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European Commission Seventh Framework programme MODSafe Modular Urban Transport Safety and Security Analysis WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2.2 Authors: TU Dresden Document ID: D2.2_Annex_Hazard_Analysis_100430_v8 Date: 2010-04-30 Contract No: 218606

WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

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Page 1: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

European Commission Seventh Framework programme

MODSafe Modular Urban Transport Safety and Security Analysis

WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2.2

Authors: TU Dresden Document ID: D2.2_Annex_Hazard_Analysis_100430_v8 Date: 2010-04-30 Contract No: 218606

Page 2: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

Table of Content Document History Overview MODSafe Hazard Analysis 1 Train movement

4

2 Train interior

68

3 Train-Station Interface (with train in station)

79

4 Train-Station Interface (without train in station)

96

5 Depot

112

6 OCC

116

7 Maintenance

123

8 Emergency – Evacuation

145

9 Environment (force of nature)

172

Page 3: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard AnalysisDocument History

File version Date Name of editorHazard numbering Hazard Description

V0.5 09.06.2009 A Herr Initial Draft D2.1

V0.6 10.06.2009 A HerrHazard Identification: Addition of further column "Possible consequential accidents"

V0.7 29.07.2009 A.Herr include comments on V06 V0.8 03.09.2009 A. Schindelhauer includes Comments on V07V1.0 15.09.2009 A. Schindelhauer approved by WP2 membersV2 21.10.2009 A. Schindelhauer includes comments WP10 membersV3 02.11.2009 A. Schindelhauer includes Comments WP10 memebers (Compilation D2.1V2)

V4 25.01.2010 A. Schindelhauer, A. Naundorf; TUD expansion of Annex D2.1, renaming into D2.2V5 02.02.2010 A. Naundorf, TUD approved by WP2 membersV6 09.03.2010 A. Schindelhauer, A. Naundorf; TUD includes comments on V5V7 09.04.2010 A. Schindelhauer, A. Naundorf; TUD includes comments on V6V8 30.04.2010 A. Schindelhauer, A. Naundorf; TUD includes comments on V7

Document History

Page 4: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2Overview Hazard Analysis

Hazard

1 Train movement1.1 Train infringes clearance envelope1.2 Object / person infringes train clearance envelope 1.3 Train collision hazard within uninfringed clearance envelope

2 Train interior2.1 person struck/hurt by object2.2 explosion2.3 person fall in train2.4 fire2.5 Inadequate temperature2.6 asphyxiation2.7 toxic releases2.8 radiation2.9 electrocution in train2.10 person contact with machinery2.11 person exposed to noise2.12 Person needs urgent asisstance

3 Train-Station Interface (with train in station)3.1 passenger falls from train on station track3.2 Passenger injured by door closing

3.3train departs with passenger trapped in doors (limb of passenger, clothes, bags, other objects from passenger, leash... )

3.4 Train moves at passenger exchange 3.5 Person between Vehicle/ Vehicle gaps3.6 Person steps / falls into Vehicle- Platform Gap3.7 electrocution

Overview MODSafe Hazard AnalysisHazard

3.7 e ect ocut o

4 Train-Station Interface (without train in station)4.1 person struck by falling object4.2 person hit by sharp object4.3 person hurt by protruding object4.4 wheelchair hazards4.5 person fall in station4.6 person falls/intrudes on station track4.7 electrocution in station4.8 smoke4.9 explosion4.10 fire in station4.11 toxic release

5 Depot5.1 Staff injured by operation of machines and equipment5.2 Shunting hazards5.3 undue train / vehicle enters operation area5.4 passenger in depot area5.5 staff run over by train

Page 5: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2Overview Hazard Analysis

6 OCC6.1 Fire in OCC6.2 Electrocution in OCC6.3 Explosion in OCC6.4 Building collapse6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC

7 Maintenance7.1 Staff injured by operation of machines and equipment7.2 Electrocution / Lightning7.3 staff endangered by moving train7.4 obstacles on guideway or walkway7.5 explosion during maintenance7.6 fire during maintenance7.7 asphyxiation/ toxication7.8 inappropriate temperature7.9 staff in danger cannot escape guideway7.10 radiation7.11 Staff caught in machinery

8 Emergency – Evacuation8.1 people hit by train: involved track, adjacent track8.2 burn / fire8.3 asphyxiation / toxication8.4 electrocution / lightning8.5 explosion during evacuation8.6 inappropriate temperature8.7 radiation8.7 radiation8.8 drowning8.9 person hurt during evacuation (others)

9 Environment (force of nature)9.1 weather conditions (moderate)9.2 Force of nature

Page 6: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 4

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

1 Train Movement Hazards

1.1 Train infringes clearance envelope (CE)

1.1.1 Train (car) leaves guideway

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

guideway (momentarily or irrevocably / derailment )

1.1.1.1 Inappropriate speed

1.1.1.1.1 VT(x) > VL(x)1.1.1.1.1.1 Wrong position

registeredOdometer failure

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Determine Train Location S S S S Design and installation of absolute and relative position measurement

Respond to Train Location Failure

S S S S Ensure safe route

1 1 1 1 1 2 W d1.1.1.1.1.2 Wrong speed registered

1.1.1.1.1.2.1 Speed Measurement failure

Wheelspin Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Calculate Train Speed - This function determines train speed.

X S S S S Ensure safe speed; Adequate speed measurement

Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.

X S S S S Ensure safe speed; Adequate speed supervision

1.1.1.1.1.2.2 On-board Speed Processing failure

On-Board ATP

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Calculate Train Speed - This function determines train speed.

X S S S S Ensure safe speed; g

equipment design failure

Adequate speed measurement

Page 7: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 5

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance of On-Board ATP equipment

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance of ATP equipment

1.1.1.1.1.3 Insufficient decelerationdeceleration

1.1.1.1.1.3.1 Improper vehicle - guideway coupling (adhesion)

9.1.1 Anything (snow, rain, leaves, greasy material) on guideway

Insufficient maintenance or clearance of guideway by crew

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular Inspection and maintenance

Guideway heatingCheck of weather dataProvide enough staff for clearance worksclearance works

1.1.1.1.1.3.1.2 Wheel failure / wear

Faulty design of wheels

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle

Insufficient maintenance

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

1.1.1.1.1.3.1.3 Track wear Faulty design of track

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of guideway

Insufficient maintenance

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, correctivecorrective maintenance

1.1.1.1.1.3.1.4 Wheel-track interface failure (incorrect design)

Disrespect of Wheel-Track-Interface specifications or legal regulations

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of guideway

Page 8: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 6

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.1.1.1.1.3.1.5 Wheel slip / slide due to excessive braking force

Faulty design of braking system

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency brakes)

Brake supervision, slip-slide control

Insufficient maintenance

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regularregular inspections, corrective maintenance

Incorrect usage of braking system by driver

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Braking system supervision X S S S S Control acceleration and braking

Slip - Slide - Control X S S S S Control acceleration and braking

Training and education of driver

1.1.1.1.1.3.1.6 Insufficient dh i

Insufficient braking force

Derail-ment

Collision Insufficient braking

Catastrophic Ensure correct braking curves X S S S S Control accelerationadhesion braking force ment braking

force results in lower frictional forces, and therefore in less adhesion

acceleration and braking

Provide enough braking force / contact

X S S S S Control acceleration and braking

1.1.1.1.1.3.2 Insufficient braking (braking-f )force)

1.1.1.1.1.3.2.1 Braking system failure

Faulty design of braking system

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency brakes)

Page 9: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 7

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Insufficient maintenance of braking system

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

greasing Derail- Collision Catastrophic Configuration Managementgreasing problems (greasing scheme)

Derailment

Collision Catastrophic Configuration Management

1.1.1.1.1.3.2.2 Underestimated mass / train configuration

Incorrect design of mass / train configuration

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct procedure for calculation and design of mass / train configuration

Wrong data used

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct data as input for mass / train configuration

1.1.1.1.1.3.3 Wrong brake command

Faulty design of on-board equipment

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.

X S S S S Ensure safe speed

I ffi i t D il C lli i C t t hi R l i ti d P tiInsufficient maintenance of on-board equipment

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

Wrong command by driver

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Training and education of driver

Employ well educated driversWell design and user supportive HMI driver desk

1.1.1.1.1.4 Wrong speed command

Faulty design of on-board equipment

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed

X S S S S Ensure safe speed

remain within the dynamic speed profile.

Insufficient maintenance of on-board equipment

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

Page 10: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 8

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Wrong command by driver

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Training and education of driver

Employ well educated driversWell design and user supportive HMI driver desk

1.1.1.1.1.5 Untimely Faulty design Derail- Collision Catastrophic Supervise Actual Speed - This X S S S S Ensure safe 1.1.1.1.1.5 Untimely acceleration / propulsion command error

Faulty design of propulsion system

Derailment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise Actual Speed This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.

X S S S S Ensure safe speed, Propulsion control; Overspeed protection

Insufficient maintenance of propulsion system

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

1.1.1.1.2 Wrong speed limit VL(X)

1.1.1.1.2.1 Wrong static route data

Incorrect surveying and

i

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Check consistency of data - This function is intended to check the

i t f il bl d t

Adequate route-database

fi timapping consistency of available data configuration and management

Employ trained and well educated staff only

Wrong input of route data

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Load Infrastructure Data onto onboard equipment

S S S S

Load Infrastructure Data onto wayside equipment

S S S S

1.1.1.1.2.2 Wrong route1.1.1.1.2.2.1 Wrong route

selection ATP failure Derail-

mentCollision Catastrophic Ensure safe route as

combination of route elements - This function is intended to allow ATP to define and implement a

S S S S S Ensure safe route

ATP to define and implement a route as a combination of route elements according to the needs of the operator and to release routes as part of it either by train movement or manually.

Page 11: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 9

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Wrong route selection by OCC staff

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Safe display - HMI OCC

Supportive functions for stress or emergency cases Clear and understandable operational rulesoperational rules

withdrawal of route (e.g. emergency release) without communication to the train

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure safe route as combination of route elements - This function is intended to allow ATP to define and implement a route as a combination of route elements according to the needs of the operator and to release routes as part of it either by train movement or manually.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

Supportive functions for stress or emergency cases

1.1.1.1.2.2.2 Wrong switch setting

ATP failure Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable

S S S S S Ensure safe route

intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

Wrong switch setting by OCC staff

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Safe display - HMI OCC

Supportive functions for stress or emergency cases Clear and understandable operational rules

1.1.1.1.2.3 Wrong (temporary) speed restriction wayside

Wrong maintenance

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Load Infrastructure Data onto onboard equipment

S S S S

waysideLoad Infrastructure Data onto wayside equipment

S S S S

Ensure correct maintenanceIncorrect input of data

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Load Infrastructure Data onto onboard equipment

S S S S

Load Infrastructure Data onto wayside equipment

S S S S

Page 12: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 10

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.1.1.1.2.4 Failed or incorrect communication of speed restriction

Faulty or insufficient communication system

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise data communication equipment - This function is intended to inform staff about availability of functions concerning operation and status of data communication equipment.equipment.

Software Intrusion (6.5.1)

see WP 9

1.1.1.1.2.5 Wrong data of speed limits on train (track database)

Wrong input by engineers, OCC or maintenance crew

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Check consistency of data - This function is intended to check the consistency of available data

Adequate route-database (i.e. speed limits) configuration and management

Load Infrastructure Data onto onboard equipment

S S S S

Load Infrastructure Data onto wayside equipment

S S S Swayside equipment

1.1.1.1.2.6 Faulty onboard speed restriction processing

Faulty design of on-board equipment

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.

X S S S S Ensure safe speed; Ensure correct speed restriction processing

Determine static speed profile - This function determines the static train speed profiles, which are based on infrastructure data such as track geometry and quality, infrastructure constraints (tunnels, bridges etc.) and train

X S S S S

( , g )data.

Page 13: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 11

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Calculate dynamic train speed profiles - this function is intended to calculate for each segment of the route the train speed limit. This function calculates the dynamic speed profiles of each train. The dynamic speed profile

S S S Ensure safe speed

train. The dynamic speed profile is based on the static speed profile, the TSR, the braking profile with the relevant safety margin.

Incorrect maintenance of on-board equipment

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

1.1.1.2 Switch hazard1.1.1.2.1 Wrong switch

status1.1.1.2.1.1 Undetected

misaligned switch Interlocking failure or erroneous status control

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

Incorrect maintenance of switch

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

1.1.1.2.1.2 Undetected unlocked switch

Interlocking failure or

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is

S S S S S Ensure safe routeunlocked switch failure or

erroneous status control

ment Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

route

Page 14: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 12

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance of switch

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

1 1 1 2 1 3 Undetected Erroneous Derail Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S Optional1.1.1.2.1.3 Undetected broken switch components

Erroneous status control

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Incorrect maintenance of switch

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

1.1.1.2.2 Insufficient safety distance to moving switchmoving switch

1.1.1.2.2.1 Insufficient worst case safety distance

1.1.1.2.2.1.1 Wrong worst case safety distance registered (on train)

1.1.1.2.2.1.1.1 Failed or incorrect communication of worst case safety distance (stop point / speed limit)

Data communication failure

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise data communication equipment - This function is intended to inform staff about availability of functions concerning operation and status of data communication equipment.q p

Faulty communication system due to incorrect maintenance

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

Page 15: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 13

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Faulty design of communication system

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of communication system

1.1.1.2.2.1.1.2 Wrong worst case safety distance estimation / estimation / determination

1.1.1.2.2.1.1.2.1 Wrong train parameters input

Mistake by driver during input

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Perform self tests during power on - This function is intended to perform all necessary tests on vital equipment during the power on process. Generally this function includes only those self tests that deal with the safety of the ATP and the inputs and outputs necessary for a vital operation. Self tests that are necessary to achieve the safety features of vital processors (computing unit including

X S S S S Supervise status of train

( p g goperating system) are not included here.Design of supportive functions for data input

Assistance during data input through intelligent design of HMI driver desk

1.1.1.2.2.1.1.2.2 Wrong route parameters input

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Load Infrastructure Data onto onboard equipment

S S S S

Load Infrastructure Data onto wayside equipment

S S S S

1.1.1.2.2.1.1.2.3 Safety distance calculation/ determination

Interlocking failure

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function

S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains determination

errormovement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.

are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.

Page 16: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 14

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.1.1.2.2.1.3 Wrong position registered

Odometer failure

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Determine Train Location S S S S Design and installation of absolute and relative position measurement

Respond to Train Location S S S S Ensure safeRespond to Train Location Failure

S S S S Ensure safe route

1.1.1.2.2.1.4 Wrong route1.1.1.2.2.1.4.1 Wrong route

selection / authorization

ATP failure Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure safe route as combination of route elements - This function is intended to allow ATP to define and implement a route as a combination of route elements according to the needs of the operator and to release routes as part of it either by train movement or manually.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

Wrong route selection by OCC staff in

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Safe display - HMI OCC

OCC staff in exceptional cases e.g. emergency cases

Supportive functions for stress or emergency cases Clear and understandable operational rules

1.1.1.2.2.1.4.2 Wrong switch setting

ATP failure Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

conditions.

Wrong switch setting by OCC staff in exceptional cases

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Safe display - HMI OCC

Supportive functions for stress or emergency cases

Page 17: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 15

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Clear and understandable operational rules

1.1.1.2.2.1.5 Wrong train departure

1.1.1.2.2.1.5.1 Wrong departure command

ATP failure Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement this function

S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trainsmovement, this function

determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.

are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.

