WHIRLYBIRDS, U.S. Marine Helicopters in · PDF fileU.S. Marine Helicopters in Korea ... combatant evacuation operations an unmanned American transport ... ducted noncombatant air-sea

Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series

WHIRLYBIRDSU.S. Marine Helicopters

in Koreaby Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Retired

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J.Brown, USMCR (Ret), is a

freelance writer, a high schoolfootball coach, and an educa-tional consultant. The author ofseveral official histories (A BriefHistory of the 14th Marines,With Marines in OperationProvide Comfort, and WithMarine Forces Afloat in DesertShield and Desert Storm), hewas also a contributing essayist for the best-selling book,The Marines, and was the sole author of A Few GoodMen: The Fighting Fifth Marines. After almost four yearsactive duty from 1968 to 1971, Brown returned to teach-ing high school for the next three decades; intermittent-ly, he served as an activated reservist traveling to Koreaamong other places. He is a combat veteran of both theVietnam and Persian Gulf conflicts. He spent 20 years asa reservist with Mobilization Training Unit DC 7, theReserve unit that supports the History and MuseumsDivision. Lieutenant Colonel Brown commanded thetraining unit before retiring from the Marine CorpsReserve in 1996. He is the author of an earlier pamphletin this series, Counteroffensive: U.S. Marines fromPohang to No Name Line.

SourcesThe most important sources used in

preparing the pamphlet are the various offi-cial Service histories and several mono-graphs produced by the Marine Corps aswell as primary documents and oral historyinterviews held by the Marine CorpsHistorical Center located in Washington,D.C. Selected secondary works were alsoused to provide context and technical infor-mation.

The starting point for this study ofMarine Corps helicopter operations inKorea was the five volume History of U.S.Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953including: Lynn Montross and CaptNicholas A. Canzona, The Pusan Perimeter,v. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch,G-3 Division, HQMC, 1954); Lynn Montrossand Capt Nicholas A. Canzona, The Inchon-Seoul Campaign, v. 2 (Washington, D.C.:Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC,1955); Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A.Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign,v. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch,G-3 Division, HQMC, 1957); LynnMontross, Maj Hubard D. Kuokka, andMajor Norman W. Hicks, The East-CentralFront, v. 4 (Washington, D.C.: HistoricalBranch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1962); LtColPat Meid and Maj James M. Yingling,

Operations in West Korea, v. 5 (Washing-ton, D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC,1972). Other official histories consultedwere: Robert F. Futrell, The United StatesAir Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (Washing-ton, D.C.: Office of Air Force History,1983); and James A. Field, Jr., History ofUnited States Naval Operations: Korea(Washington, D.C.: Navy History Division,1962).

Monographs used included: Capt JohnC. Chapin, Fire Brigade: U.S. Marines in thePusan Perimeter (Washington, D.C.: Historyand Museums Division, HQMC, 2000);LtCol Kenneth J. Clifford, Progress andPurpose: A Developmental History of theU.S. Marine Corps (Washington, D.C.:History and Museums Division, HQMC,1973); MajGen John P. Condon, Corsairs ToPanthers: U.S. Marine Aviation in Korea(Washington, D.C.: History and MuseumsDivision, HQMC, 2002); LtCol Eugene W.Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, 1946-1962 (Washington, D.C.: History andMuseums Division, HQMC, 1976); LtColGary W. Parker, A History of MarineMedium Helicopter Squadron 161 (Wash-ington, D.C.: History and MuseumsDivision, HQMC, 1978); and LtCol Gary W.Parker and Maj Frank M. Batha, Jr., AHistory of Marine Observation SquadronSix (Washington, D.C.: History and

Museums Division, HQMC, 1982).Other books reviewed included: Cdr

Malcolm W. Cagle and Cdr Frank A.Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis:U.S. Naval Institute, 1957); Col Robert D.Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea: The U.S. MarineCorps, 1775-1962 (Annapolis: U.S. NavalInstitute, 1962); Robert Jackson, Air WarKorea (Osceola, WI: Motorbooks Inter-national, 1998); Allan R. Millett, SemperFidelis: The History of the United StatesMarine Corps (New York: Macmillan, 1980);Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky (NewYork: Harper and Brothers, 1954); WayneMutza, H-13 Sioux (Carrollton, TX:Squadron/Signal Books, 1995); Edwin H.Simmons, The United States Marines: TheFirst Two Hundred Years (New York:Viking, 1974); Gordon Swanborough andPeter M. Bowers, United States NavyAircraft Since 1911 (London: PutnamAeronautical Books, 1976); and Warren R.Young, The Helicopters (Alexandria, VA:Time-Life Books, 1982).

History and Museums Division oral his-tory transcripts provided observations by:LtCol Clifford V. Brokaw III; Capt NormanG. Ewers; Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk; CaptAndrew L. McVicars; Capt Gene W.Morrison; Maj Elton Mueller; Capt ClarenceW. Parkins; 1stLt John L. Scott; and 2dLtPatrick G. Sivert.

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in theKorean War era, is published for the education and training of Marines bythe History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance ofthe 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have been defrayed in partby contributions from members of the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.To plan and coordinate the Korean War commemorative events and activi-ties of the Sea Services, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard haveformed the Sea Services Korean War Commemoration Committee, chairedby the Director, Navy Staff. For more information about the Sea Services’commemorative effort, please contact the Navy-Marine Corps Korean WarCommemoration Coordinator at (202) 433-4223/3085, FAX 433-7265(DSN288-7265), E-Mail: [email protected], Website:www.history.usmc.mil.

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR, KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Charles R. Smith

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist

Catherine A. Kerns, Visual Information Specialist

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center1254 Charles Morris Street SE

Washington Navy Yard DC 20374-50402003

PCN 190 00410 500

n Sunday, 25 June1950, CommunistNorth Korea unex-pectedly invaded itssouthern neighbor,

the American-backed Republic ofKorea (ROK). The poorly equip-ped ROK Army was no match forthe well prepared North KoreanPeople’s Army (NKPA) whosearmored spearheads quickly thrustacross the 38th Parallel. Thestunned world helplessly lookedon as the out-numbered and out-gunned South Koreans were quick-ly routed. With the fall of the capi-tal city of Seoul imminent,President Harry S. Truman orderedGeneral of the Army DouglasMacArthur, Commander in Chief,Far East, in Tokyo, to immediatelypull all American nationals in SouthKorea out of harm’s way. Duringthe course of the resultant non-combatant evacuation operationsan unmanned American transportplane was destroyed on the groundand a flight of U.S. Air Force aircraftwere buzzed by a North Korean AirForce plane over the Yellow Seawithout any shots being fired. On 27July, an American combat air patrol

protecting Kimpo Airfield near theSouth Korean capital activelyengaged menacing North Koreanplanes and promptly downed threeof the five Soviet-built Yak fighters.Soon thereafter American militaryforces operating under the aus-pices of the United NationsCommand (UNC) were committedto thwart a Communist takeover ofSouth Korea. Thus, only four yearsand nine months after V-J Daymarked the end of World War II,the United States was once againinvolved in a shooting war in Asia.

The United Nations issued aworldwide call to arms to haltCommunist aggression in Korea,and America’s armed forces beganto mobilize. Marines were quick torespond. Within three weeks ahastily formed provisional Marinebrigade departed California andheaded for the embattled Far East.Among the aviation units on boardthe U.S. Navy task force steamingwest was a helicopter detachment,the first rotary-wing aviation unitspecifically formed for combatoperations in the history of theMarine Corps. Although few real-ized it at the time, this small band ofdedicated men and their primitiveflying machines were about to rad-ically change the face of militaryaviation. Arguably, the actions ofthese helicopter pilots in Koreamade U.S. Marines the progenitorsof vertical envelopment operations,as we know them today.

Helicopters in the Marine Corps

There is great irony in the fact

that the Marine Corps was the lastAmerican military Service toreceive helicopters, but was thefirst to formulate, test, and imple-ment a doctrine for the use ofrotary-wing aircraft as an integralelement in air-ground combatoperations. The concept of mann-ed rotary-wing flight can be tracedback to Leonardo da Vinci’sRenaissance-era sketches, butmore than four centuries passedbefore vertical takeoffs and landingsby heavier-than-air craft became areality. The Marines tested arotary-wing aircraft in Nicaraguaduring the Banana Wars, but thatexperiment revealed the PitcarinOP-1 autogiro was not ready formilitary use. Autogiros used rotarywings to remain aloft, but they didnot use spinning blades to get air-borne or to power the aircraft soautogiros were airplanes not heli-copters. Some aviation enthusiasts,however, assert that the flight dataaccumulated and rotor technologydeveloped for autogiros markedthe beginning Marine Corps heli-copter development. It was notuntil 1939 that the first practicalAmerican helicopter, aircraft de-signer Igor I. Sikorsky’s VS-300,finally moved off the drawingboard and into the air. The U.S.Army, Navy, and Coast Guardeach acquired helicopters duringWorld War II. The bulk of themwere used for pilot training, but afew American-built helicoptersparticipated in special combatoperations in Burma and thePacific. These early machines con-ducted noncombatant air-sea res-

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WHIRLYBIRDSU.S. Marine Helicopters in Korea

by Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown, USMCR (Ret)

ON THE COVER: A Sikorsky HRS-1transport helicopter from HMR-161sets down behind 1st Marine Divisionlines to pick up waiting Marines.Department of Defense Photo(USMC) A159970

AT LEFT: Girded for battle, Marinesride a tense 18 miles by helicopterbefore the first “airphibious” landing inhistory successfully deposited them ona Korean hilltop. Department ofDefense Photo (USMC) A156716

cue, medical evacuation, andhumanitarian missions during thewar as well.

In 1946, the Marine Corpsformed a special board headed byMajor General Lemuel C. Shep-herd, Jr., to study the impact ofnuclear weapons on amphibiousoperations. In accordance with therecommendations made by theShepherd Board in early 1947,

Marine Corps Schools at Quantico,Virginia, began to formulate a newdoctrine, eventually termed “verti-cal assault,” which relied uponrotary-wing aircraft as an alternativeto ship-to-shore movement by sur-face craft. The following year,Marine Corps Schools issued amimeographed pamphlet entitled,“Amphibious Operations—Em-ployment of Helicopters (Tent-

ative).” This 52-page tome was the31st school publication onamphibious operations, so it tookthe short title “Phib-31.”Concurrently, the Marine Corpsformed a developmental heli-copter squadron to test the practi-cality of Phib-31’s emerging theo-ries. This formative unit, ColonelEdward C. Dyer’s Marine Heli-copter Squadron 1 (HMX-1), stoodup in December 1947 and was col-located with Marine CorpsSchools. The new squadron’s pri-mary missions were to developtechniques and tactics in conjunc-tion with the ship-to-shore move-ment of assault troops in amphibi-ous operations, and evaluate asmall helicopter as replacementfor fixed-wing observation air-planes. Among the officers as-signed to HMX-1 was the MarineCorps’ first officially sanctionedhelicopter pilot, Major Armond H.DeLalio, who learned to fly heli-copters in 1944 and had overseenthe training of the first Marine heli-copter pilots as the operations offi-cer of Navy Helicopter Develop-ment Squadron VX-3 at LakehurstNaval Air Station, New Jersey.

In February 1948, the MarineCorps took delivery of its first heli-copters when a pair of SikorskyHO3S-1s arrived at Quantico.These four-seat aircraft featured anarrow “greenhouse” cabin, anoverhead three-blade rotor system,and a long-tail housing thatmounted a small vertical anti-torque rotor. This basic outlinebore such an uncanny resem-blance to the Anisoptera sub-species of flying insects that theBritish dubbed their newly pur-chased Sikorsky helicopters “drag-onflies.” There was no Service ormanufacturer’s authorized nick-name for the HO3S-1, but the mostcommon unofficial Americanappellations of the day were“whirlybirds,” “flying windmills,”

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Pitcarin OP-1 Autogiro

The first rotary-winged aircraft used by naval avia-tion was not a helicopter. It was an autogiro, an air-plane propelled by a normal front-mounted aircraft

engine but kept aloft by rotating overhead wings, a phe-nomenon known as “autorotation.” Although ratherungainly looking due their stubby upturned wings, largetails, and drooping rotors, autogiros took well to the air.Their ability to “land on a dime” made them favorites atair shows and an aggressive publicity campaign toutedthem as “flying autos, the transportation of the future.”Autogiros, however, turned out to be neither a militarynor a commercial success.

The aircraft itself was an odd compilation of a normalfront-mounted aircraft engine used to generate thrustand three overhead free-spinning blades attached to a cen-ter-mounted tripod to provide lift. The fuselage includ-ed a pair of stubby wings that supported the landing gearand had a semi-standard elongated tail assembly.Typical of the day, it had an open cockpit.

Although a rotary-winged aircraft, the OP-1 was not ahelicopter. The engine was used to start the rotors mov-ing but was then disengaged and connected to the pro-peller to deliver thrust. A speed of about 30 miles per hourwas needed to generate lift and maintained for con-trolled flight. The OP-1 could not hover, it required con-ventional engine power to take off and move forward inthe air; the plane could, however, make a vertical land-ing. This unique feature made the OP-1 attractive to themilitary.

The specific autogiro model first tested by the MarineCorps was the OP-1 built by Harold F. Pitcarin, whowould later found Eastern Airways. His company was alicensed subsidiary of a Spanish firm. All American auto-giros were based upon designs formulated by Spanishnobleman Juan de la Cierva. His first successful flight wasmade near Madrid in 1923. More than 500 autogiros flewworldwide during the next decade. Although his air-

planes never lived up to his high expectations, de la Ciervadid develop rotor technology and recorded aerodynam-ic data later applied by helicopter designers IgorSikorsky and Frank Piasecki.

The Navy purchased three Pitcarin autogiros forextensive field-testing and evaluation in 1931. The onlycarrier tests were conducted on 23 September of that year,but the OP-1’s performance was virtually identical tothat of carrier-borne biplanes then in use. The Marinestook one OP-1 to Nicaragua to test it under combat con-ditions. Again, its performance was disappointing. Thepilots of VJ-6M noted it lacked both payload and range.The only practical use they found was evaluation ofpotential landing areas. This was not enough reason toincorporate the OP-1 into the Marine inventory. Overall,the OP-1 was described as “an exasperating contrap-tion,” not fit for military use. Further trials of a winglessautogiro in 1935 revealed no improvement, so director ofaviation Major Roy S. Geiger recommended againstadoption of that aircraft type.

In the barnstorming days between the World Wars,autogiros proved to be the ultimate novelty attraction.Aviator Charles A. Lindbergh often put on demonstrations,aviatrix Amelia Earhart set an altitude record in one, andSecretary of the Navy Charles Francis Adams flew in anautogiro to join President Herbert C. Hoover at an isolatedfishing camp in Virginia. The Royal Air Force actually usedautogiros for convoy escort and observation duringWorld War II, and the Soviet Union developed its ownautogiro.

Although the OP-1 never became a mainstreamMarine aircraft and was not a true helicopter, some avi-ation enthusiasts assert that the technology and datadeveloped by de la Cierva was crucial for rotary-wingedflight. They, therefore, make the case that the OP-1should be considered the progenitor of today’s heli-copters.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 528139

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and “pinwheels.” The HO3S-1 hada cruising speed of less than 100miles per hour, a range of about 80miles, could lift about 1,000pounds, and mounted simpleinstrumentation that limited theHO3S to clear weather and day-light operations. This very restrict-

ed flight envelope was acceptablebecause these first machines wereto be used primarily for trainingand testing. They were, however,sometimes called upon for practicalmissions as well. In fact, the firstoperational use of a Marine heli-copter occurred when a Quantico-

based HO3S led a salvage party toan amphibious jeep mired in anearby swamp.

The first Marine helicopter oper-ational deployment occurred inMay 1948 when five HMX-1 “pin-wheels” flying off the escort carri-er Palau (CVE 122) conducted 35

The Visionaries

The wake of the World War II, with its ominousspecter of nuclear weapons, forced the MarineCorps to rethink existing amphibious doctrine.

The conclusion was that previous methods of ship-to-shore movement were no longer sufficient to ensure a suc-cessful landing so alternative methods had to be devel-oped. Several options looked promising, but the only onethat stood the test of time and combat was verticalenvelopment—the use of helicopters to move troopsand supplies.

In 1946, Commandant Alexander A. Vandegrift—atthe urging of Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, the“Gray Eagle” of Marine aviation who had just witnessedpost-war nuclear tests—formed a special board culledfrom Marine Corps headquarters to study existing tacticsand equipment then make recommendations for restruc-turing the Fleet Marine Force. Assistant CommandantLemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., a graduate of Virginia MilitaryInstitute, who was arguably the Marines’ most innovativedivision commander in the Pacific, headed the board.Shepherd was an excellent choice because he was botha traditionalist and a visionary who would later becomeCommandant. Other members of the board includedMajor General Field Harris, the director of Marine avia-tion, and Brigadier General Oliver P. Smith, the head ofplans and operations division. All three men would bereunited in Korea in 1950 where they would put into prac-tice the revolutionary doctrines they set in motion;Shepherd as the commanding general of Fleet MarineForce, Pacific, Harris as commanding general of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, and Smith as commanding gener-al of the 1st Marine Division. Two colonels assigned tothe board secretariat were particularly influential,Edward C. Dyer and Merrill B. Twining. Dyer, a NavalAcademy graduate and decorated combat pilot, wasmaster of all things aeronautical while Merrill Twining, ahighly regarded staff officer, handled operational theory.Neither a formal member of the board nor its secretariatbut keeping close tabs on what transpired was BrigadierGeneral Gerald C. Thomas, Vandegrift’s trusted chief ofstaff. Dyer eventually commanded the first Marine heli-copter squadron and Thomas replaced Smith as 1stMarine Division commander in Korea.

Doctrinal development for vertical assault was done at

Marine Corps Schools located at Quantico, Virginia.First, a board headed by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E.Hogaboom laid out what was needed in a documenttitled “Military Requirements for Ship-to-ShoreMovement of Troops and Cargo.” Even though no suit-able aircraft were yet available, the thinkers atQuantico came up with new doctrine published asAmphibious Training Manual 31, “AmphibiousOperations—-Employment of Helicopters (Tentative).”One of the drivers of this project was LieutenantColonel Victor H. Krulak, a tough former paratrooperwho had been wounded in the Pacific but was alsoknown for his high intellect and an unsurpassed abili-ty to get things done. He was a prolific writer and ademanding taskmaster who kept his finger on the pulseof several vital projects including helicopter develop-ment.

Despite the nearly unlimited future potential of heli-copters for assault and support of landing forces, therewas ingrained resistance to such a revolutionary concept.Most young pilots wanted to fly sleek jets and dogfightenemy aces, not manhandle temperamental aircraft todeliver troops and supplies; experienced fliers werecomfortable with aircraft they already knew well andwere reluctant to give up their trusted planes; and crit-ics claimed helicopters were too slow and vulnerable.Twining took the lead in addressing these problemswhen he pointed out the Marine Corps had far morepilots than planes and noted that the wishes of theindividual were always subservient to the needs of theMarine Corps. He also asserted that the speed and vul-nerability of helicopters should not be properly com-pared to fixed-wing aircraft but to surface landing craft(helicopters were both faster and more agile than boatsor amphibious tractors).

All early helicopter advocates were highly motivatedand dedicated men. Their achievements and foresightkept the Marine Corps’ reputation for innovation alivedespite severe budgetary constraints and concurrentinter-Service unification battles. In fact, many of themen also played key roles in the “Chowder Society,”whose behind-the-scenes work successfully protectedMarine Corps interests during the bitter “unificationbattles” after the World War II.

flights to land 66 men and severalhundred pounds of communica-tions equipment at Camp Lejeune,North Carolina’s Onslow Beachduring amphibious command postexercise Packard II. As the yearprogressed, HMX-1’s aircraft com-plement increased by six when theMarine Corps took delivery of twonew types of helicopters, one BellHTL-2 and five Piasecki HRP-1s.The Bell HTL, often called the“eggbeater,” was a side-by-sidetwo-seat trainer that could fly atabout 85 miles per hour. It hadtwo distinctive features, a roundedPlexiglas “fishbowl” cockpit can-opy and a single overhead two-bladed rotor. This model had fourlanding wheels and a fabric-cov-ered tail assembly, although laterversions of the HTL mounted skidsand left the tail structure bare. Thelarger Piasecki HRP-1 was a 10-place troop transport whose tan-dem-mounted rotors could push italong at about 100 miles per hour.

The aircraft’s unique bent fuselage(overlapping propeller radii meantthe tail rotor had to be mountedhigher than the forward rotor)gave it the nickname “FlyingBanana.” Unfortunately, it was atemperamental machine consid-ered too fragile to be assigned tocombat squadrons. The HRP-1 wasinstead relegated to use as a testbed and demonstration aircraftuntil a more capable transporthelicopter could be procured.

During the next two yearsHMX-1 conducted numerous ex-periments, tests, exercises, demon-strations, and public appearances.Helicopters soon became crowdpleasers at air shows and wereinvariably the center of attentionfor dignitaries visiting Quantico.As a result of numerous tacticaltests and performance evaluations,Colonel Dyer recommended thatlight helicopters should be added toMarine observation squadrons.Headquarters agreed, and it was

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National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A130996

BGen Edward C. Dyer, here receivingthe Legion of Merit for meritorious ser-vice as the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing’sG-3 during the Inchon-Seoul cam-paign, was one of the most influentialmen involved in the adoption of thehelicopter by the Marine Corps. Anaval aviator, he helped to bring theconcept to reality by formulating doc-trine and then commanding HMX-1 atQuantico, Virginia.

One of five Sikorsky HO3S-1s from HMX-1 prepares to landon the Palau (CVE 122) during Operation Packard II in May1948. This was the first test to determine the value of the heli-

copter in the movement of assault troops in an amphibiousoperation.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC)

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decided that an even mix of heli-copters and airplanes should beadopted as soon as enough heli-copters and trained personnelwere available. Unfortunately,teething problems grounded eachof the helicopter types at one timeor another, and it was apparentmore reliable aircraft with muchgreater lift capacity would be nec-essary to make vertical assault atrue option in the future. Marinehelicopter detachments participatedin exercises Packard III (1949) andPackard IV (1950). This time peri-od also featured many milestones.Among them were the first overseasdeployment of a Marine helicopterpilot when Captain Wallace D.Blatt flew an HO3S-1 borrowedfrom the U.S. Navy during the

American withdrawal from Chinain February 1949; the first unitdeployment in support of a fleetexercise occurred in February1950; and the largest single heli-copter formation to that time tookplace when six HRPs, six HO3Ss,and one HTL flew by Quantico’sreviewing stand in June 1950. Bythat time, Lieutenant Colonel JohnF. Carey, a Navy Cross holder whoa dozen years later would lead thefirst Marine aviation unit sent toVietnam, commanded HMX-1.The squadron mustered 23 officersand 89 enlisted men; its equip-ment list showed nine HRPs, sixHO3Ss, and three HTLs. Since itsinception the Marine helicopterprogram had garnered many lau-rels, but several vital items

remained on the agenda—notablythe creation of helicopter squad-rons for service with the FleetMarine Force and the procurementof a combat-ready transport heli-copter. This was the status of theMarine Corps helicopter programwhen the North Korean unexpect-edly burst across the 38th Parallel.

Called to Action

The commitment of Americancombat troops to Korea on 30 Juneset off alarm bells throughout theMarine Corps. Although the official“word” had yet to be passed, with-in a few hours of the North Koreaninvasion most Marines surmised itwould not be long before theywould be on their way to war.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A55366

Piasecki HRP-1 “Flying Bananas” in action during a BasicSchool pre-graduation field problem at Quantico, Virginia.The HRP was the first Marine Corps transport helicopter,

but technical constraints limited it to demonstration andtraining use and no HRPs saw action in Korea.

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General MacArthur’s formal re-quest for a Marine regimental com-bat team and supporting aviationfinally filtered through officialchannels on 2 July, and five dayslater the 1st Provisional MarineBrigade was activated. BrigadierGeneral Edward A. Craig’s 6,534-

man unit included the 5th Marinesas its ground combat element andthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing(Forward Echelon) as its aviationcombat element.

Brigadier General Thomas J.Cushman, a veteran aviator whohad commanded an aircraft wing

in the Pacific during World War II,was “dual-hatted” as both thebrigade deputy commander andthe commander of the aviationcomponent. The 1st Brigade’s1,358-man aviation element wasbuilt around Marine Aircraft Group33 (MAG-33), which included three

Marine Helicopter Squadron 1

Marine Helicopter Squadron 1 (HMX-1) is uniquein the Marine Corps because it has several dis-tinct missions and at least three different

chains-of-command providing guidance and tasking.HMX-1 was the first Marine rotary-wing squadron. It

“stood up” at Marine Corps Airfield Quantico in Virginiaon 1 December 1947 and has been located there eversince. Its activation was the first operational move thatstarted a revolution in Marine aviation and tactical doc-trine.

One interesting insight into the Marines’ most uniqueaircraft squadron is the frequent misunderstanding of itsofficial designation. Although HMX-1 was initially taskedto develop techniques and tactics in connection withthe movement of assault troops by helicopter and toevaluate a small helicopter as an observation aircraft, the“X” does not designate “experimental” as is ofteninferred. The “Nighthawks” of HMX-1 do perform somedevelopmental tasks, but their primary missions are to pro-vide helicopter transportation for the President of theUnited States and to support Marine Corps Schools.

The squadron, initially manned by seven officers andthree enlisted men, quickly grew and mustered 18 pilotsand 81 enlisted men when the first helicopters, SikorskyHO3S-1s, arrived. These first primitive machines carriedonly the pilot and up to three lightly armed troops, butthey formed the basis for testing helicopter doctrinedescribed in Marine Corps Schools operational manualPhib-31. Eventually, HMX-1 received a mix of earlymodel helicopters with the addition of Piasecki HRPtransports and Bell HTL trainers to test doctrine before theKorean War.

On 8 May 1948, HMX-1 pilots flew from Quantico toNorfolk, Virginia, to board the escort carrier Palau (CVE122). The fly-on operation was described by HMX-1commanding officer Colonel Edward C. Dyer as a “com-plete shambles [with] sailors running all over the place inmortal danger of walking into tail rotors, and theMarines were totally disorganized as well. It was completebedlam, there was no organization and no real system [inplace].” By the next day, however, the Navy and MarineCorps were using the same basic ship-board flight oper-ations procedures practiced today—circular lines delin-eated danger areas as well as personnel staging areas and

approach lanes. Five days later, the HO3S-1s delivered 66men and several tons of equipment to Camp Lejeune,North Carolina’s Onslow Beach during command postexercise Packard II.

The following year a similar exercise employed eightHRPs, three HO3Ss, and a single HTL. During ExercisePackard III, the HRP “Flying Banana” troop transportswere carrier borne, the HTL was loaded on an LST forcommand and control, and the HO3Ss stayed ashore asrescue aircraft. The HRPs brought 230 troops and 14,000pounds of cargo ashore even though choppy seasswamped several landing craft and seriously disruptedoperational maneuvers. Many consider this superb per-formance to be the key factor in the acceptance of thehelicopter as a viable ship-to-shore method, thus pavingthe way for the integration of rotary-wing aircraft intoMarine aviation.

In 1957, HMX-1 acquired an unexpected mission—transporting the President of the United States.Helicopters were only considered for emergency situationsuntil President Dwight D. Eisenhower used an HMX-1Sikorsky HUS Sea Horse helicopter for transportationfrom his summer home on Narragansett Bay. After that,Marine helicopters were routinely used to move thePresident from the White House lawn to Andrews AirForce Base, the home of presidential plane “Air ForceOne.” That transport mission became a permanent task-ing in 1976 and continues to this day.

Currently mustering more than 700 personnel, HMX-1 is the largest Marine Corps helicopter squadron. It isdivided into two sections. The “White” side flies twounique helicopters—both specially configured Sikorskyexecutive transports, the VH-3D Sea King and the VH-60NSeahawk. The “Green” side provides basic helicopterindoctrination training for ground troops, tests new con-cepts and equipment, and assists the Marine airweapons and tactics squadron. Unlike any other Marinesquadron, HMX-1 answers to three distinct chains-of-command: the Marine Corps deputy chief of staff for airat Headquarters Marine Corps; the White House militaryoffice; and the operational test and evaluation forcecommander at Norfolk. Marine Helicopter Squadron 1 wasnot only the first such Marine unit, it also currently holdsa unique place in naval aviation.

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squadrons of propeller-drivenVought F4U Corsairs, two day fight-er squadrons (VMF-214 and -323)and one night fighter squadron(VMF[N]-513). The remaining avia-tion units included headquarters,ground support, and air controlpersonnel in addition to an obser-vation squadron.

