WHIRLYBIRDS

U.S. Marine Helicopters in Koreaby Lieutenant Colonel RonaidJ. Brown, USMCR (Ret)

n Sunday, 25 June1950, CommunistNorth Korea unex-pectedly invaded itssouthern neighbor,

the American-backed Republic ofKorea (ROK). The poorly equip-ped ROK Army was no match forthe well prepared North KoreanPeople's Army (NKPA) whosearmored spearheads quickly thrustacross the 38th Parallel. Thestunned world helplessly lookedon as the out-numbered and out-gunned South Koreans were quick-ly routed. With the fall of the capi-tal city of Seoul imminent,President Harry S. Truman orderedGeneral of the Army DouglasMacArthur, Commander in Chief,Far East, in Tokyo, to immediatelypull all American nationals in SouthKorea out of harm's way. Duringthe course of the resultant non-combatant evacuation operationsan unmanned American transportplane was destroyed on the groundand a flight of U.S. Air Force aircraftwere buzzed by a North Korean AirForce plane over the Yellow Seawithout any shots being fired. On 27July, an American combat air patrol

ON THE COVER: A Sikorsky HRS-1transport helicopter from HMR-161sets down behind 1st Marine Divisionlines to pick up waiting Marines.Department of Defense Photo(USMC) A159970

AT LEFT: Girded for battle, Marinesride a tense 18 miles by helicopterbefore thefirct "airphibious" landing inhistory successfully deposited them ona Korean hilltop. Department ofDefense Photo (USMC) A156716

protecting Kimpo Airfield near theSouth Korean capital activelyengaged menacing North Koreanplanes and promptly downed threeof the five Soviet-built Yak fighters.Soon thereafter American militaryforces operating under the aus-pices of the United NationsCommand (UNC) were committedto thwart a Communist takeover ofSouth Korea. Thus, only four yearsand nine months after V-J Daymarked the end of World War II,the United States was once againinvolved in a shooting war in Asia.

The United Nations issued aworldwide call to arms to haltCommunist aggression in Korea,and America's armed forces beganto mobilize. Marines were quick torespond. Within three weeks ahastily formed provisional Marinebrigade departed California andheaded for the embattled Far East.Among the aviation units on boardthe U.S. Navy task force steamingwest was a helicopter detachment,the first rotary-wing aviation unitspecifically formed for combatoperations in the history of theMarine Corps. Although few real-ized it at the time, this small band ofdedicated men and their primitiveflying machines were about to rad-ically change the face of militaryaviation. Arguably, the actions ofthese helicopter pilots in Koreamade U.S. Marines the progenitorsof vertical envelopment operations,as we know them today.

There is great irony in the fact

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that the Marine Corps was the lastAmerican military Service toreceive helicopters, but was thefirst to formulate, test, and imple-ment a doctrine for the use ofrotary-wing aircraft as an integralelement in air-ground combatoperations. The concept of mann-ed rotary-wing flight can be tracedback to Leonardo da Vinci'sRenaissance-era sketches, butmore than four centuries passedbefore vertical takeoffs and landingsby heavier-than-air craft became areality. The Marines tested arotary-wing aircraft in Nicaraguaduring the Banana Wars, but thatexperiment revealed the PitcarinOP-i autogiro was not ready formilitary use. Autogiros used rotarywings to remain aloft, but they didnot use spinning blades to get air-borne or to power the aircraft soautogiros were airplanes not heli-copters. Some aviation enthusiasts,however, assert that the flight dataaccumulated and rotor technologydeveloped for autogiros markedthe beginning Marine Corps heli-copter development. It was notuntil 1939 that the first practicalAmerican helicopter, aircraft de-signer Igor I. Sikorsky's VS-300,finally moved off the drawingboard and into the air. The U.S.Army, Navy, and Coast Guardeach acquired helicopters duringWorld War Ii. The bulk of themwere used for pilot training, but afew American-built helicoptersparticipated in special combatoperations in Burma and thePacific. These early machines con-ducted noncombatant air-sea res-

Helicopters in the Marine Corps

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cue, medical evacuation, and Marine Corps Schools at Quantico,humanitarian missions during the Virginia, began to formulate a newwar as well, doctrine, eventually termed "verti-

In 1946, the Marine Corps cal assault," which relied uponformed a special board headed by rotary-wing aircraft as an alternativeMajor General Lemuel C. Shep- to ship-to-shore movement by sur-herd, Jr., to study the impact of face craft. The following year,nuclear weapons on amphibious Marine Corps Schools issued aoperations. In accordance with the mimeographed pamphlet entitled,recommendations made by the "Amphibious Operations—Em-Shepherd Board in early 1947, ployment of Helicopters (Tent-

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ative)." This 52-page tome was the31st school publication onamphibious operations, so it tookthe short title "Phib-31."Concurrently, the Marine Corpsformed a developmental heli-copter squadron to test the practi-cality of Phib-31 s emerging theo-ries. This formative unit, ColonelEdward C. Dyer's Marine Heli-copter Squadron 1 (HMX-1), stoodup in December 1947 and was col-located with Marine CorpsSchools. The new squadron's pri-mary missions were to developtechniques and tactics in conjunc-tion with the ship-to-shore move-ment of assault troops in amphibi-ous operations, and evaluate asmall helicopter as replacementfor fixed-wing observation air-planes. Among the officers as-signed to l-IMX-1 was the MarineCorps' first officially sanctionedhelicopter pilot, Major Armond H.DeLalio, who learned to fly heli-copters in 1944 and had overseenthe training of the first Marine heli-copter pilots as the operations offi-cer of Navy Helicopter Develop-ment Squadron VX-3 at LakehurstNaval Air Station, New Jersey.

