WILLIAM WARD'S ESSAY OM GRAMMAR

A Critical Account and an Assessment of its Relevance

to Eighteenth and Twentieth Century Linguistics

James N. Pankhurst

B.A. (Hons.), London University, 1966

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLHENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

English

a JAMES N. PANKHURST 1969

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

August, 1969

, EXAMINING C OJflMITTEE APPROVAL

( G .L. B u r s i l l - H a l l ) Senior Supervisor

(D .He S u l l i v a n ) Examining Committee

(Ph i l ippa Polson) Examining Committee O

( ~ o n a t h a n c en nett) -.<- 7, - ,

Philosophy Department

Name: James N. Pankhwst

Degree: Master of A r t s

T i t l e of Thesis: WILLIAM WARDtS ESSAY ON GRAMMAR A Cri t ica l Account and an Assessment of i t s Relevance to Eighteenth and Twentieth Century Linguistics

This thesis offers an account of William Ward's

Essay on Grammar. The Introduction discusses the relation - of the history of linguistics to general linguistics and

suggests that the study of former theories provides a

useful evaluation measure for current work. The first

two chapters outline the main formative influences of

linguistics from the Greek period of 1765. The link

between the study of language and other intellectual - -

pursuits is suggested as the force behind innovations in

the European tradition; in England linguistics was

divorced from other interests and the problem of adapting

the grammatical categories of Latin to the English lang-

uage was the main spur to linguistic investigation.

Chapter I11 describes Ward1 s attitudes 'to language

and education, and suggests that he is distinctive among

the English grammarians because his grammatical theory grew

from the wider intellectual tradition of his age. Chapter

IV is an account of Ward's sources and the use he made of

them. John Lockets theory of ideas is the basis for a

psychological theory of language. David Hartley and some

continental grammarians also figure as major influences on

Ward. Chapter V discusses Ward's metalanguage in preparation

for an account of his grammatical theory. The juxtaposition

iii

of psychological terminology and grmatical terminology

gives new values to the grammatical terms. Ward's

word-class theory, the subject of Chapter VI, is unusual

because it concentrates on the similarities of the major

classes rather than their differences. The Lockean idea

is seen as existing prior to grammatical categories;

operations performed by the mind on the idea give it

grammatical features. A feature analysis of the major

parts of speech is developed as a means of explicating

and formalizing Ward's theory.

Ward's approach to syntax is discussed in Chapter

V I I , His account is motivated by the desire for a

psychological explanation of the relation between words

in constructions and the Lockean ideas that are said to

lie behind them, The realism inherent in Ward's adap-

tation of Lockets ideas makes it difficult to acoount

for transitive sentences, and leads him to formulate a

singular analysis of them. His account of prepositions

is unusual on account of his enlightened discussion of

their meaning and his proposal that they are signals of

underlying transitive verbs. Ward's efforts to relate

language to ideas in the mind lead him to make signifi-

cant remarks on the syntax of the relative clause and on

extraposition. For the former he proposes a solution

analogous to a rule cycle: extraposition is recognized

to be the result of an optional rule of the grammar,

I

The f i n a l chapter discusses Wzrdts grammatical

theory in terms of its relevance to contemporary theories

of syntax. A parallel is drawn between Ward's notion of

grammatically undifferentiated ideas and Emmon Bachts

proposal that nouns, verbs, and adjectives are all mem-

bers of one major category. The later rules of Ward's

grammar give the noun substantive a priority over the

other categories, which are all describable in terms of

their relationship to the noun; this suggests a compari-

son with categorical analyses of syntax which have two

major categories: sentence and noun. The fact that Ward's

grammar has so much in common with current interests is

attributed to the use he made of Locke's philosophy.

The philosophical standpoint from which he was working

gave new impetus and depth to his linguistic analysis,

When Ward's conclusions are false, which is not infrequent,

they serve to remind the linguist that his theory will

never be able to transcend the inevitably limited intellec-

tual background of the age in which he was living,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

0.1. William Ward's Essay on Grammar. 0.2. Goals of the History of k-guisti 0.3. Two Criteria for Evaluating Lingu Theories. 0.4. The Contemporary and Hi Significance of Ward's Essay. 0.5. Divi of the Thesis.

CS. .istic stori sion

cal of

Chapter I p. 12 The European Linguistic Tradition behind Ward's Essay

on Grammar 1.0. ~ntroduxion. 1.1. A Unified Tradition: The Greeks. 1.1.1. The Limits of Linguistics in Greece. 1.1.2. Reasons for Greek Interest in Language. 1.1.3. Aristotle. 1.1.4. The Stoics. 1.1.5. Dionysius Thrax and the Alexandrians. 1.1.6. Appolonius Dyscolus. 1.2. The Romans. 1.2.1. Varro. 1.2.2. Donatus and Priscian. 1.3. The Middle Ages. 1.3.1. Helias, Bacon, and Kilwardby. 1.3.2. The Modis- tae. 1.4. The Renaissance. 1.4.1. Sanctius, Ramus and Lily. 1.4.2. Continuing Interest in Speculative Grammar. 1.5. The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. 1.5.1. The Cartesian Movement. 1.5.2. Port Royal,

Chapter I1 P. 44 Philosophy and Linguistics in Post-Renaissance England

2.0. Introduction. 2.1 . Cartesian Ideas in England. 2.2. John Locke 1632-1705. 2.2.1. Locke and Language. 2.2.2. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 2.2.3. The Grammarians' Neglect of Locke. 2.3. David Hartley 1705-1757. 2.3.1. Hartley and Locke. 2.3.2. Hartley's Theory. 2.3.3. Hartley's Place in the Intellec- tual Tradition. 2.4. Summary of the Dominant Intellectual Trends of the Eighteenth Century. 2.5. Survey of the Grammatical Works in England prior to 1765. 2.5.0.1. Ways of Dealing with Case. 2.5.0.2. The Notional Concept of Case in Latin. 2.5.1. William Bullokar. 2.5.2. Alexander Hume. 2.5.3. John Wallis. 2.5.4. Charles Gildon and John Brightland. 2.5.5. James Harris. 2.5.6. Further Directions.

Chapter I11 William Ward

3.0. Introduction. 3.1. Editions of the Essav -- - - on Grammar. 3.1.1. contents of the Essay. 3.2. Ward's Motives for Writing a Grammar. 3.3. Ward's Attitudes to ducati ion. 3.4.-ward's Attitudes to Language. 3.5. Ward's claim to Uniqueness.

Chapter IV p . 87 The Sources of Ward's Essay on Grammar -

4.0. Introduction. 4.0.1. Ward's Acknowledge- ment of his Sources. 4.1. The direct Influence of John Locke, David Hartley, and Claude Buffier. 4.1.1. John Locke: An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690). 4.1.1.1. Lockets Division of Ideas. 4.1.1.2. Ward's Use of Locke's Ideas. 4.1.1.3. Mixed Modes as a Source of Ward's Linguistic Relativity Theory. 4.1.1.4. Ideas of Relation and Ward's Transitity Theory. 4.1.1.5. Particles. 4.1.1.6. The Relation of Ideas and Words. 4.1.1.7. Summary of Lockets Influence. 4.1.2. David Hartley: Observations on Man (1749). 4.1.2.1. Hartley and Rational Grammar. 4.1.2.2. Hartley's View on Language Structure. 4.1.2.3. Hartleyts Word Classes and the Analogy with Algebra. 4.1.2.4. A Seminal Semantic Theory. 4.1.2.5. Swnmary of Hartley's Influence. 4.1.3. Claude Buffier's Grammaire Francoise sur un Plan Nouveau (1749). 4.1.3.1. Grammar, Particular and Universal. 4.1.3.2. Ward's Advance on Buffier. 4.1.3.3. Ellipsis. 4.1.3.4. Summary of Buffier's Influence. 4.2. The Indirect Influence of Some Continental Grammarians. 4.2.1. Franciscus Sanctius: Minerva (1587). 4.2.1.1. Ward's Use of Sanctius. 4.2.2. Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot: Grammaire Generale et Raisonnee (1660). 4.2.2.1. Language and Thought. 4.2.2.2. Arnauld's and Ward's Views of Underlying Structure. 4.2.3. Abbe Fromant: Reflexions sur les Fondemens de 1'Art de Parler (1756). 4.3. The Indirect Influence of some Ehglish Grammarians. 4.3.1. Richard Johnson: Grammatical Commentaries (1706). 4.3.2. James Harris: Hermes (1751).

4.3.2.1. Harris' View of Case. 4.3.2.2. The Parts of Speech 4.3.2.3. Sentence Types 4.3.2.4. Coalescence 4.3.2.5. Summary of the Relation of Harris and Ward. 4.3.3. Robert Lowth (1762). 4.4. Summary of Sources.

Chapter V PO 149 The Metalanguage of Ward's Essay on Grammar -

5.0. Introduction. 5.1. Technical Terminology. 5.1.1. The 'Idea' or 'Conceptiones 5.1.1.1. The Term 'Ideat in Previous Theories. 5.1.1.2. The 'Idea' or 'Conception' in Ward's Theory. 5.1.2. The Term 'Speculative. 5.1.3. 'Operations of the Mind.' 5.1.4. 'Coalescence.' 5.1.5. 'Principles of Exist- ence.' 5.1.6. 'Demonstrative Circumstancesee 5.2. Terminology of Word Classes. 5.2.1e1Parts of Speech.' 5.2.2. Definitions of Particular 'Parts' Examined. 5.3. The Study of Meta- language.

Chapter VI

6.0. Introduction 6.1. Common Features of Substantives, Adjectives and Verbs. 6elele Noun Substantives and Noun Adjectives. 6.1.3. The Verb. 6.2. Feature Analysis of Major Word-Classes. 6.2.1. The Feature (con3 Constant Mark. 6.2.2. The Feature (ss) or Self-supporting. 6.2.3. The Feature (~oted) 6.3. Rules Linking Ideas to Word-Classes. 6.3.1. Coalescence and the Principle of Existence 6.4. The Minor Word-Classes. 6.4.1. Pronouns. 6.4.2. The Adverb,

Chapter VII p 207

Relations Between Concepts: An Approach to Syntax

7.0. Grammatical Relations. 7.1. Case. 7.1.1. Three Levels of Analysis. 7.1.2. The

! Function of Case. 7.1.3. Nominative and Accusative Cases. 7.1.4. Substantives in Oblique Cases the Equivalent of Adjectives. 7.1.5. A New Theory of Transitivity. 7.1.6, Two Basic Sentence Types. 7.1.7. Verbs

viii

Followed by Prepositions or more than One Noun, 7.1.8, Prepositions. 7.2, Adjectives and Verbs. 7.2.1. Syntactic Function of the Definitive Verb. 7.3. Relative Pronouns and Relative Clauses. 7.3.1. The Notion of Degree. 7.3.2. Content Clauses and Relative Clauses. 7.3.3. The Relative Clause and its Resolution. 7.3.4. Rule Cycles in Relative Clauses. 7.4. Extraposition. 7.5. A Note on Perform- atives.

Chapter VIII p.264 The Essay on Grammar in the Eighteenth and Twentieth -

Centuries

8.0. Introduction. 8.1. Eighteenth Century Views of Ward. 8.1.1. Eighteenth Century Interest in Universal Grammar. 8.2. Ward and the Twentieth Century. 8.2.1. Categorial Grammars. 8.3. Conclusion: WArd and Locke.

Bibliography

I would like to express my appreciation for the

help I have received in the preparation of this thesis

from Geoffrey Bursill-Hall and the other members of my

committee, My thanks also to Ronald Baker, who intro-

duced me to early English grammars, to Barry Bartlett,

Richard de Armond, and Wynn Roberts for many productive

discussions on the history of linguistics and syntactic

theory, and to Philippa Polson for her many helpful

suggestions and enthusiastic encouragement, Finally

my thanks to Maureen Henry for devotedly typing the

manuscript.

James N. Pankhurst

S i l e s p r i n c i p e s d e , l a Langue que l ' o n enseigne h t o i e n t vraiment r a i sonnes , l e s jeunes gens, que l a Grammai,re r e b u t e , y prendroient g8u t ; on e n r i c h e r o i t l e u r memoire, e t on o r n e r o i t l e u r e s p r i t ; on n 1 6 t e i n d r o i t pas , dans l e s g l a c e s d g u n e t r i s t e e t sombre r o u t i n e , c e s beaux f e u d lune noble imaginat ion, qugon ne d o i t q u l e x c i t e r e t e n t r e t e n i r dans l e c o w s des huma$nit&.

~ k f l e x i o n s s u r l e s Pondemens d x l m de ~ a r l e r , 1 7 5 6 , ~ -

Int roduct ion

0.1 . William Kard s Essay - on G r a m m a r

0.2 Goals of the History of Linguis t ics

0.3. Two C r i t e r i a f o r

0.4. The Contemporary of

Evaluating Linguis t ic Theories

and His to r i ca l Signif icance Ward's Essay

0.5. Division of Thesis

-.

INTRODUCTION

0.1. William Ward's Essay on Grammar

The following chapters offer as a contribution to

the history of linguistics an account of an interesting

but little known English grammarian, William Ward. He

published An Essay On Grammar in 1765; its complexity, - - scope of investigation, and speculative1 approach place

it outside the more familiar English grammatical tradition.

In eighteenth century England the only study at all compa-

rable to Ward's is James Harrist Hermes: or A Philosophical - 9 -

Inquiry Concerning Language and Universal Grammar (1751)~ - and although Ward's Essay is in many ways a development

from Hermes, it is markedly different in approach. The

Essay on Grammar owes a considerable debt to the Grammaire - / /

Generale - et ~aisonnge of Port Royal, published in 1660, - yet there is little direct borrowing; Ward follows a

different line of development from it than do the eighteenth

century French speculative grammarians.2 The Essay has

1. The word 'speculative' is defined by the O.E.D. as "characterized by speculation or theory in contrast to practical or positive knowledgeetl This meaning would seem to be close to Ward's; it is, however, different from the older sense of the word, as it was used in the Middle Ages, in the sense of 'mirroringt reality.

1 2. Louis Kukenheim, Esquisse Fran aise et de '+li566~ eenth century grammars.

many intellectually stimula4ing suggestions, but it

appears to mark the end of development in the short

speculative tradition in English grammars. ' There are several other English works which purport to be universal

or speculative, but they are usually so only in name. 2

Ward and Harris are the only two outstanding speculative

grammarians of the English tradition in grammar. 3

0.2. Goals of the History of Linguistics

The present-day linguist may very well question the

value of attempting to characterize the grammatical theories

of earlier periods, particularly the work of a man who

marks the end of a line of development; it is, in any case,

commonly held that the scientific study of language began

with Sir William Jonesf lecture on Sanskrit in 1786, However,

it has recently become evident that the past two thousand

years have been rich and varied as far as linguistic

speculation is concerned. What has not been made so evident

is why the study of the past in linguistics is not merely

1, No one appears to have developed Ward's ideas, although there is evidence that Charles Coote owes something to Ward. Ian Michael in ''English Grammatical Categories, " (unpublished Dissertation, University of Bristol, 1903), p. 428, notes that Coote uses the same examples as Ward in his discussion of the transitive verb. Coote' s interest in communication and his interest in Locke are discussed in Chapter V I I I .

2. There is a discussion of these in paragraph 8.1,1,

3. Harrisf Hermes has frequently been discussed in histories of linguistics. It will only be discussed here in its rel- ation to Ward's Essay.

an antiquarian

well have much

5

interest. ' Obviously, although the past may

to teach us, the linguist does not in practice

go to history in search of new ideas or new approaches. The

importance of the history of linguistics is that it helps

place the present in perspective. Present-day linguistic

science is inevitably a product of the past in that it was

the past which provided the intellectual and cultural en-

vironment out of which the present grew. This suggest that

an understanding of the history of linguistics provides us

with a means of measuring the extent to which our own theo- - -

retical assumptions are culture bound and a means of observ-

ing the latent dependency ~f these assumptions on the ~

requirements of current applications of linguistic theory. 2

If the history of linguistics is to serve these ends it is

important that the past should be seen as it was rather than

through tinted lenses of the present. It is tempting to

survey the past and select those aspects of it for study

which seem to support the findings of modern theory, but

1. In R. H. Robins, A Short Histor of Lin istics, (London, 1968), there is an e x F e r n 4 lntro uccry -- f?-7 c apter to which this introduction owes much) offering a theoretical justifica- tion of the study of the history of-linguistics.

2. The argument does exist, and is supported in part by M. A. K. Halliday, that practical requirements would dictate the structure of the theory. In many ways it is a persua- sive argument, but it renders even more necessary a clear understanding of the nature of the dependency between theory and a~nlication of theory. See M. A. K. Halliday, "Syntax i d thi consumer,lt Series - on Language - and Literature,

such a procedure will not be a means of illuminating the

present. Historical studies will be interested in the

relevance of the past to the present, but the historian

must seek to unfold the past according to what it was, even

though he is a very different participant in the context

of situation. After he has illuminated the past his task

would seem to consist in relating it to the present, point-

ing out such advances or parallels as may seem relevant,

always remembering that the present is but the antecedent

of the future and cannot necessarily be used as a yardstick - -

for measuring the worth of the past. However, the past,

because it is not part of the present to which we are cul-

turally and intellectually bound, may be able to serve as

a yardstick or criterion for evaluating the present,

0.3. Two Criteria for Evaluating Linguistic Theories

The progress which is being made today in theoretical

linguistics can be measured according to two criteria: one

is the extent to which a theory is able to account in gen-

eral terms for the phenomenon of language. This supposed-

ly an empirical criterion; however, as yet, no acceptable

evaluation procedure has been agreed upon by linguists for

measuring a theory's value, (simplicity is rejected by some,

I and agreed by others, but even those who agree to it have 1 been unable to define it satisfactorily); moreover, there

1. P. H e Mathews, ttSome Remarks on the Householder-Halle

is no general agreement as $0 whether the starting point

of a theory should be a series of syntactic ruies to which

semantic and phonological representations are eventually

attached or whether it should be a number of unordered

terms, with attached lexicon-independent semantic features,

which are ordered according to the rules of the grammar and

their inherent semantic features. While these questions

remain unanswered, there are definite problems in attempting

to use a theory's accountability value as a critical tool

measuring its worth. The alternative criterion to empirical - -

evaluation is the historical and comparative evaluation.

This depends on the hypothesis, for which there is an .

increasing amount of evidence, that most supposedly new

developments in linguistic theory will have various historic-

al antecedents. By modern standards these antecedents will

generally appear to be crude attempts at formulating co-

herent theories; that these antecedents appear crude will

partly be due to our inability to understand the writer's

terminology and general frame of reference. However, past

Controversy," Journal of Linguistics, IV, 2 (1968), 279, discusses the problem of how we are to measure simplicity:

It is not obvious that there is ANY evaluation procedure which will meet this particular condi- tion h hat descri tively adequate grammars will always be shorter 5 . Halle evidently hoped that such a procedure could be devised; but there is nothing, at least in the published literature which suggests that this hope is likely to be fulfilled.

theories will offer assistance in several ways: they will

illumine for us the philosophical motivations for the kind

of approach that we ourselves are embarking on; ' critical evaluation of an earlier theory will sharpen the critical

faculty for approaching the contemporary theory, making

us aware of the more obvious pitfalls; finally, the later

development of the old theory, or its falling into oblivion,

will suggest possible trends for the future of the contempo-

rary theory. Modern linguistics, then, has two methods

available for evaluating its progress; one is the account- - -

ability approach, which it shares with modern science; the

other is the critical evaluation approach based on the ~

history of linguistics, which is akin to the evaluation

procedures of literary criticism and philosophy: contempo-

rary work is evaluated implicitly or explicitly in terms of

what has gone before it. The fact that linguistics uses

and needs both the accountability and the comparative

criterion in evaluating its progress suggests that the

elucidation and evaluation of previous theories of language

1 , Noam Chomsky, Language - and -* Mind (New York, 1968), p.19, says:

With the benefit of hindsight I think we can now see clearly that the disparagement and neglect of a rich tradition proved in the long run to be quite harmful to the study of language.

Chomskyls work in the history of linguistics, even if some- what sketchy, is a good example of how history can clarify the presuppositions, goals, and philosophical asswnptions of a contemporary theory.

is a contribution to present-day linguistics and that the I

study of the history of linguistics is part of the study

of general linguistics.

0.4. The Contemporary and Historical Significance of

Ward's Essay

The speculative theories of the Middle Ages and the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which are so often

dismissed as obscure, are particularly deserving of atten-

tion. Their obscurity arises out of our own failure to

understand the language and the goals of the writers of

past ages. Many theories were successful or unsuccessful

attempts to make insightful statements about language;

however, we find that even if the expositions were unsuccess-

ful the explanatory goals were often remarkably similar to

our own goals. William Ward's Essay on Grammar puts forward - an explanatory hypothesis which describes not merely what

the relationships are between words, but explains how the

relationships achieve the speaker's communicative intention.

He sees what is essentially a two-term system operating in

our process of thinking, and relates the traditional and

somewhat arbitrary categories of grammar to this system.

Ward's language is often obscure, his categories often

I doubtful, and his anlysis frequently in psychological terms

rather than grammatical terms, but there is ample evidence

that recent developments in linguistic theory appear to

I have features in common with Ward's system. The historical I

significance of Willim Ward is not to be seen in ternis of

the influence he had on his contemporaries as an authority

on usage or as an innovator in the tradition; indeed, in

this sense he is not a major historical figure. His impor+

tance lies in the fact that he took over some ideas that had

developed from the Port Royal theory of language in eight-

eenth century France, and adapted them to the theory of

knowledge of John Locke, and attempted to show how one

human mind uses words to communicate with another hwnan

mind. It was not enough for William Ward that there should

be a certain number of grammatical categories (parts of

speech) in language to which ideas or meanings happen to

be attached; for him the starting point had to be the idea

itself as it existed in the mind. He sought to explain

grammar not just as a system of classification (as the

tradition was content to do), but as an account of the

total process of communication.

0.5. Division of the Thesis

Chapter I outlines the European grammatical tradition

which was the matrix out of which English linguistics grew.

Chapter I1 discusses the philosophical and grammatical

tradition in England of which Ward was part, and suggests

the special problems of the English grammarians. Chapter I11

1. This is discussed in paragraphs 8.2. and 8.2.1.

introduces Ward the grammarian and educator. Chapter IV

discusses in detail the most obvious and important sources

of the Essay on Grammar. Chapter V is an explication of - Ward's metalanguage. Chapter VI gives an account of Ward's

view of the formation of grammatical categories. Chapter

VII outlines Ward's approach to syntax and seeks to show

how the Essay offers new psychological dimensions for the

study of language; it examines Ward's discussion of the

operations performed by the mind in encoding and decoding

speech. The final chapter evaluates Ward's significance

in terms of the eighteenth century and present-day linguis-

tics.

Chapter I

The Euro~ean Linmistic Tradition Behind Ward's

Essay on Grammar

1 -0 Introduction

1.1. A Unified Tradition: The Greeks 1.1,1. The Limits of Linguistics in Greece 1 - 1 -2. Reasons for Greek Interest in Language 1.1 - 3 . Aristotle 1.1.4. The Stoics 1.1.5. Dionysius Thrax and the Alexandrians 1.1.6. Appolonius Dyscolus

1.2. The Romans 1.2.1. Varro 1.2.2. Donatus and Priscian

1 ,3. The Middle Ages 1.3.1. Helias, Bacon, and Kilwardby 1.3.2. The Modistae

1.4. The Renaissance 1.4.1. Sanctius, Ramus and Lily 1.4.2. Continuing Interest in Speculative Grammar

1.5. The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 1.5.1. The Cartesian Movement 1.5.2. Port Royal

CHAPTER I I

THE EUROPEAN LINGUISTIC TRADITION BEHIND WARD'S

ESSAY - ON GRAMMAR

Introduction

The history of linguistics is much more than an ac-

count of the Western grammatical tradition which grew out

of Plato's first speculations about the function of lang-

uage. China had a tradition of linguistic studies even

before the European world had made contact with the coun-

try;' both the Jews and the Arabs are known to have had a

linguistic tradition; then there were apparently isolated

developments of great originality, such as the First - Gram-

matical Treatise by an unknown Icelandic grammarian. 2

However, there are two dominant streams of thought which

are the antecedents of current work in linguistics: one

is the European tradition which grew from Greece, and the

other is the Indian tradition. Indian linguistics was pro-

bably inspired by the desire to preserve religious texts of

3 the Vedic period (c. 1200-1000 B.C,) and flourished sever-

al centuries before the main Greek studies of grammar. The

Indians were especially sophisticated in the area of phono-

1. R, H, Robins, - A Short History - of Linguistics, (London, 1967), p. 104.

2. Ibid., p. 72.

3. Ibid., p. 136.

14

logical theory; the discovery of their work at the end of

the eighteenth century provided a great impetus for lin-

guists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to

concentrate their studies on phonology rather than syntax.

The latter was largely abandoned, and those studies of

syntax that were produced in the first half of the twen-

tieth century tended to be arid and unproductive in

theoretical terms.' However, prior to the discovery of

Indian linguistics, syntax had been of much greater theo-

retical significance and William Ward was writing his

Essay - on Grammar at a time when the rich Greek-inspired

tradition was still flourishing. The following account'

of the European tradition2 attempts to show that it was

a productive tradition, and suggests that the science of

linguistics has made its greatest strides forward when

the field of enquiry has been in touch with other dis-

ciplines and has thus been wider than what is often

conceived to be the field of linguistic enquiry.

1. The work of Noam Chomsky is important historically because it has served to unite the phonological tradition in linguistics with the European grammatical tradition. Chomsky readily admits the correlations between his work and the concerns of the earlier grammarians,

2. This account has largely relied for factual infor- mation and, often, quotation of primary sources on the following books and article: R. H. Robins, op. cit., . - Francis 5. Dinneen, An Introduction to General Lin istics --++- (New York, 1967). a n d ~ . L. ~ u r s i l l - E l m i a e v a ramm ma tical ~h&ies," Canadian Journal - of Linguistics, IX (1963)p 40-45.

1.1. A Unified Tradition: The Greeks

The 'Parts of Speech' approach to language study,

which Ward and the other grammarians of the eighteenth

century inevitably followed, owed its origins to classical

Greece. We see Plato and Aristotle attempting to talk

about language and making basic divisions of the sentence

(or rather the proposition, which was taken to be the basic

sentence form), calling the first part the onoma and the

second part the rhema. It is not easy to decide from the

texts whether these were names of linguistic divisions of

the comparable to subject and predicate, or

topic and comment, or whether they were names of word cate-

gories as such. The terms were interpreted or re-classified

by later speculators as what we understand to be noun and

verb; various other parts of speech were then distinguished.

Dionysius Thrax recognized eight, and his system was follow-

ed closedly for the succeeding two thousand years. There is

probably no other science which has clung so closely, or so

doggedly, to the framework set up by the Greeks,

The Limits of Linguistics in Greece

Discussion of the science of linguistics in the past

is inclined to beg an important question, which is that of

the delineation of the area of its enquiry. It would be a !

possible but fruitless procedure to limit the area to what

is today considered as part of linguistic science ( and there

is no general agreement on this question even today), A ,

more satisfactory working procedure would bc to recognize

all discussion of problems connected with language as rele-

vant to the history of linguistics in those times when

there was no division between philosophical and grammatical

studies on the other: thus although Aristotle's preoccupa-

tion with language may have been a logician's preoccupation,

his logical categories were the foundation of the Stoics'

and Alexandrians' grammatical classification, The latter

procedure has been followed here, but this is not to suggest

that a comprehensive history of linguistics is being present-

ed. Rather the aim is to present a highly selective account

of the study of language in as broad a historical perspective

as possible, I

1,l.Z. Reasons for Greek Interest in Language

Interest in language in the past was fostered by the

practical needs of the community or by its intellectual

interests in areas other than language. In Greece linguis-

tic speculation was motivated by a wide-ranging number of

contemporary problems. One of these was the physis-nomos

controversy--the controversy which when discussed in rel-

ation to language centered on the question of whether it was

1 , One of the areas that has not been touched upon at all is phonetics.

17

purely conventional, Aristotle held that language was con-

ventional, while the stoics believed that it had once been

natural even if it had now become largely conventional, There

were good arguments for both sides, and in itself, it was not

perhaps a very important issue. Its importance, suggests

Robins, is that it stimulated people to examine language as

an entity in itself:

Historically the importance of the controversy is due to its place in the early development of linguistic theory and to the stimulus it provided to more detailed examination of the Greek language. Ir, maintaining and criticizing each side of the argument people were led to examine more closely the structures and the meaning of the words and the formal patterns that words exhibited. In such examications lies the beginnings of precise linguistic analysis, 1

It is important to recognize that this physis-nomos

debate did not arise from an interest in language, but

developed from the much more general philosophical concerns

of the day, and was instrumental in creating an interest

in language:

A principal topic of discussion among the pre- Socratic Philosophers and among the later Sophists, and one that appears in several dialogues of Plato, was to what extent accepted standards, institutions, and judgments of what is right and wrong, just and unjust, and so on, were grounded in the nature of things and to what extent they were essentially the products of a tacit convention or even of explicit legis- lation. 2

1. R. H. Robins, op. cit., p . 19,

2. Ibid., p. 19.

1.1.3. A r i s t o t l e ,

The extent of A r i s t o t l e ' s inf luence i n l i n g t i i s t i c s i s

debatable. The S to i c s , although disagreeing with him i n

t h e above controversy, d id use h i s d iv i s ion of the sentence

o r proposi t ion; but they used h i s terms only as a s t a r t i n g

po in t , and made t h e i r d iv i s ion of language i n t o p a r t s of

speech. However, h i s comments on language have served a s

more than jus t a s t a r t i n g point f o r S to ic grammarians.

Others throughout the next two thousand years repeated i n

var ious ways what A r i s t o t l e had sa id ; t h i s suggests t h a t he

w a s touching on mat ters of enduring concern t o l i n g u i s t s ,

H i s remarks occur i n - De In t e rp re t a t i one , a discuss ion on

l o g i c . He introduces h i s d iscuss ion of o'noma and rh8ma i n

connection with the proposition:

Let u s f irst def ine 6noma and rhcma, and then explain what i s m e a n w d e n i a m f i r m a t i o n , proposi t ion, and sentence . . . . . . . . . . An dnoma i s a sound having meaning, es tabl ished through convention alone but with no reference whatever t o time . . . . A rhzma has a time reference as well . . . . I m i c a t e s always t h a t something i s sa id o r a s se r t ed of something - -

e l s e . . . . Rhemata bs themselves. then. a r e - - .- - - . .

6nomata, and t h e y n d V f o r o r s ign i fy something for sueaker s tops i n h i s process of thinking and the mind of the-hearer acquiesces. ~ o w e v e r i they do nor as ye t express pos i t i ve o r negative judgments .

! A r i s t o t l e was i n t e r e s t ed i n speech a s a way of

1 . The t r a n s l a t i o n i s by Dinneen; see ope c i t . , p . 80.

expressing judgment. It is interesting to note the essential I

similarity that he sees between &oma and rhema. The only

difference is that one has time reference and the other does

not. There is no other such explicit emphasis on the simi-

larity of noun and verb until William Ward makes his out.--

standing and revolutionery statement that they are more alike

than different, 1

In his discussion of language Aristotle introduced

a word that has had a long and controversial history in

the metalanguage of linguistics: ptosis, 'case.' Aristotle

used it to mean falling away. For him all tenses of the

verb except the present tense were cases of the verb, or

fallings away, and all of our cases except the nominative

were cases or falling away from the true :noma or noun.

He is not using the term in a linguistic sense, but as a

descriptive term with, it seems, slightly pejorative over-

tones; he uses it as a means of circumscribing and excluding

as irrelevant all linguistic forms which do not make up

part of his logical proposition. Propositions about which

truth value had to be determined were necessarily in the

present tense (there could be no doubt about the past and

no certainty about the

"every man is healthyw

all nouns, substantive

be in what we call the

future), and they were of the form:

or "no man is healthy." In Greek,

and adjective, in these phrases would

nominative case, consequently, only

1. ~ f . Para. 6.1.

the nominative was relevant to Aristotelian logic. The words I

used for connecting propositions, or distributing them (in

a logical sense) were known as syndesmoi, which is often

translated as tparticles.t The point which is being empha-

sized here is that Aristotlets terminology was ~ o t really

grammatical terminology as such, but was developed in order

to talk about the linguistic units which made up one type

of logical proposition, The significance of Aristotle Is

comments on language arises directly from the fact that at

a certain stage in its history linguistics was not dis-

tinguished from the science of logic. The lack of differ-

entiation between what we now recognize as separate sciences

was, however, productive; Aristotlets methodology for

establishing categories was different from the methodology

of traditional grammar. His alternative criteria provide

us with fresh insights on the process of classification,

In as much as he was not using grammatical criteria it

could be said that he is not actually part of the western

grammatical tradition, but was instrumental in creating it,

1.14. Thestoics

The Stoic philosophers divided Aristotlets units

according to formal linguistic criteria, The syndesmoi

were divided into those which had invariant forms (prep-

ositions and conjunctions) amd those which were subject to /

inflection (having certain formal similarities to onoma),

21

namely, the article and the pronoun; as such articles and I

pronouns were not distinguished at this stage, They were

jointly called the arthra. Aristotlels ptosis was restrio. .

ted to nominal categories, and extended to include the

nominative case. A separate terminology for verbal cate-

gories was evolved; temporal divisions of the verb were

analysed and the Stoics recognized aspectual as well as

temporal classification of tenses, The principal interest

of the Stoics was philosophical, but theirwell known zeal

for categorization of reality led them to create categories

in language on a formal linguistic basis,

1 . I .5. Dionysius Thrax and the Alexandrians

Ultimately it was not the Stoics, but the Alexandrian

scholars who were responsible for the final division and J

naming of the parts of speech as we know them. The Techne

Grammatika of Dionysius Thrax (c.100 B,C.) is the most def-

initive of the Alexandrian gramrcatical works, Thrax8s

classification of the parts of speech is a masterpiece of

formal precision and is quoted here on account of its

historical importance. 1

1. Robins attests its importance: "...the description given by Thrax was regarded as definitive. It was translated into Armenian and Syrian early in the Christian era, and was the subject of a considerable amount of comment and exegesis

I from Byzantine critics, or scholiasts. It remained a stand- ard work for thirteen centuries and a modern writer has declared that almost every textbook of English grammar bears evidence of a debt to Thraxa4* (p. 31) .

onoma (noun): a part of speech inflected for case, signifying a person or'a thing,

4 rhema (verb): a part of speech without case inflee-- t-ut inflected for tense, person, and number, signifying an activity or process performed or undergone,

/ metoche (participle): a part of speech sharing the features of the verb and noun, A arthron (article): a part of speech inflected for case and preposed or postposed to nouns,

antonymia (pronoun): a part of speech substitutable for a noun and marked for person,

rothesis (preposition): a part of speech placed P/her words in composition and syntax,

/ > -

epirhema (adverb): a part of speech without inflect- ion, in modification of or in addition to a verb,

1 Syndesmos (conjunction): a part of speech binding together the digcourse and filling gaps in its interpretation.'

The Alexandrians were literary scholars, and interest

in language was inspired by a desire to perform textual

analysis and to preserve the literary language; thus class-

ification of linguistic material was regarded as a worth-

while activity in itself.

1 . I - 6 . Appolonius Dyscolus

The grammatical work of Appolonius Dyscolus, a grammarian

who introduced developments and innovations to Thraxts scheme,

has survived. He was described by Priscian as the greatest

authority on grammar. His historical importance lies

1. The translation is by Robins; see op. cit., p. 34.

f i r s t l y i n h i s attempt t o r eun i t e philosophy and l i n g u i s t i c s :

He made use of the same s e t of e igh t word c l a s se s a s those given i n the ~ d c h n e , but he redefined some of them more p a r t m l y t o make g r e a t e r use of philosophical terminology and t o e s t a b l i s h a common c l a s s meaning f o r each word c l a s s . He defined the pronoun not merely as a noun subst i - t u t e as Thrax had done, but add i t i ona l ly as standing f o r substance (dusia) without q u a l i t i e s , a statement repeated by P r i s c i an and of consider- ab le importance l a t e r i n mediaeval l i n g u i s t i c thought , l

and secondly i n h i s i n t e r e s t i n syntax, an a r ea which Thrax

had not d e a l t with. H i s i n t e r e s t i n syntax centered on the

r e l a t i o n of the noun and the verb; he recognized d i f f e r e n t

c l a s s e s of verbs ( ac t ive , passive, and neu te r ) , and described

t h e i r r e l a t i onsh ip t o the nominal cases. He descr ibes t h e

ac t ion as "passing over t o something e l s e H i n a c t i v e o r

t r a n s i t i v e verbs. The r e s u l t of many of h i s innovations

i s s t i l l with u s today.

1 .2. The Romans

1.2.1. Varro

The l i n g u i s t i c t heo r i e s propounded during the period

of the Roman Empire a l l owe a g rea t deal t o t h e i r Greek

antecedents; t h i s i s even t r u e of Varro, who w a s the most

o r i g i n a l of a l l Latin grammarians. Only fragments of h i s

work remain; i t i s evident from these t h a t he was dependent

1. Robins, op, c i t . , p. 37.

on Greek thought: he analyses in detail the analogy-anomaly

debate on the nature of language, Here he offers a compro-

mise solution with his notion of 'spontaneous derivationt

and hatural derivation. I tSpontaneous derivation8 . (derivatio voluntarius) refers to the spontaneous creation

of a lexical item with or without regard to the rules of

the language, and would appear to correspond to the anoma-

list position; 'natural derivationt (derivatio naturalis) ,

is the derivation of forms according to the rules of the

language. Varro asserted that any expression referring to

an object or--an idea must be subject to this process. It

is the process of analogy that the Greeks had discussed,

but Varro's observations are interesting because h.e suggests

that not only is it a property of Latin, but a property of

language in general, and one that makes language learning

possible.2 Varrots account of word formation was also inter-

esting on account of his separation of derivational and

1. This is discussed in D. Terence Langendoents article, "The Lin istic Theory of Varro," ~oundations of Language, 11 ( 1 9 6 8

- 33-36 , .

2. tt~erivation has been introduced not only into Latin speech, but into the speech of all men, because it is useful and necessary; for if this system had not devel- oped, we could not learn such a great number of words as we should have--for the possible forms into which they are inflected is numerically uclimited--nor from those which we should have learned would it be clear

! that the relationship existed between them so far as their meanings were ~oncerned.~' (De Lingua Latina, viii, 15, 62. tr. Roland G. Kent, Loeb masslcal m y , Cambridge, Mass., 1938, quoted in Langendoen, op. cit.)

inflexional endings. His division of the parts of speech, I

which appears to owe l i t t l e to the Greeks, and which se-

appears in later grammars, was based on four inflexionally

contrasting classes: nouns, having case inflexion, verbs,

having tense inflexion, participles, having both, and ad-

verbs having neither. Varro wrote his grammar in the first

century B.C.

1.2.2. Donatus and Priscian

Donatus (fourth century) and Priscian (c. A.D, 500)

are the two best - - known Latin grammarians. They both owe

much to the Greek tradition, especially the formulations

of Thrax and Appolonius Dyscolus. Although the evidence

of borrowing from Thrax is strong in both grammarians,

Priscian claims that Appolonius is the source of much of

his work. Priscian's grammar, the most complete of the

Byzantine period, and still the most complete Latin grammar

, shows evidence of Appolonius' influence, Appolonius is

quoted when Priscian describes pronouns as having substance

without quality; the sentence is defined semantically:

"Oratio est ordinatio dictionwn congrua, sententiam per-

fectam demonstrans."' Priscian's definitions of the noun

and verb indicate most clearly the change in emphasis from

1. Priscian, 2.4.15.

formal to semantic criteria: I

nomen (noun, including words now classed as Gtives): the property of the noun is t n " - indicate a substance and-a quality, it assigns a common or a particular quality to everybody or thing.

verbwn (verb): the property of a verb is to indicate an action or being acted upon; it has tense 9nd mood forms, but is not case inflected.

Priscian was codifying the grammar of classical Latin, a

dialect which had little in common with the vulgar Latin

tongue spoken in the sixth century. His purpose in ana-

lysing grammar was the elucidation of the classical authors

and the preservation of classical Latin as a literary lang-

uage among his own contemporaries.' The literary approach

of the Alexandrians had favoured formal analysis as the

process most suitable for it's purposes, and Prisciants

adoption of semantic definitions is not obviously explained

by his immediate objectives. It was probably due to the

influence of Appolonius, who Priscian esteemed so greatly.

In any event, Prisciants semantic definitions, which were

accompanied in most instances by formal criteria, were to

1. But formal or logical definitions are not abandoned. It would seem likely that the non-semantic definitions are still prior to the semantic.

2. The translations by Robins, op. cit,, p , 57.

3. The debt that classical scholarship owes to Priscian i as the preserver of literary Latin through the Dark Ages I can only be guessed. I

I

change the entire direction of the study of language in the

following centuries.

1.3. The Niddle Ages

From the point of view of the present study this period

is the most interesting and important prior to the eighteenth

century itself, We are still not able to estimate the value

and extent of the grammatical work which was accomplished

during the Middle Ages, This rather broad term should be

delimited more accurately: the most interesting period for

this study coincides with the golden age of scholastic philo- - -

sophy and extends from the twelfth to the fourteenth centu-

ries. The development of interest in grammar is due to the

integration and organization of scholarly activities of the

university curriculum into the trivium and the quadrivium.

Before a student could go on to acquire knowledge of

mathematics, astronomy, music, and geometry--the quadrivium--

he had to become familiar with the basic tools of the scho-

lar: grammar, logic, and rhetoric, which were known as the

trivium. Thus grammar was to be studied by every student,

The general direction of grammatical studies in the Byzantine

period had been towards the elucidation of literary classics,

I but the linking of grammar with logic and rhetoric gave

these studies a new impetus. Although a considerable number I of literary grammars are known to have been produced in the

i Middle Ages, they were becoming less literary in that they I

paid less attention to the literary works they were intended

for. Bursill-Hall notes the shift in emphasis: "In the

twelfth century, grammar was taught primarily as the guide

to the art of good speaking and writing, but with the shift

away from the study of literature to the study of logic,

grammar in the thirteenth century became the handmaid no

longer of literature but of logic, a speculative science;

grammar and logic go arm-in-arm, logic distinguishing from

true and false in speculation and grammar ensuring their

correct expression.ltl Peter Abelard, who has some claim

to being called a grammarian, was a significant figure in

this change of emphasis 'in that the rise of dialectic in

the twelfth century, in which he played an important part,

coincides with the change in grammatical interest.

1.3.1. Helias, Bacon, and Kilwardby

Most grammatical treatises since the sixth century

had been commentaries on Priscian, and it is one such

commentary, by Peter Helias2 which signals the change of

interest in grammatical studies. Peter Helias sought

philosophical explanations for Priscian's rules of grammar.

Both Robins and Bursill-Hall suggest that Peter Helias is

a systematizer of past achievements. He gains his place

in history as the man who reintroduced Aristotle to

1. Op. cit., p. 42.

2. Peter Helias, Summa Super Priscian, c. 1150,

grammarians and reunited language s tud i e s with l o g i c a l

s tud i e s . There i s no doubt t h a t he would have given the

same response a s the specula t ive grammarians who followed

him t o the f requent ly asked question of the next century:

I1Quis grammat& inven i t , an s c i l i c e t grammaticus an philo-

sophus Roger Bacon ( ? 1214-1294) and Robert Kilwardby

( d . 1279) follow Hel ias , and i t i s with these men t h a t we

f i r s t observe the question of general o r un iversa l grammar

discussed. Bacon th inks t h a t the accidenta l d i f fe rences

i n languages a r e not worth se r ious study, and considers

t h e subject mat ter of grammar t o be general pr inciples :

"Grammatica una e t eadem e s t secundum substantiam i n omnibus

l i n g u i s , l i c e t a c c i d e n t a l i t e r v a r i e t u r O t t 2 Robert Kilwardby

i s s imi l a r ly e x p l i c i t i n d iscuss ing the property of grammar

which g ives i t the r i g h t t o be ca l l ed a science: l1Since

science remains the same, i n any p a r t of t he world, and i t s

sub jec t remains the same, t he subject matter of grammar

ought t o be the same i n a l l parts o f the world.113 The

p o s s i b i l i t y of a general grammar stemmed from the f a c t

t h a t a l l languages were believed t o mirror the world,

1 . Boethius of Dacia, quoted by M. Grabman, i n Thomas von Er fu r t , (1943), p. 81, and quoted by Michael, op. c i t e - 2. Roger Bacon, Greek Grammar ed. Edmon Nolan and S. A. Hirsch, (camiiig-j, p . 27.

3. Robert Kilwardby, quoted by G. Wallerand, Les 0gvres de S iger - de Courtrai (Les Philosophes Belges, m.'8), ~ o u v a i n , 1963, tr. Michael, op. c i t e , p. 9.

30

(hence the term 'speculativet) and so would possess certain I

correspondences. These considerations would lead to a new

grammatical movement in the thirteenth century.

1.3.2. The Modistae

The second half of the thirteenth century was to see

the rise of a new grammatical theory, proposed by a group

of grammarians who came to be known as Nodistae. The name

comes from the subject of their investigation: the word

classes' mode of signifying (modi - significmdi) of the world's mode of being (modus essendi). Their theory un-

doubtedly grew out of the work of Peter Helias; while

Peter was concerned with the connection of logic and lang-

uage they were concerned with studying language according

to the way in which it was capable of signifying reality.

Their treatises were known as Summae Modorum Significandi.

The basis of grammatical division was moved from the realm

of language to the real world, Words had different powers

of signifying reality, and the various word classes signi-

fied different aspects of it; the division of the parts of

speech was according to the way words signified reality.

It is generally considered to be a semantic classification

but Bursill-Hall takes issue with the concept of signify-

ing as only a semantic notion and suggests that "the new

method ... sought to state the functional nature of the categories which Priscian had described, but by means of

31

criteria stated in the form of correlates of reality to

which they correspond.l8' The problem for the Modistae

lies with the indeclinable parts of speech, which can only

be described in functional, or formal terms. Any account

of the modes of signifying which discussed the indeclina-

bles as well as the principal parts of speech tends to be

unsatisfactory if it is seen as a semantic classification.

Bursill-Hall summarizes the usual explanations of the

modi significandi of the various word classes: -

Of the declinable partes operationis, the Nomen and Pronomen signify substance, that is, the stability and permanence of thi~gs; the Verbwn arid Participium express becoming, and this mode of signifying which ~

embraces movement and becoming is the general fea- ture that they share. The Nomen and Pronomen thus represent an essentially static element and the Verbwn and Participium an essentially dynamic element. The indeclinable partes orationis are grouped together by virtue of a general mode signifying the disposition of the "ens" or the act and then are differentiated by their special modes. The division of the declinable partes orationis into two sections, together with the indeclinable partes, suggests a classification, even though based on different criteria, which is not unlike the classification of word class- es found among modern linguists, viz. Hockett and Jespersen. 2

This account derives its coherence and usefulness from

the fact that it is in reality a psychological account of

the distinguishing features of the functions of the various

partes. The indeclinables are grouped together signifying

1. Op. cit., p. 47.

2. Op. cit., pp. 52-53.

32

the l ldisposi t ion of the ' ens t o r the ac t . " This s ign i f ica -

t i o n of d i spos i t i on , s ign i fy ing Ifper modim disponentis" 1

a s Siger de Courtrai c a l l s i t , does not seem t o have any

ontological s t a t u s , but r a t h e r a psychological s t a t u s i n

t h a t i t i s , as i t were, an i n s t ruc t ion t o the mind t o con-

s i d e r one of the p r inc ipa l p a r t s of speech i n a c e r t a i n way. 2

Whether they r e a l i s e d it o r no t , the Modistae were having

recourse t o formal d e f i n i t i o n i n these cases. The mode

of s ign i fy ing of the nomen, perhaps t he m o s t c l e a r l y seman-

t i c of the modes i n t h a t i t s i g n i f i e s through the modes of

s t a b i l i t y akd permanence, has a c e r t a i n dependence on

psychological c r i t e r i a , because the permanence and s t a b i l i t y

of many nouns, p a r t i c u l a r l y a b s t r a c t nouns, i s the r e s u l t

of a const ruct of the mind r a t h e r than of any c r i t e r i o n i n

t h e r e a l world. The modistic ana lys i s of syn tac t ic descrip-

t i o n , which i s based on the four types of causat ion of

Ar i s to t l e : mate r ia l , formal , e f f i c i e n t , and f i n a l , i s f u r t h e r

1. S iger de Cour t ra i , Summa Modorum Signif icandi , p. 146.

2. Ian Michael denies t h a t the re i s any psychological motivation i n the Modistae ' s ana lys i s of language: llGrammar i s fundamentally concerned with the expression and com- munication of ideas , but t h i s c e n t r a l pos i t i on given t o communication der ives not f rom psychological thinking about language, but from log ica l . " (Op. c i t . , p. 25). Michael i s t a lk ing about the Modistae here , but the f a c t s d o not seem t o bear out h i s statement.