The observation squadron as-signed to the 1st Marine Brigadewas Marine Observation Squadron6 (VMO-6) commanded by MajorVincent J. Gottschalk. Its missionwas to conduct “tactical air recon-

naissance, artillery spotting, andother flight operations within thecapabilities of assigned aircraft insupport of ground units.” This laststatement became a well-exercisedelastic clause under the innovativeguidance of Major Gottschalk, anengineering graduate of the Un-iversity of Michigan who saw sev-eral years sea duty in the Pacificbefore earning his wings. In ac-tion, Gottschalk saw to it that prac-tically any flying task in support ofground units, no matter how diffi-cult or outrageous it initially

seemed, fell within the capabilitiesof VMO-6 aircraft. He took com-mand of VMO-6 on 3 July and wasordered to be ready for overseasdeployment only four days later.

Marine observation squadronshad been serving as indispensablecomponents of Marine air-groundcombat teams since the BananaWars. Marine Observation Squad-ron 6 (then called VO-6M) wasspecifically formed for expedi-tionary duty in Nicaragua in 1928,but it was administratively trans-ferred back to Quantico for duty asa training unit about six monthslater. Marine observation squad-rons went by the wayside in 1933and did not re-emerge until opera-tions moved to the Western Pacificduring World War II. There, flyingsmall, nimble, high-wing, two-seat,single-engined Piper OE “Grass-hoppers” and similar Stinson OY-1“Sentinels” (often called Grass-hoppers as well), VMOs providedaerial reconnaissance and artillery-naval gunfire spotting as well asperforming assorted utility dutieswhile attached to various Marinedivisions. Marine ObservationSquadron 6 was reactivated in1943, saw combat action onOkinawa in 1945, and participatedin the post-war occupation ofNorth China. Upon its return to theUnited States in 1947, thesquadron flew in support of the 1stMarine Division located at CampPendleton, California. The aircraft ofVMO-6 did occasional artilleryspotting and sometimes supportedground maneuvers or performedadministrative duties, but the mainmission at Camp Pendleton was apractical one—spraying aerialinsecticide. In early June 1950,VMO-6 was assigned to the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing stationed atnearby Marine Corps Air Station ElToro.

With the arrival of the first warn-ing orders, both Camp Pendleton

Capt Victor A. Armstrong, at the controls of a Sikorsky HO3S-1 helicopter, wasthe officer-in-charge of the VMO-6 helicopter section, the first Marine helicopterunit formed for combat duty. Holder of the Distinguished Flying Cross foractions in the Pacific during World War II, he would attain the rank of majorgeneral and serve as the deputy chief of staff for air.


and Marine Corps Air Station ElToro became scenes of bedlam aspeople raced around to gathermaterials and units speedilyabsorbed new personnel. “Moth-balled” weapons and equipmentwere hurriedly broken out of stor-age and readied for use. Trainsand planes brought in personnelculled from posts and stationsacross the United States at allhours of the day and night.Arrivals were welcomed on boardand sent to their new units as soonas the handshakes finished. Spacewas at a premium, as was time.Round-the-clock work scheduleswere instituted, and the unofficialorder of the day became “sleep onthe boat!”

Major Gottschalk was originallytold to form a four-plane, four-offi-cer, and 10-enlisted man detach-ment to accompany the 1stBrigade to Korea. Although thisdetachment was far smaller than awar-strength squadron, just find-ing enough airplanes was not aneasy task. Gottschalk decided totake eight well-worn OYs toensure that four of them would beflyable—the rest would become“hangar queens” until replacementparts or new aircraft were in thesupply pipeline. While the searchfor planes and equipment gotunder way, Gottschalk’s orderswere modified on 7 July. Theentire squadron would now begoing and, in accord with earlier

recommendations, the squadronaircraft mix would also includehelicopters.

Eight officers and 30 enlistedmen were pulled out of HMX-1 atQuantico, Virginia, with orders tomove to the West Coast immedi-ately. Captain (later Major Gen-eral) Victor A. Armstrong was theofficer-in-charge of the helicopterdetachment. The other pilots in-cluded Captains George B. Farishand Eugene J. Pope, and FirstLieutenants Arthur R. Bancroft,Lloyd J. Engelhardt, Robert A.Longstaff, Max N. Nebergall, andGustave F. Lueddeke, Jr. The de-tachment’s claim to historical famewas that this was the first perma-nent assignment of a Marine heli-copter unit to the Fleet MarineForce. Contrary to some asser-tions, this detachment was neitherthe first Marine combat helicoptersquadron nor was it the first U.S.helicopter detachment to see com-bat service—a helicopter element(later designated Flight F) from theU.S. Air Force 3d Air RescueSquadron and carrier-based U.S.Navy helicopters assigned toUtility Helicopter Squadron 1 (HU-1) were already in action in Koreaby the time VMO-6 arrived.

Armstrong’s detachment madeits way from Quantico to El Toro,California, leaving on 8 July andreporting for duty on the 10th.Upon arrival, helicopter detach-ment personnel were integratedinto VMO-6, and Captain Arm-strong was named that squadron’sexecutive officer. Because only thepersonnel of the helicopter de-tachment transferred from HMX-1,aircraft had to be found. SixHO3S-1 helicopters were obtainedfrom U.S. Navy sources (two eachfrom Inyokern and Point Mugu,California, and two more from theoverhaul and maintenance facility atSan Diego). Only two days afterreporting in, the helicopter detach-

9


A Sikorsky HO3S-1 helicopter transports a passenger from one ship to another whilethe convoy carrying the VMO-6 helicopter section is enroute to Korea. Marine“Whirlybirds” flying off the carrier Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) were routinely usedto deliver messages and personnel between ships.

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Sikorsky HO3S-1

The Sikorsky HO3S-1 was the first helicopterassigned to the U.S. Marine Corps. The HO3S wasthe naval variant of Sikorky’s model S-51 com-

mercial helicopter. Despite its observation designation, theHO3S was actually a utility aircraft used for a variety ofroles. Among the 46 conceptual uses initially listed byMarine Corps Schools were the ones most used inKorea: search and rescue; aerial reconnaissance; medicalevacuation; and liaison. The U.S. Air Force flew thesame aircraft as a search and rescue helicopter designat-ed H-5F.

The HO3S was the lineal descendent of earlierSikorsky designs, the initial HNS trainer and the first des-ignated military observation helicopter (alternatelyknown as the HO2S in naval service and the R-5A to theArmy). The HO3S featured a more powerful engine thatgave it added lift and an increased payload. During theimmediate pre-war period, the HO3S proved to be an out-standing rescue craft that often utilized its winch to pulldowned pilots out of the water. Likewise, the HO3S wasan excellent observation platform for artillery spotting.

In Korea, its primary uses were as a liaison aircraft andas an aerial ambulance. A first-rate liaison aircraft withgood range, the HO3S had a dependable engine, and wasrugged enough that it required relatively little maintenancewhen compared to other rotary-wing aircraft of the day.

Even though the HO3S performed yeoman service at

the Pusan Perimeter, it had significant shortfalls as acombat aircraft. The tricycle landing gear and its high cen-ter of gravity made the HO3S unstable on all but flat solidterrain; the aircraft could not accommodate interiorstretcher loads; its lack of back-lit instrumentation pre-cluded extended night and bad weather operations; andthe high engine location made aircraft maintenance dif-ficult. Another major drawback was that it required a greatdeal of strength and endurance to handle such a heavyaircraft for an extended period without servo-controls. Inaddition, the single main rotor and long tail assembly com-bined with a centrally located engine mount oftenrequired field expedient ballast adjustments to maintainin-flight stability, so it was not unusual for pilots to keepseveral sand bags or a seabag filled with rocks in thecabin.

Aircraft DataManufacturer: Sikorsky Division of United AircraftCorporationPower Plant: Pratt and Whitney R-985 AN-7 Wasp Jr., 9cylinder, 450 horsepower, radial engineDimensions: Length, 57’ 1/2”; height, 12’ 11”; rotor, 48’composite construction bladePerformance: Cruising speed, 85 mph; range, 260 milesLift: Pilot plus two passengers or about 500 pounds ofcargo (excluding fuel)


11

ment moved to San Diego toboard ship.

The crowded escort carrierBadoeng Strait (CVE 116) carrying60 Corsairs, 8 OY Sentinels, and 6Marine helicopters along with theiraircrews sailed for the Far East on14 July. Enroute helicopters wereused for inter-ship supply delivery,mail runs, and personnel transfers.The 1st Marine Brigade was origi-nally slated for a temporary lay-over in Japan where cargo could besorted out then combat loadedand some rudimentary amphibioustraining would be conductedbefore the Marines entered thecombat zone. That was the planuntil the situation in Koreabecame so grave that the 5thMarines was ordered to go direct-ly to the beleaguered SouthKorean port city of Pusan. The avi-ation element was still slated toland in Japan, however, so theships carrying the aviation compo-nent split off and headed for theJapanese port city of Kobe.

As the ships of Navy TaskGroup 53.7 plowed through thePacific, Brigadier General Craigand his operations officerLieutenant Colonel Joseph L.Stewart flew to Korea to attend aseries of command conferences.On 30 July, they learned that uponlanding the Marines would beattached to a U.S. Army task forceassigned to shore up the crum-bling southwest flank of theUnited Nations defense lines.Colonel Stewart called the aviationadvance party command post inJapan to warn that combat actionwas imminent and requested thatVMO-6 and Marine Tactical AirControl Squadron 2 (MTACS-2) besent on to Korea as quickly as pos-sible. This emergency phone callconfirmed that the situation inKorea was desperate. According-ly, when the Badeong Strait madelandfall on the evening of 31 July

1950, Major Gottschalk receivedword to begin operations at firstlight the next morning.

Marine Observation Squadron6’s airplanes and helicopters wentashore on 1 August. The next daythe Marine air elements scattered tothe four winds. The day fightersquadrons boarded a pair of escortcarriers and then sailed for thecombat zone; the night fightersquadron joined an Air Force all-weather squadron at Itazuke AirBase on Kyushu; VMO-6 groundcrews and their equipment “trans-shipped” to a tank landing ship(LST) for transportation to Korea;and headquarters personnelmoved to Itami Air Base nearOsaka on the island of Honshu.

Helicopters Enter Combat

From Kobe, the helicopters ofVMO-6 proceeded to Itami wheretwo helicopters were assigned toMAG-33 headquarters. Theywould be held in Japan to provideliaison services between the wide-ly scattered aviation units and, atthe same time, be available asemergency replacements if need-ed. The other four HO3S-1s pro-ceeded to Korea. They made theirway from Itami to Iwakuni AirBase where they stayed overnight.After a detailed situation brief anda hasty final maintenance inspectionat Ashiya Air Base on northernKyushu on the morning of 2August, the helicopters made thehop across the Tsushima Sraits.They landed at an airfield nearPusan, the logistics keystone ofthe United Nations defensiveperimeter.

The outlook in Korea was notgood when they arrived. The hard-pressed United Nations Commandwas struggling to hold onto a 60-by-90-mile area of southeast Koreaknown as the Pusan Perimeter.The North Korean drive south was

slowing, but the outcome of thebattle for the Korean peninsulawas far from certain when the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade waswelcomed on board by EighthArmy commander Lieutenant Gen-eral Walton H. Walker, USA.

At the Pusan Perimeter, theMarine brigade acquitted itselfwell and showcased the combateffectiveness of the Marine air-ground team. The Marines wereused as a “fire brigade” movingfrom place to place to stamp outenemy threats. They spearheadedthe first U.N. offensive in Korea,and then twice threw back NKPApenetrations of the U.N. defensivelines. Marine air hit the enemywhen Corsairs swept out of thesky on the same day that theground element was comingashore at Pusan harbor. Thebrigade then consolidated at atemporary assembly area nearChangwon before mounting thefirst sustained United Nationsoffensive of the war. The initialground action occurred in thevicinity of Chindong-ni from 6 to 9August. From there the Marinespressed south to Kosong beforeturning north to the ChangchonPass after wiping out an enemymotorized regiment during theKosong “Turkey Shoot.” On 13August, as they neared Sachon,the Marines were abruptly orderedback to Masan to prepare to seal offan enemy penetration across theNaktong River. Hard fighting atRed Slash Hill and carefully coor-dinated supporting arms firesthrew the North Koreans back.While recuperating at an areadubbed the Masan “Bean Patch,”the Marines had to return to theNaktong bulge to repulse theenemy one more time. Finally, on5 September, the Marines pulledout of the line and returned toPusan so they could mount out tolead MacArthur’s amphibious turn-

ing movement at Inchon.Throughout the campaign, thehard-working HO3S-1s of VMO-6performed a wide variety of tasksand were so indispensable thatMarine and Army commanderswere soon demanding more heli-copters.

Upon its arrival at Pusan on 2August, the VMO-6’s forward ech-elon was temporarily billeted in aSouth Korean schoolhouse locatedabout 10 miles west of the portuntil the squadron support ele-ment caught up and a more per-manent, and less crowded, sitecould be occupied. The rear party,which sailed from Kobe on boarda Japanese-manned landing ship,actually arrived at Pusan on 4August but could not move out fortwo more days due to the lack oftransportation. Squadron suppliesand equipment were laboriouslyloaded (there was no cargo han-dling machinery at hand) onto thedock then reloaded onto a train

for shipment west to Chinhae on 6August. Chinhae was a SouthKorean naval base, as well as thefuture home of the Korean MarineCorps, located only a short hopacross the bay from Masan. Thesite of a former Japanese ammuni-tion depot with an airstrip, it wasselected because it was close tothe action, had a 2,600-foot grassand concrete runway (alreadybeing used by a combined US-ROK Air Force training squadron),and included a pair of completedhangars with a third under con-struction. There were enoughQuonset huts to house the men,provide adequate office space,and warehouse supplies. Thisfacility would be VMO-6’s homefield and base of operations untilthe 1st Provisional Marine Brigadewas dissolved in early September.

In Korea, VMO-6 would beunder the operational control ofthe brigade but under the adminis-trative control of the wing. This

meant that the brigade, and later thedivision, commander through hisair section would assign daily mis-sions while the aircraft wingwould provide supplies and per-sonnel administration. Unfortu-nately, the helicopters, whichbelonged partially to both, but notfully to the ground or aviationcommanders, seemed to be nei-ther fish nor fowl. To use MajorGottschalk’s words to describe thisawkward command and controlsystem: “Observation squadronswere the stepchildren of Marineaviation.” This theoretical dichoto-my, however, in no way dimin-ished the practical use of heli-copters. They soon proved theirworth in combat and, in fact,became so indispensable that vir-tually every ground commanderrecommended additional heli-copters be made immediatelyavailable by the time the Marinesdeparted the Pusan Perimeter.

The hard-working Marine heli-copters were used for a wide vari-ety of missions that taxed them tothe limit during the month ofAugust 1950. The most commonuses were for command and con-trol, aerial reconnaissance, med-ical evacuation, and combatsearch and rescue; however, theyalso spotted artillery fire, dis-pensed emergency supplies, liftedindividuals to remote outposts,and provided high-speed commu-nications wire laying services aswell. An operational pattern soonemerged. Each morning the twoduty helicopter pilots would fly toGeneral Craig’s command postwhere they would report to MajorJames N. Cupp, the brigade’s airofficer, for tasking. At about noon,these two helicopters would berelieved on station by the othertwo. This aircraft rotation ensuredadequate pilot rest and gaveground crews time for daily main-tenance work. In addition, an ad

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The commanding officer of VMO-6 holds a pre-mission pilot brief during the earlystages of the Korean War. From left to right are Capt George B. Farish, 1stLt EugeneP. Millette, Capt Victor A. Armstrong, 1stLt Lloyd J. Engelhardt, Maj Vincent J.Gottschalk, Capt Alfred F. McCaleb, Jr., 2dLt Edgar F. Gaudette, Jr., 1stLt GustaveF. Lueddeke, Jr., and enlisted pilot TSgt Robert A. Hill.


13

hoc control system evolvedwhereby the helicopter pilotswould check in and out with theMTACS-2 air control section ontheir way to and from assignedmissions. As air traffic controlsquadron commander Major EltonMueller explained:

We maintained the same pos-itive radio contact with thehelicopters that we did withall the other aircraft operat-

ing with us. The division airofficer, however, controlledthe helicopters. When theywent out on a mission, theywould fly by our operatingsite, give us a call—a radiocheck—on our reporting-in-and-out net. . . . In this man-ner [we] knew when [they]went out on a mission [and]they would tell us what typeof mission they were goingon, i.e. whether they were

going on a reconnaissance,whether they had any rankon board, whether they werecarrying the commandinggeneral out to one of theunits, or whether they weregoing out on an evacuationmission. . . . Since we hadcommunications facilities andthe air officer [did not] wecould. . . keep [him] abreast ofthe situation.

Korea was a difficult arena ofoperations due to its rugged ter-rain, weather extremes, and poor-ly developed infrastructure as aer-ial observer Second LieutenantPatrick G. Sivert recalled: “It washot and dusty, the road networkwas very poor, and the countryvery mountainous. There was noapparent pattern of any sort to themountains. . . no particular rangesor draws, compartments, or corri-dors.” The Marines were firstgreeted by sweltering heat andchoking dust, but within a fewmonths bitter cold and heavysnow brought south by the so-called “Siberian Express” wouldcreate vastly different operationalchallenges. The already difficulttopography was exacerbated bythe lack of modern hard surfaceroads as well as poor overlandcommunications links. River val-leys provided the only flat spacesuitable for roadways, but theywere susceptible to flash flooding.The lack of reliable telephonecommunications was also a prob-lem because the short-rangedinfantry radios of the day did notfunction well when out of the line-of-sight. The cumulative result ofthese disparate problems madeKorea an operational nightmare.Luckily, helicopters provided theideal technological fix. They wereunrestrained by the terrain, couldact as radio relays or lay wire athigh-speed, and easily flew over

traffic jams or roadless wilderness.According to Major Gottschalk,

the use of HO3S helicopters atPusan for command liaison workhad the greatest tactical value.

General Craig faced many unusualcommand circumstances due tothe emergency situation in Korea.Hurried planning, reliance uponoral orders, incomplete intelli-gence, poor communications, andinadequate maps all plagued thebrigade staff. Craig turned to thehelicopter to help solve his prob-lems. While stationed on Guam in1949, he became acquainted withhelicopters when he borrowed acarrier-based Navy HO3S-1 tomake command visits and observefield training, and Craig immedi-ately put this experience to use inKorea. On the morning of 3August 1950, he and his opera-tions officer, Colonel Stewart,climbed into First Lieutenant Gus-tave Lueddeke’s waiting HO3S,beginning the first Marine heli-copter flight in an active combatzone. Craig and Stewart were air-borne almost all of that day. The ini-tial leg took them from Pusan 30miles west to the brigade stagingarea at Changwon. Along the way,Lueddeke set down amid someKorean huts to allow Craig to con-

fer with a battalion commanderleading the convoy to its newassembly area. After a few minuteson the ground, Craig continued hisjourney to the actual site selected tobecome his forward commandpost. Next, he flew back to Masanto meet with the Eighth Armycommander and the commandinggeneral of the U.S. Army task forceslated to carry out the first UnitedNations offensive in Korea. On theway home, Craig stopped threetimes to inform small unit troopleaders about the upcoming oper-ation. Although this trip seemsroutine by modern standards, thatwas certainly not true in 1950.Marine Corps historian LynnMontross noted the uniqueness ofthis feat and its impact on thefuture: “Only a helicopter couldhave made this itinerary possible ina period of a few hours. A fixed-wing plane could not have landedin such unlikely spots, and a jeepcould not have covered the sameroute before nightfall over narrow,twisting roads choked with Armyand Marine vehicles.” He further

14


On 3 August 1950, 1stLt Gustave F.Lueddeke, Jr., flew the first commandliaison mission in Korea. In additionto ferrying commanders around, healso logged numerous medical evacu-ations and flew rescue missionsbehind enemy lines.

A Korean rice paddy serves as a makeshift landing pad fora Marine HO3S-1 helicopter. The air panels laid out in the

foreground mark the landing area and indicate winddirection.


15

opined: “A general and his staffcould now make direct . . . contactwith operations at the front as hadnever been possible before [andthis] enabled a commander tokeep in personal touch with hisforward units since the helicoptercould land virtually anywherewithout asking favors of the ter-rain.”

General Craig also said: “Timewas always pressing. Fortunately. . . helicopters . . . were alwaysavailable for observation, com-munications, and control. . . .Without them I do not believe wewould have had the success wedid.”

In addition to command andcontrol, a second valuable tacticaluse for helicopters was visualreconnaissance. A major problemduring the attack toward Sachonwas a scarcity of tactical maps,compounded by the fact that the

only maps readily available wereinaccurate ones created by Jap-anese cartographers sometimebefore World War II. Villages weremisnamed and misplaced, manyroads were either not shown orwere incorrectly plotted, therewere no contour lines to accurate-ly depict terrain features, and thecomplex grid system was too con-fusing to be of much value.Although no one at Quantico hadpredicted that helicopters mighthave to replace maps for naviga-tion, this is exactly what happenedin Korea. Small unit commandersoften used helicopters to recon-noiter their routes of advance or tolocate good ground for defensivepositions. On the march heli-copters shadowed ground move-ments and provided over-the-hori-zon flank security. In addition,HO3Ss were used to direct artilleryfire, a task made difficult for

ground observers due to the poormaps and hilly terrain that fre-quently masked targets.

Another ground support duty,one that had received much play atQuantico, was aerial wire laying. Ahelicopter flying nap-of-the-earthcould put down communicationswire at the rate of about a mile perminute, far faster than a groundparty could do it. The heavy andcumbersome spools presented noproblem for a helicopter, whereasground-based wire layers wereseverely limited as to how muchwire they could carry and whichterrain they could cross. An addi-tional bonus was that by flyingover tree lines or narrow defiles,helicopters could keep the wireoverhead where it was not subjectto destruction by tank treads orartillery bursts. Today, wire layingseems like a small thing but, in thedays before needed two-way radio


The leaders of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, BGenEdward A. Craig, left, and his deputy, BGen Thomas J.Cushman, right, wait in the shade of a Sikorsky HO3S-1. The

commanding officer of VMO-6 felt that command visitswere missions of the most tactical value during the fightingat the Pusan Perimeter.

16

reliability, land line communica-tions was vital for command andcontrol.

Two missions of marginal tacticalvalue had a significant impactupon morale, aerial medical evac-uations and airborne search andrescue. Helicopter evacuations,reported Major Gottschalk: “exert avery positive effect on groundtroops since they know theirchances of survival are tremen-dously in-creased. . . . A unit cut offby land [could still] have itswounded evacuated [and] ithelped units by relieving them ofthe necessity of caring for them[thus] freeing more men for fighting.The use of helicopters for rescue ofdowned pilots [was] also impor-

tant in bolstering [air crew]morale.”

On 4 August, Marine helicoptersperformed their first aerial medicalevacuation when a Marine wound-ed by an accidental weapon dis-charge was flown from Changwonto the naval hospital train atMasan. The next day helicopterswere called out to deliver waterand rations to an infantry platoonsent to a nearby hilltop to check outreports of an enemy observationparty located there. “Whirlybirds”were used because they coulddeliver the cargo in a matter ofminutes where it would havetaken a carrying party hours tobring up in the rugged terrain andintense heat. Five Marines suffering

severe heat exhaustion and inneed of advanced medical atten-tion were taken out by helicopter.

On 8 August, the squadron con-ducted a night helicopter evacua-tion—another first. This was a dar-ing feat because the HO3S did nothave proper instrumentation fornight operations. Disregardingthese limitations, Captain Arm-strong flew off into the fading lightto pick up a critically woundedman and the regimental surgeonof the 5th Marines. The nearlyblind helicopter was guided backby the light of flares and came toearth amid the glow of headlights.This dramatic flight was the first ofmore than 1,000 night evacuationsconducted in Korea.

The first of many Marine helicopter medical evacuationsoccurred when VMO-6 helicopters lifted several severe heatcasualties to safety. “Whirlybirds” were often used because

ground transportation could not traverse the rugged ter-rain and stretcher-bearer evacuation would take too long.


17

As helicopter pilot CaptainNorman G. Ewers later recalled:

Normally, helicopter evacua-tion missions [were] per-formed on orders from thedivision air officer who re-lay[ed] the requests from themedical officers of the battal-ions or regiments. Heli-copters [were] used to evacuateonly those who [were] critical-ly wounded and require[d]immediate hospital treatment.The helicopter [made] it possi-ble not only to get the man tothe hospital much morequickly, but it [provided] amuch easier ride than travelby roads over rough terrain[and] this smoother ride . . .prevent[ed] hemorrhages.

Medical evacuations were flownwithout regard for difficult circum-stances. The pilots took off in all

kinds of weather, without the ben-efit of proper instrumentation orhoming devices, and often disre-garded enemy fire in the landingzones. A tribute to the helicopterpilots of VMO-6 was rendered by aground officer: “The flying ofevacuation helicopters from juryrigged and inadequate landingsites was nothing short of miracu-lous. . . . The pilots of the obser-vation squadron received far lesscredit than they deserved. Theyused to fly at night [into] frontlinelanding strips where I had troublewalking.” Frontline medical offi-cers likewise credited the flyingskills and bravery of the medicalevacuation pilots for saving manylives. The mortality rate in Koreafell to a new low of only two per-cent, less than half the rate ofWorld War II and far below thenearly 50 percent rate prior to theAmerican Civil War, due in largepart to the rapid evacuation of

seriously wounded and the imme-diate availability of helicopter-pro-vided whole blood at forwardmedical stations.

Unfortunately, the HO3S-1 was acivilian model aircraft adopted foruse as a military machine; it was notdesigned to be a flying ambulanceand, thus, poorly configured to beused as such. Marine groundcrews in Korea quickly modifiedthe HO3Ss to carry stretcher cases.The starboard observation win-dow was removed and strapssecured the stretcher in flight, butstill a wounded man’s legs pro-truded from the cabin. This was aminor annoyance that summer, butduring cold-weather operationsseveral cases of frostbitten feetand lower legs caused by thesevere airborne wind chill wererecorded. In addition, the wound-ed man most often had to beloaded into the helicopter from aposition above the heads of thestretcher-bearers, a ponderous andawkward process. Inside thecabin, the pilot had to make quickballast adjustments to ensureproper trim on the way home.Another problem was the HO3S-1’s high profile and unstable tricy-cle landing gear; at least one HO3Stipped over while idling on roughground. Although all agreed thatthe HO3S was invaluable in emer-gencies, there was room formechanical improvement. Thiswas handled in two ways. First,requests for immediate deploy-ment of an off-the-shelf medicalevacuation helicopter, the BellHTL trainer, were sent up thechain-of-command. Second, Si-korsky Aircraft made design modi-fications to its newest observationhelicopter, the developmentalmodel S-52, which reached thefleet as the HO5S.

One mission of mercy for whichthe HO3S was perfectly suited wasthe rescue of downed pilots.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-420545

The Sikorsky HO3S-1 was a civilian model helicopter acquired for use as an obser-vation aircraft. Unfortunately, the aircraft was poorly configured for medicalevacuations, which often required Marines and Navy Corpsmen to lift patientsinto the aircraft from odd angles.

Helicopters were virtually the onlymeans by which a downed pilotcould be snatched from behindenemy lines and returned safelyhome within hours. The HO3S’sside-mounted winch was an idealtool for pulling an unfortunate avi-ator from the chilly waters off theKorean coast. The pilot or hiscrewman located the downed manand then the helicopter hoveredoverhead while the stricken manwas lifted to safety. LieutenantLueddeke made the first of theserescues on 10 August while con-ducting a ground reconnaissancewith the brigade commander onboard. Second Lieutenant DoyleH. Cole’s Corsair was struck byground fire during a strafing run.Cole was unable to make it back tothe Badoeng Strait, so his planeplunged into the water. Luckily, hewas able get out and inflate his liferaft before the plane sank.Lueddeke’s helicopter quicklyrushed toward the sinking planeto affect an airborne rescue.

General Craig winched the soakedpilot up into the helicopter asLueddeke hovered over thewreckage. Once safely inside thegrinning pilot slapped his benefac-tor on the back with the words“Thanks, Mac” before he noticedthe general’s rank insignia andwas able to render proper honors.The unperturbed senior officersimply replied: “Glad to be of ser-vice, Lieutenant.”

