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European Commission Seventh Framework programme
MODSafe Modular Urban Transport Safety and Security Analysis
WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2.2
Authors: TU Dresden Document ID: D2.2_Annex_Hazard_Analysis_100430_v8 Date: 2010-04-30 Contract No: 218606
Table of Content Document History Overview MODSafe Hazard Analysis 1 Train movement
4
2 Train interior
68
3 Train-Station Interface (with train in station)
79
4 Train-Station Interface (without train in station)
96
5 Depot
112
6 OCC
116
7 Maintenance
123
8 Emergency – Evacuation
145
9 Environment (force of nature)
172
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard AnalysisDocument History
File version Date Name of editorHazard numbering Hazard Description
V0.5 09.06.2009 A Herr Initial Draft D2.1
V0.6 10.06.2009 A HerrHazard Identification: Addition of further column "Possible consequential accidents"
V0.7 29.07.2009 A.Herr include comments on V06 V0.8 03.09.2009 A. Schindelhauer includes Comments on V07V1.0 15.09.2009 A. Schindelhauer approved by WP2 membersV2 21.10.2009 A. Schindelhauer includes comments WP10 membersV3 02.11.2009 A. Schindelhauer includes Comments WP10 memebers (Compilation D2.1V2)
V4 25.01.2010 A. Schindelhauer, A. Naundorf; TUD expansion of Annex D2.1, renaming into D2.2V5 02.02.2010 A. Naundorf, TUD approved by WP2 membersV6 09.03.2010 A. Schindelhauer, A. Naundorf; TUD includes comments on V5V7 09.04.2010 A. Schindelhauer, A. Naundorf; TUD includes comments on V6V8 30.04.2010 A. Schindelhauer, A. Naundorf; TUD includes comments on V7
Document History
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2Overview Hazard Analysis
Hazard
1 Train movement1.1 Train infringes clearance envelope1.2 Object / person infringes train clearance envelope 1.3 Train collision hazard within uninfringed clearance envelope
2 Train interior2.1 person struck/hurt by object2.2 explosion2.3 person fall in train2.4 fire2.5 Inadequate temperature2.6 asphyxiation2.7 toxic releases2.8 radiation2.9 electrocution in train2.10 person contact with machinery2.11 person exposed to noise2.12 Person needs urgent asisstance
3 Train-Station Interface (with train in station)3.1 passenger falls from train on station track3.2 Passenger injured by door closing
3.3train departs with passenger trapped in doors (limb of passenger, clothes, bags, other objects from passenger, leash... )
3.4 Train moves at passenger exchange 3.5 Person between Vehicle/ Vehicle gaps3.6 Person steps / falls into Vehicle- Platform Gap3.7 electrocution
Overview MODSafe Hazard AnalysisHazard
3.7 e ect ocut o
4 Train-Station Interface (without train in station)4.1 person struck by falling object4.2 person hit by sharp object4.3 person hurt by protruding object4.4 wheelchair hazards4.5 person fall in station4.6 person falls/intrudes on station track4.7 electrocution in station4.8 smoke4.9 explosion4.10 fire in station4.11 toxic release
5 Depot5.1 Staff injured by operation of machines and equipment5.2 Shunting hazards5.3 undue train / vehicle enters operation area5.4 passenger in depot area5.5 staff run over by train
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2Overview Hazard Analysis
6 OCC6.1 Fire in OCC6.2 Electrocution in OCC6.3 Explosion in OCC6.4 Building collapse6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC
7 Maintenance7.1 Staff injured by operation of machines and equipment7.2 Electrocution / Lightning7.3 staff endangered by moving train7.4 obstacles on guideway or walkway7.5 explosion during maintenance7.6 fire during maintenance7.7 asphyxiation/ toxication7.8 inappropriate temperature7.9 staff in danger cannot escape guideway7.10 radiation7.11 Staff caught in machinery
8 Emergency – Evacuation8.1 people hit by train: involved track, adjacent track8.2 burn / fire8.3 asphyxiation / toxication8.4 electrocution / lightning8.5 explosion during evacuation8.6 inappropriate temperature8.7 radiation8.7 radiation8.8 drowning8.9 person hurt during evacuation (others)
9 Environment (force of nature)9.1 weather conditions (moderate)9.2 Force of nature
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 4
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
1 Train Movement Hazards
1.1 Train infringes clearance envelope (CE)
1.1.1 Train (car) leaves guideway
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
guideway (momentarily or irrevocably / derailment )
1.1.1.1 Inappropriate speed
1.1.1.1.1 VT(x) > VL(x)1.1.1.1.1.1 Wrong position
registeredOdometer failure
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Determine Train Location S S S S Design and installation of absolute and relative position measurement
Respond to Train Location Failure
S S S S Ensure safe route
1 1 1 1 1 2 W d1.1.1.1.1.2 Wrong speed registered
1.1.1.1.1.2.1 Speed Measurement failure
Wheelspin Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Calculate Train Speed - This function determines train speed.
X S S S S Ensure safe speed; Adequate speed measurement
Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.
X S S S S Ensure safe speed; Adequate speed supervision
1.1.1.1.1.2.2 On-board Speed Processing failure
On-Board ATP
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Calculate Train Speed - This function determines train speed.
X S S S S Ensure safe speed; g
equipment design failure
Adequate speed measurement
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 5
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance of On-Board ATP equipment
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance of ATP equipment
1.1.1.1.1.3 Insufficient decelerationdeceleration
1.1.1.1.1.3.1 Improper vehicle - guideway coupling (adhesion)
9.1.1 Anything (snow, rain, leaves, greasy material) on guideway
Insufficient maintenance or clearance of guideway by crew
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular Inspection and maintenance
Guideway heatingCheck of weather dataProvide enough staff for clearance worksclearance works
1.1.1.1.1.3.1.2 Wheel failure / wear
Faulty design of wheels
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle
Insufficient maintenance
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
1.1.1.1.1.3.1.3 Track wear Faulty design of track
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of guideway
Insufficient maintenance
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, correctivecorrective maintenance
1.1.1.1.1.3.1.4 Wheel-track interface failure (incorrect design)
Disrespect of Wheel-Track-Interface specifications or legal regulations
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of guideway
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 6
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.1.1.1.1.3.1.5 Wheel slip / slide due to excessive braking force
Faulty design of braking system
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency brakes)
Brake supervision, slip-slide control
Insufficient maintenance
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regularregular inspections, corrective maintenance
Incorrect usage of braking system by driver
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Braking system supervision X S S S S Control acceleration and braking
Slip - Slide - Control X S S S S Control acceleration and braking
Training and education of driver
1.1.1.1.1.3.1.6 Insufficient dh i
Insufficient braking force
Derail-ment
Collision Insufficient braking
Catastrophic Ensure correct braking curves X S S S S Control accelerationadhesion braking force ment braking
force results in lower frictional forces, and therefore in less adhesion
acceleration and braking
Provide enough braking force / contact
X S S S S Control acceleration and braking
1.1.1.1.1.3.2 Insufficient braking (braking-f )force)
1.1.1.1.1.3.2.1 Braking system failure
Faulty design of braking system
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency brakes)
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 7
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Insufficient maintenance of braking system
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
greasing Derail- Collision Catastrophic Configuration Managementgreasing problems (greasing scheme)
Derailment
Collision Catastrophic Configuration Management
1.1.1.1.1.3.2.2 Underestimated mass / train configuration
Incorrect design of mass / train configuration
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct procedure for calculation and design of mass / train configuration
Wrong data used
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct data as input for mass / train configuration
1.1.1.1.1.3.3 Wrong brake command
Faulty design of on-board equipment
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.
X S S S S Ensure safe speed
I ffi i t D il C lli i C t t hi R l i ti d P tiInsufficient maintenance of on-board equipment
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
Wrong command by driver
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Training and education of driver
Employ well educated driversWell design and user supportive HMI driver desk
1.1.1.1.1.4 Wrong speed command
Faulty design of on-board equipment
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed
X S S S S Ensure safe speed
remain within the dynamic speed profile.
Insufficient maintenance of on-board equipment
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 8
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Wrong command by driver
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Training and education of driver
Employ well educated driversWell design and user supportive HMI driver desk
1.1.1.1.1.5 Untimely Faulty design Derail- Collision Catastrophic Supervise Actual Speed - This X S S S S Ensure safe 1.1.1.1.1.5 Untimely acceleration / propulsion command error
Faulty design of propulsion system
Derailment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise Actual Speed This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.
X S S S S Ensure safe speed, Propulsion control; Overspeed protection
Insufficient maintenance of propulsion system
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
1.1.1.1.2 Wrong speed limit VL(X)
1.1.1.1.2.1 Wrong static route data
Incorrect surveying and
i
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Check consistency of data - This function is intended to check the
i t f il bl d t
Adequate route-database
fi timapping consistency of available data configuration and management
Employ trained and well educated staff only
Wrong input of route data
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Load Infrastructure Data onto onboard equipment
S S S S
Load Infrastructure Data onto wayside equipment
S S S S
1.1.1.1.2.2 Wrong route1.1.1.1.2.2.1 Wrong route
selection ATP failure Derail-
mentCollision Catastrophic Ensure safe route as
combination of route elements - This function is intended to allow ATP to define and implement a
S S S S S Ensure safe route
ATP to define and implement a route as a combination of route elements according to the needs of the operator and to release routes as part of it either by train movement or manually.
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 9
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Wrong route selection by OCC staff
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Safe display - HMI OCC
Supportive functions for stress or emergency cases Clear and understandable operational rulesoperational rules
withdrawal of route (e.g. emergency release) without communication to the train
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure safe route as combination of route elements - This function is intended to allow ATP to define and implement a route as a combination of route elements according to the needs of the operator and to release routes as part of it either by train movement or manually.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
Supportive functions for stress or emergency cases
1.1.1.1.2.2.2 Wrong switch setting
ATP failure Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable
S S S S S Ensure safe route
intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
Wrong switch setting by OCC staff
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Safe display - HMI OCC
Supportive functions for stress or emergency cases Clear and understandable operational rules
1.1.1.1.2.3 Wrong (temporary) speed restriction wayside
Wrong maintenance
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Load Infrastructure Data onto onboard equipment
S S S S
waysideLoad Infrastructure Data onto wayside equipment
S S S S
Ensure correct maintenanceIncorrect input of data
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Load Infrastructure Data onto onboard equipment
S S S S
Load Infrastructure Data onto wayside equipment
S S S S
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 10
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.1.1.1.2.4 Failed or incorrect communication of speed restriction
Faulty or insufficient communication system
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise data communication equipment - This function is intended to inform staff about availability of functions concerning operation and status of data communication equipment.equipment.
Software Intrusion (6.5.1)
see WP 9
1.1.1.1.2.5 Wrong data of speed limits on train (track database)
Wrong input by engineers, OCC or maintenance crew
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Check consistency of data - This function is intended to check the consistency of available data
Adequate route-database (i.e. speed limits) configuration and management
Load Infrastructure Data onto onboard equipment
S S S S
Load Infrastructure Data onto wayside equipment
S S S Swayside equipment
1.1.1.1.2.6 Faulty onboard speed restriction processing
Faulty design of on-board equipment
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.
X S S S S Ensure safe speed; Ensure correct speed restriction processing
Determine static speed profile - This function determines the static train speed profiles, which are based on infrastructure data such as track geometry and quality, infrastructure constraints (tunnels, bridges etc.) and train
X S S S S
( , g )data.
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 11
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Calculate dynamic train speed profiles - this function is intended to calculate for each segment of the route the train speed limit. This function calculates the dynamic speed profiles of each train. The dynamic speed profile
S S S Ensure safe speed
train. The dynamic speed profile is based on the static speed profile, the TSR, the braking profile with the relevant safety margin.
Incorrect maintenance of on-board equipment
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
1.1.1.2 Switch hazard1.1.1.2.1 Wrong switch
status1.1.1.2.1.1 Undetected
misaligned switch Interlocking failure or erroneous status control
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
Incorrect maintenance of switch
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
1.1.1.2.1.2 Undetected unlocked switch
Interlocking failure or
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is
S S S S S Ensure safe routeunlocked switch failure or
erroneous status control
ment Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
route
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 12
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance of switch
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
1 1 1 2 1 3 Undetected Erroneous Derail Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S Optional1.1.1.2.1.3 Undetected broken switch components
Erroneous status control
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Incorrect maintenance of switch
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
1.1.1.2.2 Insufficient safety distance to moving switchmoving switch
1.1.1.2.2.1 Insufficient worst case safety distance
1.1.1.2.2.1.1 Wrong worst case safety distance registered (on train)
1.1.1.2.2.1.1.1 Failed or incorrect communication of worst case safety distance (stop point / speed limit)
Data communication failure
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise data communication equipment - This function is intended to inform staff about availability of functions concerning operation and status of data communication equipment.q p
Faulty communication system due to incorrect maintenance
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 13
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Faulty design of communication system
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of communication system
1.1.1.2.2.1.1.2 Wrong worst case safety distance estimation / estimation / determination
1.1.1.2.2.1.1.2.1 Wrong train parameters input
Mistake by driver during input
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Perform self tests during power on - This function is intended to perform all necessary tests on vital equipment during the power on process. Generally this function includes only those self tests that deal with the safety of the ATP and the inputs and outputs necessary for a vital operation. Self tests that are necessary to achieve the safety features of vital processors (computing unit including
X S S S S Supervise status of train
( p g goperating system) are not included here.Design of supportive functions for data input
Assistance during data input through intelligent design of HMI driver desk
1.1.1.2.2.1.1.2.2 Wrong route parameters input
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Load Infrastructure Data onto onboard equipment
S S S S
Load Infrastructure Data onto wayside equipment
S S S S
1.1.1.2.2.1.1.2.3 Safety distance calculation/ determination
Interlocking failure
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function
S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains determination
errormovement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.
are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 14
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.1.1.2.2.1.3 Wrong position registered
Odometer failure
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Determine Train Location S S S S Design and installation of absolute and relative position measurement
Respond to Train Location S S S S Ensure safeRespond to Train Location Failure
S S S S Ensure safe route
1.1.1.2.2.1.4 Wrong route1.1.1.2.2.1.4.1 Wrong route
selection / authorization
ATP failure Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure safe route as combination of route elements - This function is intended to allow ATP to define and implement a route as a combination of route elements according to the needs of the operator and to release routes as part of it either by train movement or manually.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
Wrong route selection by OCC staff in
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Safe display - HMI OCC
OCC staff in exceptional cases e.g. emergency cases
Supportive functions for stress or emergency cases Clear and understandable operational rules
1.1.1.2.2.1.4.2 Wrong switch setting
ATP failure Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
conditions.
Wrong switch setting by OCC staff in exceptional cases
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Safe display - HMI OCC
Supportive functions for stress or emergency cases
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 15
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Clear and understandable operational rules
1.1.1.2.2.1.5 Wrong train departure
1.1.1.2.2.1.5.1 Wrong departure command
ATP failure Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement this function
S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trainsmovement, this function
determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.
are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.