Ensure correct initial design of ATP regarding departure commandRegular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, correctivecorrective maintenance

Wrong departure command by driver

Authorise Train Movement by Wayside Signals - This function supports train movement authorisation to be provided to trains by wayside signals

S X X X X Ensure safe route

Provide high visibility on signals

1.1.1.2.2.1.5.2 Immobilisation brake deficient

Faulty design of braking system

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Respond to Unexpected Train Movements - This function covers the reaction of ATP in case of roll away.

X S S S S Correct and sufficient maintenance

Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency braking system (and Emergency brakes)

Incorrect maintenance of braking system

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Respond to Unexpected Train Movements - This function covers the reaction of ATP in case of roll away.

X S S S S Correct and sufficient maintenance

Page 18: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 16

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

1 1 1 2 2 1 5 3 W d t I t l ki D il C lli i C t t hi D t i M t A th it S S S S S E l f1.1.1.2.2.1.5.3 Wrong departure authorisation

Interlocking failure

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.

S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.

Authorise Train Movement by Wayside Signals - This function supports train movement authorisation to be provided to trains by wayside signals

S X X X X Ensure safe route

Incorrect authorisation by OCC in case of exceptional cases e.g. emergency cases

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Safe display - HMI OCC

Supportive functions for stress or emergency cases Clear and understandable operational rules

1.1.1.2.2.2 Wrong switch command

Interlocking failure

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable

S S S S S Ensure safe route

intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

Page 19: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 17

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Erroneous switch command by OCC staff

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

conditions.

Safe display - HMI OCCSupportive functions for stress or emergency cases

Clear and understandable operational rules

1.1.1.2.2.3 Wrong travel direction

1.1.1.2.2.3.1 Faulty direction control

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Determine Actual Train Travel Direction - This function determines the travel direction of trains.

S S S S Control acceleration and braking

1.1.1.2.2.3.2 Roll back Insufficient braking force

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Respond to Unexpected Train Movements - This function covers the reaction of ATP in

X S S S S Correct and sufficient maintenancecovers the reaction of ATP in

case of roll away.maintenance

Faulty design of brakes

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency brakes)

Incorrect maintenance of brakes

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

1.1.1.2.3 Switch moves under running train

1 1 1 2 3 1 W it h1.1.1.2.3.1 Wrong switch command

Page 20: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 18

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.1.1.2.3.1.1 Wrong switch command by system

Interlocking failure

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

conditions.

1.1.1.2.3.1.2 Wrong switch command by staff

No support for decision of switch command during exceptional cases

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supportive functions for staff of OCC in exceptional cases, where no technical control of switch command can be provided

Operational rules, Scenarios for fall back levels or emergency cases, Precautions against stress and work overload

1.1.1.2.3.3 Wrong train detection

1 1 1 2 3 3 1 T i t d t t d U i d D il C lli i C t t hi D t t U i d F il d X X X X X E f1.1.1.2.3.3.1 Train not detected Unequipped or failed train

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Data communication failure e.g. data loss

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Determine Train Location S S S S Ensure safe route

1.1.1.2.3.3.2 End of train detected untimely

Unequipped or failed train

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Data Derail- Collision Catastrophic Determine Train Location S S S S Ensure safe atacommunication failure e.g. data loss or delay

e ament

Co s o Catast op c ete e a ocat o S S S S su e sa eroute

Page 21: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 19

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.1.1.3 Guideway structural failure

Faulty design of guideway

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.

S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.

Ensure correct initial design of guideway

Incorrect maintenance of guideway

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising g y p

hazardous situations by external sensors.

p gguideway

Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.

S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.

Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, ,regular inspections, corrective maintenance

1.1.1.4 Vehicle structural failure (component break)

Faulty design of vehicle

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle

Page 22: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 20

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance of vehicle

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

1.1.1.5 Object on 1.1.1.5 Object on guideway

1.1.1.5.1 System object on guideway

1.1.1.5.1.1 Forgotten working/ maintenance/ rescue objects

Incorrect maintenance of guideway

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

Clearance verification system S S S S S Optional device

Ensure procedures to clear X X X X SEnsure procedures to clear guideway after evacuation or emergency case

X X X X S

1.1.1.5.1.2 Element from train falls on track

1.1.1.5.1.2.1 Vehicle Structural failure

Faulty design of vehicle

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle

Incorrect maintenance of vehicle

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

1.1.1.5.1.2.2 Vehicle load falls Overloaded Derail- Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct loading of vehicle on track vehicle ment

p ge.g. by vehicle examiner

Clearance verification system S S S S S Optional device

Page 23: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 21

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.1.1.5.1.3 Wayside element infringes clearance envelope

1.1.1.5.1.3.1 Power supply (catenary third

Faulty design of power

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended

S S S S S Optional device;(catenary, third

rail etc.)of power supply system

ment Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

device;Supervising guideway

Ensure correct initial design of power supply system

Incorrect maintenance of power supply system

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Regular inspection and maintenance of power supply

Preventive maintenance, p pp y

system,

regular inspections, corrective maintenance

Environmental forces violating power supply system

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Ensure correct initial design of power supply system considering environmental forces

Criminal acts Derail- Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S OptionalCriminal acts on power supply system

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Ensure correct initial design of power supply system considering criminal acts

Page 24: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 22

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.1.1.5.1.3.2 Signalling Components

Faulty design of signalling components

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Ensure correct initial design ofEnsure correct initial design of signalling components

Incorrect maintenance of signalling components

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Regular inspection and maintenance of signalling components

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

Environmental Derail- Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S Optional forces violating signalling components

ment Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

device;Supervising guideway

Ensure correct initial design of signalling components considering environmental forces

Criminal acts on signalling components

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Ensure correct initial design of signalling components considering criminal acts

Page 25: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 23

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.1.1.5.1.3.3 Equipment Cabinets/ Platform Door Enclosures/ Tunnel doors

Faulty design of equipment cabinets, platform doors enclosures, tunnel doors

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Ensure correct initial design of equipment cabinets, platform doors enclosures, tunnel doors

Incorrect maintenance of equipment cabinets, platform doors enclosures, tunnel doors

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Regular inspection and maintenance of equipment cabinets, platform doors

Preventive maintenance, regular cabinets, platform doors

enclosures, tunnel doorsregular inspections, corrective maintenance

Environmental forces violating equipment cabinets, platform doors enclosures, tunnel doors

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Ensure correct initial design ofCriminal acts on equipment

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs This function is intended

S S S S S Optional device;on equipment

cabinets, platform doors enclosures, tunnel doors

ment Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

device;Supervising guideway

Page 26: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 24

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Ensure correct initial design of equipment cabinets, platform doors enclosures, tunnel doors considering criminal acts

1.1.1.5.1.3.4 Flooding Gates Faulty design of flooding

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended

S S S S S Optional device;of flooding

gatesment Inputs - This function is intended

to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

device;Supervising guideway

Ensure correct initial design of flooding gates

Incorrect maintenance of flooding gates

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Regular inspection and maintenance of flooding gates

Preventive maintenance,

lregular inspections, corrective maintenance

Environmental forces violating flooding gates

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Ensure correct initial design of flooding gates considering environmental forces

Criminal acts fl di

Derail-t

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant I t Thi f ti i i t d d

S S S S S Optional d ion flooding

gatesment Inputs - This function is intended

to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

device;Supervising guideway

Ensure correct initial design of flooding gates considering criminal acts

Page 27: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 25

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.1.1.5.2 Foreign objects on guideway

1.1.1.5.2.1 External vehicle (on level crossing)

Insufficient protection of level crossing

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Provide levelsensors. Provide level crossing supervision

Installation of warning signals and barriers for level crossings

1.1.1.5.2.2 Environmental impacts, fallen objects (crane, tree, branches, stones, mud ...)

Insufficient precautions regarding environmental impacts or fallen objects

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Clearance supervision; e.g Installation of precautions against genvironmental impact and fallen objects

1.1.1.5.2.3 Debris from structural breakdown (bridges, buildings,...)

Faulty design bridges, buildings ..

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Clearance supervision

Ensure correct initial design of bridges and building etc ..

Incorrect maintenance

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs This function is intended

S S S S S Optional device;maintenance

of bridges, buildings, ..

ment Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

device;Supervising guideway; Clearance supervision

Ensure correct maintenance of bridges and buildings etc ..

Page 28: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 26

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.1.1.5.2.4 Human impact/ Criminal Acts

No boundaries on critical sites

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; e.g. Installation of barriers to secure secure guideway

Insufficient supervision of guideway

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; e.g. Installation of barriers to secure guideway

Installation of supervision of guideway

S S S S S Optional device

9.2.1 Flooding Insufficient precautions

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Water (level) measurement and indicator

Insufficient maintenance of protection constructions

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct maintenance of flooding gates

1.1.1.6 Train lifted from track throughtrack through aerodynamic force

1.1.1.6.1 Air draught in tunnel

Faulty design of tunnel

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Correct initial tunnel design minimising dangerous air draughts

Page 29: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 27

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Insufficient maintenance / faulty construction work

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Correct maintenance and construction work

1.1.1.6.2 Pressure by passing train

Faulty design of

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Correct initial tunnel/guideway design considering increasing passing train of

tunnel/guideway

ment design considering increasing pressure by passing train

Insufficient maintenance / faulty construction work

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Correct maintenance and construction work

9.2.2 Environmental impact on vehicle (wind, gales)

Insufficient precautions

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure appropriate system-design regarding exceptional environmental conditions (extreme wind etc.)

Establish operational rules e.g. speed reductions at critical areas

Insufficient Derail Collision Catastrophic Correct maintenance andInsufficient maintenance (construction work) on protection constructions

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Correct maintenance and construction work on protection constructions

1.1.2 Train on guideway infringes clearance envelope

1.1.2.1 Object protrudes from train

1.1.2.1.1 Vehicle structural Faulty design Derail- Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of failure

y gof vehicle ment

p gvehicle

Incorrect maintenance of vehicle

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

Page 30: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 28

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.1.2.1.2 Bad distribution of freight load

Incorrect loading

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise loading procedure as well as actual freight vehicle (e.g. by vehicle examiner)Training of staff regarding loading

Faulty design of freight cars

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of freight cars considering the of freight cars ment freight cars considering the distribution of goods

Incorrect maintenance of vehicle

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct maintenance of vehicle

1.1.2.2 Clearance envelope underdimensioned

Faulty design / dimensioning of clearance envelope by engineers

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design / dimensioning of clearance envelope

1.1.2.3 train leans excessively sideways

1.1.2.3.1 Wrong Load Distributions

Faulty design of freight

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of freight cars considering theDistributions of freight

vehiclement freight cars considering the

distribution of goodsIncorrect maintenance of vehicle

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct maintenance of vehicle

Incorrect loading

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise loading procedure as well as actual freight vehicle (e.g. by vehicle examiner)Training of staff regarding loading

1.1.2.3.2 Excessive Bogie/Axle/ Damping System Dynamics

Faulty design of bogies, axles and damping system

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial bogie/axle/damping system design

Incorrect Derail- Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct maintenance ofIncorrect maintenance of bogies, axles and damping system

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct maintenance of bogies, axles and damping system

Page 31: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 29

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.1.2.3.3 Guideway structural failure

Faulty design of guideway

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

D t i M t A th it S S S S S E l fDetermine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.

S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.

Ensure correct initial design of guideway

Incorrect maintenance of guideway

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising g y p

hazardous situations by external sensors.

p gguideway

Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.

S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.

Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenancemaintenance maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

1.2 Object / person infringes train clearance envelope

Page 32: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 30

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.2.1 Object infringes clearance envelope

1.2.1.1 Other train / vehicle infringes clearance

l (fl k

Incorrect Movement Authority

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit

S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicatinenvelope (flank

protection)determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.

(communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.

Interlocking failure

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Ensure safe route as combination of route elements - This function is intended to allow ATP to define and implement a route as a combination of route elements according to the needs of the operator and to release routes as part of it either by train movement or manually

S S S S S Ensure safe route

movement or manually.

Broken switch or derailer

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Broken rail detector

1.2.1.2 Civil structure fault / protrusion in clearance envelope

1 2 1 2 1 Tunnel structural Faulty design Derail- Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S Optional1.2.1.2.1 Tunnel structural fault/ collapse

Faulty design of tunnel

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train

Ensure correct initial design of the structure of the tunnel

Page 33: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 31

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance or incorrect construction work on tunnel

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of trainfront of train

Ensure correct inspection, maintenance and construction works on tunnel

1.2.1.2.2 Drilling or excavation above tunnel

Insufficient maintenance rules or procedures i.e. incorrect planning of construction site

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train

Ensure adequate planning of construction site

Incorrect Derail- Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S Optional maintenance or construction works (disobeying of given rules or procedures)

ment, Collision

Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train

Ensure correct inspection, maintenance and construction works - Ensure obeying of rules and procedures

1.2.1.2.3 Station structural fault

Faulty design of station

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of

S S S S S Optional device;SupervisingCollision to supervise the detection of

hazardous situations by external sensors.

Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train

Ensure correct initial design of station

Page 34: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 32

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance or construction works on station

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of trainfront of train

Ensure correct inspection, maintenance and construction works on and in station

1.2.1.3 System object infringes Clearance envelope

1.2.1.3.1 Train components (train underfloor-box/ motor/ object) fall from train

Faulty design of vehicle

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle

Incorrect maintenance of vehicle

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

1.2.1.3.2 Wayside system objects infringes CE inappropriately

Wayside traction power device (Cable tray / overhead lines) infrin-ges CE inap-propriately

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train

Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

Page 35: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 33

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

other wayside system object infringes CE

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of trainfront of train

Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective maintenance

1.2.1.3.3 Hazards related to wayside traction power devices

1.2.1.3.3.1 Current collector gets caught with wayside traction power device

Inadequate adjustment of current collector

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular inspection and maintenance

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, pcorrective maintenance

Supervise traction power supply - This function is intended to powering on/off of the traction supply by the operator at the OCC, or locally, either on given sections or on all sections.

X X X X X

1.2.1.3.3.2 Short circuits undetected short circuits on track

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Protect critical electronic equipment, e.g. by short circuit protection

S S S S S Optional device;Supervise other safety relevant Inputsp

Faulty design of equipment

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct initial design of equipment

Consideration of the possibility of short circuits

Page 36: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 34

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Protect critical electronic equipment, e.g. by short circuit protection

S S S S S Optional device;Supervise other safety relevant Inputs

Incorrect maintenance of equipment

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of equipment

1.2.1.3.3.3 Power transformer catches fire

excess voltage, failure of equipment

Fire Explosion Critical Ensure correct initial design of equipment

Regular inspection and maintenance of power supply system

Preventive maintenance, regular inspections, corrective

i tmaintenance

Installation of fire and smoke protection

S S S S S Optional device

1.2.1.4 Object thrown at train

Ensure correct initial design of equipment

1.2.1.4.1 Object thrown at train from bridges

Insufficient precautions against objects thrown at train

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial system design considering the possibility of object thrown at train.

1.2.1.4.2 Object thrown at train from platform

Insufficient precautions against

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial system design considering the possibility of object thrown at train.from platform against

objects thrown at train

Collision of object thrown at train.

1.2.1.4.3 Object thrown at train from beside the line

Insufficient precautions against objects thrown at train

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial system design considering the possibility of object thrown at train.

Page 37: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 35

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.2.1.4.4 Object thrown at train from passing train

Insufficient precautions against objects thrown at train

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial system design considering the possibility of object thrown at train.

1.2.1.5 Animals infringe Insufficient Derail- Catastrophic Ensure correct initial system 1.2.1.5 Animals infringe cleareance envelope

Insufficient precautions against animals entering guideway

Derailment, Collision

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial system design considering the possibility of animal entering railway equipment.

