Whither Asian Defense Diplomacy? The Evolving Institutional Landscape of Military and Security...
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Whither Asian Defense Diplomacy? The Evolving Institutional Landscape of Military and Security Dialogue Daniel H. Katz Ph.D. candidate, Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) LKYSPP Public Policy in Asia PhD Conference 26-27 May 2014
Whither Asian Defense Diplomacy? The Evolving Institutional Landscape of Military and Security Dialogue Daniel H. Katz Ph.D. candidate, Strategic Studies,
Whither Asian Defense Diplomacy? The Evolving Institutional
Landscape of Military and Security Dialogue Daniel H. Katz Ph.D.
candidate, Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS) LKYSPP Public Policy in Asia PhD Conference 26-27
May 2014
Slide 2
Outline of Presentation Introduction Theoretical Framework
Methodological Details Findings I: The Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD)
Findings II: The ADMM-Plus Findings III: The Jakarta International
Defense Dialogue (JIDD) Discussion Conclusion/Public Policy
Implications
Slide 3
Introduction The end of the Cold War ushered in a dramatically
different geopolitical context, particularly in Asia. No organizing
principle or comprehensive regional security architecture emerged.
Closest approximation was the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
established in 1994. Three new institutions focused on defense
diplomacy have been established, a clear indication of a desire for
robust dialogue mechanisms between defense and national security
establishments.
Slide 4
Theoretical Framework Theoretical justification of paper
evaluating accuracy of realist claims that the balance of power (or
threat) are the sole determinants of state behavior in the
international state system. If realists (Mearsheimer, Fearon) are
correct, dialogue between states is merely cheap talk. Seeming
enthusiasm and proliferation of regional security dialogue in Asia
in the post-Cold War period would seem to belie realist claims.
Liberal and neoliberal IR theorists (Nye, Keohane et al.) assert
that economic interdependence and other forces work to mitigate
conflict. Constructivist IR theorists (Wendt, Finnemore et al.)
argue that norm transmission and socialization, primarily at the
international level, exert influence on state actors. The
argument/framework adopted in this paper aligns most closely with
the defensive realists. In other words, defense diplomacy can
mitigate conflict insofar as these interactions convey useful
information about the intentions of other states and does not
merely represent cheap talk. The military balance alone does not
determine the likelihood of conflict.
Slide 5
Methodological Details Case-study method, whereby same research
questions asked of multiple cases Sources: 1) authors personal
involvement with planning of 12 th SLD in 2013 and research at
IISS-Asia on history of SLD 2) secondary literature (albeit
limited) on SLD, ADMM- Plus and JIDD Dearth of scholarly attention
to these defense diplomatic processes, in which there is consistent
senior-level ministerial involvement by regional and extra-regional
states, constitutes a significant gap in the literature.
Slide 6
Findings I: The SLD Launched in 2002 by a nongovernmental,
London-headquartered think tank, the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS) SLD held annually in Singapore at the
Shangri-La Hotel. 2014 SLD (30 May-1 June) is the 13 th incarnation
Two to three days of speeches, plenary sessions and bilateral
meetings Number of regional and extra-regional defense ministers
participating in the SLD has consistently increased. However, China
only sent its defense minister in 2011 despite sustained efforts by
the IISS to ensure high-level Chinese participation. The U.S.
Secretary of Defense has attended consistently since 2004. First
inclusive regional defense diplomacy institution in Asia. Sherpa
meeting since 2013 to frame issues for the next SLD. Valued for
private bilateral, trilateral and other meetings on the sidelines.
Some deliverables have emerged (e.g.-Eyes in the Sky).
Slide 7
Findings II: The ADMM-Plus First met in 2010 and evolved out of
the earlier ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) begun in 2006.
ASEAN organizes the ADMM and ADMM-Plus. The Plus stands for eight
ASEAN dialogue partners: Australia, China, India, Japan, New
Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the U.S. Two ADMM-Plus gatherings
have occurred thus far2010 in Hanoi and 2013 in Brunei. Several
Expert Working Groups (EWGs) focused on functional cooperation in 5
area maritime security, counter-terrorism, HADR, PKOs, and military
medicine. Distinguished from the other institutions by its
operational character. Table-top exercises on military medicine and
maritime security in July 2011 and September 2012, respectively. A
June 2013 HADR/MM exercise in Brunei involved more than 3,000
personnel and military assets from many ADMM-Plus countries.
However, there is avoidance of contentious territorial disputes in
favor of what some deride as the low-hanging fruit of HARDR/MM
exercises.
Slide 8
Findings III: The JIDD Annual gathering in Jakarta since 2011.
Indonesian government initiative organized by Indonesian Defense
University. Indonesia, already seen as a middle power and an
important actor in ASEAN, clearly wishes to places its own imprint
on the evolution of regional security diplomacy. Similar format to
the SLD. In March 2014, approximately 500 delegates from 46
countries attended the JIDD. Defense expo on sidelines. Unclear
whether there is an ongoing work program associated with the JIDD.
Appears not to have working groups (like the ADMM-Plus) or a
preparatory meeting (like the SLD). Reasonably high level of
representation by attending countries. China sent a Deputy Chief of
the General Staff, Admiral Sun Jianguo, to the 2014 JIDD,
equivalent to the rank of the Chinese defense official who normally
leads the Chinese delegation to the SLD.
Slide 9
Discussion Between allies or partners, defense diplomacy often
involves capacity-building, information-sharing and similar
activities. Between potential adversaries, defense diplomacy is
more suitably termed strategic engagement (Cottey and Forster,
2004). Range of collaborative activities between these actors more
limited due to mistrust and suspicion of intentions and
capabilities. Though the three institutions examined in this paper
are slightly different in organization and structure, they share
common goal of seeking to maintain a stable regional order. The
militaries of regional actors are operating in increasingly crowded
seas and skies. The possibility for miscalculation and accident
remains. The rise of defense diplomacy institutions in the
Asia-Pacific is an encouraging sign. Countries in the region are
demonstrating their commitment to dialogue and efforts to foster a
region that is and will be among the most important (economically,
militarily and on other dimensions) in the world.
Slide 10
Conclusion/Public Policy Implications Defense diplomacy
institutions are developing and proliferating in the Asia-Pacific
region. For example, Malaysia convened a Putrajaya Forum in
conjunction with the Defence Services Asia (DSA) programming.
Additional efforts may emerge in the future. There is a risk of
competitive institutional dynamics emerging. From a public policy
and organizational perspective, a more unified Asian defense
diplomacy architecture would be desirable. A stronger and more
robust dialogue could emerge from increased connectivity among the
diplomatic platforms. Bilateral and multilateral defense diplomacy
can and should be complementary. However, defense ministries ought
to carefully consider their annual defense diplomacy engagements.
Defense ministers and heads of state should seize the challenges
and opportunities presented by overlapping defense diplomacy
architectures.