Ensure correct initial design of ATP regarding departure commandRegular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, correctivecorrective maintenance
Wrong departure command by driver
Authorise Train Movement by Wayside Signals - This function supports train movement authorisation to be provided to trains by wayside signals
S X X X X Ensure safe route
Provide high visibility on signals
1.1.1.2.2.1.5.2 Immobilisation brake deficient
Faulty design of braking system
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Respond to Unexpected Train Movements - This function covers the reaction of ATP in case of roll away.
X S S S S Correct and sufficient maintenance
Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency braking system (and Emergency brakes)
Incorrect maintenance of braking system
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Respond to Unexpected Train Movements - This function covers the reaction of ATP in case of roll away.
X S S S S Correct and sufficient maintenance
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 16
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
1 1 1 2 2 1 5 3 W d t I t l ki D il C lli i C t t hi D t i M t A th it S S S S S E l f1.1.1.2.2.1.5.3 Wrong departure authorisation
Interlocking failure
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.
S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.
Authorise Train Movement by Wayside Signals - This function supports train movement authorisation to be provided to trains by wayside signals
S X X X X Ensure safe route
Incorrect authorisation by OCC in case of exceptional cases e.g. emergency cases
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Safe display - HMI OCC
Supportive functions for stress or emergency cases Clear and understandable operational rules
1.1.1.2.2.2 Wrong switch command
Interlocking failure
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable
S S S S S Ensure safe route
intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 17
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Erroneous switch command by OCC staff
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
conditions.
Safe display - HMI OCCSupportive functions for stress or emergency cases
Clear and understandable operational rules
1.1.1.2.2.3 Wrong travel direction
1.1.1.2.2.3.1 Faulty direction control
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Determine Actual Train Travel Direction - This function determines the travel direction of trains.
S S S S Control acceleration and braking
1.1.1.2.2.3.2 Roll back Insufficient braking force
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Respond to Unexpected Train Movements - This function covers the reaction of ATP in
X S S S S Correct and sufficient maintenancecovers the reaction of ATP in
case of roll away.maintenance
Faulty design of brakes
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency brakes)
Incorrect maintenance of brakes
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
1.1.1.2.3 Switch moves under running train
1 1 1 2 3 1 W it h1.1.1.2.3.1 Wrong switch command
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 18
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.1.1.2.3.1.1 Wrong switch command by system
Interlocking failure
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
conditions.
1.1.1.2.3.1.2 Wrong switch command by staff
No support for decision of switch command during exceptional cases
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supportive functions for staff of OCC in exceptional cases, where no technical control of switch command can be provided
Operational rules, Scenarios for fall back levels or emergency cases, Precautions against stress and work overload
1.1.1.2.3.3 Wrong train detection
1 1 1 2 3 3 1 T i t d t t d U i d D il C lli i C t t hi D t t U i d F il d X X X X X E f1.1.1.2.3.3.1 Train not detected Unequipped or failed train
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Data communication failure e.g. data loss
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Determine Train Location S S S S Ensure safe route
1.1.1.2.3.3.2 End of train detected untimely
Unequipped or failed train
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Data Derail- Collision Catastrophic Determine Train Location S S S S Ensure safe atacommunication failure e.g. data loss or delay
e ament
Co s o Catast op c ete e a ocat o S S S S su e sa eroute
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 19
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.1.1.3 Guideway structural failure
Faulty design of guideway
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.
S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.
Ensure correct initial design of guideway
Incorrect maintenance of guideway
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising g y p
hazardous situations by external sensors.
p gguideway
Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.
S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.
Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, ,regular inspections, corrective maintenance
1.1.1.4 Vehicle structural failure (component break)
Faulty design of vehicle
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 20
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance of vehicle
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
1.1.1.5 Object on 1.1.1.5 Object on guideway
1.1.1.5.1 System object on guideway
1.1.1.5.1.1 Forgotten working/ maintenance/ rescue objects
Incorrect maintenance of guideway
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
Clearance verification system S S S S S Optional device
Ensure procedures to clear X X X X SEnsure procedures to clear guideway after evacuation or emergency case
X X X X S
1.1.1.5.1.2 Element from train falls on track
1.1.1.5.1.2.1 Vehicle Structural failure
Faulty design of vehicle
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle
Incorrect maintenance of vehicle
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
1.1.1.5.1.2.2 Vehicle load falls Overloaded Derail- Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct loading of vehicle on track vehicle ment
p ge.g. by vehicle examiner
Clearance verification system S S S S S Optional device
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 21
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.1.1.5.1.3 Wayside element infringes clearance envelope
1.1.1.5.1.3.1 Power supply (catenary third
Faulty design of power
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended
S S S S S Optional device;(catenary, third
rail etc.)of power supply system
ment Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
device;Supervising guideway
Ensure correct initial design of power supply system
Incorrect maintenance of power supply system
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Regular inspection and maintenance of power supply
Preventive maintenance, p pp y
system,
regular inspections, corrective maintenance
Environmental forces violating power supply system
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Ensure correct initial design of power supply system considering environmental forces
Criminal acts Derail- Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S OptionalCriminal acts on power supply system
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Ensure correct initial design of power supply system considering criminal acts
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 22
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.1.1.5.1.3.2 Signalling Components
Faulty design of signalling components
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Ensure correct initial design ofEnsure correct initial design of signalling components
Incorrect maintenance of signalling components
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Regular inspection and maintenance of signalling components
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
Environmental Derail- Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S Optional forces violating signalling components
ment Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
device;Supervising guideway
Ensure correct initial design of signalling components considering environmental forces
Criminal acts on signalling components
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Ensure correct initial design of signalling components considering criminal acts
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 23
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.1.1.5.1.3.3 Equipment Cabinets/ Platform Door Enclosures/ Tunnel doors
Faulty design of equipment cabinets, platform doors enclosures, tunnel doors
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Ensure correct initial design of equipment cabinets, platform doors enclosures, tunnel doors
Incorrect maintenance of equipment cabinets, platform doors enclosures, tunnel doors
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Regular inspection and maintenance of equipment cabinets, platform doors
Preventive maintenance, regular cabinets, platform doors
enclosures, tunnel doorsregular inspections, corrective maintenance
Environmental forces violating equipment cabinets, platform doors enclosures, tunnel doors
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Ensure correct initial design ofCriminal acts on equipment
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs This function is intended
S S S S S Optional device;on equipment
cabinets, platform doors enclosures, tunnel doors
ment Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
device;Supervising guideway
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 24
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Ensure correct initial design of equipment cabinets, platform doors enclosures, tunnel doors considering criminal acts
1.1.1.5.1.3.4 Flooding Gates Faulty design of flooding
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended
S S S S S Optional device;of flooding
gatesment Inputs - This function is intended
to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
device;Supervising guideway
Ensure correct initial design of flooding gates
Incorrect maintenance of flooding gates
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Regular inspection and maintenance of flooding gates
Preventive maintenance,
lregular inspections, corrective maintenance
Environmental forces violating flooding gates
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Ensure correct initial design of flooding gates considering environmental forces
Criminal acts fl di
Derail-t
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant I t Thi f ti i i t d d
S S S S S Optional d ion flooding
gatesment Inputs - This function is intended
to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
device;Supervising guideway
Ensure correct initial design of flooding gates considering criminal acts
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 25
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.1.1.5.2 Foreign objects on guideway
1.1.1.5.2.1 External vehicle (on level crossing)
Insufficient protection of level crossing
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Provide levelsensors. Provide level crossing supervision
Installation of warning signals and barriers for level crossings
1.1.1.5.2.2 Environmental impacts, fallen objects (crane, tree, branches, stones, mud ...)
Insufficient precautions regarding environmental impacts or fallen objects
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Clearance supervision; e.g Installation of precautions against genvironmental impact and fallen objects
1.1.1.5.2.3 Debris from structural breakdown (bridges, buildings,...)
Faulty design bridges, buildings ..
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Clearance supervision
Ensure correct initial design of bridges and building etc ..
Incorrect maintenance
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs This function is intended
S S S S S Optional device;maintenance
of bridges, buildings, ..
ment Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
device;Supervising guideway; Clearance supervision
Ensure correct maintenance of bridges and buildings etc ..
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 26
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.1.1.5.2.4 Human impact/ Criminal Acts
No boundaries on critical sites
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; e.g. Installation of barriers to secure secure guideway
Insufficient supervision of guideway
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; e.g. Installation of barriers to secure guideway
Installation of supervision of guideway
S S S S S Optional device
9.2.1 Flooding Insufficient precautions
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Water (level) measurement and indicator
Insufficient maintenance of protection constructions
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct maintenance of flooding gates
1.1.1.6 Train lifted from track throughtrack through aerodynamic force
1.1.1.6.1 Air draught in tunnel
Faulty design of tunnel
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Correct initial tunnel design minimising dangerous air draughts
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 27
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Insufficient maintenance / faulty construction work
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Correct maintenance and construction work
1.1.1.6.2 Pressure by passing train
Faulty design of
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Correct initial tunnel/guideway design considering increasing passing train of
tunnel/guideway
ment design considering increasing pressure by passing train
Insufficient maintenance / faulty construction work
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Correct maintenance and construction work
9.2.2 Environmental impact on vehicle (wind, gales)
Insufficient precautions
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure appropriate system-design regarding exceptional environmental conditions (extreme wind etc.)
Establish operational rules e.g. speed reductions at critical areas
Insufficient Derail Collision Catastrophic Correct maintenance andInsufficient maintenance (construction work) on protection constructions
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Correct maintenance and construction work on protection constructions
1.1.2 Train on guideway infringes clearance envelope
1.1.2.1 Object protrudes from train
1.1.2.1.1 Vehicle structural Faulty design Derail- Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of failure
y gof vehicle ment
p gvehicle
Incorrect maintenance of vehicle
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 28
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.1.2.1.2 Bad distribution of freight load
Incorrect loading
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise loading procedure as well as actual freight vehicle (e.g. by vehicle examiner)Training of staff regarding loading
Faulty design of freight cars
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of freight cars considering the of freight cars ment freight cars considering the distribution of goods
Incorrect maintenance of vehicle
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct maintenance of vehicle
1.1.2.2 Clearance envelope underdimensioned
Faulty design / dimensioning of clearance envelope by engineers
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design / dimensioning of clearance envelope
1.1.2.3 train leans excessively sideways
1.1.2.3.1 Wrong Load Distributions
Faulty design of freight
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of freight cars considering theDistributions of freight
vehiclement freight cars considering the
distribution of goodsIncorrect maintenance of vehicle
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct maintenance of vehicle
Incorrect loading
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise loading procedure as well as actual freight vehicle (e.g. by vehicle examiner)Training of staff regarding loading
1.1.2.3.2 Excessive Bogie/Axle/ Damping System Dynamics
Faulty design of bogies, axles and damping system
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial bogie/axle/damping system design
Incorrect Derail- Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct maintenance ofIncorrect maintenance of bogies, axles and damping system
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct maintenance of bogies, axles and damping system
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 29
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.1.2.3.3 Guideway structural failure
Faulty design of guideway
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
D t i M t A th it S S S S S E l fDetermine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.
S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.
Ensure correct initial design of guideway
Incorrect maintenance of guideway
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising g y p
hazardous situations by external sensors.
p gguideway
Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.
S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.
Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenancemaintenance maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
1.2 Object / person infringes train clearance envelope
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 30
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.2.1 Object infringes clearance envelope
1.2.1.1 Other train / vehicle infringes clearance
l (fl k
Incorrect Movement Authority
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit
S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicatinenvelope (flank
protection)determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.
(communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.
Interlocking failure
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Ensure safe route as combination of route elements - This function is intended to allow ATP to define and implement a route as a combination of route elements according to the needs of the operator and to release routes as part of it either by train movement or manually
S S S S S Ensure safe route
movement or manually.
Broken switch or derailer
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Broken rail detector
1.2.1.2 Civil structure fault / protrusion in clearance envelope
1 2 1 2 1 Tunnel structural Faulty design Derail- Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S Optional1.2.1.2.1 Tunnel structural fault/ collapse
Faulty design of tunnel
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train
Ensure correct initial design of the structure of the tunnel
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 31
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance or incorrect construction work on tunnel
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of trainfront of train
Ensure correct inspection, maintenance and construction works on tunnel
1.2.1.2.2 Drilling or excavation above tunnel
Insufficient maintenance rules or procedures i.e. incorrect planning of construction site
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train
Ensure adequate planning of construction site
Incorrect Derail- Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S Optional maintenance or construction works (disobeying of given rules or procedures)
ment, Collision
Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train
Ensure correct inspection, maintenance and construction works - Ensure obeying of rules and procedures
1.2.1.2.3 Station structural fault
Faulty design of station
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of
S S S S S Optional device;SupervisingCollision to supervise the detection of
hazardous situations by external sensors.
Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train
Ensure correct initial design of station
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 32
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance or construction works on station
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of trainfront of train
Ensure correct inspection, maintenance and construction works on and in station
1.2.1.3 System object infringes Clearance envelope
1.2.1.3.1 Train components (train underfloor-box/ motor/ object) fall from train
Faulty design of vehicle
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle
Incorrect maintenance of vehicle
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
1.2.1.3.2 Wayside system objects infringes CE inappropriately
Wayside traction power device (Cable tray / overhead lines) infrin-ges CE inap-propriately
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train
Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 33
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
other wayside system object infringes CE
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of trainfront of train
Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance
1.2.1.3.3 Hazards related to wayside traction power devices
1.2.1.3.3.1 Current collector gets caught with wayside traction power device
Inadequate adjustment of current collector
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, pcorrective maintenance
Supervise traction power supply - This function is intended to powering on/off of the traction supply by the operator at the OCC, or locally, either on given sections or on all sections.
X X X X X
1.2.1.3.3.2 Short circuits undetected short circuits on track
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Protect critical electronic equipment, e.g. by short circuit protection
S S S S S Optional device;Supervise other safety relevant Inputsp
Faulty design of equipment
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct initial design of equipment
Consideration of the possibility of short circuits
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 34
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Protect critical electronic equipment, e.g. by short circuit protection
S S S S S Optional device;Supervise other safety relevant Inputs
Incorrect maintenance of equipment
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of equipment
1.2.1.3.3.3 Power transformer catches fire
excess voltage, failure of equipment
Fire Explosion Critical Ensure correct initial design of equipment
Regular inspection and maintenance of power supply system
Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective
i tmaintenance
Installation of fire and smoke protection
S S S S S Optional device
1.2.1.4 Object thrown at train
Ensure correct initial design of equipment
1.2.1.4.1 Object thrown at train from bridges
Insufficient precautions against objects thrown at train
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial system design considering the possibility of object thrown at train.
1.2.1.4.2 Object thrown at train from platform
Insufficient precautions against
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial system design considering the possibility of object thrown at train.from platform against
objects thrown at train
Collision of object thrown at train.
1.2.1.4.3 Object thrown at train from beside the line
Insufficient precautions against objects thrown at train
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial system design considering the possibility of object thrown at train.
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 35
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.2.1.4.4 Object thrown at train from passing train
Insufficient precautions against objects thrown at train
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial system design considering the possibility of object thrown at train.