Not every rescue had such ahappy ending. Later that same dayLieutenant Lueddeke was sent torescue another VMF-323 pilot.This time the downed flyer wasCaptain Vivian M. Moses whoseplane had been hit by antiaircraftfire in enemy territory. Lueddekeskillfully negotiated a low-levelapproach behind enemy lines topick up the stranded pilot andreturned him to Chinhae for anovernight stay. The next morning,Moses returned to his ship where hepromptly volunteered to fly anoth-er combat mission. Ironically, he

was shot down once again beforethe helicopter that delivered himreturned to action. His planecrashed into a rice paddy andflipped over when it struck thedike. Captain Moses was knockedunconscious as he fell from theplane and drowned before heli-copter pilot Captain Eugene J.Pope could save his life. Sadly,Vivian Moses became the firstMarine pilot to die in combat inKorea.

On 7 August, the first Marinehelicopter came under fire whenthe commanding general’s HO3S-1was caught in an enemy artillerybarrage. Luckily, the planeemerged undamaged after drop-ping General Craig off. The firstcombat damage to a Marine heli-copter occurred a week later whenan HO3S-1 lost its windshield whileevad-ing enemy antiaircraft fire. No“whirlybirds” were lost to enemyfire during the 580 missions flownby the helicopter section of VMO-6during the fighting at Pusan.

On 12 August, the Marineadvance toward Sachon wasabruptly halted due to a break-through that penetrated the U.N.lines near Miryang on the NaktongRiver. The situation was so criticalthat a battalion of the 5th Marineswas immediately ordered north tocounterattack. Once again, thehelicopter proved invaluable as aliaison vehicle. The battalion com-mander and the brigade opera-tions officer mounted FirstLieutenant Robert Longstaff’sHO3S-1 to rendezvous with a U.S.Army representative. They flew tothe appointed place but could notlocate their man. Luckily, theywere able to orbit the area untilthey found a reconnaissance unit,which was able to contact their di-vision headquarters. The Marineswere told that instead of joiningthe Army unit as planned theyshould instead “look the situation

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Marines refuel a VMO-6 helicopter in a rice paddy during the fighting in the PusanPerimeter. When a helicopter could not make it back to base, 55-gallon drumsof fuel and a supply of oil had to be trucked out to the makeshift landing pad.

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

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over and do what [they] thoughtproper [to] ensure the safety of the159th Field Artillery.” The Marineshad neither detailed maps of thearea nor locating coordinates, sothey took to the air to conduct avisual reconnaissance and, hope-fully, find the lost Army artillery-men. This was done, and theMarines returned to meet the rescueconvoy on the road. After giving anestimate of the situation and furtherinstructions, the two Marines

returned to the Army position toprepare for the rescue column’sarrival. Concurrently, a helicopterpiloted by Lieutenant Lueddekecarrying the artillery regimentalcommander and his operationsofficer located several survivors ofan overrun artillery battery. Theydropped a note of encouragementthen led a relief party to the spot.During this excursion, Lueddeke’sHO3S-1 came under small armsfire and had to “buck and jerk” its

way out of the area using maneu-vers not found in the pilot’s manu-al. Only helicopters could haveprovided such assistance. Groundtransportation would have beenunable to find the misplaced unitsin a timely manner, while a lightobservation plane could not havemoved back and forth betweenthe supported and supportingunits with such speed and effi-ciency. The helicopters of VMO-6saved the day.

Early Naval Helicopters

The first U.S. Navy experience with rotary-wing air-craft was not a good one. The Pitcarin OP-1 auto-giro, an airplane not a true helicopter, had been

tested and found wanting during the era between theWorld Wars. It was not until Igor Sikorsky introduced hisVS-316 model helicopter on 13 January 1942 that verti-cal takeoff and landing aircraft became feasible.Sikorsky had earlier flown the first practical American heli-copter, the VS-300, but that machine was only a testbed. The follow-on VS-316, designated the XR-4 by theU.S. Army, had a two-seat side-by-side enclosed cabin.A 200 horsepower Warner R-550-3 engine that ran a sin-gle overhead main rotor and a smaller anti-torque rotoron the tail powered the aircraft. The XR-4 prototypecould hit a top speed of around 85 miles per hour,cruised at about 70 miles per hour, and had a range ofabout 130. In July 1942, the Navy tested its first one; anR-4 transferred from the Army and then promptly redes-ignated HNS-1 by the Bureau of Aeronautics. Two morewere requisitioned from Army stocks in March 1943.The new helicopter was a success, and 22 more were pro-cured for use as trainers beginning on 16 October 1943.The HNS-1 served as the primary naval aviation helicoptertrainer until the Bell HTL-series replaced it.

Several other early helicopters (the Platt LePage R-1 andthe Kellet R-2 and R-3) produced by other manufactur-ers were considered but not selected. All was not lost,however, because a bright young Kellet engineer, FrankPiasecki, would later develop tandem-rotor helicoptersthat would become a mainstay of naval aviation. The BellAircraft Company was too busy turning out jets to enterthe initial helicopter competition, but that corporation’smathematician and engineer Arthur M. Young wouldsoon revolutionize light helicopter design.

Sikorsky Aircraft produced 133 HNS helicopters; theNavy accepted 23, the Army kept 58, and the British RoyalAir Force got 52. The first shipboard helicopter trialswere conducted by America’s first certified military heli-

copter pilot, Army Captain Hollingworth “Frank”Gregory. He put his HNS through its paces by repeated-ly landing and taking off from the tanker Bunker Hill oper-ating in Long Island Sound on 7 May 1943. Coast GuardLieutenant Commander Frank A. Erickson flew the initialnaval service helicopter mercy mission when he deliveredtwo cases of blood plasma to a hospital at Sandy Hookon the New Jersey shore. Doctors credited Erickson’s time-ly arrival with saving several lives. Other rescue missionsaiding both civilian and military personnel in the NewYork area soon followed. The U.S. Army and the Officeof Strategic Services both used helicopters for special com-bat missions in Asia during World War II.

The Navy was satisfied enough with the HNS to orderan additional 150 helicopters from Sikorsky, 100 HOS-1s(designated R-6A by the USAAF) and 50 HO2S-1s (Armydesignation R-5A) before the end of the war. The HOS-1 was more compact, more powerful, and more maneu-verable than its HNS predecessor. It mounted a singleoverhead main rotor, and was powered by a 240 hpFranklin O-405-9 engine. Three XHOS-1s were request-ed for testing from Army R-6A stocks in late 1942 and wereaccepted by the U.S. Coast Guard, which was by then run-ning Navy helicopter training at New York’s FloydBennett Field in March 1944. After the war a secondbatch of 36 HOS-1s were assigned to the Navy heli-copter development squadron (VX-3) after passingacceptance tests. The Navy also took two HO2S-1 (ArmyR-5A) test models in December 1945, but opted to placean order for slightly modified S-51 commercial models(designated HO3S-1) which became the standard Navy,Marine, and Coast Guard light utility helicopters in 1947.

When the Coast Guard returned to the TreasuryDepartment from the Navy Department on 28 December1945, the U.S. Navy took over helicopter training anddevelopment. Marine helicopter pilots learned theirtrade with VX-3 before moving on to HMX-1 atQuantico, Virginia, prior to the Korean War.

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Two HO3S-1 helicopters, twopilots, and five mechanics as-signed to headquarters squadronin Japan were released from thatduty and joined VMO-6 at Chinhaeon 15 August, just in time for oneof the biggest battles for the PusanPerimeter. The 5th Marines hadbeen pulled back from Sachon,hurriedly replenished, and thenmarched north to seal off theNKPA penetration near Miryang.Helicopters were used for visualreconnaissance of the battle area,conducted liaison visits, scoutedthe routes of advance, screenedthe flanks, spotted artillery fires,

brought in supplies, and evacuatedcasualties as the Marines weretwice called on to throw the NorthKoreans back across the NaktongRiver. During that time the heli-copter pilots began to perfect eva-sive maneuvers that allowed themto dodge enemy ground fire. Italso became obvious that the fraillooking helicopters were tougherthan previously thought. Severalwere hit by enemy small arms firebut kept on flying, and others sur-vived some very hard landings inrough country. As General LemuelShepherd later noted about thetoughness of helicopters: “I saw

[them] come in with a dozen bulletholes [but] unless they are hit in avital part, they continue to fly.”Still, the helicopters carried noarmor or weapons so they wereused in supporting roles exceptfor emergency evacuations ordeep search and rescue missions.The best tactic for those risky mis-sions was to get in and out asquickly as possible while flyingnap-of-the-earth using terrain tomask ingress and egress routes.

The Marine defense of thePusan Perimeter ended with thearrival of other elements of the 1stMarine Division and the remainder


Air-sea rescue was an important mission flown by VMO-6with the first such rescue made in August. Here, CaptEugene J. Pope, at the controls of his HO3S-1 helicopter, is con-

gratulated by his still-wet fellow VMO-6 observation pilot CaptAlfred F. McCaleb, Jr.

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of Major General Field Harris’ 1stMarine Aircraft Wing fromCalifornia in preparation for thelanding at Inchon. By late August,the helicopter detachment hadlogged 580 sorties and 348 flighthours, conducted 35 medical evac-uations, and flew 85 aerial recon-

naissance missions. Throughoutthat time helicopter availabilitywas 100 percent. In his final reportMajor Gottschalk attributed thisremarkable accomplishment totwo factors: the excellent facilitiesat Chinhae and the ground sup-port crew’s professionalism, skill,

and willingness to put in longhours. This was no small achieve-ment because helicopters requireda great deal more effort; morespare parts, more man-hours, andmore sophisticated tools and workspaces than did the OY Sentinels.On the other hand, Gottschalkalso noted that larger transporthelicopters could have providedmuch needed services such astroop lifts, resupply, and com-mand liaison, which were beyondthe capabilities of the HO3S-1.

General Craig, the first Marinecommander to use a helicopter asa command and control aircraftlater wrote:

Helicopters are a godsend. . . .The mountainous terrain ofKorea presents a difficult prob-lem for security. . . . [Transport]helicopters would be ideal to[quickly] post patrols and out-guards on high, dominatingterrain which would [normally]

Airfield Designations

United Nations Command airfields in Korea used letter-number des-ignators: the letter “K” indicated a major air base; the letter “X” indi-cated an auxiliary landing strip; and the letter “A” indicated that the

airfield adjoined a U.S. Army base or headquarters. During the Korean War,Marine helicopter squadrons operated from the following locations:

Marine Observation Squadron 6Chinhae (K-10)Kimpo (K-14)Wonsan (K-25)Yonpo (K-27)Masan (unnamed)Pohang (K-3)Wonju (K-38)Hongchon (K-47)Kwandae-ri (unnamed)

Sonjong-ni (unnamed)Sohung-ni (X-77)Sinchon (X-83)Tonggo-ri (A-9)Marine Transport Squadron 161Pusan (K-1)Kangnung (K-18)Chodo-ri (X-83)Yongpo-ni (A-17)Taejong-ni (A-33)

A VMO-6 helicopter lands near the artillery positions of the1st Battalion, 11th Marines, along the Naktong River. The

HO3S was designated as an “observation” platform but wasactually used as a light utility aircraft in Korea.


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take hours to climb. . . . [Morehelicopters] would . . . insure theearlier defeat of the enemy.They should be made availablefor use at the earliest possibledate.

He also noted other Serviceinterest in rotary-wing aircraft bystating: “The Army is enthusiasticover our ideas of employment ofthis type of aircraft and is goingahead with the idea of employingthem on a large scale.” Like Major

Gottschalk, Craig also recom-mended that a transport helicoptersquadron be formed and sent toKorea as quickly as possible. TheDirector of Marine Corps Aviation,Brigadier General Clayton C.Jerome, made the case for addi-tional helicopters in a memoran-dum to the Deputy Chief of NavalOperations (Air):

There are no superlativesadequate to describe the gen-eral reaction to the heli-

copter. Almost any individualquestioned could offer somepersonal story to emphasizethe valuable part played by[the] HO3S planes. . . . Thereis no doubt the enthusiasmvoiced . . . is entirely war-ranted. . . . No effort should bespared to get helicopters—larger than the HO3S if possi-ble—to the theater at once,and on a priority higher thanany other weapon. [We need]helicopters, more helicopters,and more helicopters.

The Inchon-Seoul Campaign

On 9 September, VMO-6 wasplaced under the operational con-trol of the 1st Marine Division,commanded by Major GeneralOliver P. “O. P.” Smith, and underthe administrative control of the1st Marine Aircraft Wing. TheMarines’ next mission was des-tined to become a military clas-sic—the amphibious assault atInchon, a battle that dramaticallyreversed the course of the Koreanconflict. U.S. Army X Corps, spear-headed by the 1st Marine Division,launched a difficult daylong am-phibious landing then rapidlymoved inland to secure the supplydepot at Ascom City and KimpoAirfield. The campaign culminatedwith the retaking of the SouthKorean capital of Seoul. Thisseizure cut the enemy’s main sup-ply routes and left the NKPA forcesin the south isolated. By the timethe lead elements of X Corps inthe north and Eighth Army comingup from the Pusan Perimeterlinked up the NKPA was in fullflight. That once awesome fightingforce had been completely routedand was headed for the dubioussafety of North Korea.

To prepare for the Inchon land-ing, Major Gottschalk divided hissquadron into forward and rear


MajGen Field Harris, left, commanding general of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,MajGen Oliver P. Smith, commanding the 1st Marine Division, and BGenThomas J. Cushman, assistant wing commander, meet in Tokyo, Japan, a weekbefore the landing at Inchon.

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echelons. The forward echelon, 10officers, 48 enlisted men, and 8helicopters, loaded on board Jap-anese-manned LST Q079 atChinhae. During the voyage, theMarines and Japanese crew sharedmess facilities. Luckily, detach-ment commander Captain VictorArmstrong spoke fluent Jap-anese—he had resided in Japanfor 15 years before the outbreak ofWorld War II. Four officers and 43enlisted men remained behind tosafeguard squadron property atChinhae.

Once ashore the Marine heli-copter detachment picked up rightwhere it left off, but on a muchlarger scale. The main missionsremained command and liaison,aerial evacuation of seriouslywounded, combat search and res-cue of downed fliers, and visualreconnaissance. Although thenumber of HO3S helicopters haddoubled since August, thedemands for their time continued toincrease.

Major General Smith, the 1stMarine Division commander and aformer member of the ShepherdBoard in 1946, quickly became ahelicopter advocate. “The heli-copter was of inestimable value tothe division commander and hisstaff in keeping personal contactwith subordinate units in a mini-mum of transit time,” he asserted.Generals Smith and Craig, nowassistant division commander,depended upon helicopters to visitthe front on a daily basis and unitcommanders scouted proposedroutes of advance, although emer-gency medical evacuations weregiven priority over liaison andreconnaissance. With as few asonly four helicopters operational,however, command and liaisonvisits were often interrupted whenthe commander’s helicopter wasdiverted for emergency missions.When critically wounded men

needed a ride the generals andcolonels either used alternativetransportation or waited until their“chopper” returned. The list ofdignitaries using helicopter trans-port during September 1950included Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, commander LieutenantGeneral Lemuel Shepherd, Com-mandant Clifton B. Cates, and XCorps commander, U.S. ArmyMajor General Edward M. Almond.At Inchon, just as at Pusan, themost often heard complaint abouthelicopters was that there werenot enough of them.

Although Marine helicoptersplayed no combat role on the firstday at Inchon, Navy helicoptersdid spot naval gunfire during thepreliminary bombardment. On 16September (D+1), Marine heli-copters entered the fray flying 14missions. The landing ship-basedMarine “whirlybirds” flew recon-naissance and artillery spottingmissions over Wolmi-do Island,and First Lieutenant Max Nebergallpulled a Navy pilot out of thedrink. On the afternoon of 17September, ground Marines cap-tured Kimpo Airfield, the largest

“Whirlybird” pilots in Korea were famous for their daring feats while rescuingdowned flyers and evacuating seriously wounded men; among the very bestwere 1stLts Robert A. Longstaff and Gustave F. Lueddeke, Jr. of VMO-6.Tragically, the Marine Corps lost two of it most promising pioneer helicopter pilotswhen Longstaff was killed in action at the Chosin Reservoir and Lueddeke suc-cumbed to poliomyelitis not long after returning from Korea.


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airfield in Korea, virtually intact.The first U.S. aircraft to land therewas Captain Armstrong’s HO3S,which arrived at mid-morning on 18September as Marines searched forthe remnants of the previousnight’s NKPA counterattack force.Armstrong carried two early pro-ponents of Marine helicopter oper-ations, Lieutenant General Shep-herd and his operations officerColonel Victor H. Krulak.

On 19 September, the 1stMarine Division moved its com-mand post from Inchon to Oeoso-ri. The next day VMO-6 moved tonearby Kimpo, which thereafterserved as the squadron’s base ofoperations until the subsequentmove north. The final phase of theInchon turning movement—therecapture of Seoul—was about tobegin, and helicopters proved tobe particularly valuable when ter-rain obstacles separated elements ofthe division during the drive toretake the capital. The generaloperational pattern was for onehelicopter to be earmarked foreach regimental commander inaddition to one each for the divisioncommander and his assistant com-mander. The regimental heli-copters were primarily used forreconnaissance and medical evac-uations, the division commander’sfor liaison, and the assistant divisioncommander’s for reconnaissance;any unassigned helicopters under-went maintenance while standingby for emergency evacuations orcombat search and rescue.

The major obstacle on the way toSeoul was the Han River. Brig-adier General Craig used his heli-copter to locate a suitable crossingarea, scout key terrain, and surveythe road approaches to the SouthKorean capital. Although fewenemy soldiers actually showedthemselves, Captain Armstrong,Craig’s pilot, had to dodge scat-tered small arms fire along the

way. As a result of his aerial recon-naissance, Craig recommendedthat the 5th Marines move acrossthe Han at an abandoned ferry sitenear Haengju and then seize thehigh ground overlooking Seoul.

Just as before, combat searchand rescue was an important addi-tional duty for the helicopters ofVMO-6. On 21 September 1950,the squadron received word that apilot had gone down behindenemy lines and was jammedinside his cockpit. Anticipating a

difficult extraction, First LieutenantArthur R. Bancroft loaded hisplane captain on board then tookoff to make the rescue. The areawas “hot,” so friendly planes main-tained a rescue combat air patrol tostrafe any enemy who showedtheir heads. Bancroft set his HO3Sdown and remained at the con-trols while the helicopter idledwith its rotor blades slowly turning.The crew chief could not free theencased pilot alone, so Bancrofthad to leave the aircraft to assist.


Capt Victor A. Armstrong, right, proudly displays the cake sent from the carrierPhilippine Sea (CV 47) as Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk, VMO-6’s commandingofficer, looks on. Capt Armstrong made a daring behind-the-lines rescue of a Navypilot shot down near Seoul and the cake was sent ashore as a mark of appreci-ation.

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Who was the First Marine Helicopter Pilot?

There is some dispute about who the first MarineCorps helicopter pilot actually was. According toMarine lore that honor goes to fighter ace and

famed test pilot Marion E. Carl, but the official records ofthe naval service identify Major Armond H. DeLalio asMarine helicopter pilot number one, and Marion Carlhimself proclaimed that Desmond E. Canavan was prob-ably the first Marine to fly a helicopter.

According to the Marine Corps’ official history,Marines and Helicopters, 1962-1973, “Major GeneralMarion E. Carl is generally credited with being the firstMarine to learn how to fly a helicopter in July 1945 [but]it was not until some years later that he was officially des-ignated [as such].” In his autobiography, Pushing TheEnvelope (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994),Carl relates that he learned how to fly a Sikorsky HNS (R-4) while a test pilot stationed at the Naval Air Test Center,Patuxent River, Maryland. He was given about threehours of instruction before he soloed. In that same mem-oir, however, he states that fellow Marine DesmondCanavan was flying helicopters in late 1944. Carl’s claimthat he was helicopter pilot number one rests upon the factthat he was the first Marine to log the 40 hours requiredfor certification even though he never applied for such cer-tification. Neither Carl nor Canovan appear on the navalservice helicopter pilot certification list prior to June 1950.

Marine Corps Historian Lynn Montross, the recognizedauthority on early Marine helicopter operations, listsNavy Cross holder Armond DeLalio as having flown U.S.Navy helicopters at New York’s Floyd Bennett Field thenunder the auspices of the U.S. Coast Guard in 1944. He isofficially recognized as the first Marine certified as a heli-copter pilot, achieving that honor on 8 August 1946.DeLalio was the operations officer for Navy helicoptersquadron VX-3 at that time. He was killed during a testflight in 1952 when a rocket-assisted takeoff pod mal-functioned causing his HRS helicopter to catch fire and thencrash.

The Navy register of early helicopter pilots lists 250 qual-ifiers prior to the onset of the Korean War in June 1950;33 are Marines, including three enlisted naval aviation pilots(the famous “Flying Sergeants” of the Marine Corps).

While who should be recognized as the true “GrayEagle” of Marine helicopter aviation remains murky, thereis little doubt about the specific incident that started theMarine Corps helicopter program. That event occurred atQuantico, Virginia, in 1946 and was described by helicopterpioneer Edward C. Dyer:

One day Marion Carl, a test pilot at Patuxent, flewa helicopter to Marine Corps Schools to demon-strate it to the students. . . . He hoisted [LieutenantColonel Victor H.] Brute Krulak . . . about 15 feet [off

the ground] and pulled him into the cockpit.[Lieutenant Colonel Merrill B.] Twining and I werestanding by the window and watching and I said ‘Bill,let’s . . . quit fooling around.’ He said ‘OK! . . . Hewrote the theory . . . principles . . . background . . .reasoning . . . and I wrote [an implementation] pro-gram.”

Marion Carl recalled that he specifically selectedLieutenant Colonel Krulak because his small stature andlightweight could be accommodated by the limited roomand lift capability of his HOS-1 helicopter. Krulak there-after became a helicopter devotee.


LtCol Armond H. DeLalio, recipient of the Navy Cross forheroism as a pilot with Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron241 during the battle of Midway and a Marine Corpshelicopter pioneer, was honored in 1965 when an ele-mentary school at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, wasdedicated in his name.

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While the two Marines busily freedthe trapped pilot, the helicopter’scollective friction device workedloose and the plane tipped on itsside where the beating rotorsdestroyed the aircraft. Luckily,Lieutenant Robert Longstaff wasable to pick up the grounded trioalthough his overloaded HO3Sstaggered under the excessiveweight until it reached friendlylines. Bancroft then promptlymounted another helicopter to res-cue a second Navy flier before theday ended.

Two days later, Captain Arm-strong recorded the longest searchand rescue operation yet by aVMO-6 helicopter when he flewnearly 100 miles behind enemylines to rescue a downed Navypilot. On the return flight, he ranout fuel over friendly territory,temporarily put down, refueled,and then landed at Kimpo afterdark using a flashlight to illumi-nate his control panel. The res-cued pilot turned out to be asquadron commander from thecarrier Philippine Sea (CV 47).The next day, VMO-6 received alarge layer cake, compliments ofthe U.S. Navy as a reward forArmstrong’s fine work. Converse-ly, Lieutenant Longstaff flew theshortest rescue mission of the warpicking up a pair of Marines froma Grumman F7F Tigercat thatcrashed after taking off fromKimpo. That mission on the 25thtook less than six minutes. Thepilot was Lieutenant Colonel Max J.Volcansek, Jr., of Marine NightFighter Squadron 542, one of threesquadron commanders to godown that day.

A more dramatic rescue alsooccurred on 25 September. A Navyhelicopter “on loan” to the Marinessuffered battle damage during adeep rescue mission and wasforced to put down near the HanRiver. Word that an American air-

crew was down in enemy territorydid not reach the division air offi-cer until about 2100—after sunset.Captain Armstrong took off de-spite the fact that the HO3S hadneither proper instrumentation norlanding lights for limited visibilityflying. Armstrong needed botharms and both feet to control thehelicopter, so he held a flashlightbetween his knees to illuminatethe unlit instrument panel. Hespotted the downed aircraft in theglow of light cast from the burningcity of Seoul and set down on anearby sandbar. The crew, a Navypilot and a Marine enlisted man,swam to Armstrong’s waiting heli-copter for a safe ride home. Heonce again had to rely uponmakeshift lights upon arrival at thelanding zone.

Thus far in Korea, VMO-6 hadlost helicopters to operational inci-dents but had suffered no fatali-ties. Tragically, this string of luckcame to an end on 29 September.A VMO-6 Sentinel was shot downabout five miles north of Seoul.Reports indicated the aerial ob-server was killed in the crash, butthe pilot was able get out. FirstLieutenants Lloyd Engelhardt andArthur Bancroft, both of who pre-viously had logged deep searchand rescue missions, were at thedivision command post when thecall for help came in. Both imme-diately volunteered to go, butMajor James Cupp, the division airofficer, ordered them to wait untilmore detailed information becameavailable. A few minutes later theylearned that the OY went downbeyond the Marine frontlines nearUijongbu, an unsecured areateeming with enemy and knownto be infested with antiaircraftguns. Bancroft, who won a coinflip to decide who would makethe rescue, took the lead withEngelhardt trailing by about a halfmile. They found the crash site,

but as Bancroft’s helicopter beganto settle it was hit by enemy fire anddisintegrated in a fireball. Engel-hardt called for fighter planes tosurvey the area. They reportedBancroft had been killed, andthere was no sign of the downedpilot. First Lieutenant Arthur R.Bancroft thus became the firstMarine helicopter pilot to die inaction.

Helicopters became crucial forcommand liaison. The rugged ter-rain, a major river, and wide dis-persal of fighting units made con-trol difficult. Helicopter mobilitymade it possible for commanders toscout approach routes, identifykey terrain, attend conferences inthe rear, and then quickly there-after meet subordinate comman-ders face-to-face. On 28 Septem-ber, Major General Smith coordi-nated the defense of Seoul as hevisited each of his three regimentalcommand posts: the 1st Marines atSeoul’s Duk Soo Palace; the 5thMarines at the Seoul Women’sUniversity; and the recentlyarrived 7th Marines on the city’swestern outskirts. The 1st and 5thMarines were to defend in placewhile the 7th attacked towardUijongbu. On 3 October, Arm-strong flew Commandant Cates onan aerial survey of the Inchon-Seoul area and a frontline inspec-tion tour highlighted by observationof an attack by the 7th Marines onthe 4th. This was the final groundcombat action of the campaign,although Marine helicopters con-tinued to fly deep rescue and med-ical evacuation missions fromKimpo throughout the rest ofOctober. Lieutenant Engelhardtrescued a Marine pilot nearChunchon on 3 October and thenplucked an Air Force pilot up atSibyon-ni on the 5th.

When the Inchon-Seoul cam-paign was officially declared over atnoon on 7 October 1950, VMO-6

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helicopters had flown 643 mis-sions, evacuated 139 seriouslywounded men, and rescued 12 air-men from behind enemy lines orout of the water.

The success of VMO-6’s fledg-ling helicopter detachment hadwide-ranging effects that spreadwell beyond the theater of opera-tions and impacted more than justthe Marine Corps. In the UnitedStates, military dogmatists andcivilian pundits complained longand loud about lack of inter-Service unity in Korea. However, inthe words of Major General John P.Condon, an expert in joint opera-tions and an experienced air

group commander in Korea: “Thefarther from Washington, the lessinter-Service differences came intoplay.” This dictate was borne out byMarine helicopter operations inlate October. On the 21st, CaptainGene W. Morrison made a series offlights to evacuate eight seriouslywounded Army paratroopers fromSukchon to Pyongyang in hisHO3S. Three days later, CaptainWallace D. Blatt, who had provid-ed helicopter coverage for thewithdrawal of U.S. forces fromChina, and First Lieutenant CharlesC. Ward flew deep into enemy ter-ritory to rescue a pair of Air Forcepilots down near Koto-ri, more

than 100 miles inland from theirtemporary base at Wonsan Harbor.These were only a few of manytimes Marine helicopters rescuedor aided other American service-men in Korea. Although both theU.S. Navy and Air Force were fly-ing helicopters in Korea, theMarine success with rotary-wingoperations at Pusan and Inchonprodded the Air Force to attachhelicopter units specifically ear-marked for medical evacuation toArmy field hospitals. Likewise, aclamor for organic transport andobservation helicopters arose fromU.S. Army commanders. The utili-ty and practicality of helicopters in

U.S. Naval Aviation Designations

During the Korean conflict, the Navy Bureau ofAeronautics used designation systems that con-veyed a lot of information about its squadrons and

aircraft in a concise manner.Squadron Designations:

The Bureau recognized three aircraft squadron types:lighter than air (Z); heavier than air (V); and helicopter(H). In addition, Marine aircraft squadrons were identi-fied by the insertion of the letter “M” between the aircrafttype and the squadron function. In general, a three let-ter prefix followed by up to three numbers was used toidentify individual Marine aircraft squadrons. The first let-ter (a “V” or “H”) identified the primary aircraft typeused by the squadron, the second letter (“M”) identifiedit as a Marine aviation unit, and the third (“O” indicatingobservation and “R” for transportation) identified thesquadron’s primary mission; the numbers in the suffixsometimes identified the squadron’s unit affiliation andalways noted its precedence order.