3. Thomas of Er fur t descr ibes the nomen as lla pa r t of speech s ign i fy ing by means o f the mode of an ex i s t en t o r of something with d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . . . . The mode o f an ex i s t en t i s the mode of s t a b i l i t y and permanence.ll The t r a n s l a t i o n i s by Robins, op. c i t . , p. 79.

testimony of their essential concern with the psychological ,

aspects c2f language:

Each construction is subject to analysis in terms of the four principles of construing, so that the material represents the members of the potential construction, the formal represents the const- ruction itself, the efficient represents congruence, the mutual appropriateness (congruitas) of the construction, and the final represents the com- pleted construction which has satisfied all the requirements for the,expression of a compound concept of the mind.

The four principles of causation are used as a means of

syntactic analysis, but the discussion of the final cause

can only be interpreted as an ultimate interest in how

concepts of the human mind are communicated, rather than

a purely grammatical interest. This is not a criticism;

the point at issue is whether going beyond narrowly gram-

matical concerns yields a grammatical theory which is

richer than it would otherwise have beenThe richness of

the syntactic theory of the Modistae is only now being

discovered. Their discussions of transitivity, of depend-

ents and terminants, of congruity (collocational suitabi-

I lity?) and other matters offer evidence of concerns of

1 fundamental importance to linguistics. It seems evident I j that these concerns were brought to the notice of the

mediaeval grammarians as a direct result of their training ! !

1. Bursill-Hall, p. 53,

34

in and interest ifi scholastic philosophy and the renewed I

mediaeval interest in ArisSotelian philosophy. Scholastic

philosophy is often accused of dealing in fine logical or

psychological distinctions which have no validity in the

real world; these accusations are often unfair, and arise

out of a lack of understanding of the goals of the scho-

lastics; in their approach to language the awareness of

fine distinctions led the writers of this period to attempt

not merely a classification of linguistic data, but to

attempt to understand how linguistic forms convey an

awareness ofd-reality from one human mind to another. They

stand out in sharp contrast to the Nominalist grammarians

of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

1.4. The Renaissance

This survey of grarcmatical interest in Europe is

following the usual divisions of history because these

divisions seem to be well founded, even if not as clear

cut as was once believed; more importantly, they do corre-

spond to changes in linguistic interest, changes brought

about by changing philosophical interests and new politi-

cal movements. On the political scene the most obvious

Renaissance factor is the rise of nationalism and the re-

cognition of the status of the vernacular tongues as

languages. Dante is justly famous for his De Vulgari - Eloquentia, written in the early fourteenth century, which

recognizes the need for an accepted Italian dialect other

than Latin as a means of political unity. As the vcrnacu-

lars came to be recognized as languages, the study of Latin

as an ideal of perfect language gave way to studies which

once again had the task of imparting rules to people who

wished to learn Latin or Greek. The Renaissance stressed

the values of classical Rome and Greece, and hence the

value of the literature of these periods. Thus grammarians

once again adapted themselves to the needs of literary

study; they did not ignore the syntactical work of the

Mediaeval speculators; they only ignored its implications:

The teaching of Latin and Greek grammar gradually took on the form in which it is known today in the standard school textbooks. Essentially this process involved the incorporation of mediaeval syntactic notions i~to the morphologi~al systematization of the late Latin grammarians.

1.4.1. Sanctius, Ramus, and Lily

One of the most famous of the Renaissance grammars

is Sanctiust Hinerva -- Seu de Causis Linguae ~atinae' which

was widely read and respected throughout Europe for the

two centuries following its publication. There is no

critical edition of Minerva and it is difficult to assess

its content from a cursory reading. There would appear to

1. Robins, p. 110.

2. Pranciscus Sanctius, often known as Francisco Sanchez, i 1

first published his grammar in 1604.

E /

be reason to believe that Sanctiushork was not as barren 1

as Robins suggests most of the Renaissance grammars were.

He may have been instrumental in developing the Port Royal

view of language. This will be considered briefly in a

later chapter. It was not Sanctius, but two other Renais-

sance grammarians who overshadowed the English grammarians /

of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Pierre Ramee

was one; he was a Frenchman, born about 1515, and is famous

for the educational reforms he introduced into Europe. He

wrote grammars of French, Latin, and Greek, and set down

his theory of grammar in his Scholae Grammaticae. He

attempted to analyse each language according to its own

formal system and showed scant respect for the a priori - approach of the Middle Ages. One result of his system was

an intense formalism. lhma Vorlat describes the Scholae

Grammaticae asuan attack on the philosophical foundations

of the Aristotelian grammatical theory. lt2 She claims that

Alexander Hume, Paul Greaves, Alexander Gill, Charles Butler /

and Ben Jonson follow Rameets formal system in England. 3

His influence is fairly limited; the main reason for this

I is that sixteenth century England already had its accepted

Latin Grammar, published by William Lily and John Colet in

1 . Robins, p. 102.

2. Op. cit., p. 17.

3. Ibid., p . 18. i

1510. It has easy, straightforward definitions, and

restricts itself to the essential mles of grammar. Its

success was so great that in 1540 Henry VIII decreed that

it was the only 'authorized grammar. It was written for

the purpose of instructing English children in the Latin

language, and was completely devoid of any philosophical /

intentions (unlike Sanctiust and Rme's grammars). It

had a major influence on the grammars published in England

in the following hundred years, and is the chief single

reason why English grammarians showed absolutely no inter-

est in offe&ng reasons for the classifications they had

made. Lily's authoritative, lapidary definitions had

every appearance of being God-given, and there was very

little reason for challenging them,

1.4.2, Continuing Interest in Speculative Grammar

Speculation about the nature of lariguage was not ex-

tinguished so easily in France during the Renaissance

period, Grammars by Sanctius, Julius Caesar Scaliger

and Thomas Campanella (the latter two being Italian gram-

marians of the sixteenth century) kept alive at least some

interest in the reasons behind language; this is attested

by the recurring titles, like De Causis Linguae Latinae, - I

This interest was to have a remarkable resurgence with f the publication of the Crammaire et Raisonnee at -

1. 'Ibid., p. 14.

Port Royal in 1660. But by this time there would no longer I

be a unified European tradition in grammatical studies,

1.5. Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

The Renaissance marked the breaking up of the unified

Europe of the Middle Ages, and the rise of nationalism,

The intellectual development of the following centuries

cannot be treated as a unified movement. There were sepa-

rate movements in Germany, Prance, and England, movements

which undoubtedly were still closely related and influenced

each other, but which have their own separate identity.

The remainder of this chapter will consider France and the

significance of Descartes and Port Royal, The development

of grammar and philosophy in England will be the subject

of the next chapter.

1 , , 1 , The Cartesian Movement

The Renaissance saw the diversification of intellec-

tual endeavour according to the emerging national boundaries;

but the impact of Rene Descartes' writings and thoughts on

the Western world was such that we must consider him and

the Cartesian school as a significant factor in the intellec-

tual history of seventeenth century Europe. His philosophy

laid emphasis on the dichotomy between matter and the spirit,

since all certain knowledge came from ideas, which derived

from the spirit. Cartesian dualism fostered an interest in

language because language was the vehicle through which the

spirit of man expressed itself. ' Ernst Cassirer suggests the implications of Cartesianism for the philosophy of

language and quotes Descartest remark to Mersenne:

Descartes gave us no independent philosophical study of la~guage--but in a letter to Mersenne . . . he shows a very characteri&ic approach --which was to be highly significant in the ensuing period . . . . Since the one identical fundamental form of knowledge, the form of human reason, recurs in all branches of know- ledge, really deserving the name, all speech must be based upon the one, universal, ration- al form of language, which, though cloaked by the abundance and diversity of verbal forms, cannot be hidden entirely.

As the system of numbers is exact with rel- atively few signs . . . Itit must be possible to designate the sum and structure of all intellectual contents by a limited number of linguistic signs, provided only that they are combined in a cordance with definite, univ- ersal rules." !?

Robins .notes that Mersenne "probably influenced by Descartes,

suggested the creation of the best of all possible languages

by which all ments thoughts could be put into the same words

with brevity and clarity. 11 3

1, Cartesian philosophy laid much greater emphasis on the separation of the spirit from matter, on the idea and its importance than did the scholastics, whose philosophical starting point was one of Mrealism,M

2. Ernst Cassirer, The Philoso h of S bolic Forms, trans, Ralph Manheim, ( Y a l e ; 7 9 3 d 8 ~ h s ~ t e r to Mersenne is dated Nov. 20th 1629, and appears in Descartes' Correspondence, ed., Adam-Tannery, 1, 80ff.

3. Op. cit,, p. 114.

Port Royal

The Cartesian influence on linguistic studies is most R /

evident some thirty years later when the Grammaire Generale

et ~aisonnke by Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot was - published. Known as the - Port Royal Grammar in England and

referred to as such hereafter, it was an attempt to look

behind the apparent anomalies of usage and to find a ra-

tional explanation for the grammar of the French language.

The possibility of rational explanation of syntax was sug-

gested by Descartes; Arnauld attempted to find the reasons

behind the facts of French and several other languages, but

he did not, as has often been suggested, attempt to set up

universal and immutable principles about language .in gen-

eral. His synthesis was rational rathep than general,

Although one of the tenets of Cartesianism is that one should

begin scientific enquiry with an analysis of the innate con-

ceptions which are known to be true, this method is not

followed in the - Port Royal Grammar; Arnauldts approach is

synthetic rather than analytic. He makes no attempt to set

up a discovery procedure, for example, and the resulting

grammar has much in common with the Modistic grammars

produced by the scholastic philosophy which Cartesianism

had rejected. The influence of Cartesian thought on lang-

I uage had another important parallel with the Middle Ages, and

this was the relationship, suggested in Descartest letter

to Mersenne, between language and a system of logic. The

Port Royal Grammar takes as its starting point that the I

mind of man has the powers of perception, judgment, and

reasoning, that the first two are to be explained by gram-

mar, but it is the study of logic which throws light on the

process of reasoning. Two years after the publication of

the Grammar, Arnauld published - La Logique, - ou 1'Art de Penser. - In this work he sees the connection between grammar and

logic to be close; it is reminiscent of the work of Peter

Helias in the twelfth century. Arnauld thinks that the

mistake of recent logicians is that they have concentrated -

exclusively on the process of reasoning, for which the syl-

logism was the necessary tool, and neglected the way in

which the premises are formed, the joining of words in a

nexus of affirmation:

Most philosophers seem to busy themselves with giving rules for good and bad reasoning. These rules often help us to discover the defects of certain intricate arguments and to arrange our thoughts in a more convincing manner; so we cannot say the rules are useless. Still this utility must not be thought to extend very far. Most of man's errors derive not from his being misled by wrong inferences but rather from his making infprences from premises based on false judgment s .

Arnauld is stating here that logicians should concern

themselves with the processes involved in sentence form-

ation, and he appears to be suggesting that a study of

1. Antoine Arnauld, The Art of Thinkin trans. J. Dickoff and P. James ( I n d i a n a ~ i ~ l ~ i 6 4 ~ ~ f : Original edition was published in 1662,

grammar, o r sentence cons t ryc t ion , should precede a s tudy

of l o g i c , which f o r him means t h e process of deducing

t r u t h o r falsehood from complete syl logisms. On account

of t h i s many of t h e observat ions made i n t h e Grammar a r e

r epea ted i n t h e Logic because of t h e i r re levance t o t h e

format ion of premises. The achievement of Arnauld, which

w a s t o be a major i n f l u e n c e on French thought f o r t h e next

two hundred y e a r s , and t h e ou t s t and ing r e p u t a t i o n of t h e

P o r t Royal G r a m m a r can be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e - s tudy of language w a s d e r i v i n g i n s p i r a t i o n from an a l l i e d

. -

d i s c i p l i n e , i n t h i s case , l o g i c ,

Chapter I1

Philosophy and Linguistics in Post-Renaissance England

Introduction

Cartesian Ideas in England

John Locke, 1632-1705 Locke and Language An Essay Concerning Human Understanding The Grammarian's Neglect of Locke

David Hartley, 1705-1757 Hartley and Locke Hartley s Theory Hartley's Place in the Intellectual Tradition

Summary of the Dominant Intellectual rends of the Eighteenth Century

Survey of the Grammatical Work in England Prior to 1765 . -

Ways of Dealing with Case The Notional Concept of Case in Latin William Bullokar Alexander Hume John Wallis Charles Gildon and John Brightland James Harris Further Directions

CHAPTER 11

PHILOSOPHY AND LINGUISTICS IN POST RENAISSANCE ENGLAND

2.0. Introduction

Lily's Latin grammar was significant for the future

of mglish linguistics in that it divorced grammatical

studies from the wider field of intellectual pursuits.

A reunion occurs in the latter part of the eighteenth

century, but until then the separation was total. Con-

sequently this chapter will consider first the philoso- . -

phical and intellectual perspectives of the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries, and then the development of .

the grammatical tradition.

Cartesian Ideas in England

It is neither possible nor necessary to estimate the

total impact of Cartesianism on the intellectual life of

England. In the field of philosophy it was obviously con-

siderable; its influence on grammatical works will be

dealt with in the latter part of the chapter.' The aspect

to be considered here falls midway between philosophy and

linguistics: it is concerned with projects for a univer-

sal language. It seems likely that Descartes and Mersenne

were instrumental in the development of these projects

in seventeenth century England. These two Frenchmen had

1. Para. 2.5.4.

discussed the possibility and desirability of a language ,

which would be universal and unmbiguous, but it was

Englishmen who undertook the extensive task of creating such

a language. At the time Arnauld was undertaking a rational

explication of the grammar of French, George Dalgarno,

Bishop John Wilkins, and other Englishmen were attempting

to create a general or universal language. Although 1 Mersenne's work was known to Wilkins, suggestions of a

similar nature had already been made in England. Francis

Bacon had deplored the inefficient nature of language, and

had mentioned it was one of the idols of the market place

which hinder the advancement of learning.* However, Wilkins

was chiefly influenced by Cartesian ideas in writing his

Essay Toward a Real Character and a Philosophical Language. -- - - The Essay is part of the intellectual tradition rather than

the grammatical tradition of England in that it does not

treat of natural language; it is an attempt at a classifica-

tion of reality. Scientists in kgland were interested in

classifying data and thus the working out of such a language

would have many practical applications. The Essay had this

much in common with the grammatical work of the period: its

creation was dictated by practical needs. The projects for

universal language never really reached fruition: they

1. Robins, p. 114.

2. Francis Bacon, The Two Bookes . . . of the Proficiency -- and of Learning, Divlne and Humane, (160v.- _CI- -

remain as monuments to the great ingenuity of their authors,

It is interesting to note the different directions that

Cartesian ideas took in England and France: in France they

served as an impetus, but not a model, for the creation of

rational firammars, while in England they moved people to

create rational languages,

2.2. John Locke, 1632-1704

The history of thought or intellectual trends is diff-

erent from the history of philosophy because philosophical

writings are read and discussed by specialists, and only

slowly do the ideas contained in them influence the thought

and attitudes of the greater part of the literate and edu-

cated population. Thus although David Hwne had published

all his philosophical works over a decade before William

Ward wrote his Essay, Hwne is not here considered part of

the intellectual movement of the period because he is read

for the most part only by philosophers, Samuel Jonson

dismissed Hume as a man who had a morbid love of change

which involved a preference of new error to old truth, 1

The dominant philosophical influence on the thought of the

age was undoubtedly John Locke,

I 1. Leslie Stephen, Histor of English Thou ht in the Eighteenth Century, d , 7 N e w York,'+

2.2.1. Locke and Language3

Locke has been sadly neglected by h i s t o r i a n s of the

study of language. I n h i s book, - The Study - of Language - i n

England, 176C-1869, Hans Aarsleff has wr i t t en more exten-

s i v e l y on Locke than anyone e l s e i n t h i s f i e l d , and he i s

very c o n s c i o ~ s of h i s i n a b i l i t y t o t r e a t Lockets work with

the a t t e n t i o n i t deserves: ItA f u l l account [of the philo-

sophy of language i n the mid-eighteenth centurylwould need

t o pay much more a t t e n t i o n t o ~ o c k e . ~ ~ ' Aarsleff confines

himself t o d iscuss ing - - Lockets inf luence on Condillac and

Destu t t de Tracey and does not d iscuss t he impl ica t ions of

h i s philosophy on English l i n g u i s t i c s ; i n f a c t , the only'

reference t o Locke t h a t w i l l be found i n d iscuss ions of

English l i n g u i s t i c s w i l l be e i t h e r about James Harris8 \

antagonism towards Locke o r Lockets inf luence on education-

a l thinking, and hence on the const ruct ion of grammar books.

The next chapter w i l l d iscuss Lockets inf luence on English

l i n g u i s t i c s , which appears t o amount t o h i s influence on

Ward. H i s inf luence on the teaching of grammar has been

assumed r a t h e r than proved, but the re i s no doubt t h a t he

was one of the f i r s t people i n England t o s t a t e c l e a r l y

t h a t " the ch i ld should f i rs t be i n s t ruc t ed i n i t s own

tongue so t h a t i t speaks, reads , and wr i t e s t h a t tongue

1 . Hans Aars lef f , - The Study - o f Language - i n England, 1760-1869, (Pr inceton, 1967), p. 1 1 .

correctly; "' the proposal that English should be studied as thoroughly as Latin and Greek would have seemed revolu-

tionary at the time he was writing, (1693), and for long

after; perhaps even until the middle of the present century

the study of the English language has not been accepted in

its own right. 2

2.2.2, A n Essay Concerning Human Understanding

Lockets most famous philosophical work is - An Essay

Concerning Human Understanding; it was first published in

1690, His purpose in it was "to inquire into the original,

certainky, and extent of human Kxlowledge, together with the

grounds and degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent, " 3 un-

like the mediaeval philosophers who allowed a theory of

knowledge to grow out of their system of philosophy, Locke

developed the suggestion implicit in Descartest work, that

philosophy should begin with epistemology.4 He rejected

Descartest assumption that ideas were innate and the mind

worked on them. Instead he called the mind a tabula - 9 raza

and investigated how it acquired ideas, and how far these

1. Richard I. Aaron, John Locke, 2nd ed,, (Oxford, 1963), p. 290.

2. Charles Gildon and John Brightland, A Grammar of the Ton e, (171 I ) , is an interesting except'ion, In triisyrk &is no hint of its being a preparation for learning Latin,

3, John Locke, - An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (1690), I, 1, 2.

4. D, J. OtConnor, - John Locke, (London, 1952), p , 27.

i deas a r e represen ta t ions ~f th ings i n the world. A t t he

ou tse t he had not considered the necess i ty of t r e a t i n g

words, but inasmuch as these a r e the means by which

knowledge i s communicated from one person t o another,

t h e i r importance soon became obvious, and he devoted a

whole book of the Essay t o t h e i r considerat ion. This book

i s of fundamental importance f o r an understanding of Ward's

Grammar, and w i l l be discussed i n the next chapter.

2.2.3. The Grammarian's Neglect of Locke

Locke w a s a man of s incere and o r i g i n a l opinions; t he re

i s no doubt t h a t many of h i s non-philosophical ideas , such

as those on education, were ahead of h i s time. This i s

a f o r t i o r i t r u e of the Essay Concerning Human Understandine. - Reaction t o i t came l a r g e l y because of the f e a r t h a t i t was

a t t ack ing t h e foundations of revealed r e l i g ion . Locke com-

ments on some i n i t i a l reac t ion t o a preliminary d ra f t : nI

have been t o l d t h a t a shor t epitome of t h i s t r e a t i s e , which

w a s p r in ted i n 1688, w a s by some condemned without reading,

because inna te ideas were denied i n i t ; they too h a s t i l y

concluding, t h a t i f inna te ideas were not supposed, t he re 1

would be l i t t l e l e f t e i t h e r of the notion o r proof of s p i r i t s . "

Yolton discusses the nature of the reac t ion t o the Essay

I and shows the extent of the c r i t i c i s m , but notes t h a t only

1. Op. c i t . , The Preface t o the reader.

a small proportbn of i t came from phi losophers .1 I n s p i t e

of t h e f a c t t ha t t h e Essay w a s a t first hastily rece ived

( p a r t l y on r e l i g i o u s grounds) , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o understand

why grammarians so completely ignored one of t h e most s ign i -

f i c a n t books of t h e century , and one t h a t w a s concerned i n

no small way wi th language. U n t i l 1765 only one grammarian

used Lockets work, and then t lonly i n two o r t h r e e places ."

T h i s i s James Greenwood; f o r t h e most p a r t he c r e a t e s a

Latin-based grammar, but he does look t o Locke on b r i e f

occasions. The f a i l u r e of grammarians t o t ake no te of Locke

can be a t t r i b u t e d t o two causes: one ( a s mentioned), t h a t

they viewed t h e i r t a s k as grammarians as narrowly pedago-

g i c a l and were content t o merely make s l i g h t emendations

t o t h e b a s i c p lan of L i l y ' s grammar; t h e o t h e r ( r e l a t e d t o

t h e i r pedagogical i n t e n t i o n s ) , t h a t they were bound t o t h e

C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n , t o which Lockets i d e a s were no t accept-

a b l e .

2.3. David Har t l ey , 1705-1757

Har t l ey w a s n o t a phi losopher of t h e same c a l i b r e as

Locke, but he w a s a man who was i n much c l o s e r con tac t wi th

t h e people of h i s age. H i s Observations on Man H i s Frame, - -' - H i s Dutg, and H i s ~ x ~ e c t a t i o n s ~ appeared some f i f t y y e a r s - -7

1 . John W . Yolton, - John Locke and t h e of Ideas , (Oxford, -- 7 19571, p. 25.

2. David Har t l ey , Observations on Van H i s Frame, H i s Duty, and H i s Ex e c t a t i o n s , 2 vols.(London, __. Hepr~:* 1967.

- - ; 7 ~ ~ 7 - . ~ a c s i n e

after Lockets Essay and was) much more immediate in its ef-

fect on the reading public,

2.3.1. Hartley and Locke

It is argued here that Hartley was largely responsible

for making Locke8s ideas acceptable to the ordinary man in

the eighteenth century, thus allowing even conservative

grammarians to use Locke, Hartley makes few specific ref-

erences to Lockets Essay, but appears to be interested in

those areas which Locke felt were beyond the province of - -

the philosopher, and that Locke had stated that he was not

going to treat: "1 shall not at present meddle with the

physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to

examine wherein its essence consists, or by what motions

of our spirits or alterations of our bodies, we come to

have any sensations by our organs, or any ideas in our

understandings; and those ideas do, in their formation, any

or all of them, depend on matter or noOtt 1

2.3.2, Hartleyts Theory

Hartley was advocating a physiological psychology in

place of one based on the c~ncept of soul, a psychology

that would complement Lockets philosophy in explaining how

ideas are formed in the mind. However, the work as a whole

deals with many more issues than the physiological explica-

1 , Locke, ope cit., The Preface to the reader.

tion of the formation of ideas. The Encyclopaedia

Britannica summarizes Hartleyts work, saying he

. . . aimed to overcome "the greatest difficulty of supposing that the Soul, an immaterial Subs- tance, exerts and receives a physical influence upon and from the Body." The preface states that he had been llinformed that the Rev. Mr. Gay had asserted the possibility of deriving our intellectual ~leasures and pains from Associa- tion." From Isaac ~ewton~s~~~ticks (1704) he derived the idea that sensory stlmuli might operate by producing "vibrationsw propagated through the nerves, like "the trembling of particles in sounding bodies;" in the brain the occurrence of vibrations in a certain order sets up a readiness for similar vibrations to recur in the same order. Part I1 explains how more complex processes--imagining, remembering, reasoning--may thus be analysed into clusters or sequences of elementary sense impressions formed by individual experience, so that all psychological acts ?an be explained by a single law of association.

2.3.3. Hartley's Place in the Intellectual Tradition

In Chapter I of the first volume of Observations - of

Man, - Hartley explains how he deals with questions raised by Newton and Locke; he stands in a direct line of intel-

lectual development from them, His contribution to the

intellectual climate of his time has not been thoroughly

investigated by scholars and his influence on the think-

ing of the ordinary educated man may well have been much

greater than is suggested by the short references to him

1. Encyclopaedia Britannica (1965),

53

in histories of philosophy', and histories of ideas. Ac-

counts of Hartleyss thought have given no attention to

his original and extremely interesting remarks on language. 2

2.4. Summary of the Dominant Intellectual Trends of the

Eighteenth Centurx

This has been a selective rather than a comprehensive

account of those major trends of the age which are known

to have had an effect on Ward's intellectual development.

The Cartesian revolution was of such importance that it

could not be omitted; people who were antagonistic to some

of its basic assumptions, such as Locke, could not but be

influenced and stimulated by its interest in rational ex-

planation. Lockets importance derives from the amount of

debate that centered around his proposal that there was no

such thing as an innate idea and his alternative suggestions.

His incomplete but substantial theoretical assumptions

about the nature of language were to filter down to and

affect the grammatical tradition, but not for some time,

and the Thoughts - on Education had a wider influence on the

reasons and motivation for teaching grammar. Hartley did

much to soften the earlier conflict between science and

1. An account of Hartley's position is given in Frederick Copleston, - A History - of Philosophy, vol. 5, 1961, pp. 191 ff.

2. The direct influence of Hartley's ideas on William Ward will be discussed in the next chapter. His psychology also seems to have been a major influence on Joseph Priestley, as has, to some extent, already been recognized.

religion, and to make way for a rational explanation of the

world and events in it which the theologians had believed

to be beyond the scope of such an explanation.

2.5. Survey of Grammatical Work in England Prior to 1765

This survey1 views the tradition of grammatical work

in England largely in terms of the category of case. The

reasons for this are several: firstly, the development

of the English grammatical tradition is very much a con-

tinuing attempt by grammarians to accomodate this category

(inherited from Latin grammar), to the English language;

secondly, the attempts to accomodate the category of case

in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had the positive

result of introducing new approaches to linguistic analysis;

and finally, Ward's own attempt to deal with case is the

main spur to his innovatory ideas, and forces him to extend

the subject area of grammar to horizons beyond the ken of

his contemporaries in England.

2.5.0.1. Ways of Dealing with Case

Most early English grammarians recognized that case

is an unimportant category in the description of English.

1. This is a brief survey. Fuller accounts may be found in the following sources, which have been used in the preparation of this summary: Ian Michael, "English Gram- matical Categories to 1800 and the Tradition Behind Them," (Unpublished Dissertation, University of Bristol, 1963); Ivan Poldauf, On the History - of Some Problems on English Grammar ~ e f oreT8r(Prague, - 194bTEmma vorlar Pro ,ress in English Grammar 1585-1735, 4 vols., (Louvain, - ?8$ir

Understandably they were di , ff ident about abandoning a

category so c e n t r a l t o t h e grammatical systems o f Lat in

and Greek, and t h e i r continuing at tempts t o make it a

v a l i d concept were instrumental i n forming opinions about

t h e nature and s t ruc tu re of language. One p a r t i c u l a r l y

i n t e r e s t i n g f a c t t h a t emerges i s t h a t grammarians r e s i s t e d

any approach t h a t would ca r ry the app l ica t ion of the cate-

gory i n English t o i t s l o g i c a l conclusion, The s igc i f icance

of t h e i r r e f u s a l w i l l be seen as the discuss ion develops;

i t s most l a s t i n g e f f e c t seems t o be t h a t they never succeeded --

i n making a complete break with the Lat in system. Let it

s u f f i c e here t o say t h a t t he re a r e presumably two l o g i c a l

conclusions about case i n English: one t h a t the re a r e no

cases i n English--this w a s i n f a c t put forward by John

Wallis i n 1653, but w a s completely ignored by everyone

except Cooper i n s p i t e of the high esteem i n which Wallist

grammar w a s held. The o ther conclusion, which would follow

f o r those who pursued the ' s i g n theoryt t o i t s l o g i c a l

conclusion would be t h a t the re a r e as many cases i n English

as the re a r e ' s i g n s t o r preposi t ions . No one proposed such

an idea; i t s p o s s i b i l i t y w a s considered, but re jec ted as

too unusual t o deserve se r ious considerat ion. James

B e a t t i e ' s a t t i t u d e i s typ ica l : "1 should not wonder, i f a

I grammarian, much given t o novelty and paradox, were t o

1 . Christopher Cooper, Gramrnatica Linguae Anglicanae, (London, 1685).

a f f i r m t h a t t h e r e a r e i n English as many c a s e s almost as

t h e r e a r e prepos i t ions ." '

2.5.0.2. The Notional Concept of Case i n L a t i n

There had been problems i n t h e a n a l y s i s of case i n

t h e c l a s s i c a l languages. D i f f e r e n t dec lens ions had d i f f -

e r e n t numbers of case endings: t h e mensa dec lens ion had

f o u r , dominus had f i v e , and verbum only t h r e e . However,

because of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c r i t e r i a , i t w a s p o s s i b l e t o

a s s i g n d i f f e r e n t cases t o t h e same forms of some words, as

t h e diagram .shows:

MOM* rnenSaL d ~ m i " " ~

domine doc. , verbum

n c c . mensam dominwn

mensae CefQ* domini Ged v e r b i

Although no L a t i n word has s i x d i f f e r e n t forms i n one

number t h e r e were seen t o be s i x cases i n t h e language:

domino sometimes had t h e same d i s t r i b u t i o n as mensa, but

sometimes i t shared t h e p r i v i l e g e s wi th mensae. Hence i t

"' 1. James B e a t t i e , The Theory of Language, (London, 1788), \

- - p . 3 3 8 .

represented two cases. Names , based on notional values

were applied to the cases in order to distinguish dominol

and dominop. Thus case in nouns came to be not just a

formal variation, but necessarily a notional concept.

Word terminations represent the formal aspect of case.

The interrelation of nouns with themselves and with other

parts of speech was seen as representing the interrelation

of objects, and the denotation of this was seen as the

semantic aspect of case. Notional names were given to

cases on the basis of their most frequent semantic fucction - -

in Latin grammars, and it was the notional aspect of case

which was taken up by the EEglish gr-arians. The obvious

manner of approaching case in English was to take a Latin

grammar (usually Lily's) and tracslate it into English,

making such alterations as would seem necessary. Thus

from 1586 to 1654 Bullokar, Greave, Hume, Gill, Butler,

and Wharton all claim that English has five or six cases.

2.5.1 . William Bullokar

The first English grammar was written by William

Bullokar, and was published in 1586. Although Bullokar

largely translates from Lily's Latin grammar, he shows

sophistication in the adaptations he makes, and the way

he handles case. He says: "A noun substantive may be

declined or at least used in five cases: to wit the Nom-

inative, the Accusative, the Gainative, the Vocative, and

t h e Geni t ive ~ r o ~ i e t a r ~ . ~ ' , " A t l e a s t usedt1 i s an addi-

t i o n Lo L i l y ' s d e f i n i t i o n , and sugges ts t h a t English does

n o t have as many d i s t i n c t forms as t h e r e a r e cases . The

Gen i t ive i s def ined formally: "it g e t t e t h - 9 e s -9 s o r - z

added t o t h e nominativev1 and s y n t a c t i c a l l y : "having a f t e r

i t ano the r word proper o r p e r t a i n i n g t o it c a l l e d t h e pro-

p r i e t y . l t2 Bul lokar n o t e s t h a t t h e g e n i t i v e may be resolved

by s e t t i n g t h e p r o p r i e t y before t h e p r o p i e t a r y and i n s e r t -

i n g ' o f . ' If t h i s i s done, then he says t h a t t h e noun

i s no l o n g e r i n t h e g e n i t i v e , but i n t h e accusa t ive because

t h e a c c u s a t i v e fo l lows "verb, p a r t i c i p l e s , p r e p o s i t i o n s ,

o r ge rund ia l , and answereth t o t h e ques t ion 9whomf?813 .

Although t h e a b l a t i v e g e n e r a l l y followed p r e p o s i t i o n s i n

L a t i n , Bullokar c la ims t h a t i t i s t h e a c c u s a t i v e i n English.

He does no t g i v e any reason f o r t h i s , but from h i s t r e a t -

ment of t h e o t h e r cases , reasons may be e s t a b l i s h e d , H i s

d e f i n i t i o n of t h e nominative i s s y n t a c t i c and func t iona l :

i t precedes t h e ve rb and answers t h e ques t ion "who, what?'@

The Gainat ive case i s def ined i n s t r i c t l y s y n t a c t i c terms:

i t i s t h e f i rs t noun when two nouns fo l low a verb. Me i s - i n t h i s case i n t h e two sentences he g i v e s as examples:

1. William Bullokar , Br ief Grammar - f o r Engl i sh , (London, 15861, p. 3.

I 2. Op. c i t . , p. 5.

3 . I b i d . , p , 47.

"He told me the matter," "fie showed me his mind." Like

the genitive it can be resolved, by a preposition, to the

accusative case; 'He told the matter to me.' Bullokar

sees case in a consistect fashion--insofar as the category

can be treated consistently in English: case belongs to

one word, the noun, as in Latin; a noun must be in some

case, although it shows no formal variation. The case is

determined by the syntactic position. The position is the

case, because that position has meaning. A noun acquires

a distinctive case if its position performs a function

which would otherwise require a special preposition. While

it is to Bullokarts credit to have proposed the phenomenon

of resolution (it is an explicit recognition of the function-

al 'slotst that nouns can occupy in English, and a recogni-

tioc of word order as a signalling device) it was tantamount

to a complete rejection of the concept of case, because all

its characteristic features had been rejected. It is

usually a formal distinction in the termination of the

word, or, much more loosely, an attribution of the semantic

meaning signalled by a particular formal termination to a

word which does not actually have the variation.

2.5.2. Alexander Hwne

In Hume's Latin grammar case is the vlspecialis termi-

natio nominis." Hume defined case as the change in form

1. Ibid., p. 5.

in a word, the bending to $he oblique position from the

rect or straight form, It is also the "affectio nominis

ad societatem personarum variati"--the changing of the

nominal form to indicate the relation between persons,

or beings, or subjects of the discourse: ItRectus unde

transitio procedit, obliquus est in quem fit transitio." 1

His English grammar has the same approach: nCase is an

affection of the noun for distinction of person;" however,

Hume notes, arid deserves much credit for doing so, that

English differs from Latin in having 'notest or 'particles1 -.

rather than termination cases: "This difference we declyne

not as doth the Latines and Greeks be terminations, but^

with noates after the manner of the Hebrew, whilk they

call particles.112 It is perfectly true that English often

expresses the same meaning as Latin cases by means of a

sign before the noun, and in stating this Hume is stating

a fact that was already implicit in Bullokarts theory:

meaning is expressed by a particular case (formal ending

or position) or the combination of preposition and noun.

However, as it stands, the sign theory does not seem to

be an advance in the treatment of case. Hurne sees English

cases as parallel to the Latin cases, and very often one

case will have two or more signs (e.g. #to8 and 'for1 for

1. Alexander Hume, Grammatica -9 Nova (London, 1612), p, 22.

2. Alexander Hume, Of the Ortho,ra hie and Congruitie of the Bri tnin Tongue, ~ o ~ n ' e 2 ~

- -

the dative) while two different cases may have the same

note: @'the accusative hath noe other noat than the nom-

inative." The note of both these cases is the and Hume -' does not even suggest distinguishing them by position.

Frequently, as in Humels own example, the note is entire-

ly missing: "Men in authority should be lanterns of lighten!

2.5.3. John Wallis

John Wallis1 Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae (1653) is

considered significant in the history of English grammar

because in it Wallis recognizes openly and clearly that

English has a different structure from Latin, and so will

require a different mode of analysis: "Et propterea nova

prorsus methoda indedendum esse mihi visum est, quam non

tam usitata Latinae Licguae quam peculiaris linguae nostrae

suade.ll' But in spite of this he appears to accept many

of the categories of Latin without question: " . . . nollem expectatis ut singula artis vocabula quae Grammaticae

Anglicanae cum alianun linguanun Grammaticis sunt communi&

singillatim explicarem."* This was perhaps an intelligent

way of avoiding a very difficult task. If he accepts the

names of the Latin parts of speech, the correspondence

ends there. He recognizes only six of them in English:

noun, verb, preposition, adverb, conjunction, and inter- !

1. p. vii.

2. p. 68.

jection. Pronouns are not,a distinct part of speech, but

part of the noun: "sunt quidem nomina, sed aliquantwn

irregularia. "' The noun, of course, comprised substantive and adjective, and words like x, and - this which could not

stand in a substantival position are adjectives. - The is

an adjective, and so is man's. Wallis conceives of an

adjective as something that wants and cleaves to a subs-

tantive. Man's and - his are manifestly lacking in signi-

fication without the addi-tbn of a following substantive,

and BO, in Wallis' grammar they became adjectives, and

are not substantives in the genitive case. The noun there-

fore has no case, because there is no variation of form if

the genitive is discounted. The cases discovered by other

grammarians (apart from Bullokar) were only translations

of the meaning of Latin cases, and it is difficult to con-

test the reasonableness of Wallis' statement: "Diversitatern

casbum . . . AnglicanacLinguae . . . neutiquam agnoscit: sed praepositionum auxilio rem omnem illam praestant quam

Graeci et Latini partim praepositionibus partim casuwn

diversitatem perficiunt ."* He recognizes that the function of the nominative and accusative is performed by word order

in English, but he does not equate - case with the function

of case. This treatment of case might well have been the

final word, had Wallist handling , of the genitive form been

more acceptable. But the grammarians who followed him and

many commentators have been unable to accept that two words

belonging to the same inflectional paradigm should belong

to different word classes. Of course, in saying that they

belong to the same inflectional paradigm one is actually

stating that they do belong to the same word class, but per-

haps the so-called genitive suffix should be considered

as a derivational ending. Wallis recognized two cases in

pronouns, the rect and the oblique; but he calls them

'states,' not from antipathy to the word 'case,' but be-

cause the change in form is more than inflectional change,

(cf. am me, we/us).

2.5.4. Charles Gildon and John Brightland

Gildon and Brightland are influenced by Wallis in their

treatment of case in - A G~ammar -- of the English Tongue (1711).

They call the cases 'statest and do not mention case names \

in English; the influence of the - Port Royal Grammar is

evident in the form of copious footnotes, which are little

more than a direct translation of that work. Brightland

and Gildon reformulate exactly Arnauldts logical descrip--

tion of the nominative and his notional description of the

accusative. Arnauld had described the nominative as the

subject of which an affirmation is made in the proposition:

"Its principal use is to be set in discourse before the

verb i n order t o be the subject of the proposi t ion, a s I

ttDominus r e g i t rne.ltl But, when the proposi t ion i s broken

down i n a l o g i c a l ana lys i s i t has a sub jec t , a copula, and

a t t r i b u t e : "Dominus e s t regens;" grammatical ob jec t s do

not f i t e a s i l y i n t o the l o g i c a l pa t te rn . Thus the accusa-

t i v e has t o be defined not ional ly :

The verbs t h a t express ac t ions , which pass from the agent , as t o beat , t o break, t o hea l , t o love, t o ha t e , have sub jec t s t o receive those th ings , o r ob jec t s , which they regard. For i f a person bea t s he bea t s something . . . so t h a t those-verbs re- qu i re a f t e r them a noun . . . which i s ca l l ed the accusat ive , - . 2

Arnauld and Lancelot adapted Lat in case names t o French

us ing l o g i c a l and not ional de f in i t i ons . Fa i lu re t o d i s -

t i ngu i sh between the two c r i t e r i a being used prevented

them from making the t r a n s i t i o n from the l o g i c a l system

of subject--copula--attribute t o the grammatical system

of subject--verb--object. Gildon and Brightland a r e in-

adequate i n the same way,

2.5.5. JamesHarr i s

James Harris' Hermes (1751) w a s not intended t o be

a grammar of English, and Har r i s makes no claim t o t r e a t

case i n English. H i s book i s given the secondary t i t l e

1 1 . The English t r a n s l a t i o n of 1753 i s used throughout, t h i s being the only one e a s i l y ava i lab le ,

2. I b id . , p. 116.

of - A - - Philosophical

Universal Grammar.

Enquiry Concerning Language - and

While he accepts uncritically the

case systemof Latin, his two chapters on prepositions

and cases contain ideas that mark a development in the

approach to case in English, and the relation of cases

and prepositions. He first attempts to define the nature

of the preposition for language in general: "A preposi-

tion is a part of speech devoid itself of signification,

but so formed as to unite two words that are significant,

and that refuse to coalesce or unite themselves.88' He

explains how far language can coalesce words into phrases,

and phrases into sentences without prepositions, and shows

how prepositions eventually become necessary if the pro-

cess is to continue.' The discussion of coalescence

appears to reflect the trend towards a psychological ex-

planation of language, which becomes much more evident

in William Ward.

Harris claims that the genitive, dative, and ablative

cases in Latin. and Greek perform the function of prepo-

sitions:

These relations the Greeks and Latins thought of so great importance as to distinguish them when they occurred, by peculiar terminations of their own, which exprest their force, without the help of a preposition. Now 'tis here we beho d the rise of the ancient genitive and dative. 3

1. James Harris, Hermes (London, 1751), p. 261.

2. Ibid., Book 11, Chapter 3.

3. Op. cit., p. 27.

H i s s t and on cases i n t h e modern languages i s c l e a r : I

Whatever we may be t o l d of cases i n modern languages,

t h e r e a r e i n f a c t no such t h i n g s ; but t h e i r f o r c e and

power i s expressed by two methods, e i t h e r by s i t u a t i o n

o r by preposition^.^^ He l a t e r q u a l i f i e s t h i s s ta tement

i n r e l a t i o n t o Engl ish , and p o i n t s out how t h e charac ter -

i s t i c s of Engl i sh throw l i g h t on t h e n a t u r e of case:

There a r e no c a s e s i n t h e modern languages, except a few among t h e p r i m i t i v e pronouns . . . and t h e English g e n i t i v e , formed by t h e a d d i t i o n of s . . . . From t h i s d e f e c t however., we may be enabled t o d iscover i n some i n s t a n c e s what a case i s , t h e Pe r i - p h r a s i s , which s u p p l i e s i t s p lace being t h e case ( a s i t were) unfolded.1

It seems as i f Harris has a double view of case. On t h e

one hand i t i s only a formal v a r i a t i o n , but on t h e o t h e r

hand i t i s some kind of u n i v e r s a l category which e x i s t s

i n language independent of formal cons ide ra t ions . I n

l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n Harris r e f e r s t o t h e nominative, accusa-

t i v e , and g e n i t i v e (of + noun type) as i f they were ca te-

g o r i e s of English. H i s p o s i t i o n appears t o be t h a t case

as a formal v a r i a t i o n i s n o t one of t h e e s s e n t i a l s of

. language, but t h e r e l a t i o n s which i n f l e c t e d cases i n d i c a t e

a r e u n i v e r s a l s , and we may u s e t h e term case with t h i s

new d e f i n i t i o n a s a convenient form of r e f e r r i n g t o t h e s e

1 . I b i d . , p. 275.

I r e l a t i o n s . (Cf. a s imi la r pos i t ion taken by Fi l lmore) .

Harris' proposals concernirig the nature of case have l i t t l e

importance i n r e l a t i o n t o the gen i t ive and da t ive , being

but a more sophis t i ca ted version of Hume's s ign theory.

However, h i s proposals concerning the nominative and accu-

s a t i v e a r e of some i n t e r e s t :

When a sentence i s regu le r and order ly , Nature 's substance, the Logician 's sub jec t , and the Gram- marian 's substant ive a r e al lpdenoted by t h a t case we c a l l the nominative.

He then goes on t o say "The nominative i s the case, with-

out which the re can be no regu la r and per fec t sentence."

That i s t o say t h a t every verb must have associa ted with

i t a t l e a s t one noun, and the noun which occupies t h i s

obl igatory pos i t ion i s sa id t o be i n the nominative case. 3

Harris then def ines the accusat ive as the case which g ives

an a c t i v e verb a subject t o work on (an object i n gram-

mat ica l terminology), thus rendering the sentence complete.

"Achi l les vulnerevi t Hectorem i s more complete than

1 . Charles J . Fillmore, "A Proposal Concerning English Prepos i t ions , lonograph s e r i e s - on Languages - &d ~ i n g u i s t i c s , 19, 19-34.

2. Ib id . , p. 280.

3. Note similar recent proposals t h a t when a verb has two

! nouns, one i n sub jec t , one i n object pos i t ion , one i s con- s idered obl igatory , the o ther op t iona l , e.g.:

The man kicked the ba l l : The man kicked. The man closed the s to re : The s t o r e closed.

But i n these recent proposals the obl igatory noun i s some- t imes a sub jec t , and sometimes an object .

t tAch i l l e s v u l n e r a v i t , l1 but , t h i s l a t t e r , Harris c la ims,

can be understood, and i s t h e bas ic sentence f o m . Thus

A c h i l l e s i s t h e ob l iga to ry noun, and t h e r e f o r e i n t h e nom-

i n a t i v e (though t h i s hard ly f i t s t h e f a c t s of L a t i n ) .

Harris was t h i n k i n g of case as something which spe-

c i f i e s t h e o b l i g a t o r y and op t iona l terms which may e n t e r

i n t o r e l a t i o n s h i p wi th verbs. A t t h e time i t must have

seemed a cur ious approach, but i t looks ahead t o t h e

approaches t o language s t r u c t u r e which see semantics

having a r o l e i n t h e base component of grammar. I n Harris'

view t h e ob l iga to ry term w i l l always be i n t h e nominative,

and t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s o b l i g a t o r y w i l l be marked by t h i s ;

t h e v e r b w i l l spec i fy whether t h e noun i n t h e nominative

i s an " a c t i v e e f f i c i e n t causew o r a 18passive subject ."

The secondary o r op t iona l term w i l l be i n t h e accusa t ive

c a s e , which, i n e f f e c t , marks t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s second-

a r y . Thus far , case i s a u n i v e r s a l phenomenon f o r Harris.

I n L a t i n t h i s u n i v e r s a l category w i l l be r e a l i z e d by case

i n f l e c t i o n s , and i n English by word order . The theory

does no t improve wi th a n a l y s i s , but i t does seem important

because i t proposes op t iona l and ob l iga to ry c a t e g o r i e s ,

determined by case , and l i n k s case with semantic and s t ruc -

t u r a l f e a t u r e s i n a meaningful way, and n o t simply because

i t i s t r a n s l a t i n g La t in cases i n t o English.

2.5.6. Further Directiqns

In the period discussed (1586-1751) there were many

minor alterations, especially to the more traditional

definitions, and many rather grotesque imitations of Latin,

with long declensions of nouns in English. This summary

has touched on the more colourful variations; it does not

seem unreasonable to suggest that the case problem was

forcing English grammarians to be creative in spite of

themselves. The proposed solution of equating case with

prepositions was little help in dealing with the nominative --

and accusative cases; the muddling of criteria in the Port

Royal explanation of these made the most reasonable method

(syntactic position) of dealing with these two cases less

acceptable. Attention was directed to the peculiar prob-

lems of the transitive construction, which Harris dealt

with in an unsatisfactory but interesting way. Descrip-

tion of cases was fast becoming explanation of cases.

Further progress in purely descriptive grammar was unlike-

ly and difficult with the state of linguistic science at

that time. Ward would be dealing with the problem of case

some fourteen years after Harris; the general direction

of his predecessorsf work suggests that any further devel-

opment would have to be in terms of some kind of explana-

tory hypothesis.

Chap te r L L I

'f/illiam Ward - 3 .O. In troduc

3.1. Edit ions

3.1.1. Contents

tion

of the Essay on Grammar - of the Essay

3.2. Ward's Motives for Writing a Grammar

3 3 Ward's Attitudes to Education

3.4. Ward's Attitudes to Language

3-50 Ward's Claim to Uniqueness

CHAPTEI~ 111

WILLIAN WARD

3.0. I n t r o d u c t i o n

W i l l i a m Ward (1708-1772) was a man of v a r i e d i n t e r -

e s t s , of which t h e study of grammar w a s but one; he w a s

a n educator , an ordained m i n i s t e r , a t r a n s l a t o r of

Terence, and a promoter of t h e f i rs t w r i t t e n school p lays

s i m e medieval t imes; he i s a l s o be l ieved t o have w r i t t e n

a n opera, The Bil le t -Master , which w a s performed post- - 1 humously at Edinburgh i n 1787. Other English grammar-

i a n s had had equal ly v a r i e d i n t e r e s t s : W i l l i a m Bul lokar

w a s a s o l d i e r and a farmer, John Wallis a mathematician,

James Harris an a n t i q u a r i a n , and Joseph P r i e s t l e y a

s c i e n t i s t . But t h e d i f f e r e n c e between Ward and a l l t h e

r e s t , except Harris, i s t h a t while t h e o t h e r s l a i d a s i d e

t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n t h e world around them when they took

up t h e grammarian's pen, Ward d i d n o t ; h i s grammar a t t e s t s

t h e breadth of h i s i n t e r e s t i n o t h e r i n t e l l e c t u a l p u r s u i t s .