1.2.1.5 Animals infringe Insufficient Derail- Catastrophic Ensure correct initial system 1.2.1.5 Animals infringe cleareance envelope
Insufficient precautions against animals entering guideway
Derailment, Collision
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial system design considering the possibility of animal entering railway equipment.
1.2.1.6 Environment elements infringes clearance envelope
9.2.5 Stalactites in tunnel
Insufficient inspection of tunnel
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstaclesensors. Obstacle detection in front of train
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of tunnel
Too much water/humidity in tunnel
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train
Ensure correct initial tunnel design considering water and general humiditygeneral humidity
1.2.1.6.2 Trees Insufficient precautions to protect track
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 36
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Correct initial design considering the possibility of falling trees on guideway
Insufficient inspections of track
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; hazardous situations by external
sensors.guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on track
9.2.3 Avalanche / landslide/ falling stones
Insufficient precautions to protect track
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train
Correct initial design considering the possibility of avalanches orthe possibility of avalanches or falling stones
Insufficient inspections of track
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on track
9.2.1 Flooding Insufficient precautions track and system
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway;
sensors. Obstacle detection in front of train
Ensure correct initial design considering the possibility of flooding
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 37
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Insufficient inspection and maintenance of flooding protection equipment
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of trainfront of train
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on flooding protection equipment
Inspection of guideway and surrounding area
1.2.1.7 Train at standstill between stations
loss of power supply
Collision Catastrophic Ensure power supply during train movement
X X X X X Control acceleration and braking
Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit f th MA di t th
S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicatin
t) f ltof the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.
g or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.
extreme weather conditions e.g. coldness
Collision Catastrophic Ensure power supply during train movement
X X X X X Control acceleration and braking
Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit
S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicatin
of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.
g or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 38
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Asphyxiation, Suffocation
Injury of person
Marginal Passenger announcement
Passenger - Staff communication
1 2 2 P i t i1.2.2 Person intrusion into clearance envelope
1.2.2.1 Person too close to station platform edge
Overcrowded situation
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Platform screen doors S S S S S Optional device
Warning flashing light at platform edge when train arrives
Attention line on platformAttention line on platformSupervise passengers on platform (Detection of overcrowding station)(Detection of person too close to platform edge / train stop)
x x x x S Optional device
Manual emergency stop for passengers/staff : platform/train
Ensure adherence to timetable
Inattentive or unconscious person
Fall of person, Electrocution,
Critical Platform screen doors S S S S S Optional device
ion, Object striking person
Warning flashing light at platform edge when train arrives
Attention line on platform
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 39
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise passengers on platform (Detection of overcrowding station)(Detection of person too close to platform edge / train stop)
x x x x S Optional device
Manual emergency stop for passengers/staff : platform/trainpassengers/staff : platform/train
1.2.2.2 Person between two cars
1.2.2.2.1 Person between two cars coming from inside car
Faulty design of train cars
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Ensure correct initial design of vehicle considering the possibility of climbing between cars
Incorrect maintenance of train cars
Fall of person, Electrocut
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance to prevent possibilities for climbing out of
ion, Object striking person
p gthe car
No installation of precautions
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise conditions for start of train movement - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites related to doors and emergency handles necessary for safe start of train movement.
X X S S S Put in or take out of operation
1.2.2.2.2 Person between two cars coming from
No installation of precautions
Fall of person, Electrocut
Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise
S S S S S Optional device;Supervisingcoming from
outsideElectrocution, Object striking person
function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
Supervising guideway
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 40
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Installation of platform screen doors
S S S S S Optional device; One possibility to prevent passengers from climbing between train between train carsFaulty design
of precautions on station and guideway
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Ensure correct initial design of precautions
Incorrect maintenance of precautions on station and guideways
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of precautions
1.2.2.4 Person falls/1.2.2.4 Person falls/ intrudes on track
1.2.2.4.1 Intrusion on the line by persons from train
1.2.2.4.1.1 Undetected persons by evacuation on line
No evacuation supervision
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
1 2 2 4 1 2 Undetected1.2.2.4.1.2 Undetected person leaves/falls out of the train
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 41
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.2.2.4.1.2.1 Undetected person leaves/falls out of the train by door
No installation of precautions
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Note: here train doors. platform doors are mentioned in 1.2.2.4.2.3.5 as an
Critical Supervise Door Opening - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites necessary for safe passenger exchange.
X X X S Control passenger doors
person as an realisation example)
Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.
X S S S S Control passenger doors
Faulty design of precautions
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Ensure correct initial design of door system
p
Incorrect maintenance of precautions
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of all door related systems
1.2.2.4.1.2.2 Undetected person leaves/falls out of the train by window
Faulty design of windows
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Ensure correct initial design of windows
Examples: Windows unable to open, Detection of broken windows
Insufficient maintenance (e.g. broken window)
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of train windows
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 42
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.2.2.4.1.2.3 Undetected person leaves/falls out of the train by end of train wall / after separation of cars
unauthorised decoupling
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise Train Integrity - This function is intended to supervise the integrity of the train (loss of coupling between vehicles of one unit)
S S S S S Supervise stauts of the train
separation of cars person
Ensure correct initial design of train i.e. wagon
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance or train i.e. wagon
Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency brakes)
Undetected parted train / separated wagon
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object
Critical Supervise Train Integrity - This function is intended to supervise the integrity of the train (loss of coupling between vehicles of one unit)
S S S S S Supervise stauts of the train
Object striking person
unit)
Ensure correct initial design of train i.e. wagonEnsure correct inspection and maintenance or train i.e. wagon
Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency brakes)
1.2.2.4.2 Person falls / intrudes track (from outside / (from outside / from station - wayside)
1.2.2.4.2.1 Risky behaviour
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 43
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.2.2.4.2.1.1 Person intrudes track wilfully (not suicide)
Insufficient precautions against intrusion
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Guideway person which passengers are not
permitted e.g. the track.Guideway Intrusion Protection System (GIPS); Fences at dedicated areas; Penalty for intrusion; Passenger information; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : l tf /t iplatform/train
1.2.2.4.2.1.2 Person intrudes track unconsciously
Insufficient precautions against intrusion
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
S S S S S Optional device;Example for realisation: Platform Screen Doors; Guideway Intrusion Protection System (GIPS); Fences at dedicateddedicated areas; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/train
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 44
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.2.2.4.2.2 Unnoticed track No installation of precautions
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
person which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
Faulty design of precautions
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Ensure correct initial design of track and precautions
Examples for realisation: Mark track (e.g. mark stones in different colours); Fences at dedicated areas; Obstacle detection and warningwarning signals by driver
Incorrect maintenance of precautions
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of track and precautions
1.2.2.4.2.3 Person fall
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 45
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.2.2.4.2.3.1 obstacles - stumble
Any reason Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Example for realisation: Platform person which passengers are not
permitted e.g. the track.Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/train
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station
Prevent obstacles in station which could be a reason to stumble by maintenance as well as regular cleaning
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 46
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.2.2.4.2.3.2 Rush / hustle / push
Overcrowded situation
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Catastrophic Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Platform screen doors; Guideway person which passengers are not
permitted e.g. the track.Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/train
Prevent overcrowded situations Ensure enough room for passengers and avoid train d ldelays
Criminal or terroristic acts
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway, Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/passengers/ staff : platform/train
Prevent criminal or terroristic acts
Supervision of station to prevent criminal acts
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 47
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.2.2.4.2.3.3 Slippery ground Faulty design of station floor, Environmental condition (Humidity, Rain, Snow ..),
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Platform Rain, Snow ..),
Slope of platform or whole station
person which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/train
Ensure correct initial design of station
Considering humidity, rain,
l fsnow, slope of station or platform
Incorrect maintenance of station floor
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/train
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 48
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station
Sufficient cleaning on platform and station
1.2.2.4.2.3.4 Insufficient lighting
Faulty design Fall of person, El t t
Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This f ti i i t d d t i
S S S S S Optional device;S i iElectrocut
ion, Object striking person
function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/trainplatform/train
Ensure correct initial design of lightning system
Considering the level of brightness
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 49
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance of lightning
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Platform person which passengers are not
permitted e.g. the track.Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/train
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of lightning system
1.2.2.4.2.3.5 Platform faulty design
Disrespect of possibility person fall
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop forstop for passengers/ staff : platform/train; Correct initial platform design
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 50
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Ensure well educated and well trained engineers
1.2.2.4.2.4 criminal act Insufficient security precautions
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object
Catastrophic Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for Object
striking person
avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
Examples for realisation: Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/train
Ensure supervision of station area
1.2.2.4.3 Person falls from above (bridge etc.)
Insufficient precautions
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Guideway intrusion detection system
Faulty design of e.g. bridge
Fall of person, Electrocuti
Critical Ensure correct initial design of bridges considering that persons might fall from e.g. bridges
Installation of precautions like fences, b i dion,
Object striking person
barriers and railings against fall of person from e.g. bridge
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 51
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Guideway which passengers are not
permitted e.g. the track.Guideway intrusion detection system
Incorrect maintenance of precautions
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of precautions
Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system Such system
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples foravoidance system. Such system
covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
Examples for realisation: Guideway intrusion detection system
1.2.2.4.3.5 Suicide Insufficient precautions
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Guideway intrusion detection systemsystem
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 52
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Faulty design of e.g. bridge
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Ensure correct initial design of bridges considering that persons might fall from e.g. bridges
Installation of precautions like fences, barriers and railings against fall of person from e.g. person from e.g. bridge
Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Guideway intrusion detection system
Incorrect maintenance of precautions
Fall of person, Electrocut
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of precautions
of precautions Electrocution, Object striking person
Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Guideway intrusion detection system
1 2 2 5 Staff inside Operational Fall of Critical Operational rules1.2.2.5 Staff inside clearance envelope during operation, maintenance, evacuation
Operational need
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Operational rules
Maintenance rulesEvacuation rules
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 53
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Warning signals for worker1.2.2.7 Person leaning
out of train infringes train clearance envelope
in focus: single person
1.2.2.7.1 Person leaning out of train infringes train clearance envelope: out of door
Faulty design of doors; Insufficient maintenance; Insufficient precautions
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.
X S S S S Control passenger doors
Supervise Door Opening - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites necessary for safe passenger exchange.
X X X S Control passenger doors
Installation of broken doors detection
Faulty design of doors and
Fall of person
Critical Ensure correct initial design of doors and precaution systemsof doors and
precaution systems
person, Electrocution, Object striking person
doors and precaution systems
Incorrect maintenance of doors and precaution systems
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of doors and precaution systems
1.2.2.7.2 Person leaning out of train infringes train
Insufficient precautions
Fall of person, Electrocut
Critical Installation of detector of open/closed/broken window
infringes train clearance envelope: out of window
Electrocution, Object striking person
Windows are not able to be open that a person could lean out
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 54
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Faulty design of windows
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Ensure correct design of windows and precautions
personIncorrect maintenance of windows
Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of windows and precautions
1.3 Train collision hazard within uninfringed clearance envelope
1.3.1 Train too close to other vehicle
1 1 1 2 2 1 Insufficient worst respect1.1.1.2.2.1 Insufficient worst case safety distance
respect sublevels
1.3.1.2 Undetected train/vehicle
1.3.1.2.1 Undetected / uncommunicated (stranded) train
1.3.1.2.1.1 Train presence signal failure (trainside)
Faulty design of trainside equipment
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route El t Thi f ti i
S S S S S Ensure safe tElements - This function is
intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
route
Ensure correct initial design of trainside equipment
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 55
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance of train side equipment
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is
S S S S S Ensure safe routeElements This function is
intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
route
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of trainside equipment
1.3.1.2.1.2 Train presence signal failure (wayside)
Faulty design of secondary train detection system
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is
S S S S S Ensure safe routeElements - This function is
intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
route
Ensure correct initial design of secondary train detection system
Incorrect maintenance of secondary train detection system
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
E S f S it h bl R t S S S S S E fEnsure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 56
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of wayside equipment
1.3.1.2.1.3 Train detection information processing / communication
Faulty design of data communication system
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
communication n system occupied by an unequipped or failed train.Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
Supervise data communication equipment - This function is intended to inform staff about availability of functions concerning operation and status of data communication equipment.equipment.
Ensure correct initial design of data communication system
Incorrect maintenance of data communication system
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
Supervise data communication equipment - This function is intended to inform staff about availability of functions concerning operation and status of data communication equipment.
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 57
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of data communication system
1.3.1.2.2 Undetected train enters system
No communication established prior entry
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
prior entry occupied by an unequipped or failed train.Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Transition to CBTC Area Technical Solution of Entry into CBTC Area
1.3.1.2.3 System loses unnoticed tracking of train
1.3.1.2.3.1 Train presence signal failure
Faulty design of trainside
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines
X X X X X Ensure safe separation ofsignal failure
(trainside)of trainside equipment
Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
Ensure correct initial design of trainside equipment
Incorrect maintenance of train side
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trainsof train side
equipmentwhether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
trains
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 58
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
conditions.
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of trainside equipment
1.3.1.2.3.2 Train presence detection failure (wayside)
Faulty design of secondary train detection system
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
conditions.
Ensure correct initial design of secondary train detection system
Incorrect maintenance of secondary train detection system
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe
S S S S S Ensure safe route
normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of wayside equipment
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 59
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.3.1.2.3.3 Train detection information processing / communication failure
Faulty design of data communication system
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route El t Thi f ti i
S S S S S Ensure safe tElements - This function is
intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
route
Supervise data communication equipment - This function is intended to inform staff about availability of functions concerning operation and status of data communication equipment.
Ensure correct initial design of data communication systemdata communication system
Incorrect maintenance of data communication system
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
Supervise data communication equipment - This function is intended to inform staff aboutintended to inform staff about availability of functions concerning operation and status of data communication equipment.
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of data communication system
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 60
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.3.1.2.4 Undetected parted train / separated wagon
Faulty design of train i.e. wagon
Collision Derail-ment
Catastrophic Supervise Train Integrity - This function is intended to supervise the integrity of the train (loss of coupling between vehicles of one unit)
S S S S S Supervise stauts of the train
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements This function is
S S S S S Ensure safe routeElements - This function is
intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
route
Ensure correct initial design of train i.e. wagon
Incorrect maintenance of train i.e. wagon
Collision Derail-ment
Catastrophic Supervise Train Integrity - This function is intended to supervise the integrity of the train (loss of coupling between vehicles of one unit)
S S S S S Supervise stauts of the train
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is
S S S S S Ensure safe routeElements - This function is
intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
route
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance or train i.e. wagon
Unauthorised decoupling
Collision Derail-ment
Supervise Train Integrity - This function is intended to supervise the integrity of the train (loss of coupling between vehicles of one unit)
S S S S S Supervise stauts of the train
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is
S S S S S Ensure safe route
intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance or train i.e. wagon
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 61
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.3.1.2.5 Undetected / unpermitted maintenance car / work train
Faulty design of operational rules
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Establish clear and understandable operational understandable operational procedures and rules
Disrespect of operational rules
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure adherence and respect of operational rules and procedures
1.3.1.3 Wrong train detection (position)
1.3.1.3.1 Wrong "position / track segment" from train from train detection
1.3.1.3.1.1 Train presence signal failure (trainside)
Faulty design of trainside equipment
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
Ensure correct initial design of trainside equipmenttrainside equipment
Incorrect maintenance of train side equipment
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 62
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
conditions.