Thus, VMO-6 was the sixth heavier-than-air Marineobservation squadron formed. The single digit indicatedthat the squadron was not specifically affiliated with a par-ticular aircraft wing (observation squadrons wereattached to ground units). On the other hand, HMR-161was the first Marine helicopter transport squadronassigned to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (the first “1” indi-cating initial assignment to the wing, numbers above“6” were used for non-fixed wing aircraft, and the last “1”signifying it was the first squadron formed).

Aircraft DesignationsIndividual aircraft designations used a similar identi-

fication system. The Bureau of Aeronautics gave eachnaval aircraft a mixed letter and number designation.

Except for experimental or prototype helicopters, thefirst letter was an “H” indicating rotary-wing status; thesecond letter indicated its primary purpose (“O” forobservation, “R” for transport, or “T” for trainer); a num-ber (except in the case of the first model) indicated themanufacturer’s sequence for producing that specific air-craft type; the next letter identified the manufacturer(“L” for Bell, “P” for Piasecki, or “S” for Sikorsky); and thenumber following a dash indicated a sequential modifi-cation of that aircraft model.

Thus, the HO3S-1 was Sikorsky Aircraft’s third modelobservation helicopter with one modification; the HRPwas Piasecki’s first transport helicopter; the HTL-4 was thefourth modification to Bell Aircraft’s original trainer heli-copter; the HO5S was Sikorsky’s fifth observationmodel; and the HRS-1 was Sikorsky’s first transport heli-copter.

The Bureau’s system was a good one that remained inuse for four decades, but there were a few problems.First, aircraft were often used for roles other than thoseassigned. For example, the HO3S-1 was actually a utili-ty aircraft that during field service performed many tasksother than observation, a task that actually became a sel-dom-used secondary mission in Korea. Second, the pro-liferation of missions and manufacturers as time passedled to confusing duplication of letters (“T” was various-ly used to indicated torpedo, trainer, and transport air-craft). Third, lack of inter-Service consistency producedconfusion (the Navy HO3S-1 was an H-5F to the AirForce and Army). The naval aircraft designation systemwas replaced by a joint aircraft designation system in 1962,but the Bureau’s squadron designation system remains ineffect.

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combat zones had been firmlyestablished by the Marines ofVMO-6 in less than three months.

The Chosin Reservoir

General MacArthur’s successfulturning movement at Inchon dras-tically changed the course of theKorean War. Thereafter, the NKPAwas a broken machine with itsscattered remnants headed for theprotection of North Korea’s hinter-lands or a safe haven inside China.MacArthur, sensing a chance toend the conflict by trapping theremaining North Korean forces,sent his United Nations Commandspeeding north beyond the 38thParallel in a race for the Yalu Riverdespite warnings not to do so.

MacArthur split his forces tohasten the pursuit. He ordered theEighth Army forward in the westand opted to use X Corps, includ-ing the 1st Marine Division, for anamphibious landing at Wonsan innortheast Korea. Once again,VMO-6 split into forward and rearelements. The advance party (4officers and 70 enlisted menknown as the “surface” echelon)embarked on board LST 1123 andthen sailed for Wonsan on 13October. Most pilots, all VMO-6aircraft, and a skeleton ground-support crew remained at Kimpo.Fifth Air Force specifically taskedthe Marine helicopters with sup-porting a U.S. Army parachutedrop near Pyongyang, but theMarines also would conduct com-bat search and rescue as needed.This “flight” echelon was com-posed of 17 officers and 19 enlist-ed men with Captain Armstrong asofficer-in-charge. The stay-behindelement was to continue opera-tions from Kimpo until ramp spaceat Wonsan became available.Included in the helicopter flightechelon were several newlyarrived pilots and replacement air-

craft ferried in from the UnitedStates on board the aircraft carrierLeyte (CV 32). The new aircraftwere welcome additions thatmade nine Marine HO3S heli-copters available.

United Nations ground forcespressed forward against onlytoken resistance. A South Koreandivision occupied Wonsan in earlyOctober, but the amphibious taskforce carrying VMO-6 had to marktime sailing up and down the eastcoast until the harbor could becleared of mines. Consequently,members of VMO-6’s stay-behindechelon actually set down inNorth Korea before the advanceparty. On 23 October, CaptainBlatt and Lieutenant Ward flewnorth from Kimpo to Wonsan. Theairfield served as the squadron’s

home base from then until VMO-6moved to Yonpo on 3 November.The embarked surface echelonfinally got ashore on the 25th, andthe flight echelon completed itsmovement to Wonsan three dayslater.

Immediately after landing, the1st Marine Division began opera-tions. One regiment occupiedWonsan and manned two battal-ion-sized outposts (Majon-ni to thewest and Kojo to the south) whiletwo regiments proceeded about 50miles north to the port ofHungnam and the railway junctionat Hamhung before moving outtoward the Chosin Reservoir some78 miles farther inland. Althoughintelligence estimates indicatedthere would be little resistanceand X Corps commander, MajorGeneral Edward M. Almond, want-ed a rapid inland movement, theenemy had other ideas. A nightattack at Kojo caught the Ameri-cans by surprise and cut the mainsupply route while unexpectedlystrong NKPA forces encircled theMajon-ni outpost. With no over-land routes open, helicoptersbecame the only reliable link withboth outposts.

The 1st Marine Division wasalerted that the Kojo garrison wasunder attack in the early morninghours of 28 October. Emergencyrequests for medical assistance,specifically aerial evacuation heli-copters and a hospital receivingship in addition to ground rein-forcements, were quickly actedupon. Six HO3S helicopters weredispatched. As Captain GeneMorrison later recalled, the situationwas desperate enough that henever shut his engine down afterarriving at Wonsan on his ferryflight from Kimpo. Instead, hereceived a hurried cockpit briefand was on his way to Kojo with-out ever leaving the aircraft.Captains Blatt and Morrison, and

Capt Wallace D. Blatt, a helicopterpilot assigned to VMO-6 in Korea,had been a Marine multi-enginedtransport pilot at Guam andOkinawa during World War II. Helearned to fly helicopters immediatelyafter the war and was the first Marinehelicopter pilot deployed overseaswhen he flew a borrowed Navy HO3S-1 during the occupation of NorthChina.

National Archives Photo (USMC) A130580

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Lieutenants Engelhardt, Lueddeke,and Ward, collectively flew 17 seri-ously wounded men from Kojo tothe hospital ship Repose (AH 17) atWonsan Harbor. Captain GeorgeB. Farish provided airborne searchand rescue. During a search on 29October, he spotted the word“HELP” spelled out in straw abouta mile northeast of Tongchon. AsFarish trolled the area, a lone figureemerged from cover and thenbegan waving. Farish shouted:“Hey Mac, looking for a ride?” Hethen plucked up the first of sever-al lost Marines he brought in thatday. During several of the rescuesFarish left his helicopter to assistbadly wounded men to the idlingaircraft. Unfortunately, his daringattempt to rescue a Navy pilotunder fire late in the day came tonaught when it was discovered theman was already dead.

Helicopters played an importantrole at Majon-ni, a vital road junc-tion located in a Y-shaped valleyabout 25 miles west of Wonsan.

The village was occupied withoutresistance on 28 October, but with-in a week the garrison was com-pletely surrounded and the vulner-able main supply route becameknown as “Ambush Alley.” Radiocommunications between Majon-ni and Wonsan was uncertainbecause intervening high groundand intermittent atmospheric inter-ference allowed an open windowof only a few hours each day, so theonly reliable communications linkswere messages carried in and outby helicopter or OY pilots. For themost part, the Majon-ni strongpoint was supplied by airdrop andcasualty evacuation was by heli-copter from 2 November until thesiege lifted.

The Chosin Reservoir campaigntested the endurance of the“whirlybirds” and the skill of theirpilots and the fortitude of theirground crews like no other periodbefore Chinese anti-aircraft firebegan to light up the cloudedskies of northeast Korea. The via-

The hospital ship Repose (AH 17) at anchor in InchonHarbor. Note the helicopter landing pad mounted on the

ship’s stern; this configuration became standard on all hos-pital ships during the course of the Korean War.


Capt Gene W. Morrison, a helicopterpilot with VMO-6, was one of the firstMarine “Whirlybirds” to arrive innorthern Korea from Kimpo Airfield tosupport the Chosin Reservoir cam-paign. At Yonpo Airfield, he wasimmediately diverted to help evacuateserious wounded Marines from Kojo tothe hospital ship Repose (AH 17) inWonsan Harbor.National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A130604

bility of extended helicopter oper-ations at high altitude and in diffi-cult weather conditions was at thattime still conjectural. It wasbelieved that helicopters might notbe able to operate safely at anypoint beyond Chinhung-ni at themouth of the Funcilin Pass, abouttwo-thirds of the way to theChosin Reservoir, due to the thin airat that altitude. The effect of pro-longed cold weather on helicopter

operations was also a source ofconcern. This issue came to thefore when Captain Eugene Popehad to return his HO3S after onlyfour minutes aloft because the col-lective and cyclic controls weretoo stiff to adequately controlflight. Ground crews subsequentlyswitched to light weight lubricantsand tried to either hangar or coverall aircraft when not in use. Thesemeasures compensated for, but

did not completely alleviate, coldweather-induced problems. Re-duced lift in low temperatures athigh altitude and flight in windyconditions made flying in themountainous terrain hazardous,but there was no choice whenemergencies occurred. It alsobecame apparent that ground-effect hovers would not be possiblein the foreseeable future. An addi-tional problem was the ungainlyconfiguration of the HO3S-1,which required stretcher cases toextend outside the cabin. Sub-freezing temperatures and extremeairborne wind chill factors putalready wounded men at risk forfrostbite while enroute to safety.Thus, the already limited flightenvelope of the HO3S-1 was furtherrestricted by terrain and weather.

On 2 November, the 1st MarineDivision began its ascent towardthe reservoir following a heli-copter reconnaissance of theSudong Valley. No enemy troopswere located from the sky, butground units were soon mixing itup with the first Chinese Com-munist units yet encountered.General Smith ignored the advice ofthe X Corps commander to speed itup and instead moved his divisionsteadily ahead along a single-laneroad, keeping all units tied in andestablishing strong points alongthe way. His foresight and pru-dence likely saved the 1st MarineDivision from annihilation whenthe Chinese sprang their trap a fewweeks later.

Helicopters scouted hill-maskedflanks, reconnoitered the roadway,laid communications wire, provid-ed radio relays, and brought incrucial small items in addition totheir by-then normal jobs of com-mand liaison and medical evacua-tion. Despite increasingly poorweather, First Lieutenant Wardflew 115 miles from Yonpo toSongjin to rescue an Air Force air-

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borne forward air controllerwhose plane had gone down nearthe Chosin Reservoir on 5 No-vember. The HO3S was badly buf-feted by crosswinds and strainedto bite into the chilly thin air.Three days later, Captain Pope’shelicopter was blown out of thesky by turbulent winds while on aresupply run. The helicopter was awreck, but Pope escaped withoutserious injury. Lieutenant Wardarrived to take him out but wasbeset by a temperamental starter, soboth pilots spent the night at aground command post.

By 26 November, the 1st MarineDivision was dangerously spreadout. Little active resistance had yetbeen encountered, but veterancommanders were leery thatthings might be going too well.The Marines had moved upward

through the snow-covered Fun-chilin Pass over the main supplyroute, a treacherous, icy, winding,narrow, dirt road. General Smithwisely established a series of out-posts along the way; a regimentalsupply base at Koto-ri just north ofthe Funchilin Pass, an airstrip anddivision headquarters at Hagaru-rion the southern tip of the reservoir,a company-sized outpost guardedthe Toktong Pass from Fox Hill,and a jump off point manned bytwo regiments at Yudam-ni on thewestern tip of the reservoir.

Conditions were terrible. Swirl-ing snow and sub-zero tempera-tures were the result of the winds,which blew down from Man-churia. It would be hard to imaginemore difficult flying conditions forhelicopter operations. The bitterlycold, short days and lack of repair

facilities hampered helicoptermaintenance. It was under thesedire circumstances that the mettle ofVMO-6’s helicopter section wastruly tested.

Beginning on the night of 27November, the advance elementsof the 1st Marine Division becameheavily engaged at Yudam-ni andHagaru-ri. The fierce fighting atthe Chosin Reservoir required anall-hands effort by VMO-6 whenmore than six Chinese divisionstried to overrun two Marine regi-ments and cut the main supplyroute at several points. Helicopterpilots Blatt and Morrison bothreported enemy roadblocks be-tween Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri, thefirst official confirmation that the1st Marine Division was surround-ed. The Marines’ abortive advancewas about to become a breakout,

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Aerial evacuation of wounded and severely frostbittenMarines and soldiers from Hagaru-ri saved numerous lives.From late November to mid-December, Maj Vincent J.

Gottschalk’s squadron conducted a total of 191 helicopterevacuations out of a total of 1,544 flights.

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an epic of modern warfare duringwhich the Marines “attacked in adifferent direction” bringing outmost of their equipment and all oftheir wounded.

Several helicopters moved for-ward to Hagaru-ri to save flighttime on 28 November, and allavailable aircraft flew from dawnuntil dusk each day for the nextweek-and-a-half. General Smithoften used helicopters to visit hisscattered units during that time.The helicopters of VMO-6 logged40 sorties (1 reconnaissance, 16transport, and 23 medical evacua-tions) in 73.7 flight hours on the29th. Fifty seriously injured menwere flown out and numerousvital supplies (particularly radiobatteries and medicine) werebrought in; General Smith visitedthe forward command posts, and alarge group of enemy was spottedby helicopter that day. CaptainFarish’s HO3S was hit severaltimes as he delivered supplies to an

isolated rifle company perchedatop Fox Hill. As he later related:“They ran me off.” Farish limpedback to Hagaru-ri and safely land-ed under covering fire by theMarines in the perimeter, but his air-craft was operationally groundeddue to damage to the main rotortransmission. The next day, Lieu-tenant Engelhardt’s HO3S was hitwhile delivering vital radio batter-ies to Fox Hill. A bullet just missedthe pilot, and the helicopter was sodamaged that it had to return tobase for emergency repairs aftercarrying out one wounded Marine.Forty-three other casualties weresuccessfully brought out that day aswell by the HO3S-1s of VMO-6.Helicopters carried out 50 wound-ed and brought in medical sup-plies, gasoline, radio batteries, andtank parts in almost 60 hours offlight time on 30 November.

The Marines consolidated atHagaru-ri, broke out of the Chi-nese trap at Koto-ri, and moved

back toward the sea by way of anair dropped Treadway portablebridge that spanned the FunchilinPass. Throughout the ordeal at thereservoir, helicopters were theonly dependable means of physicalcontact between scattered units.They provided liaison, reconnais-sance, and medical evacuation;whenever a “whirlybird” flew amedical supply mission, ammuni-tion and radio batteries were part ofthe incoming load. These opera-tions were not without cost. On 3December, First Lieutenant Long-staff was killed at Toktong Passwhen his helicopter was broughtdown by enemy fire while trying torescue a critically wounded man.Captain Blatt played a role in adaring but ultimately tragic event.After several frustrating hours tryingto start his frozen helicopter, Blattwas finally able to get his aircraft tocrank up just as an emergency res-cue mission came in. Blatt took offbut then returned when the cover-ing air patrol told him an ax and fire

Although operating at the extreme edge of their performance envelope, theMarine HO3S-1s of VMO-6 provided reliable service at the Chosin Reservoir.During the most critical period the squadron’s helicopters and OYs provided theonly physical contact between units separated by enemy action.



Helicopter pilot 1stLt Robert A. Long-staff poses in front of his HO3S-1 heli-copter decked out in flight gear afterdelivering a downed Navy airman tothe Sicily (CVE 118). Longstaff wasthe second Marine helicopter pilotkilled in action when his aircraft washit by antiaircraft fire at the ChosinReservoir.

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extinguisher would be needed tofree the trapped pilot, Ensign JesseL. Brown, USN. Arriving at thescene, Blatt joined NavyLieutenant Junior Grade Thomas J.Hudner, Jr., who had purposelycrash-landed his plane in order toassist Brown. Despite their bestefforts, they could not extract themortally wounded man before hedied. The saddened men had toreturn empty handed, but Hudnerlater received the Medal of Honorfor his unselfish actions to rescuethe United States Navy’s firstAfrican-American combat pilot.

After the 1st Marine Divisiondeparted Koto-ri for Hungnam on6 December, VMO-6 moved back toYonpo. During the ensuing voyagefrom Hungnam some of thesquadron’s helicopters were ear-marked to conduct emergency res-cues during carrier-borne air oper-ations. On 12 December, the firstelements of the squadron (includ-ing two helicopters) began to backload on board LST Q082 for imme-diate transportation to Hungnam,which would then be followed bya seaborne redeployment toPusan. Seven helicopters remainedbehind until additional ship spacescould be found. On 17 December,three HO3Ss flew from their tem-porary home on the beach atWonsan to the battleship Missouri(BB 63) and then each trans-shipped to three different carriers(the Leyte [CV 32], Princeton [CV37], and Philippine Sea [CV 47]) forduty as standby plane guards, afourth HO3S served the heavycruiser St. Paul (CA 73). Threeadditional helicopters embarkedon board the Missouri late in theday. Enroute, Lieutenant ColonelRichard W. Wyczawski, commanderof Marine Fighter Squadron 212,was charged with overseeing themovement of VMO-6’s “lostsheep” during the voyage toPusan. They were successively

located on board their variousships and then gathered together onboard the light carrier Bataan(CVL 29) as the convoy sailedsouth. Unfortunately, three heli-copters were damaged enroute byhigh winds and heavy seas. Thefour operable “whirlybirds” flewoff their host carriers to Masan on26 December 1950. The otherswere off loaded at Pusan Harborand underwent repairs.

The return to Masan closed thebooks on the Chosin Reservoircampaign. During the movementnorth and the ensuing breakoutbetween 28 October and 15December, Marine helicoptersflew 64 reconnaissance, 421 trans-port, 191 medical evacuation, 60utility, and 11 search and rescuemissions; more than 200 woundedmen were flown out, most ofwhom would have died withoutspeedy medical assistance. All ofthis, of course, could not havebeen possible without the out-standing support of the tirelessground crews aided by Mr. HaroldNachlin, the much-respected civil-ian technical representative fromSikorsky Aircraft. As impressive asthese achievements were, however,the Chosin campaign once againpointed out the inadequacy of theHO3S as a military aircraft. A moreeffective medical evacuation plat-form was desperately needed, aswas a viable transport helicopter.Fortunately, each of these was inthe pipeline and would soon seecombat service.

Pohang to the Punchbowl

The unexpected CommunistWinter Offensive initiated thelongest retreat in American mili-tary history. While X Corps pulledback from northeast Korea, theEighth Army fell back more than600 miles before halting south ofSeoul. During the next eight

months the U.S. Marines wouldrest and rebuild at Masan, chaseelusive North Korean guerrillasnear Pohang, lead the UnitedNations Command drive up cen-tral Korea from Wonju to theHwachon Reservoir, survive thelast major Chinese offensive of thewar, then once again claw theirway north to a rugged mountainarea just north of the 38th Parallelwhere the U.N. lines wouldremain until the end of the war.Throughout those U.N. counterof-fensives the helicopters of VMO-6continued to provide outstandingsupport.

While the Marines in Koreawere slogging their way back fromChosin, several Bell HTL heli-copters arrived in Japan. The HTLwas a two-seat, single-engine aircraftthat was already familiar to everyhelicopter pilot because they hadlearned to fly helicopters usingBell-made trainers at Lakehurst andQuantico. These small “fishbowls”(so called due to their prominentplexiglass bubble canopies)mounted two evacuation pods,one on each side of the fuselage.This handy configuration made theBells much better adapted formedical evacuation than the vener-able Sikorskys. Unfortunately, theirrelatively underpowered engineswere unsuited for high-altitude,cold-weather operations, so theywere kept in reserve until theMarines returned to Pusan. Most ofthe older HTL-3s were assigned toheadquarters or maintenancesquadrons while all of the newerHTL-4s went to VMO-6. The planwas to gradually replace the HO3S-1s as HTL-4s became available. On28 December 1950, three HTL-4s,two HTL-3s, and another HO3S-1joined the ranks of VMO-6. FirstLieutenant John L. Scott flew thefirst operational mission with anHTL-4 on 2 January 1951. As theNew Year dawned, VMO-6 mus-

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Bell HTL

Thanks to the opening credits of the long-runningtelevision series “M*A*S*H,” a helicopter deliver-ing wounded men to a field hospital remains one

of the most enduring images of the Korean conflict. Theaircraft featured on that show was a Bell Model-47, thesame type flown by the Marines under the designationHTL and by the Army and Air Force as the H-13.

The Model-47 first flew in 1946, was granted the firstever U.S. commercial helicopter license in 1947, andremained in production for almost 30 years. Militaryversions saw extensive service in both Korea andVietnam, and several generations of naval aviation heli-copter pilots learned to fly using HTLs. Early modelHTL-2 trainers used at Lakehurst Naval Air Station, NewJersey, mounted wheels instead of skids and were cov-ered in fabric when the first Marine trainees learned tofly rotary-wing aircraft. The Chief of Naval Operationsdesignated the HTL as the prospective observation heli-copter in 1949. The press of combat operations inKorea, particularly the need for a more suitable aerialmedical evacuation platform than the HO3S, led to a mas-sive influx of HTL-4s to Marine Observation Squadron 6at the end of 1950.

The unique technical feature of all Bell helicopters wasa two-bladed rotor and stabilizer system that reduced fly-ing weight without harming performance, and theunique visual feature of the HTL was its clear Plexiglas

“goldfish bowl” cabin canopy that allowed all-roundvision. The HTL-4’s squat configuration and skidsallowed it to land in rough terrain while the inclusion oftwo exterior stretcher pods made it the preferred aircraftfor field evacuations of seriously wounded men.Unfortunately, it had an unreliable engine and a notori-ously weak electrical system that together requiredinordinate maintenance time while its limited fuel sup-ply severely reduced the helicopter’s combat radius.

Several generations of naval aviators learned to flyusing HTL trainers, and the Bureau of Aeronautics even-tually purchased more than 200 HTLs, the last of whichwere still regularly flying more than two decades after thefirst one took to the air. Advanced versions of the HTLdeveloped into the UH-1 Huey and AH-1 Cobra, theutility and attack helicopters that arm today’s FleetMarine Forces.

Aircraft DataManufacturer: Bell Aircraft CompanyPower Plant: 200 hp Franklin O-335-5Dimensions: Length, 41’5”; height, 9’ 2”; rotor, 35’ twoblade with stabilizerPerformance: Cruising speed, 60 mph; ceiling, range, 150milesLift: Pilot plus two passengers or two externally mount-ed stretchers

VMO-6 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov52

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tered 13 helicopters and nine OYobservation aircraft. An influx offresh faces was a welcome sight aswell because, according to CaptainGene Morrison, “the old hands . . .were . . . pretty tired” after six-months of grueling combat duty.Just as with the ground units, a sig-nificant personnel change wasunderway. The Regulars were giv-ing way to recalled reservists. By theend of January 1951, the number ofReserve pilots in VMO-6 equaledthe number of Regulars.

The 1st Marine Division spent amonth recuperating throughoutthe uneventful respite at theMasan Bean Patch. During thattime, VMO-6 operated from anairstrip near the waterfront. Amaintenance detachment includ-ing four officers and 11 enlistedmen moved from Korea to ItamiAir Base in Japan to prepare thegrowing fleet of arriving heli-copters for combat service. Mosthelicopter missions at Masan wereutility and liaison flights, althoughoccasional aerial reconnaissanceand familiarization flights were

also made. Concurrently, planswere being formulated for theMarines to move about 70 milesnortheast to secure the X Corpseastern flank by conductingantiguerrilla operations near thecoastal village of Pohang.

Helicopters proved invaluablefor liaison work even before the1st Marine Division moved to Po-hang. Unfortunately, poor weatheroften hampered flying conditions.General Smith had several hair-raising encounters en-route toplanning conferences, but healways arrived on time. TwoHO3S-1s were tossed about byhigh winds as they carried GeneralSmith’s forward command group

to meet with the new Eighth Armycommander, Lieutenant GeneralMatthew B. Ridgway, USA, on 30December 1950 at Kyongju. Theymade it on time despite the har-rowing flight conditions. On 8January 1951, General Smith wassummoned to a commander’s con-ference at Taegu. Dense foggrounded all fixed-wing aircraft,so Smith boarded LieutenantLueddeke’s HO3S for the flight.Lueddeke followed some dimlyvisible railroad tracks at about 400feet, twice having to suddenlyswerve to avoid mountainsidesalong the way. Once, the visibilitywas so reduced that Lueddeke hadto put the plane down in a rice

One of the little noted, but important missions performed by VMO-6 helicopterswas laying telephone wire between frontline positions. Here, a squadronground crewman loads wire spools onto a HTL-4 flown by Capt James R.O’Moore.



Capt George B. Farish, a helicopterpilot with VMO-6, stands by his BellHTL. Farish, by late 1950, had partic-ipated in more than 100 combat mis-sions and was responsible for theevacuation of more than 55 seriouslywounded United Nations troops.

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paddy; Smith lit his pipe and madesmall talk while waiting to resumehis journey. Not long thereafter,the pair took to the air once again;this time using roadside telephoneposts to guide them.

In early 1951, the 1st MarineDivision rooted out remnants of aNorth Korean division that hadinfiltrated the region surroundingPohang and threatened X Corpsheadquarters at Taegu. Dubbedthe “Pohang Guerrilla Hunt,” thecampaign sought to secure thisarea as it held the only usable porton Korea’s southeastern coast, themain supply route for east-centralKorea, and three vital airfields.

The VMO-6 ground support ele-ments moved from Masan toPohang by air, truck convoy, andship beginning on 13 January1951. The move was complete by16 February. Pohang’s mountain-ous and forested terrain hid theenemy who quickly broke up intosmall groups when the Marinesarrived. The solution was satura-tion patrolling. The Marines sentout fire-team and squad-sizedpatrols operating from platoon-and company-bases to flush outenemy stragglers. Helicopters wereused for observation, reconnais-sance, laying wire, command andcontrol, medical evacuations, re-supply of isolated small units, andtransportation of fire teams toremote hilltops. The guerrillaswere driven underground byrelentless Marine pressure, but notdecisively defeated. In the wordsof the official history: “In retro-spect, had [a full] squadron of heli-copters been available . . . its quicklift . . . increased mobility and sur-veillance would have made quite adifference in the conduct ofaction.” Unrealized at the time, theuse of helicopters at Pohang wasactually a foretaste of the methodsthat would be used by the U.S.Marines and Army on a much larg-

er scale in Vietnam more than adecade later.

The most notable helicopterincident of the guerrilla huntoccurred when First LieutenantJohn Scott flew the first night med-ical evacuation by a Bell heli-copter. There were several othernerve-wracking experiences aswell. On 27 January, for example,an HTL-4 flown by Captain HaroldG. McRay caught a skid on a low-strung cable and crashed whileattempting to takeoff from An-dong. The aircraft was wreckedbut neither the pilot nor his pas-senger, Brigadier General Lewis B.“Chesty” Puller, who had been“frocked” to this rank the nightbefore, were injured.

The helicopters of VMO-6 evac-uated 59 men, most from the 7thMarines at Topyong-dong, be-tween 25 and 31 January.Helicopter evacuations directly tohospital ships became routineoperations. The advantages of thistime-saving and life-saving methodwere enumerated by Captain John

W. McElroy, USNR, the comman-der of the hospital ship Consola-tion (AH 15): “tests . . . conclusive-ly proved the superiority of [heli-copters for] embarking and evacu-ating patients to and from the ship.There was less handling in thatpatients were moved directly fromairstrip to ship in one short hop,thereby eliminating . . . long andrough stages by boat and ambu-lance [and] ‘choppers’ [could] oper-ate when seas were too rough forboat handling.” When the Con-solation returned stateside for anoverhaul in July, a helicopter-land-ing platform designed by MarineMajor Stanley V. Titterud wasadded and Marine pilots instructedthe ship’s company in proper land-ing procedures. Upon return her toKorean waters, a pair of Sikorsky H-19 (U.S. Air Force designation forthe HRS) search and rescue heli-copters were stationed permanent-ly on board the Consolation tocarry out medical evacuationflights. U.S. Army aircraft eventual-ly replaced these Air Force heli-copters. Operations became sosmooth that it was not unusual fora litter case to be off the helicopterand on the way to the emergencyroom within a minute or less.Eventually, all hospital ships weresimilarly outfitted with landingplatforms. There is no definitivetally as to how many seriouslywounded men were saved due tothe swift treatment afforded by thehelicopters of all Services, butmost estimates reach well into thehundreds.