1.2.1.6 Environment elements infringes clearance envelope

9.2.5 Stalactites in tunnel

Insufficient inspection of tunnel

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstaclesensors. Obstacle detection in front of train

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of tunnel

Too much water/humidity in tunnel

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train

Ensure correct initial tunnel design considering water and general humiditygeneral humidity

1.2.1.6.2 Trees Insufficient precautions to protect track

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 36

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Correct initial design considering the possibility of falling trees on guideway

Insufficient inspections of track

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; hazardous situations by external

sensors.guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on track

9.2.3 Avalanche / landslide/ falling stones

Insufficient precautions to protect track

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train

Correct initial design considering the possibility of avalanches orthe possibility of avalanches or falling stones

Insufficient inspections of track

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of train

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on track

9.2.1 Flooding Insufficient precautions track and system

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway;

sensors. Obstacle detection in front of train

Ensure correct initial design considering the possibility of flooding

Page 39: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 37

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Insufficient inspection and maintenance of flooding protection equipment

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Obstacle detection in front of trainfront of train

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on flooding protection equipment

Inspection of guideway and surrounding area

1.2.1.7 Train at standstill between stations

loss of power supply

Collision Catastrophic Ensure power supply during train movement

X X X X X Control acceleration and braking

Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit f th MA di t th

S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicatin

t) f ltof the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.

g or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.

extreme weather conditions e.g. coldness

Collision Catastrophic Ensure power supply during train movement

X X X X X Control acceleration and braking

Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit

S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicatin

of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.

g or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.

Page 40: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 38

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Asphyxiation, Suffocation

Injury of person

Marginal Passenger announcement

Passenger - Staff communication

1 2 2 P i t i1.2.2 Person intrusion into clearance envelope

1.2.2.1 Person too close to station platform edge

Overcrowded situation

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Platform screen doors S S S S S Optional device

Warning flashing light at platform edge when train arrives

Attention line on platformAttention line on platformSupervise passengers on platform (Detection of overcrowding station)(Detection of person too close to platform edge / train stop)

x x x x S Optional device

Manual emergency stop for passengers/staff : platform/train

Ensure adherence to timetable

Inattentive or unconscious person

Fall of person, Electrocution,

Critical Platform screen doors S S S S S Optional device

ion, Object striking person

Warning flashing light at platform edge when train arrives

Attention line on platform

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 39

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise passengers on platform (Detection of overcrowding station)(Detection of person too close to platform edge / train stop)

x x x x S Optional device

Manual emergency stop for passengers/staff : platform/trainpassengers/staff : platform/train

1.2.2.2 Person between two cars

1.2.2.2.1 Person between two cars coming from inside car

Faulty design of train cars

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Ensure correct initial design of vehicle considering the possibility of climbing between cars

Incorrect maintenance of train cars

Fall of person, Electrocut

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance to prevent possibilities for climbing out of

ion, Object striking person

p gthe car

No installation of precautions

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise conditions for start of train movement - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites related to doors and emergency handles necessary for safe start of train movement.

X X S S S Put in or take out of operation

1.2.2.2.2 Person between two cars coming from

No installation of precautions

Fall of person, Electrocut

Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise

S S S S S Optional device;Supervisingcoming from

outsideElectrocution, Object striking person

function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

Supervising guideway

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 40

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Installation of platform screen doors

S S S S S Optional device; One possibility to prevent passengers from climbing between train between train carsFaulty design

of precautions on station and guideway

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Ensure correct initial design of precautions

Incorrect maintenance of precautions on station and guideways

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of precautions

1.2.2.4 Person falls/1.2.2.4 Person falls/ intrudes on track

1.2.2.4.1 Intrusion on the line by persons from train

1.2.2.4.1.1 Undetected persons by evacuation on line

No evacuation supervision

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

1 2 2 4 1 2 Undetected1.2.2.4.1.2 Undetected person leaves/falls out of the train

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 41

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.2.2.4.1.2.1 Undetected person leaves/falls out of the train by door

No installation of precautions

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Note: here train doors. platform doors are mentioned in 1.2.2.4.2.3.5 as an

Critical Supervise Door Opening - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites necessary for safe passenger exchange.

X X X S Control passenger doors

person as an realisation example)

Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.

X S S S S Control passenger doors

Faulty design of precautions

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Ensure correct initial design of door system

p

Incorrect maintenance of precautions

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of all door related systems

1.2.2.4.1.2.2 Undetected person leaves/falls out of the train by window

Faulty design of windows

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Ensure correct initial design of windows

Examples: Windows unable to open, Detection of broken windows

Insufficient maintenance (e.g. broken window)

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of train windows

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 42

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.2.2.4.1.2.3 Undetected person leaves/falls out of the train by end of train wall / after separation of cars

unauthorised decoupling

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise Train Integrity - This function is intended to supervise the integrity of the train (loss of coupling between vehicles of one unit)

S S S S S Supervise stauts of the train

separation of cars person

Ensure correct initial design of train i.e. wagon

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance or train i.e. wagon

Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency brakes)

Undetected parted train / separated wagon

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object

Critical Supervise Train Integrity - This function is intended to supervise the integrity of the train (loss of coupling between vehicles of one unit)

S S S S S Supervise stauts of the train

Object striking person

unit)

Ensure correct initial design of train i.e. wagonEnsure correct inspection and maintenance or train i.e. wagon

Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency brakes)

1.2.2.4.2 Person falls / intrudes track (from outside / (from outside / from station - wayside)

1.2.2.4.2.1 Risky behaviour

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 43

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.2.2.4.2.1.1 Person intrudes track wilfully (not suicide)

Insufficient precautions against intrusion

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Guideway person which passengers are not

permitted e.g. the track.Guideway Intrusion Protection System (GIPS); Fences at dedicated areas; Penalty for intrusion; Passenger information; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : l tf /t iplatform/train

1.2.2.4.2.1.2 Person intrudes track unconsciously

Insufficient precautions against intrusion

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

S S S S S Optional device;Example for realisation: Platform Screen Doors; Guideway Intrusion Protection System (GIPS); Fences at dedicateddedicated areas; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/train

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 44

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.2.2.4.2.2 Unnoticed track No installation of precautions

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

person which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

Faulty design of precautions

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Ensure correct initial design of track and precautions

Examples for realisation: Mark track (e.g. mark stones in different colours); Fences at dedicated areas; Obstacle detection and warningwarning signals by driver

Incorrect maintenance of precautions

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of track and precautions

1.2.2.4.2.3 Person fall

Page 47: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 45

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.2.2.4.2.3.1 obstacles - stumble

Any reason Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Example for realisation: Platform person which passengers are not

permitted e.g. the track.Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/train

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station

Prevent obstacles in station which could be a reason to stumble by maintenance as well as regular cleaning

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 46

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.2.2.4.2.3.2 Rush / hustle / push

Overcrowded situation

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Catastrophic Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Platform screen doors; Guideway person which passengers are not

permitted e.g. the track.Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/train

Prevent overcrowded situations Ensure enough room for passengers and avoid train d ldelays

Criminal or terroristic acts

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway, Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/passengers/ staff : platform/train

Prevent criminal or terroristic acts

Supervision of station to prevent criminal acts

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 47

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.2.2.4.2.3.3 Slippery ground Faulty design of station floor, Environmental condition (Humidity, Rain, Snow ..),

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Platform Rain, Snow ..),

Slope of platform or whole station

person which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/train

Ensure correct initial design of station

Considering humidity, rain,

l fsnow, slope of station or platform

Incorrect maintenance of station floor

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/train

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 48

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station

Sufficient cleaning on platform and station

1.2.2.4.2.3.4 Insufficient lighting

Faulty design Fall of person, El t t

Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This f ti i i t d d t i

S S S S S Optional device;S i iElectrocut

ion, Object striking person

function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/trainplatform/train

Ensure correct initial design of lightning system

Considering the level of brightness

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 49

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance of lightning

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Platform person which passengers are not

permitted e.g. the track.Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/train

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of lightning system

1.2.2.4.2.3.5 Platform faulty design

Disrespect of possibility person fall

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop forstop for passengers/ staff : platform/train; Correct initial platform design

Page 52: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 50

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Ensure well educated and well trained engineers

1.2.2.4.2.4 criminal act Insufficient security precautions

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object

Catastrophic Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for Object

striking person

avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

Examples for realisation: Platform screen doors; Guideway intrusion protection system; Manual emergency stop for passengers/ staff : platform/train

Ensure supervision of station area

1.2.2.4.3 Person falls from above (bridge etc.)

Insufficient precautions

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Guideway intrusion detection system

Faulty design of e.g. bridge

Fall of person, Electrocuti

Critical Ensure correct initial design of bridges considering that persons might fall from e.g. bridges

Installation of precautions like fences, b i dion,

Object striking person

barriers and railings against fall of person from e.g. bridge

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 51

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Guideway which passengers are not

permitted e.g. the track.Guideway intrusion detection system

Incorrect maintenance of precautions

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of precautions

Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system Such system

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples foravoidance system. Such system

covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

Examples for realisation: Guideway intrusion detection system

1.2.2.4.3.5 Suicide Insufficient precautions

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Guideway intrusion detection systemsystem

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 52

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Faulty design of e.g. bridge

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Ensure correct initial design of bridges considering that persons might fall from e.g. bridges

Installation of precautions like fences, barriers and railings against fall of person from e.g. person from e.g. bridge

Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Guideway intrusion detection system

Incorrect maintenance of precautions

Fall of person, Electrocut

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of precautions

of precautions Electrocution, Object striking person

Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Examples for realisation: Guideway intrusion detection system

1 2 2 5 Staff inside Operational Fall of Critical Operational rules1.2.2.5 Staff inside clearance envelope during operation, maintenance, evacuation

Operational need

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Operational rules

Maintenance rulesEvacuation rules

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 53

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Warning signals for worker1.2.2.7 Person leaning

out of train infringes train clearance envelope

in focus: single person

1.2.2.7.1 Person leaning out of train infringes train clearance envelope: out of door

Faulty design of doors; Insufficient maintenance; Insufficient precautions

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.

X S S S S Control passenger doors

Supervise Door Opening - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites necessary for safe passenger exchange.

X X X S Control passenger doors

Installation of broken doors detection

Faulty design of doors and

Fall of person

Critical Ensure correct initial design of doors and precaution systemsof doors and

precaution systems

person, Electrocution, Object striking person

doors and precaution systems

Incorrect maintenance of doors and precaution systems

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of doors and precaution systems

1.2.2.7.2 Person leaning out of train infringes train

Insufficient precautions

Fall of person, Electrocut

Critical Installation of detector of open/closed/broken window

infringes train clearance envelope: out of window

Electrocution, Object striking person

Windows are not able to be open that a person could lean out

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 54

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Faulty design of windows

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Ensure correct design of windows and precautions

personIncorrect maintenance of windows

Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of windows and precautions

1.3 Train collision hazard within uninfringed clearance envelope

1.3.1 Train too close to other vehicle

1 1 1 2 2 1 Insufficient worst respect1.1.1.2.2.1 Insufficient worst case safety distance

respect sublevels

1.3.1.2 Undetected train/vehicle

1.3.1.2.1 Undetected / uncommunicated (stranded) train

1.3.1.2.1.1 Train presence signal failure (trainside)

Faulty design of trainside equipment

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route El t Thi f ti i

S S S S S Ensure safe tElements - This function is

intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

route

Ensure correct initial design of trainside equipment

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 55

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance of train side equipment

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is

S S S S S Ensure safe routeElements This function is

intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

route

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of trainside equipment

1.3.1.2.1.2 Train presence signal failure (wayside)

Faulty design of secondary train detection system

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is

S S S S S Ensure safe routeElements - This function is

intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

route

Ensure correct initial design of secondary train detection system

Incorrect maintenance of secondary train detection system

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

E S f S it h bl R t S S S S S E fEnsure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 56

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of wayside equipment

1.3.1.2.1.3 Train detection information processing / communication

Faulty design of data communication system

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

communication n system occupied by an unequipped or failed train.Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

Supervise data communication equipment - This function is intended to inform staff about availability of functions concerning operation and status of data communication equipment.equipment.

Ensure correct initial design of data communication system

Incorrect maintenance of data communication system

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

Supervise data communication equipment - This function is intended to inform staff about availability of functions concerning operation and status of data communication equipment.

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 57

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of data communication system

1.3.1.2.2 Undetected train enters system

No communication established prior entry

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

prior entry occupied by an unequipped or failed train.Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Transition to CBTC Area Technical Solution of Entry into CBTC Area

1.3.1.2.3 System loses unnoticed tracking of train

1.3.1.2.3.1 Train presence signal failure

Faulty design of trainside

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines

X X X X X Ensure safe separation ofsignal failure

(trainside)of trainside equipment

Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

Ensure correct initial design of trainside equipment

Incorrect maintenance of train side

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trainsof train side

equipmentwhether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

trains

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 58

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

conditions.

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of trainside equipment

1.3.1.2.3.2 Train presence detection failure (wayside)

Faulty design of secondary train detection system

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

conditions.

Ensure correct initial design of secondary train detection system

Incorrect maintenance of secondary train detection system

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe

S S S S S Ensure safe route

normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of wayside equipment

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 59

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.3.1.2.3.3 Train detection information processing / communication failure

Faulty design of data communication system

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route El t Thi f ti i

S S S S S Ensure safe tElements - This function is

intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

route

Supervise data communication equipment - This function is intended to inform staff about availability of functions concerning operation and status of data communication equipment.

Ensure correct initial design of data communication systemdata communication system

Incorrect maintenance of data communication system

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

Supervise data communication equipment - This function is intended to inform staff aboutintended to inform staff about availability of functions concerning operation and status of data communication equipment.

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of data communication system

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 60

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.3.1.2.4 Undetected parted train / separated wagon

Faulty design of train i.e. wagon

Collision Derail-ment

Catastrophic Supervise Train Integrity - This function is intended to supervise the integrity of the train (loss of coupling between vehicles of one unit)

S S S S S Supervise stauts of the train

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements This function is

S S S S S Ensure safe routeElements - This function is

intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

route

Ensure correct initial design of train i.e. wagon

Incorrect maintenance of train i.e. wagon

Collision Derail-ment

Catastrophic Supervise Train Integrity - This function is intended to supervise the integrity of the train (loss of coupling between vehicles of one unit)

S S S S S Supervise stauts of the train

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is

S S S S S Ensure safe routeElements - This function is

intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

route

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance or train i.e. wagon

Unauthorised decoupling

Collision Derail-ment

Supervise Train Integrity - This function is intended to supervise the integrity of the train (loss of coupling between vehicles of one unit)

S S S S S Supervise stauts of the train

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is

S S S S S Ensure safe route

intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance or train i.e. wagon

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 61

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.3.1.2.5 Undetected / unpermitted maintenance car / work train

Faulty design of operational rules

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Establish clear and understandable operational understandable operational procedures and rules

Disrespect of operational rules

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure adherence and respect of operational rules and procedures

1.3.1.3 Wrong train detection (position)

1.3.1.3.1 Wrong "position / track segment" from train from train detection

1.3.1.3.1.1 Train presence signal failure (trainside)

Faulty design of trainside equipment

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

Ensure correct initial design of trainside equipmenttrainside equipment

Incorrect maintenance of train side equipment

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 62

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

conditions.

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of trainside equipment

1.3.1.3.1.2 Train presence detection failure (wayside)

Faulty design of secondary train detection system

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

conditions.