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of trainside equipment
1.3.1.3.1.2 Train presence detection failure (wayside)
Faulty design of secondary train detection system
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
conditions.
Ensure correct initial design of secondary train detection system
Incorrect maintenance of secondary train detection system
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe
S S S S S Ensure safe route
normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of wayside equipment
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 63
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.3.1.3.1.3 Train detection information processing / communication failure
Faulty design of data communication system
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is
S S S S S Ensure safe routeElements - This function is
intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
route
Respond to Train Location Failure
S S S S Ensure safe route
Ensure correct initial design of data communication system
Incorrect maintenance of data communication system
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route S S S S S Ensure safeEnsure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
Respond to Train Location Failure
S S S S Ensure safe route
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of data communication system
Train receive information of wrong track section
Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of data communication system
section (adjacent track)
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 64
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Clear and understandable operational rules
Prevention of pick up an adjacent position reference if a train drives in reverse reverse (passing a point) a limited distance and then continues forward
1.3.1.3.2 Wrong timing of train "position" detection communication
1.3.1.3.2.1 Train presence signal failure (trainside)
Faulty design of trainside equipment
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains(trainside) equipment whether a section of track is
occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
Ensure correct initial design of trainside equipment
Incorrect maintenance of train side equipment
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
equipment occupied by an unequipped or failed train.Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 65
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of trainside equipment
1.3.1.3.2.2 Train presence detection failure (wayside)
Faulty design of secondary train detection system
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
system occupied by an unequipped or failed train.Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
Ensure correct initial design of secondary train detection system
Incorrect maintenance of secondary train detection
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
train detection system
occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of wayside equipment
1.3.1.3.2.3 Train detection information processing /
Faulty design of data communicatio
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trainsprocessing /
communication failure
communication system
whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
trains
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 66
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.
S S S S S Ensure safe route
conditions.
Respond to Train Location Failure
S S S S Ensure safe route
Ensure correct initial design of data communication system
Incorrect maintenance of data communication system
Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.
X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains
Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe
S S S S S Ensure safe route
( )conditions.
Respond to Train Location Failure
S S S S Ensure safe route
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of data communication system
1.1.1.2.2.3 (1.3.1.4) Wrong travel direction
respect sublevels
1.1.1.1.1.3 (1.3.1.5) Insufficient deceleration
respect sublevels
1.3.2 Train too close to end of track
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 67
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
1.3.2.2 Unrecognised end of track
Maintenance works
Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Example for realisation: obstacle obstacle detection in front of train (technical or by driver)
Ensure correct adherence of maintenance procedures
Communication between train, OCC and maintenance crew
Bad weather conditions
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; hazardous situations by external
sensors.guideway; Example for realisation: obstacle detection in front of train (technical or by driver)
Ensure good view for driver1.1.1.2.2.3 (1.3.2.3) Wrong travel
direction (back movement)
respect sublevels
1.1.1.1.1.3 (1.3.2.4) Insufficient deceleration
respect sublevels
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 68
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
2 Train Interior Hazards
2.1 Person struck/hurt by object
2.1.1 Break of train equipmentequipment fixation
2.1.1.1 Faulty design, implementation, maintenance
Mistakes by staff during design, implementation and maintenance
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Adequate training and education of staff
Employ trained and well educated staff only
Inadequate or no rules for design, implementation and maintenance
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Establish rules for design
maintenanceEstablish rules for implementationEstablish rules for maintenance
2.1.1.2 Vibration Faulty design of train cars
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of train cars considering the possibility of vibration
Incorrect maintenance of train cars
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Ensure correct maintenance and inspection to prevent vibration
2.1.2 Luggage / similar objects
2 1 2 1 Faulty design Mistake by Person Marginal Adequate training and education2.1.2.1 Faulty design, implementation, maintenance of luggage rack
Mistake by staff during design, implementation and maintenance of luggage rack
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Adequate training and education of staff
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 69
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Insufficient or no rules for the design, implementation and maintenance for luggage
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Establish rules regarding luggage racks
for luggage racks
2.1.2.2 Operation error2.1.2.2.1 Acceleration Unskilled
DriverPerson Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Adequate training and education of staff
Well design and user supportive HMI driver desk
2.1.2.2.2 Deceleration Unskilled Driver
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Adequate training and education of staff
Well design and user supportive HMI driver desk
2.1.2.2.3 Jerk of moving see 2.1.42.1.2.2.3 Jerk of moving train
see 2.1.4
2.1.3 Arris by vandalism
Insufficient supervision
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Supervise train equipment
Faulty design of train equipment (not considering the possibility of vandalism)
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of train equipment considering the possibility of vandalism
Incorrect maintenance
Person Struck /
Marginal Prevent vandalism by regular inspection and maintenance
and inspection Hurt by Object
p
2.1.4 Jerk of moving train
2.1.4.1 Propulsion failure Faulty design of propulsion system
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of propulsion system
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 70
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance of propulsion system
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of propulsion system
2.1.4.2 Brake failure Faulty design of braking system
Person Struck / Hurt by
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency brakes)system Hurt by
Objectbrakes)
Incorrect maintenance of braking system
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of braking system
2.1.4.3 Environmental conditions
9.1.2 Wind Inadequate precaution against wind
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Consider wind force during planning and design of railway/metro system
Operational rules to stop all trains in case of extreme wind
9 2 4 Earthquake Inadequate Person Catastrophic Consider earthquakes during9.2.4 Earthquake Inadequate precaution against earthquakes
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Catastrophic Consider earthquakes during planning and design of railway/metro system
Operational rules to stop all trains is case of forecasted earthquake
2.1.4.4 Guideway structural failure
Faulty design of guideway
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of guideway
Incorrect maintenance of guideway
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of guideway
j
2.1.4.5 Excessive deceleration
ATP on-board equipment failure
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of ATP on-board equipment
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of ATP on-board
i t
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Mistake by driver
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Ensure correct execution of operational rules
Employ trained and well educated staff only
U i d iUnconscious driver2.1.4.6 Excessive
accelerationATP on-board equipment failure
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Catastrophic Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.
X S S S S Ensure safe speed
Ensure correct initial design of ATP on-board equipmentEnsure correct inspection and maintenance of ATP on-board equipment
Mistake by driver
Person Struck / Hurt by Obj t
Catastrophic Ensure correct execution of operational rules
ObjectEmploy trained and well educated staff only
Unconscious driver2.1.4.7 Emergency
brakingAny reason Person
Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Ensure a limitation of braking force to an unharmful level for passenger
X S S S S Control acceleration and braking
Provide enough halt (e.g. handrails) in trains
Prevent unnecessary emergency brakes by passenger
2 2 Explosion2.2 Explosion2.2.1 Explosion in train
2.2.1.1 Criminal acts Insufficient supervision
Explosion Catastrophic Provide enough supervision in train
Training and education of staff
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Operational rule to stop all trains in case of a criminal or terroristic act
2.2.1.2 Egression of explosive substances in traintrain
2.2.1.2.1 Maintenance errors
Mistake by maintenance crew
Explosion e.g. due to cabling error
Catastrophic Adequate training and education of staff
Technical and procedural support
2.2.1.2.2 Faulty design, improper design
Insufficient training for staff
Explosion systematic error
Catastrophic Adequate training and education of staff
Insufficient rules/guidelines for design of train cars
Explosion Catastrophic Establish technical and procedural support for design e.g. by guidelines
2.2.1.3 Explosive material storage
Faulty design Explosion Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle considering possible gexplosions
2.2.1.4 Explosive products carried by passenger
Any reason Explosion Catastrophic Passenger information
Passenger control at entrance of station/train
2.2.2 Explosion on guideway
2.2.2.1 Criminal acts Insufficient supervision
Explosion Catastrophic Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
y ycovers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
Training and education of staff Operational rule to stop all trains is case of a criminal or terroristic act
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 73
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
2.2.2.2 Egression of explosive substances on guideway
2.2.2.2.1 Maintenance errors
Mistake by maintenance crew
Explosion Catastrophic Adequate training and education of staff
crewTechnical and procedural support
2.2.2.2.2 Faulty design, improper design
Insufficient training for staff
Explosion Catastrophic Adequate training and education of staff
Insufficient rules/guidelines for design of train cars
Explosion Catastrophic Establish technical and procedural support for design e.g. by guidelines
2.3 Person fall in train
2.3.1 Brake failure Unskilled Driver
Fall of person in train
Marginal Ensure correct execution of operational rules
Employ trained and well educated staff onlyUnconscious driver
ATP On-board problem
Fall of person in train
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of ATP on-board equipment
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of ATP on-board equipment
2.3.2 Obstacles in train Inappropriate Design
Fall of person in train
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of train cars considering possible obstacles
Incorrect maintenance
Fall of person in train
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance to prevent obstacles in train cars
2 3 3 Panic/hustle in Any reason Fall of Catastrophic Supervise train i e passenger2.3.3 Panic/hustle in train (by criminal act, jerk,...)
Any reason Fall of person in train
Catastrophic Supervise train i.e. passenger
Employ security guards and train on-board personnel
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 74
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
2.3.4 Insufficient lighting
Power blackout
Fall of person in train
Marginal Installation of secondary power supply system
Faulty design of lightning system
Fall of person in train
Marginal Ensure correct design of lightning system in train
Incorrect Fall of Marginal Ensure correct inspection andIncorrect maintenance of lightning system
Fall of person in train
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of lightning system
2.3.5 Inexistence or broken support elements
Faulty design of support elements
Fall of person in train
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of support elements
Incorrect maintenance of support elements
Fall of person in train
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of support elements
2.3.6 Slippery train floor
Faulty design of train floor
Fall of person in train
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of train floors
Incorrect Fall of Marginal Ensure correct inspection andIncorrect maintenance of train floor
Fall of person in train
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and cleaning of train floors
2.4 Fire2.4.1 Fire in train
2.4.1.1 Inflammable material used on train
Faulty design - inflammable material used
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle
Incorrect maintenance - inflammable material used
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of train cars
2.4.1.2 Ignition Faulty design e.g. faulty designed
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle
designed electrical components
Maintenance error
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of train cars
2.4.1.3 Unobstructed spread of fire
Faulty design of train cars
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 75
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Installation of fire and smoke protection
S S S S S Optional device
Maintenance error
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct execution of maintenance rules
2.4.1.4 Explosion see 2.22.4.2 Fire on guideway
ignites trainignites train
2.4.2.1 Inflammable material used on guideway
Faulty design - inflammable material used on guideway
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of guideway
Incorrect maintenance - inflammable material used
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on guideway
2.4.2.2 Ignition Faulty design e.g. faulty designed electrical components
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of guideway
components
Maintenance error
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of guideway
2.4.2.3 Unobstructed spread of fire
Faulty design of guideways
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of guideway
Installation of fire and smoke protection
S S S S S Optional device
Maintenance error
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct execution of maintenance rules
2.4.2.4 Explosion see 2.22.5 Inadequate
temperatureFaulty design of train cars
Super cooling/ Superheating of
Marginal Installation of air renewal and air conditioning systems
S S S S S Optional device
Passenger
Ensure correct maintenance of HEVAC
S S S S S Optional device
Ensure correct handling of HEVAC
2.6 Asphyxiation
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
2.6.1 Smoke Fire Asphyxiation of passenger
Catastrophic See subtree 2.4.1 Fire in train
Faulty design of vehicle
Asphyxiation of passenge
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of train cars in order to prevent the possibility of development of passenge
rpossibility of development of smoke e.g. from electronical equipment
Incorrect maintenance
Asphyxiation of passenger
Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance to prevent development of smoke
2.6.2 Air renewal failure Faulty design of air renewal system
Asphyxiation of passenger
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of air renewal system
Provide possibilities to open windows or doors in emergency cases
Incorrect maintenance
Asphyxiation of passenger
Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of air renewal system
Asphyxiation of passenger
Catastrophic Provide possibilities to open windows or doors in emergency cases
2.7 Toxic releases2.7.1 Toxic releases in
trainFaulty design of vehicle leads to combustion, leakage ..
Asphyxiation, burns of passenger
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle to prevent any form of toxic release by combustion, leakage etc.
Avoid the use of toxic material on train for construction
Incorrect maintenance of vehicle leads to combustion, leakage …
Asphyxiation, burns of passenger
Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on vehicle to prevent any form of toxic release by combustion, leakage etc.
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Avoid the use of toxic material on train for maintenance purposes
2.7.2 Toxic releases coming from outside
Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCCorder to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
2.8 Radiation2.8.1 Radiation from
equipmentFaulty design of train cars
Burns of passenger
Critical Ensure correct initial design of train cars considering the possibility of radiation
Incorrect maintenance on train cars
Burns of passenger
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on train cars considering the possibility of radiation
2.8.2 Foreign radiation/ Strong Fields
Faulty design of vehicle e.g. insufficient precaution
Burns of passenger
Critical Minimise the impact of foreign radiation and strong fields
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of precautions
2.9 Electrocution in train
Faulty design of train cars
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct initial design of train cars considering the possibility of electrocution
Incorrect maintenance of train cars
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance to ensure the protection of passenger
2.10 Person contact with machinery
Faulty design of train cars
Cuts, burns, contamination, suffocations of passenger
Critical Ensure correct initial design of machinery
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 78
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance of train cars
Cuts, burns, contamination, suffocations of passenge
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of precautions against contact of passenger with machinery
passenger
2.11 Person exposed to noise
Faulty design of train cars
Suffocation
Insignificant Ensure correct initial design of train cars considering the possibility of loud noises
Incorrect maintenance of train cars
Suffocation
Insignificant Ensure correct inspection and maintenance
2.12 Person needs urgent asisstance
heart attack, childbirth, …
Injury of person
Critical Installation of emergency call device onboard
S S S S S
Provide communication onboard staff and OCCEnsure Possibility of Announcement inside train e.g. ask for
d t b ddoctor onboard
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
3 Train-Station- Interface Hazards (with train already in station)
3.1 Passenger falls from train onfrom train on station track
3.1.1 Incorrect train alignment
No location measurement
Fall of person, Electrocution
Catastrophic Determine Train Location S S S S Ensure safe route
Support driver with signs To indicate correct location for passenger exchange
3.1.2 Vehicle doors are open on the wrong side at stationstation
3.1.2.1 Wrong Travel Direction
No measurement of travel direction
Fall of person, Electrocution
Catastrophic Determine Actual Train Travel Direction - This function determines the travel direction of trains.
S S S S Control acceleration and braking
3.1.2.2 Door control failure
No door control system
Fall of person, Electrocution
Catastrophic Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.
X S S S S Control passenger doors
Supervise Door Opening - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites necessary for safe passenger exchange.
X X X S Control passenger doors
3.1.3 Train departure ith ( ti d)
Door control f il
Fall of Catastrophic Supervise Train Doors - This f ti i i t d d t i
X S S S S Control with (unnoticed) open doors
failure person, Electrocution
function is intended to supervise the train door control system.
passenger doors
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 80
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise Conditions for Start of Train Movement - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites related to doors and emergency handles necessary for safe start of train movement.