I t i s u s u a l l y impossible t o r e l a t e English grammars t o

t h e t imes they were w r i t t e n i n , except perhaps through

t h e i r c i t a t i o n of a u t h o r s ; I a n Michael sugges ts t h a t t h i s

i s because " i n t h e e igh teen th century , e s p e c i a l l y , t h e r e

1 . The B r i t i s h Museum cata logue e n t e r s t h i s p lay under h i s name.

7 1

i s a gap (because t h e r e was then a gap) between t h e gram- - mars and t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l movements of t h e time.' ' Ward,

however, s t ands out as being deeply involved i n t h e phi lo-

soph ica l and psychological i s s u e s of h i s age , and, as an

educator , w a s obviously seeking t o make t h e s tudy of

language r e l e v a n t t o h i s p u p i l s , and t o p resen t it i n a

much broader context than w a s g e n e r a l l y considered necessa-

r y . L i t t l e i s known about Ward's l i f e except what i s

r e l a t e d i n "The His tory of Beverley G r a m m a r ~ c h o o l . " '

Born i n 1708, he w a s educated i n Cambridge, and became --

headmaster of Thornton Grammar School a t t h e age of

twenty e i g h t . I n 1751 he w a s appointed headmaster of '

t h e Grammar School a t Beverley, Yorkshire , and i t w a s

while he w a s t h e r e t h a t he wrote t h e Essay on Grammar. -

3.1. E d i t i o n s of t h e Essay on Grammar

The Essay w a s publ ished i n 1765; two y e a r s l a t e r a

s h o r t e r v e r s i o n of i t w a s publ ished as A G r a m m a r of t h e - -- Engl ish Language i n Two T r e a t i s e s . The o r i g i n a l Essay -- w a s r e p r i n t e d t h r e e t imes i n 1778, 1779, and 1788.j The

1. I a n Michael, Engl ish Grammatical Categor ies , p, 575.

2. "The His tory of Beverley Grammar School XXXVI-XXXVII, The Guardian, (Beverley, May 1930). -

1 3. The t h r e e r e p r i n t s of t h e a r e post- humous. I n 1766 t h e second was publ ished a l o n e as A P r a c t i c a l G r a m m a r A

7-

l i s t of arl e d i t i o n s appears i n t h e bibl iography a t t h e end of t h e t h e s i s . For a l i s t of a l l known p r i n t i n g s of

f i r s t e d i t i o n of 1764 has as i t s f u l l t i t l e : An Essay - on G r a m m a r A s I t Mag Be Applied t o t h e Engl ish Language - -- - -- i n Two T r e a t i s e s . The One Specula t ive , Being an Attempt -- -- - t o I n v e s t i g a t e Proper P r i n c i p l e s . The Other P r a c t i c a l , - - Containing D e f i n i t i o n s and Rules Deduced from t h e - -- P r i n c i p l e s , and I l l u s t r a t e d & a Var ie ty of Exvnples from - - - - t h e Most Approved Wri ters . --

3.1.1. Contents of t h e Essay

The t i t l e i s misleading i n t h a t t h e genera l p r i n c i -

p l e s of t h e f i rs t p a r t t u r n out t o be no t so much genera l

p r i n c i p l e s as p r i n c i p l e s der ived very much from t h e s t ruc -

t u r e of Engl i sh ; t h e r e s u l t i s t h a t many d e f i n i t i o n s a r e

o f f e r e d i n t h e first p a r t , and a r e no t confined t o the

second p a r t as t h e t i t l e sugges ts ; much of t h e second p a r t

i n e v i t a b l y appears as almost verbatim r e p e t i t i o n of t h e

Specula t ive Grammar. The P r a c t i c a l G r a m m a r con ta ins

l i t t l e new m a t e r i a l , even i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of genera l

p r i n c i p l e s ; f o r t h i s reason l i t t l e w i l l be s a i d about i t

i n t h e account of Ward's grammatical theory. Yet Ivan

t h e s e e d i t i o n s , and information on t h e whereabouts of c o p i e s , consu l t : R. C . Als ton, A Bibliography of t h e -- En , l i s h Lan ua e , (Leeds, 1965); I , pp. 50-51. The & *was used throughout t h i s t h e s i s ; i t has been republ i shed i n f a c s i m i l e r e p r i n t by The Scholar P r e s s , Menston, Yorkshire. Research by Alston, Michael, and Poldauf i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h i s e d i t i o n i s d e f i n i t i v e and t h a t l a t e r e d i t i o n s do not d i f f e r from i t i n any m a t e r i a l way, a p a r t from being l e s s comprehensive.

Poldauf has claimed that the most remarkable aspect of

Bard's Essay is the successful integration of speculative

and practical grammars; such an opinion overlooks other

more significant features of Ward's work, but it probably

suggested itself to Poldauf because of the heavy depend-

ence of the practical grammar on the speculative. This

is in contrast to the usual procedure of those who pro-

fessed to treat of universal or speculative grammar,

which was to append a short essay on universal features

of language to a completely traditional grammar. The

554 pages of the Essay are divided almost equally between

the speculative and practical grammars. The former com-

prises sections dealing first with the noun and verb to-

gether (on account of their similarities), then with the

noun substantive in particular and the meaning and func-

tion of its cases; this account of the substantive com-

pletes Book I of the speculative grammar. Book I1 is

short, and treats the noun adjective; Book I11 is entitled

"Of the Pronoun" and as well as discussing the personal

pronouns it has a long section on the syntactical impli-

cations of the reletive pronoun.' Book IV discusses

the verb; Ward's account of the verb as a major part of

speech is important, but his account of tense is lengthy

1. It was not unusual for the relative to be discussed in early grammars, but there are few discus- sions of its syntactic significance or of dependent clauses in general.

and u n i n t e r e s t i n g . Book V devotes a s e c t i o n each t o

t h e adverb, t h e conjunct ion , t h e p r e p o s i t i o n , and t h e

i n t e r j e c t i o n . The account of t h e p r e p o s i t i o n i s one of

t h e most important a s p e c t s of Wardls theory of grammar.

Book V I d i s c u s s e s " t h e power of use o r custom i n lang-

uage," i t o f f e r s a d e f i n i t i o n of t a s t e , and sugges ts

why genera l r u l e s a r e no t followed i n every iristance i n

t h e p r a c t i c a l arts. The second s e c t i o n of Book V I would

seem t o belong t o t h e p r a c t i c a l grammar: i t i s e n t i t l e d

"Of words i n connected construction^ acd d i s c u s s e s prac-

t i c a l r u l e s of syntax and prosody. The P r a c t i c a l Grammar

fo l lows almost exac t ly t h e same p lan as t h e Specula t ive

Grammar, and o f f e r s r~umerous examples i n English ' a t a l l

s t a g e s . It r e p e a t s a l l d e f i n i t i o n s i n p o e t i c form so

t h a t they may be more e a s i l y memorized.

3.2. Ward's Motives f o r Wri t ing a Grammar

For v a r i o u s reasons t h e w r i t i n g of grammar books

was a common occupation i n t h e e igh teen th century.

R . C . Alston l i s t s over f o u r hundred d i f f e r e n t p r i n t i n g s

of grammar books devoted t o t h e a n a l y s i s of English i n

t h e per iod 1750 t o 1800. A t t i t u d e s t o educat ion both

i n B r i t a i n and i n North America c rea ted a demand f o r such

1. I n - A Bibliography -- of t h e English Language, I.

books, as P r i s c i l l a Tyler land S. A. Leonard have shown. 1

From t h e a v a i l a b l e evidence i t seems t h a t schools were

no t looking f o r complex and long t r e a t i s e s : even Robert

Lowthls Short In t roduc t ion t o English G r a m m a r w a s con- - s i d e r e d too d i f f i c u l t f o r beginners , and John Ash's

Grammatical I n s t i t u t e s w a s commonly used as an i n t r o -

duc t ion t o i t .2 I t w a s n o t , t hen , t h e popular demand

f o r pedagogical grammars t h a t l e d W i l l i a m Ward t o t u r n

grammar w r i t e r . I t seems t o have been c u r i o s i t y t h a t

f i r s t l e d him t o specu la te about language and t h i s l e d I - -

him t o t h e w r i t i n g of a grammar which he w a s a b l e t o I

make use of i n h i s own teaching . C u r i o s i t y e x i s t e d i n

o t h e r s as we l l as Ward because t h e r e w a s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n

among s c h o l a r s and educators with t h e t r a d i t i o n a l enu-

merat ion of t h e p a r t s of speech according t o L i l y ' s

a d a p t a t i o n of t h e P r i s c i a n schema. Th i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n

r e s u l t e d i n t h e numerous grammar books of t h e per iod . I n

t h e Preface t o t h e Essay W i l l i a m Ward a t t empts t o answer

t h o s e who, coming upon y e t another grammar, w i l l complain

1 . P r i s c i l l a Ty le r , Grammars of t h e English Language t o -- 1850: with Spec ia l Em h a s i s on School Grammars used in- -- -- America. Four S tud les ~ h . 3 . D i s s e r t a t i o n , Western - -5- Heserve University, 1953); S t e r l i n g Andrus Leonard, The - Doctr ine of Correc tness i n English Usage 1700-1800, - Y o r k 7 1 9 6 2 ) . -

2 . Changes i n t h e name of Grammatical I n s t i t u t e s a r e evidence of i t s use i n t h i s w a y . An e d i t i o n w a s ~ r o d u c e d i n 1766 c a l l e d - The E a s i e s t ~ n t > o d u c t i o n - t o D r . I ,okth1s Eng l i sh Grammar.

"that grammar has been treated of already by so many

writers in so many languages, that whatsoever can now

be said upon the subject must be little more than a

repetition of what has been said by former grammarians." 1

Ward answers these people by saying that he is going to

show "the true nature of the conceptions annexed to

single nouns and verbstt and the "several modes of pro-

ceeding by which these conceptions are again united into

conceptions more and more complex at pleasure.2 Ward

feels that he has important contributions to make to - -

our knowledge of language, or rather, to our knowledge

of how language works. He is obviously fascinated by^

how grammatical constructions bring about the coalescence

of the separate conceptions in the mind to form Itone

single conception. lt 3 He also feels that although others

1 . William Ward, - An Essay - on Grammar, ondo don, 1765).

2. Ibid., p. iv.

3. Ward says that he is attending to the problem which Locke called attention to long ago. In fact Locke was little concerned about how words join together; he was concerned only with individual words, and the nature of the idea that lay behind the single word. What Ward mistook for an interest in connected discourse was an interest in the nature of the ideas which lay behind particles, those words which, according to Locke, con- nected other words. Locke the philosopher showed no interest in grammar, but felt that the grammarian should be interested in the words which puzzled the philosopher; he remarked: "These words that are not truly by themselves the names of any ideas are of such constant and indispensable use in language. This part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected as some

had accomodated the Latin,case system to English, they

had neglected to explain the "effect" or the function

I of the cases or the signs of cases. Thus Wardss prin-

cipal reason for writing his grammar was to give some

explanatory account of the linguistic system. He is

not content with observing correspondences between the

classical languages and English (e.g. the correspondence

of cases to certain prepositions and word order), but

wants to explain why these different grammatical forms

are able to perform the same function. His professional ' I & I !

concerns as a teacher were never far removed from his I,

work. He states at the conclusion of his Preface:

My design was to make a grammatical knowledge of the English language a step towards gaining the like knowledge in other languages, especially in the Greek and Latin: therefore I have followed the usual heads which are found in the grammars of these languages. To depart from these heads may perhaps seem more concise; but in reality little advantage is gained by it; at least no

others over-diligently cultivated.Iv (~ssay Concernin Human Understanding, 111.7.1.) Whether or not Locke'was interested in connected discourse, there is no doubt that he should have been for words do not exist just as sepa- rate entities but are always parts of sentences. Ward's apparent misunderstanding of Lockets intentions led him

into an interesting study of how words join together. Ward's concern with "the grammatic forms . . . introduced

1 into language for the sake of direction and precision1' (i.e. prepositions and cases) was closer to Lockets real concern.

1. William Bullokar had called repositions "signs of - i; casesI1 in his Brcf Grammar of 15 6.

advantage which i s e'quivalent t o t h e incon- venience of a new plan and new t e r n s , t o those who have been accustomed t o t h e o ld . 1

Yet i f t h e .Essay was t o be used as a pedagogical

a i e d , one wonders why i t should be so lengthy (554 quar to

~ a g e s ) and so obviously beyond t h e needs of schoolboys.

Perhaps i t i s because Ward be l ieved as an educator t h a t

t h e master should be more than a few pages ahead of h i s

p u p i l and have a genuine and deep u n d e r s t a n d i ~ g of h i s

s u b j e c t m a t t e r so t h a t he can h e l p h i s s t u d e n t s no t

j u s t t o l e a r n but t o understand. He adv i ses language

t e a c h e r s i n terms t h a t a r e reminiscent of t h e ~ b b b

Fromant : 2

But those who p r o f e s s t o t each any language, would do wel l t o c a r r y t h e i r r e sea rches s t i l l f u r t h e r concerning t h e n a t u r e of human speech; because such resea rches , i f prudent ly made, w i l l enable them i n many i n s t a n c e s t o g i v e those whom they t each , genera l views of the reasons of cons t ruc t ion , which i s t h e only su re way of f i x i n g i n t h e i r minds.3

1. Op, c i t . , p. xiv.

2. Fromant 's views on t h e t each ing of grammar sugges ts a worthy i d e a l f o r a l l language t e a c h e r s , They a r e quoted on page 4. I t seems t h a t Ward w a s t r y i n g t o ach ieve t h e i d e a l proposed by l'romant f o r speakers of English.

3. I b i d . , p. 12.

3.3. Ward's Attitudes to Education

Ward wrote his Essay on Grammar because he was - interested in educating people. His views on education

would seem to be sound and enlightened. For example,

he is quite clear that one goes from the known to the

unknowri in learning; this means that one should first

understand the grammar of one's own language before

seeking to understand that of a foreign tongue. This

is an idea that was accepted only slowly in the seven-

teenth and..eighteenth centuries. Only sixty years be- Uh

fore Ward, Richard Johnson (who may well have influenced ,,

Ward in this respect) was complaining bitterly about

the practice of teaching Latin grammar in Latin:

Against these rules [Lily's] I have several exceptions. At first, that they are given in Latin; which, considering the time that children are to learn them in, that is, before they understand anything of the Latin tongue, . . . is not only improper but ridiculous. 'Tis ignotum per- than which nothing can be more be said, that this Latin is explained to them in ~nglish; then I say again, 'tis the English they learn them by, and they would sooner do it by the English without Latin. And this exception is good against the whole Latin grammar: and I here make it once for all.

Not only does Ward wholeheartedly espouse this fundamental

educational principle of working from known to unknown,.

1. Richard Johnson, Grammatical Commentaries, (London, 1'7061, p. 15.

but he applies it when he insists on using the terminology

of Latin grammar in his grammar of English so that his \

students will be more prepared to come to terms with

Latin, Even more important is the fact that he realizes

that the transfer from the grammar of English to the gram-

mar of Latin will not be automatic, as the two languages

differ in many ways, He attempts to compensate for this

by providing the student with general principles. These

general principles help the student to understand how

there can be a similarity of function in spite of the -.

diversity of form in the structure of the two languages,

The understanding of these principles is not considered

as too strong milk for his young students; it is looked

upon as an intellectually stimulating activity which,

though abstruse, will lead to enlightenment, Ward's

greatest quality as an educator would seem to be his

desire to create understanding in his students, This is

the force behind his grammar; it is the reason why he

is not content with the usual enumeration of rules; it

is the spirit which Ward inherited from ~bb6 Fromant

and suggests that Ward is a figure to be esteemed in the

history of education as well as the history of linguistics,

I 3.4. Ward's Attitudes to Language

Since the publication of Sterling A. Leonard's

Doctrine of Correctness ih English Usage 1700-1800, - 1

the eighteenth century has been labelled as the century

of authoritarian attitudes in language. Leonard is by

no means wholly responsible for this gross generaliza-

tion, but it is true that attitudes to correctness

developed then were of such force that they still have

tremendous influence at some levels of our society today.

It is important to emphasize that not only did the gram-

marians of the eighteenth century not have any divinely

bestowed legislative authority, but many of them, most

notably Joseph Priestley, developed enlightened and

intelligent attitudes to usage. William Ward preserves

an attitude of almost scientific neutrality in that he

offers no cri'icisms of any particular usages; he certain-

ly never has any prescriptive advice for his readers.

The following quotation from the Essay argues that the

analysis of usage is not enough; the task of the grmar-

ian is to investigate the principles behind the usage;

Ward is not condemning usage as a guide, he is saying

only that to understand the principles behind language

we need to think, and not to take for granted the folk

myths about the nature of language:

For if that is true which is laid down, as a certain principle, by some writers on grammar,

1. Sterling Andreas Leonard, Doctrine of Correctness in English Usage 1700-1800, University 3 Wisconsin - Studies 25, 1929.

v i z . t h a t whatsoever ' i s authorized by use and custom, i s there fore r i g h t i n language; i t i s then evident , t h a t the only province of a gram- marian i s , t o examine what i s of the most es ta- bl ished use i n the language of which he t r e a t s ; and t o g ive himself no t rouble as t o specula t ive r e f l ex ions on the general na ture of language.1

A t no point i n t he Essay does h i s specula t ive reasoning

lead him t o make proposals about a theory of usage. He

does make c l e a r t h a t we have "an accustomed plan of con-

s t ruc t ion" which'enables u s t o use language, and t h a t ,

us ing t h i s plan, we a r e able t o say th ings which have

not been sa id before, bending o r moulding the language

t o our needs:

But when an author s i ts down t o wr i te , he must adapt h i s s t y l e t o h i s sub jec t , and t h i s subject may be of a kind t h a t has never been t r e a t e d of i n the language i n which he wri tes . Here then he i s a t l i b e r t y t o exer t h i s genius upon t h e language i t s e l f i n which he composes. And, provided he does not qu i t e l o s e s igh t of t he accustomed plan of const ruct ion, he may model h i s expressions i n t o var ious forms t h a t never have been used before; and every o r ig ina l genius has constant ly done t h i s i n poetry, ora tory , h i s to ry , and i n every work o f imagination . . . . So t h a t the received forms of const ruct ion i n t he language i n which they wr i te , supply them not with f ixed pa t t e rns , from which they must never depar t ; but with rough mate r ia l s , which they mould and fashion so as t o f i t them t o t h e i r conceptions of excellence i n the language i n which they wri te . 2

1. Op. c i t . , p. 254.

2. Op. c i t . , p. 258.

Not only is this passage 'exceptional in the eighteenth

century in its attitude to variation from the accepted

norm, but it also seems as if Ward is here making the same

kind of suggestion which is often made today when discuss-

ing poetry and generative grammar: poets have to follow

the general plan of the language in order to be understood,

but can obtain special effects, insights, and creativity

by breaking low level rules of syntax.' Ward does not

offer any examples of how creativs writers mould language,

so it is difficult - - to decide exactly what he means; but

the important point is that Ward not only refuses to see

himself as a legislator, but makes a posikive attempt to

include deviations from the norm in his general theory.

This position is a long way from that of his contemporary

James Buchanan who took it upon himself to render the

first six books of Paradise Lost into grammatical English! 2 -

Although Ward does not set himself up as an arbitep

right and wrong in language, he does profess to see lang-

uage as an organic and growing system which is capable

1. Cf. Noam Chomsky, I1Some Methodological Remarks on Generative Grammar," Word, XVII (1961), 219-39, especially 235 ff. See also ~ a m u e l R . Levin, "Poetry and Grammatical- ness," in Essa s on the Lan ua e of ~itergture, ed. Seymour Chatman & amue KT ~ i - 0 ~ 19671, 224-230.

1 2. Ward's comment on Milton's language is amusing: IfMr. Addison says that the English language sunk under Milton. So would the Greek language have sunk under Homer, if he had made an epic poem on Miltonts subject." (p. 291).

of amelioration or deterioration:

Many attempts in every language are usually made, before the plan of construction is brought to such a degree of perfection as the language is capable of reaching. And posterity easily per- ceives, that the language used in one age by the writers of a nation, is better than that which is used by those of another aEe. As for instance, all agree that the language of Virgil is better than that of Ennius. 1

In spite of the ease with which we are able to decide

on the superiority of Virgil over Ennius, the way we

do it, our judgment by taste, is so intimately human

that Ward is able to offer no analysis of how it is

done. Ward does not go so far as to offer any judgments

about style in English; we can only infer from the fact

that he uses Dryden, Pope, and Addison as sources of

many of his examples of English that he considers the

language of the hundred years immediately preceding

publication of his grammar to have reached an acceptable

standard of development. On the other hand, it may be

that the practical purposes of his grammar suggest to

him that the obvious period to go to is the most recent

regardless of the value of the style of the period.

3.5. Ward's Claim to Uniqueness

Ward's claim to uniqueness derives from his interest

1. Op. cit., p. 259.

in the intellectual movements that were influencing man

of letters and scientists, but not grammarians in the - eighteenth century. He had obviously read and thought

about John Lockets philosophical work; there is consider-

able evidence, which will be discussed in the following

chapter, that David Hartleyts psychological theories

had a great impact on Ward's thinking. Even his attitudes

to language mark him as a man of his age, aware of the I/

intellectual currents around him. His reading of the

French grammarians point to a breadth of scholarship -.

which appears to be unequalled by his fellow-grammarians. b

Harris' Hermes and Ward's Essay mark a turning point in

language studies in England. After them we see two

distinct developments: on the one hand the continuation

of prescriptive school grammars; on the other the scholar-

ly study of language. The uniqueness of William Ward's

work and the viewpoint from which it will be studied here,

is that it is the only comprehensive synchronic study of

the English language in the eighteenth century that relates

the study of language to the wider intellectual movements

of the age.

Chapter IV ,

The Sources of Ward's Essay on Grammar

4.1. Introduction 4.0.1. Ward's Acknowledgement of his Sources

4.1. The Direct Influence of John Locke, David Hartley, and Claude Buffier

4.1.1. John Locke A n Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690)

4.1.1.1. Lockets Division of Ideas 4.1.1.2. Ward's Use of Locke's Ideas 4.1.1.3. Mixed Modes as a Source of Ward' s Linguistic

Relativity Theory 4.1.1.4. Ideas of Relation and Ward's Transitivity Theory 4.1.1.5. Particles 4.1 .1.6. The Relation of Ideas and Words 4.1.1.7. Siunmary of Locke's Influence

4.1.2. David Hartley: Observations on Man (1749) 4.1.2.1. Hartley and Rational Grammar 4.1.2.2. Hartley's View on Language Structure 4.1.2.3. Hartley's Word Classes and the Analogy with Algebra 4,1.2.4. A Seminal Semantic Theory 4.1,2.5. A Summary of Hartley's Influence

4.1.3. Claude Buffier: Grammaire Fran~oise sur un Plan --- Nouveau

4.1.3.1. Grammar, Particular and Universal 4.1.3.2. Ward's Advance on Buffier 4.1.3.3. Ellipsis 4.1.3.4. Summary of Buffier8s Influence

4.2. The Indirect Influence of Some Continental Grammarians

4.2.1. Franciscus Sanctius: Minerva (1587) 4.2.1.1, Ward's Use of Sanctius 4.2.2. Antoine Arnayld and Claude Lancelot: Grammaire

~Qnerale et Raisonee (1660) 4.2.2.1. Language and ~hougm 4.2.2.2. Arnauldls and Ward's Views of Underlying Structure 4.2.3. Abbe' Fromant: Reflexions sur les Fondemens de ltArt

a a X & - - 4.3. The Indirect ~nfluen= 'of Some English Grammarians 4.3.1. Richard Johnson: Grammatical Commentaries (1706) 4.3.2. James Harris: Hermes (1751)

4.3.2.1. H i s View of case ' 4.3.2.2. The P a r t s of Speech 4.3.2.3. Sentence Types 4.3.2.4. Coalescence 4.3.2.5. Summary of t h e Re la t ion of Harris and Ward 4.3.3. Robert Lowth

4.4. Summary o f Sources

CHAPTER IV

THE SOURCES OF WARD'S ESSAY ON GRAMMAR

4.0. Introduction

Chapter I1 outlined the grammatical tradition and

allied philosophical developments of the years prior to

lard's Essay. This chapter is also concerned with the

years prior to 1765, but only insofar as certain works

of grammar or philosophy appear to have directly influ-

enced William Ward. It is intended as an investigation

of his sources, and will prepare the way for an account

of his own theory; in the course of the chapter a number

of interesting points in the Essay will be mentioned, as

they grew out of Ward's study of his sources. They are

mentioned here as they do not form part of the main

argument of later chapters.

4.0.1. Ward's Acknowledgements of his Sources

Anxious to show his suitability for the task before

him, Ward indicates the extent of his reading in his

preface:

I have received some assistance in this work from a very learned and ingenious treatise, called Hermes; as likewise from the Grammaire ~aisonnde of Messieurs de Port-Royal, with the ~bbd Promant's very useful and ingenious reflexions upon it; also from Father Buffier's Grammar: I have had some advantage from Sanctius' Minerva; some from the excellent Introduction mentioned above [Robert

~owthls]; I have a l s o received some help from D r Ward's four Essays on the English Language, espec ia l ly f r o m the l i s t of verbs published at the end of these Essays; I l ikewise made use of M r White 's t r e a t i s e of the English verb: but above a l l M r Johnson's d ic t ionary has been o f use t o me. I could not have wr i t t en severa l parts of the P r a c t i c a l Grammar, had not t h i s most excel lent p e r f ~ r m a n c e ~ s u p p l i e d me with examples, and other help.

Ward a l s o mentions William Holder ( " . . . whoever con-

s i d e r s a t t e n t i v e l y what D r Wallace and D r Holder have

sa id or. t he a r t i c u l a t i o n s by which the sounds of language

a r e formed . . . . 'I) and Thomas ~uddiman. Although Ward

never mentions David Hartley t he re i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence

i n t he t e x t t o suggest t h a t he not only knew of Har t ley ' s

work, but w a s s t rongly influenced by i t . Ward r e f e r s t o

John Locke i n h i s preface, and h i s e n t i r e plan of grammar

evident ly owes much t o h i s reading of Locke. I n the

following pages the d i r e c t inf luence of Locke, Hartley,

and Claude Buff ier w i l l be discussed, and then the in-

d i r e c t inf luence of th ree cont inenta l grammarians (Fran-

c i scus Sanctius, Antoine Arnauld, and ~ b b k Promznt) and

th ree English grammarians (Richard Johnson, James Harris,

and Robert Lowth) w i l l be considered. 3

1 . Ward, p. x i i i .

2. Op. c i t . , p. 24.

3. John Wall is , W i l l i a m Holder, Thomas Ruddimon, Samuel Johnson, John Ward, and James White a r e not s ign i f i can t i n terms of influence. However, a shor t account o f t h e i r

r e l a t i o n t o Ward i s g iven here:

John Wallis: Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae (1658). Ward mentions t h e a i d he received from a D r . Wal l i s ; t h e h i s - t o r y of Engl i sh grammar sugges ts t h a t Wallis w a s read and ignored by a l l h i s successors ; t h i s c e r t a i n l y seems t r u e as fa r as Ward i s concerned. There i s no t r a c e of any of Wallis' o r i g i n a l grammatical i d e a s i n Ward's Essay; he has read him because a t one po in t Ward says h i s disagree- ment wi th Wallis on case i s only r e a l l y an argument about terminology. The main reference t o Wallis i n t h e t e x t i s a d i scuss ion on ar t icu la t ion . Ward w a s u s i n g Wallis1 ac- count of a r t i c u l a t i o n i n h i s in t roduc to ry chap te r on orthography and phonology; Ward does n o t cons ider t h a t orthography and pronuncia t ion form p a r t of u n i v e r s a l gram- mar, apart from t h e se l f -evident f a c t t h a t a l l words a r e composed of sounds, and t h e s e sounds u n i t e t o g e t h e r t o form s y l l a b l e s ; a l l e l s e i s beyond h i s province as a spe- c u l a t i v e grammarian: "But t h i s proceeding must be con- ducted by d i f f e r e n t r u l e s i n every d i f f e r e n t language, and t h e r e f o r e has l i t t l e r e l a t i o n t o u n i v e r s a l grammar.*I (Ward: p. 6 ) . Ward's remarks i n t h e s e a r e a s a r e n o t worthy of s e r i o u s cons ide ra t ion , and so Wallis1 in f luence w i l l n o t be d iscussed . William Holder w i l l n o t be d i s - cussed f o r t h e same reason.

Thomas Ruddiman: Grarnmaticae Lat inae I n s t i t u t i o n e s (1725). Ward makes an i s o l a t e d re fe rence t o Ruddiman's L a t i n gram- mar on page 24. The grammar i s completely u n i n t e r e s t i n g a p a r t from t h e f a c t t h a t Ruddiman makes h i s primary d i v i - s i o n of t h e p a r t s of speech according t o whether they a r e d e c l i n a b l e s o r non-declinables. He a l s o acknowledges t h a t t h e r e i s a ' n a t u r a l t syntax and an a r b i t r a r y syntax, t h e former being language u n i v e r s a l . He had no obvious i n f l u e n c e on Ward's th ink ing , but e x p l i c i t r ecogn i t ion of p o s s i b l e u n i v e r s a l s i s unusual enough i n England t h a t he deserves mention f o r t h i s a lone.

Samuel Johnson: Dic t ionary of t h e English Language (1755). I t i s r a t h e r s u r p r i s i n g t o f i n d t h a t Ward d e s c r i b e s Johnson t s d i c t i o n a r y as "my g r e a t e s t help; ' ' Ward exp la ins t h a t he used i t t o he lp him with h i s examples i n t h e Prac- t i c a l Grammar; t h u s i t i s no t d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e development of h i s theory. We do no t e a s i l y understand t h e va lue a t t ached t o i t because we a r e not aware of t h e tremendous g r a t i t u d e t h a t people i n t e r e s t e d i n language

4.1. The Di rec t Influenpe of John Locke, David Har t lex ,

and Claude B u f f i e r

Locke, Har t l ey , and Buf f i e r a l l appear t o have had

a d i r e c t in f luence on t h e formation of Ward's theory , i n

t h a t he n o t only read t h e i r works, but took over i n almost

t h e i r o r i g i n a l form some of t h e i r thoughts concerning

language.

4.1.1. John Locke: An Essay Concerning Humanunderstanding

( 1690)

Locke!s Essay i s l a r g e l y concerned

' i d e a s , ' and how they a r e formed i n t h e

wi th what he c a l l s

mind as a r e s u l t

of sense impressions; he t o t a l l y r e j e c t s t h e Car tes i an

idea l i sm which rega rds i d e a s as inna te . He i s concerned

as a r e most phi losophers who t ake rea l i sm as a s t a r t i n g

po in t of t h e i r philosophy, with t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of acquir-

i n t h e e igh teen th century must have f e l t towards D r . Johnson f o r t h e east and u n p a r a l l e l e d work of r e f e r - ence t h a t he gave them.

John Ward: Four Essays Upon t h e English Language (1758) and James White: The English Verb (1758). John Ward's f o u r essays and James White 's t r e a t i s e on t h e ve rb helped Ward with t h e p r a c t i c a l grammar r a t h e r than t h e s p c c u l ~ t i v e grammar. I n t h e p r a c t i c a l grammar Ward's a n a l y s i s of t e n s e s and mood i s t r a d i t i o n a l and bad. I t seems l i k e l y t h a t such sys temat iza t ion as he has he took d i r e c t l y from Ward and White. We f i n d t h e usua l conjugat ion of t h e v e r b wi th s i x persons, but j u s t one change i n form on page 292. Ward's t rea tment of t e n s e i s t h e worst a spec t of t h e Essay on G r a m m a r . -

i n g general o r un iversa l ideas from the t r a n s i t o r y and

p a r t i c u l a r sense impressions which a r e f o r him the source

of a l l ideas . He proposes t h a t general i deas a r e formed

by taking note of only c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s i n t he mu l t i p l i c i -

t y of sense impressions which an object p resen ts u s with;

these f e a t u r e s have no reference t o the e x i s t e n t i a l

uniqueness of the object : "Ideas become general by sepa-

r a t i n g from them the circumstances f o time and place and

any o ther i deas t h a t may determine them t o t h i s o r t h a t

p a r t i c u l a r existence.lt l Book I11 of Lockets Essax i s - -

e n t i t l e d O f Words, and i s e x p l i c i t l y concerned with the - expression and communication of ideas ; i t i s from t h i s

book t h a t Ward obta ins some of h i s most s t imulat ing ideas

on language.

4.1.1.1. Lockets Division of Ideas

Locke divides the i deas t h a t we have i n our minds

i n t o four major categories: simple ideas , complex ideas

of substance, complex ideas of r e l a t i o n , and complex ideas

of mixed modes. Adjectives denoting s ing l e physical

p rope r t i e s would s ign i fy simple ideas ; gold , when i t s i m -

p ly means a colour, i s the example t h a t Locke uses. But

gold would s ign i fy a complex idea of substance when it

! r e f e r s t o the metal , and i n t h i s case would be composed

1 . Locke, op. c i t . , I I I . i i i . 6 .

of a c o l l e c t i o n of simple) i d e a s r e p r e s e n t i n g i t s colour ,

m a l l e a b i l i t y , weight, va lue , e t c . ; we have complex i d e a s

of substance of a l l n a t u r a l o b j e c t s qua o b j e c t s . Man - s i g n i f i e s a complex i d e a of substance, but i f a man i s - considered as a f a t h e r , t hen t h i s i s a complex i d e a of

r e l a t i o n ; i d e a s of r e l a t i o n a r e i d e a s of cause, e f f e c t ,

i d e n t i t y , and convent ional o r n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s ;

Aaron says: "For i n s t a n c e if of Caius I say he i s a man,

t h i s i s d e s c r i b i n g him p o s i t i v e l y , but i f I say he i s a

husband, t h i s l a t t e r i s a pure ly r e l a t i v e term, and I -.

s i g n i f y more than Caius he re , I s i g n i f y another person." 1

Locke d e s c r i b e s complex i d e a s of mixed modes thus: I

Modes I c a l l such complex i d e a s which, however compounded, con ta in no t i n them t h e suppos i t ion of subsisting by themselves, but a r e considered as dependences on, o r a f f e c t i o n s of substances; such as a r e t h e i d e a s s i g n i f i e d by t h e words t r i a n g l e , g r a t i t u d e , murder, e t c . 2

Ward's choice of examples appears t o r e f l e c t an

a t tempt t o d e a l wi th t h e u n i v e r s a l i s t language which

caused d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e e m p i r i c i s t ' s p o s i t i o n . Locke

had t o account f o r t h e a b s t r a c t terms i n language and

d i d so by choosing t o d i s c u s s f a i r l y concre te a b s t r a c t

1 . Aaron, op. c i t . , p. 181.

2 . I I . x i i . 4 .

I such as triangle and murder. He subsumed all

qualities that were universal rether than particular

under the catch-all category of mixed modes. Ideas of

substance are ideas of things that subsist by themselves, 2

while mixed modes are taffections' of something else.

In Lockets discussion of ideas he seems to have been con-

cerned with describing the ideas of things and qualities.

He does not consider explicitly the ideas attached to verbs.

However, we are not concerned so much with Lockets inten-

tions as with Ward's understanding of those intentions.

There is sufficient ambiguity in Lockets discussions for

Ward to perceive grammatical correlates in Lockets dis-

tinctions. Simple ideas correspond to adjectives, ideas

,f substance to s~bst~tives, but mixed modes could be

interpreted either as abstract nouns or second order

nominals (nouns derived from verbs or adjectives), or as

verbs. In this passage Locke appears to be referring to

1. I am grateful to Jonathan Bennett for suggestions about Lockets mixed modes,

2. Locke describes them thus:

The ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed or confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief, (I1 .xii.6.)

abstract nouns :

The names and essences of mixed modes have nothing but what is common to them with other ideas; but . . . they have something peculiar. The first particularity is that abstrzct ideas or the essences . . . of mixed modes are made by the - understandin~ wherein they differ from those of simple ideas. In the next place, these essences of the species of mixed modes are not only made by the mind, but made very arbitrzrily.1

Locke also refers to mixed modes as actions, and here

they would seem to refer to verbs:

Besides, the greatest part of mixed modes, being actions which perish in their birth, are not capable of lasting duration, as substances which are the actors, and wherein the simple ideas that make up the complex ideas designed by the name have a lasting union.2

4.1.1.2. Ward's Use of Lockets Ideas

Lockets discussion of mixed modes is unclear, pro-

bably because Locke himself was unclear, but in any case

Ward makes little attempt to follow this discussion of

ideas as it stands. There are, however, a number of

important correspondences and borrowings. He accepts

completely Lockets distinction between words, ideas, and

things. Ward discusses the correspondence of grammatical

categories, not to things in the world, as did the

!

Modistae, but to distinctive types of ideas or concep-

tions in the mind: "The whole plan of the application of

language takes its immediate original from the nature of

the conceptions which the mind of man forms and affixes

to substantives and verbs; and not from the nature of the

objects whence the conceptions are formed."' A detailed

analysis of Ward's use of the term 'idea' is given in

the following chapter. Ward makes a distinction (corre- 6

sponding to Locke's distinction between ideas of substance,

and ideas of mixed modes) between words whose annexed - -

conception denotes a principle of existence with a foun-

dation in the world and those whose conceptions denote '

a principle of existence which is given by the under-

standing; this distinguishes abstract and concrete nouns.

He talks of verbs as having an ninconstant principle of

existencet1 because they denote transitory states. This

inconstant principle is again based on Ward's understand-

ing of Lockets analysis of mixed modes ''which perish in

their birth."

4.1.1.3. Mixed Modes as a Source of Ward's Linguistic

Relativity Theory

Lockels discussion of mixed modes appears to have

stimulated Ward to some comments on language differences

and the problem of t r ans l a t i on . Locke says t h a t mixed

modes a r e a r b i t r a r y c rea t ions of man:

But i n i t s complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a l i b e r t y not t o follow the ex i s t - ence of th ings exact ly .... I n t he making there fore of the species of mixed modes men have had regard only t o such combinations as they had occasion t o mention one t o another. These they have combined i n t o d i s t i n c t complex ideas and given names t o , whi ls t o thers t h a t i n na ture have a near union a r e l e f t loose and unregarded. 1

Following from t h i s Ward sees a uniformity i n a l l lang-

uages i n t h e naming of n a t u r a l ob jec t s and animals

(Lockets complex ideas of substance), but no t i n t h e

naming of a r t i f a c t s and i n s t i t u t i o n s of soc ie ty (which

a r e represented by ideas of mixed modes); here the se-

l e c t i o n of i deas i s made according t o what soc ie ty sees

as important: "such combinations as they had occasion t o

mention one t o another.ll2 This w i l l present problems i n

t r a n s l a t i o n from the language of one cu l tu re t o t h a t of

another: "It comes t o pass t h a t t he re i s l i t t l e agreement

amongst t he conceptions annexed t o names o f species , which

t ake t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s from i n s t i t u t i o n s pecu l ia r t o

each nat ion. And t h i s i s one p r inc ipa l reason why

these languages cannot be. t r ans l a t ed one i n t o another.

4.1.1.4. Ideas of Relat ion and Ward's T r a n s i t i v i t y Theory

Probably the most far-reaching, though not the most

obvious use t h a t Ward made of Lockets d iv i s ion of ideas ,

i s h i s use of the ideas o f r e l a t i o n , Ward f e l t i t w a s a

grammarian's t a sk t o d ivide nouns i n t o species according

t o the kinds of species discoverable i n nature ; t h i s w a s

an amusing pastime f o r e a r l i e r grammarians, but w a s of

l i t t l e r e a l use i n the grammatical ca tegor iza t ion of

language,-- One species t h a t Ward f i n d s among nouns i s

t h e "co r r e l a t i ve speciest t which comprises a l l nouns t h a t

Locke would have sa id s ign i fy i deas of r e l a t i o n , A

parent i s "an object generat ing," and an of f spr ing Itan

ob jec t generatedgt; mention of one introduces i n the mind

a not ion of the o ther , o r a s Aaron says of Caius: " I f

I say he i s a husband, the l a t t e r i s a purely r e l a t i v e

term, and I s ign i fy more than Caius here , I s ign i fy ano-

t h e r person.812 The idea of r e l a t i o n i s not important i n

Ward's d iscuss ion of nouns, but he extends the discuss ion

of r e l a t i o n t o suggest t h a t one grammatical s t ruc tu re w i l l

c a l l f o r t h i n the mind i t s r e l a t e d transform:

1, p * 37. I

2, Aaron, p. 181.

Hence it i s c l e a r , t h a t t h e concept ion of e i t h e r s p e c i e s of any c o r r e l a t i v e p a i r , supposes t h e concept ion of t h e o t h e r s p e c i e s of t h e same p a i r . And i t w i l l appear , when we speak of t h e corresponding a c t i v e and pass ive s t a t e s of any one and t h e same t r a n s i t i v e verb , t h a t e i t h e r of them supposes t h e o the r ; so t h a t i f t h e ve rb which expresses e i t h e r of t h e s t a t e s be men- t i o n e d , t h e r e i s no need t o mention t h a t which expresses t h e o t h e r ; but any c e r t a i n mark, o r s i g n , appropr ia t ed f o r t h e purpose, i s s u f f i - c i e n t t o d i r e c t t h e h e a r e r t o supply i n h i s own mind t h e ve rba l s t a t e , e i t h e r pass ive o r a c t i v e , which i s t h e c o r r e l a t i v e t o t h a t which i s ac t ive - l y mentioned.

This specu la t ion on t h e extens ion of Lockets i d e a of I

r e l a t i o n i s seminal i n forming Ward's a n a l y s i s of t h e

t r a n s i t i v e sentence type. On account of some incons is -

t e n c i e s i n t h e Essay on Grammar t h e r e seems l i t t l e doubt - t h a t Ward developed h i s theory while he w a s a c t u a l l y

w r i t i n g t h e grammar; t h e r e i s l i k e w i s e l i t t l e doubt t h a t

Locke t s d i scuss ion of r e l a t i o n w a s t h e i n s p i r a t i o n of

h i s theory of t h e t r a n s i t i v e cons t ruc t ion . The theory

w i l l be f u l l y d iscussed i n Chapter V I I .

4 . 1 5 . P a r t i c l e s

I d e a s a r e s i g n i f i e d by words, and conversely moat,

but not a l l words s i g n i f y ideas . Those t h a t do no t s ig-

n i f y i d e a s a r e d iscussed by Locke i n h i s chap te r O f

P a r t i c l e s :

1 . Ward, p.40.

Besides words which are the names of ideas in the mind, there are a great many others that are made use of to signify the con- nexion that the mind gives to ideas or pro- positions, one with another . . . . The mir~d needs other signs to show or intimate some particular action of its own at that time relating to those ideas. This it does several ways, as is and is not are the gen- eral marks of themind, E i n g or deny- ing. But besides affirmation or negation, without which there is in words no truth or falsehood, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to others connect not only the parts of propositbns but whole sentences one to another, with their several relations and dependencies, to make a coherent dis- course.

Man must observe the dependence of his thoughts and reasonings one upon another: and to express well such methodical and rational thoughts, he must have words to show what connexion, restriction, distinct- ion, opposition, emphasis etc. he gives to each part of his discourse . . . . These words not truly by themselves the names of any ideas are of such constant and indispen- sable use in language. 1

Particles are concerned with the connexion of ideas, and

it is the problem of connecting ideas which motivates

Ward to write his grammar; he says his primary intention

is to account "for the several modes of proceeding by

which those conceptions are again united into conceptions

more and more complex at pleasure. This is by much the

most difficult part of grmmar, and, as Mr. Locke com-

plained long ago, has not been sufficiently attended

to."' Locke says that particles are used to connect

subject and attribute; these particles are the copula

in its positive and negative form: is and is not. Lockets - discussion of the copula appears to be not so different

from the Port Royal proposal that the verb is essentially

an affirmation. Such a view is totally rejected by Ward, 2

and he never discusses the copula as an affirmation word.

His proposal for the joining of noun and verb is never-

theless remarkably similar to Lockets; Locke says that

the function of the copula is to assert that the idea . -

represented by the subject and the idea represented by

the attribute are present together in the same larger

unit; Ward says that when a noun and verb are in con-

struction the conceptions denoted by each unite to form

one larger conception and become "an object of the species

1. Ward, p. fv. The passage from Locke to which Ward is referring is:

But though prepositions and conjunctions etc. are names well known in grammar, and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions, yet he who would show the right use of particles, and what significance and force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing.

They are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind; and therfore to understand them

I rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations and several other thoughts of the mind . . . are to be diligently studied. (111.vii.3.)

whereof t h e s t a t e i s t h e c r a r a c t e r i s t i c .l" Aff i rmation

f o r Locke o r t h e construcLion of t h e noun with t h e V e r b

d e f i n i t i v e M f o r Ward i s a recogn i t ion of i d e n t i t y r a t h e r

t h a n a s tatement of a f f i r m a t i o n , " A i s bl1 becomes Itab,"

whereas t h e t r a d i t i o n a l l o g i c i a n and even t h e Por t Royal

l o g i c i a n s e e s 'la i s bw as a statement t h a t Itone of t h e

p r o p e r t i e s of a i s b-ness.I1 While t h e d i v i d i n g l i n e

between t h e s e two p o s i t i o n s may seem f i n e , i t r e f l e c t s

important d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e concept ion of language. The

P o r t Royal view of t h e a f f i r m a t i o n as t h e s i g n a l of judg- --

ment i n a p r o p o s i t i o n s e e s language as a t o o l f o r ana-

l y s i n g and d i s s e c t i n g t h e un ive r se , whereas Locke and

Ward s e e language as a process of a d d i t i o n i n t h e mind.

Our mind i s f u l l of i s o l a t e d i d e a s , and t h e f u n c t i o n of

language i s t o s i g n i f y t h e jo in ing of t h e s e d i s p a r a t e

i d e a s t o g e t h e r , so as t o bu i ld from them a p i c t u r e of

t h e un ive r se which w i l l enable u s t o communicate t o ano-

t h e r person t h e concept ions we have. It i s t h e s t r e s s on

t h e communicative s i d e of language which i s t h e s i g n i f i -

c a n t a spec t of Ward's theory , and Locke i s d i r e c t l y r e s -

pons ib le f o r t h i s emphasis,

4.1 . I - 6 . The Re la t ion of Ideas and Words

I n s p i t e of t h e c r e d i t given t o Locke f o r h i s found-

i n g of t h e empir ica l school of philosophy, many of h i s

ideas have been severely criticized by philosophers, I

particularly his views on lamguage. His proposal that

ideas exist independently of words has been rejected in-

asmuch as no one has been able to give an empirical ac-

count of the thought process before it is expressed in

any symbolic medium. Wittgenstein points out the vacuity

of Lockets argument in - - The Blue Book: "It is misleading

then to talk of thinking as a 'mental activity.' We may

say that thinking is essentially the activity of operating

with signsattl Lockets separation of the idea or content

from the sign or the vehicle of expression is not accept-

able to his critics. However, this separation of word

and thought is of considerable importance when adapted

to Ward's theory of language. Ward suggests that the

idea can have several characteristics, and the particular

characteristics it has will determine the form of the

word which is later attached to it. Thus the idea WHITE

may have Ita mark of constant existence which is not attend-

ed to;" this will mean that it has the form of an ad-

jective: white; on the other hand, the principle of

existence may be attended to, in which case the idea or

conception will have the noun whiteness attached to it.

Something similar occurs when certain ideas or character-

istics arc withdrawn from the complex conception; here

the complex idea is represented not by different gramma-

1. Ludwig Wittgcnstein, --- The Blue and Brown - 9 Books (Oxford, 1964), p . 6 .

tical categories, but by different words altogether:

Locke suggests that Itman and horse can be subsumed under

animal, by taking away particular parts of these separate

complex ideasu1 and Ward makes use of the distinction

between idea and word to elaborate a theory of pronominal-

ization, which clearly owes much to Lockets suggestion

that distinguishing characteristics can be withdrawn.

Lockets account of the idea/word distinction, as taken

over by Ward, is not an unrealistic or useless linguistic

assumption when considered as a level of abstraction rather

than of physical separation; the idea corresponds closely

to what linguists today call a bundle of semantic features.

The occurrence of a lexeme signifies that certain semantic

features are present; thus the word - man would appear to I

consist of several semantic features including the follow-

ing: i) human, ii) adult, and iii) male; these contrast

its meaning with that of -9 bull child, and woman respectively.