Ensure correct initial design of secondary train detection system

Incorrect maintenance of secondary train detection system

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe

S S S S S Ensure safe route

normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of wayside equipment

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 63

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.3.1.3.1.3 Train detection information processing / communication failure

Faulty design of data communication system

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is

S S S S S Ensure safe routeElements - This function is

intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

route

Respond to Train Location Failure

S S S S Ensure safe route

Ensure correct initial design of data communication system

Incorrect maintenance of data communication system

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route S S S S S Ensure safeEnsure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

Respond to Train Location Failure

S S S S Ensure safe route

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of data communication system

Train receive information of wrong track section

Collision Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of data communication system

section (adjacent track)

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 64

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Clear and understandable operational rules

Prevention of pick up an adjacent position reference if a train drives in reverse reverse (passing a point) a limited distance and then continues forward

1.3.1.3.2 Wrong timing of train "position" detection communication

1.3.1.3.2.1 Train presence signal failure (trainside)

Faulty design of trainside equipment

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains(trainside) equipment whether a section of track is

occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

Ensure correct initial design of trainside equipment

Incorrect maintenance of train side equipment

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

equipment occupied by an unequipped or failed train.Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 65

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of trainside equipment

1.3.1.3.2.2 Train presence detection failure (wayside)

Faulty design of secondary train detection system

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

system occupied by an unequipped or failed train.Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

Ensure correct initial design of secondary train detection system

Incorrect maintenance of secondary train detection

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

train detection system

occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of wayside equipment

1.3.1.3.2.3 Train detection information processing /

Faulty design of data communicatio

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trainsprocessing /

communication failure

communication system

whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

trains

Page 68: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 66

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe conditions.

S S S S S Ensure safe route

conditions.

Respond to Train Location Failure

S S S S Ensure safe route

Ensure correct initial design of data communication system

Incorrect maintenance of data communication system

Collision Catastrophic Detect Unequipped or Failed Trains - This function determines whether a section of track is occupied by an unequipped or failed train.

X X X X X Ensure safe separation of trains

Ensure Safe Switchable Route Elements - This function is intended to switch switchable route elements and ensure the switching is performed under normal (undisturbed) and safe

S S S S S Ensure safe route

( )conditions.

Respond to Train Location Failure

S S S S Ensure safe route

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of data communication system

1.1.1.2.2.3 (1.3.1.4) Wrong travel direction

respect sublevels

1.1.1.1.1.3 (1.3.1.5) Insufficient deceleration

respect sublevels

1.3.2 Train too close to end of track

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 67

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

1.3.2.2 Unrecognised end of track

Maintenance works

Collision Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; Example for realisation: obstacle obstacle detection in front of train (technical or by driver)

Ensure correct adherence of maintenance procedures

Communication between train, OCC and maintenance crew

Bad weather conditions

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway; hazardous situations by external

sensors.guideway; Example for realisation: obstacle detection in front of train (technical or by driver)

Ensure good view for driver1.1.1.2.2.3 (1.3.2.3) Wrong travel

direction (back movement)

respect sublevels

1.1.1.1.1.3 (1.3.2.4) Insufficient deceleration

respect sublevels

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 68

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

2 Train Interior Hazards

2.1 Person struck/hurt by object

2.1.1 Break of train equipmentequipment fixation

2.1.1.1 Faulty design, implementation, maintenance

Mistakes by staff during design, implementation and maintenance

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Adequate training and education of staff

Employ trained and well educated staff only

Inadequate or no rules for design, implementation and maintenance

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Establish rules for design

maintenanceEstablish rules for implementationEstablish rules for maintenance

2.1.1.2 Vibration Faulty design of train cars

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of train cars considering the possibility of vibration

Incorrect maintenance of train cars

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Ensure correct maintenance and inspection to prevent vibration

2.1.2 Luggage / similar objects

2 1 2 1 Faulty design Mistake by Person Marginal Adequate training and education2.1.2.1 Faulty design, implementation, maintenance of luggage rack

Mistake by staff during design, implementation and maintenance of luggage rack

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Adequate training and education of staff

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 69

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Insufficient or no rules for the design, implementation and maintenance for luggage

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Establish rules regarding luggage racks

for luggage racks

2.1.2.2 Operation error2.1.2.2.1 Acceleration Unskilled

DriverPerson Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Adequate training and education of staff

Well design and user supportive HMI driver desk

2.1.2.2.2 Deceleration Unskilled Driver

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Adequate training and education of staff

Well design and user supportive HMI driver desk

2.1.2.2.3 Jerk of moving see 2.1.42.1.2.2.3 Jerk of moving train

see 2.1.4

2.1.3 Arris by vandalism

Insufficient supervision

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Supervise train equipment

Faulty design of train equipment (not considering the possibility of vandalism)

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of train equipment considering the possibility of vandalism

Incorrect maintenance

Person Struck /

Marginal Prevent vandalism by regular inspection and maintenance

and inspection Hurt by Object

p

2.1.4 Jerk of moving train

2.1.4.1 Propulsion failure Faulty design of propulsion system

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of propulsion system

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 70

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance of propulsion system

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of propulsion system

2.1.4.2 Brake failure Faulty design of braking system

Person Struck / Hurt by

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency brakes)system Hurt by

Objectbrakes)

Incorrect maintenance of braking system

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of braking system

2.1.4.3 Environmental conditions

9.1.2 Wind Inadequate precaution against wind

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Consider wind force during planning and design of railway/metro system

Operational rules to stop all trains in case of extreme wind

9 2 4 Earthquake Inadequate Person Catastrophic Consider earthquakes during9.2.4 Earthquake Inadequate precaution against earthquakes

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Catastrophic Consider earthquakes during planning and design of railway/metro system

Operational rules to stop all trains is case of forecasted earthquake

2.1.4.4 Guideway structural failure

Faulty design of guideway

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of guideway

Incorrect maintenance of guideway

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of guideway

j

2.1.4.5 Excessive deceleration

ATP on-board equipment failure

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of ATP on-board equipment

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of ATP on-board

i t

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 71

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Mistake by driver

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Ensure correct execution of operational rules

Employ trained and well educated staff only

U i d iUnconscious driver2.1.4.6 Excessive

accelerationATP on-board equipment failure

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Catastrophic Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.

X S S S S Ensure safe speed

Ensure correct initial design of ATP on-board equipmentEnsure correct inspection and maintenance of ATP on-board equipment

Mistake by driver

Person Struck / Hurt by Obj t

Catastrophic Ensure correct execution of operational rules

ObjectEmploy trained and well educated staff only

Unconscious driver2.1.4.7 Emergency

brakingAny reason Person

Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Ensure a limitation of braking force to an unharmful level for passenger

X S S S S Control acceleration and braking

Provide enough halt (e.g. handrails) in trains

Prevent unnecessary emergency brakes by passenger

2 2 Explosion2.2 Explosion2.2.1 Explosion in train

2.2.1.1 Criminal acts Insufficient supervision

Explosion Catastrophic Provide enough supervision in train

Training and education of staff

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 72

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Operational rule to stop all trains in case of a criminal or terroristic act

2.2.1.2 Egression of explosive substances in traintrain

2.2.1.2.1 Maintenance errors

Mistake by maintenance crew

Explosion e.g. due to cabling error

Catastrophic Adequate training and education of staff

Technical and procedural support

2.2.1.2.2 Faulty design, improper design

Insufficient training for staff

Explosion systematic error

Catastrophic Adequate training and education of staff

Insufficient rules/guidelines for design of train cars

Explosion Catastrophic Establish technical and procedural support for design e.g. by guidelines

2.2.1.3 Explosive material storage

Faulty design Explosion Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle considering possible gexplosions

2.2.1.4 Explosive products carried by passenger

Any reason Explosion Catastrophic Passenger information

Passenger control at entrance of station/train

2.2.2 Explosion on guideway

2.2.2.1 Criminal acts Insufficient supervision

Explosion Catastrophic Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

y ycovers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

Training and education of staff Operational rule to stop all trains is case of a criminal or terroristic act

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 73

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

2.2.2.2 Egression of explosive substances on guideway

2.2.2.2.1 Maintenance errors

Mistake by maintenance crew

Explosion Catastrophic Adequate training and education of staff

crewTechnical and procedural support

2.2.2.2.2 Faulty design, improper design

Insufficient training for staff

Explosion Catastrophic Adequate training and education of staff

Insufficient rules/guidelines for design of train cars

Explosion Catastrophic Establish technical and procedural support for design e.g. by guidelines

2.3 Person fall in train

2.3.1 Brake failure Unskilled Driver

Fall of person in train

Marginal Ensure correct execution of operational rules

Employ trained and well educated staff onlyUnconscious driver

ATP On-board problem

Fall of person in train

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of ATP on-board equipment

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of ATP on-board equipment

2.3.2 Obstacles in train Inappropriate Design

Fall of person in train

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of train cars considering possible obstacles

Incorrect maintenance

Fall of person in train

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance to prevent obstacles in train cars

2 3 3 Panic/hustle in Any reason Fall of Catastrophic Supervise train i e passenger2.3.3 Panic/hustle in train (by criminal act, jerk,...)

Any reason Fall of person in train

Catastrophic Supervise train i.e. passenger

Employ security guards and train on-board personnel

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

2.3.4 Insufficient lighting

Power blackout

Fall of person in train

Marginal Installation of secondary power supply system

Faulty design of lightning system

Fall of person in train

Marginal Ensure correct design of lightning system in train

Incorrect Fall of Marginal Ensure correct inspection andIncorrect maintenance of lightning system

Fall of person in train

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of lightning system

2.3.5 Inexistence or broken support elements

Faulty design of support elements

Fall of person in train

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of support elements

Incorrect maintenance of support elements

Fall of person in train

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of support elements

2.3.6 Slippery train floor

Faulty design of train floor

Fall of person in train

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of train floors

Incorrect Fall of Marginal Ensure correct inspection andIncorrect maintenance of train floor

Fall of person in train

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and cleaning of train floors

2.4 Fire2.4.1 Fire in train

2.4.1.1 Inflammable material used on train

Faulty design - inflammable material used

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle

Incorrect maintenance - inflammable material used

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of train cars

2.4.1.2 Ignition Faulty design e.g. faulty designed

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle

designed electrical components

Maintenance error

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of train cars

2.4.1.3 Unobstructed spread of fire

Faulty design of train cars

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Installation of fire and smoke protection

S S S S S Optional device

Maintenance error

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct execution of maintenance rules

2.4.1.4 Explosion see 2.22.4.2 Fire on guideway

ignites trainignites train

2.4.2.1 Inflammable material used on guideway

Faulty design - inflammable material used on guideway

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of guideway

Incorrect maintenance - inflammable material used

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on guideway

2.4.2.2 Ignition Faulty design e.g. faulty designed electrical components

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of guideway

components

Maintenance error

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of guideway

2.4.2.3 Unobstructed spread of fire

Faulty design of guideways

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of guideway

Installation of fire and smoke protection

S S S S S Optional device

Maintenance error

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct execution of maintenance rules

2.4.2.4 Explosion see 2.22.5 Inadequate

temperatureFaulty design of train cars

Super cooling/ Superheating of

Marginal Installation of air renewal and air conditioning systems

S S S S S Optional device

Passenger

Ensure correct maintenance of HEVAC

S S S S S Optional device

Ensure correct handling of HEVAC

2.6 Asphyxiation

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 76

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

2.6.1 Smoke Fire Asphyxiation of passenger

Catastrophic See subtree 2.4.1 Fire in train

Faulty design of vehicle

Asphyxiation of passenge

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of train cars in order to prevent the possibility of development of passenge

rpossibility of development of smoke e.g. from electronical equipment

Incorrect maintenance

Asphyxiation of passenger

Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance to prevent development of smoke

2.6.2 Air renewal failure Faulty design of air renewal system

Asphyxiation of passenger

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of air renewal system

Provide possibilities to open windows or doors in emergency cases

Incorrect maintenance

Asphyxiation of passenger

Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of air renewal system

Asphyxiation of passenger

Catastrophic Provide possibilities to open windows or doors in emergency cases

2.7 Toxic releases2.7.1 Toxic releases in

trainFaulty design of vehicle leads to combustion, leakage ..

Asphyxiation, burns of passenger

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of vehicle to prevent any form of toxic release by combustion, leakage etc.

Avoid the use of toxic material on train for construction

Incorrect maintenance of vehicle leads to combustion, leakage …

Asphyxiation, burns of passenger

Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on vehicle to prevent any form of toxic release by combustion, leakage etc.

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Avoid the use of toxic material on train for maintenance purposes

2.7.2 Toxic releases coming from outside

Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCCorder to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

2.8 Radiation2.8.1 Radiation from

equipmentFaulty design of train cars

Burns of passenger

Critical Ensure correct initial design of train cars considering the possibility of radiation

Incorrect maintenance on train cars

Burns of passenger

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on train cars considering the possibility of radiation

2.8.2 Foreign radiation/ Strong Fields

Faulty design of vehicle e.g. insufficient precaution

Burns of passenger

Critical Minimise the impact of foreign radiation and strong fields

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of precautions

2.9 Electrocution in train

Faulty design of train cars

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct initial design of train cars considering the possibility of electrocution

Incorrect maintenance of train cars

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance to ensure the protection of passenger

2.10 Person contact with machinery

Faulty design of train cars

Cuts, burns, contamination, suffocations of passenger

Critical Ensure correct initial design of machinery

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance of train cars

Cuts, burns, contamination, suffocations of passenge

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of precautions against contact of passenger with machinery

passenger

2.11 Person exposed to noise

Faulty design of train cars

Suffocation

Insignificant Ensure correct initial design of train cars considering the possibility of loud noises

Incorrect maintenance of train cars

Suffocation

Insignificant Ensure correct inspection and maintenance

2.12 Person needs urgent asisstance

heart attack, childbirth, …

Injury of person

Critical Installation of emergency call device onboard

S S S S S

Provide communication onboard staff and OCCEnsure Possibility of Announcement inside train e.g. ask for

d t b ddoctor onboard

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 79

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

3 Train-Station- Interface Hazards (with train already in station)

3.1 Passenger falls from train onfrom train on station track

3.1.1 Incorrect train alignment

No location measurement

Fall of person, Electrocution

Catastrophic Determine Train Location S S S S Ensure safe route

Support driver with signs To indicate correct location for passenger exchange

3.1.2 Vehicle doors are open on the wrong side at stationstation

3.1.2.1 Wrong Travel Direction

No measurement of travel direction

Fall of person, Electrocution

Catastrophic Determine Actual Train Travel Direction - This function determines the travel direction of trains.

S S S S Control acceleration and braking

3.1.2.2 Door control failure

No door control system

Fall of person, Electrocution

Catastrophic Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.

X S S S S Control passenger doors

Supervise Door Opening - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites necessary for safe passenger exchange.

X X X S Control passenger doors

3.1.3 Train departure ith ( ti d)

Door control f il

Fall of Catastrophic Supervise Train Doors - This f ti i i t d d t i

X S S S S Control with (unnoticed) open doors

failure person, Electrocution

function is intended to supervise the train door control system.

passenger doors

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 80

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise Conditions for Start of Train Movement - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites related to doors and emergency handles necessary for safe start of train movement.

X X S S S Put in or take out of operation; Example for realisation: Installation of manual movement. manual emergency stop for passengers/staff on platform and train

Installation of CCTV system to monitor platform area

Prevention of untimely departure by monitoring

3.2 Passenger injured by door closing

3.2.1 Inadequate Pressure/ Forces

Faulty design of doors system

Trapping of person

Critical Supervise Conditions for Start of Train Movement - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites related to doors and emergency handles necessary for safe start of train movement.