X X S S S Put in or take out of operation; Example for realisation: Installation of manual movement. manual emergency stop for passengers/staff on platform and train
Installation of CCTV system to monitor platform area
Prevention of untimely departure by monitoring
3.2 Passenger injured by door closing
3.2.1 Inadequate Pressure/ Forces
Faulty design of doors system
Trapping of person
Critical Supervise Conditions for Start of Train Movement - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites related to doors and emergency handles necessary for safe start of train movement.
X X S S S Put in or take out of operation
Ensure correct initial design of door system
Test correct door closing pressure/ force
Installation of door control and obstacle detection system
X X X X S
Incorrect maintenance of door system
Trapping of person
Critical Supervise Conditions for Start of Train Movement - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites related to doors and emergency handles necessary for safe start of train movement.
X X S S S Put in or take out of operation
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 81
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of door system
Including obstacle detection and door closing pressure/ force
3 2 2 Passenger injured3.2.2 Passenger injured by platform screen doors
3.2.2.1 Person hit by platform screen's doors during closing
Injury of person, Passenger hit by train, Trapping of person
Marginal Installation of door control and obstacle detection system
X X X X S
3.2.2.2 Installation of PSD - Passenger
h d i t
Wrong installation procedure
Fall of person
Injury of person, Passange
Marginal Migration phase procedures
smashed against PSD/ construction material during passenger boarding
procedure Passanger hit by train, Trapping of person
overcrowded situation
Fall of person
Injury of person, Passanger hit by train, Trapping of person
Marginal Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 82
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
3.2.2.3 Misuse of manual control panel for PSD by staff in case of PSD failure
Staff communication, misunderstandings, insufficient education Trapping
Passanger hit by
Marginal Training and education of staff
education pp gof person
ytrain
Establish clear and understandable operational procedures and rules
3.2.2.4 Loss of locking status of PSD
Fall of person
Injury of person, Passanger hit by train, Trapping of person
Marginal Manage PSDs closing - This function is intended to manage the platform door closing if existing after exchange of passenger at stations.
S S S S S Optional device
3.2.3 Inadequate space between door leaf
d b d
Faulty design of doors system
Trapping of person
Critical Ensure correct initial design of door system
and car body system
Installation of door control and obstacle detection system
X X X X S
Incorrect maintenance of door system
Trapping of person
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of door system
3.3 Train departs with passenger trapped in doors (limb of passenger, clothes, bags, other objects fromother objects from passenger, leash... )
3.3.1 Wrong door closing / interlocking signal
No door control
Trapping of person
Critical Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.
X S S S S Control passenger doors
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 83
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Conditions for start of train are not fulfilled
Trapping of person
Critical Supervise Conditions for Start of Train Movement - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites related to doors and emergency handles necessary for safe start of train movement.
X X S S S Put in or take out of operation
movement.
3.3.2 Undetected obstacles
Obstacle detector signals clearance
Trapping of person
Critical Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.
X S S S S Control passenger doors; Example for realisation: Obstacle detection in doors (train and PSD)
Mistake by driver
Trapping of person
Critical Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.
X S S S S Control passenger doors; Example for prealisation: Obstacle detection in doors (train and PSD)
Support driver during clearance check
X X S S S Ensure sufficient sight onto platform and doors
Design or maintenance error of train doors
Objects striking person
Injury of person
Critical Correct initial design of train doors
doors
Regular inspection and maintenance
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 84
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Overcrowded situations, Vandalism, Panic, Unawareness of Passenger
Objects striking person
Injury of person
Critical Correct initial design of train doors
3.3.3 Passenger/ object trapped in platform screen doors
Regular inspection and maintenance
3.3.3.1 Person stuck between train doors and screen's doors
Dsign or maintenance errors of PSD
Injury of person
Objects striking person, Trapping of person Critical
Ensure correct initial design of interaction traindoor / Platform screen doors
Regular inspection and maintenance
3.3.3.2 Anything (leashes, ties,
Overcrowded situations,
Ensure correct initial design of PSD(leashes, ties,
wrist of a child ..) sticks in PSD and is not detected by PSD
situations, Vandalism, Panic, Unawareness of Passenger
Injury of person
Objects striking person, Trapping of person Critical
PSD
Manage PSDs closing - This function is intended to manage the platform door closing if existing after exchange of passenger at stations.
S S S S S Optional device
Design or maintenance
Objects striking
Ensure correct initial design of PSDmaintenance
error of PSDInjury of person
striking person, Trapping of person Critical
PSD
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
3.3.3.3 Person or object is between closed PSD and closed train doors -> and train departs with passenger in doors
Design or maintenance error of PSD
Objects striking person
Ensure correct initial design of PSD
doors Injury of person
person, Trapping of person Critical
3.4 Train moves at passenger exchange
3.4.1 Incorrect Train Departure
3.4.1.1 Wrong Departure Authorisation / Command
Conditions for start are not fulfilled
Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object
Catastrophic Supervise Conditions for Start of Train Movement - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites related to doors and emergency handles necessary for safe start of train movement.
X X S S S Put in or take out of operation
(object striking person)
movement.
3.4.1.2 Door Status Failures
Door status is lost
Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object striking person)
Catastrophic Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.
X S S S S Control passenger doors; Installation of door status control
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Door status signals clearance but door occupied
Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object
Critical Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.
X S S S S Control passenger doors; Installation of obstacle detection
(object striking person)
3.4.2 Rear end collision Train enters occupied track in station
collision Catastrophic Ensure exclusiveness of train in track section
3.4.3 Propulsion Failure Faulty design of propulsion system
Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of propulsion system
(object striking person)
Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.
X S S S S Ensure safe speed
Respond to Unexpected Train Movements - This function covers the reaction of ATP in case of roll away.
X S S S S Correct and sufficient maintenance
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance of propulsion system
Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object
Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of propulsion system
(object striking person)
Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.
X S S S S Ensure safe speed
Respond to Unexpected Train Movements - This function covers the reaction of ATP in case of roll away.
X S S S S Correct and sufficient maintenance
3.4.4 Brakes Failure Faulty design Fall of Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of 3.4.4 Brakes Failure Faulty design of braking system
Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object striking person)
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency brakes)
Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.
X S S S S Ensure safe speed
p o e
Respond to Unexpected Train Movements - This function covers the reaction of ATP in case of roll away.
X S S S S Correct and sufficient maintenance
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance of braking system
Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object
Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of braking system
(object striking person)
Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.
X S S S S Ensure safe speed
Respond to Unexpected Train Movements - This function covers the reaction of ATP in case of roll away.
X S S S S Correct and sufficient maintenance
3.4.5 Important Overcrowded it ti
Fall of Marginal Provide enough room for i t tipassenger
movement in the vehicle
situation person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object striking person)
passenger in station
Provide enough room for passenger in train
Provide enough halt inside of train
3 5 Person between3.5 Person between Vehicle/ Vehicle gaps
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
3.5.1 Passengers risky behaviour
Any reason Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object
Critical Installation of platform screen doors
S S S S S Optional device
(object striking person)
Installation of manual emergency stop for passenger and staff on platform and train
S S S S S
Manage train door closing - This function is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.
X X X X S Control passenger doors
Manage PSDs closing - This function is intended to manage
S S S S S Control passenger function is intended to manage
the platform door closing if existing after exchange of passenger at stations.
passenger doors
3.5.2 Unconsciousness (children, elder people...)
Any reason Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object striking person)
Critical Installation of platform screen doors
S S S S S Optional device; Control passenger doors
Installation of manual emergency S S S S SInstallation of manual emergency stop for passenger and staff on platform and train
S S S S S
Manage train door closing - This function is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.
X X X X S Control passenger doors
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Manage PSDs closing - This function is intended to manage the platform door closing if existing after exchange of passenger at stations.
S S S S S Control passenger doors
3.5.3 Rush / hustle / push
Any reason Fall of person
Critical Installation of platform screen doors
S S S S S Optional device;push person,
Trapping of person; Impact on person (object striking person)
doors device; Control passenger doors
Installation of manual emergency stop for passenger and staff on platform and train
S S S S S
Manage train door closing - This X X X X S Control g gfunction is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.
passenger doors
Manage PSDs closing - This function is intended to manage the platform door closing if existing after exchange of passenger at stations.
S S S S S Control passenger doors
Prevent criminal or terroristic acts
Supervision of station
Avoid overcrowded situations Provide enough room in station
Ensure adherence to timetable In order toEnsure adherence to timetable In order to prevent rush
3.5.4 Unknown misalignment of train
Manage train door closing - This function is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.
X X X X S Control passenger doors
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
3.6 Person steps / falls into Vehicle- Platform Gap
3.6.1 Risky behaviour along the train
Any reason Fall of person, T i
Critical Installation of platform screen doors
S S S S S Optional device; C t lTrapping
of person; Impact on person (object striking person)
Control passenger doors
Installation of manual emergency stop for passenger and staff on platform and train
S S S S S
Supervision of platform Detection of person falls inperson falls in gap
Manage train door closing - This function is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.
X X X X S Control passenger doors
Manage PSDs closing - This function is intended to manage the platform door closing if existing after exchange of passenger at stations.
S S S S S Control passenger doors
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
3.6.2 Excessive gap Faulty design of vehicle-platform gap
Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object
Critical Ensure correct initial design of station i.e. vehicle-platform gap
Consider the dimension of the vehicle to construct platform
(object striking person), Electrocution
Installation of gap filling devices E.g. Movable step
Announcements and warnings regarding the gap
E.g. "Mind the gap"
Installation of manual emergency stop for passenger and staff on platform and train
S S S S S
Supervision of gap S S S S S Optional device;Prevent injuries to persons between cars or between platform and train
Ensure gap is free before train departure
X X S S S Prevent injuries to persons between cars
b tor between platform and train
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
3.6.3 Passenger steps / falls in gap at door area
Insufficient warnings
Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object
Critical Announcements and warnings regarding the gap
E.g. "Mind the gap"
(object striking person), Electrocution
Installation of manual emergency stop for passenger and staff on platform and train
S S S S S
Supervision of gap S S S S S Optional device;Prevent injuries to persons between cars or between platform and train
Ensure gap is free before train departure
X X S S S Prevent injuries to persons between cars or between platform and train
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
vehicles doors open but PSD are closed
Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object
Critical Ensure correct initial design of interaction traindoor / Platform screen doors
(object striking person), Electrocution
PSD opens but train doors are closed
Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object striking person),
Critical Ensure correct initial design of interaction traindoor / Platform screen doors
person), Electrocution
3.6.4 Person fall Overcrowded situations, Panic, Unawareness of Passenger
Injury of person
Installation of Platform Screen Doors
S S S S S Optional device
Faulty design of precautions
Injury of person
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct initial design of precautions
Incorrect Injury of Electrocut Critical Ensure correct inspection andIncorrect maintenance of precautions
Injury of person
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of precautions
3.7 Electrocution
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
3.7.1 Difference of potential between train and other equipment
Faulty design Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct initial design of train and other railway/metro equipment
Considering the possibility of potential differences
Incorrect maintenance
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance to prevent potentialmaintenance ion maintenance to prevent potential differences
3.7.2 Contact with train power supply
Faulty design of train power supply
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct initial design of train power supply
Considering the position of the power supply in connection to the passengers, to cover the power supply against contact of persons
Incorrect Electrocut Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of train power supply
ion maintenance of train power supply
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
4 Station Interior Hazards (with no train presence)
4.1 Person struck by falling object
Faulty design of station
Impact on person
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building
Consideration of possibility that objectthat object might fall on persons
Incorrect maintenance of station
Impact on person
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station building
Prevention of object fall on person, neither caused by maintenance works or during works
4.2 Person hit by sharp object
Faulty design of station
Impact on person
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building
Consideration of possibility that sharp object might hitobject might hit persons
Incorrect maintenance of station
Impact on person
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station building
Prevention of sharp object hits person, neither caused by maintenance works or during works
4.3 Person hurt by protruding object
Faulty design of station
Impact on person
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building
Consideration of possibility that protruding objects might hurt personhurt person
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance of station
Impact on person
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station building
Prevention of that protruding object might hurt person, neither caused by maintenance maintenance works or during works
4.4 Wheelchair/ baby carriage hazards
4.4.1 Uncontrolled wheelchair/ baby carriage movement
Faulty design of station
Impact on person
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building
Considering safety for wheelchairs e.g. ramps, lifts, dedicated places.
Incorrect Impact on Marginal Ensure correct inspection and Ensure that all Incorrect maintenance of station
Impact on person
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station building
Ensure that all facilities for wheelchairs are properly maintained e.g. cleaning to prevent slippery floors
Panic, rush, hustle
Impact on person
Marginal Prevent panic Prevent overcrowded situations, train delays, criminal acts.
4 4 2 Wh l h i / b b F lt d i I t M i l E t i iti l d i f C id i4.4.2 Wheelchair/ baby carriage rolls over
Faulty design of station
Impact on person
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building
Considering safety for wheelchairs e.g. ramps, lifts, dedicated places.
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance of station
Impact on person
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station building
Ensure that all facilities for wheelchairs are properly maintained e.g. cleaning to prevent prevent slippery floors
Panic, rush, hustle
Impact on person
Marginal Prevent panic Prevent overcrowded situations, train delays, criminal acts
4.5 Person fall in station
4.5.1 Person fall4.5.1.1 Obstacles (trip
hazard)Faulty design of station building
Fall of person
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building
Ensure no obstacles are laying aroundbuilding laying around
Insufficient cleaning of station building
Fall of person
Marginal Ensure correct maintenance and cleaning of station building
Ensure no obstacles are laying around
4.5.1.2 Rush/ hustle Overcrowded situation due to faulty design of station
Fall of person
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station building
Provide enough room for passenger
Overcrowded situation due to train delays
Fall of person
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building
Minimise train delays and following departure/arrival changesg
Criminal or terroristic acts
Fall of person
Critical Prevent criminal or terroristic acts
Supervision of station building, Control entrance
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
4.5.1.3 Slippery floor Faulty design of station floor i.e. wrong/slippery material used
Fall of person
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building
Avoid slippery material is used for station floor
Faulty design Fall of Marginal Ensure correct initial design of AvoidFaulty design of platform and station - slope of platform or whole station
Fall of person
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building
Avoid jeopardising slope of platform or whole station
Environmental conditions (Humidity, rain, snow ..)