Linguists who accept that the meaning of words can be

atomized in this way into semantic features will have no

trouble in accepting Ward's interpretation of Lockets

idea/word distinction in spite of the absurdity of some

aspects of Lockets original formulation. 2

2. A full discussion of the philosophical debate over Lockets dichotomy between idea and word is out of place here. D. J. OtConnor outlines the arguments against Lockets position in Chapter 6 of his book John Locke. -

4.1.2. David Hartley: Observations on Man (1749)

Hartleyts main contribution to psychological theory

is his extension of Lockets account of the doctrine of

association to account for the interaction of the spirit-

ual and material in man; he puts forward a theory of phy-

sical vibrations which are in perfect correspondence with

a parallel set of intellectual vibrations. Among other

4.1.1.7. Summa.ry of Lockets Influence

Lockets philosophy enabled Ward to bread away from

the traditional concept of the idea as an objective copy

of reality.' He was then able to discuss translation

difficulties, and to offer at least a weak version of

the linguistic relativity hypothesis. The novelty of

this approach to the idea is discussed in the following

chapter, Locke provided a means for Ward to differen-

tiate the parts of speech not on a semantic or logical

basis, but - - on a psychological basis, according to the

kind of idea or conception to which they were attached.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of Lockets philosophy

is the fact that it enabled Ward to recognize that the

word was not the ultimate unit in linguistic analysis,

and could be broken down into its semantic components,

1. An account of the development of the idea in linguistic theory is given in the following chapter.

t h ings t h i s o f f e r s an a c c ~ u n t of language and i t s con-

nect ion with thought: atwords and phrases must e ~ c i t e

Ideas i n u s by Association, and they exc i t e ideas i n u s

by no o ther means."' The ideas t h a t most words exc i te

a r e simple ideas , but they coalesce t o form complex ideas ,

and these complex ones coalesce t o form more complex ones:

"And . . . i t may appear . . . t h a t simple Ideas of sen-

s a t i o n must run i n t o c l u s t e r s and combinations, by Asso-

c i a t i o n ; and t h a t each of these w i l l , a t l a s t , coalesce

i n t o one complex i d e a O u 2 - -

ideas coalescing t o form

statement of coalescence

p lex ones i s much c lo se r

Locke had spoken of the simple

complex ones, but Har t ley ' s

of complex ideas i n t o more corn-

t o Ward's own view. For Ward,

every noun, ad j ec t ive , o r verb indicated some kind of

conception, which he usua l ly ca l l ed a complex conception;

when two words were uni ted i n const ruct ion Ward described

the conceptions as coalescing t o form one s ing le more

complex conception. Only occasionally did Locke d i scuss

coalescence above the l e v e l of the word; with Hartley t h i s

i s a constant theme.

4.1.2.1. Hartley and Rational Grammar

Hartley considers t h a t h i s theory of assoc ia t ion of

1 . David Hart ley, Observations on Man, H i s Frame, H i s Duty, - and H i s Expectations, (London, lng),p.268, --

ideas will have important,ramifications in the field of

rational grammar: '!It follows from the Proposition [that

words and phrases excite ideas in us by association] that

the Arts of Logic a ~ d rational Grammar depend entirely on

the Doctrine of Association. For Logic, considered as

the Art of Thinking or Reasoning, treats only of such

Ideas as are annexed to Words;" he is suggesting that

his analysis of words joining together to form more complex I

I

conceptions be used as the starting point of a grammatical

analysis, and Ward willingly takes up his challenge: - -

have accounted for the several modes of proceeding by

which these conceptions are again united into conceptions

more and more complex at pleasure. ,I 2

4.1.2.2. Hartley's Views on Language Structure

Hartley himself makes a number of interesting gen-

eral remarks about language structure in the context of

a discussion about how a child learns his language; he

sees the child as conditioned to learn the meaning of

words by constant repetition, and coupling of the sound

with what it represents: "The Association of the Picture

of the Nurse will by degrees overpower all the accidental

Associations of this Picture with other Words, and be so

1. Ibid., p. 270.

2. Ward, op. cit., p. iv.

firmly cemented at last, that the Picture will excite 4

the idea of the word.lt' Hartley emphasizes one important

point about language learning which appears to contradict

his analysis of speech as a process of coalescence: it is

that we learn a language by learning the sentences of the

language rather than the individual words: "Both Children

and Adults learn the Ideas belonging to whole Sentences

many times in a summary Way, and not by adding together

the Ideas of the several Words in the sentenceOu2 Locke

has been much criticized by philosophers of language for - -

proposing that word meaning is prior to sentence meaning,

and sentence meaning is always to be derived from an addi-

tion of word meanings. We get the i~pression from Locke

that by adding words together we create conceptions more

and more complex until we get final complex conception,

which is the sentence. Lockets position is clearly un-

tenable as a model of language learning because word

meanings are normally only learnt in sentential contexts.

Hartley is not contradicting himself and Ward is not com-

promised by tacitly accepting Lockets approach; it is

perfectly true that sentence meaning is a composite of

the meaning of the words and the structural meaning. 3

1. Hartley, op. cit., p. 271.

2. Op. cit., p. 274. 3. See for example, J. J. Katz and J. Fodor, "The Structure of a Semantic Theory," Q., 39. 170-210.

The point i s t h a t Locke's,account i s not a v a l i d ana lys i s

of the way languages a r e l e a r n t , but i t i s perhaps a

v a l i d account of how a language, once l e a r n t , i s used.

Har t ley i s perceptive i n no t ic ing and cor rec t ing Locke's

shortcoming; Ward never ac tua l ly considers the nature of

language lea rn ing , Hart ley shows even more perception

when he discusses how, having l e a r n t a language, chi ldren

possess a s e t of r u l e s , with which they can form new

sentences: "The r u l e s of Etymology and Syntax determine

the app l ica t ion and purport of words i n many cases; agree- - -

ably t o which we see , t h a t Children, while ye t unacquaint-

ed with the Propr ie ty of Words and Phrases, which Custom

es t ab l i shes , o f ten make new Words and Constructi'on, which

. . . a r e ye t analogous t o the Tenor of the language, i n

which they speak.''' I t i s remarkable t h a t a view so s i m i -

l a r t o the modern views of language lea rn ing should be

proposed: Hartley i s suggesting t h a t i n l ea rn ing a lang-

uage we i n t e r n a l i z e a system of ru les . This view i s

r e f l e c t e d i n Ward's own approach t o language and grammar

teaching, which i s t o reveal what i s i n a sense already

known, r a t h e r than t o impart r u l e s , 2

4.1.2.3. Har t l ey ' s Word Classes and the Analogy with Algebra

The discuss ion of language lea rn ing leads Hartley t o

1 . Hart ley, op. c i t . , p. 282.

2 . This i s discussed i n Chapter I.

see four different classes of words. He distinguishes:

1: Such as have Ideas only. 2: Such as have both Ideas and ~efinitibns. 3: Such as have Definitions only. 4: Such as have neither Ideas nor Definitions.

These may be equated with different classes of ideas in

Lockets analysis of ideas: the first class are Lockets

simple ideas, which, being simple, cannot be defined.

The second class are his complex ideas of substance,

which may be defined by enumerating simple ideas of which

they are composed; the third class are abstract ideas, or

mixed modes, which do not have exact counterparts in rea-

lity, and therefore, according to Hartley, but not Locke,

are made up of ideas. The fourth class is equivalent to

Locke's particles, and Hartleyts comments on this class

are interesting:

Lastly, Words of the Fourth Class.answer to the algebraic Signs for addition, Subtraction, &c. to Indexes, Coefficients, &c. These are not algebraic quantities themselves; but they alter the Import of the Letters that are; just as Particles vary the Sense of the principal Words of a Sentence, and yet signify nothing of them- selves. 1

Hartley refers to the principal word classes as algebraic

quantities, and to particles as the signs of algebraic

operations. When Ward discusses the fact that different

prepositions can be arranged with substantives to produce

Y , ,

1. Hartley, op. cit., p. 280.

t h e same meaning, he f o l l ~ w s Har t ley i n t h e analogy wi th

a lgebra :

This i s no more than comes t o pass i n estima- t i n g a l l k inds of q u a n t i t y , so as t o express t o express t h e r e s u l t of t h e process i n al- gebra ic spec ies : . . . . And t o c a r r y on t h e resemblance f a r t h e r , a f i c t i t i o u s q u a n t i t y i s always introduced merely t o assist t h e mind i n r e g i s t e r i n g t h e s t e p s of t h e process ; and t h i s q u a n t i t y i s f r e q u e n t l y p lace i n t o a f i c t i t i o u s s t a t e , t ill t h e r e s u l t of t h e opera t ion a r i s e s , i n which whatsoever w a s f i c t i t i o u s i s asce r t a ined . T h i s proceeding i n a l g e b r a i s made use of merely t o a i d t h e l i m i t e d powers of t h e mind of ma, and t h e l i k e kind of proceeding i n language i s made u s e of on t h e very same account . I

Here t h e p r e p o s i t i o n i s compared t o a n a l g e b r a i c symbol of

unknown va lue , and i t s value i s determined from t h e con-

t e x t ; t h e u s e of context i n determining t h e s i g n i f i c a t i o n

o f words such as b~ o r t o i s se l f -evident . I n h i s pre- - f a c e Ward t a l k s about ' c a s e t and s t r u c t u r a l markers a c t -

i n g as s i g n s which r e q u i r e t h e mind t o perform c e r t a i n

opera t ions :

I t has long been observed, t h a t a l g e b r a i c s p e c i e s , when used i n connected s e r i e s , form a kind of lang- uage a p p l i c a b l e t o q u a n t i t y only; and t h e reason why t h e s e a r t i f i c i a l marks do so , i s ev iden t ly be- cause t h e l e t t e r s express concept ions similar t o those which a r e denoted by noun s u b s t a n t i v e s , and t h e s i g n s by which t h e l e t t e r s a r e connected, de- n o t e d i s c u r s i v e a c t s similar t o those which a r e denoted by t h e s i g n s of cases , w h i l s t t h e mark of

1. Ward, op. c i t . , p. 244.

e q u a l i t y denotes affirmation . . . . I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e [ a lgebra ic ] s i g r ~ s do no t perform these opera t ions , but a r e only marks invented t o r e g i s t e r t h e s e v e r a l k inds of d i s c u r s i v e opera t ions by which t h e mind pro- ceeds i n i t s i n v e s t i g a t i o n ; and t h e s i g n s of cases a r e exac t ly of t h e same n a t u r e wi th t h e s e s i g n s , only l e s s d e f i n i t e and p r e c i s e . Now s u r e l y no man w i l l say t h a t t h e r e a r e no genera l p r i n c i p l e s on which t h e app l i - c a t i o n of a l g e b r a i c s p e c i e s proceeds, and i f t h i s cannot be s a i d , n e i t h e r can i t be t r u l y s a i d , t h a t t h e r e a r e no genera l p r i n c i p l e s on which t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of lang- uage proceeds. And i f t h e former a r e l e a r - l y d iscovered , why may no t t h e l a t t e r . $

Har t l ey and Ward a r e t h e first people t o make a compari- I

son of t h i s kind between a lgebra and language. I a n Michael

n o t e s Ward's r e fe rence t o a lgebra2 and two o t h e r i s o l a t e d

comparisons of t h e same kind: John Sedger, ic - The S t r u c t u r e

o f t h e E r g l i s h Language (1798) compares a u x i l i a r i e s with -- t h e s i g n s of a lgebra , and t h e 1797 e d i t i o n of t h e Ency-

chpaedia Bri tanri ica (Be p. 56) t e l l s u s "The o f f i c e of

t h e v e r b . . . seems t o be merely t h i s : 'To jo in toge the r

t h e s u b j e c t and p r e d i c a t e of a p r o p o s i t i o n ' ; i t s powers

a r e analogous t o those of t h e s ign + i n Algebra."

Michael d e s c r i b e s such r e f e r e n c e s as "extremely r a r e u

and sugges ts t h a t they a r e antecedents of George Boo le t s ,

l i n k i n g of language and a lgebra ; he does no t observe

1 , Op. c i t , , p. v i .

2. Michael, op. c i t . , p. 514. Michael d i scusses o t h e r r e f e r e n c e s t o a lgebra on p. 418.

that it was David Martley who made the first extended

comparison of language and algebra about a hundred years

before Boole.

4.1.2.4. A Seminal Semantic Theory

Hartleygs speculations on the relation of language

and thought have some interesting implications for seman-

tic theory that Ward appears to have taken over. Hartley

discusses how we acquire the meaning of words and suggests

that words have a central core of meaning and additional

meanings which they take on when in association with other

words. The words they collocate with determine to some

extent their semantic features: "Thus the word white--

being associated with the visible appearances of Milk,

Liner*, Paper, gets a stable power of exciting the Idea

of what is common to all, and a variable one in respect of

the particularities, circumstances and adjuncts. ltl Ward

goes even further than Hartley in stating that these words

will have certain selection restrictions; he properly does

not attempt to state the rules for these. He then clear-

ly reiterates Hartleygs point that the substantive deter-

mines the precise semantic content of the adjective:

It is manifest that the judgement must be exerted before any adjective can be joined consistently with the word on which it depends; for every

1. Hartley, op. cit., p. 273.

adjective cannot coalesce with every substan- tive; nor can any rules be given to shew what substantives or verbs a particular adjective may depend upon . . . . The conception denoted by one and the same adjective is modified in the mind, so as to suit the nature of every different object, or state, upon the name of which such adjective is made to depend . . . . The quality denoted by Mgoodll is as different as the nature of the objects to which the same adjective is applied.1

A comparison of the two passages does not offer conclusive I

evidence that Ward has taken this idea from Hartley; how-

ever, the obviously close reading which Ward gave to t

Hartley means that Hartleyts discussion of the meaning I

of the word white cannot have escaped him, and probably

did inspire his om reflections on semantics.

4.1.2.5. Summary of Hartley's Influence

Ward is indebted to Hartley for stating many of the

suggestions offered by Loeke in a form much more suitable

for the grammarian to accomodate. Hartley's account of

the coalescence of conceptions at sentence level expanded

considerably Lockets seminal ideas ori this subject;

Hartley's account of how a child learns language produced

completely new insights; his views on an internalized

grammar were useful to Ward in establishing what the func-

tion of grammatical teaching should be. His considerations

1. Ward, op. cit., p. 116.

of semantics were also extremely novel (although the

Bodistae had recognized the need for collocational suit-

ability or 'congruitasg ) . Hartley's most significant

influence is his attempt to compare algebra and language.

This had far-reaching possibilities which Ward made use

of throughout his account of grammatical construction,

and particularly in his accou~t of the meaning of prepo-

sitions. Hartleyts interest in larguage forms but a small

part of his Observations of Man. His whole plan is - offered as a possible explanation of the tension between

- - I

the spiritual and the material in man. &ard accepts his

views on language, and with more dogmatism thar. Hartley ,

shows; Ward never considers the possibility that his ex-

planations may have very little empirical validity.

Hartley was very conscious of his limitations; however,

he felt that even if his theory was incorrect, it was

a mode of understanding some of the phenomena that were

little understood in his day; an incorrect understanding

was much more than no understanding at all. Hartley gave

Ward the impetus to explore language in its psychological

dimensions, dimensions that had been virtually ignored

for the last four centuries,

4.1 - 3 . Claude Buffier: Grammaire Franpoi se sur un Plan Nouveau (1741)

Ward says that he found great help in Buffierts

grammar; i t seems t h a t he w a s t h e only English grammarian

t o make use of E'rench grammars o t h e r than t h e P o r t Royal

grammar. French was taught i n schools , and i t would seem

t h a t grammars such as B u f f i e r ' s , though l i t t l e s u i t e d f o r

t each ing Englishmen French, found t h e i r way i n t o England

f o r t h e purposes of i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e language r a t h e r

t h a n on accourLt of i n t e r e s t i n t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l view-

p o i n t . I n an age t h a t w a s t r y i n g t o break f r e e from t h e

v i c e - l i k e g r i p of t h e L a t i n grammatical t r a d i t i o n i t i s

unders tandable t h a t grammars o t h e r than Engl ish grammars

should be ignored by grammarians. However, French had

f a r more i n common with Efiglish than L a t i n had, and Ward

was a b l e t o d i scover many s t i m u l a t i n g i d e a s i n B u f f i e r l s

Like Arfiauld, t o whom he w a s obviously g r e a t l y in-

debted, B u f f i e r recognized an i n t i m a t e connection between

language and thought , t h a t would in f luence a l l t h e sc iences

i n c l u d i n g theology:

. . . puisque 1 ' a r t d l a r r a n g e r l e s mots, a conngxion e s s e n t i e l l e avec l a manibre d l a r r a n g e r l e s pensees. C 1 e s t par-l$ q u l i l f e r t de base aux p l u s hau tes sc iences , e t sur tout ,& l a Logique: e t q u l i l f o u r n i t des re 'gles, oh l a Theolo i e m&e e s t quelquefois obligke d ' a v o i r recours . f

1. Claude Buff ie r , Grammaire Fran o i s e s u r un Plan Nouveau, Nouvelle Ed i t ion , ( p a r i s , I t / 5 4 ] ) 7 - -

The reference to theologg reflects the theological debates

that Arnauld entered into, and reminds us of his attempt

to defend the doctrine of tran"substafitiation with his

grammatical definition of the pronoun.

4.1.3.1. Grammar, Particular and Universal

Buffier follows Sanctius in his discontent with the

usual methods of defining the parts of speech, claiming

that they are long, ambiguous, and often circular! He

says that it is necessary to pay more attention to their

natural relations with each other and their mutual depend-

ence:

~ n e d6faut qui semble les regarder toutes: savoir qulon ne fait point assez sentir leur rapport mutuel, leur arrangement, leur d6pendance; ce qulelles ont dlessentiel selon llordre naturel, et ce que llusage ou la pr6vention y ont ajout6 dlarbitraire. 1

It is not possible to make a language fit a preconceived

and fossilized grammar:

Tout au contraire clest essentielement ramma ma ire de slajuster aux langues pour lesquelles elle est faite, & dont elle nlest pour ainsi dire que $e tgmoin ou ltanalyse. Les langues nlont pas etk faites pour la Grammaire, mais la Grammaire pour les langues: elle doit servir k les enseigner ?i ceux ui ne les savent pas: 9 mais en les supposant d ja &tablies telles qulelles sont; puisqulil seroit ridicule de prdtendre rnontrer ce qui nlexisteroit pas dkj$.

1. Op. cit., p. 5.

-. De-la v i e n t que chaqve langue, pour G t r e b ien a p r i s e , d o i t a v o i r sa Grammaire p a r - t i c u l i k e ; & ce qui a f a i t t a n t d~ mauvaises Grammaires,, c t e s t d t a v o i r voulu a p l i q u e r c e l l e qui e t o i t 2 ~ p r o p r e $$ 'une,langue, 5 une a u t r e langue t o u t e d i f e r e n t e .

Buf f i e r h a s been quoted a t l e n g t h he re on account of h i s

sound views on grammar as a d e s c r i p t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r

language, r a t h e r than as a u n i v e r s a l system which i s

superimposed on language. He does, however, recognize

t h a t t h e r e w i l l be c e r t a i n t h i n g s i n common t o a l l lang-

uage s : --

I1 s e t rouve essen t i e l l ement dans t o u t e s , ce que l a Phi losophie y consid&e, en l e s regard,ant comrne l e s express ions n a t u r e l l e s de nos pensees; c a r cornme l a n a t u r e a m i s un o rd re ndcessa i re e n t r e nos penskes, e l l e a m i s p a r une conskquence i n f a i l l i b l e , un ordre ne 'cessaire dans l e s langues.

The necessary o rde r r e s i d e s i n t h e r ecogn i t ion of t h r e e

u n i t s i n language: t h e r e a r e those which s i g n i f y f ) " l e

s u j e t dont on p a r l e , " i i ) I t c e q u t o n a f f i rme ," and i i i )

I t les c i r cons tances de P u n & de l ' a ~ t r e , ~ ' . This i s very

d i f f e r e n t from t h e P o r t Royal d i v i s i o n of t h e p a r t s of

speech: t h e l i n k between t h e noun and t h e ve rb i s one of

a f f i r m a t i o n , but t h e ve rb i s - n o t t h e a f f i r m a t i o n i t s e l f ,

as i n t h e P o r t Royal grammar, but i s what i s af f i rmed

2. Op. c i t . , p. 9.

of t h e sub jec t . The noun'and t h e ve rb a r e t h e two

p r i n c i p a l p a r t s of speech, and they may both be modified

by adjuncts . ' Thus t h e bas ic s t r u c t u r e of t h e sentence

could be represented by t h e fol lowing:

( Noun ( Adjunct ) ) ( Verb ( Adjunct ) )

Buff ie r does no t d i s c u s s t h e f a c t t h a t adverbs w i l l modify /I//

t h e v e r b while a d j e c t i v e s w i l l modify t h e moun; i n h i s

d i s c u s s i o n of n a t u r a l syntax he s e e s them belonging t o a 8

common c l a s s of adjuncts. ' Ward breaks wi th t h e powerful Y

P o r t Royal t r a d i t i o n and fo l lows B u f f i e r f s p lan almost U

i d e n t i c a l l y . Ward s t a t e s t h a t Itthe noun and v e r b a r e t h e

p r i n c i p a l p a r t s of speech"3 and he cons ide r s t h a t t h e ad-

v e r b d e r i v e s i t s importance from t h e f a c t t h a t i t modif ies

nouns, a d j e c t i v e o r verbs , and completes o r c l o s e s t h e

cons t ruc t ion : "no t i ce i s given t h a t t h e concept ion i s

in tended t o modify some q u a l i t y denoted by an a d j e c t i v e ,

o r some s t a t e denoted by a ve rb which i s p l a c d i n con-

s t r u c t i o n with t h e adverb; w h i l s t t h e concept ion i t s e l f

1 . Le nom & l e verbe sont l e s p l u s e s s e n t i e l l e s p a r t i e s du language . . . Lfuce & L f a u t r e . . . s o n t s u s c e p t i b l e s de d i v e r s e s c i r cons tances ou modif icat ions: 'Le zk le sans

i prudence agi t temerairement. f f --Ibid., p. 44.

2. IfCette dernie 're s o r t de mots, qui ne se rven t q u 1 s mo- d i f i e r l e nom e t l e verbe n f a po in t de nom g&&al dans l e s grammaires o r d i n a i r e s . On nous permet t ra de l e s a p p e l e r i c i m o d i f i c a t i f ~ . ~ @ - - I b i d . , p. 45.

3. Ward, op. c i t . p. 11 .

denoted by the adverb, is ,not usually intended to be

modifiedeil' Buffier suggests that nouns occur in one of

two positions in sentences: they are either 18nominatifs

du verbe,ll when appearing in subject position, or "si le

nom est seulement employ&, pour exprimer 1 lobjet qui par-

ticularise la signification du .verbe, alors le nom est

apelk r&me du verbe;" Buffier gives the following sent-

ence as an example: llLe pasteur cono?t ses brebislt and

states that I1les brebis est le rc&ime du verbe, parce que I

- ctest llobjet qui particularise la signification du verbe Y

-

conoh, marquant en particulier ce que le Pasteur cono?t.ll

He continues, stressing the modifying function of the .

object of the transitive verb:

Quand les norns sont employe's c o m e r&gimzs & non pas c o m e nominatifs, ils sont dits etre en des cas obliques. Ces cas obliques des noms se distinguent 2ar les divers articles dont nous avons parle. 11s pouroient encore trss-bien stapeler cas modificatifs: car ce qui particularise la signification dlun mot la modifie aussi. 2

Ward's view of syntax is that the noun in the nominative

is the principal unit of the sentence, and that the verb

attached to it modifies its conception in a certain way,

and the noun following the verb modifies or limits the

1. Ibid., p. 213.

2. ope cit., pp. 57-58.

verb's conception very much a s any o ther modifier would.

Common t o the two descr ip t ions i s the f a c t t h a t the nouns

o ther than those i n the nominative a r e demoted f r o m t h e i r

s t a t u s as nouns t o t h a t of mere modifiers , I t should be

noted t h a t t h i s i s only one of two d i s t i n c t explanations

of t r a n s i t i v i t y t h a t Ward pu ts forward.

Ward discusses the verb be exact ly a s i f i t were any - o the r verb, whereas i t had been given spec i a l s t a t u s by

Sanct ius and Por t Royal, and had been known as the verb

substant ive , Buffier made the break with t h i s t r a d i t i o n --

before Ward and may have suggested the i dea t o him; he

discusses the sentence Vous $ t e s savantn a s i f i t had

exac t ly the same s t ruc tu re a s a t r a n s i t i v e sentence typeH

llvous s e r a l e nominatif , & savant s e r a l e rggime: parceque - savant p a r t i c u l a r i s e ce que vous @ t e s O w

Ward's Advance on Buf f ie r

Ward only mentions Buffier once, and t h i s i s i n a

discuss ion of the r e l a t i v e pronoun, where Ward ' s conclu-

s ions about i t a r e the same as B u f f i e r l s , but he f e e l s

t h a t h i s explanations a r e be t te r :

We have shown, t h a t the r e l a t i v e pronoun extends i t s s i g n i f i c a t i o n , so a s t o partake o f these connexions of i t s antecedent; and ther fore i t i s seldom considered s ingly and i n i t s e l f , as the name of any object . Hence Father Buff ier had ca l l ed the r e l a t i v e an incornpleat pronoun, and the personal and demonstrative pronouns compleat ones; because, he says he, these

f r e q u e n t l y s tand a lone f o r t h e names of o b j e c t s , which t h e r e l a t i v e pronouns do n o t , B u f f i e r g i v e s no reason why t h i s happens i n language, , which reason i s mani fes t ly t h a t g iven above.

I t seems t h a t Ward had g r e a t r e spec t f o r B u f f i e r t s grammar,

bu t f e l t t h a t he himself w a s a b l e t o go somewhat f u r t h e r

i n expla in ing t h e u n i v e r s a l phenomena of language, We s.ee

him claiming h i s s u p e r i o r i t y of explanat ion he re , and t h e r e

i s no doubt t h a t he f e l t t h a t h i s second and l a t e r expla- I

n a t i o n of t h e t r a n s i t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n w a s s u p e r i o r t o t h e

one suggested t o him by Buf f i e r .

4.1.3.3, E l l i p s i s

Sanc t ius and P o r t Royal had d iscussed t h e f u n c t i o n

of e l l i p s i s i n language, but i t i s B u f f i e r who most c l e a r -

l y i n d i c a t e s how c e r t a i n formal dev ices i n language serve

t o s i g n i f y t h e same t h i n g as a much longer locu t ion .

Thus he s e e s t h e impera t ive and t h e i n t e r r o g a t i v e moods

as s h o r t ways of saying what i s i n t h e mind: "Les i n t e r r o -

g a t i f s sont encore des termes du sup16ment: a i n s i d?tes-

vous c e l a ou quand viendrez vous s i g n i f i e n t je vous de-

mande si vous d l t e s c e l a , ou je vous demande quardvous

v iendrezn and ItLes imp&atifs d e s verbes qui sont pour

marquer l a volontk que nous avons qutun a u t r e f a s s e cer -

a i n e chose; a i n s i venez me t rouver s i g n i f i e je vous

ordonne, ou je vous c o n s e i l l e , ou je vous p r i e , ou je

1 . Ward, op. c i t . , pp. 146-7.

vous exhorte do me venir trouver.l1l He is spelling out

in a paraphrase the meaning of the structural devices

which mark the imperative and interrogative, Ward fol-

lows him in resolving imperatives and interrogatives to

affirmative sentences; his description of interrogatives

is part of a general discussion of interrogative pronouns:

To dispatch the subject of question in language all in one place, it is only necessary to observe, that when a question is not asked by the means of an interrogative pronoun, or an interrogative adverb . . . a supposition is made by the speaker concerning that which the question is about, and the speaker signifies his desire to be informed, whether that supposition is right or not; which signification is made by placing the nominative case after the verb. Thus, "1s Mr M-here?" is equivalent to the expression "1 would know whether the supposition express d in the words, Mr N- is here, be true or not?" 1

The paraphrase of the imperative mood is more straight-

forward :

We have already shewn, that a question always depends upon the words, "1 would know, or I would be told," or upon some sentence of the same import, And it is equally manifest, that a command always depends upon the words, !'I direct--1 ordain--I command" or on some sentence of the like import; for if the expression, Itdo this" be completed it will amount to the foll wing sentence, ltI direct that you do this." 3

1. Buffier, op. cit., pp. 81-2.

2. Ward, op. cit., pp. 151-2,

3. Ibid., p . 189.

Faraphrase as a mode of qesolving structural features

in language was not unknown in the preceding centuries,

but the closeness of Ward's analysis and BuffieA, the

almost parallel performative verbs used in the imperative

paraphrase (ordonner, corseiller, prier, and direct,

ordain, and command) suggest that Buffier's grammar is

the immediate source of Ward's resolution of imperatives

and interrogatives.

4.1.3.4. Summary of Buffier's Influence

Buffier is one of Ward's most important sources;his

analysis of transitivity, and oblique cases, his division

of the parts of speech, and his analysis of imperatives

and interrogatives are all taken over by Ward. It would

seem that Sanctius was one of the major sources of

Buffier's own work; but much research remains to be done

on the sources of many of the seventeenth and eighteenth

century grammarians. Vivian Salmon has pointed out that

most of the supposedly new or 'Cartesian' ideas in fact

have antecedents in Priscian, the Modistae, and some

little known Renaissance grammarians. 1

4.2. The Indirect Influence of Some Continental Grammarians -

One of the aspects of Ward which distinguish him

1. Vivian Salmon, Review of 'Cartesian Linguistics,' Journal - of Linguistics, V, 3 , 1969, 165-187.

from o t h e r Engl i sh grammarians i s t h e extens ive use he

made of t h e c o n t i n e n t a l grammatical t r a d i t i o n . H i s bor-

rowings from B u f f i e r has been examined. If t h e r e i s no t

any evidence of d i r e c t borrowing o r a b s o l u t e dependence

on Sanc t ius , Arnauld, and Fromant, t h e r e i s undoubtedly

ample evidence of i n d i r e c t ix f luence .

4.2.1. Franciscus Sanct ius: Minerva (1587)

Ward's r e fe rence t o Sanc t ius was perhaps more d u t i f u l

t h a n genuine. Sanc t ius was t h e one Renaissance grammarian

b e s i d e s t h e n a t i v e L i l y t h a t every Engl ish grammarian

knew of . There i s evidence i n t h e form of numerous edi-

t i o n s of Minerva t o show t h a t he w a s much read and widely

esteemed. Both Chornsky and Michael a t t e s t t h a t he i s t h e

most i n t e r e s t i n g of t h e Renaissance grammarians. He i s

d i scon ted wi th t h e t r a d i t i o n a l grammatical c a t e g o r i e s ,

mocks t h e i r weakness, and sugges ts t h a t more l o g i c a l

c r i t e r i a be used i n d e l i n e a t i n g them.' He bel ieved t h a t

reasons should be g iven f o r language; by t h i s i t seems

t h a t he meant a s e t of r u l e s ; language would be explained

by i t s conformity t o t h e s e r u l e s . One of t h e no t ions

t h a t he introduced t o achieve t h i s goal of explanat ion

w a s t h a t of e l l i p s i s , whereby c e r t a i n cons t ruc t ions could I be rendered more reasonable by t h e a d d i t i o n of c e r t a i n

words, which though not u t t e r e d , were supposed t o be i n

1 . See Michael, op. c i t . , p. 550.

t h e mind of t h e speaker. Agairi pursuing h i s goal of

l o g i c a l explanat ion he makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between verbs

s u b s t a n t i v e and ve rbs a d j e c t i v e , - esse being t h e only ve rb

subs tan t ive . The P o r t Royal grammar followed t h i s d i s -

tinction.

4.2.1.1. Ward l sUse of Sanc t ius

Ward's use of Sanc t ius i s no more obvious than h i s

d i s rega rd . He e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t s Sanc t ius ' s ta tement

t h a t t h e voca t ive case i s no t i n t h e second person.1 On

t h e o t h e r hand, he mainta ins e m p h a t i c d l y with Sanc t ius ,

and a g a i n s t almost everyone e l s e , t h a t t h e i n f i n i t i v e i s

a t r u e verb.' I t w a s g e n e r a l l y regarded as a kind of

noun subs tan t ive . Sanc t ius makes t h e observat ion , which

i s p a r t l y t r u e , t h a t t h e a b l a t i v e i s t h e case a s s o c i a t e d

wi th p r e p o s i t i o n s i n Lat in . Bullokar , who a l s o read

S a n c t i u s , had decided i n 1586 wi th some sense t h a t r a t h e r

than t h e a b l a t i v e t h e accusa t ive would be t h e case which

performed t h i s f u n c t i o n i n English. V!ard na ive ly fo l lows

1. Sanc t ius had claimed: V o c a t i v u s non e s t secundae personae, u t a j u n t Gra -mat i c i , sed r e s a l i q u a , cum qua sermonem communicamus.~--Kinerva, (apud Jansonio-Waesber- g i o s , 1733), p. 155. Ward says "This case i s i n e f f e c t only a nominative case of t h e second person.'' (p . 90)

2. S a n c t i u s ' d e f i n i t i o n of t h e i n f i n i t i v e w a s : " I n f i n i - tivum verburn e s t , quod personas, modos, e t tempora non f i n i t , ( s i v e quod pe r son i s numeris e t temporibus non de- f i n i t u r ) . ol--Op. c i t . , p. 104. He says t h a t time and person a r e p resen t but not def ined so t h a t i t does not c o n t r a d i c t h i s genera l d e f i n i t i o n of t h e verb: loverbum e s t vox p a r t i c e p s numeri p e r s o n a l i s cum tempore." (p . 78)

S a n c t i u s ' p o s i t i o n i n English and g i v e s a long, very

u n s a t i s f a c t o r y e l abora t ion of p r e p o s i t i o n s which go w i t h

t h e a b l a t i v e case. Ward a l s o u s e s e l l i p s i s as a means

of expla in ing a g r e a t dea l i n h i s system, but i t i s not

obvious t h a t he borrowed t h e concept d i r e c t from Sanc t ius ,

as most of t h e French grammarians t h a t Ward knew had a l s o

followed Sanc t ius i n proposing e l l i p s i s as a means t o

grammatical a n a l y s i s.

I t would be a mistake t o a t t r i b u t e too much import-

ance t o Ward's having read Sanc t ius , as Sanc t ius had been

a source of maEy i d e a s t o many people; i t i s impossible

t o i s o l a t e in f luence u n l e s s t h e r e i s evidence of d i r e c t

quota t ion . But Kard l s tenac ious claim t h a t t h e i n f i n i t i v e

w a s a ve rb and n o t a subs tan t ive , a l though t o some ex ten t

a meat ingless quibble1 r e f l e c t e d a burning i s s u e of t h e

day. The f a c t t h a t he had t h i s esteemed a u t h o r i t y t o

support him would have been inva luab le and h i s r e l i a n c e

on Sanc t ius a t t h i s po in t i s without ques t ion ,

4 .2 .2 . Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot: Grammaire Generale e t Haisonn6e (1660)

Ward knew t h i s grammar w e l l , but i t s in f luence seems

1 . I t i s a meaningless quibble f o r those who can s e e t h e s t u d y of language as something more than a s tudy of only one l e v e l of language, and f o r whom t h e t a s k of d e f i n i t i o n i s n o t of paramount importance. Obviously i n t h e e ight - een th century t h e problem of adequate d e f i n i t i o n could n o t be e a s i l y dismissed.

to have been limited to proposing topics for Ward to con-

sider and provide better explanations for. It had been

read widely in England ever since its publication in the

original French. An English translation was published

in 1753. Gildon and Brightland are the only English

grammarians to have made extensive use of it, and it seems

that they did not understand it very well. Misunderstand-

ing of its method was probably as widespread as knowledge

of its aims in England; it was remarkably different from

the English grammars of the seventeenth and eighteenth A.

centuries.

4.2.2.1. Language and Thought

~rnauld,' like Ward, stresses the relation of

language to thinking, and the fact that words are signs

by which we express our thoughts. His definition of gram-

mar states this point: "Grammar is the art of speaking,

Speaking is to explain our thoughts by signs which men

have invented for that purpose.tt2 Any investigation of

language, he says, will have to pay attention to what

happens in our minds: "We cannot therefore perfectly

understand the different sorts of significations, annexed

I 1. Arnauld and Lancelot were co-authors; for the sake of convenience only Arnauld will be mentioned, as he is the senior member of the partnership.

2. Port Royal Grammar, p. 1 . P

to words, without first cbnsidering what passes in our

minds, since words were invented only to communicate our

thoughts.u1 The powers of the mind are said to be powers

of perception, judgment, and reasoning. Judgment is

considered to be the essence of language; consequently

Arnauld's theory of language stresses the process of

affirmation; it divides parts of speech into those which

signify objects of thought, and those which signify the

manner of thought, that is, those that are signals of the

process of affirmation or judgment, and the other opera-

tions of the mind. The verb esse was the one word that - truly expressed affirmation and hence expressed a manner

of thought, but all verbs, on account of their similarity

to this verb were considered as expressing manners of

thought, The theory was not always coherent; the division

of words into those representing objects, and those repre-

senting manners of thought was an interesting one, but its

application was slipshod. However, the grammar was break-

ing new ground, and it is not surprising that there should

have been inconsistencies; the inconsistency of the defini-

tions of case was mentioned in Chapter 11. Both Arnauld

and lK!ard are inconsistent in their efforts to accomodate

the category to their native languages. The difference

1. Op. cit., p , 22.

between the two is that the Port Royal grammar makes no

attempt to show how case functions, while Ward does. - Both claims to be rational grammarians, yet Ward has much

more far-reaching explanatory goals; perhaps this is be-

cause Port Royal shared Sanctius ' views of explanation in language..' We find the same absence of interest in expla-

nations in the Port Royal discussion of the relative pro-

noun; the analysis has been widely acclaimed in that it

recognizes both the conjunctive and the subordinating as-

pects of this pronoun, but the explanation of how or why - -

the pronoun subordinates the following clause is not con-

sidered as it is in Ward's discussion.

4.2.2.2. Arnauld's and Ward's Views of Underlying Structure

The linking of the adjective and noun in the sentence:

"The invisible God created the visible world1' is seen as

the signal that there are underlying propositions present,

namely 'God is invisible1 and 'the world is visible1; this

recognition of underlying structure has recently been con-

sidered as the greatest insight of the Port Royal grammar.

However, its failure to see more than one proposition in

''The valour of Achilles has been the cause of the taking

of Troy1' is difficult to understand; Arnauld saw the

genitive relationship as a simple one involving no under-

lying proposition. Ward on the other hand felt that

1. Cf. Para. 4.2.1.

between t h e two nouns i n > t h i s r e l a t i o n t h e r e w a s an

understood t r a n s i t i v e verb ; he w a s slow t o recognize

anyth ing corresponding t o t h e P o r t Royal r e s o l u t i o n of

t h e Adjective-Noun cons t ruc t ion . I t w a s mentioned i n

t h e d i s c u s s i o n on Har t ley t h a t Ward recognized t h a t prepo-

s i t i o n s had a range of meanings from which we had t o s e l e c t

t h e a p p r o p r i a t e one f o r t h e d i scourse ; t h i s w a s no t an i m -

p e r f e c t i o n wi th language i n Ward's eyes, but t h e gentlemen

of P o r t Royal s e e i t as n o t i n accord with a r a t i o n a l ac-

count of lmguage : llMo one language has followed on t h e . -

s u b j e c t of p r e p o s i t i o n s what reason seems t o r e q u i r e ,

which i s t h a t one r e l a t i o n should be marked only by one

p r e p o s i t i o n , and t h a t t h e same p r e p o s i t i o n should n o t

mark more than one r e l a t i o n . # @ ' The P o r t Royal account

of t h e adverb as a n abbrev ia t ion of p r e p o s i t i o n and noun

(cum s a p i e n t a = s a p i e n t e r ) w a s a l s o questioned. Ward's

r e j e c t i o n of t h e v e r b e s s e as a n a f f i r m a t i o n word d i s t i n c t - from o t h e r ve rbs i s a l s o s u r p r i s i n g . H i s a l t e r n a t i v e

views t h e psychological a spec t of a f f i r m a t i o n . I t i s

d i f f i c u l t t o t a l k of in f luence when Ward c o n t i n u a l l y seems

t o be paying no heed t o P o r t Royal, and o f t e n saying t h e

exact opposi te . The po in t i s t h a t t h e P o r t Royal grammar

w a s read by Ward, as he admits, thought about , and then

much of i t w a s r e j e c t e d . I ts inf luence may have been

1. Op. c i t . p. 86.

negative, but such a work could not be considered unim-

portant. Ward's rejection is evidence of a positive

step to build a new and independent theory, 1

4.2.3. ~ b b k Fromant: Reflexions sur les Fondemens de

1'Art de Parler (1756)

~bbe' Fromant wrote his reflections on the art of

speaking only some nine years before Ward's own grammar

was published.2 Fromant is a compiler and seeks to bring

together what has been said on universal grammar since

the publication of the Port Royal grammar. He is emphatic

about the universality of grammatical phenomena: "Cornme

il noy a qutune Grammaire dans le monde pour toutes les

1. No mention is made in Ward's Grammar of LtArt de Penser, or the Art of Thinking as it was known in ~nglish(see chapterT,=d there is no reason to assume that Ward was familiar with it; however on p , 117 Arnauld says: "Mote that any sentence containing an active verb along with its object expresses a complex proposition and in one sense two propositbns." This sounds remarkably like Ward's statement that every transitive verb implies that there are two sentences, however, Arnauld clarifies his stztement by saying that the sentence "Brutus killed a tyrantu can be analysed as "Brutus killed someone who was a tyrant." Ward's own analysis of the transitive con- struction is concerned with the relationship of active and passive sentences rather than Arnauld's (extremely inter- esting) analysis of noun phrases.

2. It has not been possible to consult the original edi- tion which Ward probably knew; the one consulted was published in 1769, some four years after Ward had written his grammar,, and, more important, after the publication of M. Beauzee's grammar. Frornant's reflections are con- cerned with what was being written about language in the eighteenth century; thus the 1769 edition has numerous comments on and criticisms of ~eauzge's grammar. He claims that there is little difference between this later edition and the previous one; such as there are would presumably be the additbns about ~eauzde.

langues, parce q u ' i l n l y a, qulune Logique pour tous l e s

hommes, il ne f a u t pas e t r r s u r p r i s de trouver d a m une

langue, . . . l e s memes pr incipes e t l e s memes r eg l e s que

dans l e s a u t r e s langues. He has few o r ig ina l opinions

of h i s own, though he has considerable a b i l i t y i n c r i t i -

c i z i n g the opinions of o thers . H i s claim t o greatness

undoubtedly r e s t s on the importance he gave t o reasonable

explanation, as opposed t o emmeration of f a c t s . The

quotat ion a t the beginning of the t h e s i s i s ar, eloquent

testimony t o - - an educational i d e a l t h a t Fromant passed on

t o Ward. Fromant f e l t t h a t those s tudents who have t o

put up with d u l l r u l e s i n col leges would love I1les r i g l e s

lwnineuses e t fgcondes de l a Grammaire raisonnge. He

adopts B u f f i e r l s system of nouns, verbs, and modifiers ,

and emphasizes the di f ference between t h i s and the Por t

Royal approach. Aoun substant ives and ad jec t ive were the

same p a r t of speech f o r him because they share i n an iden-

t i t y ; a t t r i b u t e s i n the predicate pos i t ion do not share

i n i d e n t i t y with the substant ive because they a r e i n a

r e l a t i o n o f af f i rmat ion on account of the nexus formed

by the substant ive verb. Although an admirer of Buf f ie r ,

Fromant l a y s much g r e a t e r emphasis than d id Buff ier on

t h e verb as an aff i rmat ion word. Ward's treatment of

1 . ~ b b ~ F r rnant, ions s u r 1"s Fondemens 9 1 ' A r t de P a r l e r , ~Paris,*, p. x l l . 7

the verb follows Buffier, .not ~romant .' Frornant is im- portant to Ward because of his plea for grammatical studies

which would not only be useful for the acquisition of lang-

uages, but would also be intellectually stimulating. Ward's

Essay on Grammar can be seen as an attempt to answer - Fromant's plea for the students of grammar in England.

4.3. The Indirect Influence of Some English Grammarians W.

No mention has been made as yet of any English gram- I

marian that had any influence on Ward. Obviously, influence

cannot be traced when it is extremely general. Ward in-

herited the tradition, such as it was, of English grammar, ,!

There were, however, three grammarians that may be singled

out as having influenced him in a more specific way than

the others. Their influence is not direct. Ward thought

about what they said, and then went his own way in the tra-

dition. These three grammarians are Richard Johnson,

James Harris, and Robert Lowth.

4.3.1. Richard Johnson: Grammatical Commentaries (1706)

Richard Johnson's commentaries are on Lily's Latin

grammar, and he is completely concerned with a discussion

1. Fromant's position had difficulties as he himself realized. It correctly suggested that the adjective and noun in 'beau livre8 were in a relationship of identity,

l and the words in 'liber Petri' were not, because "ces deux mots prdsentent $ loesprit deux objetidiff&ens, dont llunC n'est pas l1autre8@--(p. 157). However, forms in Latin of the type 'Evandreus ensis' could not be claimed to be in an identity relation.

of Latin; Michael suggests,that he was widely read in the

eighteenth century. Johnson's emphasis on sound educa-

tional methodology has been noted in Chapter I11 as a

possible stimulus to Ward's own common-sense approach;

perhaps with educational objectives in sight, Johnson

rejected the regular concept of substantive and adjective

as members of the same major parts of speech; he has been

credited with introducing them as separate parts of speech,

but Mark Lewis had already recognized their distinctness

in 1670. Ward did not follow Johnson in his innovation, -

but his grammar does reflect Johnson's definition of the

adjective, Johnson's definition is:

It is a word added to a substantive, to declare some additional accident of the Substantive con- sidered by itself as of Quality, Property, Rela- tion . . . . I have added considered by itself because the Relations of substantives, as con- sidered in sentences are declared by Prepositions and not by ~djectives.1

Johnson distiriguishes the adjective by its having a rela-

tion solely with the noun; it is never involved in the

sentence structure as such other than as an adjunct of

the noun. This is quite different from the Port Royal

account where every adjective is part of a proposition.

It is a reasonable account, particularly when one con-

siders the structure of Latin, and would seem to be the

1. Richard Johnson, Grammatical Commentaries, (London, 1706), p. 8.

motivation for Ward's str?ng assertion in his preliminary

d i s c u s s i o n s o f the adjective that it unites with and ope-

rates with the substantive; for all other constructions

Ward requires some verb to be recognized in the deep

structure as a linking force, Johnsonts views on the dis-

tinction between substantive and adjective do not prevent

him from recognizing class change between nouns and adjec-

tives, depending on position and use of the words: "And

though Substantives be put in apposition with other Subs-

tantives and agree with them, yet this is no real object- - -

ion; such Substantives become Adjectives, by that very

use, as an adjective, or any other part of speech becomes

a Substantive when it is used like a Substantive, that is,

considered as a thing.lt ' Johnsont s definition of parts

is based on their form, and he allows class change through

functio~al change, This is a much more structural account

of language2 than we find in Ward, however, the fact that

Johnson sees this change of class as a possibility in

language allows Ward to give his psychological account of

class change with good authority. Ward's use of Johnson

is reflected in his adherence to the general plan of Latin

grammar and the viewing of noun and adjective as closely

1 , Op. cit., p. 9.

2. The distinction so clearly drawn between form class and functional class membership is similar to that pro- posed by James Sledd in A Short Introduction - to ~nglish Grammar, (Chicago, 1959);

related. Johnson's grammar does not make any startling

innovations, and one doubts whether it greatly affected

Ward's general plan. Johnson formed part of the gramma-

tical establishment, and Ward would have failed in his

preparation for his task if he had not made himself

familiar with Johnson's work. Ultimately Johnson's great-

est significance stems from his enlightened and sensible

comments on methods of teaching grammar. il

4.3.2. James Harris: Hermes (1751) I

, -- Harris was the most interesting and certainly the

most readable grammarian of eighteenth century England,

He wished to excite his readers to a contemplation of

language and universal grammar, and has a number of sti-

mulating ideas which later grammarians unfortunately

failed to develop. As a classical scholar he goes to

Aristotle and Plato rather than to John Locke for the

philosophical background to his theory. The result is

that he is able to talk with confidence about universals

in language; he offers lexical universals and grammatical

universals. His lexical universals are interesting but

were unacceptable to Ward as they assume a Platonic ideal

relation between words and things; his grammatical univer-

sals were far more reasonable and Ward's attempt to recog-

nize universals developed from Harrist position,

4.3.2.1. His View of Case

We saw in Chapter I1 that Harris viewed case not just

as an inflectional ending or the translation of such into

Engl i sh , but as a category functional relation, and as

such language universal; this view of case as a relation

can be compared with Ward's; Ward sees case as an opera-

tion of the mind; it has the function of subordinating the

idea signified by the noun so that it can coalesce with

the idea signified by the verb or noun it is in construct-

ion with. Harris sees case as a statement of relation - -

rather than a signal of an operation; these positions are

not so far apart and Hockett suggests that statements of

relation or operation are alternate ways of looking at the

same thing: "Whekher we speak of an 'operationt or of a

'relation8 depends on notation and attitude, rather than

on the abstract mathematical nature of what we are dealing

with."' Both grammarians have in common the view of case

as a language universal phecomenon expressing functional

relationships; while this does not seem an extraordinary

or unusual view today, it is in marked contrast to the

usual eighteenth century view of it as a transfer to English

of the meaning of a Latin inflection which had been deter-

mined by rules without reason.

