburg)

Dombarovsky: 13th MD (Yasnyy)

30

R-36MUTTH/R-36M2 (SS-18)

Nizhniy Tagil: 42nd MD (Verkhnyaya Salda, Nizhniy Tagil-41, Svobodnyy)

27

Topol (SS-25)

33rd Guards Missile Army (Omsk)

Uzhur: 62nd MD (Uzhur-4, Solnechnyy)

28

R-36MUTTH/R-36M2 (SS-18)

Novosibirsk: 39th GMD (Novosibirsk-95, Pashino, Gvardeiskiy)

36

Topol (SS-25)

Irkutsk: 51st GMD (Zelenyy)

27

Topol (SS-25)

Barnaul: 35th MD (Sibirskiy-2)

36

Topol (SS-25)

MD - Missile Division, GMD - Guards Missile Division

Missile systems

R-36MUTTH (also known as RS-20B and SS-18) and R-36M2 (RS-20V, SS-18) missiles were developed by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine). R-36MUTTH missiles were deployed in 1979-1983, R-36M2 -- in 1988-1992. The missiles were produced by the Yuzhnyy Machine-Building Plant (Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine). The missiles have two liquid-fuel stages and can carry 10 warheads. The Strategic Rocket Forces plans to keep all R-36M2 missiles in service. With service lives extended to 25-30 years as planned, R-36M2 missiles could remain in operation until about 2016-2020.

UR-100NUTTH (SS-19) missiles were developed by the Machine-Building NPO (Reutov, Moscow oblast) and were deployed in 1979-1984. The missiles were produced by the M. V. Khrunichev Machine Building Plant (Moscow). The missile has two liquid-fuel stages and can carry 6 warheads. A number of missiles have been removed from service, but after a series of test launches service life of the missile was extended to more than 30 years, so some of them could be kept in service.

Road-mobile Topol (SS-25) missile system was developed at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology. The systems were deployed in 1985-1992. The missile has three solid-propellant stages and carries single warhead. The missiles were produced at the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant. The currently deployed missiles are close to the end of their service lives and are being withdrawn from service.

Topol-M (SS-27) and RS-24 missile systems have been developed at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology. Topol-M exists in two versions -- silo-based and road-mobile. Deployment of the silo-based version began in 1997. The road-mobile version has completed flight tests in December 2004. The first mobile missiles began service in December 2006. The missile has three solid-propellant stages and was initially developed as a single-warhead missile. In 2007 Russia began tests of a MIRVed version of the Topol-M mobile missile, which was designated RS-24. Deployment of this missile began in 2010.

[April 20, 2011]

Missiles

After the Second World War new ways were formed on further weapon development with allowance for obtained experience. In the course of the war it became evident that destruction of strategic objects of military and economical potential in the enemy rear is extremely important. These tasks were placed on long-range bombers. Creation of nuclear weapon demonstrated its unique striking capabilities. An aspiration rose to develop a kind of weapon which later would named as a strategic offensive weapon.

One of the basic elements of the SOW is a family of various carriers of nuclear charges. The first specimens of this kind were USA bombers B-29, number of which grew rapidly. The threat of new military blocs and plans of attack on the USSR was a reason to take extraordinary measures on defense capacity assurance of the country, and the main goal was - to create the nuclear weapon.

In 1953 the nuclear charge was tested in the USSR, and thus the first basic element of the SOW appeared. The next necessary step - creation of NC carriers. The main requirements for them were: long range close to the intercontinental one, weight-lifting capacity of more than one ton, firing accuracy (deviation from the impact point) of no more than several kilometers. These requirements could be met by then bombers except the range. This shortage could be compensated by location of the base aerodromes closer to targets, and it was done by the USA AF.

This way was unacceptable for the USSR because of absence of heavy bombers until beginning of fifties and bases for them near borders of possible opponents. Besides, the serious disadvantage of bombers was very long time of target reaching and vulnerability to the AD. So, both the USA and USSR in the first after-war years had come to a decision to create long-range ballistic missiles.

During the Second World War the armies of belligerent powers used reactive missiles on smokeless powder. But their main characteristics were lower by one-two orders than requirements for the SOW carriers, therefore it was impossible to create the LRBM on the basis of their improvement.

The specialists turned their attention to the fact that utilization of engines burning liquid propellants may considerably increase both speed and range of rockets owing to much higher power potential of liquid propellants. Correspondingly, the rockets with LRE have better mass characteristics.