Fall of person
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building
Installation of precautions to minimise influence of environmental forces
Incorrect maintenance of station floor
Fall of person
Marginal Ensure correct inspection, maintenance and cleaning of station floor and precautions of station floor
i.e. insufficient cleaning
station floor and precautions against environment
4.5.1.4 Insufficient lighting
Faulty design of lightning system
Fall of person
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of lightning system
Consideration of level of brightness
Incorrect maintenance of lightning system
Fall of person
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of lightning system
4.5.1.5 Platform faulty design
Badly educated and untrained engineers
Fall of person
Marginal Employ professionals only, sufficient retraining of all employees (especially planning staff)
Insufficient rules and guidelines for planning and design of platforms
Fall of person
Marginal Establish or provide sufficient rules and guidelines for planning and design of platforms
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 100
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
4.5.2 Escalator hazard Faulty design of escalator e.g. jerk
Fall of person
Critical Ensure correct initial design of escalator
Consideration that it is dangerous if escalator moves ways too fast or stops suddenlystops suddenly
Incorrect maintenance of escalator
Fall of person
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of escalator
Consideration that it is dangerous if escalator moves ways too fast or stops suddenly
4.5.3 Lift hazard Faulty design of lift - sudden stop or jerk
Fall of person
Marginal Ensure correct initial design of lift Consideration that it is dangerous if lift suddenly stops orstops or moves too fast
Incorrect maintenance of lift
Fall of person
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of lift
Consideration that it is dangerous if lift suddenly stops or moves too fast
4.6 Person falls/intrudes on station track
4.6.1 Person falls from platform into track
Panic, Suicide,
Fall of person
Electrocution
critical Detection of guideway intrusion on platform
S S S S S Optional device;platform into track Suicide,
inattention, etcperson ion on platform device;
Supervising guideway
4.6.2 Person leaning against PSD which suddenly opens
Faulty design of equipment
Fall of person
Electrocution
critical Detection of guideway intrusion on platform
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
4.6.3 Person climbs over PSD and enters track area
Panic, Suicide, Vandalism, etc
Fall of person
Electrocution
critical Detection of guideway intrusion on platform
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Supervise traction power supply - This function is intended to powering on/off of the traction
X X X X X
powering on/off of the traction supply by the operator at the OCC, or locally, either on given sections or on all sections.
4.7 Electrocution in station
4.7.1 Equipment insulation fault
Faulty design of equipment insulation (e.g. too little insulation or too high voltage)
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct initial design of insulation of equipment
I t El t t C iti l E t i ti dIncorrect maintenance of equipment insulation
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of equipment insulation
4.7.2 Short circuits Faulty design of equipment
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct initial design of equipment
Consideration of the possibility of short circuits
Protect highly critical electronic equipment , e.g. short circuit protection
S S S S S Optional device;Supervise other safety relevant Inputs
Incorrect maintenance of equipment
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of equipment
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
4.7.3 Criminal acts Insufficient security precautions (e.g. not enough security personnel or
Electrocution
Critical Provide sufficient platform/station supervision
E.g. by CCTV or personnel
personnel or technical supervision)
Critical Design of station considering criminal acts (security aspect)
Protect highly critical components even against criminal acts
4.7.4 Contact with train power supply
Faulty design - insufficient boundary/warnings to protect passenger
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct initial design of train power supply
Considering the position of the power supply in connection to the passengers, to cover thecover the power supply against contact of persons
Incorrect maintenance of power supply - no protection of passenger
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of train power supply
4.8 Smoke4.8.1 Fire Faulty design
of station - combustible
Asphyxiation, Contamin
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station building
Minimise the use of combustible
material used ation, Burns
material - and therefore the likelihood of ignition of fire
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Supervise infrastructure ThisSupervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
Maintenance error
Asphyxiation, Contamination, Burns
Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on station building and fire protection equipment i.e. smoke detectors
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.and escalators.
4.8.2 Chemical reaction Faulty design of station - use of toxic material
Asphyxiation, Contamination, Burns
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station
Minimise the use of toxic material
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Supervise infrastructure ThisSupervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
Maintenance error
Asphyxiation, Contamination, Burns
Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on station building and fire protection equipment i.e. smoke detectors
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators. and escalators.
4.8.3 Emission of smoke through failure
Faulty design of station (e.g. pipe work - leakage)
Asphyxiation, Contamination, Burns
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station
E.g. minimise leakage of pipe works
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
S i i f t t ThiSupervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
Maintenance error
Asphyxiation, Contamination, Burns
Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on station building and fire protection equipment i.e. smoke detectors
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans
d l tand escalators.
4.8.4 Air renewal failure Faulty design of station (e.g. air conditioning system)
Asphyxiation, Contamination, Burns
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station i.e. air renewal system
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Supervise infrastructure - ThisSupervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
Maintenance error
Asphyxiation, Contamination, Burns
Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of air renewal system and fire protection equipment i.e. smoke detectors
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalatorsand escalators.
4.9 Explosion
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
4.9.1 Criminal act Insufficient security precautions (e.g. not enough security personnel or
Explosion Catastrophic Design of station considering criminal acts (security aspect)
E.g.: No paper bin, Light and open station buildings
personnel or technical supervision)
Provide sufficient platform/station supervision
E.g.: By CCTV or personnel
4.9.2 Maintenance error Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Explosion Catastrophic Employ trained and well educated staff only
Training and education of staff
Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures
4.9.3 Faulty design, improper design
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Explosion Catastrophic Employ trained and well educated staff only
Training and education of staff
Establish guidelines Consideration of explosion during planning phase
Establish quality management Verification and Validation procedures
4.9.4 Explosive material storage
Wrong storage
Explosion Catastrophic Correct station design considering the storage of explosive material
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of storage equipment
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
4.9.5 Explosive products transported by passenger
Any reason Explosion Catastrophic Detain passenger from entering station with explosive products
Control of passenger when entering station via security guards and technical systemssystems
4.10 Fire in station4.10.1 Inflammable
material usedFaulty design of station
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station
Prevent usage of (highly) inflammable material
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors
Supervise infrastructure - ThisSupervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
Incorrect maintenance on station
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station
Prevent usage of (highly) inflammable material
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
4.10.2 Ignition Faulty design of station
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station
Prevent usage of material or equipment which easily leads to ignition
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external
S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smokehazardous situations by external
sensors.Fire/Smoke detectors
Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
Incorrect maintenance
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station
Prevent usage of material ormaintenance
on station maintenance of station of material or
equipment which easily leads to ignition
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors
Supervise infrastructure ThisSupervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
4.10.3 Unobstructed spread of fire
Faulty design of station - e.g. insufficient barriers or
ti
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station
E.g. by installation of fire doors or barriers
precautions
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors
Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance on station - e.g. disrespect of maintenance rules
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station
Ensure adherence to maintenance rules e.g. use of temporary fire barriers
rules
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors
Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
4.11 Toxic release 4.11.1 Toxic elements Faulty design
of station by use of toxic elements
Contamination, Burns, Suffocation
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station
Minimise the use of toxic elements during planning and construction
Incorrect maintenance - incorrect use of toxic elements
Contamination, Burns, Suffocation
Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station
Minimise the use of toxic elements during maintenance; Prevent maintenance errors while working on toxic elements
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
5 Depot Hazards5.1 Staff injured by
operation of machines and equipment
Faulty design of machines and equipment
Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts,
Critical Ensure correct initial design of machines and equipment for operation in depot
Cuts, Contamination, Asphyxia, Burns, Electrocution
Insufficient precautions against injuries - insufficient safety at work
Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts, Contamination,
Critical Establish rules and procedures for safety at work and operations - supervise their adherence
ation, Asphyxia, Burns, Electrocution
Insufficient educated and trained staff
Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts, Contamination, Asphyxia, Burns
Critical Ensure well educated and well trained staff at depot
Burns, Electrocution
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
5.2 Shunting hazards Insufficient safety at work -insufficient operational rules
Collision, Derail-ment, Injury of staff
Critical Severity "Critical" justified by category Depot Hazard, less
Establish rules and procedures for safety at work and operations - supervise their adherence
E.g. Shunting rules and procedures, Shunting areas or times
less person exposed
Insufficient educated and trained staff - disrespect of procedures
Collision, Derail-ment, Injury of staff
Critical Severity "Critical" justified by category Depot Hazard, less person exposed
Ensure well educated and well trained staff at depot
5.3 Undue train / Unoccupied or Collision, Critical Severity Determine Movement Authority S S S S S Examples of 5.3 Undue train / vehicle enters operation area
Unoccupied or unsupervised vehicles
Collision, Derail-ment, Injury of staff
Critical Severity "Critical" justified by category Depot Hazard, less person exposed
Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.
S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.
Supervise shunting area E.g. by personnel of CCTV
Installation of mechanical barriers
E.g. derailer
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
5.4 Passenger in depot area
Passenger still in train after service; Insufficient precautions against passenger
Injury of person
Critical Ensure passenger are all gone after termination of service
E.g. by: Train interior check (whether empty or not), before taking out of service; Announcement passenger
entering depotAnnouncement inside train, when train will be taken out of service; Possibility for emergency-call inside train
Insufficient precautions against passenger entering depot
Injury of person
Critical Protect depot against passenger entrance
E.g. by: Barriers
entering depot
5.5 Staff run over by train
Unoccupied or unsupervised vehicles; Insufficient precautions (safety at work); Operational mistakes/ failure
Injury of person
Critical Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.
S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.
Supervise shunting area E.g. by personnel of CCTVCCTV
Insufficient safety at work -insufficient operational rules
Injury of person
Critical Establish rules and procedures for safety at work and operations - supervise their adherence
E.g. Shunting rules and procedures, Shunting areas or times
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Insufficient educated and trained staff - disrespect of procedures
Injury of person
Critical Ensure well educated and well trained staff at depot
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
6 OCC Hazards6.1 Fire in OCC
6.1.1 Inflammable material used
Faulty design of OCC
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of OCC
Prevent usage of (highly) inflammable material
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors
Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalatorsand escalators.
Incorrect maintenance on OCC
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on OCC
Prevent usage of (highly) inflammable material
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors
Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
6.1.2 Ignition Faulty design of OCC
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of OCC
Prevent usage of material or equipment which easily leads to ignition
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors
Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalatorsand escalators.
Incorrect maintenance on OCC
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on OCC
Prevent usage of material or equipment which easily leads to ignition
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
6.1.3 Unobstructed spread of fire
Faulty design of OCC - e.g. insufficient barriers or precautions
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of OCC
E.g. by installation of fire doors or barriers
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors
Supervise infrastructure - ThisSupervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
Incorrect maintenance on OCC - e.g. disrespect of maintenance
Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on OCC
Ensure adherence to maintenance rules e.g. use of temporary
rulesp y
fire barriers
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 119
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
6.2 Electrocution in OCC
6.2.1 Equipment insulation fault
Faulty design of equipment insulation (e.g. too little insulation or too high voltage)
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct initial design of insulation of equipment
Incorrect maintenance
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of equipment
of equipment insulation
q pinsulation
6.2.2 short circuits Faulty design of equipment
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct initial design of equipment
Consideration of the possibility of short circuits
Protect critical electronic equipment, e.g. by short circuit protection
S S S S S Optional device;Supervise other safety relevant Inputs
Incorrect maintenance
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of equipmentmaintenance
of equipmention maintenance of equipment
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
6.2.3 Criminal act Insufficient security precautions (e.g. not enough security personnel or
Electrocution
Critical Provide sufficient supervision around and inside of OCC
E.g. by CCTV or personnel; Entrance control at OCC
personnel or technical supervision)
Design of OCC considering criminal acts (security aspect)
Protect highly critical components even against criminal acts
6.3 Explosion in OCC
6.3.1 Criminal act Insufficient security precautions (e.g. not enough
Explosion Catastrophic Design of OCC considering criminal acts (security aspect)
gsecurity personnel or technical supervision)
Provide sufficient supervision around and inside of OCC
E.g. by CCTV or personnel; Entrance control at OCC
6.3.2 Maintenance error Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Explosion Catastrophic Employ trained and well educated staff only
Training and education of staffTraining and education of staff
Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures
6.3.3 Faulty design, improper design
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Explosion Catastrophic Employ trained and well educated staff only
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Training and education of staff Establish guidelines Consideration
of explosion during planning phase
E t bli h lit t V ifi tiEstablish quality management Verification and Validation procedures
6.4 Building collapse Mistaken design of OCC building
Severe injury of person
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of building of OCC
Incorrect maintenance or construction work
Severe injury of person
Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of building
Insufficient precautions against potential
Severe injury of person
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of building of OCC - Design of precautions against environmental forcespotential
environmental forces
environmental forces
Crminal/ terroristic acts
Severe injury of person
Catastrophic Design of OCC considering criminal acts (security aspect)
Provide sufficient supervision around and inside of OCC
E.g. by CCTV or personnel; Entrance control at OCC
6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts
Insufficient precautions against criminal or
Severe injury of person
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of OCC building considering the possibility of terroristic or criminal acts
terroristic actEntrance supervision of staff and visitorsProvide sufficient supervision around and inside of OCC
6.5.1 Software Intrusion See WP 9
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
6.6 Radiation in OCC
6.6.1 Radiation from equipment
Faulty design of OCC equipment
Burns of staff
Critical Ensure correct initial design of OCC equipment considering the possibility of radiation
6.6.2 Foreign radiation/ Faulty design Burns of Critical Minimise the impact of foreign Strong Fields of OCC
equipment insufficient precaution
staff radiation and strong fields
6.7 Asphyxiation / toxication in OCC
6.7.1 Smoke Fire Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors
6.7.2 Air renewal failure System damaged
Asphyxiation,
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended
S S S S S Optional device;
Suffocation
to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 123
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
7 Maintenance Hazards
7.1 Staff injured by operation of machines and equipment
7.1.1 Insufficient education / training
Bad company management
Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts, Contamination, Asphyxia, Burns, Electrocution
Critical Establish a company wide safety culture to ensure the importance of safety (i.e. safety at work)
Ensure regular and adequate training coordinated for eachtraining coordinated for each individual working group or department
Lazy workers Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts, Contamination, Asphyxia, Burns, Electrocution
Critical Employ staff which is willing to learn
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Unqualified tutors
Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts, Contamin
Critical Control/test of quality of training (teachers as well as staff) - Approval/certificate of quality
Contamination, Asphyxia, Burns, Electrocution
Mismanagement of maintenance alarms
Injury of person
Fire Critical Maintenance procedures at depot
Clarify responsibility of maintenance alarm between dispatcher, OCC, Depot, Maintenance CrewMaintenance Crew
7.1.2 Disregard of safety regulations
Insufficient supervision of adherence of safety regulations
Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts, Contamination, Asphyxia, Burns, Electrocution
Critical Ensure adherence to safety regulations by regular and strict supervision
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Stress/ work overload
Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts, Contamin
Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as management
Contamination, Asphyxia, Burns, Electrocution
Mismanagement of maintenance alarms
Injury of person
Fire Critical Maintenance procedures at depot
Clarify responsibility of maintenance alarm between dispatcher, OCC, Depot, Maintenance Crew
7 1 3 Insufficient Faulty design Fall of Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / S S S S S Optional7.1.3 Insufficient lighting
Faulty design Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person
Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.