1. Charles C. Hockett, Language, Mathematics and Linguistics, - h he Hague, l 9 6 7 ) , p. 32.

4.3,2,2. The Parts of Speech

Harris1 views of the parts of speech is his most

original contribution to grammatical theory. He divides

all words into 'principals1 and 'accessories1 according

to whether they signify ideas or relations within the

linguistic system. The 'principals1 are divided into

'substantives1 and 'attributes1; both verb and adjective

belong to the common class called sattribute.l The subs-

tantive is separated from other principals because it

posits an existing object: "Whatever a thing may be whe- *.

ther black, white, . . . it must first of necessity exist, before it can possibly be anything else."' Harrist view

is in accord with modern linguists who believe that the

one universal surface category in language may be the

noun. Attributes take several forms: "The Sun is bright,

the Sun rises, and the Sun is risingt1 have three diff-

erent forms, but are said to form a common class inasmuch

as they all modify the substantive. Harris distinguishes

a third class of principals which he calls 'attributes of

the second order1 and which are commonly called adverbs.

Jespersen develops much the same analysis of the parts of

speech in - The Philosophy - of Grammar and it is the basis

of most theories of categorial grammar. It would appear

to be fundamentally the same as Ward's system, but Ward

1. Harris, Op, cit., p. 88.

did not explicate it with the clarity of Harris; it

put forward in a slightly different form as Ward sees

the basic sentence as a noun modified by (or coalescing

with) a verb, and finally closed by an adverb, Ward's

explanation has some advantage over Harris8 in that he

is able to accommodate the transitive verb sentence pat-

tern to his explanation, whereas Harris appears to be

content to consider only those kinds of sentences which

Aristotle had considered (see Chapter I), Harris is

more realistic than Ward when he includes adjectives with

verbs as a common part of speech; Ward, under Richard

Johnson's influence, discusses the adjective as ,part of

the noun phrase rather than as a sentence element, It

is not suggested here that Harris was the definitive

influence on Ward in his account of the principal parts

of speech; Buffier's analysis of the sentence was closer

to Ward's than Harrist; had Ward been following Harris

directly he could have scarcely avoided considering the

adjective from a wider perspective than he in fact did.

4.3.2.3. Sentence Types

A central concept in Harriso discussion about

language is that of energy. He sees words and parts of I

speech generally endowed kith the energy of things; 1

sentences publish an energy of the soul.2 Although he

sees four sentence types: statements, interrogatives,

commands, and volitions, he claims that they represent

only two energies of the soul: those of perception and

volition. Thus although he does not spell out the expla-

nation of how four tmoodst or sentence types can be sub-

sumed to two major categories in the same detail as Ward , I

and Buffier, he is wrestling with the same problem: the

semantic resolution of structurally distinct types.

4.3.2.4. Coalescence

The term lcoalescence' is familiar to us from Hartley's

Observations; Harris sees coalescence as an important con-

cept in language, although it is not aiways clear whether

his discussion is about language or about things:

Some things coalesce and unite of themselves; others refuse to do so without help and as it were compulsion. Thus in words of War the mortar and the stone coalesce of themselves;

1. nAll things that exist, exist as energies or affections of some other thing, or without being the energies or af- fections of some other thing. If of something else they are attributes. Thus 'to thinkt is an attribute of 'man,' 'to be white' of a swan. If not of this manner they are substances."--Ibid., p. 9.

2. "Speech or Discourse is a publishing of some Energie or Motion of his soul, So it indeed is in everyone that speaks, excepting along the Dissembler or Hypocrite." --Ibid., p, 15.

but the wainscot and' the wall not without nails and pins. For example all quantities and qualities coalesce immediately with their substances. Thus 'tis we say 'a fierce lion,' 'a vast mountaint; and from this natu- ral concord of subject and accident arises the grammatical concord of Substantive and Adjective.1

Harris concludes from this .that things which are united

in nature unite easily in language, but those which do

not, need the addition of prepositions: .Those parts of

speech unite of themselves in Grammar, whose original

archetypes-unite of themselves in Nature. lt2 Coalescence

occurs between noun and adjective, noun and verb, and

even verb and verb , though here the help of the accessory to is required; Harris gives as examples of the coalescence - of verb and verb: "1 desire to livev and "1 eat to live,"

remarking that the coalescence is more intimate in the

first case than in the second, Wardts discussion of co-

alescence in the Essay on Grammar is derived from Hartley - rather than Harris; Harris views coalescence not as the

coalescing of ideas but rather the coalescence of things

in nature as reflected in language. While two very diff-

erent ideas when joined in construction are said to be

completely in coalescence in Hartleyts theory, Harris

will only admit a degree of coalescence, because the

1. Op, cit., p. 262.

2. Op. cit., p. 363.

I

things represented by the words cannot easily coalesce

in the world. Ward and Hartley use the term 'coalescencet

to denote the complete union of ideas in the mind which

a grammatical construction represents, while Harris uses

the term only as a means of distinguishing those con-

structions of principals which do not require accessories

from those that do.

4.3.2.5. Summary of the Relation of Harris and Ward

There are many points of common reference between A -

Viard and Harris: there is the reduction of the sentence

types, the analysis of the principal parts of speech, ~

there is the idea of coalescence, and the proposal that

words represent ideas. However, there were fundamental

differences on all these points. Harris' statement that

there are two kinds of sentences, those indicating per-

ceptions and those indicating volitions seems to be a

foretaste of the modern distinction between performative

verbs and others; Ward was intent on reducing sentence

types too, but he did not make the division with the

clarity that Harris does. Harrist analysis of the prin-

cipal parts of speech has much in common with Ward's,

but they both use a very different terminology. Harris8

1 idea of coalescence is not nearly so well worked out as

Ward's, and suffers from confusing the realm of language

with t h e realm of th ings . ' Rather than suggest t h a t Ward

borrowed t h e i d e a from Harris, we should ques t ion whether

Harris went t o t h e same source f o r i t as Ward, i . e .

Har t l ey ; if he d i d , he d i s t o r t e d r a t h e r than developed

H a r t l e y l s views. Both Ward and Harris d i s c u s s t h e i d e a s

t h a t a r e s i g n i f i e d by words, and seem t o p o s i t t h e e x i s t -

ence of an i d e a i n t h e mind f o r every word. Here they

a r e man i fes t ly d i f f e r e n t : Harris claims t h a t h i s i d e a s

must have been implanted i n t h e mind by God, while Ward

goes t o Lockels philosophy f o r an explanat ion of h i s

i d e a s . Thus t h e i r i d e a s have no common ground. Harris

u s e s h i s as evidence of l e x i c a l u n i v e r s a l s , and Ward u s e s

h i s as evidence of l i n g u i s t i c r e l a t i v i t y and as a b a s i s

f o r a theory of pronominalization. Ward's i n t e n t i o n s t o

avoid "a l l d i s p u t e s with former w r i t e r s of grammar'l must

have been s t r a i n e d t o t h e utmost when he considered those

of Harrist i d e a s which were s o c l o s e t o h i s own and y e t

s o d i f f e r e n t .

4.3.3. Robert Lowth: A n In t roduc t ion t o English Grammar

(1762)

W i l l i a m Ward had a h igh opinion of Lowthls grammar,

p a r t i c u l a r l y of t h e way i t d iscussed t h e so-called e r r o r s

of many eminent w r i t e r s . He argues f o r t h e importance of

p r a c t i c a l grammar of Engl i sh on account of t h e mistakes

made by the great, which Lowth had pointed out. Yet such

an attitude is totally foreign to Ward (see Chapter 111);

it is certainly disappointing that such a perceptive

writer should be so impressed with Lowth's syllabus of

errors. Lowth's grammar had been published three years

before Ward's Essay, and had obviously gained immediate

popularity. Lowth acknowledged the importance of univer-

sal grammar, but said that it should be approached through Q

the grammar of particular languages; his own grammar deals 1

with English, and makes no further mention of universal , -.

1

grammar. It is a significant advance on earlier works 8

published in England as it has a long section on syntax, 8

I

enumerating twelve distinct construction types, Ward's I

attitude to Lowth is difficult to determine. He appears I L

to admire him, but rejects almost everything that Lowth

says: Lowth observes only two cases in English; Ward

recognizes six. There are two points of interest which

do not appear to have influenced Ward, but which do suggest

that Lowth and Ward were not quite so apart as a casual

glance at their grammars might suggest: firstly, Lowth

recognizes three modes in English: the explicative, the

interrogative mode, and the imperative. He goes on to

say that the interrogative mode does not exist as such

(presumably because there is no formal distinction of

the verb for it, but only a change in word order), but

the interrogative construction should be recognized as

a mode. His belief in this suggests that he is in accord

with Harris and Ward in seeing modes from a semantic point

of view as well as a structural point of view; secondly,

he recognizes that many verb + particle constructions

could be seen as paraphrases of another verb. While to - cast means the same as to throw, to cast up is totally - distinct, and means to compute. He is attempting to re-

solve the same kind of problem as Ward, who claimed that

to arrive at should be paraphrased as to reach as a means

of avoiding the explanation of this difficult post-verb

preposition. Such views reflect a common attempt in both

men to recognize lexicon-independent semantic units or

ttideas,w to which lexical formatives are afterwards

attached. 1

4.4. Summary of Sources

William Ward claims that he received help from many

sources, and we have examined most of them, not in enough

detail to do justice to the intrinsic merits of the sources,

but sufficiently to suggest which of his sources were

most obviously responsible for his very singular views on

1. Cf. John Anderson, "On the Status of Lexical Formatives," Foundations of Lan a e, IV, 3. (1968) 308-318. Several times.in this -I?=- c apter points have been mentioned because they are recurring in modem discussions; their reappear- ance does not imply that they are valid or correct; it merely suggests that these ideas are of enduring interest

linguistic theory. Many bf the ideas that Locke had

brought forward were used by Ward, but Lockets ideas

came to Ward just as much through the writings of Hartley

as through those of Locke himself. Hartley was the most

powerful ar:d important influence of all on Ward, inasmuch

as he was chiefly responsible for suggesting to Ward that

some words are signals of operations that are performed

by the mind on ideas, and that the construction of words

together was a symbol or sign of the coalescence of ideas.

P2re Buffier suggested to Ward many of his most interest-

ing grammatical ideas; he suggested an explanation of

transitivity, the resolution into ordinary discourse of

the various moods of the verb; he suggested a system of

the parts of speech to him and preceded him in the com-

plete break from the Port Royal tradition, Richard

Johnson and ~bbk Fromant are important because of their

sound views on pedagogy and the function of language

studies. James Harris, though not an obvious influence,

cannot be ignored because even though he and Ward agreed

on so few points, Ward's course ran so close to his own

and they were both attempting to improve the study of

language in eighteenth century England.

to the students of language, and hence are of some interest to the historian of linguistics,

Chapter V I

The Metalanguage of Ward's Essay on Grammar

Introduction

Technical Terminology The 'Idea1 or 'Conception1 The Term 'Idea1 in Previous Theories The 'Ideat or 'Conceptionv in Ward's Theory The Term 'Speculative1 'Operations of the Mind1 'Coalescence1 'Principles of Existence 'Demonstrative Circumstancesa

Terminology of the Word Classes 'Parts of Speech1 Definitions of Particular 'Parts1 Examined

The Study of Metalmguage

I

CHAPTER V

THE METALANGUAGE OF WARD'S ESSAY ON GRAMMAR

5.0. Introduction

A grammarian's metalanguage is the language he uses

to talk about language; he has to discuss a linguistic

system by means of itself or a related system, and in

order to do this he introduces new terms or re-defines

old terms to accomodate the language to its introspective

examination of itself. Ward's metalanguage needs exa-

mining with some care, for, as he says, "the old terms

of grammar are indeed retained; but the investigation .

of every part of the subject is altogether new."' Ling-

uists are sometimes criticized for talking about every-

day subjects in technical jargon; Ward goes to the other

extreme and hides novel ideas behind familiar terms.

This Chapter will consider Ward's metalanguage in two

parts: firstly, the general technical vocabulary he uses

will be discussed, and then the terminology of the word-

classes. Both these areas cover to some extent the

terminology of syntax. Syntax is very much Ward's concern,

but his psychological interest in the formation of lang-

uage leads him to talk about it in psychological terms

rather than specifically grammatical terms.

1. These two terms are used interchangeably by Ward, although he usually opts for 'conception.'

5.1. Technical Terminology

5.1.1. Thc 'Idea' or 'Conception'

The 'idea' or 'conception that Ward is always dis-

cussing is a case in point, His use of the term is the

most significant aspect of his metalanguage; in order

to make clear the novelty of his approach, the relation-

ship of 'idea,' 'word,' and 'thing' will be traced through

history as a prelude to analysing Ward's own view of the J

i

relationship of the three, and his meaning of the term iY

'idea.' Inasmuch as 'ideas8 are the building blocks of j

Ward's lii&istic *theory, an understanding of them is of i

paramount importance. Their elucidation renders under- I

standable the differentiation in the levels of his ana-

lysis; it ascertains his views on the relation of

substantives, adjectives, and verbs; it accounts for his

theory of linguistic relativity, his comments on collo-

cation, and his view of pronominalization. Above all

it will enable us to determine whether the idea is a

linguistic unit of some kind, or just, a mentalistic

copy of the word, whether or not it has a formal relation

to linguistic units on other levels which is statable in

non-redundant terms,

5,l,l.l. The Term 'Idea8 in Previous Theories

The relationship between the word, the idea, and

the object that the word represents has been of constant

i n t e r e s t t o s t u d e n t s of language. For P l a t o t h e meaning I

of a word i s i t s idea . In t h e Thea&etus he has Socra tes

formulate h i s d e f i n i t i o n of language: "The expression of

o n e ' s thoughts by means of gnomata and rhsmata which, as

i t were, m i r r o r r e f l e c t o n e ' s i d e a s i n t h e stream which

passes through t h e mouth.I1 The main po in t here i s t h a t

words a r e capable of r e f l e c t i n g o r mi r ro r ing i d e a s , and

i d e a s f o r P l a t o a r e t h e d i s t i n c t i v e r e a l i t y , e x i s t i n g

independent ly of words and th ings . F. R. Dinneen says

t h a t P l a t o d iscussed language because of Onthe p o s s i b i l i t y I

I I

of l e a r n i n g something about t h i n g s through a s tudy of

t h e i r names and t h e c o r r e c t combinations of expressions ,

dea l ing wi th them. It' I

I

A r i s t o t l e brought P l a t o ' s i d e a s down t o e a r t h con-

c e i v i n g of them not as e x i s t i n g independently of t h e

r e a l i t y t h a t we see , but as a b s t r a c t e d from the world

around by t h e a c t i v e power of t h e mind. He be l ieved

t h a t a l l people s e e t h e world i n t h e same way and words

represented t h e ' e s sences ' of t h i n g s ; h i s system of l o g i c

provided him with t h e means of ensuring t h a t language

would adequately r e f l e c t r e a l i t y ; thus h i s epis temological

foundat ions were secure. Erns t C a s s i r e r desc r ibes how

no t only words, but even gramma%ical s t r u c t u r e s were seen

as corresponding t o r e a l i t y i n A r i s t o t e l i a n apd Medieval

1 . F r a n c i s P. Dinneen. An In t roduc t ion t o General * - - L i n g u i s t i c s , (New York, 196 '0 , p. 79.

philosophy:

The structure of the sentence and its division into words and classes of words seem, in large part, to have served Aristotle as a model for his system of categories . . . the last four categories . . . seem to become fully trans- parent only when we consider them in reference to certain fundamental distinctions which the Greek language makes in its designation of verbs and verbal actions. Here logical and grammatical speculation seemed to be in thorough- going correspondence, to condition one another --and medieval philosophy, basing itself on Aristotle, clung to this correspondence between the two.1

But t.here were important differences between the

Greek and mediaeval grammars. The Greeks analysed only

Greek; the mediaeval grammarians were aware of other ~

language s and sought to discover universal grammatical

features, and later, the actual rules followed by the

mind in expressing itself .' Their search for universal

categories implied a belief in universal properties of

the mind; one of these powers for the Modistae was the

power of understanding things. Bursill-Hall sees the

direct relation of word and thing in Modistic grammar

as prior to any grammatical function: "The word, which

must express a reality, is a sign (signum); these words

1. Ernst Vol. I , tr. Ralph

2. G. L. Bursill-Hall, "Mediaeval Grammatical Theories, op. cit., p. 43.

must be taken as c o r r e l a t i v e s of t h i n g s i n t h e world of

r e a l i t y before they can be considered grammatical express-

ions." ' The b e l i e f t h a t t h e word can c o r r c c t l y express

r e a l i t y i s t h e same as A r i s t o t l e l s , but he re t h e i d e a

has a b s o l u t e l y no p lace i n t h e system: t h e mind can under-

s t and an o b j e c t , but i t does t h i s by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e

o b j e c t i t s e l f ( t h e o b j e c t has t h e 'modus i n t e l l i g e n d i

p a s s i v i l ) r a t h e r than c r e a t i n g a copy o r i d e a of t h e

o b j e c t ,

The age of Descar tes has been c a l l e d t h e Age of

Reason because many b e l i e f s which previous ly had been

u n c r i t i c a l l y accepted were subjec ted t o r igorous i n t e l -

l e c t u a l a n a l y s i s . This r igorous a n a l y s i s stemmed from

a f a i t h i n t h e power of t h e mind, and because o f t h i s

very f a i t h , no one quest ioned t h e power of t h e mind t o

formula te o b j e c t i v e i d e a s of th ings . I d e a s o r thoughts

were recognized as i n t e r m e d i a r i e s between words and t h i n g s ;

t h e purpose of language i s t o communicate our thoughts

about th ings : I1Words t h e r e f o r e may be def ined , d i s t i n c t ,

and a r t i c u l a t e sounds, made use of by men as s i g n s , t o

express t h e i r thoughts , l t 2 The P o r t Royal -- A r t of Thinking

emphasizes t h e p r e c i s e s t a t u s and psychological r e a l i t y

1 1 . I b i d . , p . 49,

2. - P o r t Royal Grammar, op. c i t e , p. 25,

of the idea as intermediary: W e are capable of express-

ing something with a word when we have an idea of the

thing signified by the word." 1

Thus in the past an idea was sometimes recognized

as intermediary between words and things, and sometimes

it was not; when it was, it had no function in linguistic

theory. The word expressed our idea of a thing, but since

our idea of a thing was always a direct reflection of the

thing (Platols position), or objectively shared in the

qualities of the thing (Arnauldls position), it was not -.

a useful concept for grammatical analysis,

English linguistics was dominated by practical mo-

tives in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The

English grammarians did not question or even consider

the relationship between words and things. Gildon and

Brightland offer a description of 'names (nouns) which

is the most extended comment we find on the relation of

words and things in the first half of the eighteenth

century:

Names, (as the Word imports), express the things themselves, and convey some certain Idea, or Image of the Mind that wants not any other Word

1. Ibid., p. 22.

2. Analysis of the relationship between words and things is here considered in terms of the noun substantive. If a grammarian has no comment on this part of speech it is unlikely that he will have any on the others.

to make it the Object of the Understanding. 1

I

Wilkins with his Philosophical Language had realized

that natural languages do not offer a one to one descrip-

tion of the world. He had demanded that " . . . the theory upori which such a design [as a universal language]

were to be founded should be exactly suited to the nature

of things.u2 De Mott, noting the development within

Wilkins' thoughts remarks:

One notes a progress from the conviction that a satisfactory pattern for a new language can be taken from an old language to the belief that such a patterc must derive from a correct description of the order of reality, 3

While Wilkins is not in the main line of devdopment of

English linguistics, his interest in universal language

had drawn attention to the fact that the words we use

do not necessarily represent things as they are, It is

not wltil Harrist Hermes in 1751 that the problem of the

relation of words and things really entered the field of

discussion. Harris argues that words are not images or

1. Gildon and Brightland, op. cit., p. 72.

2. John Wilkins, Essay Towards a Real Character - and Philosophical Language, (London,-lm, p. 21.

3. Benjamin De Mott, I1The Sources and Development of John Wilkinsl Philosophical Language," Journal - of English and Germanic Philology, LVI (1958) , po 2. -

i m i t a t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l p b j e c t s , as t h i s would make

comunicat ion impossible:

They can be Symbols of noth ing e l s e , except genera l Ideas , because noth ing e l s e except those remains. --And what do we mean by genera l Ideas? --we mean such as a r e common t o many i n d i v i d u a l s ; no t only t o I n d i v i d u a l s which e x i s t now, but which e x i s t e d i n l p a s t ages , and w i l l e x i s t i n ages f u t u r e ,

Ul t imate ly t h e permanence and a u t h e n t i c i t y of t h e s e i d e a s

i s der ived from God, because i t does no t make sense t h a t

i n t e l l e c t u a l i d e a s should o r i g i n a t e from s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s , I

I

Presumably-the sense impressions made on t h e mind i l lumine

t h e d i v i n e i d e a s which a r e i n n a t e i n t h e mind. Because

t h e s e i d e a s i n the mind came from God they a r e seen as

t h e b a s i s of t h e l e x i c a l u n i v e r s a l s d iscussed i n t h e last

chapter .

5.1.1.2. The ' I d e a 1 o r 'Conception1 i n Ward's Theory

W i l l i a m Ward broke new ground i n An Essay on Grammar - - by borrowing o r r a t h e r accep t ing Lockets psychological

theory of t h e formation of i d e a s and h i s d i s t i n c t i o n

between nominal and r e a l essences, Locke had argued t h a t

words must r e f e r t o genera l i d e a s of some kind; however

h i s genera l i d e a s were very d i f f e r e n t from those of James

Harris. He recognized t h a t t h i n g s could have two essences: I

1 , James Harris, op. c i t . , p. 341.

a nominal essence imposed,as it were by the name, and

a r e a l essence, which is generally unknowable. In other

words a sign, because it represents a thing does not

represent the heart of it, or a kind of Platonic or even

Aristotelian essence, but it is just a name which is

associated with those ideas that the speaker associates

with the things; there is no reason why the speaker's

idea of a horse should correspond to the real essence,

or even be the same as the listener's idea of a horse. I

The consequences of this position are more significant - -

than they may appear: we do not attach (arbitrary) names

to fixed, pre-established ideas in the mind, but we

construct or unite the complex ideas themselves on an

arbitrary basis. We have ideas of some things but not

of others because we have never yoked together the right

collection of simple ideas. Moreover although two people

may use the same word to designate the same object, there

is no guarantee that the word will refer to the same

complex idea in their minds.

These are the foundations on which a theory of

1. To understand the origin we must consider wherein this making of these complex ideas consists: and that is not in the making of any new idea, but putting together those which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does these three things: first it chooses a certain number. Secondly, it gives them connexion and makes them into one idea. Thirdly it ties them together by a name. (John Locke, op. cit., 111 .iii .9).

linguistic relativity could easily be built. ' When Ward

explains how the conceptions of noun substantives are

created in the mind he is almost paraphrasing Locke:

the mind is not passive in acquiring its conceptions but

exerts a selective attention. The fixing of attention

upon an object accompanied by hearing its name mentioned

in childhood creates a bond of association whereby the

occurrence of one will call forth the other. 2

The fact that most ideas are constructs of the mind

of man, that once constructed they can be stored and - -

recalled at will enables Ward to treat them as malleable

entities capable of modification, and as dassifiable into

a variety of states, which would have the function of

selecting the appropriate lexical or grammatical word

form. In adopting a Lockean approach to the idea Ward

1. Cf. Para. 4.1.1.3.

2. 'The power of the mind is not merely passive in acquir- ing the conceptions above mentioned, as it is in receiving the perceptions which are conveyed to it by the senses. But the attention is confined to some particulars of what may be before the mind at once, so that the rest are dis- regarded, till the particulars which are intended to be taken into signification of one substantive, or verbal name, are fixed in the intellect. We acquire in our earliest infancy the custom of exerting the power of con- fining or checking the attention. For this is constantly done, when particular things . . . are pointed out, or presented to us, in such a manner that we fix our atten- tion on them, whilst their names are mentioned to us. When any set of particulars has been so attended by the mind, as that it forms a conception from them, separately considrred and denoted by a substantive or a verbal name; the event is, that whensoever the conception recurs to the mind, the name recurs with it by mere recollecti~n.~~ (Ward: p. 23) .

160

was attempting to create some linguistic unit below the

surface on which (psychologicel) operations could be per-

formed to produce the peculiar picture of reality that

language provides. The components of Ward's ideas are

often unclear. The idea which represents a noun is said

to have ltconstant marks or characters, which are conceived

to be evidences of a constant principle of existence

peculiar to each object, whether such principle is to be

taken notice of or not ."' In other words, the features which mark the noun as a noun are in some way related to

- -

the fact that there is an object which caused the idea.

But this is not always the case: ideas annexed to abstract

nouns are considered as if they themselves were the ex-

ternal objects. 2

Ward had difficulty severing completely the idea as

an entity from the objects to which he owes its origins.

The confusion in many instances appears to be due to lack

of revision; the following quotation appears to be a

statement of intention and should serve as a guide in a

search for a coherent theory in Ward's presentation:

1. Ward, p. 12.

2. Very many objects denoted by substantives have really no separate principle of existence in themselves; as for instance, all the lvirtues--vices--arts--sciences, and all relations--qualities--attributes,' and in general all ob- jects, the conceptions whereof are usually called abstract ideas. But the mind considers these objects as if each of them had a constant principle of existence in itselfet1 (Ward: p. 1 4 ) .

The whole plan of the application of language takes its immediate 'original from the nature of the conceptiolr;which the mind of man forms and affixes to substantives and verbs; and not from the nature of the objects whence the conceptions are formed.1

Grammarians had recognized from the very beginning

that the word, or material part language

was of an arbitrary nature. De Saussure's %ignet or the

traditional 'idea1 had been considered to be fixed, to

be some sort of a copy of the entities of the external

world. The result was an increasing faith in the power - -

of semantics to define word categories, and several naive

approaches to the problem of universal grammar. The sig-

nificance of Ward's application of Locke's philosophy to

grammatical studies is that at last the 'signet as well

as the 'signifiank' is seen as an arbitrary construct of

the mind of man. Its powers to function in discourse

depend not on some grammatical category that it is given

from above, but on what operations the mind chooses to

perform on this grammatically undifferentiated bundle of

features, or as Ward calls them, conceptions. The conse-

quences are that Ward will have to seek for universals

or general principles not as pre-existing entities, but

either as entities created by the mind using ideas as

basic data, or in terms of the kind of processes which the

1. Ward, p. 31.

mind performs; the i n t e r e s t , i n un iversa l s i s t rans fe r red

f rom p a r t i c u l a r categories (e .g . cane) t o the universa l

processes of the mind t h a t a r e s ign i f i ed by such a cate-

gory; the e n t i r e l y new l i n g u i s t i c u n i t v;hich has brought

about t h i s revolut ion i s Bard's ' i dea ' o r 'conception.'

5.1 .2. The Term Speculative

Ward made use of ideas o r conceptions i n order t o

o f f e r h i s readers a ' specu la t ive ' grammar. The meaning

of the term has changed l i t t l e s ince the eighteenth cen- I

I

I

t u ry , but Ward's meaning of the term d i f f e r s considerably

from the mediaeval meaning. The Modistae were specula t ive 1

grammarians because they believed t h a t language w a s a

speculum o r mirror of r e a l i t y , and because they believed

t h e i r t a sk w a s t o exp l ica te exact ly how language was ab le

t o mirror r e a l i t y . Ward however f e l t t h a t language was

anything but a p i c tu re of r e a l i t y ; i t w a s perhaps a pic-

t u r e of how we see r e a l i t y , but t h a t i s a very d i f f e r e n t

th ing. While h i s P r a c t i c a l Grammar would give i n s t ruc t -

ions on how words a r e t o be placed i n const ruct ion, the

Speculative Grammar would account f o r the "general prin-

c i p l e s . . . by which the app l ica t ion of language i s

conducted."' I t considers the "general nature of the

very p a r t s of speech" and i s in t e r e s t ed i n language i n

1 . Ward, p. 1.

general. But Ward does not make the claim that the

categories he is investigating are in any sense univer-

sal. They are categories of English, and a speculative

grammar for Ward does not attempt to show why particular

categories are universal, but instead shows the general

principles that are involved in setting up these categories

in this language and in setting up these or other cate-

gories in other languages. Speculative grammar will

investigate the principles involved in language genera-

tion, and these appear to consist in the kind of opera-

tbns performed on the fundamental and non-grammatical

ideas or conceptions which are at the base of Ward's

theory.

5.1.3. 'Operations of the Mind8

Language is a signalling system for Ward, but it

does. not directly signal meaning, but rather signals

'operations of the minde8 Ward sees words as signs of

Lockean ideas: almost every word has an idea associated

with it. When words are placed in construction, the

grammatical construction itself is a signal that the

ideas behind the words are to be linked in certain ways.

One of the most usual ways that they are linked is by

1 means of fusing the 'principles of existencet of separate

ideas so that instead of there being two unlinked ideas,

they are indistinguishable from each other and exist in

coalescence. This transfer of the 'principle of exist-

ence' is a typical 'operation of the mind' signalled by

certain constructions.

5.1.4. 'Coalescence8

'Coalescence' is a term that Ward has borrowed from

~artle~,' and which he uses with the same signification.

Hartley discusses the union of ideas to form more complex

ideas, and even the union of letters to form words. The

union is h e of 'coalescence:' what were previously sepa-

rat ely existing entities are no longer distinguishable

from the other parts to which they have united, In Ward's

theory the union of the noun and the verb is one of coa-

lescence: "Thus, 'a man speaking--thinking--approving,'

denotes the man to be considered as of the species 'speak-

5.1.5. 'Principles of Existence'

While one of the fundamentals of Locke's theory of

ideas was that every idea in the mind must have been

caused by some sense impression, Locke himself had diffi-

culty in the application of this, which led to a class

1. Cf. Para. 4.1.2.

2. Ward, p. 161.

of i d e a s known as mixed modes.' The problem w a s even more

a c u t e f o r Ward who wished t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e n a t u r e of

v e r b a l concept ions as wel l as o t h e r a b s t r a c t conceptions.

For Ward t h e ' p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t e n c e ' of an i d e a w a s t h a t

which gave i t i t s r a i s o n d B % t r e , which sus ta ined i t i n

ex i s t ence . Where he could, he claimed t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e

was i n o b j e c t s i n t h e e x t e r n a l world, and t h a t i d e a s had

'marks' which i n d i c a t e d t h e n a t u r e of t h e p r i n c i p l e of

ex is tence . However, wi th a b s t r a c t nouns which d id n o t

have c o r r e l a t e s . . i n t h e world of o b j e c t s , t h i s became

meaningless, so Ward claimed t h a t such words, o r t h e i r

i d e a s , were der ived from t h e world of o b j e c t s , but t h e

p r i n c i p l e of ex i s t ence had been t r a n s f e r r e d from t h e r e a l

world and were a c t u a l l y a t t ached t o t h e i d e a s themselves.

I n a sense, t h e i d e a s became th ings . I n verbs , t h e pr in-

c i p l e of ex i s t ence w a s s t i l l considered t o be i n t h e ac-

t i o n i n t h e world, and because a c t i o n s a r e t r a n s i t o r y ,

t h e p r i n c i p l e w a s s a i d t o be ' i n c o n s t a n t ' ( p r i n c i p l e s of

ex i s t ence i n nouns were always ' c o n s t a n t t ) . Moreover,

t h e p r i n c i p l e of ex i s t ence of verbs w a s s a i d t o be 'com-

municable , ' t h a t i s , i t could be t r a n s f e r r e d t o pa r t i cu -

l a r nouns, which s i g n i f i e d o b j e c t s o r people capable of

performing t h e a c t i o n denoted by t h e idea . Thus when a

3. C f . Para . 4.1.1.1.

noun and verb were in congtruction the inconstant prin-

ciple of existence of the verb, which had t o receive its

existence from some actual performing of the action de-

noted by the verb, received it from the object or person

denoted by the noun, who was the performer.

5.1 - 6 . tDernonstrative Circumstances8

'Demonstrative Circumstancest are Ward's way of de- I

scribing the non-linguistic context in which an utterance

occurs. They would seem to be the equivalent of the

Firthian term 'context of a situation. I 1 Like Firth,

Ward maintains that the total meaning of an utterance is 1 I

only knowable if the demonstrative circumstances are taken I

into account. Ward's conception of the relevance of the

non-linguistic setting is narrower than Firth's in that

he only sees it as important in connexion with a limited

number of grammatical features; pronouns and one word

sentences are the areas where demonstrative circumstances

become important, He remarks that the first and second

person pronouns are not marked for sex, and do not need

any form of antecedent because the 'antecedento is the

speech act itself in which the first and second person

1, J. R. Firth used and developed the term 'context of I situation' to refer to the extra-linguistic components

of the speech event itself and its situation.

actually participate. ' Ward remarks that the nature of

verbs is such that they require a noun to precede them

in order for there to be a sentence realising the speak-

er's communicative intention. When there are single

word sentences, the fact that they are sentences derives

not from the nature of the verbs "but from the demonstra-

tive circumstances which may attend the act of pronoun-

cing any one of them ~ingly.'~ 'Demonstrative circums-

tances' include not only the actual situation ic which

a sentence - . is uttered , but the act of pointing, and paralinguistic features, such as the tone of voice: "The

act of pointing . . . and the tone of voice to declarations, by the established customs

the use of language. '12

. . . amount observed in

5.2. Terminology of the Word-Classes

Nowhere is Ward's claim that he is using the old

terminology with new meanings more completely demonstrated

than in his discussion of the parts of speech. Although

his delineation of the class of verbs for example is

probably little different from most other^,^ his diver-

gence lies in the reasons for calling them verbs. His

1. Cf. Para. 6.4.1.

2. Ward, p. 263.

3. The o~ly area of difference being the infinitives, which were often considered to be nouns.

definitions of the parts will be examined briefly in this

chapter (fuller discussion of the more interesting classes

follows in the next chapter), but first his rather con-

fused overall view of the parts will be examined,

5.2.1. 'Parts of Speech8

Although Ward refers to the word-classes as 'parts

of speech,' and enumerates seven of them in the aecula-

tive Grammar, his conformity to the tradition is apparent - rather than real, and his discussion of the various class-

es indicates that the term 'part of speech' had little

meaning in his grammatical analysis, The plan of the

Speculative Grammar treats the parts in the following

order: Noun (including Substantive and Adjective; the

article is treated with the noun, and deemed to be just

an appendage of the noun rather than a part in its own

right), Pronoun, Verb, Adverb, Conjunction, Preposition,

and Interjection. However, in the Practical Grzmmar,

Ward says that the participle is a part of speech, and,

in English, the article as well, 1

Ward's manner of definition or description suggests

a very different plan: he has five major categories, dis-

tinguished by the nature of the ideas annexed to exponents

1. Ward, p. 320.

of the categories.' These categories are: Concrete Noun

Substantive, Abstract Noun Substantive, Noun Adjective,

Verb Infinitive, and Verb Coalescent (including Verb

~efinitive). Pronouns are not a separate category, but

are a subclass of Nouns, and are also divided into Substan-

tives and Adjectives. Some Pronouns have a special

syntactic function (e.g. relatives and interrogatives),

but this special syntactic function is not a reason for

making them members of a separate class, any more than

the special - . syntactic function of the definitive verb

is a reason for setting this up as a class separate from

the verb coalescent. Adverbs, however, although in many

ways equivalent to nouns in the ablative case, form a

separate class precisely because they have a distinctive

syntactic function which differentiates them from nouns. 2

Prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections are all

traditionally defined. The disparity between Ward's

superficial description of the 'parts of speech' and his

working model suggests that the term 'parts of speech1

had no theoretical significance or real meaning for him.

5.2.2. Definitions of Particular 'Partst Examined

The term 'noun' refers primarily not to a particular

1. These categories are discussed in detail in Chapter VI.

2. Cf. Para. 6.4.2.

syntactic class of word, but to those words which are

attached to a particular class of idea, or conception.

The distinguishing feature of the conceptions annexed

to nouns is that they have llconstant marks or charac-

ters."' Pronouns are able to belong to the same general

class because they have annexed conceptions, which though

less distinctly laid out than those of nouns, have the

same constant marks attached to theme2 Adjectives and

substantives are closely related, but the relation is

conceived as existing only between abstract substantives - -

and adjectives. There appears to be no real difference

between the conceptions of substantives and adjectives,.

Both, as nouns, have a constant principle of existence,

but the mind is only aware of it in substantives. In

adjectives the principle of existence.is not noted; in-

stead the principle of existence of the adjoining substan-

tive is noted.

Verbs have inconstant marks of existence, denoting

statese3 The verb is divided into the infiniti~e,~ the

coalescent, and the definitive. The infinitive is like

the other verbs because it has an inconstant principle,

1. Ward, p. 12.

2. Ward, p. 125.

3. Ward, p. 12.

4. Ward often calls the infinitive the 'verb objective.'

but it is like a noun substantive in that it can have

other verbs depending on it when it is in subject posi-

tion, The verb coalescent is so called because it most

naturally coalesces with a noun; the verb definitive has

the same properties as the verb coalescent, but it also

marks a completed construction, Coalescence is a quality

of ideas, definiteness is a grammatical quality.

5 -3. The Study of Metalanguage

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: in the first

place, it attempts to relate some of the more important

terms that Ward uses to the intellectual context of their

time; secondly, it provides in short space an introduction

to the more unusual terminology that will be met in the

detailed explication of Ward's grammatical theory.

Ward's technical language highlights a juxtaposition

of terms taken from psychology and the conventional gram-

matical terminology. Grammatical terms in collocation

with the psychological terms (coalescence, principle of

existence, conception) have taken on a signification so

entirely new that an understanding of their new meanings

requires a full analysis of Ward's theory of word-classes.

Bursill-Hall has suggested that collocational analysis be

used as one way of stating the meaning of the technical

terminology or metalanguage of grammar. But it would

seem that the theory of collocational meaning is suggest-

ive rather than definitive in its analysis of terms, It

shows that familiar words in new collocations take on

new meanings, but it does little to show why Ward assigns

new values to old terms, nor does it reveal the signifi-

cance of the new values. The full explanation of the

new values and Ward's aims in assigning these new values

will be the subject of the next two chapters.

1. G. L. Bursill-Hall. "Notes on the Semantics of Linguistic Description," In Memory of J, R. Firth, ed. C. E. Bazell et al., (London, 1-67, 70-51.

Chapter VI

Word-Class Theory

6.0. Introduction

6.1. Common Features of Substantives, Adjectives, and Verbs

6.1.1. Noun Substantives and Noun Adjectives 6.1.2. Class Change in Substantives and Adjectives 6.1.3. The Verb

6.2. Feature Analysis of Major Word-Classes 6.2.1. The Feature [con] or Constant Mark 6.2.2. The Feature [ss] or Self-Supporting 6.2.3. The Feature [noted]

-.

6.3. Rules Linking Ideas to Word-Classes 6.3.1. Coalescence and the Principle of Existence

6.4. The Minor Word-Classes 6.4.1. Pronouns 6.4.2. The Adverb

WORD-CLASS THEORY

6.0, Introduction

William Ward8s theory of the parts of speech is

based on the - idea or conception. He sees different

word-classes based on distinctions in the ideas that are

annexed to words. This chapter seeks to explicate Ward's

analysis of the parts of speech in terms of the idea,

6.1. Cominon Features of Substantives, Adjectives, and Verbs

Grammatical theories can usually be divided into .

those that stress the similarity of verb and adjective

and those that stress the similarity of substantive and

adjective. In the past the latter approach was almost

universal as a result of the impetus given it by the

close ontological relation of substance and accidents in

the philosophy of the time; Plato and Aristotle, however,

had favoured the identification of adjective and verb as

a result of the close dependence of their linguistic

analysis on the logical proposition, William Ward's

position differs from all others in that he recognized

1, "If grammatic definitions are made as accurate as the subject admits of, they must be founded on properties of the conceptions of the mind which are somewhat remote from common observation^.^' (Ward, p o x . )

an underlying similarity ip all three parts.' It may

well be, he thinks, that the gramrnarianss most difficult

task is to indicate how parts differ from one another:

for this I8much abstract consideration becomes necessary." 2

One obvious difference appears to emerge which will dis-

tinguish nouns and verbs: it is that nouns are said to

denote objects and verbs to denote states. But we must

weigh against this Ward's warning that his plan of lang- Ill

uage takes its form from the conceptions that the mind

of man forms and affixes to nouns and verbs, and - not --

from the nature of the objects. The fact that Ward says

some ideas refer to states and some to objects is there-

fore irrelevant and extra-linguistic: parts of speech

differ only as the ideas annexed to them differ.

6.1.1. Noun Substantives and Noun Adjectives

Wardss explanations are often cumbersome, and his

style repetitious. In the following pages a feature

analysis of his major parts of speech is proposed which

1. It will be necessary to consider the general nature of several [sc. subst., adj., and verb] of the parts of speech together on many occasions, for the sake of dis- covering the properties that they have in common with each other--as likewise the properties in which they disagree." (Ward, p. 3.)

I 2. Wuch abstract consideration becomes necessary to distinguish the several particulars of the signification of the same part of speech one from another; and especially in the noun and verb. Every part of speech in some parti- culars of its signification approaches to the nature of some other part of speech." (ward, p. x.)

attempts to abbreviate and state succinctly what Ward

takes mamy pages to lay before his reader. The con-

ceptions or ideas annexed to nouns "are distinguished

in the mind by constant marks or characters, which are

conceived to be evidences of a constant principle of

existence peculiar to each object, whether such a prin-

ciple is to be taken notice of or not."' Although the

constant marks or characters are evidence of a constant

principle of existence in the extra-linguistic world

of objects the constant marks - are characteristics of the

ideas. When an idea or bundle of semantic features is

associated with the grammatical category 'noun8 it has

the characteristic or distinguishing feature of a 'con-

stant mark'; we will call this an "Idea with a Mark of

Existence which is constantt' and give it the abbreviated

notation: IME [+con].

Noun substantives and noun adjectives are distin-

guished according to whether or not the mind takes

notice of this constant mark attached to the idea. 2

1. Ward, p. 12.

2. nIn the conceptions annexed to substantives, notice is taken of the peculiar separate principle of existence of the object which each substantive denotes . . . . In the conceptions annexed to adjectives, no separate prin- ciple of existence is to be taken notice of." (Ward, p.12) The second sentence here could be interpreted as a sug- gestion that not only should a separate principle not be taken notice of in adjectives, but that it may not exist at all. But this would contradict Ward's claim that all nouns have a constant mark indicating principles of exist- ence.

Ideas associated with adjectives do have a constant mark

as evidence of a constant principle, but the mind does

not attend to the mark. In noun substantives the con-

stant mark is taken notice of. The mind's attention to

this feature of the idea will be marked with [+noted]

in our abbreviated notation, and its lack of attention

will be marked with [-noted]. Thus the noun substantive

will become: IME rEz:ed] and the noun adjective:

IME e . Ward envisages the ideas not simply as the perception in the mind of the essences of objects

denoted by sense impressions (the position of the Port

Royal grammar), or as constructs made from these sense.

impressions through association by the active process of

the mind (Lockets position), but as objects existing in

the mind which the mind can know completely or only

partially. If an idea has a constant mark attached to

it, as do all nouns, there seems no reason in principle

why the mind should not pay attention to this mark. But

according to Ward the mind frequently does not take

notice of this mark, for this is the reason why the word

annexed to such an idea takes on the grammatical form

and function of an adjective.

6.1.2. Class Change in Substantives and Adjectives

It would seem to follow from this that all adjectives

are capable of becoming substantives, and all substantives

are capable of becoming adjectives, as it is merely a

matter of the kind of attention given the idea by the

mind. Thus Ward says that woody is an adjective, because

its conception is not llseparately ascertained in the

intelle~t,'~ that is, its constant mark is not attended

to. If it were attended to and ascertained, it would

receive a separate principle of existence and would be-

come the abstract conception denoted by woodiness.' In

fact it seems that all substantives are not freely inter-

changeable-with adjectives because here Ward has selected

woodiness rather than - wood, and later he becomes even

more explicit : "The conceptions denoted by 'manly-bruti sh-

earthy1 are not the same with those denoted by the

substantives 'man-brute-earth,' but with those denoted by

lmanliness-brutishness-earthiness. 11'' This is because

all adjectives "express abstract conceptions":even such

1. Ward puts it thus:

If it were considered under such ascertainment, it would become the conception of an abstract object, to which the mind gives a separate prin- ciple of existence; and such conception might be denoted by a substantive which corresponds with the adjective. As for instance the con- ceptions denoted by the adjectives 'woody- fertile--extensive--desolate,' if considered as separately ascertained in the intellect, become the abstract conceptions which are de- noted by the substantives 'woodiness--fertility --extent--desolation. (Ward, p a 15)

2. Ward, p. 15.

adjectives as are derivedlfrom substantives which are

the names of real beings.ll' Adjectives, then, as signals

of abstract conceptions are related only to abstract

substantives. Some adjectives do not have a related

abstract substantive, but this is only llbecause such

have not been found necessary in language." Ward's dis-

tinction between substantives which represent abstract

conceptions and those which do not depends on whether

the conception has a constant mark indicating a constant

principle of existence in some object or whether "the -

mind considers these [conceptions] as if each of them

has a peculiar principle of existence in itself ."* Ward is saying that the constant mark is not always evidence

of a constant principle in things, but is sometimes evi-

dence of a principle of existence in the ideas themselves.

He seems to be saying that the constant mark of an abstract

noun has the additional characteristic of being self-

supporting, of being a mark of the idea's - own constant

principle. As only the conceptions attached to abstract

nouns enjoy the privilege of changing class from substan-

tive to adjective and - vice versa it seems that the fea-

ture [+noted] - is relevant to these only. The conceptions

I 1. Ibid., p. 15.

2. Ward, p. 14.

which are self-supporting,will be marked [+ss] and those

whose marks are evidence of a principle of existence out-

side the idea will be marked [-s~], The following analy-

sis of Ward's plan of the ideas annexed to nouns is

proposed:

Concrete substantives: IME F~F] (.here is a con- stant mark of a

(e.g. wood) principle of existence outside the idea),

Abstract substantives: IME +ss he principle of +noted existence is now

(e.g. woodiness) ['On 1 within the idea, and thus it is

Adjectives:

(e.g. woody)

self-supporting, The mind is ta- king notice of the principle).

(A constant prin- -no t ed ciple belongs to

the idea, but is not noticed, All adjectives are considered abs- tract).

In spite of the fact that Ward sees the 'abstract' ad-

jectives related to abstract nouns (inasmuch as they have

the same bundle of semantic features behind them), he

calls such adjectives 'derived' adjectives' and claims

that they are derived from concrete nouns. He does not

state what this process of derivation consists of, and

1. Ward, p. 15.

he probably had no clear idea; for the purposes of our

analysis we can say that it consists in the marking of

[-ss] with a positive value; this makes a concrete noun,

or idea of substance, into an abstract idea without any

grammatical or phonological realization; a linguistic

distinction will arise according to whether or not the

mind is attending to the mark of existence which is now

a property of the idea itself. Thus derivation of abs-

tract nouns and adjectives consists in the change of the

'self-supporting' feature from negative to positive value,

and the addition of the feature 'noted.' For Ward, ideas

annexed to concrete noun substantives, being the equiva-

lent of Locke's complex ideas of substance, are inevi-

tably linked to the grammatical category of substantive,

but when the mind makes these ideas independent of the

world of objects, so that they become self-supporting,

they are not intrinsically substantival or adjectival,

but belong to a more general category, 'noun.' They

only become further differentiated when the mind actual-

ly focusses on the idea. If the mind focusses on it

cornrJetely then the noun takes on the rank of substantive;

if it only focusses in a more general way and does not

take into account the specific nature of the mark of

existence, then the noun only has the status of adjec-

tive. The category to which the word belongs depends

on the degree of attention given to the idea by the

mind; but t h i s only seems to be the case with abstract

nouns and adjectives; all other categories would seem

to enjoy the full attention of the mind.