On 1 February, Captain GeneMorrison made a daring nightlanding on the deck of the Con-solation. The next day a similarevacuation flight to the Consola-tion almost ended in tragedy whena delirious patient became so vio-lent that Captain Clarence W.Parkins had to make an unsched-uled landing so he and the corps-


Capt Clarence W. Parkins points outthe spot where he was forced to crashland his helicopter in the water duringa test flight. Parkins later becameVMO-6’s acting commander.

man on board could subdue andbind the man. Parkins thenresumed the mercy flight.

From Pohang, the Marines weretapped to lead IX Corps up thecenter of the peninsula during aseries of limited objective attacks,Operations Killer, Ripper, andRugged, collectively called the“Ridgway Offensives.” These suc-cessive attacks, which began inlate February and continuedthroughout March and April, grad-ually pushed the Communists out ofthe Som River Valley and backabove the Hwachon Reservoir.During that time, VMO-6 followedin trail of the advance, successive-ly moving forward from Pohang toChung-ju, Wonju, Hongchon, andChungchon, only to move backagain when the Chinese mountedtheir spring offensives.

The Marines jumped off on 21February, but traffic congestiondelayed the arrival of Marineassault troops and hampered com-mand and control. Luckily, Gen-eral Smith had the use of a heli-copter and was able to communi-cate directly with his subordinatesand be present to observe the ini-tial attack. In the words of MarineCorps historian Lynn Montross:“Only the helicopter . . . enabledGeneral Smith to solve his timeand space problems prior toOperation Killer. The division wasrequired to move 150 miles byroad and rail from Pohang to theobjective area near Wonju in centralKorea, with only one road beingavailable for the last 30 miles.”

Three days later, Marine Gen-eral Smith was hurriedly sum-moned to the IX Corps advancedcommand post to take commandafter the commanding generaldied of a heart attack. This battle-field promotion, however, wasonly temporary until a more seniorArmy general arrived. Smith com-mandeered a Marine helicopter to

use during his time at IX Corps.As he later explained: “at theCorps level the helicopter waseven more essential for commandpurposes than at the divisionlevel.”

Just as before, although not anofficial task for observationsquadrons, combat search and res-cue missions remained a high pri-ority. Captain Morrison picked up aMarine fighter pilot downed nearSong-gol on 12 March. On 27

March, two Marine helicoptersflown by Captain Norman C.Ewers and First Lieutenant Robert A.Strong were called out to conducta search and rescue mission for anAir Force C-119 Flying Boxcar thathad gone down behind enemylines. They found the site, setdown, picked up three injuredcrewmen, and recovered the bodyof a fourth airman. The impact ofhelicopters on operations in Koreawas such that by that time this dar-

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ing mission that would once havegarnered stateside headlines, hadbecome routine.

Between 1 January and 30March, VMO-6 evacuated 539wounded Marines (60 in January, 99in February, and 370 in March).The helicopter section was ex-tremely fortunate; it lost only twoaircraft (General Puller’s HTL-4and an HO3S-1 lost to a takeoffincident on 12 March) and suf-fered no one killed in action.Unfortunately, the month of Aprilwas a tough one; three helicopterswould be lost during heavy fighting.

April began with a command

change for VMO-6. Major Gotts-chalk departed on the last day ofMarch and the officer-in-chargehelicopter section, Captain Clar-ence W. Parkins, became the actingsquadron commander until thearrival of Major David W. Mc-Farland who would command thesquadron for the next six months.The squadron at that time num-bered 28 officers and 125 enlistedmen with nine OY observation air-craft, five HO3S-1s, and six HTL-4s.

The 13th of April was a busyday for helicopter search and res-cue. First, Captain James R.O’Moore and Technical Sergeant

Philip K. Mackert took off tosearch for a lost aircraft with thehelp of a flight of Marine Corsairs.They were unable to locate thatpilot and one of the Corsair escortswas shot down. O’Moore set hisHO3S down, then he and Mackertrushed over to try to save the pilotbut it was too late. Later that day,Captain Valdemar Schmidt, Jr.’sHO3S-1 was brought down byenemy fire during a rescue missionabout 20 miles behind enemylines. Several hits from small armsfire caused a loss of power andcontrol as the helicopter made itsfinal approach. He crash landed in

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As commanding officer of VMO-6, Maj David W.McFarland initiated night aerial observation flights by OYplanes. Instead of the intended improvement in Marine

artillery accuracy, the mere presence of an OY overheadwould often silence enemy artillery.


hilly terrain and his aircraft rolledover upon impact. Schmidt suf-fered only minor injuries, but hispassenger, Corporal Robert Sarviawrenched his leg, cut his hand,and went into shock. Americanaircraft circling above kept theenemy at bay with strafing runsuntil helicopter pilot CaptainFrank E. Wilson arrived on thescene. Wilson picked up the twoMarines in addition to the AirForce pilot they had came afterand then made his precarious wayback in the dark, flying an over-loaded helicopter without naviga-tional aids. Jeeps, trucks, andflares lit the field for Wilson’sreturning aircraft.

Not every mission had a happyending. Sometimes, despite greateffort on the part of helicopterpilots, a rescue could not be made.On 14 April, Captain GeneMorrison made three attempts topick up a downed pilot, but hisHO3S was turned away by enemyfire each time. Captain NormanEwers then tried, but he took somany hits he had to return to baseempty handed as well. Plans weremade to rig a stretcher to lift thepilot out the next morning, butinclement weather intervened.When OY aircraft flying over thetarget area could not locate theman, the helicopter rescue wasscrubbed.

On the night of 22 April, theChinese mounted their longexpected Fifth Phase Offensive.When a South Korean unit on theMarines’ left flank broke and ran,the 1st Marine Division pulledback and formed a semi-circle onthe high ground to defend severalvital river crossings. The bitterfighting, collectively known as thebattle of Horseshoe Ridge, wasmarked by fierce hand-to-handcombat and several last ditchdefensive stands by isolated unitsthat equaled the combat intensity at

the Naktong bulge or the ChosinReservoir. The division sufferedabout 500 casualties in three daysfighting.

The last days of April found thehelicopters of VMO-6 busily evac-uating wounded men from dawnuntil dusk in an all-hands effortuntil the Marines reached the NoName Line. At about 0600 on the23d, all helicopters were airborneand most continued operationsthroughout the day with 36 indi-vidual flights made (15 by HO3S-1sand 21 by HTL-4s). Fifty woundedMarines were evacuated. CaptainDwain L. Redalen logged 18 evac-

uations in almost 10 hours of flying;First Lieutenant George A. Eatonwas a close second with 16 menbrought out. The next day an HTL-4 was lost to enemy fire when FirstLieutenant Robert E. Mathewsonwas shot out of the sky as heattempted a medical evacuation.Enemy fire hit the engine, instru-ment pedestal, and tail sectionsrendering Mathewson’s aircraftuncontrollable as he hovered overthe air panels set out to mark thelanding zone. Mathewson crash-landed but was uninjured.Lieutenant John Scott, who set arecord with 18 evacuations in one

39

Capt Norman G. Ewers receives word that a helicopter is needed in the forwardarea for a reconnaissance mission. During daylight hours VMO-6 pilots stood bywith elements of the 1st Marine Division, maintaining constant contact with tac-tical air controllers by field telephone.


day, tried to fly in despite the dan-ger, but was waved off byMathewson who then picked up arifle and temporarily joined theinfantry. His crippled aircraft wasdestroyed by demolitions beforethe Marines departed. Thirty-twohelicopter missions were flown,and about another 50 seriouslywounded were evacuated byMathewson’s fellow pilots.

The United Nations Commandbriefly regrouped behind the NoName Line, repelled a secondCommunist offensive, then onceagain set off north—this timeheading the Kansas Line along the38th Parallel. Non-stop fightinghad exhausted the enemy and hisforces were seriously depletedafter suffering grievous losses inthe recently concluded springoffensive. The desperation of theenemy was evident as unprece-dented numbers of them began tosurrender. This time it was the

Communists who were “buggingout.” By the end of June, theUnited Nations Command wasonce again about to enter NorthKorea. At that point, the Com-munists called for a cessation ofoffensive actions as a prelude topeace talks. The United Nationsaccepted this condition, and thefighting forces of both sides tem-porarily settled down along a linenot far from the original pre-warborder between the two Koreas.

During August, VMO-6 operat-ed from Songjong until the 28th,then moved to Sohung. The monthsaw several rescue missions. FirstLieutenant Joseph C. Gardiner, Jr.,picked up a downed Marine fight-er pilot on 12 August. On 28August, Major Kenneth C. Smedleyused his HTL-4 to pull two com-munications men stranded on asmall island in the middle of arapidly rising river out of harm’sway. That same day, Captain

Frank E. Wilson lost control of hisHTL-4 when a crewman jumpedout of the hovering aircraft duringan attempted rescue. CaptainFrank G. Parks was credited withsaving several lives by deliveringwhole blood in darkness on 29August despite the fact his heli-copter had no lit instrumentation,no landing lights, and no hominglocator.

When peace talks broke down inSeptember, Lieutenant GeneralJames A. Van Fleet, USA, comman-der of the Eighth Army since mid-April, mounted a series of limitedattacks intended as much to pres-sure the Communists back to thepeace table as to secure dominatingterrain just north of the KansasLine. The Marine sector featured avolcanic depression known as thePunchbowl. Its capture was abloody three-week slugfest foughtover nearly impassable roadlessmountain terrain, so helicopterswere much in demand. Marinepilots were at risk as they coura-geously defied enemy fire on theirmissions of mercy. The HO3 andHTL helicopters delivered smallloads of medicine, ammunition,and radio batteries to the front andthen brought out 541 severelywounded men. Another frequentmission was the delivery of wholeblood to forward-deployed Med-ical Companies A and E of the 1stMedical Battalion.

On 16 September the light heli-copters of VMO-6 evacuated 85men. First Lieutenant JosephGardiner led the pack with 17medical evacuations. Major Ed-ward L. Barker’s HTL was hit byenemy artillery as he tried to liftout a pair of wounded Marines. Heescaped without injury, but one ofhis passengers succumbed to hiswounds before reaching medicalsanctuary. The following day,Captain William G. Carter’s HTL-4crashed while conducting an

40


1stLt Joseph C. Gardiner, left, an HO3S-1 pilot with VMO-6, is awarded a NavyCommendation Ribbon and a pair of gold stars denoting second and thirdawards of the Air Medal for combat actions during the Inchon-Seoul campaign.Marine helicopters played an important role in the drive inland by providing trans-portation, medical evacuation, and visual reconnaissance for the 1st MarineDivision.

emergency medical evacuation.Ground personnel attempting toassist the landing on rough terraingrabbed the helicopter’s skids butinadvertently tipped the aircraftcausing it to crash. The aircraftwas lost and the pilot sufferednon-threatening injuries. CaptainGilbert R. Templeton’s HO3S-1was hit by enemy fire during aresupply mission on 21 Septem-ber; Templeton was able to returnto base for repairs, but the missionhad to be scrubbed. Major Ken-neth C. Smedley, the squadron’sexecutive officer, crashed whenhis HO3S-1 lost hover and setdown hard on uneven ground.When the plane began to slip overthe steep cliff, Smedley had tointentionally roll the helicopter onits side to stop its descent. Neitherhe nor his passenger was injured,but the helicopter was wrecked.

The fighting for the Punchbowllasted until late September. Afterthat, both sides settled down andbegan to dig in. The capture of thePunchbowl marked the last majoroffensive action by the Marines inKorea.

As the first year of the KoreanWar came to a close there could belittle doubt that the helicopter wasthe most important tactical innova-tion to date. The plucky little aircrafthad proven themselves adaptable,versatile, and survivable. The abil-ity of the helicopter to traverse dif-ficult terrain, to land in tight spots,and to rapidly scout unfamiliar ter-ritory made it the preferred mode oftransportation for generals andcolonels; downed pilots couldlook forward to being hoisted outof the freezing water or grabbed upfrom behind enemy lines with acertainty never before experi-enced; and almost 2,000 men hadbeen lifted to hospitals with in afew hours of being wounded, afactor that greatly increased sur-vival rates. There was little doubt

the helicopter was here to stay,but thus far in the war the “whirly-birds” had not yet been used fortheir proposed main missions andoriginal raison d’etre: vertical en-velopment and assault support.This was due to the inadequate liftof the machines currently avail-able, but that was about to changeas the war entered its second year.

Arrival of HMR-161

Marine Transport HelicopterSquadron 161 (HMR-161) was thefirst transport helicopter squadronin history. It was also the first fullhelicopter squadron committed tocombat. Mounted in brand newSikorsky HRS-1 helicopters, HMR-161 arrived in Korea in earlySeptember 1951 and was soontesting new operational methodsunder actual combat conditions, alittle more than one year afterBrigadier General Edward Craig’soriginal recommendation that sucha squadron be sent into combat.The squadron’s arrival at that par-ticular juncture in the war was for-tuitous because the 1st MarineDivision, then slogging its waynorth against stubborn Communistresistance in the mountains ofeast-central Korea, was led by twoearly and very influential propo-nents of helicopters—divisioncommander Major General GeraldC. Thomas and his chief of staffColonel Victor H. Krulak. BothMarines were plank holders in thehelicopter program; from Wash-ington, D.C., and Quantico, Vir-ginia, they pushed for adoption ofrotary-winged aircraft and created atest-bed squadron immediatelyafter the war. Krulak helped writeinitial helicopter doctrine anddrew up many of the first opera-tional plans used by HMX-1, whileThomas pushed for expandedhelicopter development at Head-quarters Marine Corps in the

immediate post-war period, thengained practical experience intheir use at Quantico after hisreturn from China in the late1940s. Both men were knownthroughout the Corps as innova-tors and visionaries, but they alsogarnered reputations for thoroughplanning and meticulous execu-tion of those plans. In retrospect, itwas clear that HMR-161 and the1st Marine Division formed a per-fect match.

Plans to create transport heli-copter squadrons had been on theboard well before the outbreak ofthe Korean War. In fact, early post-war planners envisioned a Marinehelicopter aircraft wing comprising10 squadrons with 24 helicopterseach. The proposed machinesshould be able to carry 15-20 menor 4,000 pounds of cargo. This wasno small order because that numberof aircraft just about equaled theentire American helicopter pro-duction to that time and no existinghelicopter could come close to lift-ing the specified number of troopsor amount cargo. The main stickingpoints were lack of funds, a ceilingon aircraft procurement, and—most importantly—lack of a suit-able aircraft. The demands of theKorean War loosened up fundingand virtually eliminated aircraftprocurement restrictions. Thus, theonly remaining roadblock becamethe machines themselves.

Long-range plans in the late1940s called for the creation of upto six transport helicopter squad-rons by the mid-1950s. Thisleisurely pace was driven as muchby technology as by anything else.The Marines wanted a reliable,high-performance, heavy-lift heli-copter to carry cohesive tacticalunits ashore from escort carriersand then rapidly build up supplieswithin the beachhead. The problemwas the machines of the day weretoo limited in range, lift, and

41

42

Sikorsky HRS-1

The HRS transport helicopter was the military ver-sion of the Sikorsky S-55 commercial aircraft. It fea-tured the familiar Sikorsky design signatures, a

single overhead main rotor and a small anti-torque rotoron the tail boom. Although many of its componentswere simply enlarged versions of similar ones found inthe HO3S, the HRS did not look much like the Marines’earliest observation helicopter. It was much larger, itscargo space included seats for eight passengers, thetwo-seat cockpit was located high on the fuselage and setfarther back than the HO3S, and the engine was mount-ed low on the front of the aircraft rather than high amid-ships. Although initially selected as only an interimmodel until a larger heavy-lift helicopter became available,the Navy Department eventually purchased 235 variantsof the S-55. The U.S. Army and Air Force flew similar mod-els as H-19s, and the Coast Guard variant was the HO4S-3G.

The Marine Corps turned to the Sikorsky S-55 after itsfirst choice, the Piasecki H-16, outgrew the ability tooperate from small escort carriers—foreseen as thetransport helicopter’s primary mission. The Navy wasalready looking at one version of the S-55; an antisub-marine variant designated the HO4S. There was no obvi-ous external difference between the HRS and the HO4S.This was because the main difference was each respec-tive aircraft’s mission. The Marine transport helicopter didaway with mine detection equipment but mountedtroop seats and had self-sealing fuel tanks. The mostinnovative feature of the S-55 was its engine placement.It was set low in the helicopter’s nose. A drive shaft ranup through the back of the cockpit to provide power tothe three-bladed overhead main rotor. The engine place-ment made it easy to reach, cutting maintenance time.That configuration also eliminated critical center-of-gravity problems that plagued both the HO3S and the

HTL. The HRS also mounted a drop hook to carry exter-nal loads under the cabin. The main shortfalls of the HRSwere that the machine was underpowered and mechan-ical failures required them to be grounded on severaloccasions. No Marine HRSs were lost to enemy fire, butseveral crashed while hovering and at least two wentdown in mid-air due to engine failure.

The HRS was a great step forward, but it was not thetransport helicopter Marine planners envisioned. Theywanted an aircraft that could carry 15 or more men toensure unit integrity during assaults and generatingenough lift to carry most division equipment. The mainproblem with the HRS was lifting power. Although ratedfor eight passengers, in the harsh reality of the Koreanmountains the HRS could only carry about six men—onlyfour if they were fully combat loaded. Both IgorSikorsky and Frank Piasecki worked feverishly to deliv-er a more capable aircraft, but that advance would haveto wait until the development of a practical turbine heli-copter engine.

The first batch of Marine HRS-1s included 60machines and the second order of HRS-2s mustered 91,the final version (HRS-3) included 89 more. Only the firsttwo variants saw action in Korea, but some HRS-3s werestill in the Marine inventory when their designation waschanged to the CH-19E in accordance with theDepartment of Defense unified designation system in1962.

Aircraft DataManufacturer: Sikorsky Aircraft Division of United AircraftCorporationType: Transport helicopterAccommodation: Ten-places (two crew and eight passengers)Power Plant: One 600 hp Pratt & Whitney R-1340-57Cruising speed: 80 mphPayload: 1,050 pounds


avionics. Frank Piasecki’s tandemrotor helicopters seemed to offerthe best potential. However, thedevelopment of an improved ver-sion of the Flying Banana was tak-ing too long, and its projected sizewas not compatible with escortcarrier deck space. The Marines,therefore, reluctantly opted to gowith an interim transport heli-copter until a more capable air-craft became a reality. Themachine they chose was a variantof the Sikorsky model S-55, whichwas already in naval service as theHO4S. The HO4S featured thestandard Sikorsky frame: a singleoverhead rotor with a tail-mountedanti-torque rotor. Many of its com-ponents were little more than larg-er versions of those of the HO3S,but a front-mounted engine great-ly enhanced ease of maintenanceand in-flight stability. Luckily, theantisubmarine warfare HO4S heli-copter required only minor modifi-cations to meet Marine Corps

requirements. A Marine assaulttransport helicopter, designatedthe HRS, was created by eliminatingthe antisubmarine warfare suitesand then adding self-sealing fueltanks and placing troop seats inthe cargo bay. An initial order for 40HRS-1s was sent to SikorskyAircraft in July 1950. The “interim”tag, however, may have been pre-mature. Every U.S. Armed Serviceand many of our allies eventuallyused the S-55 (designated H-19 bythe Army and Air Force), and 235HO4S/HRS variants entered navalservice over the next decade.

On 15 January 1951, the firstMarine transport squadron wasformed at Marine Corps Air StationEl Toro. The unit tentatively wasdesignated HMR-1 (“H” for heli-copter, “M” for Marine, “R” fortransport, and “1” for first), butthat name was changed before thesquadron became operational.The new squadron was given theprefix “1” because it would be

assigned to the 1st Marine AircraftWing; the middle number “6” wasadopted because the highest fixed-wing designator to that time hadbeen “5”; and the last “1” indicatedit was the first squadron formed,thus the new squadron becameHMR-161. The commanding offi-cer was Lieutenant ColonelGeorge W. Herring, the formerexecutive officer of HMX-1. A mixof regulars and reservists populat-ed the new transport helicoptersquadron. Most of the pilots, likethe squadron’s executive officerMajor William P. Mitchell, hadbeen fixed-wing pilots in thePacific. Lieutenant Colonel Her-ring, however, had received theNavy Cross as a Marine raiderbefore receiving his wings. Whilethe mix of regular and reservepilots was about equal, most of thesquadron’s enlisted personnelwere reservists. The squadrontrained at the Navy’s formerlighter-than-air base located at

43

In July 1951, Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161staged a helicopter demonstration for the press at CampPendleton, California. Its purpose was to show how helicopters

would be used in modern warfare as envisioned by theMarine Corps.


Tustin, California, not far fromCamp Pendleton while waiting forits new helicopters. The squadrongradually built up to its fullstrength of 43 officers and 244enlisted men flying 15 HRS-1 heli-copters before receiving orders toprepare to ship out for Korea inJuly 1951.

The squadron embarked at SanDiego on 16 August with the heli-copters and aircrews on board theescort carrier Sitkoh Bay (CVE 86)and the equipment and a workingparty on board the civilian-manned cargo ship Great Falls.The squadron arrived at Pusan on2 September. In Korea, HMR-161came under the administrative

control of the 1st Marine AircraftWing and the operational control ofthe 1st Marine Division, the samecommand and control arrange-ments used by VMO-6. Four daysafter landing, HMR-161 movedfrom airfield K-1 (Pusan East) toairfield K-18 (Kangnung Airdrome)in central Korea. From there, theadvance echelon moved by truckand air to X-83 at Chodo-ri, anauxiliary airstrip not far from thedivision headquarters, alreadyhosting VMO-6. A rear echelonremained at K-18 to conductadvanced maintenance and makecomplex repairs.

The fact that HMR-161 was evenin Korea was at least partially due

the efforts of Major GeneralThomas and Colonel Krulak whoactively pushed to speed the paceof getting transport helicoptersinto the combat zone. Thomas andKrulak were well aware of thetechnical limitations of the HRS-1and the demands of Korea’s difficultweather and rugged terrain, sothey began testing its abilitiesslowly. The initial helicopter oper-ations were modest ones to testthe waters, carefully conductedwith little risk. First came a coupleof resupply efforts well shieldedfrom enemy observation anddirect fire. Next came small-scaletroop lifts, eventually increasing tobattalion-sized movements. Tac-tical innovations were also on theagenda: counter-guerrilla activi-ties; a night assault; and rapidmovement of rocket batteries. Itwas not long before a division oflabor emerged. The smaller aircraftof VMO-6 concentrated on med-ical evacuations, reconnaissance,observation, and liaison work,while HMR-161 conducted aerialresupply, moved troops, andexperimented with vertical envel-opment. Although the HRS coulddo everything its smaller kincould, medical evacuations andcombat search and rescue weresecondary missions for HMR-161.This was possible because of thestatic nature of the fighting. In fact,the combat situation eventuallybecame stable enough that it waspossible to increase emphasis onamphibious training even thoughthe squadron remained in thecombat zone, a factor that lent ele-ments of realism and urgency tothe helicopter training programthat were probably not present atQuantico, Virginia, or OnslowBeach, North Carolina. The stun-ning success in Korea of heli-copters used for assault supportsilenced critics and convertedskeptics. In the words of historian

44


A Marine Sikorsky HRS-1 transport helicopter is loaded on board the escort car-rier Sitkoh Bay (CVE 86) at San Diego, California, for the journey to Korea. Thearrival of HMR-161 and the HRS-1 would mark a new era in Marine airbornesupport to ground troops.

Lynn Montross, with the introduc-tion of HMR-161 to Korea “a newera of military transport haddawned.”

The first order of business was toconduct familiarization flights sothe pilots could become accus-tomed to the terrain and get a feelfor the tactical and operationalconditions at the front. The veteranpilots of VMO-6’s helicopter ele-ment indoctrinated the new menof HMR-161 in flying conditionsand combat procedures. Also dur-ing this time various potentiallanding zones and flight routeswere identified. While the pilotswere busy flying, selected mem-bers of the shore party battalionbecame familiar with helicopterlanding and loading procedureswhile planners met to prepare forthe squadron’s first combat opera-

tion. General Thomas wiselydecided to use a series of cautiousactivities until both the helicoptercrews and ground units got up tospeed, he then pushed an aggres-sive agenda featuring a wide vari-ety missions that became progres-sively more complex and thatthoroughly tested existing opera-tional procedures and new theo-ries for helicopter employment.

The initial combat operation byHMR-161 took place only twoweeks after its arrival. It wasdubbed Operation Windmill tohonor the HRS’s unofficial nick-name, “Flying Windmill.” Mindful ofthe chaotic experiences of the firstPackard exercise at Camp Lejeune,North Carolina, and well aware ofthe dictates of Phib-31, Krulak andThomas ensured the new transporthelicopters would be carefully

45


LtCol George W. Herring, right, com-manding officer of HMR-161, is wel-comed to Korea by LtCol Edward V.Finn, the 1st Marine Division’s airofficer. LtCol Herring commanded theworld’s first transport helicoptersquadron used in combat.

MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, center, in command of the 1stMarine Division, discusses plans for using the new 10-placeSikorsky HRS-1 helicopters with the leaders of HMR-161,LtCol George W. Herring, the commanding officer, right,

and his executive officer, Maj William P. Mitchell. Thomaswas instrumental both in bringing helicopters into theMarine Corps and getting the first Marine helicopter trans-port squadron to Korea in 1951.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-132027

integrated into a Marine air-groundcombat team, not just used as a“nice-to-have” aviation adjunct aswas sometimes the case withVMO-6’s light helicopters. One ofthe first steps in this process was totrain elements of the 1st ShoreParty Battalion for helicopter oper-ations. Shore parties had beenformed during World War II tohandle supplies coming ashore bylanding craft. The logical exten-sion of this mission to landingzones as well as landing beacheseventually led to the formation ofspecially trained helicopter sup-port teams. In addition, the ener-getic division chief of staff,Colonel Krulak, held a series ofplanning conferences with the 1stMarine Division staff even beforeHMR-161 was in Korea to draw uptentative standard operating pro-cedures. Ground units needed tolearn the intricacies of helicoptermovement and their leaders wereencouraged to apply the uniquecapabilities of helicopters in tacticalsituations. Before HMR-161 leftKorea, its helicopters had per-

formed virtually every missionenvisioned under operational con-ditions. The squadron’s main func-tions, however, were to test thepracticality of vertical envelop-ment and to practice assault supportby ferrying troops and deliveringsupplies to units in the field. Thelatter was the most exercised mis-sion while on the East-CentralFront. After moving to westernKorea in 1952, emphasis eventual-ly shifted to vertical envelopmentusing a continuing series ofamphibious exercises. These exer-cises and combat operations werethe foundation of the sophisticatedairmobile tactics and techniquesstill used by the U.S. Army andMarine Corps of today.

In September 1951, Marineswere clearing the enemy from aseries of ridges around an extinctvolcano called the Punchbowl.The ground battalion commander,Lieutenant Colonel Franklin B.Nihart described the difficult tacti-cal situation:

“We were attacking from Hill

673 toward Hill 749 . . . oursupply and evacuation routewas four miles of mountainousfoot trails. The only way tokeep supplies moving . . .was by using Korean ServiceCorps porters. . . . [They]could not keep up with thelogistical demands imposedby heavy casualties and highammunition expenditure [so]HMR-161 was called in to fillthe . . . gap.”

On 12 September, the first com-bat helicopter support team—aplatoon from 1st Shore PartyBattalion—attended briefings a-bout proper loading techniquesand learned how to transmit land-ing signals to incoming aircraft.The next morning was devoted toarranging supplies into 800-poundbundles. The first flight consistingof four helicopters made its wayabout seven miles and thendeposited the shore party landingpoint section to enlarge andimprove the landing zone, directlanding operations using hand sig-nals, unload arriving helicoptersand collect cargo bundles, establishsupply dumps, and load battlecasualties. In mid-afternoon, sevenHRS-1s began lifting off with cargoloads suspended from belly hooks.The ingress and egress routes fol-lowed a deep valley that maskedthe helicopters from direct enemyobservation. A restrictive fire planwas in effect to avoid friendly fire.The landing zone was markedwith fluorescent panels, but thefirst incoming aircraft could onlyplace two of their four wheels onthe landing platform, which wassituated on the reverse slope of asteep hill. The first supply heli-copter dropped its sling at 1610and then picked up seven battlecasualties (two stretcher cases andfive walking wounded). Opera-tion Windmill I comprised 28

46


Vital supplies are transferred from a truck to a helicopter for delivery to front-line troops. Helicopters often offered the only practical way to supply positionsin the trackless mountain terrain near the Punchbowl.

flights that delivered 18,848pounds of supplies and evacuated74 seriously wounded men. Theelapsed time was two hours and 40minutes with a total of 14.1 flighthours logged. Lieutenant ColonelNihart’s final evaluation of HMR-161’s first combat action in sup-port of his battalion was that “they. . . performed admirably.”