The most intensive investigations and development of LRE and rockets with LRE were conducted in Germany, beginning from the thirties of the last century. Creation of A-4 rocket in the first half of forties was an outstanding achievement on the way of new weapon development. The single specimen of a rocket from the times of the war ending, which may be evaluated as a prototype of the LRBM was the Germany rocket A-4 known also as V-2. The A-4 rocket used such liquid propellants as ethanol and liquid oxygen (LOX). Both USA and USSR concentrated their attention on this rocket and took measures for acquisition of all available data and materials in order to use an experience of Germany for creation of the LRBM as fully as possible.

The soviet specialists began study of the German rocket technology on a territory of the East Europe. This activity was concluded in 1946 by release of the government order on development of the research institutes, design offices, test centers and allocation of experimental plants. These measures allowed creation of all conditions required for development of the new weapon in the USSR in the shortest time.

FIRST GENERATION

The main organization on LRBM was NII-88 headed by S.P.Korolyov. Under his management and use of an experience of German experts the A-4 rocket was reconstructed under designation R-1. Then R-2 rocket was designed, the first strategic missile R-5 was drafted and its version R-5M as a nuclear ammunition carrier.

The propellant which used the liquid oxygen in rockets R-1, R-2 and R-5M was convenient for the first LRBM. The oxygen is a strong oxidizer, and mixing with an efficient fuel it brings a high specific impulse. The propellant LOX+ ethanol is not toxic, and this facilitates development and handling of engines and rockets. Both components are rather inexpensive and mass-produced. These advantages determined propellant selection for the first LRBM and ICBM.

However, a well-known disadvantage of this propellant is that the LOX shall be continuously kept at the combat position in the frosted-up steaming tanks. Because of that, an application of the LOX-based propellant is not advisable for military rockets or missiles. The rocket cannot stay for a long time in loaded state, and the ground tanks shall be replenished at an oxygen-produced plant close to the rocket. Consequently, the launch complex becomes cumbersome and hardly camouflaged. The pre-launch processing of such rocket is complicated and protracted. As a result, the wartime readiness of this rocket complex is extremely low.

Another disadvantage of R-2, R-5, R-7 and R-9 rockets was utilization of systems of the side radio-correction and range radio-control of a distance which were not protected against external interference. They required disposition of two radars and a station of radio-control at the launch site.

Taking all this into account, the Administration of the Head of Jet Armament which was a customer and user of missiles put a requirement that the future missiles would be protected against interferences, be veiled and be ready for a launch to the maximum extent.

The studies on possibility to create the LRBM with engines operating on storable high-temperature propellants began. Assimilation of these propellants was quite difficult, but they allowed prolonged stay of the rocket in the loaded state with considerable increase of its wartime readiness.

The persistent advocate of the idea to use the storable propellants for missiles was M.K. Yangel, the former Deputy Chief Designer of OKB- 1 in beginning of fifties, and then Director and Chief Engineer of NII-88. Namely in NII-88 an effectiveness of various propellants was investigated in the framework of a special scientific-research program. In that time the first Soviet tactical missile R-11 with a storable propellant was developed. It has the same range as the R-1, but two times higher operational readiness.

Creation of this missile had proved possibility and advisability to develop the LRBM with storable propellants.

SECOND GENERATION

During development of the first missiles designed by OKB-586 a possibility became evident to perfect them significantly. In particular, the potential of high-temperature propellant was not used in full measure, the time of stay duration in loaded state did not exceed one month. To bring the missile into the full readiness for a launch some tens of minutes or even hours was required depending on initial state.

This is why the OKB-586 made a proposal in the end of fifties to update all the three kinds of its missiles with designations R-22, R-24 and R-26. The first figure indicated the second step in elaboration of these missiles, the second one reflected a continuity of the preceding respective missile. The main new property of each updated missile was an encapsulated design and possibility to stay in the loaded state within up to one year. Besides, the proposed technological and design improvements provided considerable reduction of overall dimensions, lift-off mass and recurring cost.

The government was not able to accept this proposal, since at that moment preparation of five plants were in full swing for mass production of missiles R-12, R-14 and R-16. An exception was made for the R-26 missile, elaboration of which was assigned to the OKB-586 in May 1960 for replacement of R-16 missile. But some then events influenced a fate of the R-26 missile.

The USA were creating the high-temperature silo-based Titan-2 ICBM that was able to carry a nuclear charge of great power. The USSR was in possession of superpower thermonuclear charge, but there was no corresponding carrier. The missile design offices began elaboration of heavy and superheavy missiles.

In the OKB-1 a three-stage global missile GR-1 was designed.The OKB-52, strengthened by design offices of V.M.Myasishchev and S.A.Lavochkin transferred to it jointly with nearby plants and technical documentation from OKB-1 and OKB-586 proposed three types of missiles: UR-100, UR-200 and UR-500. Here the letters "UR" means "Universal Rocket", and figures indicate a range of the missile's lift-off mass.