6.1.3. TheVerb

Ward's definition of the verb stresses that it has

a mark which indicates that the principle of existence

of the verbal state is not constant.' The main problem

with this definition is to establish what Ward means by

the inconstant nature-of the principle of existence, and

to determine how and when it is present, and when it is

absent. Unfortunately Ward gives few examples to demons-

trate his definitions; it seems that he recognizes an

inconstant principle to be present when a verb is in

construction with a noun; the principle of existence is

inconstant because it is the mark of existence of one of

Lockets ideas of mixed modes, which perish in their birth;

thus verbs in construction have a mark of the inconstant

1. Ward's definition of the verb is:

Verbs are expressions of states of being, as dis- tinguished in the mind by marks or characters, which may be conceived as evidences of a prin- ciple of existence in the states. But not of a principle of such a nature as to be constantly in each state, or peculiar to each period into which the state may be distinguished. (Ward, p, 12).

principle of existence of ,the fleeting actions denoted

by imixed modes.l Because this principle of existence

is communicable to the noun and will be the means of

uniting the idea of the verb with the tincommunicable

principle of existencet of the noun, Ward says that the

inconstant principle is not inherent in the idea, but is

only marked by it. Thus finite verbs do not have a

self-supporting principle of existence. However, the

infinitive, when used as subject 0f.a sentence, having

another verb dependent on it, is not required to commu- -.

nicate any principle of existence to a noun; here, Ward

says, Itthe state under such consideration will be repre-

sented to the mind by a conception that is separately

ascertained in the intellect [i.e. has its own principle

of existence], as the conception denoted by a substantive

is; and such conception must become the object of nwnberOgt 1

Ward appears to be giving an explanation of the independ-

ence of the 'conceptiont attached to an infinitive verb

which is similar to that proposed for an abstract noun:

the conception is marked for a principle of existence

not in some extra-linguistic entity but in the idea it-

self. Ward is adamant that infinitive differ from nouns,

even though there are so many similarities; the greatest

1. Ward, p. 16.

similarity for him is that infinitives, like substantives

are subject to number; his examples include "to think and

to speaktt and "to speak once - twice - thrice many times.It 1

Apart from the formal distinction of the linguistic forms

themselves (which Ward recognizes as a reason for looking

for distinguishing features, but not the basis of the

difference), the only distinction between nouns and infini-

tives is that the .idea attached to an infinitive verb has

an inconstant principle of existence, inconstant because

the state it denotes is inconstant. He also notes that

while even abstract nouns can receive Itthe mark of the

vocativeu in poetry, infinitives never can; * this, how- ever, is a structural feature, and does not explain why

they are different.

The ideas attached to infinitive verbs will be

represented in our notation as ItIdeas with Marks on

Existence that are not constant, but that are self-

supporting,It which becomes IME +ss . All other verbs CcOl differ from infinitives in having conceptions which are

not separately laid up in the mind, and therefore are not

self-supporting; they have a derived principle of exist-

ence; it is derived from the world of objects as was the

1. Ibid., p. 17.

2. Ward, p. 26.

case with the concrete noun substantives. Verbs other

than infinitives are annexed to "Ideas with Marks of

existence which are not constant and self-supporting,Is -con

or in our notation: IPE [-ss ] . There are also dif- ferences between participles and finite verbs; Ward

calls the two categories 'verbs coalescent1 and 'verbs

definitive'; but these differences are not differences

in the ideas annexed to them, but differences in them

as signals of operations, and as such will be discussed

later,

6.2. Feature Analysis of Major Word-Classes

Thus far we have discussed five different kinds of

principal parts of speech; these are: concrete substantives,

abstract substantives, adjectives, infinitives, and other

verbs. The ideas attached to these differ according to

the nature of the mark of existence. It may be constant

or inconstant, it may be self-supporting or derived from

things; whether the mind focusses on it or not may also

be significant. The feature representation for the marks

of existence of the various parts is:

Concrete substantives

Abstract substantives IME recon +ss 1

Adjectives

Infinitives

I,, : 1 -note$

IME +ss 1 Other Verbs

The purpose of this feature representation is to

suggest the similarity in Ward's view of all three parts

of speech. The three become five distinguishable parts

in Ward's analysis, and the change in class is achieved

in all instances by the change of one feature from a

positive to a negative value or vice versa, or by the

addition of one new feature. All five distinctive class-

es or parts have in common the fact that they are made up

from an idea with a mark of existence. Differences are

only in the nature of the mark of existence, and it is

these differences that are distinguished by features in

this analysis.

6.2.1. The Feature [con] or Constant Mark

The validity of the analysis rests upon the recogni-

tion of these features, and so these will be examined in

some detail; let it first be clear that the purpose of

this analysis is not to test the validity of Ward's

theory, but is simply a means of explicating his writing.

I n Ward's d i scuss ion of t h e cons tan t o r incons tan t

p r i n c i p l e s of ex i s t ence ( [+ - con]) he appears t o be

a l lowing t h e r e a l world t o impinge on h i s l i n g u i s t i c

system: t h e f i n i t e v e r b has an incons tan t p r i n c i p l e of

ex i s t ence which i s no t i t s own, but t h a t of o b j e c t s i n

a c t i o n ; t h e reason t h e p r i n c i p l e of ex i s t ence i s cons tant

i n t h e noun, and incons tan t i n t h e verb , i s t h a t i t i s

only i n ex i s t ence f o r t h e v e r b dur ing t h e per iod of time

i n d i c a t e d by t h e t e n s e of t h e verb , o r perhaps, f o r t h e

d u r a t i o n of t h e a c t i v i t y s i g n i f i e d by t h e ve rb ; i t can

be completely withheld by t h e nega t ive p a r t i c l e . ' I t is

p o s s i b l e t o fo l low Ward's reasoning, i f n o t t o ag ree wi th

i t , when he d i s c u s s e s t h e incons tan t p r i n c i p l e i n r e l a t i o n

t o t h e t e n s e s and t o t h e n o t i o n s a t t ached t o verbs i n

genera l : we a r e reminded of Lockets mixed modes. However,

h i s d i s c u s s i o n of t h e nega t ive , and h i s proposal t h a t a

v e r b with a nega t ive p a r t i c l e g i v e s evidence of an i d e a

1 . Ward d i s c u s s e s t h e v e r b ' s p r i n c i p l e of ex i s t ence and t h e e f f e c t of t h e nega t ive p a r t i c l e as follows:

I t i s c l e a r t h a t a ve rba l s t a t e , as expressed by any of t h e t e n s e s o r any of t h e moods, i s appre- hended t o have a p r i n c i p l e of ex i s t ence which may be conceived as with-held from i t a t t h e p leasure of t h e mind. If t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s conceived t o be always with-held from any p a r t o r per iod of a v e r b a l s t a t e , such p a r t o r per iod can have no ex i s t ence . Hence t h e nega t ive p a r t i c l e @kotN when un i t ed with a verb , expresses a s t a t e which i s without a c t u a l ex i s t ence . . . because t h e p r i n c i p l e by which i t should e x i s t i s never com- municated t o i t . (Ward, p. 19).

with absolutely no mark of existence is perplexing. If

the idea has no mark of existence, one wonders how it

exists at all; Locke and Hartley believed that the mind

had a store of ideas that had accumulated from birfh and

were summoned forth either by the recurrence of the ap-

propriate physical stimulus or by a word linked to them

by association; consequently for them, ideas do all exist

in the mind, but are only activated or charged with what

Ward calls existence when stimulated by the associated

words or things. We must assume that where Bard considers

verbs that have been negated he is suggesting the ideas

excited by those words remain in the unactivated state

which the countless other unmentioned ideas in the mind

are in. The only difference between uniting the particle

not with a verb, thus negating it, and not mentioning the --.

verb at all is that in the former case one is explicitly

publishing the fact that the state denoted by the verb

is not existing, and therefore cannot be in coalescence

with the substantive. Ward's explanation is consistent

with the rest of his theory of ideas, although it produces

certain difficulties in the formulation of the parts of

speech which he sets out, and which has been explicated

here. However, even today linguists are not at all certain

about how the negative enters into the verb phrase. The

rather curious implications on the proposed feature ana-

lysis of the parts of speech suggests an inconsistency

i n Ward 's own theory , but tshould no t be considered of

s u f f i c i e n t importance t o des t roy t h e otherwise coherent

scheme t h a t Ward has e s t ab l i shed .

The f e a t u r e [con] i s f a i r l y c l e a r i n i t s impl ica t ions :

i d e a s a s s o c i a t e d wi th words have t o be a c t i v a t e d , t h a t i s ,

they have t o become assoc ia ted wi th a p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t -

ence; some words (nouns) have t h i s p r i n c i p l e a l l t h e t ime,

whi le o t h e r s ( a l l verbs) only have i t f o r t h e per iod

covered by t h e i r time reference . This appears t o suggest

t h a t t h e main d i f f e r e n c e between nouns and verbs i s t h a t

of time re fe rence ; however, Ward does not say t h a t t h i s

i s t h e case , and h i s d i s t i n c t i o n may well be more s u b t l e .

( C f . end of Para. 6.3.).

6.2.2. The Feature [ s s ] o r Self-support ing

The f e a t u r e [ss], when marked f o r i t s p o s i t i v e va lue ,

i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e mark of ex i s t ence , whether cons tan t

o r incons tan t , denotes a p r i n c i p l e of ex i s t ence wi th in

t h e very i d e a s (as i n woodiness o r woody), while i t s ne-

g a t i v e va lue denotes t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e of ex i s t ence i s

der ived from t h i n g s i n t h e case of noun ( a s i n - wood) o r

a c t i o n s of t h i n g s i n ve rbs (as i n - 9 s e e s ho lds ) . This

r a t h e r tenuous d i s t i n c t i o n between marks of ex i s t ence

and p r i n c i p l e s of ex i s t ence , t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e concept

of t h e p r i n c i p l e of ex i s t ence , and the supposed t r a n s f e r -

a b i l i t y of i t c o n s t i t u t e t h e most u n s a t i s f a c t o r y p a r t

of Ward's a n a l y s i s ; i t i s c l e a r l y based on Lockels no t ion

t h a t a l l i d e a s e x i s t i n t h e mind only because they have

some kind of c o r r e l a t e s i n t h e ou t s ide world. Ward un-

doubtedly cons iders t h i n g s i n t h e world as t h e ' p r i n c i p l e

of e x i s t e n c e ' of i d e a s ; when i d e a s a r e removed from t h e

immediate realm of t h e phys ica l world ( t h a t of t h e con-

c r e t e noun s u b s t a n t i v e ) t o t h e realm of t h e a b s t r a c t

i d e a s they a r e given a se l f -suppor t ing p r i n c i p l e o f

ex i s t ence ; Ward r e a l i z e d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s of t h e rea l i sm - -

i n h i s theory , and excuses himself f o r t h i s hypothesiza-

t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s of ex i s t ence ; nThe mind cons iders

t h e s e o b j e c t s [ a b s t r a c t i d e a s ] as i f each of them had

a p e c u l i a r cons tant p r i n c i p l e of ex i s t ence i n i t s e l f

[ i . e . [+ss]] ; and t h i s t h e mind does merely f o r i ts own

convenience. '(1

6.2.3. The Feature [ ~ o t e d l

The f e a t u r e [+noted] i n d i c a t e s whether o r n o t t h e

mind i s paying a t t e n t i o n t o t h e mark of ex i s t ence . Ward's

p ropos i t ion t h a t t h e mind e i t h e r n o t i c e s o r does n o t

n o t i c e t h e p r i n c i p l e of ex i s t ence is, as it s tands , d i f -

f i c u l t t o understand; however, i t has much i n common with

t h e P o r t Royal suggest ion t h a t s u b s t a n t i v e s s i g n i f y t h i n g s

1 . Ward, p. 14.

clearly and adjectives sipify them confusedly; ' it also reminds us of Jespersents suggestion in The Philosophy of - - Grammar that adjectives can become substantives through

a process of specialization, focussing, or definition. 2

Although Ward does not use the terms 'clear' or 'confusedt

of Port Royal, and although he does not appear to see the

wider implications of his statement that Jespersen does,

it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that he had in

mind a similar explanation.

- - 6.3. Rules Linking Ideas to Word-Classes

It is now possible to see why Ward's ideas are said

to be grammatically undifferentiated, and to demonstrate

how related the various parts are one to another. Ward,

as a follower of Locke, believed all our ideas to be

founded in sense knowledge; as a consequence of this the

basis of all linguistic ideas would have to be objects

in the world; concrete substantives, then, are in a sense

the primary linguistic category. Ideas all start as +con

members of this category: IBE pss] . The first process which the mind can perform on these ideas is to make

them abstract, or self-sufficient, by removing their

1. Port Royal Grammar, op. cit., Part 11, Chapter on Noun. - 2. Otto Jespersen, - The Philosophy of Grammar (1924), p. 78. -

dependence on the world oft objects; this is done by

making the feature [ss] positive. As a result of this

the idea does not belong to any surface grammatical cate- Kconl

gory (there is no category with only the features kssl i if, however, the mind is considering the idea as repre-

senting an object in the world (and linguistically

manifested as a primary or concrete noun) this feature

change will not take place. The mind has the option of

leaving the original idea in the concrete noun substan-

tive form or preparing it to belong to other categories; -

this option can be expressed by the following feature

change rule:

Assuming that the optional change is made, the idea now

has - no grammatical significance and is just a collection

of simple ideas or semantic features which, as they are,

can have no grammatical function. However, any change or

addition to them will make them members of a grammatical

category. The following rule allows them to remain as

they are, in which case an additional feature will be

added ( [ +noted] ) which will distinguish abstract nouns

and adjectives; alternatively the value of one or both

features may change, giving an infinitive or some other

verbal form:

The change in feature from [+con] to [-con] implies that

the mind is focussing on a typical activity of the object

rather than on its existence, It would be useful to demon-

strate these rules with an 'idea' or semantic concept in - -

English; Ward himself only outlines his theory; he never

worries about showing us how it will work. There are .

few semantic concepts that occur in all five grammatic

forms that have been discussed, The concept of a circle,

although not considered by Ward, is one that is susceptible

to the various changes which he envisaged: circle could

be a noun or a verb, there is an adjective circular,

and an abstract noun circularity. But these forms do

represent a considerable semantic spread: to circle is

to 'put a circle around,' and circularitx is considered

a property of arguments rather than circles; however,

if we can lay aside the semantic spread of these words,

and consider the verb circle as referring to what aircraft

do when waiting to land, and circularity a property of

circles, and circles to be physical objects (which is

highly unlikely!) we can see Ward's point: the mind

perceives a c i r c l e througQ the sense impressions, and

the idea t h a t t h i s enkindles i s an IME pzp] , t h a t i s ,

one t h a t has the grammatical p roper t i es of a concrete

noun substant ive; however, the re a r e occasions when one

does not wish t o r e f e r t o a c i r c l e , but may wish t o r e f e r

t o the a c t i v i t y of c i r c l i n g , the abs t r ac t property of

being c i r c u l a r , o r jus t the qua l i t y . If t h i s i s the case,

t h e mind takes the idea e i t h e r f r o m the s t o r e of ideas ,

o r f r o m the immediate sense impressions and f i rs t per-

forms the process of turning it i n t o an abs t r ac t idea by > .

applying r u l e one. This a b s t r a c t idea can receive the

f e a t u r e [-noted] by r u l e two and may thus be l ex i ca l i zed

without the mind not ing i t s p r inc ip l e of existence; it

w i l l thus become the ad jec t ive c i r c u l a r . If r u l e two

changes the ex i s t i ng f ea tu re s t o t h e i r negative value

we w i l l have the f i n i t e verb c i r c l e s (but not necessar i ly

marked f o r t h i r d person or i n t h i s t e n s e ) ; Ward i s clairn-

i n g t h a t the mind can a l t e r the grammatical character is -

t i c s of a bundle of semantic f e a t u r e s t o make them belong

t o d i f f e r e n t ca tegor ies of c lasses . Khen he discusses

t h e t h ree terms man -9 manly, and manliness, he says t h a t

both manly and manliness a r e derived from man* -9 t h i s

would be achieved by applying r u l e s and t w o ; he a l s o

s a i d t h a t they both share the same idea: t h a t i s , i n our +con

a n a l y s i s , both have the f ea tu re s [+ss] . There a r e no

verbs with the base form 'mant except as i n " to man the

guns," which is semantically distinct, but Ward does

suggest that to be a man and to be a judge are verbs;

so if the negative value of [con] were chosen the verbal

form of the idea would be the result. The rules of syn-

tax ensure that the correct feature matrix combinations

result in a sentence which follows the normal conventions

of the language.

Ward says that the process of abstraction from a

concrete substantive may result in the formation of a

I verbal conkeption; the process involves forming abstract

conceptions from the objects, and allowing these to exist

by a principle that may be communicated or withheld, i.e.

an inconstant principle. Interchangeability between

verb and adjective is also easily accomplished by igno-

ring the inconstant principle in verbs, with the result

that no principle is noted; the idea would appear to have

1. He says:

No such object as is expressed by the 'mind, body, a man, a tree, a beast, a mineralt can be denoted by any verb. But states, the con- ceptions whereof are formed by abstraction from the objects above mentioned, may be de- noted by verbs, if these states are conceived to exist by a principle which may be cornmuni- cated to them, or withheld from them, at the pleasure of such objects as have a real prin- ciple of existence in themselves, or of any object to which the mind assigns such principle for its own convenience. (ward, p. 20).

1 the features of an adjective. The easy change between

verb and adjective helps Ward to see why the verb coa-

lescent (the participle, that is) can easily occupy the

same position as the adjective (cf. a running horse and

a black horse). He says that verbal conceptions may unite

with substantival conceptions in the same way as adjecti-

val conceptions doe2 But Ward still emphasizes the in-

constant principle of existence of the verbal conception,

even though the so-called present participle hardly has

any limiting time reference. It seems that while Ward

appears to be referring to actual time reference when

discussing the inconstant principle, he is actually

trying to make the active/stative or action/non-action

distinction which is discussed in many modern treatments

of verbs and adjectivesb3 The point that Ward was empha-

sizing was that verbs are not indicative of a permanent

1. "The same conceptions which are denoted by verbs, may be denoted by adjectives, if the occasional principle by which the verbal states are conceived to exist is not at- tended to.I1 (Ward, p. 20).

2. llConceptions denoted by verbs may unite with those denoted by substantives, much in the same manner that adjective conceptions unite with substantive conceptions; except that the verbal conception will carry along with it the notion of the inconstancy of the principle by which it exists. But the adjective conception will carry no

I such notion along with it.11 (Ward, p. 20).

3. Cf. H. A. Jacobs and P. S. Rosenbaum, English Transformational Grammar (1968), p. 63.

state as are adjectives; he was gropingly reaching for

this distinction through the limiting factor of tense.

It is not of course true that all verbs indicate action

and all adjectives non-action or permanence, but undoubt-

edly the great majority do, and Ward felt that this was

the main distinguishing feature of verbs and adjectives; 1

it is this feature that lends support to his proposal

that infinitives are true verbs. While his insight into

the relationof substantive and adjective resembles the

analysis offered by Jespersen early in this century, 2

his analysis of the verb and adjective appears to be

founded on the same insights as those developed in

current transformational theory. 3

6.3.1. Coalescence and the Principle of Existence

Construction in language is said to occur through

a process of tcoalescencet;4 this is one of the corner-

stones of Ward's theory. Coalescence has to be under-

1 . He is aware that there are exceptions to the general rule of action/non-action division between verbs and ad- jectives, such as t'equalleth,H and treats them as excep- tions.

2. Cf. note 2, page 191.

3. Cf. note 3, page 196.

4. Cf. Para. 5.1.4.

stood in terms of Ward's ~otion of number. He says that

if we had one word to express every different conception

in the mind there would be no need for connected discourse

as such; for him, a sentence is a unit because it builds

up one complex conception, just as a picture subsumes

many details into a unity. The difficult thing for him

to explain is how it is that words that are each attached

to a separate idea with its own principle of existence

can all refer to only one single complex conception when

they are in construction. He uses the principle of coa- - -

lescence to resolve the difficulty: an idea becomes a

'coalescent circumstance' by virtue of being in a parti-

cular syntactic position, and as such, it "unites with

an object without increasing the number of the Object."

Thus v;hen a verb unites with a noun substantive it is able

to do so because its inconstant principle of existence

coalesces with the principle of existence of the noun, and

instead of there being two distinct principles there is

only the one larger one. Adjectives in English can

achieve coalescence more immediately than verbs' because

the characteristic of the verb is attended to by the

1. Ward maintains this position in the first part of his Speculative Grammar, but appears to revise it later. See Para. 7.2.

mind.' Thus the adjective is immediately taken to be

in coalescence with the nearest principle of existence,

that of the noun substantive. Ward does not discuss how

the adjective gives this express notice; he entirely

ignores structural considerations throughout the Essay;

we can only assume that he considered they gave express

notice because they are adjectives; we know that they - are adjectives because of their syntactic position, and

the form of the word which, we, as native speakers, know

is that of an adjective.

6.4. Minor Word-Classes

The discussion of word-classes has so far been limit-

ed to those areas which concern the way the mind forms

concepts; the reason for this is that the uniqueness of

the terms discussed lies in their psychological implica-

tions, in the process of the formation of concepts. Ward's

grammatical analysis consists of two chief topics: one is

a discussion of the formation of concepts, and the other

is the expression of the relation between these concepts.

His discussion of the formation of concepts relies heavixy

1. Ward says:

Noun adjectives are the names of abstract con- ceptions, similar to those which are denoted by substantives; only these adjective names give express notice, that no principle of separate existence is to be attended to, in whatsoever is denoted by any of them. (Ward, p. 13).

2Q0

on Locke and Hartley. His, unique and original contri-

bution here is that he is able to ~$ve an account in

psychological terms of the characteristics of ideas

which lie behind the different grammatical categories.

The analysis of his account given here has attempted to

stress the essential simplicity of his formulation, a

simplicity which is difficult to see when reading his

grammar on account of the endless repetition which he

indulges in, as well

and define his terms - -

discussed only ideas

the parts which Ward

as his failure to give examples

unambiguously. So far we have

which lie behind nouns and verbs,

calls the most important parts of

speech. Discussion of the term 'coalescence' suggested

that these concepts, once formed, undergo processes which

relate to each other. The processes of relation which

Ward discusses are essentially his account of syntax; here,

as in his account of the parts of speech, he pays little

attention to the structural markers of syntax; whether

they are cases, articles, pronouns, or prepositions, they

are all seen as ttsignals of the operation of the mind":

as such these minor parts of speech will be discussed

mainly in the following chapter; however, pronouns and

adverbs are discussed here because of their relation to

the noun.

6.4.1.. Pronouns ,

Pronouns are Itthe names of objects of certain species,

distinguished by characteristics of so extensive a nature,

as to comprehend all objects whatsoever as individuals

thereof; "' sometimes they refer back to objects previous- ly mentioned; often they are general names made to refer

to particular objects by means of additional 'demonstra-

tive circumstances1 such as pointing: Vronouns are names

of objects belonging to species so very extensive that

when some,demonstrative circumstance does not attend the

use of them it must be supplied, in order to ascertain

more particularly the nature and properties of the object

denoted by any one of them. "* Ward's description of the

pronoun is distinctive , especially when compared to the more usual definition of them as noun substitutes, such

as Lowthls; Lowth says: lla pronoun is a word standing

instead of a Noun, as its Substitute or representative. t t 3

The superiority of Ward's definition of the pronoun is

probably more due to his indebtedness to Harris than to

original thinking, except for one important part of his

description: the quality of the pronoun that he focusses

1. Ward, p. 125.

2. Ward, p. 127.

3. Lowth, op. cit., p. 31.

on is its ability to refer to individuality without

referring to specific characteristics; pronouns have

llcharacteristics of so extensive a nature, as to compre-

hend all objects . . . as individuals." This approach is

somewhat similar to the much older one which claims that

pronouns indicate 'substance without quality,' but Ward

developed his approach through contact with Lockets

philosophy. The mind has the ability to focus on parti-

cular ideas, perhaps on those of a horse; but it can just

focus on some so that this horse is seen not as a horse

but as an animal; it may then choose to ignore the fea-

tures which indicate that it is living; then it will be

referred to as a thing, or just as it* the idea is suf- - 9

ficiently removed from particulars to be able to refer

to a wide variety of objects at the choice of the mind,

but its property of number is such that the mind can only

choose to focus on one such object at a time. Substance

without qualities was unknowable and anathema to the

Lockean spirit, but the association of the pronouns with

ideas so general that the possible area of reference is

unlimited achieves the same perspicuity as the mediaeval

interpretation of the attitude. It is interesting to

observe how two very distinct philosophical systems are

able to offer equally useful explanations of linguistic

systems.

Ward makes the usual'division of pronouns: personal

pronouns, possessives, and relative pronouns; his analysis

of the relative will be discussed in the chapter on syn-

tax, as he discusses it with reference to the relations

between conceptions. His treatment of the personal and

possessive pronouns is largely conventional apart from

an interesting distinction between the first and second

person pronouns and the third person pronouns. The first

person has the characteristic oftla speaker mentioning

himself in what he says, as distinguished by the act of

speaking,'! and the second person pronoun has the cha-

racteristic of being "an object . . . mentioned as dis- tinguished by words addressed to the object." All other

pronouns are of It third personal species. !I' The point is

that - I and you, although words with extremely general

signification are immediately given singular significa-

tions without any kind of antecedent, the ltdemonstrative

circumstances~ being attached to the act of speaking

itself .* Although Harris notes and Lowth repeats3 that

2, "For when the words are actuzlly spoken, the person or persons to whom they are addressed usually see the speaker; and by that means know more of that speaker, than the pronoun 11111 expresses. And the speaker, by seeing those whom he speaks to , and frequently by being acquainted personally with them, knows more of them than the pronoun Ityet' or "you1! expresses. (ward, p. 126).

3. Harris, op. cit., p. 70; and Lowth, op. cit,, p, 32.

the first and second person do not have a sex distinction

because the people are present together, making such a

distinction superfluous, they do not go any further in

studying the implications of this presence. Ward goes

further in attempting to state the implications of the

peculiarities of these two persons. He notes that the

writers of Latin grammar had considered these two pronouns

not to require antecedents; he attempts to show how the

place of antecedents is taken by the peculiar circwnstan-

ces of the addresser-addressee relationship. He also

criticizes former grammarians for suggesting that pronouns

form a common class on account of the antecedent re-

quirements. He says: "This is a very considerable over-

sight; for the connexion of a personal pronoun.with its

antecedent is very different from that of a relative

pronoun, as will fully appear in the account of each in

this book. Ward s inherent conservatism in relation

to class names does not allow him to set them up as

completely distinct classes, but his statement of their

distinctive natures will serve as a justification for

the separate discussion of personal and relative pronouns

in this thesis. Relatives are discussed in Paras. 7.3.ff.

1. Ward, p. 128.

6.4.2. The Adverb I

The adverb is discussed with a certain ambiguity

by Ward; he does not completely endorse the Port Royal

analysis which sees the adverb as an abbreviation of

the preposition + noun construction because for Ward

the adverb has a particular function to perform which

cannot be performed by any substantive; however, he does

say that "the sense of the adverb may be expressed by

some of the forms of a substantive in the ablative case,

in almost-any sentence. Thus 'very goodt is in effect

'good in verity. ' But there is a fundamental distinc-

tion between the adverb and the noun in the ablative

case or with a preposition. The adverb is more than

just an abbreviated form of 'preposition + nount because it has the syntactic function of closing the construction

or sentence modification.* This it does by giving notice

of a mental operation. However, the conceptions denoted

1. Ward, p. 213.

2. If the conception, usually expressed by an adverb, is at any time expressed by the case of a substantive of an equivalent signification; that conception may, if the speaker pleases, be farther modified by some connective word made to depend on the substantive; as appears in the expressions, 'good in perfect reality--to act with infinite wisdom' . . . . These modifications by other dependent words, can very seldom be applied when an adverb is made use of; and therefore this circumstance . . . with the grammatical form of the adverb are the only particulars which distinguish most of the adverbs from the oblique case of the noun substantive. (ward, p. 213).

by the adverb are sirnilar'to those of a noun with a

preposition. Ward agrees with the Port Royal analysis

in seeing the adverb as signifying a particular species

of conception, also signified by 'preposition + noun,'

but he disagrees as to its syntactic function.

Chapter VII

Relations Between Concepts: An Approach to Syntax

7 .O. Grammatical Relations

Case Three Levels of Analysis The Function of Case Nominative and Accusative Cases Substantives in Oblique Cases the Equivalent

of Adjectives A New Theory of Transitivity Two Basic Sentence Types Verbs Followed by Prepositions or More Than

One Noun Prepositions

Adjectives and Verbs 7.2. 7.2.1. Syntactic Function of the Definitive Verb

7 3. Relative Pronouns and Relative Clauses 7.3.1. The Notion of Degree 7.3.2. Content Clauses and Relative Clauses 7.3.3. The Relative Clause and its Resolution

7.4. Extraposition

7.5. A Note on Performatives

I

CHAPTER VII

RELATIONS BETWEEN CONCEPTS: AN APPROACH TO SYNTAX

7.0. Grammatical Relations

Part of the function of the adverb, the relative

pronoun, the verb definitive, and the entire function

of the cases, prepositions, and conjunctions, is to give

notice of operations of the mind. Ward's continual

reference to goperations of the mindt suggests that this

term transcends and embraces the particular functional

units in some way. It invokes considerations of Locke

and Hartley. Ward's view of language structure is es-

sentially a dynamic one; he does not view a sentence as

a set or relations without movement, but a set of relations

which has developed because a series of operations have

modified and arranged the primitive conceptions or ideas

of the mind. These operations of the mind are triggered

off by various structural markers, prepositions, cases,

etc., and serve to arrange the ideas in an order of de-

pendence. Before these operations start functioning

the grammatical categories attached to the ideas have

already been selected, presumably by the communicative

needs of the speaker. The operations of the mind are a

means of arranging these grammatically undifferentiated

ideas. Thus there are two stages in sentence con-

208

struction; they are:

1) attachment of semantic concepts to grammatical categories,

2) arran~ement of grammatical categories in meaning- ful dependency relation.

The first stage was discussed in the last chapter, There

were no observable signals for this part of the process;

Ward recognized that there are related forms in language

(cf.: man manly, and manliness) and used Lockels theory - 9

of ideas to construct a theoretical interpretation of

these forms. There are however, observable signals of

the ordering operations that are performed by the mind.

Operations of the mind are signalled by structural markers

I which place one idea in a dependency relation to another

I (as was briefly discussed in relation to adjectives and

verbs). Operations can be said to order grammatical

units; however, this ordering does not appear to be

a sequential ordering; the way that particular surface

forms in language follow each other is considered only

a matter of custom, and not a part of universal grammar.

Ward gives the Hebrew genitive as an example of language

particular surface distinctions; he says that the same

relation is indicated as in Latin, but the attachment

of case markers to the nouns is the opposite from what

it is in Latin. Undoubtedly the fact that noun adjective

comes next t o t h e noun sulbstnntive and t h e ve rb fo l lows

t h e sub jec t i n Engl i sh , i s considered extremely appropri-

a t e by Ward, but i d e a s themselves cannot be s e q u e n t i a l l y

ordered; they can only be placed i n dependency r e l a t i o n s .

T h i s , and n o t t h e o rde r ing of t h e phonological manifesta-

t i o n of language i s t h e func t ion of t h e ' ope ra t ions of

t h e mind.' If Ward had followed h i s p lan through coherent-

l y , he would have had t o d i s c u s s t h e s e t of language

p a r t i c u l a r r u l e s which t ake i n t o account t h e order of

dependency i n i d e a s and r e l a t e i t t o t h e sequen t i a l

o rde r ing of words. I t does no t seem t h a t Ward ' s o v e r a l l

view of language w a s s u f f i c i e n t l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d t o achieve

t h i s , o r perha.ps i t was t h a t he f e l t t h a t such w a s too

t r i v i a l an a c t i v i t y f o r h i s concern, i t being so obvious

t h a t a d j e c t i v e s come befores s u b s t a n t i v e s , and preposi-

t i o n s between nouns.

There i s perhaps t h e more fundamental reason why

Ward w a s n o t concerned with s t a t i n g t h e r u l e s which jo in

t h e dependency r e l a t i o n s of i d e a s t o t h e s e q u e n t i a l

o rde r ing of t h e phonological man i fes ta t ion of them: i n

s p i t e o f t h e f a c t t h a t Ward 's s t a r t i n g po in t was a philo-

soph ica l o r psychological account of t h e formation of

i d e a s i n t h e mind, once he had accounted f o r t h e s e bas ic

i d e a s , t h e c r i t e r i a he used f o r manipulat ing them, t h e

only criteria he had avai:able in fact, were the cri-

ieria derived f rom the structure of Latin and English.

Only occasionally does he allow considerations of the

structure of Latin to impinge on his Essay, so his

analysis of English is the continual justification for

his discussion of what happens to the ideas in the mind

which have been derived from the world through sense

impression. This reliance on English is almost inevi-

table: Ward's limited knowledge of other languages could

not provide him with a wider knowledge or analysis of . -

language; his predecessors had all been guilty of exactly

the same mistake, believing analysis of language to be

an analysis of their own language. While the peyspective

that this provided him with is inevitably limited, it is

important to point out that his reliance on his own

language does not make his investigations any the less

interesting, but it does render any attempt to relate

the underlying ideas to surface structure completely

redundant. Ward's attempt to understand the process of

speaking, and to suggest some universal properties

associated with it, is not expected to withstand ob-

jective criticism as a current theory would be; conscious

of the limitations imposed on Ward by the state of

knowledge of his age, the present-day reader of Ward's

grammar is searching for innovations in terms of the

eighteenth century attitudes to language. Insofar as

Ward's analysis is limited by his lack of knowledge of

other languages and by a lack of methodological pre-

suppositions, we excuse him; insofar as he was able

to transcend these limitations and suggest avenues of

investigation which have proved valuable in throwing

light on the nature of language, we admire him. These

observations on Ward's aims are made here in order to

account for the continual use of psychological accounts

to explain. supposedly grammatical terminology, and to

account for Ward's lack of interest in what are normally

considered to be grammatical definitions. It might once

have been objected that accounts of this nature were not

the concern of linguistics; times have changed from this

point of view; interest in categories and phenomena that

are not directly observable has returned, and is justi-

fied just so long as there are definite empirical reasons

for positing the existence of such categories and pheno-

mena. The empirical reasons we find in Ward lie in the

structure of the English Language; insofar as the struc-

ture of Ehglish is not characteristic of language in

general it is easy to pinpoint numerous false observa-

tions that Ward makes; but a surprisingly large number

of observations do in fact transcend the limitations

of the English language, and it is this ability of

W a r d ' s t o t ranscend -par t icu lars t h a t g i v e s him h i s

c laim t o r ecogn i t ion .

7.1. Case - It was suggested i n Chapter 11' t h a t t h e category

of case was a s t imulus t o l i n g u i s t i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and

t h a t Ward's own method of d e a l i n g with case would p lay

a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the development of h i s s y n t a c t i c

theory . The explanat ions of case t h a t had been proposed

i n previous y e a r s were encouraging f u t u r e grammarians t o -.

be l e s s concerned with d a t a and more concerned with

theory. Psychological o r explanatory i n t e r e s t i n case

l e d t o a r e t u r n t o t h e kind of specu la t ion on syntax

t h a t t h e mediaeval grammarians had indulged i n . -Ac-

counts of t h e h i s t o r y of l i n g u i s t i c s do n o t u s u a l l y

1. Para . 2.5.6.

2. James Harris i s d e f i n i t e l y theory-or ienta ted . C f . Para . 2.5.5.

3. I an Michael desc r ibes t h e mediaeval approach t o syntax as an i n t e r e s t i n expla in ing phenomena:

The s p e c u l a t i v e grammarians ' most s i g n i f i c a n t ex tens ion of t h e grammatical t r a d i t i o n w a s t h e i r enlargement of t h e concept of syntax: they were l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n whether a ve rb o r a preposi- t i o n governed a p a r t i c u l a r case than i n what was meant by saying t h a t i t 'governed' a case a t a l l . By v i r t u e of what power d id i t govern? This new approach t o syntax, f o r a l l i t s pa t t e rned ar t i - f i c i a l i t y , w a s , a t i t s b e s t , a l i n p p i s t i c enquiry. But i t i s perhaps only by h inds igh t t h a t i t can be seen as such. ( ~ i c h a e l , p. 523) .

c r e d i t Renaissance Crammarkans o r English grammarians

of t h e seventeenth and e ighteenth c e n t u r i e s with such

e n q u i r i e s . ' However, a cursory g lance a t Ward's

Essay - on G r a m m a r ( o r Hermes) would suggest t h a t i t i s

d i f f e r e n t from t h e usua l run of English grammars, even

though only a few pages a r e devoted t o t h e t o p i c " O f

Words i n Connected Construct ionu o r what today would

be c a l l e d syntax. What would be equated with t h e me-

d i a e v a l n o t i o n of syntax i s discussed throughout t h e

Specu la t ive Grammar.

7.1.1. Three Levels of Analysis

I n t h e Essay t h e r e i s no c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of con-

s t r u c t i o n types of t h e kind we f i n d i n Lowth's G r a m m a r ,

and t h e r e i s l i t t l e e x p l i c i t concern with r&ime and

concord, which formed such a major p a r t of con t inen ta l

d i s c u s s i o n s on syntax a t t h i s per iod. Ward's discus-

s i o n c e n t r e s on t h e r e l a t i o n s of i d e a s r a t h e r than t h e

r e l a t i o n s of words, and i t i s case , o r i t s mani fes ta t ion

i n Engl ish , which he s e e s as t h e p r i n c i p a l s i g n a l of

t h e s e r e l a t i o n s ; case , p r e p o s i t i o n s , and word order a r e

a l l s i g n a l s of dependencies among ideas . Ward i s

unique among t h e English grammarians i n recognizing

t h r e e s e p a r a t e l e v e l s of grammatical a n a l y s i s ; he

1 . Ian Michael ' s account i s t y p i c a l . See p. 523.

recognizes t h e phenomenon of language as manifested

i n words as t h e su r face l e v e l of language, below t h i s

t h e r e i s t h e l e v e l of grammatically d i f f e r e n t i a t e d

i d e a s , and below t h i s aga in , t h e l e v e l of semantic u n i t s

which belong t o no grammatical category:

Phonological man i fes ta t ion of r e l a t e d ideas Level One

C h. L

ramm ma tic all^ Grammatically r e l a t e d . r e l a t e d r e l a t e d Two

i d e a i d e a idea I d I

The su r face l e v e l , l e v e l one, i s t h e only concern o f

most grammarians, but Ward n e i t h e r d e a l t with t h i s l e v e l

p r e s c r i p t i v e l y , as d id many w r i t e r s of the e ighteenth

cen tu ry , nor d id he seek t o desc r ibe i t sys temat ica l ly

as Wal l i s and a few o t h e r s had attempted t o do. He

Rules one and two of las t chap te r produce l e v e l two from l e v e l t h r e e

semantic conception

A A

4 r t

semantic semantic Level conception conception Three

1 4

r e c o p i z e d t h e su r face l e v e l only as a means of s igna l -

l i n g important processes i n t h e underlying l e v e l s . Ward's

i n t e r e s t i n t h e deep s t r u c t u r e r a t h e r than t h e su r face

s t r u c t u r e sugges ts t h a t he w a s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e expla-

n a t o r y r a t h e r than t h e d e s c r i p t i v e a s p e c t s of language;

i n many ways he w a s , and he paid l i t t l e heed t o t h e qua-

l i t y of t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of s u r f a c e c a t e g o r i e s , as i s

evidenced by h i s acceptance of a conventional schema

of t h e p a r t s of speech, However, h i s neg lec t of t h i s

a r e a w a s occasioned by a t t e n t i o n t o what he be l ieved

t o be t h e more fundamental concern: t h e meaning of t h e

s y n t a c t i c c a t e g o r i e s of l e v e l two. He used l e v e l one

as a means of reaching l e v e l two; a f t e r ana lys ing l e v e l

two he could have re tu rned t o t h e s u r f a c e l e v e l and

o f f e r e d a new a n a l y s i s of t h i s on t h e b a s i s of h i s f ind-

i n g s ; however, he d i d n o t t ake t h i s f i n a l s t e p , and

consequent ly h i s work has remained r e l a t i v e l y unnoticed

by those who t r a c e t h e h i s t o r y of English grammar.

7.1.2. The Function of Case

Case w a s one of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s t h a t

Ward used i n o rde r t o reach l e v e l two. For him t h e

l a c k of formal man i fes ta t ion o f cases i n Engl i sh was

no reason f o r ignor ing case o r a b o l i s h i n g i t , as Wallis

had done, The cases , he argues , have a func t ion , and

so they must exist in Engiish in some way.' The main

function of cases and "the connective parts of speechu

is to place substantives in such a position that they

are able to modify either other substantives or verbal

states .' Nodification of substantives by other substan-

tives is fairly common in language, whether it is by

means of the genitive relation or the modifier-head

construction as in pin cushion; Ward says that case

is necessary in order that the conceptions signified

by both words unite to form one complex conception

instead of remaining two separate ones. The result

of mentioning two different substantives is usually to

increase the number of objects being considered by the

1. llAlthough the English nouns have little of that variation which in Latin and Greek grammars is called case, it is by no means unnecessary for the understanding of the principles on which language is founded to explain what the cases of nouns are in those languages, and to shew by what means the En lish . . . supplies the want of cases in its nouns.I1 ?Ward, p . 48).

2. "The intent of language requires, that the concep- tion annexed to any noun substantive, or to any verb, should be modified in innumerable ways; and this can only be done by applying one conception, as to modify, or give additional ascertainment to another. All the connective parts of speech are used for this purpose; and the Greeks and Romans have varied their nouns by alterations of the last syllables, in order to make these forms of the substantives themselves connective parts of speech." (Ward, p. 48).

I mind. This can be avoided by giving signals that

certain substantives are not to be considered as signs

of independent ideas, but as ftcircumstantiating" or

depending on other nouns. The signals used are those

of en oblique case or a preposition.2 The result is

that there is only one complex conception in the mind

because when substantives "are applied merely to express

circumstances attending states or objects, or other

circumstances, . . . no increase of number ensues upon the application of the dependent circumstance. 11 3

7.1 .3. Nominative and Accusative Cases 4

Kard offers a discussion of the transitive verb

which he hopes will help elucidate "this most abstruse

part of grammar." In the transitive sentence type the

substantive in subject position raises the conception

1. tlFor when the conceptions of objects and states are . . . united, none of them will represent mere circum- stances coalescing with some other object, but each of them will represent an object, or state, as the concep- tion thereof is separately laid up in the memory." ('A1ard, p. 53).

2. "If a substantive be used in dependence upon another substantive or upon an adjective; the sign of an oblique case or some preposition, must be made use of to shew the nature of the dependence." (Nard, p. 54).

3. Ward, p. 54.

4. Ward follows the usual custom of English grammarians of identifying these cases on the basis of position. His interpretation is latinate. Cf. 7.1.6.

of a "capital object" in the mind of the hearer; when

this is followed by a verb definitive (any finite verb)

the conception raised by the finite verb does not exist

independently of the conception of the substantive, but

coalesces with it to give a complex conception of the

object represented by the substantive engaging in the

activity or state expressed by the verb. The reason that

the ideas coalesce is that the verb's principle of exist-

ence lies outside of itself, in some object which suggests

to the mind the "idea of mixed modes8I denoted by the

verb and one such object in which the verb's principle

of existence could inhere is that signified by the

substantive. Thus walk denotes a typical activity of - a human being or an animal, and when the construction

"The horse walks" is uttered, the principle of existence

of the idea of walk is said to be in the idea signified

by horse rather than in some unmentioned ideas. Thus

coalescence of two separate conceptions has been achieved

and these have become just one single conception. Coa-

lescence of adjectives to nouns is even easier because

the principle of existence in adjectives is unnoticed

so there is no necessity of transferring it to the

substantive. It seems then that the substantive-verb

construction and the adjective-substantive construction

are in no way dependent on the function of cases or any

o t h e r s t r u c t u r a l m a r k e r s , , However, when an ob jec t f o l -

l o w s t h e verb , as i t always does i n t h e sentence type

we a r e d i s c u s s i n g llNotice i s given t h a t t h e conception,

denoted by t h e [second] s u b s t a n t i v e i s t o be made use

of merely t o c i r c u m s t a n t i a t e t h e s t a t e denoted by t h e

ve rb , i n which t h e s u b s t a n t i v e depends. l t l For t h i s

c i r c w n s t a n t i a t i o n t o t ake p lace " the s i g n of an obl ique

c a s e , o r some p r e p o s i t i o n must be made use of t o shew

t h e n a t u r e of t h e dependence,t12 because " the proper ty

of an obl ique case i s , ' a d i r e c t i o n t o supply i n t h e - -

mind somewhat n o t d i r e c t l y mentioned, i n o rde r t o t u r n

t h e conception of an o b j e c t i n t o t h a t of a dependent

circumstance. I u 3 The accusa t ive case g i v e s e x p l i c i t

n o t i c e , we a r e t o l d , t h a t t h e conception denoted by t h e

noun i n t h a t case i s t o be considered as a dependent

circumstance of t h e conception denoted by a verb , which

i n i t s t u r n i s a l ready u n i t e d t o t h e noun s u b s t a n t i v e

i n t h e nominative c a s e , Thus t h e accusa t ive i s g i v i n g

n o t i c e t h a t t h e i d e a denoted by t h e word James i n t h e

phrase "John hold ing Jamestt i s n o t t o be considered as

s e p a r a t e l y a s c e r t a i n e d , but i s t o be seen as a dependent

circumstance of t h e conception denoted by John holding.

1 . Ward, p. 59.

2. Ward, p. 61.

3. I b i d . , p . 58.

The p r i n c i p l e of ex i s t ence , which i s t h e reason f o r t h e

conception normally being s e p a r a t e l y a s c e r t a i n e d i s pre-

sumably cance l l ed out o r ignored as a r e s u l t of t h e

choice of t h e accusa t ive case f o r t h i s noun. This can-

c e l l a t i o n would appear t o have t h e e f f e c t of making t h e

grammatical composition of t h i s word exac t ly t h e same

as t h a t of an a d j e c t i v e .

7.1.4. Subs tant ives i n t h e Oblique Cases t h e Equivalent of Adjec t ives

A s t h e func t ion of a l l t h e obl ique cases i s similar

t o t h e accusa t ive i n t u r n i n g t h e conception of t h e ob jec t

i n t o a dependent c ircumstance, ' no noun i n any case

except t h e nominative should be considered a subs tan t ive

as i t s p r i n c i p l e of ex i s t ence w i l l n o t be taken n o t i c e

of by t h e mind.' Such nouns w i l l of course have t h e same

form as a subs tan t ive and f o r t h i s reason Ward i s pre-

pared t o cont inue c a l l i n g them s u b s t a n t i v e s r a t h e r than

upse t t h e t r a d i t i o n . However, even i f we can equate a

s u b s t a n t i v e i n t h e accusa t ive wi th an a d j e c t i v e as f a r

as t h e i d e a i s concerned, we cannot say t h a t they a r e

e q u i v d e n t i n a l l ways: t h e dependence on t h e subs tan t ive

1 . C f . Note 3, p. 218.

2 . 'Uard does not here cons ider sentences with Be + Pr'ed. Nominal, but elsewhere (p . 4 4 ) says t h a t t o be a man and t o be a judqe a r e r e a l verbs . The p red ica te nominal would presumably become p a r t of t h e ve rb i n sentences of t h e type 'Jcanes i s a baby.' C f . r e l a t e d d i scuss ion i n Para. 6.3.

is not the same as that of the adjective, at least, not

if we are to continue using Ward's original account of

the adjective, as we have up till now. It is at this

point that lard's explanation becomes somewhat confused:

he is certain that a case does not denote a fixed relation

but rather 'la mode of attention of the mind itself,''

yet this distinction between the different modes of

attention is never made explicit. The basic grammatical

distinction in language that he sees is binary rather

than multiple. It distinguishes between words that exist

independently and the others that exist dependently. There

do not appear to be distinct modes of dependent existedce

in spite of the four oblique cases, the noun adjective,

and the finite verb.

7.1.5. A New Theory of Transitivity

So far Ward's system appears to be very similar to

Buffier's:' the verb is dependent on the substantive in

the nominative case, and the substantive in the accusa-

tive case is dependent on them both; yet the dependency

of the accusative is obviously not the same as the adjec-

tival dependency of the 'adjective + substantivet con-

struction, and would appear to be of a different order

from the dependency of the verb on the subject noun

1. Cf. Para. 4.1.3.1.

substantive; the mode of c,ircumstantiation is by no

means obvious or satisfactory to Ward at t h i s point,

The weak point of James Harris1 theory of transitivity 1

was that he too saw the initial subject noun and its

verb as the basic unit to which the object was somehow

added on as an optional element. Such an explanation

does not correspond to our intuitions about language,

although it is a manner of explaining the three terms

of the transitive construction. Essentially it sees

the object noun phrase as an optional addition just as -.

an adverbial phrase. Ward realized clearly the wn-

satisfactory nature of this approach, and investigated.

the implications of the relation between active and

passive sentences as a possible avenue of explanation.

He says that the traditional notion of the two voices

of the verb expressing action and suffering is uproper

enough for conveying to learners a general conception

of the nature of each1' but that the semantic implications

of the two voices is frequently not one of action and

passion; they are actually signals of mutual equivalence. 2

1, Cf. Para. 2.5.5.

2. "The true nature of these states is, that those of each pair . . . are conceived to derive their existence from one and the same principle; so that if this prin- ciple of existence is communicated to, or with-held from, either state of a pair, it is communicated to, or with-held from, the other state of the same principle." (Ward, p. 59) .