Continued fierce fighting in thevicinity of the Punchbowl, particu-larly for an outcropping dubbed“the Rock,” led to the secondtransport helicopter assault sup-

port mission. Spurred on theunquestioned success of WindmillI as well as the need for heavy for-tification materials such as sandbags, timber, barbed wire, andland mines, it was decided to con-duct a follow-on aerial supplyoperation, Windmill II. The need tomove bulky fortification materials toa nearly inaccessible positiondrove operational planning. Sandbags, barbed wire, land mines,and timber were all too cumber-some and heavy to be moved for-ward by Korean laborers so

General Thomas turned to hisrotary-winged “mule train” for thesecond time in a week. The formalrequest was made on the morningof 19 September, approved beforenoon, and underway before night-fall. Ten HRS-1s delivered morethan 12,000 pounds of cargo using16 flights in about one hour. Thesame operational procedures forWindmill I were used: an advancehelicopter support team wasinserted to operate the landingzone; the helicopters used coveredand concealed routes; and materi-al was delivered using sling-loaded bundles for speed and easeof handling. The major differencewas the rapid planning process,this time preparations took only afew hours instead of several days.Once again, the helicopters ofHMR-161 did within a few hourswhat would have taken the trail-bound South Korean porters severaldays.

With the ability of HMR-161 todeliver supplies fully established,the next evolution was to lifthuman cargo. This was OperationSummit. The mission was for the 1stMarine Division reconnaissancecompany to replace a SouthKorean unit occupying Hill 884, akey observation post located atopa rugged mountain. It was estimat-ed that it would take a Marine riflecompany about 15 hours to scalethe roadless heights with all resup-ply thereafter accomplished eitherby foot or by helicopter. GeneralThomas decided instead to mountthe first combat helicopter trooplift in history.

Once again, careful planningand preparation were the hall-marks of this operation. Lieuten-ant Colonel Herring and MajorMitchell coordinated their tacticalplans with Major Ephraim Kirby-Smith (the ground unit comman-der) and worked out the loadingplans with First Lieutenant Richard

47

Marine transport helicopter “HR-10,” one of 15 HRS-1s assigned to HMR-161, landsto deliver supplies near the Punchbowl. Detachments from the 1st Air DeliveryPlatoon loaded the supplies while helicopter support teams from the 1st Shore PartyBattalion controlled the unloading at forward area landing zones.


C. Higgs, representing the divisionembarkation section. Aerial recon-naissance indicated the landingwas going to be a tight squeeze.The only two available spots werelocated some 300 feet below thetopographical crest about a foot-ball field length apart, and eachwas less than 50-feet square with asheer drop on two sides. Terrainlimited each landing zone to onearrival at a time. Operational plan-ning was based upon the dictates ofPhib-31 and practical experienceduring the Windmill operations.The landing force would consist ofa reinforced reconnaissance com-pany. Helicopter support teamsfrom the 1st Shore Party Battalionwould control loading and unload-ing. Landing serials were compiledand rehearsals began on 20

September. H-hour was slated for1000 the next day.

Several problems soon becameapparent. First was the number oftroops each helicopter could carry.The HRS-1 was rated to carry eightcombat-loaded troops but practicalexperience in California and Koreaquickly showed this figure to beoverly optimistic. The actual safeload was six men carrying onlysmall arms and personal equip-ment. A second problem wasweather. The threat posed by highwinds and the possibility of limitedvisibility or rain influenced opera-tions. An additional problem in themountainous region was reliableradio communications. The solu-tion was to earmark one helicopteras a radio relay aircraft, the firstuse of a helicopter for air-to-air

command and control duringground operations.

Operation Summit was delayedon the morning of 21 September bydense ground fog. Finally, about ahalf-hour later than expected, thefirst wave of three helicopters atlanding field X-83 departed for the14-mile run to Hill 884. Theyapproached their objective flyinglow along a streambed betweenthe ridgelines and then hoveredover Hill 884’s reverse slope. Asecurity element went hand-over-hand down knotted ropes andthen fanned out. Next in were twolanding site preparation teams.About 40 minutes later, idling heli-copters at X-83 received word tobegin loading. Each carried fiveriflemen. Two hundred and twen-ty four men, including a heavy

48

A Sikorsky HRS-1 transport helicopter delivers suppliesusing “sling loading” techniques. Sling loading employedprepackaged materials that were carried in nets, lifted by a

powered winch, and dropped by a remotely controlled hookthat allowed helicopters to rapidly deliver vital supplieswithout landing.


machine gun platoon, and almost18,000 pounds of equipment werebrought in using 12 helicoptersrequiring a total elapsed time ofabout four hours. The bulk of theequipment and supplies weredelivered by suspended cargonets, which had to be released ontop of the mountain because thehillsides were so steep. This tookplace in full view of the enemy,but no helicopters were hit byenemy fire. The final touch wasthe airborne laying of two tele-phone lines in about a quarterhour from Hill 884 to the groundcommand post more than eightmiles away. This would have beena daylong task for a wire party onfoot. The event was headline newsin the States, and congratulationsfrom higher headquarters pouredin: General Shepherd notedOperation Summit was “a bright

new chapter in the employment ofhelicopters”; and X Corps com-mander Major General Clovis E.Byers claimed: “Your imaginativeexperiment with this kind of heli-copter is certain to be of lastingvalue to all the Services.”

Holding the Minnesota Line

In late September 1951, theUnited Nations Command onceagain halted offensive operations.All across the trans-peninsularfrontline troops began digging in.Soon, a series of interconnectedtrenchlines reminiscent of WorldWar I extended from the Sea ofJapan in the east to the Yellow Seain the west, and the U.S. EighthArmy was prohibited from launch-ing new attacks. Ground activitieswere limited to conducting dailyfoot patrols, mounting tank-

infantry raids, manning small out-posts, and setting up nightlyambushes. The overriding tacticalconcern was a penetration of themain line of resistance by theCommunists. The war in Koreahad once again entered a newphase; but, unlike the others, thisone would last from the fall of1951 until the ceasefire almost twoyears later.

The 1st Marine Division wasassigned 22,800 yards of frontalong the northern edge of thePunchbowl with orders “to orga-nize, construct, and defend” theMinnesota Line. Much of the mainline of resistance ran throughroadless mountains, and the re-serve regiment was located almost17 miles to the rear. With his man-power stretched to the limit andterrain and distance limiting rapidoverland reaction by reserve

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An aerial view of auxiliary airfield X-83 located nearChodo-ri, not far from 1st Marine Division headquarters.

Both helicopter squadrons (VMO-6 and HMR-161) shared thisforward airfield situated near the Punchbowl.

HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov-Dec51

forces, General Thomas turned toHMR-161 to help solve his timeand distance problems. He decidedto test-lift a single rifle company. Inaddition, since most Chineseattacks occurred under cover ofdarkness, this helicopter lift wouldtake place at night.

Once again careful planningand detailed rehearsals were con-ducted. Fortunately, the HRS-1,unlike the light utility helicopters ofVMO-6, had flight attitude instru-ments, albeit not the sophisticatedinstrumentation found on fixed-wing aircraft. Daylight reconnais-sance of the operational area, day-

time practice inserts, and nightindoctrination flights were con-ducted. The helicopter embarka-tion zone was a dry riverbedsoutheast of Hill 702, and the land-ing zone was located near thenorthwest rim of the Punchbowl.The straight-line five-mile ingressroute, however, actually became a13-mile round trip due to tacticalconsiderations.

A daylight rehearsal on themorning of 27 September gotOperation Blackbird off to aninauspicious start. Six helicopterslifted more than 200 men into a50-by-100-foot area cleared by a

provisional helicopter supportteam. This practice lift took abouttwo hours. During the march out,however, a rifleman detonated anantipersonnel mine, and subse-quent investigation revealed thatthe proposed route to the mainline of resistance was seeded withunmarked mines. It was decidedto change the ground scheme ofmaneuver but to keep the heli-copter landing zone the same.

At 1930 on the 27th, OperationBlackbird, the first night combathelicopter troop lift in history, gotunderway. Departing at three-minute intervals as they shuttled

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All veteran World War II fighter pilots, the officers of MarineHelicopter Transport Squadron 161 pose with their com-manding officer, LtCol George W. Herring, kneeling in

front left, and the squadron’s executive officer, Maj WilliamP. Mitchell.

between the departure and arrivallanding zones, each aircraft carriedfive riflemen. Different altitudeswere used for ingress and egress toavoid collisions, and running lightswere switched on for two minutesas aircraft neared the landingzones. Only two hours and 20minutes were required to lift all223 men, a movement that wouldhave required at least nine hours byfoot.

Unfortunately, there were manyproblems. Rotor wash blew outmany of the flare pots that illumi-nated the embarkation area, bat-tery-powered lanterns in the land-ing zone were inadequate, wind-shield glare temporarily blindedthe pilots, artillery flashes distract-ed the pilots as they wormed theirway through the high mountainridges, and many in-bound pilotsneeded radio assistance to find thelanding zone. As the squadron’safter action report candidly stated:

“Night lifts are feasible with pre-sent equipment [but they] should belimited to movements withinfriendly territory.” Although theoperation was a marginal successthat affirmed the possibility ofemergency night reinforcementand intermittent night indoctrina-tion flights continued, OperationBlackbird was the only major nighthelicopter troop lift conducted inKorea.

The next day, HMR-161 lost itsfirst helicopter to an operationalmishap. A dozen light helicopters(HO3S-1s and HTLs) had beenpreviously lost to enemy fire andoperational mishaps, but this wasthe first HRS to go down. TheHRS-1 piloted by Major Charles E.Cornwell and First LieutenantFrederick D. Adams came into thelanding zone too low. The heli-copter struck the ground, bouncedinto the air, canted on its side los-ing all lift, and then careened to

the ground and caught fire. Theflaming helicopter was a totalwreck, but both pilots escapedwithout injury.

The ability to rapidly move asingle rifle company had beenestablished by Operations Summitand Blackbird, so Thomas andKrulak were eager to see if thesame principles could be applied toa larger lift. On 9 October, a warn-ing order for Operation Bumble-bee, the lift of an entire rifle bat-talion, was issued. Second Lieu-tenant Clifford V. Brokaw III, atthat time an assistant operationsofficer with the 7th Marines,recalled that the genesis of theoperation actually occurred muchearlier when Colonel Krulakinquired if helicopters could sup-port a frontal attack. ColonelHerman Nickerson, the regimentalcommander replied with a firm“no!” While in reserve, however,the regiment was tasked to pre-pare an amphibious contingencyplan including a helicopter lift.Then, at Krulak’s insistence, thatplan was adapted to provide forthe heliborne relief of a rifle bat-talion on the main line of resis-tance. Well aware that such amajor helicopter event wouldbecome headline news, the divi-sion public relations officer askedwhat the operation was going to becalled. Sergeant Roger Hanks, aformer University of Texas footballplayer, mindful of the many vocif-erous skeptics who questioned theviability of helicopters for combatduty, quickly piped up: “Bumble-bee because supposedly they can’tfly either.”

Colonel Krulak headed theplanning group that includedLieutenant Colonel Herring andMajor Mitchell from HMR-161,Lieutenant Colonel Harry W.Edwards, the rifle battalion com-mander, and Lieutenant ColonelGeorge G. Pafford, the shore party

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HMR-161 pilots and crewmen attend a pre-mission brief for OperationBlackbird, the first major night helicopter troop lift. Careful planning andrehearsals were conducted to test the feasibility of night helicopter operations; afteraction reports noted it was possible in an emergency, but Blackbird was the onlynight helilift actually carried out.


battalion commander. Bumblebeewas planned as if it were anamphibious operation. Assign-ment and loading tables werecarefully constructed, detailedarrival and departure scheduleswere prepared, and helicopterloading and unloading serialswere established with each personassigned a specific spot in the heli-

copter, and order of embarkationand debarkation charts were dis-tributed. Lieutenant Brokaw re-called that this time eight troops,carrying only small arms and limit-ed ammunition loads, weresqueezed in and only one pilotflew each helicopter to test if such“surge loading” was practical in anemergency. Familiarization classes

and rehearsals were held on 10October.

Operation Bumblebee kickedoff at 1000 on 11 October. TwelveHRS-1 helicopters, working atabout 30 second intervals and fly-ing nap of the earth 15-mileroutes, carried 958 passengers andmore than 11 tons of supplies fromairfield X-77 to Hill 702 using 156individual flights in a total elapsedtime of a little more than six hours.Two debarkation zones, Red andWhite, were used. In each, pas-senger manifests were used tocontrol loading. The men movedfrom an assembly area to the“standby” box to the “ready” boxand then into the helicopter. If anyserial was short, additional passen-gers were summoned from a near-by “casual” area. At the offloadspots shore party personnel “vig-orously assisted the passengers bygrasping their arms and startingthem away from the aircraft.” Thefirst man out was the team leaderand the last man out checked to seeif any gear was adrift. Guides fur-nished by the ground units hurriedthe debarking men on their way tokeep the landing zones clear forthe oncoming waves. Bumblebeemade the stateside headlines, butmore importantly for the MarineCorps it was a giant step towardturning vertical envelopment theo-ry into reality.

Four days later, the helicopters ofHMR-161 again demonstrated theirflexibility by mounting OperationWedge, a short notice lift of 10tons of ammunition and the evac-uation of two dozen seriouslywounded South Korean soldiers.Upon learning that a Republic ofKorea unit was surrounded and inneed of ammunition and medicalassistance, Major Mitchell led sixHRS-1 helicopters to the rescue.Captains Albert A. Black andJames T. Cotton each made fourflights into the embattled landing

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zone. At the end of this ad hocoperation IX Corps commander,Major General Claude F. Feren-baugh, USA, personally thankedeach pilot for his effort in supportof an allied nation.

While the main focus of effortwas defense of the main line ofresistance, several incidents be-hind the lines led to the use ofHMR-161 helicopters for antiguer-rilla activities. The first of these,Operation Bushbeater, used heli-copter-borne teams to sweep theSoyang River Valley in late Oc-tober. Unfortunately, the uneventerrain and lack of emergencypower combined to make thisoperation the most costly in Koreain terms of aircraft lost. ThreeHRS-1s went down on 22 Octoberwhile trying to insert ground units

using knotted ropes for debarkationdue to rough terrain. The pilotshad difficulty maintaining stationat the specified landing site. It wasvirtually impossible to hoverabove the ridge because inconsis-tent wind conditions sometimescaused the sudden loss of groundeffect. When an aircraft is near thesurface a thick layer of air builds upbetween the rotor and the surface.This cushion is known as “groundeffect,” and it creates additionallift. The loss of ground effectrequires quick action by the pilot,who must either add power or gointo motion before the helicopterplummets. Most pilots were able toavert a crash by gaining forwardspeed, making an abrupt turn, ordiving into the valley. Unfortu-nately, three helicopters were

unable to take such actions andcrashed; two were lost and thethird badly damaged its tail rotor;fortunately, only one man wasinjured. The follow-on salvageoperation became another pio-neering effort. Supervised byMajor Edwin E. Shifflett, and ledby Technical Sergeant Thomas M.McAuliffe, Marine working partieswere able to dismantle the injuredaircraft so all usable parts and oneairframe could be recovered.Major Mitchell used his HRS as a“flying crane” to lift out an entirefuselage secured by ropes and har-nessed to his cargo hook. Despitethe initial setback, the operationcontinued when more suitablesites were used. Forty insertionswere made and more than 200men landed. Post-crash investiga-

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Troops load on board an HRS-1 at Airfield X-77 duringOperation Bumblebee in October 1951. The Bumblebee

troop lift was actually made to test contingency plans in caseChinese Communist forces cracked the Minnesota Line.

tors determined that similar opera-tions should continue but onlyafter a careful study of the pro-posed terrain and evaluation ofexisting atmospheric conditions.

Several other heliborne anti-guerrilla operations followed.Operation Rabbit Hunt used heli-copters for systematic patrols ofthe vast wilderness area behindthe main line of resistance. Thisoperation was not unlike thosemounted by the 1st MarineDivision to control the An HoaBasin southwest of Da Nang in theRepublic of Vietnam 15 years later.Operation Houseburner wasmounted on 26 October to depriveenemy irregulars hiding behind

friendly lines of much-neededshelter as winter approached.Two helicopters each carried four-man destruction teams armed withdemolitions, flamethrowers, andincendiary grenades. Initially, oneship provided cover while theother hovered and sprayed the tar-get area with a flammable mixtureprior to dropping incendiarygrenades. Later, both helicopterslanded and let the destructionteams do their work from theground. Operation Houseburner IIused four helicopters to destroy113 dwellings on the last day ofthe month. This action also fea-tured the first extended firefightbetween helicopters and ground

troops when an airborne automat-ic rifle team engaged an enemyposition. Although the helicopteritself was not armed, this incidentwas probably the forerunner ofthe helicopter gunship.

Operation Switch, the relief andreplacement of a full regiment at thefrontlines, was the largest heli-copter effort so far. On 11November, nearly 2,000 combatloaded troops swapped positionsbetween Hill 884 (unofficiallydubbed “Mount Helicopter” be-cause so many helicopter lifts tookplace there) and airfield X-83 inabout 10 hours. Standard operatingprocedures included a three-planeflight that dropped off the ad-vanced helicopter support team tosupervise operations at the land-ing zone, departure teams con-trolled operations at X-83, andnaval gunfire kept enemy headsdown during flight operations.

Operation Farewell on 19 De-cember saw the rotation of onebattalion for another and markedthe last flight by HMR-161 com-manding officer Lieutenant Colo-nel George Herring. After thatflight, he departed Korea toassume duties as commandingofficer of HMX-1 at Quantico. Hisreplacement was that unit’s previ-ous commander, Colonel Keith B.McCutcheon. The holder of anadvanced degree in aeronauticalengineering, McCutcheon hadbeen a proponent and pioneer ofMarine close air support duringWorld War II before learning to flyhelicopters. Major Mitchell re-mained as squadron executiveofficer.

After only two months in thecombat, HMR-161 had loggedmore than 1,200 flight hours com-prising more than 1,000 sorties todeliver 150 tons of supplies andcarry out 192 medical evacuations.The “flying windmills” of HMR-161participated in morale building as

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A helicopter-borne Marine destroys a potential enemy guerrilla hideout duringOperation Rabbit Hunt. In addition to troops on the ground, Marine demolitioncrews on board helicopters sprayed gasoline on huts serving as enemy cover andthen set them ablaze with phosphorus grenades.


well as tactical operations: theydelivered large cakes so the front-line Marines could celebrate theMarine Corps birthday on 10November; on Thanksgiving theybrought turkey dinners to thefront; a heavy snow storm inter-rupted plans for Christmas feasts,but the arrival of several UnitedService Organization entertainersaround the new year helped raisemorale. The New Year also sawimplementation of an additionalduty that would last until the end ofthe war. After ice destroyed abridge spanning the Imjin River,one HRS-1 and its crew were dis-patched on a weeklong rotation tothe United Nations Commandadvanced headquarters at Munsan-ni to ferry United Nations peacedelegates to and from Panmunjom.

Colonel McCutcheon’s first full

month as squadron commanderwas the most ambitious helicopter-borne effort thus far; HMR-161flew the most missions (820) in asingle month so far and logged themost combat missions (506) in asingle month during the entirewar. Three major efforts werelaunched in January 1952—Mule-train, Changie-Changie, andMouse Trap. Each exercised a dif-ferent capability. Muletrain andChangie-Changie were assaultsupport (helicopter-borne resup-ply and troop transport), whileMouse Trap was an exploration oftactical vertical envelopment.Operation Muletrain (named for apopular song of the day) called forthe complete supply of a battalionlocated on the main line of resis-tance for one week. The destinationwas once again Hill 884.

McCutcheon’s squadron used a“flying crane” technique devel-oped by Major Charles E. Cornwellwhereby the HRS-1s mountedunderslung nets carrying about850 pounds and controlled fromthe cockpit to deliver cargo ratherthan pallets as had been previous-ly done. Tentage, stoves, rations,fuel oil, and ammunition com-prised the various loads. Four heli-copters, operating on a rotatingbasis, were so effective that theyactually flew in more cargo thancould be handled by the shoreparty during the first week ofJanuary; 219 loads equaling150,730 pounds were ferried about10 miles from the supply dump toMount Helicopter.

Operation Changie-Changie(pidgin Korean-English meaning“exchange”) was a troop lift that

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Col Keith B. McCutcheon, left, shakes the hand LtCol GeorgeW. Herring, the departing commanding officer of HMR-

161. The squadron’s last troop lift under Herring wasdubbed “Operation Farewell” in his honor.

began on 10 January. The essentialdifference between this troopmovement and previous ones wasthat this time the helicopters flewinto company-sized positionslocated within a few hundredyards of the frontline. In addition,the 35-man 1st Air DeliveryPlatoon took over helicopterground support operations, reliev-ing the hard-pressed 1st ShoreParty Battalion of that duty. Thisrealignment of missions was morein line with each unit’s stated mis-sions; First Lieutenant William A.Reavis’ 1st Air Delivery Platoonwas thereafter tasked “to prepareand deliver supplies by air,whether by parachute, air freight, orhelicopter.” Operation MouseTrap, conducted from 14 to 17 Jan-uary, tested the ability of Marines tolaunch a counter-guerrilla reactionoperation on short notice. Thesquadron was not notified untiljust after midnight to be prepared tomount a two-company lift by mid-morning on the 14th. the operationwent off with only minor difficulties

and was so smooth that three sim-ilar lifts were made by the 17th.

For the most part, HMR-161ceded deep search and rescueoperations to VMO-6. The most

notable such mission occurred inearly February when the EighthArmy-Fifth Air Force Joint Opera-tions Center requested help tobring back a fighter pilot and heli-copter crew downed in enemy ter-ritory. Two previous attempts hadbeen turned away by the timeMajor Mitchell’s HRS-1 departed X-83 for airfield K-50 where it wouldpick up fighter escorts. Divertedenroute, the helicopter landed onthe cruiser Rochester (CA 124) for apre-flight brief before setting out.Fighter planes strafed the valleyand surrounding ridgelines as thehelicopter neared the crash site,but no activity was spotted soMitchell reluctantly aborted themission. The techniques used onthis mission became standardoperating procedure even thoughthe rescue attempt had come upempty.

February 1952 was a harbinger oftrouble on the horizon. Anotherrelief in place, Operation Rotate,was successfully conducted on24th. That same day, however,

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Marines in Korea for the first time are moved into frontline positions the “mod-ern way.” Instead of climbing the steep trails, and spending hours to reach theridges’ crest, helicopters airlift troops in a matter of minutes.

Hot chow is served at the HMR-161 forward operating base near the Punchbowl;after finishing their meal, Marines go through the wash line. Living and work-ing conditions were primitive, but the hard-working ground crews carried on.


Captain John R. Irwin was enroutefrom Seoul to X-83 when heencountered severe vibrations. Af-ter putting down to locate thetrouble, he was amazed to discov-er the broken remnants of his tailassembly lying in the snow. Fourdays later, Captain Calvin G.Alston’s HRS-1 began to buck andjerk without warning. Suspectinghe had been hit by enemy fire,Alston set down to inspect thedamage. Like Irwin, he quicklyfound that a broken tail assemblywas the culprit. Similar accidentsoutside the combat zone promptingthe Chief of Naval Operations toground all HRS-type aircraft untilthe problem could be isolated,analyzed, and corrected. Thesquadron was not able to resumenormal operations until after newtail assemblies for each aircraft

were installed in mid-March. After the end of the fighting at

the Punchbowl, VMO-6 continuedto support the 1st Marine Divisionflying from Sinchon in the X Corpssector of the East-Central Front.Indicative of the changing roles forlight utility helicopters, the squad-ron listed four HO3S-1s and fourHTL-4s in October 1951, but onlyone HO3S-1 remained on the rollsby March 1952 while the number ofHTL-4s had increased to 10. Thewisdom of combining helicoptersand fixed-wing aircraft withinobservation squadrons was con-firmed by combat experience. Awell-defined division of laborbetween the fixed-wing airplanesand helicopters of VMO-6 hadevolved since the early days of thewar. The nimble OY were bestsuited for reconnaissance, artilleryspotting, and airborne control ofclose air support while the heli-copter niche combined combatsearch and rescue and medicalevacuation. Transportation andadministrative flights were divided

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HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Jan52

The Marine metal shop was located at K-18 airdrome near Kangnung in cen-tral Korea. This major maintenance facility served HMR-161 which was flyingfrom the forward strip X-83 at Chodo-ri, behind the Minnesota Line.

Sikorsky representative, Louis Plotkin, left, explains the intricacies of an HRS-1aircraft engine to HMR-161 pilots. Representatives of the Bridgeport,Connecticut, company accompanied the squadron to Korea not only to assist withtechnical problems, but also to report on how the aircraft performed in combat.


about equally between fixed-wingand rotary-wing aircraft. Unfortu-nately, hopes for all-helicopterobservation squadrons still wereconsidered impractical. As timepassed, HTL-4s gradually replacedthe aging HO3s-1s, and byFebruary 1952 the one remainingSikorsky was no longer flyingcombat missions. The helicoptersection’s priorities graduallychanged to reflect the new tacticalsituation as well. Positional war-fare placed more emphasis onground support and administrativemissions while deep combatsearch and rescue had become thebailiwick of Navy and Air Forcehelicopter detachments. In Sep-tember 1951, medical evacuationand combat search and rescue hadbeen at the top of the list, but by

March 1952 the new prioritieswere: evacuation of wounded;reconnaissance and observation;liaison and transportation; admin-istrative and resupply flights; andcombat search and rescue, in thatorder. The vulnerability of heli-copters was an early concern, butthis proved not to be the case asfew helicopters were lost and thenumber coming back with bulletholes became all too common tomerit special mention.

Between October 1951 andMarch 1952, the helicopter sectionlogged 2,253 total flights (1,277combat and 976 non-combat mis-sions), including 637 medicalevacuations to deliver 1,096 seri-ously wounded men. Most trans-portation flights involved bringingdistinguished visitors to the front.

Among them was Dr. CharlesMayo of the famed Mayo Clinicwho visited units of the 1stMedical Battalion. Liaison flightsincluded transportation of theCommandant of the Marine Corps,and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific,and IX Corps commanders. Thebulk of the administrative andresupply flights went for medicalsupport; the delivery of freshwhole blood or plasma, medicine,and medical records. After thefrontlines stabilized, very fewsearch and rescue missions werecalled for. Only seven such mis-sions were flown between 1October 1951 and 15 March 1952.

The helicopter section’s onlycombat casualty during that timeoccurred when Captain David T.Gooden’s HTL-4 was shot down as

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HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Jul52

In March 1952, the 1st Marine Division moved from theMinnesota Line located in central Korea to the Jamestown Linein western Korea. HMR-161 likewise relocated its forward

base to A-17 (Yongpu-ni), while the rear echelon’s mainte-nance facility was moved to A-33 not far from the massivesupply base at Ascom City outside the capital of Seoul.

it wandered past friendly linesduring a medical evacuation mis-sion on 7 February. Neither thepilot nor the helicopter could berecovered due to their locationbehind enemy lines.

Defending the Jamestown Line

With both sides roughly equalin manpower and firepower onthe ground, the frontlines re-mained unchanged during thewinter of 1951-1952. In March, theUnited Nations Command decidedto realign its forces. The 1st MarineDivision moved from its positionsalong the Minnesota Line on theEast-Central Front to the James-town Line astride the Pyongyang-Seoul corridor on the westernflank. This move initiated the so-called “outpost war” which lastedfrom March 1952 until July 1953during which no significant chang-es of territory occurred. The major

actions of the outpost war includ-ed those at “Bunker Hill” in August1952, a temporary incursion of themain line of resistance at the“Hook” in October 1952, toughfighting for positions “Berlin” and“East Berlin” in early 1953, the“Nevada Cities” (Outposts Reno,Carson, and Vegas) battles inMarch 1953, and the last fight at“Boulder City” just before thearmistice in July 1953.