The light class missile UR-100 with the lift-off mass lesser almost by 3 times and with the charge power lesser by 1.5 times in comparison with the R-16 missile was proposed also as an anti-missile weapon.The medium class missile UR-200 was of the same lift-off mass as R-16. The proposal was to use it also for injecting anti-satellite means as well as means of global sea reconnaissance into the Earth orbit.

The UR-500 missile of around 600t lift-off mass was able to carry the PU of around 20t mass and also solve some space tasks.In the strategic plan of the country leadership two tasks had been formed: to increase as soon as possible a total number of ICBM (the USA in 1962 had 3 times higher fleet) and to create a missile that could carry the most powerful NC among existing ones, penetrate through the AMD to be developed and stay long time in loaded state at maximum battle readiness.

For solution of the first task the UR-100 missile was chosen. It was manufactured under an up-to-date technology, intended for a service in an encapsulated state condition inside a TLC, and was able be stored for several years inside a SL of simplified type.Solution of the second task was imposed upon the new R-36 missile under development by OKB-586 in two versions - ballistic (8K67) and global one (8K69).

The super-heavy rockets were transferred into a space category. The further development of R-26 and UR-200 was stopped. However, all the innovative technical solutions of the R-26 rocket were used at creation of powerful R-36 missile.

THIRD GENERATION

In the end of the sixties - beginning of seventies a qualitative leap occurred in creation of strategic missile complexes. Many research institutes (NII) and design offices (KB) from various branches of industry had developed miniature digital computing devices, command instruments of high accuracy for control and targeting systems, nuclear charges of high specific characteristics, advanced propulsion systems, new schemes of launchers strengthening. A great amount of theoretical and experimental works was performed in the dynamics of rockets. These combined effects was a basis for creating the third generation of ICBM. The leadership of the country took a decision to modernize the missile complexes R-36 and UR-100 that composed the main potential of Strategic Missile Forces. The developers of these complexes were charged with a task to submit their technical proposals on competitive basis.In 1967-1968 a couple of scientific research works was performed with allowance for the latest scientific-technical achievements. As a result, the Yuzhnoye SDO jointly with a number of NII and KB had formulated five basic principles of the impending modernization of strategic missile complexes, implementation of which should provide the qualitative increase of their combat effectiveness:

1. Increase of survival probability of the missile complexes in any conditions of combat actions, including nuclear or non-nuclear attacks, with following launches of missiles for a guaranteed back strike at targets of potential aggressors.2. Increase of probability to hit the most important objects and economical regions at a territory of potential enemy protected by fortification means, as well as by upgraded CMD system in conditions of both back or preventive strike.3. Increase of a stay of missile complexes in an autonomous mode both in the menacing time and after non-destructive strike.4. Reduction of time required to put the MC on duty, as well as reduction of time for performing any service operations at simultaneous reduction of attending personnel for all service phases.5. Increase of the guaranteed service life and inter-maintenance period.

These principles formed the basis of technical proposals for elaboration of three strategic stationary MC with silo-based missiles and high grade of protection against NE factors:

- R-36M MC with a liquid missile equipped with the SWH having 10 WHU or monoblock PU with charges of considerably higher power than SWH WHU (2 versions);- MR-UR100 MC with a liquid missile equipped with the SWH having 4 WHU unified with WHU of R-36M MC and monoblock PU with more powerful charge than SWH WHU;- RT-23 MC with a solid propellant missile equipped with 10 WHU

The first two complexes were planned to replace existing complexeswith heavy missile 8K67 and light missile 8K84. The third complex could be created depending on readiness of production of solid propellant mixture, large-scale blocks from them, shells and nozzle assembly of SRM from polymer composite material.The specificity of combat tasks, conditions of combat application of the ICBM and their mass-scale deployment required to update such characteristics as:

- effectiveness of warhead payloads;- firing accuracy and battle readiness;- protection of launch devices;- service properties;- reliability and guaranteed service life

The technical proposals on modernization of liquid MC were submitted by Yuzhnoye SDO in 1968. The improved in 1969 proposals were based on following main principles realized in subsequent designs:

- elaboration of autonomous CS on the basis of digital computer, and a complex of command instruments of higher accuracy;- creation of a multi-unit split-up warhead with individual targeting of WHU;- elaboration of a complex of counter-missile defense penetration aids, including fault warheads operationable both outside and inside the atmosphere;- full ampoulization (encapsulation) of the missile's propellant systems;- constant service of the missile inside the transport-launch container, arrangement of all technological equipment and instrumentation necessary for th