S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway
7.2 Electrocution / Lightning
7.2.1 Staff too close to power supply
7.2.1.1 Improvidence by Insufficient Electrocut Critical Training and education of staff 7.2.1.1 Improvidence by staff
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Training and education of staff
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Establish a company wide safety culture to ensure that it is for the good of employee and company to work correct and thoughtful
Stress / work l d
Electrocuti B
Critical Establish procedures to cope ith t k l d
Staff as well as toverload ion, Burns with stress or work overload management
7.2.1.2 Staff on guideway procedures / behaviour
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Training and education of staff
Stress / work overload
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as management
Faulty design of guideway i.e. too little protection of
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Ensure correct initial design of guideway to protect staff and provide sufficient room for maintenance worksprotection of
electronic components
maintenance works
Incorrect maintenance procedures
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Establish clear and understandable maintenance procedures
Disregard of maintenance procedures
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures
7.2.1.3 Faulty power shutdown
Incorrect maintenance procedures
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Establish clear and understandable maintenance procedures
Disregard of maintenance procedures
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures
proceduresInsufficient training or badly educated staff
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Training and education of staff
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Stress / work overload
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as management
Communication problem between staff
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Ensure communication procedures to avoid misunderstandings
Incorrect design of power supply
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Ensure correct initial design of power supply system to prevent faulty power shutdown
7.2.2 Short circuits7.2.2.1 Equipment
insulation failureFaulty design of insulation equipment insulation
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Ensure correct initial design of insulation of equipment
Incorrect maintenance on insulation of equipment
Electrocution, Burns
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of equipment insulation
7.2.2.2 Short circuits due Faulty design Electrocut Critical Ensure correct initial design of Consideration 7.2.2.2 Short circuits due to maintenance action
Faulty design of equipment
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct initial design of equipment
Consideration of the possibility of short circuits
Protect critical electronic equipment, e.g. by short circuit protection
S S S S S Optional device;Supervise other safety relevant Inputs
Incorrect maintenance of equipment
Electrocution
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of equipment
7 3 Staff endangered7.3 Staff endangered by moving train
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
7.3.1 Insufficient information about maintenance on track
Insufficient communication between staff
Severe injury of person
Critical Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.
Establish information and communication system to ensure that all participating participating parties are well informed about maintenance work (between OCC, Maintenance Crew and Driver)
Insufficient maintenance procedures
Severe injury of person
Critical Establish clear and understandable maintenance procedures
Clear wording while communication
t- prevents misunderstandings
Disregard of maintenance procedures
Severe injury of person
Critical Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures
Mismanagement of maintenance alarms
Injury of person
Fire Critical Maintenance procedures at depot
Clarify responsibility of maintenance alarm between dispatcher, OCC, Depot, M i t CMaintenance Crew
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
7.3.2 Insufficient warning to track workers
Insufficient communication between staff
Severe injury of person
Critical Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.
Establish information and communication system to ensure that all participating participating parties are well informed about maintenance work (between OCC, Maintenance Crew and Driver)
Insufficient warning system
Severe injury of person
Critical Establish warning system E.g. by personnel or technicaly p
Insufficient maintenance procedures
Severe injury of person
Critical Establish clear and understandable maintenance procedures
Clear wording while communication - prevents misunderstandings
Disregard of maintenance procedures
Severe injury of person
Critical Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures
7.3.3 Risky behaviour Insufficient maintenance procedures
Severe injury of person
Critical Establish clear and understandable maintenance procedures
Clear wording while communication - prevents
i d t dmisunderstandings
Disregard of maintenance procedures
Severe injury of person
Critical Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Severe injury of person
Critical Training and education of staff
Stress / work l d
Severe i j f
Critical Establish procedures to cope ith t k l d
Staff as well as toverload injury of
personwith stress or work overload management
7.3.4 Insufficient training
Bad company management
Severe injury of person
Critical Establish a company wide safety culture to ensure the importance of safety (i.e. safety at work)
Ensure regular and adequate training coordinated for each individual working group or department
Lazy workers Severe injury of person
Critical Employ staff which is willing to learn
Unqualified tutors
Severe injury of person
Critical Control/test of quality of training (teachers as well as staff) - Approval/certificate of qualityperson Approval/certificate of quality
7.4 Obstacles on guideway or walkway
7.4.1 Fallen tree, branches, crane
Environmental forces
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Correct initial design of guideway and walkways considering the possibility of fallen trees, braches or cranes (e.g. installation of precautions - protection against environmental forces)
E.g.: Ensure trees and cranes should have a minimum distance to guideway and walkways
Supervision of guideway, p g ywalkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
7.4.2 Fallen from bridge Incorrect design of bridges
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Correct initial design of bridge considering the possibility of fallen objects from bridge (e.g. installation of precautions like fences or barriers on bridge)
S i i f idSupervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew
Incorrect maintenance of bridges
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Ensure correct execution of maintenance works on bridge
Supervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew
Avoid maintenance works under bridge which is under under construction
7.4.3 Blown by wind Insufficient installation of precautions against obstacles blown on guideway
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Marginal Correct initial design of guideway and walkways considering the possibility of objects might be blown on guideway or walkway (e.g. installation of precautions like fences or barriers on guide and walkway)
Supervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew
7.4.4 Guideway structural failure
Faulty design of guideway
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Ensure correct initial design of guideway
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew
Incorrect maintenance on guideway
Injury of member of
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on guideway
on guideway of maintenance crew
Supervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew
Environmental forces like earthquakes
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Ensure correct initial design of guideway considering the possibility of earthquakes
S f SSupervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew
Supervision includes earthquake detection
7.4.5 Faulty design Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Training and education of staff
Insufficient quality management procedures
Injury of member of maintena
Critical Ensure adequate quality management procedures
nce crew
7.4.6 Infrastructure failure
Faulty design of infrastructure
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Ensure correct initial design of infrastructure
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew
Incorrect maintenance on
Injury of member of
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on infrastructure
on infrastructure
of maintenance crew
Supervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew
Environmental forces like earthquakes
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Ensure correct initial design of infrastructure considering the possibility of earthquakes
Supervision of guideway SupervisionSupervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew
Supervision includes earthquake detection
7.4.7 Forgotten/ non orderly left after maintenance
Insufficient maintenance procedures
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Establish clear and understandable maintenance procedures
Clear wording while communication - prevents misunderstandings
Disregard of maintenance procedures
Injury of member of maintena
Critical Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures
nce crew
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Training and education of staff
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Stress / work overload
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as management
7 4 8 Forgotten/ non Insufficient Injury of Critical Establish clear and Clear wording7.4.8 Forgotten/ non orderly left after evacuation
Insufficient evacuation procedures
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Establish clear and understandable evacuation procedures
Clear wording while communication - prevents misunderstandings
Disregard of evacuation procedures
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Supervise adherence of evacuation procedures
Insufficient training or badly
Injury of member of
Critical Training and education of staff
badly educated staff
of maintenance crew
Stress / work overload
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload - especially for evacuation cases
Staff as well as management
7.4.9 Vandalism Faulty design of guideway and walk way - disrespect of possibility of
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Ensure correct initial design considering security aspects and potential vandalism
Installation of fences and barriers in order to prevent access
vandalism to guideway and walkway
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Insufficient supervision of guideway and walkways
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Supervision of guideway and walkway (personnel or CCTV)
Insufficient removal or cleaning of old damages from vandalism
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Remove immediately all damages of vandalism
7.4.10 Corrosion/ oxidation of wayside structures equipment
Faulty design Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Ensure correct initial design considering potential corrosion or oxidation
Incorrect maintenance
Injury of member
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenancemaintenance member
of maintenance crew
maintenance
9.2.1 Flooding Faulty design i.e. insufficient precautions against flooding
Injury of member of maintenance crew
Critical Ensure correct initial design considering the possibility of flooding i.e. installation of flooding precautions
Supervision of surrounding area Flooding detection
Insufficient maintenance
Injury of member
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of guideways,
of guideways and flooding precautions
of maintenance crew
g y ,walkways and flooding precautions
Supervision of surrounding area Flooding detection
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
7.5 Explosion during maintenance
7.5.1 Maintenance error Insufficient maintenance procedures
Explosion Critical Establish clear and understandable maintenance procedures
Disregard of Explosion Critical Supervise adherence ofDisregard of maintenance procedures
Explosion Critical Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Explosion Critical Training and education of staff
Stress / work overload
Explosion Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as management
7.5.2 Criminal act Insufficient security precautions (e g not
Explosion Critical Design of railway equipment/building/constructions considering criminal acts (security aspect)
Installation of access barriers or fences to(e.g. not
enough security personnel or technical supervision)
(security aspect) fences to railway equipment
Provide sufficient supervision E.g. by: CCTV or personnel
7.5.3 Faulty design, improper design
Insufficient procedures or guidelines for design
Explosion Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures and guidelines for planning and design
Disregard of procedures or
Explosion Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and guidelines
E.g. by: Validation and procedures or
guidelinesprocedures and guidelines Validation and
verification procedures
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Explosion Critical Training and education of staff
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Stress / work overload
Explosion Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as management
7.5.4 Inadequate storage
Faulty design of storage equipment
Explosion Critical Ensure correct initial design of railway equipment considering adequate storage possibilities
Insufficient procedures regarding storage
Explosion Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures and guidelines for planning and design
Disregard of procedures for storage
Explosion Critical Supervise adherence of procedures for storage
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Explosion Critical Training and education of staff
Stress / work Explosion Critical Establish procedures to copeStress / work overload
Explosion Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
7.6 Fire during maintenance
7.6.1 Explosion during maintenance
see 7.5
7.6.2 Inflammable material
Insufficient procedures regarding the use of inflammable material
Fire Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures for the use of inflammable material
Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment
Disregard of procedures for the use of inflammable material
Fire Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Fire Critical Training and education of staff
Stress / work overload
Fire Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as managementoverload with stress or work overload management
7.6.3 Ignition Insufficient procedures regarding the ignition of fire
Fire Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the potential of ignition
Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment
Disregard of procedures for the use of inflammable material
Fire Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules
Insufficient Fire Critical Training and education of staffInsufficient training or badly educated staff
Fire Critical Training and education of staff
Stress / work overload
Fire Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as management
7.6.4 Unobstructed spread of fire
Insufficient procedures regarding unobstructed speed of fire
Fire Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the potential of unobstructed spread of fire
Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment
Disregard of Fire Critical Supervise adherence ofDisregard of procedures regarding fire protection
Fire Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Fire Critical Training and education of staff
Stress / work overload
Fire Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as managementoverload with stress or work overload management
7.7 Asphyxiation/ toxication
7.7.1 Smoke Insufficient procedures regarding the danger of smoke
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the dangerous potential of smoke
Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment
Disregard of procedures regarding smoke
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Training and education of staff
Stress / work overload
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as management
7.7.2 Air renewal failure Insufficient procedures regarding the maintenance of air renewal system
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the maintenance of the air renewal system
Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment
Disregard of procedures regarding the maintenance of air renewal system
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Training and education of staff
Stress / work overload
Asphyxiation;
Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as managementoverload on;
Contamination
with stress or work overload management
7.7.3 Toxic release7.7.3.2 Smoke Insufficient
procedures regarding the danger of smoke
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the dangerous potential of smoke - especially regarding toxic releases
Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment
Disregard of procedures regarding smoke
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules
Insufficient Asphyxiati Critical Training and education of staffInsufficient training or badly educated staff
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Training and education of staff
Stress / work overload
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as management
7.7.3.3 Toxic elements Insufficient procedures regarding toxic elements
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding toxic elements
Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment
Disregard of procedures regarding toxic elements
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Training and education of staff
Stress / work overload
Asphyxiation;
Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as managementoverload on;
Contamination
with stress or work overload management
7.7.3.4 Noxious leakage by maintenance
Insufficient procedures regarding maintenance on pipe works
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding toxic elements e.g. the maintenance on pipe works
Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment
Disregard of procedures regarding maintenance on pipe works
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Training and education of staff
Stress / work overload
Asphyxiation; Contamination
Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as management
7.8 Inappropriate temperature
7.8.2 Air renewal failure Faulty design Suffocatio Marginal Ensure correct initial design of y gof air renewal system
ng g
air renewal system
Incorrect maintenance of air renewal system
Suffocation
Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of air renewal system
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
7.9 Staff in danger cannot escape guideway
7.9.1 Insufficient/ Obstructed Emergency W lk
Faulty design of emergency walkway
Severe injury of person
Critical Ensure correct initial design of emergency walkways
WalkwayIncorrect maintenance of emergency walkway
Severe injury of person
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of emergency walkways
Obstacles on guideway or walkway
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of emergency walkways
7.9.2 Emergency Exits/ Access Protection Closed
Faulty design of emergency exits or accesses
Severe injury of person
Critical Ensure correct initial design of emergency exits and accesses
Incorrect maintenance of emergency exits or accesses
Severe injury of person
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of emergency exits and accesses
7.9.3 Captured by broken down structures, fires etc.
Faulty design of guideway
Severe injury of person
Critical Ensure correct initial design of guideway
Consideration of possible brake downs, fire, flooding, explosions
Incorrect maintenance of guideway
Severe injury of person
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on guideway
of guideway person7.10 Radiation
7.10.1 Radiation from equipment
Faulty design of equipment e.g. train, buildings
Burns, Suffocation
Critical Ensure correct initial design of equipment considering the possibility of radiation
E.g. construction of heat barriers
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance on equipment e.g. Trains, buildings
Burns, Suffocation
Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on equipment considering the possibility of radiation
7.10.2 Foreign radiation Faulty design of vehicle
Burns, Suffocatio
Critical Minimise the impact of foreign radiation and strong fields
Adequate system designof vehicle,
buildings, surrounding facilities e.g. insufficient precaution
Suffocation
radiation and strong fields system design (plan precautions against these unavoidable hazards)
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of precautions
7.11 Staff caught in equipment
7.11.1 Staff caught in machinery
Faulty design of machinery
Cuts, Burns, Electrocution,
Critical Ensure correct initial design of machinery
Ensure healthy use of machines
ion, Contaminations
Insufficient procedures regarding correct use of machinery
Cuts, Burns, Electrocution, Contaminations
Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the use of machinery
Disregard of procedures regarding use of machinery
Cuts, Burns, Electrocution, Contaminations
Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Cuts, Burns, Electrocution, Contaminations
Critical Training and education of staff Special training for each type of machinery
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Stress / work overload
Cuts, Burns, Electrocution, Contaminations
Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as management
7 11 2 Staff ca ght Faulty design Cuts Critical Ensure correct initial design of Ensure healthy7.11.2 Staff caught in moving equipment (switch,…)
Faulty design of moving equipment
Cuts, Suffocation
Critical Ensure correct initial design of moving equipment
Ensure healthy use of moving equipment
Insufficient procedures regarding correct use and handling of moving equipment
Cuts, Suffocation
Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the use moving equipment
Disregard of procedures
Cuts, Suffocation
Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Cuts, Suffocation
Critical Training and education of staff Special training for each type of machinery
Stress / work overload
Cuts, Suffocation
Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as management
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 145
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
8 Emergency and Evacuation Hazards
8.1 People hit by train: involved track, adjacent tracktrack
8.1.1 Evacuation not signalled
Geographical/ structural circumstances (i.e. potential evacuation behind bridges, turns etc)
Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of person
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations; Enlarge evacuation area at difficult sites
No signalling signs available
Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situationsstriking
person, Fall of person
passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
situations
8.1.2 OCC failure Communication system failure (i.e. OCC has only insufficient or wrong information)
Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of person
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and dataprovide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 146
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Stress / work overload for staff
Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Fall of person
Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Insufficient rules or procedures regarding emergency cases and evacuation
Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of person
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures
Disregard of Derail- Catastrophic Supervise adherence ofDisregard of evacuation and emergency procedures
Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of person
Catastrophic Supervise adherence of emergency and evacuation procedures
8.1.3 Undetected passengers by evacuation
Communication problems or failures (i.e. staff has only insufficient or wrong information)
Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of person
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
p
Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 147
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Stress / work overload for staff
Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Fall of person
Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Darkness Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of person
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations; Ensure sufficient lightning during evacuation
Geographical / structural
Derail-ment
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise
X X X X S Ensuring detection andstructural
demanding area
ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of person
function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
detection and management of emergency situations; Establish special procedures for these demanding areas
8.1.4 Passenger trapped in equipment
8.1.4.1 Caught by a moving switch
No evacuation area defined
Trapping of person
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise
X X X X S Ensuring detection and moving switch area defined
by OCCof person function is intended to supervise
passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
detection and management of emergency situations
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 148
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Insufficient rules and procedures for emergency cases and evacuation to guide a
Trapping of person
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
guide a structured evacuation - Passenger leaving accident site
Ensure rules and procedures for emergency cases and evacuation
8.1.4.2 Person jammed in lift or escalator
No evacuation area defined by OCC - Lift and escalators continue operation
Trapping of person
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which the are not normall permitted
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations; Ens re liftsoperation
during evacuation or emergency case
they are not normally permitted. Ensure lifts and escalator stop operation in case of emergency
Insufficient rules and procedures for emergency cases and evacuation to guide a structured
Trapping of person
Critical Ensure rules and procedures for emergency cases and evacuation
Ensure no person is jammed in lift or escalator
evacuation
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 149
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
8.1.4.3 Passenger trapped in doors (limb of passenger, clothes, bags, other objects from passenger leash)
Untimely or wrong train door closing command
Trapping of person
Critical Manage train door closing - This function is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.