Although the generally flat terrainof western Korea simplified logis-tical challenges, the JamestownLine was no tactical bargain.Terrain and diplomatic conditionsprohibited defense in depth andseverely hampered the ability ofMarine commanders to maneuveror commit reserve forces in caseof a Communist breakthrough.The 35-mile Marine sector was thelongest defensive zone held byany Eighth Army division. Thelow-rolling hills on the Marine side

of the line were dominated by thehigh ground on the far side of no-man’s-land held by the Com-munists. To make matters worse,the Imjin River, with only fourcrossing points, ran behind themain line of resistance. Majorwaterways separated the line attwo points, and a diplomaticdemilitarized “neutral corridor”from Munsan-ni to Panmunjomdivided the defensive zone. TheUnited Kingdom’s 1st Common-wealth Division anchored theMarine flank on the northeast atthe Samichon River, where the38th Parallel crossed the James-town Line. From there the mainline of resistance generally tracedthe Imjin for about 10 miles until itintersected that river; the main linethen followed the south bank ofthe Imjin estuary to where the HanRiver joined the Imjin, and acrossthe Han an isolated defense sectorwas located on the Kimpo Penin-sula. The main line of resistancewas extremely vulnerable and hadto be protected by a series of com-bat outposts scattered throughoutno-man’s-land. The scrub-covered,low-lying areas that predominatedthe Marine sector were subject ofyear-round enemy observationand flooding each spring. Overall,the Jamestown Line was a tacti-cian’s nightmare.

In late March, the 1st MarineDivision moved 180 overlandmiles from the Punchbowl toMunsan-ni, an urban rail junctionlocated near the Imjin River about30 miles from Seoul. LieutenantColonel William T. Herring’s VMO-6 and Colonel McCutcheon’s HMR-161 began displacing from Sin-chon in mid-March and had com-pleted their respective moves bythe end of the month. Each took upresidence at separate landingfields near the 1st Marine Di-vision’s command post. The VMO-6 airstrip (A-9) was located in the

59

His predecessor, Maj William G. MacLean, right, welcomes LtCol William T.Herring on board as the new commanding officer of VMO-6. A graduate of theNaval Academy, Herring served as the commanding officer of Marine FighterSquadron 111 and operations officer of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing during WorldWar II.


village of Tonggo-ri about threemiles south of the division com-mand post. The airfield was quick-ly named Bancroft Filed to honorthe first Marine helicopter pilotkilled in action. HMR-161’s for-ward flight echelon was located atYongpu-ni’s A-17, while its rearechelon including advanced main-tenance personnel was at airfield A-33 (Taejong-ni, a well-developedairdrome that served the massiveEighth Army supply base knownas Ascom City, which should not beconfused with airfield K-5 located atTaejon in south-central Korea).

For the most part, VMO-6 con-tinued flying missions as beforewith medical evacuation as its

number one priority. During thistime the squadron’s executive offi-cer, Major William G. MacLean, Jr.,developed a plan to station evacu-ation helicopters, crews, andmaintenance personnel at thecommand post of the centrallylocated, frontline infantry regimenton weeklong rotations. This “for-ward evacuation echelon” was on-call around-the-clock and couldreach any part of the frontlinewithin a few minutes, cutting evac-uation time in half thereby keepingseverely injured men within whatthe surgeons called “goldenminute”—the period during whichimmediate treatment could save aman’s life. These operations began

in June, and they included the firstroutinely scheduled night evacua-tions. The normal forward evacua-tion echelon complement was fiveofficers, nine enlisted men, andtwo helicopters. In addition, closeliaison with American and otherallied nations’ medical stations andhospital ships was maintained.Other missions performed byVMO-6’s helicopter section wereliaison flights and visual recon-naissance. The former usuallybrought important visitors to thefront while the latter flew com-manders along the main line ofresistance and offered high alti-tude glimpses into enemy territory.

Major General John T. Selden,

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A badly wounded Marine receives life-sustaining plasma andwill be flown to an advance medical care facility in the

dark. Night evacuations were hazardous affairs becauseearly helicopters lacked instrumentation and back lighting.

the commander of the 1st MarineDivision, required that a strongdefensive line be established butwas still nervous because it wouldbe difficult to quickly reinforce theJamestown Line. Accordingly, twoexisting “fallback” lines, Wyomingand Kansas, were strengthened,and a series of rapid deploymentexercises by the division reserveregiment were planned. Primaryamong them were those conductedby HMR-161 in the spring andsummer of 1952.

The first test of the ability tomove across water obstacles wasOperation Pronto. On 5 April, a662-man battalion and about10,000 pounds of supplies weretransported from Munsan across

the Han River to the KimpoPeninsula. Ironically, OperationPronto was both the longest dis-tance and the shortest notice heli-copter-borne troop lift so far.Colonel McCutcheon was not noti-fied until about 0210 in the morn-ing, yet, the first helicopter lifted offonly about three-and-a half hourslater. The initial wave carried spe-cialists from the 1st Air DeliveryPlatoon to two landing zones.Thereafter, nine helicopters (sevenof them manned by pilots freshfrom the United States) were used.The hour-long round trips werealmost 60 miles because of flightrestrictions in the vicinity of thePanmunjom “neutral corridor.”The squadron logged 99 flights in

more than 115 flight hours with atotal elapsed time of 14 hours, anall-time high. After the operation,Colonel McCutcheon noted: “Thisairlift . . . proved that a Marinetransport helicopter squadron cansuccessfully operate as an ‘on call’tactical tool.” The operation wascarried out with only minimal liai-son between flight and groundunits and virtually none of thedetailed planning previously em-ployed. Helicopter operations,which only a few months earliermade front-page news in theUnited States, had by that time,become routine.

An intermittent series of trooplift exercises were interspersedwith several tactical and logisticaloperations over the next year anda half. Pronto was promptly fol-lowed by two-day OperationLeapfrog, the helicopter-borne ex-change of one South KoreanMarine battalion for another on 18and 19 April. Operation Circus, thelift of a U.S. battalion closed out themonth. All operations, except foremergencies, were discontinuedon 27 April after the Chief of NavalOperations grounded all HRS-1sdue to structural problems. By themiddle of May, HMR-161’s heli-copters were back in action. Twomore short notice troop lifts,Operation Butterfly and EverReady, were conducted in Juneand a third, Operation Nebraska,took place in November. The lastsuch exercise was OperationCrossover II held the followingspring.

Although combat search andrescue was not a primary mission ofHMR-161, one dramatic episodeoccurred in late May. Two heli-copters were dispatched from A-17 to look for a downed Navypilot near Hapsu, North Korea.During the airborne search, theHRS-1 flown by Major Dwain L.Lengel and Captain Eugene V.

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Pointer with crew chief TechnicalSergeant Carlyle E.J. Gricks onboard lost flight control due acombination of low speed andhigh altitude. Flying low to theearth, the helicopter was unable togain enough power to maneuveraround a stump. The aircraftcrashed and no one was seriouslyinjured, but the would-be rescuersnow needed to be rescued. Thecrew quickly moved to a pick uplocation but had to wait almosttwo days due to bad weather.Squadron mates Captain Robert J.

Lesak, First Lieutenant WallaceWessel, and Technical SergeantElmer DuBrey flew the rescue mis-sion. It was a complicated pick-upprocedure. In order to keep fromrepeating the previous crash,Captain Lesak had to keep his air-craft in motion to stay aloft. Thisrequired the downed crew to graba trailing rope ladder as the HRSpassed overhead. Fortunately, therescue was a success, if not a frus-trating one.

One of the primary purposes ofrushing HMR-161 to Korea was to

test vertical envelopment conceptsas they applied to amphibiousoperations under wartime condi-tions. This was not possible at firstdue to geographic restrictionswhen the Marines manned theEast-Central Front. The move towestern Korea brought theMarines close to the sea, but initialoperational tempo and subsequentgrounding of the HRS-1s delayedthe opportunity until June. At thattime as series of Marine landingexercises (MarLExs) were held at arate of about two each month for

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LtCol John F. Carey, left, bids farewell to his predecessor ascommanding officer of HMR-161, Col Keith B.McCutcheon; both men had previously commanded HMX-1 at Quantico. McCutcheon made his reputation as a close

air support advocate in the Pacific and eventually com-manded all Marines in Vietnam; later he was slated tobecome the first active duty Marine aviator to receive afourth star but illness intervened.

the remainder of 1952 with twomore held the following year.Although there were minor varia-tions in each MarLEx, they generallyfollowed a similar pattern: adetachment of a half dozen HRS-1sfrom HMR-161 would lift one bat-talion of the division reserve fromone small island to a larger oneduring a simulated amphibiousassault. The purpose of these exer-cises was twofold. First, tactics andtechniques were perfected witheach passing exercise as lessonswere learned and assimilated.Second, aircraft and ground per-sonnel became familiar with thestandard operating procedures forhelicopter-borne operations. The

main problems were the lack of anescort carrier and helicopters.Untested Marine amphibious doc-trine envisioned individual trans-port helicopter squadrons and riflebattalions embarked on boardescort carriers during the move-ment to the amphibious objectivearea. Once there, the helicopterswould conduct one portion of theship-to-shore movement then beon call to deliver supplies andevacuate casualties until thebeachhead was secured and oper-ations could safely move ashore.The trouble was that the Navy didnot have enough carriers or crewsto implement this policy, and noescort carrier was readily available

to support most MarLEx opera-tions. In addition, the demands onHMR-161 prohibited the entiresquadron from participating in theexercises.

MarLEx I was held on 10 and 11June with its announced purpose togain experience in vertical envel-opment as part of an amphibiousoperation. Because no escort carri-er was available, the island ofSung Bong-do about 40 milessouthwest of Inchon would stand infor the missing ship. NearbyTokchok-to, a five-mile-long islandwith two broad sandy beacheslocated about six miles southeast,was selected as the objective. Aswas standard practice, helicopter

63

An HRS-1 helicopter of HMR-161 approaches the escort car-rier Sicily (CVE 118). The Marine transport squadronexperimented with the newly developed concept of vertical

assault in the many landing exercises conducted during theKorean War.


support teams descended fromhovering helicopters using ropeladders to prepare landing zones.Seven aircraft delivered 236 fullyequipped troops the first day andanother 236 the following day.Unfortunately, the exercise did notgo well. Communications wereunsatisfactory, and the time re-quired to land troops by helicopterwas “too great in comparison tothe time needed to land troops . . .by boat.” It was decided to use acloser island the next time toreduce the strain on the heli-copters and the time in the air.MarLEx II was held later thatmonth. This time Soya-do, two

miles from Tokchok-to, was used asthe simulated carrier. Four insteadof seven aircraft were used to lift235 men, and the exercise wasdeemed a success.

The Marines finally got to trainwith an actual aircraft carrier inSeptember. The escort carrierSicily (CVE 118) was available tosupport MarLEx VII. This exerciseoffered the most realistic test ofamphibious doctrine as envisionedby planners at Quantico. On 1 and2 September, the bulk of HMR-161’s 12 HRS helicopters wereused to lift 964 troops from thecarrier deck to Landing ZonesAble and Baker on Tokchok-to.

Five more MarLEx operations wereheld in 1952. They were followedby a six-month break, then twomore amphibious exercises wereheld in the summer of 1953 beforethe ceasefire took effect.

On 30 July, HMR-161 received arequest to launch a humanitarianeffort in support of the U.S. Armyand South Koreans. More than 600American soldiers and about 150Korea civilians had been strandedby flash flooding of the PukkanRiver. Six Marine helicopters flew tothe rescue. This spur-of-the-mo-ment evacuation was made withoutwritten orders or advanced sched-uling. The squadron mounted 182

64

Col Harry N. Shea, right, commanding officer of the 11thMarines, briefs from left, 1stLt Donald L. Seller,Commanding Officer, 1st Air Delivery Platoon, 1stLtWilliam B. Fleming, Executive Officer, 1st 4.5-inch Rocket

Battery, Capt Edwin T. Carlton, Commanding Officer, 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, and LtCol John F. Carey, CommandingOfficer, HMR-161, prior to a fire mission in support ofKorean Marines.

1st Air Delivery Platoon Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Feb53

flights over about three hours. Thesquadron after action report noted:“The average load was five menand gear [but we lifted] as many asnine small children complete withdogs and chickens . . . in one trip. . . . The Army and Air Force . . .marveled at the expeditious wayour helicopters carried out theoperation.”

The month of August saw achange of command when Lieu-tenant Colonel John F. Carey, yetanother veteran of HMX-1, re-placed Colonel McCutcheon ascommanding officer of HMR-161.September was the busiest monthof the war for HMR-161. Thesquadron flew 1,195 missions.Included in that total were thelargest aerial supply operationthus far, the first of many regularlyscheduled helicopter-borne trooprotations, the only amphibiousexercise supported by an aircraftcarrier, and the tactical lift of arocket artillery battery.

The first of two large logisticalsupport operations took placefrom 22 to 26 September. Opera-tion Haylift was designed to com-pletely support a frontline regi-ment for five days. Included in the

loads were rations, water, ammu-nition, fortification material, andfuel. These supplies were carriedinternally or suspended below thehelicopter frame in wire basketsand cargo nets. The distance fromloading zone to landing was about20 miles, depending upon whichloading zone was used. The 1stService Battalion supplied LoadingZone Able while the 1st OrdnanceBattalion did so at Loading ZoneBaker; air delivery platoon person-nel supervised loading operationsand shore party personnel un-loaded the incoming aircraft.More than 350,000 pounds ofcargo and 75 passengers were lift-ed despite rainy weather. Thiseffort tripled the output of Opera-tion Muletrain, the previouslybiggest logistical operation. Op-eration Haylift was summed up ina single sentence in the squad-ronreport: “No unusual problemswere encountered and the opera-tion progressed smoothly and con-tinuously throughout.”

The use of helicopters to rotatetroops between the rear and thefront had become routine by thesummer of 1952. So much so thatthe 1st Marine Division initiated

regularly scheduled replacementoperations intended “to effect therelief of a unit on the MLR andreturn the relieved unit to a reararea as expeditiously as possible,”using the codename “Silent Red-line.” Silent Redlines were con-ducted at the rate of about one permonth during the rest of the year,but were only intermittently usedthe following year due to tacticalconsiderations (the 1st MarineDivision was either off the line orheavily engaged). The first ofthese began on 11 September withthe lift of a Korean Marine battalion.Because these operations werecarried out under enemy observa-tion, if they came under direct firesquadron aircraft were directed toseek landing spots in defilade andmaintain communications whilethe ground troops debarked andsought the best defensive terrain.Ten aircraft, each carrying six menor five men and a crew-servedweapon, transported 1,618 troops inan overall time of six-and-one-halfhours during Silent Redline I.

By the summer of 1952, thestrategy in Korea had developedinto positional warfare andartillery began to dominate tacticalthinking. Unfortunately, the Chi-nese actually began to outgun theAmericans as a result of massiveSoviet aid that furnished excellentweapons and plenty of ammuni-tion, and in western Korea theenemy controlled the TaedokMountain spur which gave themsuperior observation of the UnitedNations lines. The Marines coun-tered by adopting mobile artillerytactics using multiple gun posi-tions. One innovative solutioncame about as the result of acooperative effort between thepilots of HMR-161 and the ar-tillerymen of the 11th Marines. Aparticularly valuable weapon wasthe towed multiple rocket launch-er. The problem was that these

65

Two rocket battery crewmen prepare the launcher for action as an air deliver pla-toon signalman assigned by HMR-161 to direct incoming cargo-carrying aircraftto the landing site loads a rocket round into the tube.


mobile rocker launchers were vul-nerable because their back blastkicked up dust and debris that wasvisible from the Communist side.The rapid insertion of light artilleryinto defiladed positions followedby a rapid withdrawal, however,would allow the Marines to land, setup, fire a barrage, and then leavebefore enemy counterbattery firecould pinpoint the target. Experi-ments at Quantico, Virginia, andCamp Lejeune, North Carolina,proved the feasibility of lifting a4.5-inch rocket launcher alongwith a skeleton crew and a smallamount of ammunition in a singleload. On 19 August, HMR-161 putthis theory into practice duringOperation Ripple. Rehearsals inKorea tested new delivery meth-ods using a variety of externalhooks and release mechanisms,but there was some trouble duringthe initial lift of the 1st 4.5-inchRocket Battery. The problemswere solved that night and addi-tional operations the followingday went much more smoothly.Colonel Carey was able to recom-mend that helicopters were suit-able for rocket launcher trans-portation, and Operation Ripplewas followed by several more sim-ilar tactical operations over thenext few months. These were theonly operations in which heli-copters were directly responsiblefor putting rounds on the target.As such, they were the distantforerunners of the “fire base” con-cept that became a tactical mainstayin Vietnam.

Beginning in October, one heli-copter and a standby crew wereassigned to Marine Aircraft Group12 on a rotating basis to provide air-sea rescue and administrativetransportation. As a result of heavyfighting at the Hook the squadronlogged the most medical evacua-tions that month as well, 365.During the month, the squadron

also began receiving SikorskyHRS-2 helicopters. Although anewer model, the HRS-2 offeredno significant increase in perfor-mance because it used the sameengine as the HRS-1; the main dif-ferences were that the HRS-2 wasabout a foot shorter and a fewinches closer to the ground.Operation Nebraska, conductedon the 13th, tested the ability ofHMR-161 to move troops from onephase line to another. Ten heli-copters lifted one rifle battalionand a heavy mortar platoon (820men) in only two-and-one-halfhours comprising 169 individualflights.

Activities in December includedOperations Crossover, the move-ment of a reserve rifle battalionfrom the Wyoming Line to theKansas Line; Silent Redline III, theby-then standard helicopter-bornerotation of a frontline battalion byone from the reserve area; MarLEx

XII-52, the last amphibious exer-cise of the year; and OperationSanta Claus during which heli-copter HR-69 was made up to looklike jolly old Saint Nicholas as itdelivered toys and food to about100 orphans adopted by thesquadron. Also during the month,Colonel Carey flew out to thenewly arrived Danish hospital shipJutlandia to test its helicopter-landing platform and to familiarizethe crew with helicopter landingprocedures. The cold, dampweather and fog continued tointerfere with flight operations, butnew hangars eased the mainte-nance burden to some degree.Although few of the shiveringmechanics would have believed itat the time, conditions on theJamestown Line were far superior tothose encountered on the East-Central Front the previous year.

January 1953 witnessed the useof HRS helicopters as “flying squad

66

HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Dec52

Transport squadron’s “HR-69” helicopter is decked out as Santa Claus to deliv-er toys and food on Christmas Day 1952. Although the visionaries at Quantico,Virginia, before the Marines received helicopters foresaw almost every possible usefor rotary-winged aircraft and made up a potential task list, it is doubtful thatthis humanitarian mission appeared on that list.

cars” as they carried members of the1st Military Police Battalion search-ing for Communist infiltrators. Onthe 23d, fire was exchanged be-tween the airborne Military Policeand guerrillas on the ground.Three enemy troops were killedwhile the helicopter suffered onlyminor gunfire damage.

February hosted the largest heli-copter supply operation in Korea,Operation Haylift II. While HayliftI the previous September had sup-ported one frontline regiment forfive days, Haylift II was twice asambitious. This time, two frontlineregiments would receive heli-copter-transported Class I (ra-tions), III (fuel), IV (constructionmaterials), and V (ammunition)supplies for five days, from 23 to 27February. The planning and exe-cution of Haylift II was similar to itsforerunner, but on a much largerscale. And, this one would takeplace in much more difficultweather conditions. One hundred

and thirty tons per day wererequired to support both regi-ments, but this total was actuallyexceeded on the first day. Theunloading time per load was lessthan one minute. On 25 February,HMR-161 brought in more than200 tons, a record. By the thirdday, the supply build-up had actu-ally surpassed the ability of theground logisticians to cope with it.Fortuitously, emergency requestsfor ammunition by other unitslessened the backlog. Ground fogon the last two days slowed oper-ations. Still, the final results wereimpressive, 1,612,406 pounds liftedwithout the loss of crew or aircraft.February also saw records set forthe number of combat hours (765),total flight hours (1,275.5), combatflights (575), and total flights(1,183), and the gross lift of morethan two million pounds thatmonth was the largest of the entirewar for HMR-161.

Sadly, that month also ended

HMR-161’s streak of not losing aman. On the 12th, a three-planeflight departed A-33 for Pusan torendezvous with a carrier that wasto take them to Japan. Along theway the HRS-1 carrying CaptainAllen W. Ruggles and TechnicalSergeant Joe L. Brand, Jr., becameseparated and crashed into the seaabout 25 miles south of Pusan.The cause was believed to havebeen mechanical failure, but thiswas never confirmed becausethere were no survivors andwreckage was never located.

On 15 March, Colonel Owen A.Chambers took over HMR-161.Ten days later, a second HRS-1went down with three crewmem-bers on board. Major Doil R. Stitzelwas making a test hop out ofAscom City with mechanics MasterSergeant Gilbert N. Caudle, Jr., andSergeant Richard L. Parsell whentheir aircraft suddenly lost power,crashed, and burned. All threemen were lost.

Only two major operations wereconducted that spring, both weretroop lifts from the reserve area tothe Jamestown Line, OperationCrossover II and Silent Redline VI.On 27 March, all HRS-2 helicopterswith more than 200 flight hourswere grounded because of rotorblade problems. This was a pre-cautionary move due to statesideincidents, and no HRS-2s in Koreawere lost to this cause.

Beginning on 26 April, HMR-161participated in Operation LittleSwitch, the six-day exchange ofprisoners of war. The UnitedNations released 6,670 NorthKorean and Chinese prisonerswhile the Communists returnedonly 684 captives, including 15Marines and three Navy corpsmen.From the middle of the month,HMR-161 provided transportationfrom Freedom Village nearMunsan-ni to Panmunjom for vari-ous international delegates and

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A helicopter from HMR-161 prepares to lift bundled supplies from the 1st AirDelivery Platoon area to frontline troops. The air delivery platoon signalman holdsthe hook while the other Marine holds the net in a hook-up position.


American negotiators. During theactual prisoner exchange, heli-copters stood by to transport theseriously ill or wounded Marinesfrom Panmunjom to one of threehospital ships, the Consolation(AH 15), the Haven (AH 12), or

the Jutlandia, riding at anchor inInchon harbor. Four Marines had tobe evacuated.

In May the 1st Marine Divisioncame off the line for the first timesince the Masan interlude ended inJanuary 1951. While this represent-

ed a relief from the rigors of com-bat, it was not exactly a time ofrest and relaxation. The divisionstaff ordered HMR-161 to get busyon the first Marine landing exer-cise of the New Year (MarLEx I-53). On 13 May, after careful plan-

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Sikorsky HO5S

The HO5S helicopter, developed from Sikorsky’sS-52 design begun in 1948, was the purpose-builtreplacement observation helicopter for the HO3S.

The S-52 was first conceived as a compact two placemachine, but it eventually incorporated recommendationsfrom the fighting front under the designation S-52-2.The HO5S was more compact than its predecessor andfeatured several new design features to overcome tech-nical problems identified in the HO3S. Forty-eightHO5S-1s were ordered for the Marine Corps in 1951 andaccession began in January 1952.

Although its theoretical performance statistics appearonly marginally better than its predecessor, the HO5S wasactually a much-improved aircraft that addressed many ofthe HO3S’s shortcomings. The HO5S was the first U.S.helicopter fitted with all-metal blades, could mount twostretchers internally, and was much more stable on theground due to its low center of gravity and four-wheellanding gear. The most unique practical innovation wasa hinged, two-piece, forward-mounted observation bub-ble. Opening the left seat side of the bubble allowedaccess to the cabin interior for two stretcher-bornepatients. In addition, the HO5S could carry three com-bat-loaded men over short distances.

By the time of the armistice in 1953, almost all VMO-

6 helicopters were HO5Ss. Unfortunately, plans toreplace light airplanes with HO5S helicopters in Marineobservation squadrons had to be put on hold due to per-formance problems and structural defects that came to thefore in Korea. It was decided that the Marine Corps need-ed a machine that offered better stability and easier in-flight control in addition to a more powerful engine.Thus, instead of becoming the backbone of Marineobservation squadrons, the HO5S was actually replacedby the Kaman HOK beginning in 1954; the later aircraftremained in operational service for the next decade untilwas it in turn replaced by the Bell UH-1 Iroquois(“Huey”), which remains the designated Marine obser-vation and utility helicopter to this day. Marine obser-vation squadrons were equipped with fixed-wing air-planes after light helicopter squadrons were created dur-ing the Vietnam-era.

Aircraft DataManufacturer: Sikorsky Division of United AircraftCorporationPower Plant: 245 hp Franklin O-425-1 engineDimensions: Length, 27’ 5”; height, 8’8”; rotor, three 33’ metalbladesPerformance: Cruising speed, 96 mph Lift: Pilot and three passengers or two internal stretchers

VMO-6 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov52

ning and rehearsals, HMR-161brought a battalion landing teamto Yongdong-ni, a beach areasouthwest of Seoul. This exercisewas followed in June by a specialhelicopter assault demonstrationas part of the rehearsal for MarLExII-53. Similar to the previousamphibious exercise in scope andpurpose, MarLEx II-53 actuallyturned out to be the last majoramphibious exercise during theKorean War. The squadron re-turned to the lines on 10 July andthereafter continued routine oper-ations delivering supplies to variousoutposts and transporting mail and

personnel until the ceasefire wasdeclared on 27 July 1953.

The Korean Conflict had finallyended, but HMR-161 was not yethomeward bound. Immediatelyafter the guns cooled off, HMR-161would support a massive prisonerof war exchange and then enter aperiod of “watchful waiting” be-fore returning stateside.

The intervening 16 monthsbetween the move to the James-town Line in March 1952 and thearmistice in July 1953 were busyones for the helicopter section ofMarine Observation Squadron 6.The last of the venerable HO3S-1s

(Bureau of Aeronautics number124343) departed VMO-6 in April1952. Bell HTLs carried the loadthroughout the spring until thearrival of replacement helicoptersthat summer. The first of the newSikorsky HO5S-1 helicopters ar-rived in July. This new machine,the first helicopter equipped with allmetal rotor blades, was a three-seat utility aircraft that mounted athree-bladed overhead main rotorand a two-bladed tail rotor.Powered by a 245-horsepowerFranklin engine, it could carry a750-pound load at a cruisingspeed of 96 miles per hour. The

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A seriously wounded Marine near the Jamestown Line isloaded on board a Sikorsky HO5S-1 helicopter from VMO-6. By 1953, the HO5S-1, which was designed to remedy short-

falls of the HO3S-1, had become the Marines’ primary med-ical evacuation aircraft.

70

The Innovators

The first rotary-winged flight machines were chil-dren’s toys believed to have been developed inChina. Just after the end of World War I a rotary-

winged airplane, the autogiro, was developed andgained some popularity during the Jazz Age. True heli-copter technology, however, did not really take offuntil just before World War II. Pre-war helicopterenthusiasts in France, Italy, Spain, and Germany spreadtheir gospel throughout Europe and on to the UnitedStates. Of the early American designers, three standout: Igor I. Sikorsky, Frank N. Piasecki, and Arthur M.Young. Each of these men left an indelible mark on U.S.helicopter development, and their legacy lives on in theaircraft used by current Marine aviators.

IGOR I. SIKORSKYAmerica’s preeminent helicopter advocate, pioneer,

and designer was a Russian émigré who moved to theUnited States to escape communism. He did not invent,nor was he the first to fly, a helicopter. He did, howev-er, formulate a solution to movement stability forrotary-wing flight that has since evolved into the mostpopular modern helicopter configuration—a single,large, horizontal, overhead rotor stabilized by a small,

vertical, anti-torque tail rotor with forward movementcontrolled by varying the main rotor’s pitch while usingthe tail rotor to determine direction. Igor IvanovichSikorsky developed a wide variety of helicopters thatbecame versatile aircraft equally suited for both com-mercial and military use, aircraft able to performunique tasks on land, at sea, and in the air. After WorldWar II, Sikorsky worked closely with the U.S. MarineCorps to adapt his helicopters to military use, a symbi-otic relationship between manufacturer and user that car-ried on even after his death. Today, Igor Sikorsky is right-fully considered the “Father of American helicopters.”

Although long interested in rotary-wing flight,Sikorsky actually first gained fame for his multiple-engine aircraft designs. Born in Kiev, Russia, on 25 May1889, his interest in, and aptitude for, aeronautical engi-neering became evident early in his life. He beganexperimenting with flying machines and the principlesof aerodynamics prior to entering the Russian NavalAcademy. After three years, Sikorsky left St. Petersburgto study in Paris and then returned to his homeland toattend Kiev Polytechnic Institute. He returned to Parisa second time to learn more about rotary-winged flight.