X X S S S Put in or take out of operation

Ensure correct initial design of door system

Test correct door closing pressure/ force

Installation of door control and obstacle detection system

X X X X S

Incorrect maintenance of door system

Trapping of person

Critical Supervise Conditions for Start of Train Movement - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites related to doors and emergency handles necessary for safe start of train movement.

X X S S S Put in or take out of operation

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of door system

Including obstacle detection and door closing pressure/ force

3 2 2 Passenger injured3.2.2 Passenger injured by platform screen doors

3.2.2.1 Person hit by platform screen's doors during closing

Injury of person, Passenger hit by train, Trapping of person

Marginal Installation of door control and obstacle detection system

X X X X S

3.2.2.2 Installation of PSD - Passenger

h d i t

Wrong installation procedure

Fall of person

Injury of person, Passange

Marginal Migration phase procedures

smashed against PSD/ construction material during passenger boarding

procedure Passanger hit by train, Trapping of person

overcrowded situation

Fall of person

Injury of person, Passanger hit by train, Trapping of person

Marginal Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

3.2.2.3 Misuse of manual control panel for PSD by staff in case of PSD failure

Staff communication, misunderstandings, insufficient education Trapping

Passanger hit by

Marginal Training and education of staff

education pp gof person

ytrain

Establish clear and understandable operational procedures and rules

3.2.2.4 Loss of locking status of PSD

Fall of person

Injury of person, Passanger hit by train, Trapping of person

Marginal Manage PSDs closing - This function is intended to manage the platform door closing if existing after exchange of passenger at stations.

S S S S S Optional device

3.2.3 Inadequate space between door leaf

d b d

Faulty design of doors system

Trapping of person

Critical Ensure correct initial design of door system

and car body system

Installation of door control and obstacle detection system

X X X X S

Incorrect maintenance of door system

Trapping of person

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of door system

3.3 Train departs with passenger trapped in doors (limb of passenger, clothes, bags, other objects fromother objects from passenger, leash... )

3.3.1 Wrong door closing / interlocking signal

No door control

Trapping of person

Critical Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.

X S S S S Control passenger doors

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Conditions for start of train are not fulfilled

Trapping of person

Critical Supervise Conditions for Start of Train Movement - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites related to doors and emergency handles necessary for safe start of train movement.

X X S S S Put in or take out of operation

movement.

3.3.2 Undetected obstacles

Obstacle detector signals clearance

Trapping of person

Critical Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.

X S S S S Control passenger doors; Example for realisation: Obstacle detection in doors (train and PSD)

Mistake by driver

Trapping of person

Critical Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.

X S S S S Control passenger doors; Example for prealisation: Obstacle detection in doors (train and PSD)

Support driver during clearance check

X X S S S Ensure sufficient sight onto platform and doors

Design or maintenance error of train doors

Objects striking person

Injury of person

Critical Correct initial design of train doors

doors

Regular inspection and maintenance

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Overcrowded situations, Vandalism, Panic, Unawareness of Passenger

Objects striking person

Injury of person

Critical Correct initial design of train doors

3.3.3 Passenger/ object trapped in platform screen doors

Regular inspection and maintenance

3.3.3.1 Person stuck between train doors and screen's doors

Dsign or maintenance errors of PSD

Injury of person

Objects striking person, Trapping of person Critical

Ensure correct initial design of interaction traindoor / Platform screen doors

Regular inspection and maintenance

3.3.3.2 Anything (leashes, ties,

Overcrowded situations,

Ensure correct initial design of PSD(leashes, ties,

wrist of a child ..) sticks in PSD and is not detected by PSD

situations, Vandalism, Panic, Unawareness of Passenger

Injury of person

Objects striking person, Trapping of person Critical

PSD

Manage PSDs closing - This function is intended to manage the platform door closing if existing after exchange of passenger at stations.

S S S S S Optional device

Design or maintenance

Objects striking

Ensure correct initial design of PSDmaintenance

error of PSDInjury of person

striking person, Trapping of person Critical

PSD

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 85

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

3.3.3.3 Person or object is between closed PSD and closed train doors -> and train departs with passenger in doors

Design or maintenance error of PSD

Objects striking person

Ensure correct initial design of PSD

doors Injury of person

person, Trapping of person Critical

3.4 Train moves at passenger exchange

3.4.1 Incorrect Train Departure

3.4.1.1 Wrong Departure Authorisation / Command

Conditions for start are not fulfilled

Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object

Catastrophic Supervise Conditions for Start of Train Movement - This function is intended to supervise all prerequisites related to doors and emergency handles necessary for safe start of train movement.

X X S S S Put in or take out of operation

(object striking person)

movement.

3.4.1.2 Door Status Failures

Door status is lost

Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object striking person)

Catastrophic Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.

X S S S S Control passenger doors; Installation of door status control

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Door status signals clearance but door occupied

Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object

Critical Supervise Train Doors - This function is intended to supervise the train door control system.

X S S S S Control passenger doors; Installation of obstacle detection

(object striking person)

3.4.2 Rear end collision Train enters occupied track in station

collision Catastrophic Ensure exclusiveness of train in track section

3.4.3 Propulsion Failure Faulty design of propulsion system

Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of propulsion system

(object striking person)

Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.

X S S S S Ensure safe speed

Respond to Unexpected Train Movements - This function covers the reaction of ATP in case of roll away.

X S S S S Correct and sufficient maintenance

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance of propulsion system

Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object

Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of propulsion system

(object striking person)

Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.

X S S S S Ensure safe speed

Respond to Unexpected Train Movements - This function covers the reaction of ATP in case of roll away.

X S S S S Correct and sufficient maintenance

3.4.4 Brakes Failure Faulty design Fall of Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of 3.4.4 Brakes Failure Faulty design of braking system

Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object striking person)

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of braking system (and Emergency brakes)

Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.

X S S S S Ensure safe speed

p o e

Respond to Unexpected Train Movements - This function covers the reaction of ATP in case of roll away.

X S S S S Correct and sufficient maintenance

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance of braking system

Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object

Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of braking system

(object striking person)

Supervise Actual Speed - This function supervises the operation of trains to ensure that trains remain within the dynamic speed profile.

X S S S S Ensure safe speed

Respond to Unexpected Train Movements - This function covers the reaction of ATP in case of roll away.

X S S S S Correct and sufficient maintenance

3.4.5 Important Overcrowded it ti

Fall of Marginal Provide enough room for i t tipassenger

movement in the vehicle

situation person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object striking person)

passenger in station

Provide enough room for passenger in train

Provide enough halt inside of train

3 5 Person between3.5 Person between Vehicle/ Vehicle gaps

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

3.5.1 Passengers risky behaviour

Any reason Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object

Critical Installation of platform screen doors

S S S S S Optional device

(object striking person)

Installation of manual emergency stop for passenger and staff on platform and train

S S S S S

Manage train door closing - This function is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.

X X X X S Control passenger doors

Manage PSDs closing - This function is intended to manage

S S S S S Control passenger function is intended to manage

the platform door closing if existing after exchange of passenger at stations.

passenger doors

3.5.2 Unconsciousness (children, elder people...)

Any reason Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object striking person)

Critical Installation of platform screen doors

S S S S S Optional device; Control passenger doors

Installation of manual emergency S S S S SInstallation of manual emergency stop for passenger and staff on platform and train

S S S S S

Manage train door closing - This function is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.

X X X X S Control passenger doors

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04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 90

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Manage PSDs closing - This function is intended to manage the platform door closing if existing after exchange of passenger at stations.

S S S S S Control passenger doors

3.5.3 Rush / hustle / push

Any reason Fall of person

Critical Installation of platform screen doors

S S S S S Optional device;push person,

Trapping of person; Impact on person (object striking person)

doors device; Control passenger doors

Installation of manual emergency stop for passenger and staff on platform and train

S S S S S

Manage train door closing - This X X X X S Control g gfunction is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.

passenger doors

Manage PSDs closing - This function is intended to manage the platform door closing if existing after exchange of passenger at stations.

S S S S S Control passenger doors

Prevent criminal or terroristic acts

Supervision of station

Avoid overcrowded situations Provide enough room in station

Ensure adherence to timetable In order toEnsure adherence to timetable In order to prevent rush

3.5.4 Unknown misalignment of train

Manage train door closing - This function is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.

X X X X S Control passenger doors

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

3.6 Person steps / falls into Vehicle- Platform Gap

3.6.1 Risky behaviour along the train

Any reason Fall of person, T i

Critical Installation of platform screen doors

S S S S S Optional device; C t lTrapping

of person; Impact on person (object striking person)

Control passenger doors

Installation of manual emergency stop for passenger and staff on platform and train

S S S S S

Supervision of platform Detection of person falls inperson falls in gap

Manage train door closing - This function is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.

X X X X S Control passenger doors

Manage PSDs closing - This function is intended to manage the platform door closing if existing after exchange of passenger at stations.

S S S S S Control passenger doors

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

3.6.2 Excessive gap Faulty design of vehicle-platform gap

Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object

Critical Ensure correct initial design of station i.e. vehicle-platform gap

Consider the dimension of the vehicle to construct platform

(object striking person), Electrocution

Installation of gap filling devices E.g. Movable step

Announcements and warnings regarding the gap

E.g. "Mind the gap"

Installation of manual emergency stop for passenger and staff on platform and train

S S S S S

Supervision of gap S S S S S Optional device;Prevent injuries to persons between cars or between platform and train

Ensure gap is free before train departure

X X S S S Prevent injuries to persons between cars

b tor between platform and train

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

3.6.3 Passenger steps / falls in gap at door area

Insufficient warnings

Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object

Critical Announcements and warnings regarding the gap

E.g. "Mind the gap"

(object striking person), Electrocution

Installation of manual emergency stop for passenger and staff on platform and train

S S S S S

Supervision of gap S S S S S Optional device;Prevent injuries to persons between cars or between platform and train

Ensure gap is free before train departure

X X S S S Prevent injuries to persons between cars or between platform and train

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

vehicles doors open but PSD are closed

Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object

Critical Ensure correct initial design of interaction traindoor / Platform screen doors

(object striking person), Electrocution

PSD opens but train doors are closed

Fall of person, Trapping of person; Impact on person (object striking person),

Critical Ensure correct initial design of interaction traindoor / Platform screen doors

person), Electrocution

3.6.4 Person fall Overcrowded situations, Panic, Unawareness of Passenger

Injury of person

Installation of Platform Screen Doors

S S S S S Optional device

Faulty design of precautions

Injury of person

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct initial design of precautions

Incorrect Injury of Electrocut Critical Ensure correct inspection andIncorrect maintenance of precautions

Injury of person

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of precautions

3.7 Electrocution

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

3.7.1 Difference of potential between train and other equipment

Faulty design Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct initial design of train and other railway/metro equipment

Considering the possibility of potential differences

Incorrect maintenance

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance to prevent potentialmaintenance ion maintenance to prevent potential differences

3.7.2 Contact with train power supply

Faulty design of train power supply

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct initial design of train power supply

Considering the position of the power supply in connection to the passengers, to cover the power supply against contact of persons

Incorrect Electrocut Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of train power supply

ion maintenance of train power supply

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

4 Station Interior Hazards (with no train presence)

4.1 Person struck by falling object

Faulty design of station

Impact on person

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building

Consideration of possibility that objectthat object might fall on persons

Incorrect maintenance of station

Impact on person

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station building

Prevention of object fall on person, neither caused by maintenance works or during works

4.2 Person hit by sharp object

Faulty design of station

Impact on person

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building

Consideration of possibility that sharp object might hitobject might hit persons

Incorrect maintenance of station

Impact on person

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station building

Prevention of sharp object hits person, neither caused by maintenance works or during works

4.3 Person hurt by protruding object

Faulty design of station

Impact on person

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building

Consideration of possibility that protruding objects might hurt personhurt person

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance of station

Impact on person

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station building

Prevention of that protruding object might hurt person, neither caused by maintenance maintenance works or during works

4.4 Wheelchair/ baby carriage hazards

4.4.1 Uncontrolled wheelchair/ baby carriage movement

Faulty design of station

Impact on person

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building

Considering safety for wheelchairs e.g. ramps, lifts, dedicated places.

Incorrect Impact on Marginal Ensure correct inspection and Ensure that all Incorrect maintenance of station

Impact on person

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station building

Ensure that all facilities for wheelchairs are properly maintained e.g. cleaning to prevent slippery floors

Panic, rush, hustle

Impact on person

Marginal Prevent panic Prevent overcrowded situations, train delays, criminal acts.

4 4 2 Wh l h i / b b F lt d i I t M i l E t i iti l d i f C id i4.4.2 Wheelchair/ baby carriage rolls over

Faulty design of station

Impact on person

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building

Considering safety for wheelchairs e.g. ramps, lifts, dedicated places.

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance of station

Impact on person

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station building

Ensure that all facilities for wheelchairs are properly maintained e.g. cleaning to prevent prevent slippery floors

Panic, rush, hustle

Impact on person

Marginal Prevent panic Prevent overcrowded situations, train delays, criminal acts

4.5 Person fall in station

4.5.1 Person fall4.5.1.1 Obstacles (trip

hazard)Faulty design of station building

Fall of person

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building

Ensure no obstacles are laying aroundbuilding laying around

Insufficient cleaning of station building

Fall of person

Marginal Ensure correct maintenance and cleaning of station building

Ensure no obstacles are laying around

4.5.1.2 Rush/ hustle Overcrowded situation due to faulty design of station

Fall of person

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station building

Provide enough room for passenger

Overcrowded situation due to train delays

Fall of person

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building

Minimise train delays and following departure/arrival changesg

Criminal or terroristic acts

Fall of person

Critical Prevent criminal or terroristic acts

Supervision of station building, Control entrance

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

4.5.1.3 Slippery floor Faulty design of station floor i.e. wrong/slippery material used

Fall of person

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building

Avoid slippery material is used for station floor

Faulty design Fall of Marginal Ensure correct initial design of AvoidFaulty design of platform and station - slope of platform or whole station

Fall of person

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building

Avoid jeopardising slope of platform or whole station

Environmental conditions (Humidity, rain, snow ..)

Fall of person

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of station building

Installation of precautions to minimise influence of environmental forces

Incorrect maintenance of station floor

Fall of person

Marginal Ensure correct inspection, maintenance and cleaning of station floor and precautions of station floor

i.e. insufficient cleaning

station floor and precautions against environment

4.5.1.4 Insufficient lighting

Faulty design of lightning system

Fall of person

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of lightning system

Consideration of level of brightness

Incorrect maintenance of lightning system

Fall of person

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of lightning system

4.5.1.5 Platform faulty design

Badly educated and untrained engineers

Fall of person

Marginal Employ professionals only, sufficient retraining of all employees (especially planning staff)

Insufficient rules and guidelines for planning and design of platforms

Fall of person

Marginal Establish or provide sufficient rules and guidelines for planning and design of platforms

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

4.5.2 Escalator hazard Faulty design of escalator e.g. jerk

Fall of person

Critical Ensure correct initial design of escalator

Consideration that it is dangerous if escalator moves ways too fast or stops suddenlystops suddenly

Incorrect maintenance of escalator

Fall of person

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of escalator

Consideration that it is dangerous if escalator moves ways too fast or stops suddenly

4.5.3 Lift hazard Faulty design of lift - sudden stop or jerk

Fall of person

Marginal Ensure correct initial design of lift Consideration that it is dangerous if lift suddenly stops orstops or moves too fast

Incorrect maintenance of lift

Fall of person

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of lift

Consideration that it is dangerous if lift suddenly stops or moves too fast

4.6 Person falls/intrudes on station track

4.6.1 Person falls from platform into track

Panic, Suicide,

Fall of person

Electrocution

critical Detection of guideway intrusion on platform

S S S S S Optional device;platform into track Suicide,

inattention, etcperson ion on platform device;

Supervising guideway

4.6.2 Person leaning against PSD which suddenly opens

Faulty design of equipment

Fall of person

Electrocution

critical Detection of guideway intrusion on platform

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

4.6.3 Person climbs over PSD and enters track area

Panic, Suicide, Vandalism, etc

Fall of person

Electrocution

critical Detection of guideway intrusion on platform

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Supervise traction power supply - This function is intended to powering on/off of the traction

X X X X X

powering on/off of the traction supply by the operator at the OCC, or locally, either on given sections or on all sections.