He suggests that the followine two sentences are para-

phrases of each other:

John holding Jmes

1 James is held by John.

This pair, and all similarly related pairs, express the

same account of reality, he says, and if a picture were

painted of both it would be the same in both cases; the

picture, however, would not be able to take notice of

Ifthe modes of operation by which the parts . . . are put together in the mind itself.I1 This is a way of say-

ing that speech allows us to focus on particular aspects

of an event. Both sentences, he says, are made up of

two components: John holds and James is held; the choice

of the active or passive sentence indicates the point

of view or focus of the speaker rather than any real

difference in the situation. The 'subject-verb-objectt

construction is a shorthand way of making two distinct

1. The verbal forms that Ward uses in his examples when he discusses these paraphrase relations raise certain points: firstly, he continually uses the present partici- ple rather than an active finite verb in his examples; this appears strange, and incomplete, but later discus- sion of the verb reveals that he regards the participial form of the verb as more basic (Cf. 7.2.); secondly, when he was discussing the passive, he might well have suggest- ed that is held consists of more than one grammatical unit, particularly in view of the fact that he views is as a full verb when it occurs alone in a sentence. he fact that he sees the passive construction of 'be + par- ticiple' as no more complex than the active form is

1 statements. This new way of analysing transitive sen-

tences is not to be found in any of Ward's sources; it

was suggested in Chapter IV that it grew from a, consid-

eration of Locke8s ideas of relation, which Ward used

when discussing the 9qcorrelative speciest1 of the noun

substantive. 2

The function of the accusative in this new analysis

is to give notice that the passive form of the verb is

to be associated with the substantive in the accusative

case .3 ~h& the expression ItJohn holding James" tells

us first of all that John is holding, and then, the last

word, James, gives notice that the passive form of the

verb - hold is to be considered in construction with James,

doubtless a result of his adherence to a Latin-based interpretation of verb forms. To be consistent with himself, he should have selected the form being held.

1. "Now if an object is represented in one of these verbal states, and another object in the same relation to the first object, as it would be if the corresponding state were mentioned and this other object represented in that state; there is no occasion actually to mention such corresponding state, but to give notice by some sicn that it is to be supplied in the mind, and it will be supplied of course; because the one of these corre- sponding states always supposes the other." (Ward, p, 60) ,

2. Cf. Para. 4.1.1.4.

3. "The sign of the accusative case is not the mark of any one certain relation, but of a certain kind of ope- ration of the mind itself, which can be performed upon the sort of conception that is denoted by the active form of a transitive verb.It (ward, p. 60).

giving: 81James i s held." The impl ica t ion i s t h a t when-

eve r we have any t r a n s i t i v e sentence , a l though only one

sentence appears i n t h e su r face s t r u c t u r e , t h e substan-

t i v e which i s considered t o be i n t h e accusa t ive case

g i v e s n o t i c e t o another sentence , and i s no t r e a l l y p a r t

of t h e o r i g i n a l sentence a t a l l . The conception a t tached

t o t h e pass ive form of t h e v e r b i s t h e same as t h a t at-

tached t o t h e a c t i v e form, so al though t h e r e a r e two

sentences i n t h e mind, i n t h e sense t h a t t h e r e a r e two

s u b s t a n t i v e s , both with ve rbs depending on them, they

a r e both l i n k e d by t h e common v e r b a l conception; they

both sha re i t s mark of ex i s t ence . The s u b s t a n t i v e s then

have no r e l a t i o n t o each o t h e r except t h a t i n d i c a t e d by

t h e v e r b i n i t s two forms,

7.1.6. Two Basic Sentence Types

Ward's grammatical terminology r e l i e s heav i ly on

L a t i n terminology; "James i s he ld by John" i s given a

l a t i n a t e a n a l y s i s : by John i s i n t h e a b l a t i v e case because

t h i s would be t h e case of - John i n t h e L a t i n t r a n s l a t i o n .

I n both sentences t h e f i rs t word i s considered t o be i n

t h e nominative, as i n La t in , because t h i s has t h e func t ion

of r a i s i n g a conception i n t h e mind: "For t h e noun i n

t h i s case i s considered as ba re ly r a i s i n g a conception

of some o b j e c t , and

s e e s t h e a c t i v e and

s a t i v e and a b l a t i v e

c o n s t i t u e n t s of t h e

t h a t by mere r e c o l l e c t i o n . 1 1 ' Ward

pass ive sentence forms and t h e accu-

cases as t h e fundamental grammatical

language. 2

He says t h a t i f ve rba l s t a t e s could in te rvene be-

tween every p a i r of o b j e c t s " t h e r e would man i fes t ly be

no occasion i n language, f o r t h e s i g n of any case except

t h a t of t h e accusa t ive , and t h a t of t h e corresponding

a b l a t i v e . " The po in t i s t h a t v e r b a l s t a t e s do no t always . -

i n t e r v e n e between two nouns, and t h e r e f o r e these cases

a r e n o t enough. Where t h e r e i s no ve rba l s t a t e between

two nouns, one of them u s u a l l y occurs i n a d i s t i n c t i v e

case , which has t h e func t ion of i n d i c a t i n g t h e n a t u r e of

I . Ward, p. 73.

2. "Now i t i s manifest t h a t t h e o b j e c t s , between which every p a r t i c u l a r kind of r e l a t i o n can e x i s t , a r e each of them i n a c e r t a i n s t a t e of being i n consequence of such r e l a t i o n ; so t h a t t o cons ider two o b j e c t s as t h e terms between which a c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n e x i s t s , i s , i n e f f e c t , t o cons ider one of t h e o b j e c t s as i n a s t a t e of being, wi th which t h e s t a t e of being, i n which t h e o t h e r ob jec t i s , has t h e s&me kind of correspondence as t h a t which occasions t h e r e l a t i o n . And t h i s i s manifes t ly t h e reason why so many kinds of r e l a t i o n s may be expressed i n language, by rep resen t ing one o b j e c t a s i n the a c t i v e o r pass ive s t a t e , which i s denoted by some t r a n s i t i v e ve rb , and another ob jec t as i n t h e correspondent pass ive s t a t e . I1 (Ward, p. 63) .

t h e r e l a t i o n . 1 I

The siign of which f o r Ward i s t h e s i g n of t h e - 9

g e n i t i v e , has t h e func t ion of showing t h a t t h e word

fol lowing i t depends on t h e word preceding i t . The kind

of r e l a t i o n between t h e words man and l e a r n i n g i n "a man - of l e a r n i n g t t i s so obvious, according t o Ward, t h a t t h e r e

i s no need f o r a t r a n s i t i v e ve rb t o express i t ; t h e ' o f t

c o n s t r u c t i o n and t h e saxon g e n i t i v e may be considered

e l l i p t i c a l forms of a ' s u b j e c t i v e + verb + o b j e c t ' ex-

press ion: man of l e a r n i n g t t i s equiva lent t o "a man - -

having l ea rn ing . tt2

Ward ' s r ecogn i t ion of have as a deep s t r u c t u r e - v e r b i n d i c a t i n g t h e s t a t e of some ob jec t i s d i f f i c u l t

t o r e l a t e t o h i s theory of verbs being t h e expression

of mixed modes, and would g e n e r a l l y be considered

1. ''But on some occasions, i t i s u t t e r l y unnecessary t o mention t h e p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e s of being, i n which o b j e c t s a r e . . . because t h e n a t u r e of t h e o b j e c t s themselves s u f f i c i e n t l y shews how they a r e r e l a t e d ; and t h e r e f o r e any mark, o r n o t i c e , t o d i r e c t t o t h e name, which i s t o be considered a mere circumstance and n o t a c a p i t a l o b j e c t , i s d i r e c t i o n enough t o enable t h e mind t o u n i t e t h e conceptions denoted by two s u b s t a n t i v e s i n t o t h e conception of a c a p i t a l ob jec t f u r t h e r a s c e r t a i n e d by t h e circumstance which i s denoted by t h e dependent s ~ b s t a n t i v e . ~ ~ ( E a r d , p. 63 ) .

2. ''The kind of r e l a t i o n t h a t i s given n o t i c e of by t h e s i g n "oft placed i n English between two s u b s t a n t i v e s , may be more exac t ly expressed, by s u b s t i t u t i n g some t r a n s i t i v e ve rb i n s t e a d of t h e s i p ; as 'a man of l ea rn - i n g - a horse of s t r e n g t h t a r e expressions equiva lent t o ' a man having l e a r n i n g - a horse having s t r e n g t h ; ' and t h e s e express ions may be reversed , i f t h e corre- sponding pass ive s t a t e , ' h a d t be s u b s t i t u t e d i n s t e a d

unsatisfactory by modern standards ; ' certainly the passivization of such a verb is unacceptable. Ward was

probably aware of the awkwardness of the passive form

here, but, being unable to deal with verbs such as have - and be in any more sophisticated way, he was forced to - bend the language slightly in order for it to fit his

facts, It is not difficult to see the ingenuity behind

his proposal, and on the basis of this, ignore the oc-

casional strange construction he presents. Ward also

notes the relation of 'a horse which has strengtht to - -

the other forms, but delays discussion of this till he

discusses relative pronouns.

7.1.7. Verbs Followed by Prepositions or More Than

One Noun

- Although Ward states that all nouns have a transi-

tive verb linking them, if not on the surface, then at

least signalled by the case of one of the substantives,

he still has a problem in accounting for cases or signs

of cases other than the accusative or ablative which

nouns depending not on other nouns but on transitive

verbs exhibit; there also seems to be no reason for pre-

of Ihavingt . . . I the learning had by a mant. It (Ward, p. 64).

1. Cf. Bunon Bach, "Have and Be in English Syntax,It L,mgua€:e, XLIII ( 1 967 'mG2-485.

positions between verbs and nouns.' These difficulties

lead Ward to state the nature of the relation prepositions

and cases siwify. He discusses for at lencth, suggesting - that the "mode of contemplation is made the characteristic

of the species 'final cause1;" in doing this he is milty

of the worst kind of notional simplification of distinct

semantic relations. He recognizes that there are diffi-

culties in analysing the meanings of prepositions: "This

way of reducing connections to sorts, by the several

modes of attention which the mind exerts in apprehending a -

and applying each sort is mznifestly the utmost effort

of the abstractive powers of the mind."' He suggests

that although the meaning that we associate with the

different occurrences of the same preposition may not be

the same, the recognition of a common class is justified

because the common basis resides not in the meaning but

in the common processes of the mind: ttPor every connexion,

or relation, is denoted by the same sign, when the same

kind of proceeding of the mind itself is used in applying <

1. "If more than one object are required to circwnstan- tiate a transitive state different signs must be used, to show the different manners in which the conceptions of these objects are applied to signify mere circumstances of such state.I1 (Ward, p. 67).

2. Ward, p. 68.

such connexion, or relation. In spite of the con-

vincing appeal to the proceeding of the mind, the

recognition of unity here is pure casuistry; Ward is

clearly unhappy that the facts of English do not corre-

spond with the analysis he would like to put forward.

He can account for prepositions or case relations between

nouns, but he has no satisfactory solution for the

lverb-preposition-substantive' construction. Prepositions

are not susceptible to simple semantic analysis, but

their indistinct meaning can be resolved in the case of A -

the 'noun-preposition-noun' construction by replacing

the preposition or case with a transitive verb. Not

only does this remove the indistinctness but it also

resolves the construction to the more basic noun-verb

construction which Ward sees as the fundamental one in

language. But no such solution is possible with prepo-

sitions following verbs. He sees the necessity of pre-

positions when more than two nouns enter into construct-

ions with the verb, but cannot explain them satisfactorily.

Where there are only two nouns in construction with a

verb, end the one following the verb is preceded by a

preposition as in W e came to such a place,I1 or "John

being with James," Ward attempts to overcome his immediate

1. Ibid., p. 69.

d i f f i c u l t y by sugges t ing ' that paraphrases without pre-

p o s i t i o n s a r e i n some sense more bas ic , and t h e func t ion

of t h e cases o r p r e p o s i t i o n s i s t o suggest t h e paraphrase

a l t e r n a t i v e s . 1

7.1.8. P r e p o s i t i o n s

The po in t t h a t Ward's own theory i s f o r c i n g him t o

recognize i s t h a t t h e p r e p o s i t i o n o r t h e mark of case

i s a very f l e x i b l e u n i t .2 The meaning of a p r e p o s i t i o n

i s der ived from a cons ide ra t ion of t h e meaning of t h e . -

words i t jo ins : "The p r e c i s e n a t u r e of t h e connexion

. . . i s l e f t t o be determined by t h e judgement, from

t h e n a t u r e of t h e concept ions which a r e u n i t e d kb i t . * 1 3

1 . "'Vie reached such a p l a c e ' i s of t h e same import i n Engl i sh wi th 'we came t o such a p l a c e t . . . , 'John accompanying James' i s equiva lent t o 'John being wi th James' and s o of innumerable o t h e r i n s t a n c e s , i n which a t r a n s i t i v e ve rb may be s u b s t i t u t e d i n s t e a d of a pre- p o s i t i o n o r s i g n of a case. This shews c l e a r l y , t h a t t h e same r e l a t i o n between o b j e c t s may be expressed i n language by d i f f e r e n t modes of e s t ima t ion , i f t h e pre- mises a r e changed, by t h e he lp whereof t h e r e l a t i o n s a r e t o be estimated.I1 (ward, p. 70) . C f . Lowth8s p o s i t i o n d iscussed i n Para. 4.3.3.

2. "It i s obvious t o perce ive , t h a t they a r e a l l ex- p r e s s i o n s of r e l a t i o n , but t h e d i f f i c u l t y i s t o determine how such v a r i o u s k inds of r e l a t i o n s among o b j e c t s them- s e l v e s , can be expressed by one and t h e same p repos i t ion without confusion; and why one and t h e same r e l a t i o n may be expressed . . . by t h e h e l p of d i f f e r e n t . , . preposition^.^' (ward, p. 243).

3. Ward, p. 244.

He recognizes that ,

The distance of London from York The distance from London to York The distance between London and York

all indicate the same meaning, and the difference be-

tween them comes from the "different modes of estimation,

which modes the prepositions give notice of." The same

kind of process is seen in numerical calculation where

the same answer is achieved through different modes of

calculation-, ' Ward equated prepositions with variables:

they are like "a fictitious quantity . . . introduced merely to assist the mind in registering the steps of

the process." He is not saying that the preposition or

case is without meaning, but that its meaning is not

clearly determined; it is acquired in a particular con-

struction: "It comes to pass that signs of cases and

prepositions bear in themselves a less determinate sig-

nification than nouns and verbs do." Premises or ac-

companying information are necessary to make their

1 . I1This is no more than comes to pass in estimating all kinds of quantity, so as to express the result of the process in algebraic species: for we are usually at liberty to proceed several different ways; and yet, if the reasoning is just, we shall always come at last to an expression, which, though different in form, is in effect the same with that which is the result of any other way of proceeding, in which the reasoning is also just. " (Ward, p. 244).

s i g n i f i c a t i o n c l e a r : "Sornd premises must be given . . . before t h e conception of a r e l a t i o n denoted by a par-

t i c u l a r s i ~ m w i l l a r i s e . Harris had at tempted t o

exp la in English p r e p o s i t i o n s by saying t h a t i n t h e i r

l i t e r a l meaning they express a spatial r e l a t i o n , and

t h a t t h i s meaning i s extended metaphor ica l ly t o apply

t o a b s t r a c t o b j e c t s . Ward's account i s d i s t i n c t and

o r i g i n a l because he does no t recognize metaphorical

ex tens ion t o t h e bas ic meaning, b u t ' s e e s t h e p r e p o s i t i o n s

as having an almost i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y of p o s s i b l e s i g n i -

f i c a t i o n s and only vague connect ions wi th d i r e c t i o n a l

meaning. The re fe rence of a p r e p o s i t i o n i s indeterminate ,

l i k e tha.t of an a l g e b r a i c symbol; i t s mezning can only

be discovered from t h e meaning of t h e words it i s r e l a -

t i n g . 2

Ward is a t tempt ing t o express what w a s never con-

s i d e r e d i n t h e e igh teen th century , t h a t p r e p o s i t i o n s

do n o t have determinate meaning; h i s o r i g i n a l i t y l i e s not

1 . Ward, p. 244.

2. "The mind perce ives t h a t a b s t r a c t o b j e c t s have con- nexions wi th each o t h e r , which r e q u i r e n e a r l y t h e same modes of e s t ima t ion which t h e r e l a t i o n s of l o c a l s i t u a - t i o n do; and t h e r e f o r e , i n Language whatsoever connexion i s conceived t o r e q u i r e t h e same mode of a t t e n t i o n i n o r d e r t o e s t ima te i t , i s denoted by one and t h e same s i g n , and t h e p r e c i s e n a t u r e of t h e connexion, as i t i s i n itself, i s l e f t t o be determined by t h e judgement, from t h e n a t u r e of t h e concept ions which a r e un i t ed by t h e sign." (Ward, p. 244) .

in drawing attention to the variety of' meaning, but in

attempting to explain how the person hearing such a

preposition is in fact able to associate with it a

definite meaning. He suggests that the preposition is

a signal of an operation of the mind which places a

definite transitive verb, suggested by the nouns and - the preposition, in relation with those nouns. Circuni-

stances do not always make such an explanation possible,

and then his account is less satisfactory; thus he cannot

deal with prepositions in sentences where more than two . .

nouns are attached to the verb phrase.

7.2. Adjectives and Verbs

Vt'ard's analysis of the transitive sentence type

allowed him to develop his considerations in several

interesting ways. One particularly valuable approach,

which broke new ground as far as the English grammatical

tradition was concerned, was the analysis of relative

pronouns and relative clauses. This analysis of the

relative, which will be discussed shortly, led him to

see deficiencies in the theory he had already developed:

he had reduced the principal constructions in the Ehglish

language to two: the adjective-substantive construction

and the substantive-verb construction; but he had to

distinguish, if he wished to preserve this analysis,

between adjective-substantive constructions and particle-

substantive constructions.~ IIe also had to offer some

kind of explanation for the difference between verbs

coalescent and verbs definitive. In his analysis of the

relative he maintains the distinction between participle

and adjective, although, as he commented, most grammarians

see them as the same.' It is difficult to see 'ilardls

distinctions, and realizing this, he offers other dis-

tinctions. He says that when participles are united

with substantives they have a union which is so intimate

that it is expressible in the form of derived nouns: A -

'a seeing mant is the equivalent of la seer1, 'a moving

man' the equivalent of 'a mover.' This, says Ward,

only happens with participles: "But nothing of thls

kind ensues when an adjective, or the oblique case of

a substantive is made dependent on another substantive. 1' 2

Actually a similar process happens with adjectives: the

substantive form a black is derived from a black man,

but it is true that the - -er suffix is only added to

verb stems. Such an explanation as Ward offers here to

distinguish participles from adjectives is still con-

vincing, although at base it is a repetition of Ward's

1. 'The participle is as properly a verb, as any other verbal form is; for it expresses a state which depends on an inconstant principle of existence. Wherees an adjective gives express notice, that no principle of existence is to be attended to, in that which is denoted by it." (V!ard, p. 115).

2. Ward, p. 164.

2 . "The mode of coalescence by which a participle unites with the object . . . is more simple than that by which =an adjective uni-tes with the object . . . In the union of' a participle coalescent, there is no interveninp: state to be understood: but in the union of an adjective, some

belief that the verb represents activity of limited

duration rather than the permanent condition expressed

by adjectives, for he says that the objects denoted by

seer and mover are not to be considered to be in these - states continuously but only occasionally. His struggle

to mark off the participle from the adjective results

eventually in redefinition of the adjective. Ward had

originally seen the mode of union of the adjective with

the substantive as a simple one achieved without any

intervention because no principle of existence was to

be noted in the adjective, and it could therefore unite

with the substantive. ' In his discussion of the verb

coalescent, he has to amend his original account of the

adjective in order to suggest another difference between

adjectives and participles. He now sees the coalescence

of participles as more natural than that of adjectives. 2

1. The original description of the adjective was:

An adjective unites with a substantive, so as to form a kind of name of the object represented by the expression. Por the principle by which the object exists is taken notice of in the concep- tion which the substantive denotes, and the con- ception denoted by the adjective takes no notice of the principle of existence, but unites with the conception which does take notice of such principle. (Ward, pp. 15-16).

The two salient points of Qis new definition are: firstly,

that an intervening; siate is now required to uni-Le adjec-

tive and substantive, and secondly, a substantive is said

to be contained in an adjective; previously they were

alternate grammatical lexicalizations of the same under-

lying idea. Yard gives the example 'a deceitful man1 and

says this is equivalent to 'a man of deceit,' Prepositions

often indicate underlying verbs, and this construction in

turn implies 'a man practising deceit.' This development

of the definition of the adjective is tantamount to a

rejection of the schema proposed in Ward's original dis-

cussion of nouns; Ward is here saying that there are no

independently existing adjectives, but all are derivations

from abstract substantives, and that these adjectival

substantives are linked to the head noun by a transitive

verb, here practising, but more usually having. This

is a move to remove the 'adjective-substantivet con-

struction, and reduce all language to the form of either

'substantive + verb active' or substantive + verb passive,'

state must be understood to form the coalescence. For the substantive ad.iective. can s ch&acteristic of a species, as a participial state may be; and therefore the mind is under a necessity of having recourse to some mode of estimation similar' to some of those which are denoted by prepositions, to form the connexions between an ad'ective and the substantive on which it dcpcnds." !Ward, p. 1 6 2 ) .

Such a change is brought about by Ward's reco~mition

that his distinction between part.iciples and adjectives

is unconvincing. Obviously some proposal similar to

current approaches suggesting a common category of

verbals to which both adjectives and verbs belong would

have been a solution to Y!ard, but no such solution was

available; he wanted to keep the treditional categories

separate, but in maintaining the verb/adjective separa-

tion he was forcing himself to move the adjective closer

to the substantive.

Such vacillations in fundamentals of the theory in

the course of the Essay make it impossible and meaningless

to attempt to extract a coherent analysis from Ward's

grammar; but it would be a mistake to gloss over his

inconsistencies and to impose on his writings a system

that appears satisfactory to the modern lin,ggist, but is

totally foreign to Ward's own speculations. The inter-

esting aspect of Ward's grammatical speculations, which

in this respect form a microcosm of the whole of English

linguistics in the eighteenth century, is that there is

a continuing search going on as he writes the grammar

for a set of categories, and for definitions of catego-

ries, which will fit the facts of the English lcane;uage.

Ward hoped that his own search might be more successful

than most others because he was taking a different

starting point, one that should not lead him astray:

the Lockean idea, which Hartley had shown was a useful

tool in linguistic analysis. Ward attempted to link

Lockets ideas to grammatical categories, and the link-up

he achieved was convincing; the grammatical categories

themselves, however, had not been examined in the first

place for their validity. Participles and infinitives

were reckoned to be verbs because Sanctius had seen

them as - such,' . and because of their formal similarity

in English; Ward felt that all the verbal forms had the

common characteristic that they were comparable to

certain aspects of Lockets mixed modes: they perished

in their birth.2 But he did not have the means to make

clear in what ways verbs differed from adjectives; he

appeared to be conscious of the active/stative dis-

tinction between verbs and adjectives, but was only

able to express it in terms of the time reference of

the verb. Unfortunately the present participle has

no explicit time reference, und his initial reason for

distinguishing verbs and adjectives was no longer very

good. He gave up his subtle distinction of constant/

1. Cf. Para. 4.2.1.1.

2. Abstract nouns were comparable to other aspects of the mixed modes. Cf. Para. 4.1.1.1.

inconstant (action/stat?) because he could find no

structural marker of the semarl i i c disiinciion in par-

ticiples; and these for him were the basic form of the

verb.' However, with the new distinction of participles

as immediately coalescing words, and adjectives as

words requiring the intervention of a preposition or

transitive verb, he was able to use the two categories

to define two distinct types of relative clause: all

relative clauses are reducible either to adjectives

or participles, 2 - -

Where the antecedent indicated by the relative is

linked with the action denoted by the verb in the

relative clause (e,g. 'the man who I sawt) the clause

is equivalent to a participle; where the antecedent is

not immediately linked to the relative clause verb

(e,g. 'the man whose brother I saw8) the relative

clause is the equivalent of an adjective, How much

better Ward's analysis might have been if he had said

1 , Cf. Note 1 la.

2, When the object represented by a relative pronoun, is neither that on which the verb of its clause im- mediately depends . . . such relative clause is equi- valent to an adjective. But if the object represented by the relative is either that on which the verb of its clause immediately depends, or that depending upon the verb by the means of a sign of case or other preposition; such relative clause is equivalent to a participle," (Ward, p, 146).

that a participle was the equivalent of a relative

clause rather than the reverse. However, he did not;

in a sense he obviously felt that the participle was

a very basic unit. The reasons for this probably were

that its union with a substantive so easily summoned

up a picture in the mind: la running man1 seems to be

a single idea in a way that 'the man runs' or 'the man

who runs1 could never be. This would also account for

Ward's preference for *John holding James' rather than

the sentence 'John holds James.' The former is not a

sentence from a grammatical point of view, but although

it is not complete, it definitely summons up as clear

a conception in the mind as the more normal sentence

form. Ward is not decided about the status of the

verb definitive. He says that it summons up the same

kind of conception as the verb coalescent; this is

the reason they were discussed together in the last

chapter.

7.2.1. Syntactic Function of the Definitive Verb

Ward defines the verb definitive by its character-

istic function which is to show "that the expression

of the objective conception on which it depends is 1

stopped, as to any further composition; and that the

object denoted by the whole expression, becomes an

object of the species whereof the participial state

contained in the verb is the characteristic."' This

description is interesting for two reasons: firstly,

it shows that the participial form is definitely con-

sidered in some sense more basic: it is "contained

in the significance of the verb definitive;" secondly,

it pays no heed to the common notion that affirmation

is the distinguishing characteristic of this form of

the verb. The participle is the basic verb, and when

it is in construction with the substantive, the ideas

signified by both words are already in coalescence--

there is thus an identity between the ideas rather

than an affirmation2--so that the function of the

more complex definitive form cannot be to affirm the

proper ties of the verb to the substantive. It must

have some function distinct from that of the participle,

and Ward claims that it is to "stopu or limit the con-

ception indicated by the substantive. Ward is saying

that the verb definitive signifies that we have a

complete noun phrase, which will not be susceptible to

further modification. His example of this is inter-

esting: all the while only participle forms are used

1. Ward, p. 164.

2. Cf. Lockels position discussed in Para. 4.1.1.5.

i n post-head modif ica t ion , t h e complex conception denoted

by t h e noun phrase can expand: 'la lady s i t t i n g i n t h e

garden, viewing t h e f lowers , p resen t ing va r ious colours ." 1

The use of t h e d e f i n i t i v e form of t h e ve rb impl ie s t h a t

t h e cons t ruc t ion i s now closed. Th i s i s a d e f i n i t i o n of

t h e f i n i t e ve rb as a s i g n a l l i n g device: i t s i g n a l s t h a t

t h e sentence formation i s now reaching a s t a g e of comple-

t i o n , j u s t as an i n t o n a t i o n contour might do; he s e e s

t h e v e r b d e f i n i t i v e as having c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s similar

t o an i n t o n a t i o n contour: i t d i r e c t s a t t e n t i o n towards

t h e sub jec t . The d i f f e r e n c e between ve rbs coalescent

and verbs d e f i n i t i v e i s r e l a t i v e l y unimportant. Ward '

.mentions but does no t dwell on t h e f a c t t h a t d e f i n i t i v e

v e r b s have t e n s e forms; t h e po in t i s t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e

between v e r b s coalescent and d e f i n i t i v e does n o t l i e

i n t h e realm of i d e a s and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p .

7.3. R e l a t i v e Pronouns and R e l a t i v e Clauses

Only when Ward cons ide r s r e l a t i v e c l a u s e s do t h e

i m p l i c a t i o n s of syntax r e a l l y come t o t h e f o r e . He

e n t i t l e s Sec t ion I11 of h i s chap te r on pronouns " O f t h e

R e l a t i v e Pronoun1' but shows i n s i g h t and o r i g i n a l i t y by

e n l a r g i n g h i s d i scuss ion t o c e n t r e on t h e whole r e l a t i v e

c l a u s e r a t h e r than j u s t t h e form of t h e pronouns. He

1 . Ward, p. 138.

1 . "The r e l a t i v e pronoun i s the name of an object as a personal pronoun is: but when an object i s named by a r e l a t i v e pronoun, no t ice i s given, ' t h a t the pronoun both expresses the ob jec t , and l ikewise shews t h a t the c lause i n which such object i s concerned, i s not t o be considered e i t h e r a s expressing complete t r u t h o r fa l se -

I hood, o r a complete conception of the i n t e l l e c t ; but a s an expression of the same object which the r e l a t i v e represents . l l (Ward, p. 134) .

2. Cf. M. A. K. Halliday, "Categories of the Theory of Grammar, Word, X V I I (1961), 241-92. -

says t h a t the simple pronbuns of the c l a s s a r e -9 who

which, and -p t h a t * he fa i l s t o make any d i s t i n c t i o n between

t h e r e l a t i v e t h a t and the t h a t which introduces whole - - sentences i n noun phrases. He a l s o includes a l l wh- - adverbs as having the wpoweru of a r e l a t i v e pronoun i n

t h e i r s i gn i f i ca t ion . H i s d e f i n i t i o n of the r e l a t i v e

pronoun s t r e s s e s t h a t the r e l a t i v e clause must be pa r t

of some l a r g e r u n i t , and tha t the pronoun i t s e l f must

have an mtecedent .' H i s own discussions of the r e l a t i v e

do not i n f a c t always require the second condit ion, as i s

evident when he discusses the various degrees a t which

a sentence can operate.

7.3.1. TheNotion of Degree

Ward's concept of a sentence operat ing a t various

degrees i s very s imi l a r t o the modern concept of rank-

s h i f t : * u n i t s of language usua l ly operate a t t h e i r own

l e v e l , thus words function i n phrases, phrases within

c lauses , and c lauses within sentences. However, they

a r e f r e q u e n t l y s h i f t e d t o l a d i f f e r e n t l e v e l : when a

c l a u s e modif ies a noun, i t i s opera t ing wi th in t h e phrase

r a t h e r than wi th in t h e sentence, and i t is s a i d t o be

r a n k s h i f t e d t o t h e l e v e l of a word. Ward d i scusses t h e

u n i t ' d a u s e , I which, though he does no t d e f i n e i t , would

seem t o c o n s i s t of some kind of noun followed by e i t h e r

a v e r b coalescent o r a ve rb d e f i n i t i v e . The r e l a t i v e

c l a u s e 'which runs1 con ta ins as i t s noun t h e r e l a t i v e

pronoun, and i n Ward's example has as an antecedent

horse , water o r - time. However, i f t h e antecedent "be

p laced - i n t h e c l ause 'which runst i n s t e a d of t h e r e l a t i v e

*whicht t h e t h r e e sentences 'a horse runs - water r u n s ' -

t ime r u n s 1 w i l l be formed."' Ward concludes from t h i s

t h a t Itany r e l a t i v e c l ause w i l l become a complete sentence.'"

He a l s o s e e s t h e r e v e r s e t o be t r u e : t h a t any f u l l sen-

t e n c e may be turned i n t o a r e l a t i v e c lause .

7.3.2. Content Clauses and R e l a t i v e Clauses

The no t ion of degree i s most completely discussed

when Ward in t roduces t h e sentence Ita peace i s concluded."

A s i t i s , i t i s a complete sentence. By p r e f i x i n g ' t h a t 1

t o t h i s sentence and i n s e r t i n g i t i n another sentence,

i t becomes t h e equiva lent of a noun subs tan t ive : "That

1 . Ward, p. 137.

a peace is concluded is no,w past doubt.I1 Ward comments:

"Thus a sentence of complete truth or falsehood is re-

duced one degree lower, viz. to a level with the expres-

sion of a mere object of the intellect, as denoted by

a noun substantive.11' The clause is now one degree lower

than a sentence, because it occupies the position of

the major or principal sentence constituent, the noun

substantive. The process can continue: "But it is of

the utmost convenience in language to reduce a complete

sentence lower still, viz. to a level with the expression -

of a conception denoted by a noun adjective, or dependent

participle.112 Ward does not give an example of this ~

lower degree with his basic sentence "a peace is con-

cluded" but it would have to be of the following type:

"The belief that a peace is concluded is now past doubt."

This analysis of the three levels at which a sentence

can operate is very perspicacious, but it is at odds

with Ward's account of the relative in various ways:

firstly, sentences in the second degree have no ante-

cedent whatsoever, and insteadof proposing some 'under-

stood1 antecedent, Ward affirms that the clause is in

the noun substantive position of the sentence. He does

1. Ward, p. 135.

2. Ibid,, p. 136.

not appear to notice the inconsistency of this with his

earlier definition of the relative, nor does he notice

that the - that is not the 'name of an object. I ' Secondly,

Ward's failure to notice the distinction between the two

grammatically distinct forms of that and thus his failure - to recognize that he is not talking about the relative

clause at all, makes us feel that his discussion of the

three degrees is much more idiosyncratic than it in fact

is. However, the phenomenon with which he was dealing

was an interesting one, and later grammarians' discussions - -

of it indicate the real difficulty which Ward was attempt-

ing to account for. Jespersen recognizes two kinds of'

clauses introduced by -9 that a content clause and a rela-

tive clause;2 content clauses are of the type 'that a

peace is concludedw and they have the characteristic that

the - that cannot be replaced by a wh-word; relative clauses

however have that as an optional reduced form of who or - which. Ward's proposal that the clause can be reduced

to the degree of adjective or participle, by the placing

of a substantive before it as antecedent has been dernon-

strated by the sentence: 'Ithe belief that a peace is

1. Many true relatives do not have antecedents, notably the indefinite relatives; but they do all name objects in some sense. Cf. "You can have what you like."

2. Otto Jespersen, Modern English Grammar, 111, Chapter 2, Sections 1-3.

concluded is now past doubt." Jespersen rejects the

notion that the "that a peace has been concludedH of

this sentence is a relative clause, because the obviously

related sentence "that a peace has been concluded is now

past doubt9' has no relative clause in it. The content

clause in post-substantive position differs from the

relative clause in that only a limited number of nouns

can come before this clause as antecedents, and these

appear to be pro-forms of -the following content clause.

Jespersen notes this and calls them 98props98 rather than - -

antecedents: "Sometimes the words the fact or the cir-

cumstance are used to prop up the clause.ll'

Jacobs and Rosenbawn distinguish between these con-

tent clauses and relative clauses in a rather different

manner by positing different deep structure analyses of

the noun phrases:z

the whom I saw

the fact that Ricky came late

1. Op. cit., Chapter 2, Section 1.1.

2. ~ p . cit., p. 48 ff.

But such an a n a l y s i s i s ra$her u n s a t i s f a c t o r y because

t h e r u l e s f o r t h e noun phrase expansion

would have t o be complemented by a highly s p e c i f i c s e t

of r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e l e x i c a l s e l e c t i o n of t h e N i f ,

and only i f , t h e op t iona l S were se lec ted , h he nouns

r e q u i r e d would be i d e a , f a c t , b e l i e f , e t c . ) . I t seems

t o be an - a p r i o r i requirement of any grammar that t h e

o b l i g a t o r y elements should determine t h e n a t u r e of t h e .

op t iona l elements and n o t t h e reverse , Jacobs and

Rosenbaum f a i l t o spec i fy t h e dependence of t h e N on t h e

S i n t h e i r r u l e formulat ion. Thei r a n a l y s i s a l s o fa i l s

t o r e l a t e ' t h a t Ricky came l a t e 1 with ' R i c k y l s coming

l a t e , ' ' f o r Ricky t o come l a t e , ' e t c . The i r oversimpli-

' f i c a t i o n i s almost as g r o s s as Ward's,

Jacobs and Rosenbaum see Ward's second degree

sen tences a s r e a l l y c o n s t i t u t i n g t h i r d degree sentences;

t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c l ause can appear i n s u b s t a n t i v a l

p o s i t i o n i s a t t r i b u t e d t o op t iona l d e l e t i o n of t h e sub-

s t a n t i v e ; Jespersen on t h e o t h e r hand s e e s t h e noun.

s u b s t a n t i v e only as an a d d i t i o n a l prop, and suppor ts

h i s s ta tement by h i s t o r i c a l evidence: "1 t h i n k t h a t he

is deadtt evolved from "1 Phink that" he is dead";' the

that was originally a demonstrative pronoun. - The facts surrounding this problem are complex

and Ward was attempting to impose a pattern on them.

Jespersenls and Jacobs and Rosenbaumls analyses are not

discussed or offered as a measure to evaluate Ward's

attempt (although he would not come off badly in such

an evaluation),but to demonstrate the contemporary debate

which still surrounds an issue which Ward had provided

a meaningful analysis for in the terms of his o m theory. -

In the Practical Grammar he again discusses the 'that

+ S t clause or 'content clause' in relation to extra-

position; his remarks on extraposition will be c'onsidered

shortly.

7.3.3. The Relative Clause and its Resolution

Ward's analysis of "that a peace is concluded is

now past doubtv ignored the requirement of his Own

definition of the relative, that it have an antecedent.

His inclusion of some pronouns in the class, notably

whatsoever, whichsoever, and whosoever completely precludes

the possibility of any antecedent in many cases; he does

not appear to notice this, but he is aware of some forms

i (apart from the content clauses discussed earlier) which

1. Op. cit., Chapter 2, Section 3.1.

have no antecedent, such a s l w I know who has been hereu

and "who reasons wisely i s not there fore wiseM; here he

says t h a t t he re i s a personal pronoun understood within

t h e r e l a t i v e . ' Ward's so lu t ion i s open t o d ispute a s

being remarkably -- ad hoc ( i t says i n e f f e c t t h a t a cha-

r a c t e r i s t i c of the r e l a t i v e i s t h a t i t r e f e r s t o an

antecedent except where i t d o e s n s t ) ; however, i f h i s

ana lys i s was incomplete, o r inaccurate , i t w a s no d i f -

f e r e n t from many l a t e r analyses i n t h i s respec t , and i t

was very d i f f e r e n t from the majori ty of contemporary

works. Ward recognized the unusual q u a l i t y of h i s des-

c r i p t i o n , and a t t r i b u t e s h i s not ion t h a t the r e l a t i v e

pronoun i s an incomplete pronoun t o Buff ier ; but he

s t r e s s e s t he supe r io r i t y of h i s own explanation of in-

completeness.* The f a c t which he has t o explain i s how

t h e r e should only be one idea i n the mind when i t has

been summoned up twice, once by the antecedent and once

by the r e l a t i v e ; the problem i s one t h a t i s created by

t h e theory of t he correspondence of words and ideas , but

i t i s resolvable by the general theory of the p l a s t i c i t y

of the p r inc ip l e of existence; the nature of the operat ion

1 . "Therefore the r e l a t i v e , i n such app l ica t ion of i t , may be considered as equivalent t o a r e l a t i v e and personal pronoun both i n one, and the r e l a t i v e clause may be con- s idered as containing complete sense i n i t s e l f . " (Ward, p . 147).

2. C f . Para. 4.1.3.2.

performed on t h e pr . inc ip l& of ex i s t ence of t h e r e l a t i v e

c l a u s e a f t e r t h e "c lause i s formedw makes i t "vanish

ou t of ex i s t enceu render ing t h e c l ause equiva lent e i t h e r

t o a d j e c t i v e s o r verbs coa lescen t , n e i t h e r of which

i n c r e a s e s t h e number of o b j e c t s e x i s t i n g i n t h e mind." 1

The s t r u c t u r e of t h e a d j e c t i v a l r e l a t i v e c l ause

(e.g. ' a man who i s good') g i v e s Ward some evidence and

b a s i s f o r h i s suggest ion t h a t a d j e c t i v e s a r e s i g n s g i v i n g

n o t i c e t h a t a noun subs tan t ive equiva lent i n meaning t o - -

t h e a d j e c t i v e i s l i n k e d t o t h e p r i n c i p a l s u b s t a n t i v e by

means of a p r e p o s i t i o n o r a t r a n s i t i v e verb. I n t h e reLa-

t i v e c l ause t h e a d j e c t i v e i s n o t l i n k e d immediately t o

t h e s u b s t a n t i v e , but i s joined by means of t h e ve rb be. -

1. "A r e l a t i v e pronoun r e p r e s e n t s t h e o b j e c t denoted by i t , only till i t s c lause i s formed, and t h e ob jec t i s a s c e r t a i n e d with which t h e conception expressed by t h e c l a u s e i s t o coalesce: but when t h e mind forms t h e coa- l e scence , t h e ob jec t with which t h a t coalescence i s made i s n o t conceived t o be denoted twice over , i. e. once by t h e antecedent and once by t h e r e l a t i v e : but by t h e ante- cedent only. So t h a t such o b j e c t as i s denoted by t h e r e l a t i v e vanishes out of t h e conception which i s expressed by a r e l a t i v e c l ause i n a c t u a l union with i t s antecedent ,

Hence i t ev iden t ly fo l lows, t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e re- p r e s e n t s an o b j e c t as supported by a p r i n c i p l e of e x i s t - ence, which t h e mind can des t roy , o r t r a n s f e r a t i t s p l e a s u r e . . . but t h e conception may be contemplated i n i t s e l f . . . If t h e p r i n c i p l e by which t h e r e l a t i v e o b j e c t e x i s t s i s conceived t o be destroyed, t h e r e l a t i v e c l a u s e becomes of t h e n a t u r e of a noun a d j e c t i v e , i f t h i s p r i n c i p l e be conceived as only t r a n s f e r r e d , t h e c l ause becomes of t h e n a t u r e of a dependent p a r t i c i p l e .

I t would seem t h a t t h e r e a r e two s t a g e s i n t h e process

of a r r i v i n g from t h e su r face s t r u c t u r e t o t h e s t r u c t u r e

of t h e i d e a s i n t h e mind: f i rs t of a l l t h e r e l a t i v e

c l a u s e i s reduced t o an a d j e c t i v e , and t h i s a d j e c t i v e

i s then converted i n t h e mind t o a noun s u b s t a n t i v e ,

and l i n k e d t o t h e p r i n c i p a l s u b s t a n t i v e by means of

a t r a n s i t i v e verb , probably have: "A man who i s good" - becomes "a good man," which becomes "a man having good-

ness. ' ' Ward does n o t o f t e n connect s ta tements made i n

one p a r t of h i s Essay wi th those made elsewhere, and it

i s a m a t t e r of con jec tu re whetherhe ever c a r r i e d out a l l

t h e s e s t e p s even i n h i s own mind. They a r e suggested

by t h e t e x t , but examples a r e r a r e l y given. The p r e c i s e

e x i s t e n t i a l s t a t u s of t h e in te rmedia te s t a g e s a r e no

c l e a r e r than i s t h e e x i s t e n t i a l s t a t u s of va r ious s t a g e s

i n t h e d e r i v a t i o n s proposed i n genera t ive grammars, but

wi th l e s s reason: modern accounts of sentence d e r i v a t i o n

a r e q u i t e simply r u l e s l i n k i n g one l e v e l with another

l e v e l , and they have no claim t o r e a l ex i s t ence ; but

Ward's account i s everywhere c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o what is

happening t o i d e a s i n t h e mind. Thus t h e r e l a t i v e c l a u s e

Thus, 'a man who i s good - a horse which i s s w i f t , ' I a r e express ions n e a r l y equiva lent t o 'a good man - a

s w i f t h o r s e ' and 'a m a n who speaks - a horse which r u n s t a r e n e a r l y equiva lent t o ' a man speaking - a horse run- n ing . ' (Ward, pp. 142-3).

cannot be r e l a t e d t o t h e substantive + have + substan-

t i v e ' form by means of t h e ' a d j e c t i v e + s u b s t a n t i v e 1

s t a g e u n l e s s a l l t h r e e l e v e l s e x i s t i n some r e a l way.

I t might be e a s i e s t t o account f o r h i s proposa ls by ad-

m i t t i n g t h a t t h e ' s u b s t a n t i v e + have + s u b s t a n t i v e 1 form

corresponds c l o s e l y t o t h e i d e a s i n t h e mind ( t h e a c t u a l

i d e a s being two: l subs tan t ive + v e r b a c t i v e 1 and 'sub-

s t a n t i v e + verb p a s s i v e ' ) and t h a t t h e only func t ion of

a l l t h e o t h e r forms i s t o r e c a l l i n t h e mind t h i s bas ic

form, They a r e j u s t a l t e r n a t e r e a l i z a t i o n s of i t ; Ward

never cons ide r s how t h e s e a l t e r n a t e r e a l i z a t i o n s first

found t h e i r way i n t o t h e language.

7.3.4. Rule Cycles i n Re la t ive Clauses

Ward's explanat ion of t h e way t h e r e l a t i v e c l ause

f i t s i n t o t h e sentence sugges ts t h a t he s e e s t h e process

of communication t o be i n some sense t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of

r u l e s on a c y c l i c bas i s : he says t h a t t h e pronoun re-

p r e s e n t s t h e ob jec t denoted by i t s e l f Itonly till t h e

c l a u s e i s formed and t h e o b j e c t i s a s c e r t a i n e d with which

t h e conception expressed by t h e c l ause i s t o c ~ a l e s c e , ~ ~ I

Then, when coalescence i s achieved between t h e c l ause

and i t s antecedent , t h e r e l a t i v e no longer r e p r e s e n t s

t h e o b j e c t s as e x i s t i n g s e p a r a t e l y from t h e antecedent .

1 . Nard, p. 142.

256

We a r e reminded of how Katz and P o s t a l suggest i n An I n t e l ~ r a t e d Theory of L i n e i s t i c ~ e s c r i ~ t i o n ' t h a t t r ans - - format ional r u l e s apply first of a l l t o the innermost

sentence ( s i g n i f i e d by t h e bracket ing) , and when a l l

t h e r u l e s have appl ied t o t h i s sentence, the b racke t s

a r e removed, and t h e sentence becomes a u n i t of t h e next

sentence up, and t h e process of r u l e app l i ca t ion begins

anew. Ward sees t h e r e l a t i v e c l ause a t a c e r t a i n s t a g e

(which he presumes t o be t h e a c t u a l moment i t i s u t t e r e d )

as an e n t i r e sentence with i t s own ~ r i n c i p a l o r c a p i t a l -

o b j e c t ( t h e r e l a t i v e ) , i t s own coalescing verb, and t h e

r e l z t e d pass ive form un i t ed t o t h e object of t h e ve rb

w i t h i n t h e r e l a t i v e c lause . Noun subs tan t ives , o r t h e i r

s u b s t i t u t e s ( t h e r e l a t i v e ~ r o n o u n s ) , have independent

marks of ex is tence; but when t h e cons t ruc t ion i s comple-

t e d a l l t h e independent conceptions a r e fused i n t o one

complex conception, and then , t h e p r i n c i p l e of ex i s t ence

of t h i s complex conception i s lfdestroyed o r t r a n s f e r r e d f f

wi th t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e whole sentence u n i t becomes an

a d j e c t i v a l o r ve rba l p a r t of a l a r g e r u n i t , and t h e

process of sentence formation begins aga ino Ward's ana-

l y s i s of t h e r e l a t i v e l a c k s some of t h e p e r s p i c u i t y of

t h e d i s c u s s i o n s i n t h e A r t of Thinking of Por t Royal, --

1. J e r r o l d J . Katz and Paul M. F o s t a l , An I n t e g r a t e d Theor of L ingu i s t i c Descr ip t ion ( ~ a m b r i z e , kiss. 1964), * FF. PP. 4

but the lack of perspicuity' is more on account of style

than poverty of ideas. Bard does not, however, make

the distinction between limiting and non-limiting rela-

tives that Arnauld does.' Ward's analysis takes into

account a large number of facts about the relative pro-

noun, and seeks to relate them to the philosophical

standpoint from which he is giving an account of language.

7.4. Extraposition

Little attention has been given to the second -.

half of Ward's Essay, the Practical Grammar; this is

because it very often merely restates the points made

in the Speculative Grammar or discusses usages in English,

and offers ad hoc accounts of them. However, Ward does -- turn his attention again in the Practical Grammar to the

sentential complements or content clauses that he had

discussed in the Speculative Grammar as if they were

relative clauses. This time he does not confuse them with

relatives; in a Section entitled "Of whole sentences used

as substantives"* Ward recognizes - that as a demonstrative,

which is historically correct, rather than as a

1. -- The Art of Thinkin-, op. cit., p. 124 and p. 118. The terms U S ~ Ior ese clauses are lrestrictivel and lexplicative.l

--TI?