Inventor Igor I. Sikorsky, the father of American heli-copters visits HMX-1 at Marine Corps Air StationQuantico, Virginia. In the background is an HO3S-1 heli-

copter, one of the first two “Whirlybirds” assigned to theU.S. Marine Corps.


71

He built his first helicopter, a wooden box mounting twohorizontal propellers powered by a 25-horsepowermotorcycle engine, upon his return to Kiev in 1909. Hecould never get this machine to fly and concluded thatthe technology of the day was not adequate, but he alsoremained convinced that in time rotary-winged aircraftwould surpass fixed-wing airplanes as flying machines.Sikorsky continued his experiments using engine-pow-ered sleighs until he turned to designing multiple-engine airplanes. In 1913, he designed and built theworld’s first four-engine airplane. Thus, he embarkedupon a new career path for the next 40 years.

Driven from Russia by the Bolshevik Revolution, anearly penniless Igor Sikorsky fled to the United Statesby way of France. In America he eked out a livingteaching mathematics and consulting part time. Amonghis projects was a proposed, but never adopted, tri-motor bomber for the U.S. Army. After much hardship,he was able to live the American dream when he con-verted a Long Island, New York chicken farm into theSikorsky Aero Engineering Company in 1923. Six yearslater, the company joined Boeing, Pratt & Whitney, andChance Vought in forming the United Aircraft andTransportation Corporation. These humble beginningscomprised the genesis of one of America’s most suc-cessful aviation enterprises. Sikorsky’s first successful U.S.design—an all-metal, twin-engine transport, the S-29A—established his reputation for building aircraftnoted for their ability to withstand hard landings onrough surfaces, poor weather conditions, and continu-ous operations with only rudimentary maintenance. Byfar his most successful airplane to that time was hiseight-passenger, high-wing, twin-engine S-38 amphibian.Although designed for commercial use, 16 variantsbearing Bureau of Aeronautics “RS” designations werepurchased by the U.S. Navy, some of which saw servicewith the Marine Corps. Sikorsky next turned to large,long-range, four-engine, transoceanic passengerplanes. His successive S-40, -41, and -42 modelsgained fame as the “American Clippers,” large flyingboats that plied their trade for Pan-American Airways inthe Carribean and across the Pacific Ocean. Economictroubles forced the shutdown of United Aircraft’sSikorsky Division in 1938, but this setback fortuitouslyonce again whetted his long-standing interest in rotary-winged aircraft.

Heartened by technological progress and spurredinto action by recent European developments—notablyGermany’s spectacular public exhibitions of HeinrichFocke’s Fa-61—Sikorsky went back to developing heli-copters. By 1939 he had created the VS-300, an ungain-ly looking contraption consisting of a sprawling baremetal frame mounting a single main rotor for lift and asmall-tail rotor for control. Although this “flying bed-spring” was not aesthetically pleasing and performedmore like a bucking bronco than a steady workhorse, itbecame the first practical American helicopter after its

initial free flight on 13 May 1940. Not long thereafter, theU.S. military became interested in helicopter develop-ment. In early 1942, Sikorsky won an unofficial com-petition by producing the VS-316. This two-place, sin-gle-main rotor helicopter was given the military desig-nation R-4 (R-1, -2, and -3 were competing designs byother manufacturers). It was soon followed byimproved versions labeled R-5 and R-6. By the end of thewar more than 400 Sikorsky helicopters had been built.The U.S. Navy procured its first Sikorsky helicopter, anArmy R-4 given the designation HNS upon transfer inOctober 1943. Sikorsky-built helicopters have been amainstay of naval aviation ever since. Marines current-ly fly the Sikorsky three-engine CH-53E heavy-lift trans-port helicopter, one of the largest helicopters in theworld.

FRANK N. PIASECKIFrank Piasecki, the son of an immigrant Polish tailor

born in 1919, was considered the “wonder boy” of earlyhelicopter development. By his 21st birthday he alreadyheld degrees in mechanical engineering from theUniversity of Pennsylvania and aeronautical engineeringfrom New York University. He began working as amechanic for Kellet Autogyro while a teenager thenbecame a designer with Platt-LePage after collegebefore branching off on his own. Piasecki developed thesecond successful American helicopter using castoffauto parts and an outboard motor. He endeared himselfto Marine helicopter proponents with his theories of howtandem rotors could support very large or heavy loads,an innovation that promised to make ship-to-shoremovement of complete units and bulky equipmentwhen other machines of the day could lift only a pilotand one or two others. Piasecki co-founded P.V.Engineering Forum, a consortium of aircraft designersinterested in rotary-wing flight and was the drivingforce behind that firm’s most successful project, the PV-3. The PV-3 was a large, elongated, bent fuselage, tan-dem rotor transport helicopter; the first of a series nick-named “Flying Bananas.” The PV-3 was unique becausethe Flying Banana was rated for eight passengers aswell as a crew of two. After its first flight in 1945, theNavy purchased 22 PV-3s (designated HRPs by theBureau of Aeronautics). The HRPs quickly established thepracticality of tandem rotors for heavy lift, and orders forimproved models quickly poured in. Piasecki’s notableearly success was the famous H-21 Workhorse, whichwas used by the Air Force as a rescue craft and by theArmy (“Shawnees”) to haul troops and cargo. The P.V.Engineering Forum became the Piasecki HelicopterCorporation in 1947, then a division of Vertol Aircraft,which in turn became a division of Boeing Aircraft.Venerable Boeing-Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight assault heli-copters, lineal descendants of the first Flying Banana havebeen the backbone of Marine helicopter aviation for morethan four decades and continue to serve with the fleetto this day.

most unique feature of the aircraftwas a removable forward canopythat allowed access for twostretchers inside the cabin. Thislatter feature protected injuredpassengers from the elementswhile enroute to advanced med-ical care, a significant improve-ment over both the HO3S and HTLmodels. The HO5S also possessedsuperior flight characteristics thatmade it a good reconnaissanceand observation aircraft. Unfortu-nately, its underpowered engineand some structural defects limitedthe aircraft’s performance. By theend of July, VMO-6 mustered eightHO5S-1s in addition to nine HTL-4s.Plans called for the HO5S to com-pletely replace the HTLs as soon aspossible. The number of HTLssteadily declined as time passeduntil only one HTL-4 remainedwhen the ceasefire was declared alittle over a year later.

Throughout the remainder of its

tour, VMO-6 had a reputation forbeing a “happy ship.” In the wordsof commanding officer Major Wal-lace J. Slappey, Jr.: “Morale wasextremely high. . . . The squadronwas loaded with gung-ho person-nel. Pilots were actually stealingflights from one another. . . . Theengineering department was out-standing, working round the clock. . . . Every man pulled his weightby simply knowing what neededto be done and doing it willingly.”

From April 1952 until the arm-istice in July 1953 the helicoptersection of VMO-6 averaged about600 missions per month, usuallyflying out between 200 and 300wounded. More than 1,000 mis-sions were mounted in two differ-ent months during the summer of1952 with the single month recordof 721 non-combat missions flownin September. Squadron recordsfor combat missions (375) andmedical evacuations (428) were

achieved in October 1952 duringintense fighting at the Hook whenthe Communists made their onlysuccessful, albeit temporary, pene-tration of the Jamestown Line. InMay 1953, the helicopter sectionwas reorganized into three eche-lons: a liaison and medical evacu-ation flight assigned to the 1stMarine Division command post;the squadron headquarters andmost aircraft located at airfield A-9;and a maintenance crew in additionto any “down” aircraft stationed atAscom City (A-33). In May andJune, HO5S-1 helicopters fromVMO-6 served as standby planeguards in support of the MarLEx Iand II amphibious exercises.

Two HTLs and five HO5S-1ssuffered major damage due opera-tional mishaps or crashed due tomechanical failures during thesquadron’s stay in western Korea,and all HO5S-1s were grounded inJuly 1953 because of numerous

72

ARTHUR M.YOUNGThe brilliant, but somewhat eccentric, scion of a

wealthy Pennsylvania family, Arthur M. Young inventeda rotor stabilizer bar that allowed two-bladed rotors topower light utility helicopters. His invention enabled BellHelicopter Corporation to produce the two most prolif-ic helicopter models in history, each of which remainedin production for more than 30 years.

Young began developing his idea while employed byLawrence D. Bell’s aircraft company, the same firm thatproduced the first U.S.-built jet (the P-59 BellAiracomet) and the first supersonic aircraft (the X-1rocket plane). After 15 years of building models andresearching rotary-winged flight, Young perfected his rev-olutionary new concept. He knew that Sikorsky’s tailrotor concept eliminated torque, but he wanted toimprove flight stability and reduce weight. His solutionwas a small counter-weighted stabilizer bar linkeddirectly to the rotor that functioned like a flywheel, adevice that kept the rotor blades independent from themovement of the fuselage. In 1941, he assigned hispatents to Bell Aircraft with an agreement to oversee theproduction of a few prototype Model-30 helicopters.The first of these rolled out at Gardenville, New York,in December 1942, and then made its first untetheredflight the following June. The second prototype lookedlike an automobile with its fully enclosed cabin and fourwheels. That aircraft was the first helicopter used to trans-

port a doctor on an emergency call, and it also rescueda pair of fishermen stranded on an ice floe in 1945. Thethird prototype featured an advanced instrument panel,a bare metal tubular tail boom, and a distinctivePlexiglas bubble canopy.

Building on the lessons learned while improving theearly models, Young next developed the first full pro-duction Bell helicopter labeled the Model-47. Thismachine, first flown on 8 December 1945, was the firsthelicopter certified for sale by the Civil AeronauticsAdministration. It was quickly adopted as a training air-craft by the military under the Army designation H-13 andthe Navy designation HTL. The Navy Department pur-chased 10 HTL-1s for evaluation in 1947. A dozen HTL-2s followed in 1949, with nine HTL-3s the next year. TheHTL-4 was virtually identical to the HTL-3 except forsome internal mechanical improvements. Eventually,nine variants of the HTL saw naval service, and theNavy purchased more than 200 of them between 1947and 1958. The Model-47 was so successful that the lastHTLs were not stricken from the Marine Corps flight lineuntil 1962, and H-13s were still in service with the U.S.Army well into the Vietnam War.

Modern-day Marines fly two descendants of the HTL,the Bell UH-1N Huey Twin utility helicopter and theheavily armed AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopter.Both have rendered yeoman duty thus far and are slat-ed to continue naval service for the foreseeable future.

73

Aviator and Aircraft Losses in Korea, 1950-1953

12 Sep 50

25 Sep 50

29 Sep 50

9 Nov 50

3 Dec 50

27 Jan 51

12 Mar 51

13 Apr 51

19 Apr 51

24 Apr 51

25 Aug 51

28 Aug 51

17 Sep 51

22 Sep 51

28 Sep 51

22 Oct 51

22 Oct 51

12 Jan 52

21 Jan 52

23 Jan 52

7 Feb 52

1 Mar 52

14 Mar 52

17 Mar 52

27 May 52

12 Feb 53

25 Mar 53

18 JuL 53

VMO-6

HU-1 (USN)*

VMO-6

VMO-6

VMO-6

VMO-6

VMO-6

VMO-6

VMO-6

VMO-6

MAG-33

VMO-6

VMO-6

VMO-6

HMR-161

HMR-161

HMR-161

MAMS-12

HMR-161

VMO-6

VMO-6

HMR-161

VMO-6

VMO-6

HMR-161

HMR-161

HMR-161

VMO-6

HO3S-1

HO3S-1

HO3S-1

HO3S-1

HO3S-1

HTL-4

HO3S-1

HO3S-1

HTL-4

HTL-4

HTL-3

HTL-4

HTL-4

HO3S-1

HRS-1

HRS-1

HRS-1

HO3S-1

HRS-1

HTL-4

HTL-4

HRS-1

HTL-4

HTL-4

HRS-1

HRS-1

HRS-1

HO5S-1

122514

122720

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

122518

122517

128638

128632

124566

128633

128902

124342

127802

127789

127792

122528

127797

122521

128892

Unknown

128625

128887

127784

127798

127822

130112

Operational mishap

Enemy fire

Operational mishap

Operational mishap

Enemy fire

Operational Mishap

Operational mishap

Enemy fire

Operational mishap

Enemy fire

Operational mishap

Operational mishap

Operational mishap

Operational mishap

Operational mishap

Operational mishap

Operational mishap

Mechanical failure

Operational mishap

Operational mishap

Enemy fire

Structural failure

Operational mishap

Operational mishap

Operational mishap

Mechanical failure

Mechanical failure

Enemy fire

Date Unit Type BuAer No Cause

Crews Killed1stLt Arthur R. Bancroft

TSgt Joe L. Brand, Jr.

MSgt Gilbert N. Caudle, Jr.

Capt David T. Gooden

1stLt Robert A. Longstaff

1stLt Charles B. Marino

Sgt Richard L. Parsell

Capt Allen W. Ruggles

Maj Doil R. Stitzel

Helicopter Losses

* U.S. Navy helicopter “on loan” to VMO-6 with one Navy pilot and one Marine crewman on board.

stateside tail boom failures. Theonly combat loss occurred on 18July 1953 when an HO5S-1 pilotedby First Lieutenant Charles B.Marino was hit by enemy antiair-craft fire while on an artillery spot-ting mission. The helicopter lostcontrol and crashed killing boththe pilot and the artillery observer.This was the last helicopter-relatedcombat casualty in Korea.

Ceasefire

At 1000 in the morning on 27July 1953, the United Nations andCommunist delegations sat downinside Panmunjom’s “Peace Pa-goda” to sign the formal ceasefireagreement that would bring anend to the fighting in Korea. Thedeed was done in only a few min-utes, and the guns fell silent a half-day later, at 2000 that evening. Itwas, however, an uneasy peace.Neither side fully trusted the other.The fighting had stopped, but fewbelieved the war was really over.

The Marines did not stand downand were not going home tomarch in any victory parades asthey had in 1945. Instead, the 1stMarine Division was ordered toorganize post-armistice battle posi-tions and to establish a “no pass”line south of the DemilitarizedZone. The Marines were alsocharged with assisting in the finalprisoner exchange of the war,Operation Big Switch. This wouldbe a high-profile undertaking thatwould be conducted under thewatchful eyes of the internationalpress. Anticipating many of theformer prisoners would need med-ical assistance, helicopters fromHMR-161 stood by to carry litterpatients or those too weak to trav-el by ambulance to the U.S. Army11th Evacuation Hospital at Free-dom Village near Munsan-ni.Seriously injured men were takendirectly to the hospital ships by

helicopter or were air evacuated toJapan by fixed-wing transportplanes.

Even at this late date, Marinehelicopters in Korea were calledupon to perform another missionnever dreamed of by the earlyplanners at Quantico. This timethe HRSs of HMR-161 provided thebest solution to a tangled diplo-matic knot. The Marines wereresponsible for the safety of non-repatriated enemy prisoners, Chi-nese and North Koreans, who didnot want to return home andwould instead be placed in thecustody of a neutral country,India. The problem was that Syng-man Rhee, the president of theRepublic of South Korea, refusedpermission for Indian troops toenter his country. In the words ofGeneral Mark W. Clark, USA, theUnited Nations field commander:“We had to go to great lengths tolive up to our pledge . . . that noIndian troops would set foot onSouth Korean soil. Therefore, weset up an airlift operation, whichcarried more than 6,000 Indiansfrom the decks of our carriers offInchon by helicopter to the De-militarized Zone. It was a majorundertaking which just about woreout our helicopter fleet.”

Marine Helicopter TransportSquadron 161 carried on in Koreafor almost two more years. ItsHRS-2s and -3s transported cargo,personnel, and medical evacueesuntil orders to prepare to leaveKorea arrived in late February1955. The squadron moved fromA-17 to Ascom City and the heli-copters flew to Iwakuni, Japan, toprepare for the sea journey. On 12March, HMR-162 officially as-sumed responsibility for supportingthe 1st Marine Division in Korea. Bythat time part of the squadron hadalready departed on board theamphibious cargo ship Seminole(AKA 104) and the remaining per-

sonnel, helicopters, and gear werestowed on board the aircraft carri-er Wasp (CV 18) when it bid good-bye to the Far East and sailed forMarine Corps Air Station Kaneohe,Hawaii, on 26 March 1955.

Following the ceasefire, VMO-6’s helicopter section continued toprovide liaison, observation, andmedical evacuation for the 1stMarine Division. The squadronalso supported training exercises.The last HTL-4 departed in August1953, and all HO5S-1s were back inaction by October. The squadronreached a helicopter milestone ofnote when Major John T. Dunlavyflew VMO-6’s 55,000th flight hour inKorea during an HO5S-1 test hopon 14 May 1954. The squadronbegan standing down on 4 Feb-ruary 1955, and finally departedKorea when four separate incre-ments sailed from Inchon for SanDiego in April 1955.

Contributions

The final accounting showednine Marine pilots and aircrewmen lost their lives during heli-copter operations in Korea, fourdue to enemy fire. Helicoptersproved to be generally moreresilient and far less vulnerable toenemy fire than most thought pos-sible prior to the test of combat—only six (all from VMO-6) of morethan two dozen helicopters de-stroyed during the war were shotdown while an uncounted numbersuffered some damage at thehands of the enemy but returned tobase for repairs. The helicoptersection of VMO-6 flew 22,367 mis-sions including 7,067 medicalevacuations in 35 months of com-bat flying. During its time in thecombat zone, HMR-161 logged19,639 flights (4,928 combat and14,711 non-combat), transported60,046 people, evacuated 2,748seriously wounded, and offloaded

74

7,554,336 pounds of cargo.Marine Observation Squadron 6

was awarded a individual U.S.Presidential Unit Citation andshared two others as an organiccomponent of senior commands.In addition, the squadron receiveda Navy Unit Commendation, anArmy Distinguished Unit Citation,and three Korean Presidential UnitCitations for its actions in Korea.Marine Helicopter TransportSquadron 161 was recognized for itsparticipation as a component ofcommands that were awarded oneU.S. Presidential Unit Citation, aNavy Unit Commendation, andone Korean Presidential Unit Ci-tation.

Some notable early Marine heli-copter pilots met mixed fates aftertheir combat service. First Lieu-tenant Gustave Lueddeke suc-cumbed to poliomyelitis not longafter returning to HMX-1 at Quan-tico, Virginia. Major ArmondDelalio was killed during a testflight when his specially config-ured HRS caught fire and crashed atPatuxent River Naval Air Station,Maryland. First Lieutenant LloydEngelhardt and Captain GeneMorrison each commanded MarineMedium Helicopter Squadron 161as lieutenant colonels in the 1960s.Morrison, in fact, got to put intopractice the helicopter combat tac-tics and techniques he pioneered inKorea when he led the squadronduring its deployment to Vietnam in1965. Brigadier General Edward C.Dyer and Colonel Keith B. Mc-Cutcheon both sat on the influen-tial Hogaboom Board that restruc-tured the Fleet Marine Force in1956. The board recommendedthat all Marine divisional equip-ment be air transportable andentire assault battalion landingteams be helilifted ashore tosecure beachheads using verticalassault techniques. Captain VictorArmstrong and Colonel Mc-

Cutcheon both rose to the highestaviation post in the Marine Corps.McCutcheon was the director ofaviation on the eve of the Vietnamera and then later both he andArmstrong held the post of deputychief of staff (air) as major gener-als—McCutcheon from 1966 to1970 and Armstrong in 1975.Lieutenant General McCutcheonwas actually slated to become thefirst Marine aviator to wear fourstars on active duty until he wastragically felled by cancer immedi-ately after commanding Marineforces in Vietnam.

Much like that first MarineHO3S that guided the rescue partyto the mired amphibious jeep inthe marsh at Quantico in 1948,VMO-6 and HMR-161 led the wayfor helicopters in the other

Services. The United States Armyowes a salute to the Marines forconceptualizing and testing theprinciples of modern airmobilewarfare. The Army had long beeninterested in rotary-winged aircraftand actually used some primitivehelicopters during World War II.The Marine Corps, however, pio-neered doctrine, employed fullhelicopter units in combat, anddeveloped hands-on tactical con-cepts in Korea. Phib-31, written atQuantico, Virginia, before theMarines even had a helicoptersquadron, is arguably the forerun-ner of today’s airmobile doctrine.According to Air Force historianRobert F. Futrell: “Army officerswere [so] impressed by the utility ofMarine helicopters in Korea [that]General Ridgway asked the De-

75


HMR-161 conducted its first aerial medical evacuation on 13 September 1951.Although medical evacuation was a secondary mission, the squadron carried morethan 2,000 seriously wounded men to various locations for advanced medicalcare. Its sister helicopters of VMO-6 evacuated more than 7,000 during 35months of combat flying.

partment of the Army to providefour Army helicopter transportbattalions, each with 280 heli-copters.” His request was signifi-cantly scaled down (to only twocompanies), but within a decadethe Army went on to create an air-mobile division whose assault ele-ments could be helilifted intocombat. The Navy and the AirForce took their cues from VMO-6

whose light utility helicopters per-formed search and rescue, medicalevacuation, liaison, and reconnais-sance—missions that closely par-alleled the needs of thoseServices.

Today the legacy of those earlyhelicopter pioneers of HMX-1,VMO-6, and HMR-161 lives onwithin the Marine Corps as well.Marine skeptics were silenced by

helicopter performance in combat,and helicopters thereafter becamea full partner in naval aviationrather than the “stepchildren” theyhad previously been. It is a tributeto the dedication, bravery, andskill of Marine helicopter air andground crews in Korea that heli-copters are vital components ofthe modern Marine air-groundteam. Current Marine helicopterpilots are mounted in the directdescendants of those simple ro-tary-winged machines that tra-versed the Korean skies from 1950to 1953: Bell UH-1 “Hueys” andAH-1 Sea Cobras were sired by theHTL “eggbeaters,” the tandem-rotor Boeing-Vertol CH-46 SeaKnights are advanced develop-ments of Frank Piasecki’s HRP“flying banana,” and the massiveSikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallionsevolved from the much smallerHO3S-1 “pinwheels.” Currently,the tilt-rotor Boeing MV-22 Os-prey is making true the vision ofdesigner Frank Piasecki about thefuture of rotary-winged flightvoiced a half century earlier: “Themost dramatic progress will beincreased speed of vertical-lift air-craft. This will come from twodirections: helicopter designerswill add speed to their machines;conversely, airplane designers willadd vertical-lift capabilities to theirhigh-speed aircraft. The result willbe a blending of flight intomachines fully capable of bothhelicopter flight as we know it andhigh-speed flight.”

While we cannot be certainexactly what the future holds, wecan safely state that vertical as-sault and rotary-winged assaultsupport will remain mainstays ofMarine Corps doctrine well intothe 21st century. With this inmind, we should always remem-ber this is due to the achievementsof the Korean “whirlybirds” thatled the way.

76

Col Keith B. McCutcheon became one of the most versatile and best-knownMarine aviators during his career. He was an innovator and theoretician as wellas a doer, and, like his hero MajGen Roy S. Geiger, he commanded both air andground units in combat.


About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J.Brown, USMCR (Ret), is a

freelance writer, a high schoolfootball coach, and an educa-tional consultant. The author ofseveral official histories (A BriefHistory of the 14th Marines,With Marines in OperationProvide Comfort, and WithMarine Forces Afloat in DesertShield and Desert Storm), hewas also a contributing essayist for the best-selling book,The Marines, and was the sole author of A Few GoodMen: The Fighting Fifth Marines. After almost four yearsactive duty from 1968 to 1971, Brown returned to teach-ing high school for the next three decades; intermittent-ly, he served as an activated reservist traveling to Koreaamong other places. He is a combat veteran of both theVietnam and Persian Gulf conflicts. He spent 20 years asa reservist with Mobilization Training Unit DC 7, theReserve unit that supports the History and MuseumsDivision. Lieutenant Colonel Brown commanded thetraining unit before retiring from the Marine CorpsReserve in 1996. He is the author of an earlier pamphletin this series, Counteroffensive: U.S. Marines fromPohang to No Name Line.

SourcesThe most important sources used in

preparing the pamphlet are the various offi-cial Service histories and several mono-graphs produced by the Marine Corps aswell as primary documents and oral historyinterviews held by the Marine CorpsHistorical Center located in Washington,D.C. Selected secondary works were alsoused to provide context and technical infor-mation.

The starting point for this study ofMarine Corps helicopter operations inKorea was the five volume History of U.S.Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953including: Lynn Montross and CaptNicholas A. Canzona, The Pusan Perimeter,v. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch,G-3 Division, HQMC, 1954); Lynn Montrossand Capt Nicholas A. Canzona, The Inchon-Seoul Campaign, v. 2 (Washington, D.C.:Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC,1955); Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A.Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign,v. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch,G-3 Division, HQMC, 1957); LynnMontross, Maj Hubard D. Kuokka, andMajor Norman W. Hicks, The East-CentralFront, v. 4 (Washington, D.C.: HistoricalBranch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1962); LtColPat Meid and Maj James M. Yingling,

Operations in West Korea, v. 5 (Washing-ton, D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC,1972). Other official histories consultedwere: Robert F. Futrell, The United StatesAir Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (Washing-ton, D.C.: Office of Air Force History,1983); and James A. Field, Jr., History ofUnited States Naval Operations: Korea(Washington, D.C.: Navy History Division,1962).

Monographs used included: Capt JohnC. Chapin, Fire Brigade: U.S. Marines in thePusan Perimeter (Washington, D.C.: Historyand Museums Division, HQMC, 2000);LtCol Kenneth J. Clifford, Progress andPurpose: A Developmental History of theU.S. Marine Corps (Washington, D.C.:History and Museums Division, HQMC,1973); MajGen John P. Condon, Corsairs ToPanthers: U.S. Marine Aviation in Korea(Washington, D.C.: History and MuseumsDivision, HQMC, 2002); LtCol Eugene W.Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, 1946-1962 (Washington, D.C.: History andMuseums Division, HQMC, 1976); LtColGary W. Parker, A History of MarineMedium Helicopter Squadron 161 (Wash-ington, D.C.: History and MuseumsDivision, HQMC, 1978); and LtCol Gary W.Parker and Maj Frank M. Batha, Jr., AHistory of Marine Observation SquadronSix (Washington, D.C.: History and

Museums Division, HQMC, 1982).Other books reviewed included: Cdr

Malcolm W. Cagle and Cdr Frank A.Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis:U.S. Naval Institute, 1957); Col Robert D.Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea: The U.S. MarineCorps, 1775-1962 (Annapolis: U.S. NavalInstitute, 1962); Robert Jackson, Air WarKorea (Osceola, WI: Motorbooks Inter-national, 1998); Allan R. Millett, SemperFidelis: The History of the United StatesMarine Corps (New York: Macmillan, 1980);Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky (NewYork: Harper and Brothers, 1954); WayneMutza, H-13 Sioux (Carrollton, TX:Squadron/Signal Books, 1995); Edwin H.Simmons, The United States Marines: TheFirst Two Hundred Years (New York:Viking, 1974); Gordon Swanborough andPeter M. Bowers, United States NavyAircraft Since 1911 (London: PutnamAeronautical Books, 1976); and Warren R.Young, The Helicopters (Alexandria, VA:Time-Life Books, 1982).

History and Museums Division oral his-tory transcripts provided observations by:LtCol Clifford V. Brokaw III; Capt NormanG. Ewers; Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk; CaptAndrew L. McVicars; Capt Gene W.Morrison; Maj Elton Mueller; Capt ClarenceW. Parkins; 1stLt John L. Scott; and 2dLtPatrick G. Sivert.

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in theKorean War era, is published for the education and training of Marines bythe History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance ofthe 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have been defrayed in partby contributions from members of the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.To plan and coordinate the Korean War commemorative events and activi-ties of the Sea Services, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard haveformed the Sea Services Korean War Commemoration Committee, chairedby the Director, Navy Staff. For more information about the Sea Services’commemorative effort, please contact the Navy-Marine Corps Korean WarCommemoration Coordinator at (202) 433-4223/3085, FAX 433-7265(DSN288-7265), E-Mail: [email protected], Website:www.history.usmc.mil.

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR, KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Charles R. Smith

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist

Catherine A. Kerns, Visual Information Specialist

U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center1254 Charles Morris Street SE

Washington Navy Yard DC 20374-50402003

PCN 190 00410 500

Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series

WHIRLYBIRDSU.S. Marine Helicopters

in Koreaby Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Retired

Documents

WHIRLYBIRDS, U.S. Marine Helicopters in · PDF fileU.S. Marine Helicopters in Korea ... combatant evacuation operations an unmanned American transport ... ducted noncombatant air-sea