4.7 Electrocution in station

4.7.1 Equipment insulation fault

Faulty design of equipment insulation (e.g. too little insulation or too high voltage)

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct initial design of insulation of equipment

I t El t t C iti l E t i ti dIncorrect maintenance of equipment insulation

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of equipment insulation

4.7.2 Short circuits Faulty design of equipment

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct initial design of equipment

Consideration of the possibility of short circuits

Protect highly critical electronic equipment , e.g. short circuit protection

S S S S S Optional device;Supervise other safety relevant Inputs

Incorrect maintenance of equipment

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of equipment

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

4.7.3 Criminal acts Insufficient security precautions (e.g. not enough security personnel or

Electrocution

Critical Provide sufficient platform/station supervision

E.g. by CCTV or personnel

personnel or technical supervision)

Critical Design of station considering criminal acts (security aspect)

Protect highly critical components even against criminal acts

4.7.4 Contact with train power supply

Faulty design - insufficient boundary/warnings to protect passenger

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct initial design of train power supply

Considering the position of the power supply in connection to the passengers, to cover thecover the power supply against contact of persons

Incorrect maintenance of power supply - no protection of passenger

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of train power supply

4.8 Smoke4.8.1 Fire Faulty design

of station - combustible

Asphyxiation, Contamin

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station building

Minimise the use of combustible

material used ation, Burns

material - and therefore the likelihood of ignition of fire

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Supervise infrastructure ThisSupervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

Maintenance error

Asphyxiation, Contamination, Burns

Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on station building and fire protection equipment i.e. smoke detectors

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.and escalators.

4.8.2 Chemical reaction Faulty design of station - use of toxic material

Asphyxiation, Contamination, Burns

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station

Minimise the use of toxic material

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Supervise infrastructure ThisSupervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

Maintenance error

Asphyxiation, Contamination, Burns

Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on station building and fire protection equipment i.e. smoke detectors

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators. and escalators.

4.8.3 Emission of smoke through failure

Faulty design of station (e.g. pipe work - leakage)

Asphyxiation, Contamination, Burns

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station

E.g. minimise leakage of pipe works

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

S i i f t t ThiSupervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

Maintenance error

Asphyxiation, Contamination, Burns

Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on station building and fire protection equipment i.e. smoke detectors

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans

d l tand escalators.

4.8.4 Air renewal failure Faulty design of station (e.g. air conditioning system)

Asphyxiation, Contamination, Burns

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station i.e. air renewal system

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Supervise infrastructure - ThisSupervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

Maintenance error

Asphyxiation, Contamination, Burns

Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of air renewal system and fire protection equipment i.e. smoke detectors

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalatorsand escalators.

4.9 Explosion

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

4.9.1 Criminal act Insufficient security precautions (e.g. not enough security personnel or

Explosion Catastrophic Design of station considering criminal acts (security aspect)

E.g.: No paper bin, Light and open station buildings

personnel or technical supervision)

Provide sufficient platform/station supervision

E.g.: By CCTV or personnel

4.9.2 Maintenance error Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Explosion Catastrophic Employ trained and well educated staff only

Training and education of staff

Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures

4.9.3 Faulty design, improper design

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Explosion Catastrophic Employ trained and well educated staff only

Training and education of staff

Establish guidelines Consideration of explosion during planning phase

Establish quality management Verification and Validation procedures

4.9.4 Explosive material storage

Wrong storage

Explosion Catastrophic Correct station design considering the storage of explosive material

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of storage equipment

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

4.9.5 Explosive products transported by passenger

Any reason Explosion Catastrophic Detain passenger from entering station with explosive products

Control of passenger when entering station via security guards and technical systemssystems

4.10 Fire in station4.10.1 Inflammable

material usedFaulty design of station

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station

Prevent usage of (highly) inflammable material

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors

Supervise infrastructure - ThisSupervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

Incorrect maintenance on station

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station

Prevent usage of (highly) inflammable material

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

4.10.2 Ignition Faulty design of station

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station

Prevent usage of material or equipment which easily leads to ignition

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external

S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smokehazardous situations by external

sensors.Fire/Smoke detectors

Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

Incorrect maintenance

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station

Prevent usage of material ormaintenance

on station maintenance of station of material or

equipment which easily leads to ignition

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors

Supervise infrastructure ThisSupervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

4.10.3 Unobstructed spread of fire

Faulty design of station - e.g. insufficient barriers or

ti

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station

E.g. by installation of fire doors or barriers

precautions

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors

Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance on station - e.g. disrespect of maintenance rules

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station

Ensure adherence to maintenance rules e.g. use of temporary fire barriers

rules

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors

Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

4.11 Toxic release 4.11.1 Toxic elements Faulty design

of station by use of toxic elements

Contamination, Burns, Suffocation

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of station

Minimise the use of toxic elements during planning and construction

Incorrect maintenance - incorrect use of toxic elements

Contamination, Burns, Suffocation

Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of station

Minimise the use of toxic elements during maintenance; Prevent maintenance errors while working on toxic elements

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

5 Depot Hazards5.1 Staff injured by

operation of machines and equipment

Faulty design of machines and equipment

Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts,

Critical Ensure correct initial design of machines and equipment for operation in depot

Cuts, Contamination, Asphyxia, Burns, Electrocution

Insufficient precautions against injuries - insufficient safety at work

Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts, Contamination,

Critical Establish rules and procedures for safety at work and operations - supervise their adherence

ation, Asphyxia, Burns, Electrocution

Insufficient educated and trained staff

Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts, Contamination, Asphyxia, Burns

Critical Ensure well educated and well trained staff at depot

Burns, Electrocution

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

5.2 Shunting hazards Insufficient safety at work -insufficient operational rules

Collision, Derail-ment, Injury of staff

Critical Severity "Critical" justified by category Depot Hazard, less

Establish rules and procedures for safety at work and operations - supervise their adherence

E.g. Shunting rules and procedures, Shunting areas or times

less person exposed

Insufficient educated and trained staff - disrespect of procedures

Collision, Derail-ment, Injury of staff

Critical Severity "Critical" justified by category Depot Hazard, less person exposed

Ensure well educated and well trained staff at depot

5.3 Undue train / Unoccupied or Collision, Critical Severity Determine Movement Authority S S S S S Examples of 5.3 Undue train / vehicle enters operation area

Unoccupied or unsupervised vehicles

Collision, Derail-ment, Injury of staff

Critical Severity "Critical" justified by category Depot Hazard, less person exposed

Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.

S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.

Supervise shunting area E.g. by personnel of CCTV

Installation of mechanical barriers

E.g. derailer

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

5.4 Passenger in depot area

Passenger still in train after service; Insufficient precautions against passenger

Injury of person

Critical Ensure passenger are all gone after termination of service

E.g. by: Train interior check (whether empty or not), before taking out of service; Announcement passenger

entering depotAnnouncement inside train, when train will be taken out of service; Possibility for emergency-call inside train

Insufficient precautions against passenger entering depot

Injury of person

Critical Protect depot against passenger entrance

E.g. by: Barriers

entering depot

5.5 Staff run over by train

Unoccupied or unsupervised vehicles; Insufficient precautions (safety at work); Operational mistakes/ failure

Injury of person

Critical Determine Movement Authority Limit - To ensure safe train movement, this function determines for each train its limit of the MA, corresponding to the first danger point ahead of the train.

S S S S S Examples of danger points are other trains (communicating or not), faulty points, suspected broken rails, etc.

Supervise shunting area E.g. by personnel of CCTVCCTV

Insufficient safety at work -insufficient operational rules

Injury of person

Critical Establish rules and procedures for safety at work and operations - supervise their adherence

E.g. Shunting rules and procedures, Shunting areas or times

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0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Insufficient educated and trained staff - disrespect of procedures

Injury of person

Critical Ensure well educated and well trained staff at depot

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0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

6 OCC Hazards6.1 Fire in OCC

6.1.1 Inflammable material used

Faulty design of OCC

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of OCC

Prevent usage of (highly) inflammable material

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors

Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalatorsand escalators.

Incorrect maintenance on OCC

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on OCC

Prevent usage of (highly) inflammable material

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors

Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

6.1.2 Ignition Faulty design of OCC

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of OCC

Prevent usage of material or equipment which easily leads to ignition

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors

Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalatorsand escalators.

Incorrect maintenance on OCC

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on OCC

Prevent usage of material or equipment which easily leads to ignition

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

6.1.3 Unobstructed spread of fire

Faulty design of OCC - e.g. insufficient barriers or precautions

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of OCC

E.g. by installation of fire doors or barriers

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors

Supervise infrastructure - ThisSupervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

Incorrect maintenance on OCC - e.g. disrespect of maintenance

Fire Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on OCC

Ensure adherence to maintenance rules e.g. use of temporary

rulesp y

fire barriers

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components auxiliaries, including components of signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

6.2 Electrocution in OCC

6.2.1 Equipment insulation fault

Faulty design of equipment insulation (e.g. too little insulation or too high voltage)

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct initial design of insulation of equipment

Incorrect maintenance

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of equipment

of equipment insulation

q pinsulation

6.2.2 short circuits Faulty design of equipment

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct initial design of equipment

Consideration of the possibility of short circuits

Protect critical electronic equipment, e.g. by short circuit protection

S S S S S Optional device;Supervise other safety relevant Inputs

Incorrect maintenance

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of equipmentmaintenance

of equipmention maintenance of equipment

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

6.2.3 Criminal act Insufficient security precautions (e.g. not enough security personnel or

Electrocution

Critical Provide sufficient supervision around and inside of OCC

E.g. by CCTV or personnel; Entrance control at OCC

personnel or technical supervision)

Design of OCC considering criminal acts (security aspect)

Protect highly critical components even against criminal acts

6.3 Explosion in OCC

6.3.1 Criminal act Insufficient security precautions (e.g. not enough

Explosion Catastrophic Design of OCC considering criminal acts (security aspect)

gsecurity personnel or technical supervision)

Provide sufficient supervision around and inside of OCC

E.g. by CCTV or personnel; Entrance control at OCC

6.3.2 Maintenance error Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Explosion Catastrophic Employ trained and well educated staff only

Training and education of staffTraining and education of staff

Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures

6.3.3 Faulty design, improper design

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Explosion Catastrophic Employ trained and well educated staff only

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0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Training and education of staff Establish guidelines Consideration

of explosion during planning phase

E t bli h lit t V ifi tiEstablish quality management Verification and Validation procedures

6.4 Building collapse Mistaken design of OCC building

Severe injury of person

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of building of OCC

Incorrect maintenance or construction work

Severe injury of person

Catastrophic Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of building

Insufficient precautions against potential

Severe injury of person

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of building of OCC - Design of precautions against environmental forcespotential

environmental forces

environmental forces

Crminal/ terroristic acts

Severe injury of person

Catastrophic Design of OCC considering criminal acts (security aspect)

Provide sufficient supervision around and inside of OCC

E.g. by CCTV or personnel; Entrance control at OCC

6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts

Insufficient precautions against criminal or

Severe injury of person

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of OCC building considering the possibility of terroristic or criminal acts

terroristic actEntrance supervision of staff and visitorsProvide sufficient supervision around and inside of OCC

6.5.1 Software Intrusion See WP 9

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

6.6 Radiation in OCC

6.6.1 Radiation from equipment

Faulty design of OCC equipment

Burns of staff

Critical Ensure correct initial design of OCC equipment considering the possibility of radiation

6.6.2 Foreign radiation/ Faulty design Burns of Critical Minimise the impact of foreign Strong Fields of OCC

equipment insufficient precaution

staff radiation and strong fields

6.7 Asphyxiation / toxication in OCC

6.7.1 Smoke Fire Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors

6.7.2 Air renewal failure System damaged

Asphyxiation,

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended

S S S S S Optional device;

Suffocation

to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

E.g. Fire/Smoke detectors

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

7 Maintenance Hazards

7.1 Staff injured by operation of machines and equipment

7.1.1 Insufficient education / training

Bad company management

Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts, Contamination, Asphyxia, Burns, Electrocution

Critical Establish a company wide safety culture to ensure the importance of safety (i.e. safety at work)

Ensure regular and adequate training coordinated for eachtraining coordinated for each individual working group or department

Lazy workers Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts, Contamination, Asphyxia, Burns, Electrocution

Critical Employ staff which is willing to learn

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0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Unqualified tutors

Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts, Contamin

Critical Control/test of quality of training (teachers as well as staff) - Approval/certificate of quality

Contamination, Asphyxia, Burns, Electrocution

Mismanagement of maintenance alarms

Injury of person

Fire Critical Maintenance procedures at depot

Clarify responsibility of maintenance alarm between dispatcher, OCC, Depot, Maintenance CrewMaintenance Crew

7.1.2 Disregard of safety regulations

Insufficient supervision of adherence of safety regulations

Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts, Contamination, Asphyxia, Burns, Electrocution

Critical Ensure adherence to safety regulations by regular and strict supervision

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0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Stress/ work overload

Impact on persons (object striking person), Cuts, Contamin

Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as management

Contamination, Asphyxia, Burns, Electrocution

Mismanagement of maintenance alarms

Injury of person

Fire Critical Maintenance procedures at depot

Clarify responsibility of maintenance alarm between dispatcher, OCC, Depot, Maintenance Crew

7 1 3 Insufficient Faulty design Fall of Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / S S S S S Optional7.1.3 Insufficient lighting

Faulty design Fall of person, Electrocution, Object striking person

Critical Supervise Intrusion Detection / Avoidance System - This function is intended to supervise the intrusion detection / avoidance system. Such system covers the protection of areas in which passengers are not permitted e.g. the track.

S S S S S Optional device;Supervising guideway

7.2 Electrocution / Lightning

7.2.1 Staff too close to power supply

7.2.1.1 Improvidence by Insufficient Electrocut Critical Training and education of staff 7.2.1.1 Improvidence by staff

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Training and education of staff

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Establish a company wide safety culture to ensure that it is for the good of employee and company to work correct and thoughtful

Stress / work l d

Electrocuti B

Critical Establish procedures to cope ith t k l d

Staff as well as toverload ion, Burns with stress or work overload management

7.2.1.2 Staff on guideway procedures / behaviour

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Training and education of staff

Stress / work overload

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as management

Faulty design of guideway i.e. too little protection of

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Ensure correct initial design of guideway to protect staff and provide sufficient room for maintenance worksprotection of

electronic components

maintenance works

Incorrect maintenance procedures

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Establish clear and understandable maintenance procedures

Disregard of maintenance procedures

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures

7.2.1.3 Faulty power shutdown

Incorrect maintenance procedures

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Establish clear and understandable maintenance procedures

Disregard of maintenance procedures

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures

proceduresInsufficient training or badly educated staff

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Training and education of staff

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Stress / work overload

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as management

Communication problem between staff

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Ensure communication procedures to avoid misunderstandings

Incorrect design of power supply

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Ensure correct initial design of power supply system to prevent faulty power shutdown

7.2.2 Short circuits7.2.2.1 Equipment

insulation failureFaulty design of insulation equipment insulation

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Ensure correct initial design of insulation of equipment

Incorrect maintenance on insulation of equipment

Electrocution, Burns

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of equipment insulation

7.2.2.2 Short circuits due Faulty design Electrocut Critical Ensure correct initial design of Consideration 7.2.2.2 Short circuits due to maintenance action

Faulty design of equipment

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct initial design of equipment

Consideration of the possibility of short circuits

Protect critical electronic equipment, e.g. by short circuit protection

S S S S S Optional device;Supervise other safety relevant Inputs

Incorrect maintenance of equipment

Electrocution

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of equipment

7 3 Staff endangered7.3 Staff endangered by moving train

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

7.3.1 Insufficient information about maintenance on track

Insufficient communication between staff

Severe injury of person

Critical Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.