2. Ward, p. 488.

r e l a t i v e . ' Ward no t only c o r r e c t l y desc r ibes t h e t h a t - c l a u s e i n I t i t came t o pass a t t h e end of f o r t y days,

t h a t Noah opened t h e Window of t h e Ark," but appears t o

recognize t h a t t h e sentence has been extraposed from i t s

s u b j e c t p o s i t i o n . He d i scusses t h e phenomenon of ex t ra-

p o s i t i o n under t h e heading " O f t h e cons t ruc t ion of verbs

impersonal . l 1 2 He says t h a t a l l ve rbs have s u b j e c t s , but

sometimes i t i s no t convenient t o mention t h e s u b j e c t

be fo re t h e d e f i n i t i v e verb. The f a c t t h a t Ward n o t e s

the,phenomenon a t a l l i s i n t e r e s t i n g ; d i scuss ion of syn-

t a x had been minimal i n previous grammars of English,

1 . '!The s e n t e n t i a l o r causa l demonstrative t h a t , when - pre f ixed t o a sentence i s t o be considered a l l of i t to- g e t h e r as one subs tan t ive i n some cases . Thus i n ,

I t came t o p a s s a t t h e end of f o r t y days, t h a t Noah opened t h e Window of t h e Ark. (Old Testa- ment)

'That Noah opened t h e Window of t h e Arkt denotes t h a t which came t o pass , and t h e r e f o r e i s a kind of nominative case.l1 (Ward, p. 488).

2. "1 have a l r eady shewed t h a t every ve rb d e f i n i t i v e has r e l a t i o n t o some s u b j e c t . . . Nevertheless , i t is n o t convenient , i n a l l i n s t a n c e s t o express t h i s s u b j e c t a t l a r g e before t h e d e f i n i t i v e v e r b i s mentioned . . .

It i s h ighly laudable t o pay respec t t o men descended from worthy ances to r s . (Specta tor , No. 612)

i . e . ' t o pay respec t t o , &c. i s h igh ly l a u d i b l e . ' I t i s l ikewise used t o r ep resen t what i s denoted by a f u l l s en tence depending on t h a t i n t h e fol lowing p a r t of t h e sentence.I1 (Ward, p. 492).

which had concentrated on' defining categories and dis-

cussing category membership. Ward not only attempted

to deal with the significance of the basic constructions

in language, but was sufficiently observant to notice

the curious phenomenon of extraposition. The reason

that Ward gives for the existence of such a feature,

that "it is not convenient . . . to express this subject . , . before the definitive verb," has nothing whatsoever to do with the arrangemqnt of ideas in the mind, or thelr

relation; -it is only for the convenience of the speaker,

and is for the convenience of arranging the surface

structure. This is presumably the reason why it only

merits a place for discussion in the Practical Grammar,

The 'there is' construction is similarly relegated to

the Practical Grammar, as it is a surface structure varia-

tion which does not affect deeper levels.' All words of

a structural character "give noticell or information about

the linguistic system, Those discussed immediately above

(viz, the it replacing extraposed subjects and the un- - stressed there) give notice of changes in the superficial

word order, and could be called signals of optional

transformations that have taken place, Others, giving

1. "There is only used to give notice that the nominative case stand behind the verb, and therefore, is no more than a notice concerning the structure of the words themselves." (Ward, p. 492,)

n o t i c e of t h e arrangement b f i d e a s and t h e kind of

dependency r e l a t i o n s h i p , could be c a l l e d simals of

o b l i g a t o r y t ransformations. I t i s of course a mistake

t o a t tempt t o see Wardls grammar through t h e f i l t e r i n g

l e n s e s of c u r r e n t t r ans fo rmat iona l theory; t h e purpose

of t h e s tudy of t e x t s of t h e p a s t i s t o e l u c i d a t e what

they a r e saying i n t h e i r own time r a t h e r than measure

i t a g a i n s t c u r r e n t t h e o r i e s . A s s t a t e d i n t h e Introduc-

t i o n , t h e purpose of e l u c i d a t i o n i s p a r t l y t h a t cu r ren t

t h e o r i e s may be measured a g a i n s t t h e o r i e s of t h e p a s t ,

r a t h e r than v i c e versa . However, inasmuch as many of - t h e achievements of t ransformat ional theory a r e t h e

fo rmal i za t ion of previous i n s i g h t s about language, t h e

terminology o f t e n proves u s e f u l i n r e f e r r i n g , i n shor t -

hand form, t o phenomena t h a t have long been recognized

by grammarians.

7.5. A Note on Performatives

I t would be a mistake t o b e l i e v e t h a t Wardls

a n a l y s i s of grammatical devices i s thorough and coherent ;

an at tempt has been made i n t h i s chap te r t o present some

p o i n t s which Ward develops i n a reasonably coherent

f a sh ion . But t h e r e a r e many o t h e r phenomena t h a t Viard

accounts f o r by s t a t i n g t h a t they g i v e n o t i c e t h a t some

supposedly r e l a t e d form i s t o be understood. Thus he

gives the unwary reader the feeling that all things are

being reduced to the utmost simplicity whereas in actual

fact Ward makes no real effort to come to terms with

many of the facts. One particular instance of this

occurs in his discussion of imperatives and interrogatives.

His resolution of these forms, and his dependence on

Buffier for the suggestion have already been discussed

in Chapter I11 .' It may be remarkably easy to say that

the structural markers of the interrogative signal a

particular locution, and the structural markers of the -

imperative signal another; however, what Ward is really

doing is attempting to give a semantic analysis of a

syntactic feature; similar proposals are being made

today.* Of particular interest is the fact that present-

day proposals and Ward's proposal both suggest that these

sentences consist of two sentences in the deep structure:

a performative and a proposition. Ward is actually

discussing questions with interrogative pronouns, such

as "Who is that man?"; he says: #'Every question that is

asked by the help of one of these pronouns consists in

effect of two complete sentences, in each of which one

and the same object is concerned. The one of these

1. Cf. Para. 4.1.3.3.

2. J. Boyd and J. P. Thorne, "The Deep Grammar of Modal Verbs," Journal - of Lintyuisti.cs, V ( 1 9 6 9 ) ~ 57-74.

sentences shows what the question is about; and the other

signifies the desire or intention of the speaker to re-

ceive information concerning that which the question is

about."' The first of Ward's sentences is the 'proposi-

tion,' and the second is the 'performativet in Boyd and

Thorne's terminology. In their article '#The Deep Grammar

of Modal Verbs," they only discuss imperatives, They

suggest that the imperative sentence "You will go," and

its paraphrases (tlGo,u ''1 order you to gow) have identi-

cal deep structures made up of two, not one, sentential

elements, the first carrying the illocutionary potential

of the sentence, the second what might be termed its

lpropositional content. That is, something roughly

like:

Ward's discussion is of interest because similar dis-

cussions are currently being hailed as new analyses

(~oyd and Thorne claim that they are proposing a new

analysis of modals;) but Ward does not attempt to in-

tegrate the fact that there are two sentences here with

1. Ward, p. 148.

2, Boyd and Thorne, op. cit., p. 59.

wi th h i s t h e o r i e s about i d e a s i n t h e mind. There would

perhaps be some d i f f i c u l t y i n having i d e a s s i g n i f i e d by

a performative sentence. I n any event , t h i s d i scuss ion

of modals i s n o t p a r t of l a r d ' s a n a l y s i s of language i n

Lockean terms; i t i s an i d e a t h a t he had obtained from

B u f f i e r and which i s mentioned here f o r i t s own value

r a t h e r than as p a r t of h i s overa l l scheme t o r e l a t e t h e

grammatical c a t e g o r i e s of language t o Lockets theory of

ideas .

Chapter Vlii

The Essay on Grammar in the Eighteenth and the Twentieth Centuries

8.0. Introduction

8,i. Eighteenth Century Views on 8.1.1. Eighteenth Century Interest

8.2. Ward and the Twentieth Centu 8.2,1. Categorical Grammars

8.3. Conclusion: Ward and Locke

* -

Ward in Universal Grammar

I

CHAPTER VIII

THE ESSAY ON GHNi'DiIAR I N THE EIGHTEENTH AND

TWENTIETH CENTURIES

8.0. Introduction

William Kard s theory of language had little in-

fluence among his contemporaries; this does not mean

that it is historically unimportant. In terms of trends

and influences it may not be significant, but in terms of

its relation to present-day linguistics it has much to

offer for consideration. Linguistic theories of the

past are interesting to the antiquarian because they

belong to the past; but to linguistic scientists they

are interesting either because they are the sources of

the present or because they have interesting parallels

with current concerns. Ward's theory is interesting to

the historian (and not just to the antiquarian) because

of the extensive use he made of Locke8s philosophy in

his grammatical theory. It cannot be claimed that his

theory is the source of any present-day approaches to

linguistics, because his influence on the history of

linguistics is negligible. However, his interests do

I have important parallels with linguistic trends of the

current decade, and these will be the concern of this

265

,

c h a p t e r , A s l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n h a s s o f a r been given t o

contemporary r e a c t i o n t o Ward's work, t h i s w i l l first

be considered.

8.1. F ighteenth Century Views on Ward

I t i s only i n r e t r o s p e c t t h a t Ward can be considered

t o have enlarged t h e e igh teen th century concept of gram-

mar. H i s contemporaries appear t o have been b l ind t o

t h e t a s k t h a t Ward had s e t h imsel f , and h i s reviewers

i n both t h e Konthly ~ e v i e w ' and t h e C r i t i c a l Review 2

had few words of p r a i s e f o r h i s endeavour. The l a t t e r

journal i s almost wholely condemnatory of Ward's a t tempt ,

but t h i s i s because t h e only reason t h a t t h e reviewer

s e e s f o r t h e s tudy of grammar i s t h a t i t might enable

one t o l e a r n b e t t e r t h e p r a c t i c a l ar t of wr i t ing ; i n

f a c t he negates h i s own po in t by a l s o observing t h a t

t h e connection between l e a r n i n g grammar and w r i t i n g wel l

i s i l l u s o r y . 3 He quotes ex tens ive ly from what a r e

1 . "An Essay on Grammar . . . by William Ward," (anon. r ev . ) llonthly Heview, XXXII (1765), 289-293.

2 . '!An Essay on Grammar . . . by W i l l i a m Ward," (anon. rev . ) C r i t i c a l Review, X I X (1765), 199-203.

3. "Upon enquiry i t w i l l perhaps be found, t h a t our p u r e s t and b e s t speakers , a s wel l as w r i t e r s , l i v e d i n t imes when no grammar of t h e English tongue ex i s t ed ; o r i f t h e r e w a s one, t h a t they never consul ted it." ( P . 199).

considered t o be important' passages of t h e Specula t ive

Grammar i n o rde r t o show t h e i r l a c k of re levance t o

p r a c t i c a l r u l e s .

The Monthly Review i s much more sympathetic t o

Ward's endeavours, but p o i n t s t h a t Harris' Hermes and

Lowth's Short In t roduc t ion a r e s u p e r i o r t o t h e Specula t ive

G r a m m a r and F r a c t i c a l Grammar r e s p e c t i v e l y . There i s no

doubt t h a t Harris' work is much more readable than Ward's,

but t h e revievier does n o t seem t o be aware t h a t Ward i s 4 -

t r y i n g t o do very d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s from Harris. The

l a t t e r ' s u n i v e r s a l s i n language were su r face gramrnatica\l

c a t e g o r i e s and l e x i c a l u n i v e r s a l s ; Ward's were concerned

wi th t h e n a t u r e of i d e a s and t h e r u l e s t h a t u n i t e i d e a s

t o each o t h e r . The Monthly Review t a k e s i s s u e with Ward's

d e f i n i t i o n s and says t h a t they a r e enigmatical because

t h e y a r e " j u s t . " This comment r e v e a l s an i n t e r e s t i n g

f a c e t of t h e a t t i t u d e s i n t h e e igh teen th century towards

grammatical d e f i n i t i o n . Ward's d e f i n i t i o n a r e s a i d t o

be bad because they a r e inc lus ive . ' S impl ic i ty and

c l e a r n e s s rank above c o r r e c t n e s s f o r t h e reviewer, and

i t would n o t seem u n l i k e l y t h a t t h i s w a s a genera l a t t i -

tude. Twentieth century grammarians b e r a t e and c r i t i c i z e

1 . "This w i l l ever be t h e case , a l s o , when a w r i t e r , i n d e f i n i n g a term, i s s o l i c i t o u s t o inc lude every c i r - cumstance t h a t r e l a t e s t o t h e ob jec t o r a t t r i b u t e s p e c i f i e d . " ( p . 290) .

eighteenth century grammapians for the inaccuracy and

incompleteness of their definitions without realizing

that they did not perhaps intend to create complete

definitions, but were rather giving useful or mnemonic

descriptions. On these grounds Ward's attempt at fuller

definition results in criticism; however, the reviewer

is disturbed not only by the difficulty of the defini-

tions themselves but by the extremely incomprehensible

general style of Ward's writing. Vjhile admitting the

"true philosophic principlesw that Ward has worked from,

the reviewer suggests that 'Imost people will rather

choose to remain ignorant all their lives, than engage

in so laborious a task as that of pursuing the same

pathM as Ward.

It is significant of the reviewer's field of inter-

est that after making his justified comments on Ward's

tortuous style, and his interesting comments on the

function of definition, the reviewer goes on to discuss

Ward's very short section on phonology and his section

on metre1 rather than comment on the much more significant

1. The reviewer objects to Ward's use of the classical metre, indicating that there did not exist a general

I acceptance of classical metrics in the eighteenth cen- tury:

Mr Ward is also one of those classical theorists, who would reduce the numbers and measures of English

a s p e c t s of t h e ~ p e c u l a t i v k Grammar t h a t t h i s t h e s i s has

attempted t o d i scuss . I t seems t h a t what modern l i n g u i s t s

s e e as important were no t n e c e s s a r i l y important i n the

e igh teen th century ; indeed even H a r r i s 1 Hermes o f t e n

i seems t o have been p ra i sed r a t h e r than used. The mood

of e igh teen th century England w a s no t ready f o r specula-

t i o n s on u n i v e r s a l grammar of so s o p h i s t i c a t e d a form.

The f a c t t h a t Home Tooke w a s t o cap tu re t h e minds of

t h e reading pub l i c so s h o r t l y a f te rwards i s i t s e l f evi-

dence of an absence of any deep enqui r ing i n t e r e s t i n

language a t t h i s per iod i n England.

8 . 1 . Eighteenth Century I n t e r e s t i n Universal Grammar

There w a s a l a c k of i n t e r e s t i n Ward's E-y on - Grammar because he w a s a t tempt ing t o g ive an account o f

language t h a t was more far-reaching than t h e average

educator f e l t was necessary. I n t e r e s t i n language t h a t

went beyond t h e s u p e r f i c i a l forms of language was gener-

a l l y known a s l lun ive r sa l grammar1t; Harris w a s considered

v e r s e , t o t h e s tandards of t h e a n c i e n t s ; but t h e learned have so long i n va in at- tempted t o shackle modern poet ry with t h e f e t t e r s of Iambics, Trochees, Dactyls and Anapests, t h a t t h e po in t i s now given . . . by almost every reader of t a s t e .

1 . Robert Lowth, f o r example, p r a i s e s Hermes and d i s - -- misses Universal Grammar i n t h e same sentence. ( L O W ~ ~ ,

op. c i t . , p. x i ) .

by t h e Monthly Heview wri ' ter t o be t h e b e s t r ecen t ex-

ponent of u n i v e r s a l grammar; however, t h e r e were s e v e r a l

o t h e r people who claimed t o t r e a t of u n i v e r s a l grammar

o r who have some claim t o be compared wi th Ward i n t h e

i n v e s t i g a t i o n of a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s . A s e a r l y as 1695

A . Lane had attempted t o d e a l with t tsuch p recep t s as

a r e common t o a l l languagestf1 i n h i s Ra t ioca l and Speedy - Method of At ta in ing t o t h e L a t i n Tongue. Lane t s grammar - -- i s c h i e f l y i n t e r e s t i n g because i t i s an e a r l y a t tempt t o

apply the-Varronic c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of t h e p a r t s of speech

t o t h e Engl ish language;2 al though Lane's a t tempt a t

fo rmula t ing u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e s was muddled and i n d i -

r e c t , ' h i s conception of t h e i r ex i s t ence w a s unambiguous;

he speaks of " the u n a l t e r a b l e r u l e s of r i g h t reason,

which a r e t h e same i n a l l languages how d i f f e r e n t soever

they b e e t t 4 I n 1726 J. T. P h i l i p p s p re f ixed a u n i v e r s a l

grammar t o an e d i t i o n of James S h i r l e y ' s La t in G r a m m a r , - and c a l l e d t h e whole book a Universal and Rat ional G r a m - - - m a r : t o g e t h e r with Rules f o r Learning L a t i n i n Engl i sh .__ - - -9 - 1. A . Lane, A Rat ional and S eed Nethod of At ta in ing 9iL - t o t h e La t in Tongue, 1 6 9 r t l t e page. -- 2 . Varro had maintained t h a t t h e r e were f o u r , no t e i g h t , p a r t s of speech. C f . Para. 1,2.1,

3. See Michael, op. c i t . , p. 186.

4. Lane, op. c i t .

Verse; however, this, in common with several other at-

tempts at investigating general principles was indis-

tinguishable from a basic grammar.1 The most interesting

universal grammar to appear before Hermes was Benjamin

Martin's essay which formed a preface to his dictionary.

The dictionary was known as the Institutes of Language: - containing a Physical-Grammatical Essay on the Propriety - -- and Rational -- of the English Tongue; Michael describes

it as "the most thoughtful consideration of Universal

grammar since Wilkins, though on quite different lines > -

and poorly organizedetl2 It was an investigation of

linguistic change rather than a logical analysis of

language. James Harrisq Hermes was the first extended

treatment of universal grammar or general principles of

language in English; as has already been mentioned, it

is a far more readable work than Ward's. Ward's Essay

is not able to match the breadth of learning that Harris8

work possesses; the Essay is interesting and a valuable

record of eighteenth century linguistics because it

extended the field of analysis of general principles

or universal grammar beyond the area treated by Harris;

1. See Michael, op. cit., p. 187.

1 2. Ibid., p. 187. Wilkins and other creators of univer- sal languages have not been considered here because they were not strictly writing grammars and they were far removed in time from Ward's Essay.

Ward was concerned with the deep structure of language

as well as the surface categories that Harris treats.

Ward's interest in levels of language below the surface

parallels the continental interest in these areas, but

little of it was borrowed from the French grammarians.

It was Ward's interest in Lockets philosophy that had

enabled him to extend his analysis in new ways and pro-

pose an altogether new basis for the parts of speech.

After-1751 there are numerous works which deal

with the theory of lariguage, and which tend to supersede

the interest in universal grammar, as this is generally

understood. Most of them have a scope of investigation

beyond the narrowly grammatical, and pertain to the

philosophy of language rather than the study of ling-

uistics; three works in the latter half of the century

should be mentioned; these are Joseph Priestley's lectures

On the Theory of Language or Universal Grammar, delivered -- - - and published at Warrington in 1762, James Beattie1s

Theory of Language (1783), and Charles Cootels Elements of the Grammar of the English Language (1788). Priestleyls - -- lectures are of interest because they deal with the parts

2 of speech in psychological terms.' Ivan Poldauf sug-

gests that Priestley's theory is influenced by Hartleyts

psychology, and that his grammatical categories are

founded on Lockets distinction between names and par-

ticles. It appears that although Priestley was using

the same sources as Ward, his theory and his conclusions

are very different. There is no evidence to suggest that

Kard was aware of Priestley's lectures.

James Beattie's Theory - of Language discusses in its

first part "the origin and general nature of speech,"

and in the second, universal grammar, which is defined

1. He says that their aim is:

. . . to point out the several powers and modes of expression that sounds and characters are ca- pable of, to trace their connexion with, or rela- tion to the ideas they represent; and to show the actual variety of the external expressions of the same mental conce~tions which different lanmages - - exhibit. (~ose~h- Priestley, -- On the Theory of L a . a e or Universal Grammar, Warrington, 1 7 6 2 ,

,*-

2. Ivan Poldauf and Ian Michael are the sources of in- formation of all comments on Priestley; it was hoped that he could have been considered in much greater detail; however, it was not possible to locate a copy of the Lec- tures. Poldauf says of Priestley:

In his general attitude towards language, Priestley follows the lines of his materialist philosophy and David Hartley's psychology of associations. His chief concern is the origin and development of lankpage in their relation to the social and cul- tural atmosphere of the single stages of the growth language, which itself is determined so that it is useless to try to change it by supposed autho- rity. (~oldauf, op. cit., p. 138).

I

as Ifthose things, that all languages have in c~mmon.~

Beattie's treatment of universal grammar is like that

of most of his predecessors: it is a grammar of English

with reference to Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. His book

is interesting, but not from the point of view of gen-

eral principles.

Charles Coote quotes Locke to support his opinion

that knowledge of universal grammar is important for

investigating the philosophy of thehunan mind; his --

treatment of universal grammar, however, is but the

introduction to his grammar of English; it follows

Harrist schema of the parts of speech, while showing

the same interest as Ward in speech as a process of

communication.

This short survey suggests that although in some

sense Ward's Essay is a natural development from the

English grammatical tradition,' it was undoubtedly

unique in the eighteenth century in the scope of its

investigation of general principles.

8.2. Ward and the Twentieth Century

In the course of the preceding chapters reference

1. Cf. Para. 2.5.6.

has been made on several occasions to present-day views

on lan~~age and lineistics that have parallels in Ward Is

Essay. These parallels are interesting because they

suggest a continuing effort to come to terms with cer-

tain problems and serve as a reminder that much of the

work of present-day linguistic science consists in the

reformulation of linguistic facts in contemporary terms

rather than in their actual discovery. Examples of this

include the notion of extraposition, the psychological

I relation of substantive and adjective, and the equation * -

of adjective and verb in the deep structure. 2

It was suggested in the Introduction that Ward's

theory of grammar has much in common with modern theories

which see the base component of language structure as

semantically differentiated units. The most common

present-day view of grammatical theory is still that of

Chomsky in Aspects -- of the Theory of Syntax ( 1 9 6 5 ) , which - sees the set of phrase structure rules as the starting

point in sentence generation; they produce a syntactic

1. A n adjective becomes a substantive throuch the pro- cess of focussing. Cf. Para. 6.2.3. where Ward's analy- sis is compared to Jespersenls.

2. This was not part of Ward's final theory, but was part of his initial suppositions, and was recognized in Buffierls grammar, from which he borrowed a good deal.

3. Especially those of George Lakoff, John Ross, and Emmon Bach.

string which is then with a semantic interpre-

tation, as illustrated below.

Semantics in Chomsky's Model

r *

Phrase Structure +Deep Structurc+Transformation9 Phono- Hul e s Representation Ilul e s logical

- . 2 i

Semantics Phonetic

J L

Even from a superficial point of view such a model seems

undesirable because the role of semantics appears mar-

ginal rather than central. l It is intuitively obvious

that semantics should have a central role in sentence

generation. James McCawley shows that the. syntactic

selection rules, part of the phrase structure rules, are

completely unnecessary and argues that semantic selection

restriction must operate in the base component in order

to produce a deep structure which is adequate for the

functioning of the transformational rules. 2

1. This is perhaps the result of the development of Chomsky's theory from a series of structural theories of language, which were not intended to deal with meaning.

2. James McCawley, "The Eole of Semantics in Grarnmar,l1 in Universal in Lin yuistic Theor , e&. Ehmon Bach and Ilobert T . H~~G,'-&GTS?,TRJ~, 124-169, but es- pecially 233 ff.

Such a view is held by Ward who declares that the

starting point of linguistic theory is not grammatical

categories (e.g. nouns and verbs), but ideas or concep-

tions (i.e. bundles of semantic features) which become

grammatically differentiated for the purpose of entering

into syntactic construction.' Such a view makes seman-

tics a central part of the theory of language in a way

that it can never be in Chomskyts theory (cf, diagram

above). Ward goes further than McCawley, however, and

sees seman%ics as relevant not only to the very first

stage of sentence generation, in terms of rules, but as

functioning before the semantic features are attached

to specific grammatical categories.

This can be compared to Emmon Bachls proposal2 that

nouns, verbs, and adjectives are variations of one more

general category . ' Bachts view is suggested by a

1. Cf. Chapter VI.

2. Emmon Bach, "Nouns and Noun Phrases, in Universals in Linguistic Theor , ed. Emmon Bach and Robert T. Harms m e w York, 1 9 6 ~ - 1 2 4 .

3. "If this third hypothesis [that the actual rules of the base are the same for every language] is correct, then it cannot be the case that Nootka, Japanese, and English,for example, differ in having one, two, and three major lexical categories, respectively. George

I Lakoff and Paul Postal have argued that the classes of adjectives and verbs in English are in actuality merely two sub-classes of one lexical category, thus making English look more like Japanese. Traditional

comparison of Nootka and 'Engl ish and i s supported by

t h e f a c t s t h a t 1) i n g e n e r a l , t r ans fo rmat iona l r u l e s

work on t h e element NP r a t h e r than on t h e ca tegory Noun,

2 ) Chomsky's c laim t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e between nouns on

t h e one hand and ve rbs and a d j e c t i v e s i s r e f l e c t e d i n

t h e i r behaviour wi th r e spec t t o s e l e c t i o n r u l e s i s f a l s e ,

3 ) phonological r u l e s of English r e q u i r e t h e i d e n t i f i c a -

t i o n of a c l a s s , c o n s i s t i n g p r e c i s e l y of nouns, a d j e c t i v e s ,

and ve rbs , and 4) a c t i v e and s t a t i v e a r e c a t e g o r i e s of

t h e noun as well as of verbs and a d j e c t i v e s ( c f . ItDon't

be a f o o l f t and IfDon1t.be a m a m m a l t 1 ) ' Bach's proposal i s

p a r t of h i s argument t h a t i n d i v i d u a l ve rbs , nouns, and

a d j e c t i v e s a r e a l l der ived from r e l a t i v e c l a u s e s ; it

h a s n o t been j u s t i f i e d i n d e t a i l , o r even demonstrated

i n d e t a i l , but o f f e r s extremely i n t e r e s t i n g a r e a s of in-

v e s t i g a t i o n . The c a t e g o r i e s of t h e base component inc lude

term' (which Bach s a y s i s more o r l e s s an N P and 'con-

t e n t i v e . l 2 The con ten t ives c o n s i s t of grammatically

Indo-European grammar, on t h e o t h e r hand, h a s genera l ly lumped t o g e t h e r nouns and a d j e c t i v e s ( l a r g e l y , t o be s u r e , because of morphological c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ) . I s h a l l . . . presen t some arguments which seem t o me t o i n d i c a t e t h a t a l l t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s a r e represented by one i n t h e base c~mponen t .~ ' (Bah, op. c i t , , pp. 114- 115).

1 . See Bach, op. c i t . , pp. 116-117.

2. I b i d . , p. 91.

undifferentiated bundles of semantic features which are

attached to the terms or indices in a relative clause

matrix. 1tules of ordering and transformation determine

the surface categories of noun, verb and adjective,

Bachls conclusions, although tentative, are based

on the facts of English and Nootka. If his position

turns out to be tenable, it will have far-reaching im-

plications; Bach suggests that these will include the

realization that "the actual rules of the base are the

same for every language,I1 which will constitute Ita direct

denial of the Humboldt-Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in its

strongest form.l1l The implications for the history of'

linguistics are even greater: the apparently fundamental

categories of linguistic description from the beginnings

of the Western grammatical tradition until later than

1965 have in fact only been surface categories, suggested

by the forms of Greek and other Indo-European tongues,

Although this has in part been recognized by the identi-

fication in some cases of substantives and adjectives, . and in others of adjectives and verbs, the aspects common

to all three categories has completely escaped the notice

of all grammarians except William Ward, who proclaimed

1. Op. cit., p. 122.

t h a t a l l t h r e e c a t e g o r i e & a r e more a l i k e than d i f f e r e n t . 1

The h i s t o r y of l i n g u i s t i c s , then , i s almost t o t a l l y

t h e h i s t o r y of a sc ience which has been unable t o see

beyond c e r t a i n supposedly fundamental u n i t s , because t h e s e

u n i t s had been r e i f i e d and hallowed by t h e t r a d i t i o n .

Viilliam Ward's r ecogn i t ion of underlying u n i t i e s i n t h e

f irst book of h i s Essay i s a s i g n i f i c a n t bredsthrough i n

t h e t r a d i t i o n a l th ink ing about language. The i d e a o r

concept ion i s t h e source of u n i t y of t h e t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s

a t a s p e c i f i c s t a g e of t h e communicative a c t of speech; > -

however, when subs tan t ives , a d j e c t i v e s and ve rbs a r e

1. A r i s t o t l e , though ha rd ly a grammarian, had noted t h a t t h e only d i f f e r e n c e between onoma and rhema w a s t h a t t h e l a t t e r had time re fe rence as wel l ( see Para. 1.1.3.). George Dalgarno, i n h i s A r s Signorum (1661) had recognized - only one p a r t of speech: "Ego vero . . . unicam tantum O r a t i o n i s partem, P r i m a r i m , e t p ropr ie s i c dictam agnos- co ; Nomen s c i l . Caeteras vero vulgo s i c h a b i t a s e s se i n t e r F lexiones , e t Casus hu jus numerandas, (p. 63). The v e r b was considered t o be a name, j u s t as t h e noun. Apart from t h e i m p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of such a scheme, i t i s n o t t h e same kind of proposal as Ward's and Bachls , Thomas Gunter Browne i n ~ e r m e s Unmasked; o r t h e ar t o f ---- S eech Founded on t h e Associa t ion of Words and Ideas h a t t e m p t e T t 1 r s h e w t h a t t h e r e S l i t v but one s o r t of word, and t h a t t h e r e i s no d i s t i n c t i o k o r i - g i n a l l y between t h e noun and verb.'! ( p , 3 ) . This seems a more i n t e r e s t i n g proposal , p a r t i c u l a r l y as t l ichael sug- g e s t s t h a t " h i s argument i s der ived from an incomplete unders tanding of . . . Hart leye1I ( ~ i c h a e l , p. 286). However, i t has n o t been p o s s i b l e t o consu l t Browne's work a t first hand. I t i s n o t l i k e l y t h a t h i s proposal i s as c a r e f u l l y worked out as i s Ward's,

I Ward says , at t h e beginning of h i s d i scuss ion of grammar: "1 s h a l l t h e r e f o r e proceed t o g i v e a genera l view of both of t h e s e p a r t s of speech t o g e t h e r , i n o rde r t o account f o r some &enera1 p r o p e r t i e s i n which t h e ve rb appears t o agree with t h e noun." (P. 11).

2. Represented by l e v e l 3 i n t h e diagram i n Para , 7.1.1.

d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by t h e foc;ssine process of t h e mind, 1

t h e i r d i s t i n ~ p i s h i n g f e a t u r e s and t h e p r i o r i t y g iven

t o t h e s u b s t a n t i v e suggest comparisons with o t h e r pro- 2

p o s a l s concerning t h e p a r t s of speech.

8.2.1. Ca tegor ia l G r a m m a r s

Ward 's grammar emphasizes t h e fundamental importance

o f t h e noun s u b s t a n t i v e as a sentence c o n s t i t u e n t on which

a l l o t h e r s depend. Ca tegor ia l grammars have a similar

view of t h e noun. These grammars, l a r g e l y developed by

l o g i c i a n s , 3 have two fundamental ca tegor ies : ' sen tence

and 'noun' ; a l l o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s a r e der ived from t h e s e ,

and t h e i r n o t a t i o n i n d i c a t e s t h e i r combinator ial possi-

b i l i t i e s wi th o t h e r elements. Thus t h e sentence "John

r u n s u i s denoted by In. S t . The meaning of ' S t i s t h a t - - n n

when t h i s i s combined wi th a noun (hence t h e In' i n

t h e denominator p o s i t i o n ) they w i l l t o g e t h e r form a

1 . Expressed i n r u l e s 1 and 2 i n Para. 6.3.

2. Espec ia l ly those of John Lyons and Bar-Hillel . C f . John Lyons, "Towards a ' n o t i o n a l ' theory of t h e ' p a r t s of speech, 'I1 Journal of Lin u i s t i c s , I1 (1966), 209-236, and Yehoshua Bar-Hine*-Mathematical Nota t ion f o r Syn tac t i c ~ e s c r i ~ t i o n , 'I ~ a n & u a . ~ e , X I X ( 1953), 47-58.

3. Kas in ie rz Ajukiewicz, a P o l i s h l o g i c i a n produced a seminal a r t i c l e on t h e s u b j e c t of c a t e c o r i a l grammars i n 1935 : "Die Syntakt i sche Konnexitat , " Stud ia Phi loso h i c a (Ylarszawa), Vol. I (1935), 1-20. J . Lamm.& and J , Tlyons have a l s o pursued t h e s u b j e c t , The n o t a t i o n used i n t h i s d i scuss ion i s t h a t of Lyons, but t h e r e i s l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s and o t h e r s .

sentence ( i n d i c a t e d by t h e ' S t i n t h e numerator p o s i t i o n ) .

The sentence could be expanded with an a d j e c t i v e and ad-

verb:

Poor John ran away n . - n. s - S - n n n

By c a n c e l l a t i o n t h e s e elements can u l t i m a t e l y be reduced

to- t h e s i n g l e S. However, t h e o rde r of c a n c e l l a t i o n

must be r e s t r i c t e d i n o rde r t o complete t h e process

without r e s idue . The c o r r e c t o rde r of c a n c e l l a t i o n w i l l

r e f l e c t t h e o rde r of dependency of t h e elements. The

proposed advantages of t h e c a t e g o r i a l a n a l y s i s of sentence

t y p e s r a t h e r than t h e r e w r i t e r u l e a n a l y s i s i s t h a t t h e

c a t e g o r i a l a n a l y s i s has t o make c l e a r t h e dependency of

one category on another . The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e compa-

r i s o n of Ward's system t o c a t e g o r i a l grammars i s t h a t

t h e no t ion of dependency i s inheren t i n Ward's system:

a l l o t h e r words o r c a t e g o r i e s a r e u l t i m a t e l y dependent

on t h e noun subs tan t ive i n t h e l a t e r s t a g e s of h i s gram-

m a r , a l though he had e a r l i e r a s s e r t e d t h e e s s e n t i a l

s i m i l a r i t y of s u b s t a n t i v e s , a d j e c t i v e s , and verbs .

John Lyons draws a t t e n t i o n t o a supposed inadequacy

of c a t e g o r i a l grammars: "A c a t e g o r i a l grammar w i l l i d e n t i f y

'adjectives' and 'intransitive verbs' as members of

the same major category (e.g. beautiful and dances in

such sentences as 'Nary is beautiful' and 'Mary dances'),

but will fail to relate 'transitive verbs' and 'intran-

sitive verbs, ' " ' Thus dances and is beautiful may be

signified by ' S t - , while a verb such as - kick will have n

the representation IS' - . Ward's analysis circumvents n n

this difficulty because he sees the presence of a tran-

sitive verb as a signal of two distinct sentences, Thus -

"John kicks the ball"' is composed of '!John kicks" and n. S -

n

"The ball is kicked." The representation given .to "John n. S -

n

walks1' would be exactly the same. Categorial analysis

fits Ward's scheme suitably because it formalizes his

views of dependency and adequately reflects his view

of the relation between transitive and intransitive

sentences.

Let us consider an analysis in Ward's terms of the

sentence "Poor John, who is holding James, kicked the

horse. 'I A categorial analysis of t'who is holding JamesM

[ 1. John Lyons, - A n Introduction - to Theoretical Lingyistics,

\P* 330.

2. This sentence, although not Ward's has been chosen because it exhibits those features which have had a central part in the discussion of Ward's syntax,

g i v e s i n t h e f i rs t p lace 'two simple sentences: "who h o l d s ~ ~ n. S -

n

and "James i s h e l d n ; however, a f t e r t h e sentence has n. S -

n

been u t t e r e d , t h e r e l a t i v e pronoun, according t o Ward,

g i v e s n o t i c e t h a t no independently e x i s t i n g conception

i s denoted by i t , t h a t i t expresses an o b j e c t only through

i t s l i n k with i t s antecedent , and t h a t t h e c l ause a t t ached

t o t h e pronoun i s no t a sentence' but a modif ica t ion of

t h e cap i t a l -ob jec t . Rhen t h i s n o t i c e i s given t h e s t a t u s

of t h e r e l a t i v e changes from t h a t of an In' t o a u n i t which

combines wi th a s u b s t a n t i v e t o i n d i c a t e t h e conception

o f t h a t s u b s t z n t i v e , t h a t i s n. The v e r b holds jo ins - n

w i t h t h i s r e l a t i v e t o form a modif ica t ion of i t , and so

w i l l be denoted by n. - V o o r John who holdslV becomes: n

n. n. g . n. There does n o t , however, seem any reason - - n n n

f o r demoting t h e second p a r t of t h e r e l a t i v e c l ause from

i t s sentence s t a t u s , because t h i s i s , i n f a c t , a sentence,

1 . NO^ . . . expressing complete t r u t h o r falsehood . . . but as an expression of t h e same ob jec t which t h e r e l a t i v e r e p r e s e n t s . " (ward , p. 1 3 4 ) .

completely independent of+ t h e r e l a t i v e pronoun: "James i s

held." Kicked, t h e d e f i n i t i v e ve rb , combines with t h e

conception denoted by John t o form a sentence , and i s - given t h e n o t a t i o n - S. F i n a l l y , t h e r e i s a t h i r d in -

n

dependent sentence: "The horse i s kicked. The a n a l y s i s

of t h e t h r e e sentences i s as follows:

Poor John who i s holding -- kicked. I James i s he ld .

I The horse w a s kicked.!

Af te r t h e f i r s t s e r i e s o f c a n c e l l a t i o n s , these become:

then:

and f i n a l l y :

The ana lys i s l i n k s every element of the sentence d i r e c t l y

t o the cons t i tuen t noun or substant ive , and ensures t h a t

t h e f i n a l cance l la t ion i s between the noun substant ive ,

o r the phrase represent ing i t , and the verb d e f i n i t i v e .

I t g ives a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t o verbs i n subordinate c lauses

which i s d i s t i n c t from t h a t of those i n the p r inc ipa l

c lause , but t h i s i s because they a r e d i f f e r en t : the

r e l a t i v e pronoun has given no t i ce of t h i s f a c t . .

The disputable p a r t of Ward's ana lys i s s t i l l remains,

t h a t i t makes of t he o r ig ina l sentence th ree d i s t i n c t

sentences, This has no equivalent i n modern theory; it

was suggested t o Ward by the f a c t t h a t the re a r e th ree

d i s t i n c t ideas i n the mind ; the idea of John, the idea

James, and the idea of the horse. However, the strange- ,

ness o f t h i s ana lys i s may be moreapparent than r ea l :

t h e r e i s l i t t l e d i f fe rence between the statement t h a t

t h e r e a r e two terms i n the mind r e l a t e d t o a verb by

I d i s t i q c t case r e l a t i o n s and the statement t h a t t he re a r e

two nouns which each have separa te but i d e n t i c a l verb

forms a t tached t o them.

Much of the unreality of Ward's theory for the

modern reader comes from the fact that he was forever

reifying his categories whereas modern grammarians have

a highly abstract interpretation of the units of lin-

guistics: units in the deep structure obviously exist

in some sense, but the problem of how they exist has not

been the subject of discussion. It was stated above that

the difference between Ward's unusual approach to the

transitive sentence type and contemporary approaches may

be more apparent than real. This implies that the cate-

gorial analysis of his grammatical theory is of some

importance: it suggests that the selection of the main

categories of a categorial grammar is a direct reflection

of the notional importance attached to the categories of

the theorists. This importance is madeclear by Ward,

but does not seem to be noticed by some proponents of

the theory. Bar-Hillel claims that the notation repre-

sents only a way of presenting an analysis already made; 1

however, it would appear that a choice of major catego-

ries must be linked with certain theoretical presupposi-

tions. Ward's Essay makes clear the implications of the

choice of these categories, as does to a certain extent,

John Lyons' discussion "Towards a 'notional' definition

of the parts of speech.''* The work on categorial grammars

1. Bar-Hillel, op. cit., p. 47.

2. See Note 31.

is not sufficiently developed to have produced much

discussion on the implications of the choice of the noun

as the major category, but several linguists feel that

this may be a universal category of language. Ward's

arrival at this same conclusion by means of a considera-

tion of Locke's philosophy indicates that the findings

of linguists working from different philosophical stand-

points will not necessarily be different, but only that

the mode of explanation will be different.

-.

8.3, Conclusion: Ward and Locke

Vardts central achievement can be considered to b8

his adaptation of Lockets theory of ideas to a grammati-

cal theory of language. Ward was not a professional

philosopher, and there no evidence in the Essay - on Grammar

of any critical evaluation of Lockets ideas, and few spe-

cific references to the work; Hartley's dilution of ~ocke's

,philosophy was obviously acceptable to Ward, and Ward

himself had no qualms about diluting the theory further

for his own purposes, However, in spite of the dilution

andbsregard for the philosophical issues raised in the

Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Ward's reading of

Locke had two consequences of fundamental importance. / The first and greatest was undoubtedly that he was to

seek for explanations of the surface structure of language

at a distinct and deeper level; the second was that the

nature of this level was predetermined by -the philosophi-

cal system that he was using. The first consequence gives

v!ardts Essay a claim to originality in the English gram-

matical tradition: he was proposing underlying sentences

which existed in the mind, and which were signalled by

the surface structure. The real sentences were those that

existed in the mind. Thus the language of thought was

not just a mirror of the real language in Ward's terms,

but was distinct in several ways: there were two sentences

in the mind for every transitive sentence in the surface

structure; imperatives, and interrogatives were signals

of two sentences in the mind; prepositions were signals

of underlying sentences. No such complexities had been

envisaged by Locke, but they arose from Ward's attempt

to adapt Lockets account of ideas to units of language

at the sentence level, rather than just at the word level.

The Port Royal grammar had proposed underlying sentences

for adjective-substantive structures, but had not gene-

rally dealt with the problems of any construction other

than the Substantive + Be + Adjective construction; (Participle

thus Lockets schema of underlying levels was much more

I complex than that envisaged by Arnauld. In English

linguistics the relations between language and thought

had been discussed to some extent, and the realization

I

that lantuage and thought did not correspond perfectly

had been the impetus for speculation on universal lang-

I uage. The lack of correspondence, however, had never

motivated anyone to attempt to state the rules that link

the level of thought to a natural language.

Ward was the first to see the function of grammar

as that of accounting for the link between the process

of thinking and the surface phonological form of lanpage.

That he attempted to describe this link may be largely - -

explained by the fact that Locke had provided him with

an analysis of the thought process, or the formation .

bf ideas, which he could use as the starting point of

his analysis.

This leads us to the second point about Ward's

grammar, and that is that the nature of his notions of

the deep level was predetermined by the philosophical

system he was using. Wzrd set out tb explain the relation

of language to thought, to explain the general principles

on which language was constructed so that there wbuld be

reasoned foundation to grammar. His model of the thought

processgs was essentially that of Locke; he had the

1. Cf. Para. 2.1.

Engl ish language, and Lockets account b f t h e mind; h i s

t a s k w a s t o account f o r one i n terms of t h e o the r . He

w a s r e s t r i c t e d by h i s dec i s ion t o keep t h e t r a d i t i o n a l

terms of grammar, but h i s g r e a t e s t r e s t r i c t i o n l a y i n

adopt ing Locke's scheme as h i s s t a r t i n g po in t . However

s u r e Locke and Ward may have been t h a t Lockets system

was a c o r r e c t account of r e a l i t y , we can s e e (admit ted ly

w i t h h i n d s i g h t ) , t h a t t h e r e a r e good reasons f o r r e j e c t -

i n g Lockets account. We a r e a l s o aware t h a t any present-

day theorx of t h e mind t h a t we a r e f a m i l i a r wi th , and

f i n d a t t r a c t i v e , as Ward d id Lockets , i s only a theory ,

and cannbt be taken as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t t o develop a

system of grammatical r u l e s . We t h e r e f o r e start wi th

t h e d a t a of language, and seek t o f i n d r u l e s t h a t w i l l

r e l a t e apparen t ly d i v e r s e d a t a ; t h e more genera l a r u l e

i s , t h e more l i k e l y t h a t i t i s a genuine i n s i g h t i n t o

t h e workings of language. Rules today a r e s a i d t o r e q u i r e

' empi r i ca l v a l i d i t y ' ; t h i s i s a way of saying t h a t t h e i r

j u s t i f i c a t i o n must stem from t h e f a c t t h a t they account

f o r d i v e r s e forms i n lnnguage. When we have formulated

such a r u l e , i t i s o f t e n t h e case t h a t we have done so

by p y s i t i n g a deeper l e v e l of language from which t h e

s u r f a c e l e v e l i s derived. The deeper l e v e l i s an

a b s t r a . c t i o n which i s t e n t a t i v e l y accepted because i t

accoun t s f o r language d a t a . But Ward d id no t work from

t h e data of language t o fbrmulate a b s t r a c t deep l e v e l s .

H i s deep l e v e l w a s a l r eady i n ex i s t ence , provided by

Locke, and he only had t o produce r u l e s which would l i n k

p a r t i c u l a r s u r f a c e forms t o t h e deep l e v e l . Hence he w a s

a b l e t o p o s i t many a r b i t r a r y s o l u t i o n s t o problems by

say ing t h a t t h e r e would have t o be r u l e s which connect

a c e r t a i n base form t o a c e r t a i n su r face form. He d id

n o t have t o formulate t h e r u l e s i n every case because h i s

knowledge of t h e base form was n o t der ived from t h e sur-

f a c e form,_nor cont ingent on a lmowledge of t h e r u l e s

r e l a t i n g t h e two l e v e l s . Thus Wardls deep s t r u c t u r e

d i f f e r s from c u r r e n t models of deep s t r u c t u r e i n t h a t it

i s one of p re -ex i s t ing axioms of t h e theory r a t h e r t h a n

a c o n s t r u c t of t h e theory. It a l s o d i f f e r s i n t h a t i n

c u r r e n t theory a l l l e v e l s of language a r e a b s t r a c t l e v e l s .

Ward made h i s deep l e v e l a l e v e l r e a l l y e x i s t i n g i n t h e

mind of t h e speaker. Locke's i d e a s were very r e a l t h i n g s ,

and H a r t l e y l s theory of a s s o c i a t i o n made i t p o s s i b l e t o

r e l a t e them t o t h e l i n g u i s t i c forms. Ward was proposing

n o t only grammatical r u l e s but an incompletely formulated I but n e v e r t h e l e s s r e a l neurologica l model of speech.

Modern t h e o r i s t s seek t o expla in language, o r g ive an

account which s a t i s f i e s t h e p a r t i c u l a r enqu i r i e s o f

t w e n t i e t h century man. They a r e conscious of t h e l i m i -

t a t i o n s of t h e i r theories--or should be--and r e a l i z e

that proposals are tentat'ive and likely to be superseded

by more adequate models. No such doubts entered L'ardls

mind. Me was confident of the validity and reality of

his units. In his certainty and in his concretization

of what we see as abstractions, he was no different from

his contemporaries: although the categories of grammar

were under constant examination and reappraisal in the 1

eighteenth century, the categorymes remained as evi-

dence of some supposedly real entities: the parts of

speech. They were seen as existing independently of

language, hence the ready transfer of them from one lang-

uage to another; case and tense distinctions were equally

reified. Ward is as guilty of the reification of cate-

gories as any other grammarian, and extends it to levels

other than the surface level.

It is Ward's extension of the area of language study,

and hence also of reification, that makes him such an

important figure in the eighteenth century; it is the

reification itself of the deep structure which makes his

analy,sis so unacceptable to modern linguists. His Essay

serves as a warning to modern linguists of the dangers

of concentrating on rules which connect a pre-established

1. Michael's dissertation attempts to show the amount of reappraisal and examination beneath the apparent uni- formity of the Lhglish tradition.

base component with the surface structure, rather than

reco~mizing that ultimately the only acceptable input

for the generation of rules is the language itself. When

rules are derived which account for language data and fit

the constructs produced by other similarly formed rules,

then progress is being made towards producing a general

theory. Once the underlying abstractions (or real enti-

ties in Ward's case) have become axiomatic, linguistics

ceases to be a scientific investigation of language, and

becomes, as it has in the Essay on Grammar a sophisticated - - -

but unproductive form of game playing.

Ward stands near the close of the Priscian tradition

in grammar (no new theories of grammar in the tradition

were to emerge in the following, years, although countless

compilations were published), and almost on the thresh-

hold of modern linguistics (he was writing justtwenty

years before Sir Villiam Jones was to give his lecture

on Sanskrit). He is significant in terms of the older

tradition in that he considerably enlarges the area of

interest: the relation of language and thought was not /

one to one, and he idicated that it was the grammarians'

task to state the nature of the relationship between the

two levels. He is mainly significant for modern theo-

reticians in that he draws attention to the dangers of

reifying hypotheses and , treafing them as axiomatic, consequently limiting the scope of investigation, His

use of Locke was undoubtedly tremendously productive in

terms of the contemporary approaches to grammar, but it

again serves as a warning that although modern philo-

sophical insights can have a liberating influence on

linguistics, they serve as no panacea and inevitably

turn out to have severe limitations of their own insofar

as the development of linguistic science is concerned,

I

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