X X X X S Control passenger doors
passenger, leash)
8.1.4.4 Person jammed in swing door or track access door
Untimely swing door or track access door command
Trapping of person
Critical Manage swing doors or track access doors in case of emergency
8.1.5 Inappropriate emergency egress
8.1.5.1 Emergency egress blocked
Faulty design Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency
passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
situations
Ensure correct initial design of emergency exits and accesses
Blocked by construction site
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct planning of construction sites
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Blocked due to environmental forces (snow, obstacles blown by wind ..)
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
..)
Ensure correct design of infrastructure
Consideration of environmental forces and installation of precautions to protect emergency egresses
8.1.5.2 Emergency egress not appropriated maintenance
Insufficient procedures regarding correct
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergencymaintenance
(rusted...)correct maintenance
system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
of emergency situations
Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding correct maintenance
Disregard of maintenance procedures
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Supervise adherence of procedures and rules
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 151
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Insufficient training or badly educated staff
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Training and education of staff Stress / work overload
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload
Staff as well as management
8.1.5.3 Emergency Faulty design Passenge Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This X X X X S Ensuring 8.1.5.3 Emergency egress inappropriate signed
Faulty design of emergency egress signs
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct initial design of emergency exits and accesses
Signs are missing due to vandalism
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
they are not normally permitted.
Ensure correct initial design of signs - protection against vandalism
E.g. by: Fences, barriers
Supervision of infrastructure E.g. by: CCTV or personnel
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Signs are missing due environmental forces i.e. extreme wind
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct initial design of signs - protection against environmental forces
Signs are blocked by construction site
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct planning of construction sites
8.1.6 Inadequate walkway
8.1.6.1 Missing walkway Faulty design of infrastructure
Passenger hit by train
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct initial design of infrastructure: including emergency walkways
8.1.6.2 Obstructed walkway
Faulty design of walkways
Passenger hit by
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise
X X X X S Ensuring detection andwalkway of walkways r hit by
trainfunction is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
detection and management of emergency situations
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Ensure correct initial design of walkways
Incorrect maintenance of walkways
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situationspassengers in areas in which
they are not normally permitted. situations
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of walkways
Obstruction due to environmental forces e.g. snow, object blown by wind
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct initial design of Consideration walkways of
environmental forces
Obstruction due to vandalism
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct initial design of walkways
Consideration of vandalism
8.1.6.3 Important gap from walkway to
Faulty design of walkway
Passenger hit by
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise
X X X X S Ensuring detection andfrom walkway to
platformof walkway r hit by
trainfunction is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct initial design of walkways
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 154
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
8.1.6.4 Walkway on the other side of the access door
Faulty design of walkways
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct initial design of walkways
8.1.6.5 Inadequate size / arrangement
Faulty design of walkways
Passenger hit by train
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct initial design of walkways
8.1.6.6 Walkway opposed t th l tf
Faulty design of walkways
Passenger hit by
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise
X X X X S Ensuring detection andto the platform of walkways r hit by
trainfunction is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct initial design of walkways
8.1.6.7 Handrail failure Faulty design of walkways i.e. handrail
Passenger hit by train
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct initial design of walkways
Consideration of correct design of handrails
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 155
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect maintenance of walkways i.e. handrail
Passenger hit by train
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of walkways
Consideration of correct maintenance of handrails
8.1.6.8 Insufficient lighting on walkway
Faulty design of walkways i.e. lightning on walkways
Passenger hit by train
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct initial design of walkways
Consideration of lightningwalkways of lightning
Incorrect maintenance of walkways i.e. lightning on walkways
Passenger hit by train
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of walkways
Consideration of correct maintenance of lightning
8.1.7 Passenger t d i t i
Untimely or no d l i
Fall of Critical Supervise evacuation - This f ti i i t d d t i
X X X X S Ensuring d t ti dtrapped in train door closing person
inside train
function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
detection and management of emergency situations
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 156
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Manage train door closing - This function is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.
X X X X S Control passenger doors
Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and dataprovide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.
Insufficient emergency egress on train
Fall of person inside train
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.
Installation of emergency egress on windows and doors
8.2 Burn / fire8.2.1 Undetected
passengers by evacuation
8.2.1.6 Panic / rush / hustle
Inadequate evacuation
Burns, Asphyxia,
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise
X X X X S Ensuring detection and
procedures Suffocation
passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
management of emergency situations
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 157
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures
Inappropriate emergency egress
Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of emergency exits and accesses
Inadequate walkway
Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocatio
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of emergency walkways
Suffocation
8.2.2 Passenger trapped in train
Untimely or no door opening
Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Manage train door closing - This function is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.
X X X X S Control passenger doors
P id i ti ith t ffProvide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 158
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device
Supervise Infrastructure ThisSupervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
Insufficient emergency egress on train
Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
they are not normally permitted.
Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.
Installation of emergency egress on windows and doors
Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S Optional Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
device
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
8.2.3 Passenger trapped in equipment
Any reason Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of train equipment
8.2.4 Inappropriate emergency egress
Faulty design Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation
Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of emergency exits and accesses
Inappropriate Burns, Catastrophic Emergency and evacuation emergency and evacuation procedures
Asphyxia, Suffocation
procedures
8.2.5 Train enters section with fire in progress
wrong operational decision / failure of communication OCC - Train
Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation
Catastrophic Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
P id i ti ith t ffProvide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 160
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Installation of fire and smoke protection
S S S S S Optional device
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of air renewal system and fire protection equipment i.e. smoke detectors
Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the potential of unobstructed spread of fire
8.2.6 Train stops at station with fire in progress
wrong operational decision / failure of communication OCC - Train
Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation
Catastrophic Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.
Installation of fire and smoke protection
S S S S S Optional device
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of air renewal system and fire protection equipment i.e. smoke detectors
Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the potential of unobstructed spread of fire
8.3 Asphyxiation / toxication
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
8.3.1 Smoke Fire Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g.: Smoke / fire detection
Supervise Infrastructure - ThisSupervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which th t ll itt d
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
they are not normally permitted.
8.3.2 Air renewal failure System damaged due to accident
Asphyxiation, Suffocation
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g.: Smoke / fire detection
Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical ecessa y act o s o c t caauxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
8.3.3 Toxic release Leakage e.g. By freight train, storage
Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g.: Smoke / fire detection
Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps,of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Ensure evacuation procedures regarding toxic material
8.4 Electrocution /8.4 Electrocution / lightning
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
8.4.1 Persons too close to equipment for power supply
Inadequate evacuation procedures
Electrocution, Burns
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures
Supervise traction power supply - This function is intended to powering on/off of the traction supply by the operator at the OCC, or locally, either on given sections or on all sections.
X X X X X
Doors open on wrong side off train
Electrocution, Burns
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation Such
X X X X S Ensuring detection and managementoff train passenger evacuation. Such
system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
management of emergency situations
8.4.2 Power shutdown failure
No communication to OCC
Electrocution, Burns
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Incorrect cut-off of power supply rail during evacuation (wrong section is cut-off) ,
Electrocution, Burns
Catastrophic Training and education of staff
is cut off) , misunderstanding, communication problems
Supervise traction power supply - This function is intended to powering on/off of the traction supply by the operator at the OCC, or locally, either on given sections or on all sections.
X X X X X
Reinjection of braking current while track section was cut-off power (during passenger evacuation)
Electrocution, Burns
Catastrophic Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures
Prevent regenerative braking on all trains that could feed a traction power supply section
X X X X
traction power supply section that has been cut off for passengers or staff protection
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
8.4.3 Short circuits Electronical equipment damaged due to accident
Electrocution, Burns
Catastrophic Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures
Protect critical electronic equipment, e.g. by short circuit protection even against
S S S S S Optional device;Superviseprotection even against
accidentsSupervise other safety relevant Inputs
8.4.4 Electrical equipment abnormally accessible
Equipment damaged by accident
Electrocution, Burns
Catastrophic Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures
Protect critical electronic equipment, e.g. by short circuit protection even against accidents
S S S S S Optional device;Supervise other safety relevant Inputs
8.5 Explosion during Any reason Explosion Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S Optional8.5 Explosion during evacuation
Any reason Explosion Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g.: Smoke / fire detection
Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
8.6 Inappropriate temperature
8.6.1 Air renewal failure Any reason Asphyxiation, Suffocation
Catastrophic Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
8 6 2 Explosion during Any reason Explosion Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S Optional8.6.2 Explosion during evacuation
Any reason Explosion Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g.: Smoke / fire detection
8.6.3 Burns/fire Any reason Fire Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
8.7 Radiation Any reason (insufficient electromagnetic compatibility (EMC); laser radiation, radiation
Burns, Suffocation
Catastrophic Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components radiation
within the infrared, visible and ultraviolet area)
auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
8.8 Drowning Any reason, flooding
Drowning, Suffocation
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;E.g.: Flooding detection
Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.
Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
8.9 Person hurt during evacuation (others)
8.9.1 Passenger fall8.9.1.1 Slippery floor Water or
h i l dFall of Critical Supervise evacuation - This
f i i i d d iX X X X S Ensuring
d i dchemicals due to flooding or fire-fighters
person function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
detection and management of emergency situations
Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)
8.9.1.2 Slope (of platform, rescue walkway )
Platform or walkway hit by train cars
Fall of person
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation Such
X X X X S Ensuring detection and managementwalkway, ) train cars passenger evacuation. Such
system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
management of emergency situations
Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)
8.9.1.3 Unadjusted levelling at lift enter/exit (small step)
Lift got hit e.g. by train cars, obstacles
Fall of person
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency step) y p
passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
g ysituations
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)
8.9.1.4 Insufficient lightinglighting
8.9.1.4.1 System breakdown/ default
Any reason Fall of person
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)
Design and installation of emergency power system
8.9.1.4.2 Insufficient lighting level
Any reason Fall of person
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)
D i d i t ll ti fDesign and installation of emergency power system
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
8.9.1.5 Train movement during evacuation
No evacuation area defined
Fall of person
Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)
8.9.1.7 Obstacles8.9.1.7.1 Obstacles on
guideway or walkway
Any reason (e.g.: train cars, equipment of fire-fighters)
Fall of person
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)
Free guideways and walkway; Do not obstruct them even in emergency cases
8.9.1.7.2 Obstacles in the train
Any reason (e.g.: Lifeless bodies, Fallen or broken objects)
Fall of person
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which th t ll itt d
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
they are not normally permitted.
Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
8.9.1.7.3 Obstacles in the station
Any reason (e.g.: fallen or broken objects e.g. part of bridges, train cars, buildings)
Fall of person
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
buildings)
Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)
8.9.2 Passenger hit by sharp / protruding object
Any reason (e.g.: damaged train cars, building or bridges)
Fall of person
Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)
Get passenger as fast as possible out of dangerous area
8.9.3 Passenger caught by moving switch
Inappropriate emergency and evacuation procedures
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.
X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations
Emergency and evacuation procedures
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
9Environmental influences
9.1 Weather conditions (moderate)
9.1.1 Anything (snow, rain, leaves,
Insufficient maintenance
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Regular Inspection and maintenancerain, leaves,
greasy material) on guideway
maintenance or clearance of guideway by crew
ment maintenance
Guideway heatingCheck of weather data
Provide enough staff for clearance works
9.1.2 Wind Inadequate precaution against wind
Person Struck / Hurt by Object
Marginal Consider wind force during planning and design of railway/metro system
Wind barriers like walls or tunnels
Operational rules to stop all trains in case of extreme wind
9.2 Force of nature9.2 Force of nature9.2.1 Flooding Insufficient
precautionsDerail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Water (level) measurement and indicator
Insufficient maintenance of protection constructions
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Ensure correct maintenance of flooding gates
Ensure correct initial design considering the possibility of flooding
Insufficient Derail- Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S OptionalInsufficient inspection and maintenance of flooding protection equipment
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Obstacle detection in front of train
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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
9.2.2 Environmental impact on vehicle (wind, gales)
Insufficient precautions
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Ensure appropriate system-design regarding exceptional environmental conditions (extreme wind etc.)
Establish operational rules e.g. speed reductions at critical areasp
Insufficient maintenance (construction work) on protection constructions
Derail-ment
Collision Catastrophic Correct maintenance and construction work on protection constructions
9.2.3 Avalanche / landslide/ falling stones
Insufficient precautions to protect track
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Obstacle detection in front of train
Correct initial design considering the possibility of avalanches or the possibility of avalanches or falling stones
Insufficient inspections of track
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Obstacle detection in front of train
Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on trackEnsure correct inspection and maintenance on flooding protection equipment
Inspection of guideway and surrounding area
9.2.4 Earthquake Inadequate precaution
Person Struck /
Catastrophic Consider earthquakes during planning and design ofprecaution
against earthquakes
Struck / Hurt by Object
planning and design of railway/metro system
Operational rules to stop all trains is case of forecasted earthquake
04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 174
Safety measuresgeneric safety measures
0 1a 1b 2 3 4
GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks
X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system
Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk
Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard
Hazard Cause
Type of Accident (primary)
Possible consequential accidents Remarks
Severity of Conse-quences
Likeli-hood Risk Remarks
9.2.5 Stalactites in tunnel
Insufficient inspection of tunnel
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Obstacle detection in front of train
Ensure correct inspection andEnsure correct inspection and maintenance of tunnel
Too much water/ humidity in tunnel
Derail-ment, Collision
Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.
S S S S S Optional device;Obstacle detection in front of train
Ensure correct initial tunnel design considering water and general humidity
Inadequate precaution against
Electrocution
Critical Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of
S S S S S Optional device
9.2.6 Lightning
lightning hazardous situations by external sensors.