Establish information and communication system to ensure that all participating participating parties are well informed about maintenance work (between OCC, Maintenance Crew and Driver)

Insufficient maintenance procedures

Severe injury of person

Critical Establish clear and understandable maintenance procedures

Clear wording while communication

t- prevents misunderstandings

Disregard of maintenance procedures

Severe injury of person

Critical Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures

Mismanagement of maintenance alarms

Injury of person

Fire Critical Maintenance procedures at depot

Clarify responsibility of maintenance alarm between dispatcher, OCC, Depot, M i t CMaintenance Crew

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

7.3.2 Insufficient warning to track workers

Insufficient communication between staff

Severe injury of person

Critical Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.

Establish information and communication system to ensure that all participating participating parties are well informed about maintenance work (between OCC, Maintenance Crew and Driver)

Insufficient warning system

Severe injury of person

Critical Establish warning system E.g. by personnel or technicaly p

Insufficient maintenance procedures

Severe injury of person

Critical Establish clear and understandable maintenance procedures

Clear wording while communication - prevents misunderstandings

Disregard of maintenance procedures

Severe injury of person

Critical Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures

7.3.3 Risky behaviour Insufficient maintenance procedures

Severe injury of person

Critical Establish clear and understandable maintenance procedures

Clear wording while communication - prevents

i d t dmisunderstandings

Disregard of maintenance procedures

Severe injury of person

Critical Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Severe injury of person

Critical Training and education of staff

Stress / work l d

Severe i j f

Critical Establish procedures to cope ith t k l d

Staff as well as toverload injury of

personwith stress or work overload management

7.3.4 Insufficient training

Bad company management

Severe injury of person

Critical Establish a company wide safety culture to ensure the importance of safety (i.e. safety at work)

Ensure regular and adequate training coordinated for each individual working group or department

Lazy workers Severe injury of person

Critical Employ staff which is willing to learn

Unqualified tutors

Severe injury of person

Critical Control/test of quality of training (teachers as well as staff) - Approval/certificate of qualityperson Approval/certificate of quality

7.4 Obstacles on guideway or walkway

7.4.1 Fallen tree, branches, crane

Environmental forces

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Correct initial design of guideway and walkways considering the possibility of fallen trees, braches or cranes (e.g. installation of precautions - protection against environmental forces)

E.g.: Ensure trees and cranes should have a minimum distance to guideway and walkways

Supervision of guideway, p g ywalkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

7.4.2 Fallen from bridge Incorrect design of bridges

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Correct initial design of bridge considering the possibility of fallen objects from bridge (e.g. installation of precautions like fences or barriers on bridge)

S i i f idSupervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew

Incorrect maintenance of bridges

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Ensure correct execution of maintenance works on bridge

Supervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew

Avoid maintenance works under bridge which is under under construction

7.4.3 Blown by wind Insufficient installation of precautions against obstacles blown on guideway

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Marginal Correct initial design of guideway and walkways considering the possibility of objects might be blown on guideway or walkway (e.g. installation of precautions like fences or barriers on guide and walkway)

Supervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew

7.4.4 Guideway structural failure

Faulty design of guideway

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Ensure correct initial design of guideway

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew

Incorrect maintenance on guideway

Injury of member of

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on guideway

on guideway of maintenance crew

Supervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew

Environmental forces like earthquakes

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Ensure correct initial design of guideway considering the possibility of earthquakes

S f SSupervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew

Supervision includes earthquake detection

7.4.5 Faulty design Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Training and education of staff

Insufficient quality management procedures

Injury of member of maintena

Critical Ensure adequate quality management procedures

nce crew

7.4.6 Infrastructure failure

Faulty design of infrastructure

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Ensure correct initial design of infrastructure

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew

Incorrect maintenance on

Injury of member of

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on infrastructure

on infrastructure

of maintenance crew

Supervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew

Environmental forces like earthquakes

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Ensure correct initial design of infrastructure considering the possibility of earthquakes

Supervision of guideway SupervisionSupervision of guideway, walkway and adjacent area and eventual warning of maintenance crew

Supervision includes earthquake detection

7.4.7 Forgotten/ non orderly left after maintenance

Insufficient maintenance procedures

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Establish clear and understandable maintenance procedures

Clear wording while communication - prevents misunderstandings

Disregard of maintenance procedures

Injury of member of maintena

Critical Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures

nce crew

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Training and education of staff

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Stress / work overload

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as management

7 4 8 Forgotten/ non Insufficient Injury of Critical Establish clear and Clear wording7.4.8 Forgotten/ non orderly left after evacuation

Insufficient evacuation procedures

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Establish clear and understandable evacuation procedures

Clear wording while communication - prevents misunderstandings

Disregard of evacuation procedures

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Supervise adherence of evacuation procedures

Insufficient training or badly

Injury of member of

Critical Training and education of staff

badly educated staff

of maintenance crew

Stress / work overload

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload - especially for evacuation cases

Staff as well as management

7.4.9 Vandalism Faulty design of guideway and walk way - disrespect of possibility of

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Ensure correct initial design considering security aspects and potential vandalism

Installation of fences and barriers in order to prevent access

vandalism to guideway and walkway

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Insufficient supervision of guideway and walkways

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Supervision of guideway and walkway (personnel or CCTV)

Insufficient removal or cleaning of old damages from vandalism

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Remove immediately all damages of vandalism

7.4.10 Corrosion/ oxidation of wayside structures equipment

Faulty design Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Ensure correct initial design considering potential corrosion or oxidation

Incorrect maintenance

Injury of member

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenancemaintenance member

of maintenance crew

maintenance

9.2.1 Flooding Faulty design i.e. insufficient precautions against flooding

Injury of member of maintenance crew

Critical Ensure correct initial design considering the possibility of flooding i.e. installation of flooding precautions

Supervision of surrounding area Flooding detection

Insufficient maintenance

Injury of member

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of guideways,

of guideways and flooding precautions

of maintenance crew

g y ,walkways and flooding precautions

Supervision of surrounding area Flooding detection

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

7.5 Explosion during maintenance

7.5.1 Maintenance error Insufficient maintenance procedures

Explosion Critical Establish clear and understandable maintenance procedures

Disregard of Explosion Critical Supervise adherence ofDisregard of maintenance procedures

Explosion Critical Supervise adherence of maintenance procedures

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Explosion Critical Training and education of staff

Stress / work overload

Explosion Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as management

7.5.2 Criminal act Insufficient security precautions (e g not

Explosion Critical Design of railway equipment/building/constructions considering criminal acts (security aspect)

Installation of access barriers or fences to(e.g. not

enough security personnel or technical supervision)

(security aspect) fences to railway equipment

Provide sufficient supervision E.g. by: CCTV or personnel

7.5.3 Faulty design, improper design

Insufficient procedures or guidelines for design

Explosion Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures and guidelines for planning and design

Disregard of procedures or

Explosion Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and guidelines

E.g. by: Validation and procedures or

guidelinesprocedures and guidelines Validation and

verification procedures

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Explosion Critical Training and education of staff

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0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Stress / work overload

Explosion Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as management

7.5.4 Inadequate storage

Faulty design of storage equipment

Explosion Critical Ensure correct initial design of railway equipment considering adequate storage possibilities

Insufficient procedures regarding storage

Explosion Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures and guidelines for planning and design

Disregard of procedures for storage

Explosion Critical Supervise adherence of procedures for storage

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Explosion Critical Training and education of staff

Stress / work Explosion Critical Establish procedures to copeStress / work overload

Explosion Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

7.6 Fire during maintenance

7.6.1 Explosion during maintenance

see 7.5

7.6.2 Inflammable material

Insufficient procedures regarding the use of inflammable material

Fire Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures for the use of inflammable material

Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment

Disregard of procedures for the use of inflammable material

Fire Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Fire Critical Training and education of staff

Stress / work overload

Fire Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as managementoverload with stress or work overload management

7.6.3 Ignition Insufficient procedures regarding the ignition of fire

Fire Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the potential of ignition

Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment

Disregard of procedures for the use of inflammable material

Fire Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules

Insufficient Fire Critical Training and education of staffInsufficient training or badly educated staff

Fire Critical Training and education of staff

Stress / work overload

Fire Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as management

7.6.4 Unobstructed spread of fire

Insufficient procedures regarding unobstructed speed of fire

Fire Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the potential of unobstructed spread of fire

Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment

Disregard of Fire Critical Supervise adherence ofDisregard of procedures regarding fire protection

Fire Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules

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0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Fire Critical Training and education of staff

Stress / work overload

Fire Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as managementoverload with stress or work overload management

7.7 Asphyxiation/ toxication

7.7.1 Smoke Insufficient procedures regarding the danger of smoke

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the dangerous potential of smoke

Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment

Disregard of procedures regarding smoke

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Training and education of staff

Stress / work overload

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as management

7.7.2 Air renewal failure Insufficient procedures regarding the maintenance of air renewal system

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the maintenance of the air renewal system

Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment

Disregard of procedures regarding the maintenance of air renewal system

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Training and education of staff

Stress / work overload

Asphyxiation;

Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as managementoverload on;

Contamination

with stress or work overload management

7.7.3 Toxic release7.7.3.2 Smoke Insufficient

procedures regarding the danger of smoke

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the dangerous potential of smoke - especially regarding toxic releases

Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment

Disregard of procedures regarding smoke

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules

Insufficient Asphyxiati Critical Training and education of staffInsufficient training or badly educated staff

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Training and education of staff

Stress / work overload

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as management

7.7.3.3 Toxic elements Insufficient procedures regarding toxic elements

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding toxic elements

Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment

Disregard of procedures regarding toxic elements

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules

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0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Training and education of staff

Stress / work overload

Asphyxiation;

Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as managementoverload on;

Contamination

with stress or work overload management

7.7.3.4 Noxious leakage by maintenance

Insufficient procedures regarding maintenance on pipe works

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding toxic elements e.g. the maintenance on pipe works

Includes rules for correct clothing and adequate working equipment

Disregard of procedures regarding maintenance on pipe works

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Training and education of staff

Stress / work overload

Asphyxiation; Contamination

Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as management

7.8 Inappropriate temperature

7.8.2 Air renewal failure Faulty design Suffocatio Marginal Ensure correct initial design of y gof air renewal system

ng g

air renewal system

Incorrect maintenance of air renewal system

Suffocation

Marginal Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of air renewal system

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

7.9 Staff in danger cannot escape guideway

7.9.1 Insufficient/ Obstructed Emergency W lk

Faulty design of emergency walkway

Severe injury of person

Critical Ensure correct initial design of emergency walkways

WalkwayIncorrect maintenance of emergency walkway

Severe injury of person

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of emergency walkways

Obstacles on guideway or walkway

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of emergency walkways

7.9.2 Emergency Exits/ Access Protection Closed

Faulty design of emergency exits or accesses

Severe injury of person

Critical Ensure correct initial design of emergency exits and accesses

Incorrect maintenance of emergency exits or accesses

Severe injury of person

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of emergency exits and accesses

7.9.3 Captured by broken down structures, fires etc.

Faulty design of guideway

Severe injury of person

Critical Ensure correct initial design of guideway

Consideration of possible brake downs, fire, flooding, explosions

Incorrect maintenance of guideway

Severe injury of person

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on guideway

of guideway person7.10 Radiation

7.10.1 Radiation from equipment

Faulty design of equipment e.g. train, buildings

Burns, Suffocation

Critical Ensure correct initial design of equipment considering the possibility of radiation

E.g. construction of heat barriers

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance on equipment e.g. Trains, buildings

Burns, Suffocation

Critical Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on equipment considering the possibility of radiation

7.10.2 Foreign radiation Faulty design of vehicle

Burns, Suffocatio

Critical Minimise the impact of foreign radiation and strong fields

Adequate system designof vehicle,

buildings, surrounding facilities e.g. insufficient precaution

Suffocation

radiation and strong fields system design (plan precautions against these unavoidable hazards)

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of precautions

7.11 Staff caught in equipment

7.11.1 Staff caught in machinery

Faulty design of machinery

Cuts, Burns, Electrocution,

Critical Ensure correct initial design of machinery

Ensure healthy use of machines

ion, Contaminations

Insufficient procedures regarding correct use of machinery

Cuts, Burns, Electrocution, Contaminations

Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the use of machinery

Disregard of procedures regarding use of machinery

Cuts, Burns, Electrocution, Contaminations

Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Cuts, Burns, Electrocution, Contaminations

Critical Training and education of staff Special training for each type of machinery

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Stress / work overload

Cuts, Burns, Electrocution, Contaminations

Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as management

7 11 2 Staff ca ght Faulty design Cuts Critical Ensure correct initial design of Ensure healthy7.11.2 Staff caught in moving equipment (switch,…)

Faulty design of moving equipment

Cuts, Suffocation

Critical Ensure correct initial design of moving equipment

Ensure healthy use of moving equipment

Insufficient procedures regarding correct use and handling of moving equipment

Cuts, Suffocation

Critical Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the use moving equipment

Disregard of procedures

Cuts, Suffocation

Critical Supervise adherence of procedures and rules

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Cuts, Suffocation

Critical Training and education of staff Special training for each type of machinery

Stress / work overload

Cuts, Suffocation

Critical Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as management

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

8 Emergency and Evacuation Hazards

8.1 People hit by train: involved track, adjacent tracktrack

8.1.1 Evacuation not signalled

Geographical/ structural circumstances (i.e. potential evacuation behind bridges, turns etc)

Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of person

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations; Enlarge evacuation area at difficult sites

No signalling signs available

Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situationsstriking

person, Fall of person

passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

situations

8.1.2 OCC failure Communication system failure (i.e. OCC has only insufficient or wrong information)

Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of person

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and dataprovide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Stress / work overload for staff

Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Fall of person

Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Insufficient rules or procedures regarding emergency cases and evacuation

Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of person

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures

Disregard of Derail- Catastrophic Supervise adherence ofDisregard of evacuation and emergency procedures

Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of person

Catastrophic Supervise adherence of emergency and evacuation procedures

8.1.3 Undetected passengers by evacuation

Communication problems or failures (i.e. staff has only insufficient or wrong information)

Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of person

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

p

Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Stress / work overload for staff

Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Fall of person

Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Darkness Derail-ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of person

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations; Ensure sufficient lightning during evacuation

Geographical / structural

Derail-ment

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise

X X X X S Ensuring detection andstructural

demanding area

ment, Collision, Objects striking person, Fall of person

function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

detection and management of emergency situations; Establish special procedures for these demanding areas

8.1.4 Passenger trapped in equipment

8.1.4.1 Caught by a moving switch

No evacuation area defined

Trapping of person

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise

X X X X S Ensuring detection and moving switch area defined

by OCCof person function is intended to supervise

passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

detection and management of emergency situations

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Insufficient rules and procedures for emergency cases and evacuation to guide a

Trapping of person

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

guide a structured evacuation - Passenger leaving accident site

Ensure rules and procedures for emergency cases and evacuation

8.1.4.2 Person jammed in lift or escalator

No evacuation area defined by OCC - Lift and escalators continue operation

Trapping of person

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which the are not normall permitted

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations; Ens re liftsoperation

during evacuation or emergency case

they are not normally permitted. Ensure lifts and escalator stop operation in case of emergency

Insufficient rules and procedures for emergency cases and evacuation to guide a structured

Trapping of person

Critical Ensure rules and procedures for emergency cases and evacuation

Ensure no person is jammed in lift or escalator

evacuation

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

8.1.4.3 Passenger trapped in doors (limb of passenger, clothes, bags, other objects from passenger leash)

Untimely or wrong train door closing command

Trapping of person

Critical Manage train door closing - This function is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.

X X X X S Control passenger doors

passenger, leash)

8.1.4.4 Person jammed in swing door or track access door

Untimely swing door or track access door command

Trapping of person

Critical Manage swing doors or track access doors in case of emergency

8.1.5 Inappropriate emergency egress

8.1.5.1 Emergency egress blocked

Faulty design Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency

passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

situations

Ensure correct initial design of emergency exits and accesses

Blocked by construction site

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct planning of construction sites

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Blocked due to environmental forces (snow, obstacles blown by wind ..)

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

..)

Ensure correct design of infrastructure

Consideration of environmental forces and installation of precautions to protect emergency egresses

8.1.5.2 Emergency egress not appropriated maintenance

Insufficient procedures regarding correct

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergencymaintenance

(rusted...)correct maintenance

system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

of emergency situations

Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding correct maintenance

Disregard of maintenance procedures

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Supervise adherence of procedures and rules

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Insufficient training or badly educated staff

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Training and education of staff Stress / work overload

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Establish procedures to cope with stress or work overload

Staff as well as management

8.1.5.3 Emergency Faulty design Passenge Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This X X X X S Ensuring 8.1.5.3 Emergency egress inappropriate signed

Faulty design of emergency egress signs

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct initial design of emergency exits and accesses

Signs are missing due to vandalism

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

they are not normally permitted.

Ensure correct initial design of signs - protection against vandalism

E.g. by: Fences, barriers

Supervision of infrastructure E.g. by: CCTV or personnel

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0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Signs are missing due environmental forces i.e. extreme wind

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct initial design of signs - protection against environmental forces

Signs are blocked by construction site

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct planning of construction sites

8.1.6 Inadequate walkway

8.1.6.1 Missing walkway Faulty design of infrastructure

Passenger hit by train

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct initial design of infrastructure: including emergency walkways

8.1.6.2 Obstructed walkway

Faulty design of walkways

Passenger hit by

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise

X X X X S Ensuring detection andwalkway of walkways r hit by

trainfunction is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

detection and management of emergency situations

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Ensure correct initial design of walkways

Incorrect maintenance of walkways

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situationspassengers in areas in which

they are not normally permitted. situations

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of walkways

Obstruction due to environmental forces e.g. snow, object blown by wind

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct initial design of Consideration walkways of

environmental forces

Obstruction due to vandalism

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct initial design of walkways

Consideration of vandalism

8.1.6.3 Important gap from walkway to

Faulty design of walkway

Passenger hit by

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise

X X X X S Ensuring detection andfrom walkway to

platformof walkway r hit by

trainfunction is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct initial design of walkways

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

8.1.6.4 Walkway on the other side of the access door

Faulty design of walkways

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct initial design of walkways

8.1.6.5 Inadequate size / arrangement

Faulty design of walkways

Passenger hit by train

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct initial design of walkways

8.1.6.6 Walkway opposed t th l tf

Faulty design of walkways

Passenger hit by

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise

X X X X S Ensuring detection andto the platform of walkways r hit by

trainfunction is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct initial design of walkways

8.1.6.7 Handrail failure Faulty design of walkways i.e. handrail

Passenger hit by train

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct initial design of walkways

Consideration of correct design of handrails

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect maintenance of walkways i.e. handrail

Passenger hit by train

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of walkways

Consideration of correct maintenance of handrails

8.1.6.8 Insufficient lighting on walkway

Faulty design of walkways i.e. lightning on walkways

Passenger hit by train

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct initial design of walkways

Consideration of lightningwalkways of lightning

Incorrect maintenance of walkways i.e. lightning on walkways

Passenger hit by train

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of walkways

Consideration of correct maintenance of lightning

8.1.7 Passenger t d i t i

Untimely or no d l i

Fall of Critical Supervise evacuation - This f ti i i t d d t i

X X X X S Ensuring d t ti dtrapped in train door closing person

inside train

function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

detection and management of emergency situations

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Manage train door closing - This function is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.

X X X X S Control passenger doors

Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and dataprovide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.

Insufficient emergency egress on train

Fall of person inside train

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.

Installation of emergency egress on windows and doors

8.2 Burn / fire8.2.1 Undetected

passengers by evacuation

8.2.1.6 Panic / rush / hustle

Inadequate evacuation

Burns, Asphyxia,

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise

X X X X S Ensuring detection and

procedures Suffocation

passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

management of emergency situations

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures

Inappropriate emergency egress

Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of emergency exits and accesses

Inadequate walkway

Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocatio

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of emergency walkways

Suffocation

8.2.2 Passenger trapped in train

Untimely or no door opening

Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Manage train door closing - This function is intended to manage the train door closing at stations.

X X X X S Control passenger doors

P id i ti ith t ffProvide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device

Supervise Infrastructure ThisSupervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

Insufficient emergency egress on train

Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

they are not normally permitted.

Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.

Installation of emergency egress on windows and doors

Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S Optional Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

device

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

8.2.3 Passenger trapped in equipment

Any reason Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of train equipment

8.2.4 Inappropriate emergency egress

Faulty design Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation

Catastrophic Ensure correct initial design of emergency exits and accesses

Inappropriate Burns, Catastrophic Emergency and evacuation emergency and evacuation procedures

Asphyxia, Suffocation

procedures

8.2.5 Train enters section with fire in progress

wrong operational decision / failure of communication OCC - Train

Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation

Catastrophic Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

P id i ti ith t ffProvide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Installation of fire and smoke protection

S S S S S Optional device

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of air renewal system and fire protection equipment i.e. smoke detectors

Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the potential of unobstructed spread of fire

8.2.6 Train stops at station with fire in progress

wrong operational decision / failure of communication OCC - Train

Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation

Catastrophic Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

Provide communication with staff - This function is intended to provide voice and data communication notably between staff fulfilling different functions for operation and maintenance.

Installation of fire and smoke protection

S S S S S Optional device

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance of air renewal system and fire protection equipment i.e. smoke detectors

Establish clear and understandable procedures regarding the potential of unobstructed spread of fire

8.3 Asphyxiation / toxication

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

8.3.1 Smoke Fire Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g.: Smoke / fire detection

Supervise Infrastructure - ThisSupervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which th t ll itt d

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

they are not normally permitted.

8.3.2 Air renewal failure System damaged due to accident

Asphyxiation, Suffocation

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g.: Smoke / fire detection

Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical ecessa y act o s o c t caauxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

8.3.3 Toxic release Leakage e.g. By freight train, storage

Burns, Asphyxia, Suffocation

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g.: Smoke / fire detection

Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps,of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Ensure evacuation procedures regarding toxic material

8.4 Electrocution /8.4 Electrocution / lightning

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

8.4.1 Persons too close to equipment for power supply

Inadequate evacuation procedures

Electrocution, Burns

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures

Supervise traction power supply - This function is intended to powering on/off of the traction supply by the operator at the OCC, or locally, either on given sections or on all sections.

X X X X X

Doors open on wrong side off train

Electrocution, Burns

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation Such

X X X X S Ensuring detection and managementoff train passenger evacuation. Such

system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

management of emergency situations

8.4.2 Power shutdown failure

No communication to OCC

Electrocution, Burns

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Incorrect cut-off of power supply rail during evacuation (wrong section is cut-off) ,

Electrocution, Burns

Catastrophic Training and education of staff

is cut off) , misunderstanding, communication problems

Supervise traction power supply - This function is intended to powering on/off of the traction supply by the operator at the OCC, or locally, either on given sections or on all sections.

X X X X X

Reinjection of braking current while track section was cut-off power (during passenger evacuation)

Electrocution, Burns

Catastrophic Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures

Prevent regenerative braking on all trains that could feed a traction power supply section

X X X X

traction power supply section that has been cut off for passengers or staff protection

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

8.4.3 Short circuits Electronical equipment damaged due to accident

Electrocution, Burns

Catastrophic Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures

Protect critical electronic equipment, e.g. by short circuit protection even against

S S S S S Optional device;Superviseprotection even against

accidentsSupervise other safety relevant Inputs

8.4.4 Electrical equipment abnormally accessible

Equipment damaged by accident

Electrocution, Burns

Catastrophic Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures

Protect critical electronic equipment, e.g. by short circuit protection even against accidents

S S S S S Optional device;Supervise other safety relevant Inputs

8.5 Explosion during Any reason Explosion Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S Optional8.5 Explosion during evacuation

Any reason Explosion Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g.: Smoke / fire detection

Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

8.6 Inappropriate temperature

8.6.1 Air renewal failure Any reason Asphyxiation, Suffocation

Catastrophic Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

8 6 2 Explosion during Any reason Explosion Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S Optional8.6.2 Explosion during evacuation

Any reason Explosion Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g.: Smoke / fire detection

8.6.3 Burns/fire Any reason Fire Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

8.7 Radiation Any reason (insufficient electromagnetic compatibility (EMC); laser radiation, radiation

Burns, Suffocation

Catastrophic Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components radiation

within the infrared, visible and ultraviolet area)

auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

8.8 Drowning Any reason, flooding

Drowning, Suffocation

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;E.g.: Flooding detection

Supervise Infrastructure - This function is intended to provide function is intended to provide alarms about critical auxiliaries in order to inform the OCC operator: then staff can perform necessary actions on critical auxiliaries, including components of the signalling system, pumps, fans and escalators.

Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

8.9 Person hurt during evacuation (others)

8.9.1 Passenger fall8.9.1.1 Slippery floor Water or

h i l dFall of Critical Supervise evacuation - This

f i i i d d iX X X X S Ensuring

d i dchemicals due to flooding or fire-fighters

person function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

detection and management of emergency situations

Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)

8.9.1.2 Slope (of platform, rescue walkway )

Platform or walkway hit by train cars

Fall of person

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation Such

X X X X S Ensuring detection and managementwalkway, ) train cars passenger evacuation. Such

system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

management of emergency situations

Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)

8.9.1.3 Unadjusted levelling at lift enter/exit (small step)

Lift got hit e.g. by train cars, obstacles

Fall of person

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency step) y p

passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

g ysituations

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)

8.9.1.4 Insufficient lightinglighting

8.9.1.4.1 System breakdown/ default

Any reason Fall of person

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)

Design and installation of emergency power system

8.9.1.4.2 Insufficient lighting level

Any reason Fall of person

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)

D i d i t ll ti fDesign and installation of emergency power system

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

8.9.1.5 Train movement during evacuation

No evacuation area defined

Fall of person

Catastrophic Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)

8.9.1.7 Obstacles8.9.1.7.1 Obstacles on

guideway or walkway

Any reason (e.g.: train cars, equipment of fire-fighters)

Fall of person

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)

Free guideways and walkway; Do not obstruct them even in emergency cases

8.9.1.7.2 Obstacles in the train

Any reason (e.g.: Lifeless bodies, Fallen or broken objects)

Fall of person

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which th t ll itt d

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

they are not normally permitted.

Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

8.9.1.7.3 Obstacles in the station

Any reason (e.g.: fallen or broken objects e.g. part of bridges, train cars, buildings)

Fall of person

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

buildings)

Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)

8.9.2 Passenger hit by sharp / protruding object

Any reason (e.g.: damaged train cars, building or bridges)

Fall of person

Critical Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Establish clear and easy-understandable emergency and evacuation procedures (in order to prevent further damage)

Get passenger as fast as possible out of dangerous area

8.9.3 Passenger caught by moving switch

Inappropriate emergency and evacuation procedures

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Supervise evacuation - This function is intended to supervise passenger evacuation. Such system covers the protection of passengers in areas in which they are not normally permitted.

X X X X S Ensuring detection and management of emergency situations

Emergency and evacuation procedures

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Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

9Environmental influences

9.1 Weather conditions (moderate)

9.1.1 Anything (snow, rain, leaves,

Insufficient maintenance

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Regular Inspection and maintenancerain, leaves,

greasy material) on guideway

maintenance or clearance of guideway by crew

ment maintenance

Guideway heatingCheck of weather data

Provide enough staff for clearance works

9.1.2 Wind Inadequate precaution against wind

Person Struck / Hurt by Object

Marginal Consider wind force during planning and design of railway/metro system

Wind barriers like walls or tunnels

Operational rules to stop all trains in case of extreme wind

9.2 Force of nature9.2 Force of nature9.2.1 Flooding Insufficient

precautionsDerail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Water (level) measurement and indicator

Insufficient maintenance of protection constructions

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Ensure correct maintenance of flooding gates

Ensure correct initial design considering the possibility of flooding

Insufficient Derail- Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant S S S S S OptionalInsufficient inspection and maintenance of flooding protection equipment

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Obstacle detection in front of train

Page 175: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 173

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

9.2.2 Environmental impact on vehicle (wind, gales)

Insufficient precautions

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Ensure appropriate system-design regarding exceptional environmental conditions (extreme wind etc.)

Establish operational rules e.g. speed reductions at critical areasp

Insufficient maintenance (construction work) on protection constructions

Derail-ment

Collision Catastrophic Correct maintenance and construction work on protection constructions

9.2.3 Avalanche / landslide/ falling stones

Insufficient precautions to protect track

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Obstacle detection in front of train

Correct initial design considering the possibility of avalanches or the possibility of avalanches or falling stones

Insufficient inspections of track

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Obstacle detection in front of train

Ensure correct inspection and maintenance on trackEnsure correct inspection and maintenance on flooding protection equipment

Inspection of guideway and surrounding area

9.2.4 Earthquake Inadequate precaution

Person Struck /

Catastrophic Consider earthquakes during planning and design ofprecaution

against earthquakes

Struck / Hurt by Object

planning and design of railway/metro system

Operational rules to stop all trains is case of forecasted earthquake

Page 176: WP2 Hazard Analysis Annex D2 - MODSafe · 2011. 12. 9. · 6.4 Building collapse 6.5 Terrorism, Attacks, Criminal Acts 6.6 Radiation in OCC 6.7 asphyxiation / toxication in OCC 7

04.05.2010 MODSafe WP2 Hazard Analysis Page 174

Safety measuresgeneric safety measures

0 1a 1b 2 3 4

GOA Respon-sibilities Remarks

X = responsibility of operations staff (may be realised by techn. system)S= realised by the control/command and supervision of train movement system

Hazard Identification Estimation of Risk

Hazard Numbering (up to 10 level) Hazard

Hazard Cause

Type of Accident (primary)

Possible consequential accidents Remarks

Severity of Conse-quences

Likeli-hood Risk Remarks

9.2.5 Stalactites in tunnel

Insufficient inspection of tunnel

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Obstacle detection in front of train

Ensure correct inspection andEnsure correct inspection and maintenance of tunnel

Too much water/ humidity in tunnel

Derail-ment, Collision

Catastrophic Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of hazardous situations by external sensors.

S S S S S Optional device;Obstacle detection in front of train

Ensure correct initial tunnel design considering water and general humidity

Inadequate precaution against

Electrocution

Critical Supervise other safety relevant Inputs - This function is intended to supervise the detection of

S S S S S Optional device

9.2.6 Lightning

lightning hazardous situations by external sensors.