In February 1948, the MarineCorps took delivery of its first heli-copters when a pair of SikorskyHO3S-ls arrived at Quantico.These four-seat aircraft featured anarrow "greenhouse" cabin, anoverhead three-blade rotor system,and a long-tail housing thatmounted a small vertical anti—torque rotor. This basic outlinebore such an uncanny resem-blance to the Anisoptera sub-species of flying insects that theBritish dubbed their newly pur-chased Sikorsky helicopters "drag-onflies." There was no Service ormanufacturer's authorized nick-name for the H035-I, but the mostcommon unofficial Americanappellations of the day were"whirlybirds," "flying windmills,"

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Pitcarin OP-i Autogiro

he first rotary-winged aircraft used by naval avia-tion was not a helicopter. It was an autogirn, an air-plane propelled by a normal front-mounted aircraft

engine but kept aloft by rotating overhead wings, a phe-nomenon known as "autorotation." Although ratherungainly looking due their stubby upturned wings, largetails, and drooping rotors, autogiros took well to the air.Their ability to "land on a dime" made them favorites atair shows and an aggressive publicity campaign toutedthem as 'flying autos, the transportation of the future."Autogiros. however, turned out to be neither a militarynor a commercial success.

The aircraft itself was an odd compilation of a normalfront-mounted aircraft engine used to generate thrustand three overhead free-spinning hlades attached to a cen-ter-mounted tripod to provide lift. The fuselage includ-ed a pair of stubby wings that supported the landing gearand had a semi-standard elongated tail assembly.Typical of the day, it had an open cockpit.

Although a rotary-winged aircraft, the OP-i was not ahelicopter. The engine was used to start the rotors mov-ing but was then disengaged and connected to the pro-peller to deliver thrust. A speed of about 30 miles per hourwas needed to generate lift and maintained for con-trolled flight. The OP-i could not hover, it required con-ventional engine power to take off and move forward inthe air; the plane could, howevei make a vertical land-ing. This unique feature made the OP-i attractive to themilitary.

The specific autogiro model first tested by the MarineCorps was the OP-i built by Harold E Pitcarin, whowould later found Eastern Airways. His company was alicensed subsidiary of a Spanish firm. All American auto-giros were based upon designs formulated by Spanishnobleman Juan de Ia Cierva. His first successful flight wasmade near Madrid in 1923. More than 500 autogiros flewworldwide during the next decade. Although his air-

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planes never lived up to his high expectations, de la Ciervadid develop rotor technology and recorded aerodynam-ic data later applied by helicopter designers IgorSikorsky and Frank Piasecki.

The Navy purchased three Pitcarin autogiros forextensive field-testing and evaluation in 1931. The onlycarrier tests were conducted on 23 September of that year,but the OP-i's performance was virtually identical tothat of carrier-borne biplanes then in use. The Marinestook one OP-i to Nicaragua to test it under combat con-ditions. Again, its performance was disappointing. Thepilots of VJ-6M noted it lacked both payload and range.The only practical use they found was evaluation ofpotential landing areas. This was nor enough reason toincorporate the OP-i into the Marine inventory. Overall,the OP-i was described as "an exasperating contrap-tion," not fit for military use. Further trials of a winglessautogiro in 1935 revealed no improvement, so director ofaviation Major Roy S. Geiger recommended againstadoption of that aircraft type.

In the barnstorming days between the World Wars,autogiros proved to he the ultimate novelty attraction.Aviator Charles A. Lindbergh often put on demonstrations,aviatrix Amelia Earhart set an altitude record in one, andSecretary of the Navy Charles Francis Adams flew in anautogiro to join President Herbert C. Hoover at an isolatedfishing camp in Virginia. The Royal Air Force actually usedautogiros for convoy escort and observation duringWorld War II, and the Soviet Union developed its ownautogiro.

Although the OP-i never became a mainstreamMarine aircraft and was not a true helicopter, some avi-ation enthusiasts assert that the technology and datadeveloped by de La Cierva was crucial for rotary-wingedflight. They, therefore, make the case that the OP-ishould be considered the progenitor of today's heli-copters.

Department of Detense Photo (UsMc) 528139

The Visionaries

The wake of the \\' tld War II. with its ominousspecter of nuclear weapons, forced the MarineCorps to i'ethink existing amphibious doctrine.The concIusi n was that previous methods of ship—to—hoi'e nlovement cre no longer sufficient to ensure a suc—('essluI landing so alternative methods had to be devel-oped. several options kokecl promising, hut the only onethat st( d the test of time and combat was verticalenvelopment—the use of helicopters to move troopsand supplies.

In 19ih, Commandant Alexander A. Vandegrift—atthe urging of lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, the"Gray Eagle" of Marine aviation e ho had just witnessedpost-war nuclear tests—formed a special board culledfrom Marine Corps headquarters to study existing tacticsand equipment then make recommendations for restruc-turing the Fleet Marine Force. Assistant CommandantLerntiel C. hphcrd, Jr.,a graduate of Virginia MilitaryInstitute, who was arguably the Marines most innovativeihi' ision commander in the Pacific, headed the board.Shepherd was an excellent choice because he was botha ti IrIit malist and a visionary who would later becomeCoiiunanclant, Other members of the board includedMajor General Field Harris, the director of Marine avia-tion, and Brigadier General Oliver P. Smith, die head ofplans and operations division. MI three men would bereunited in Korea in l9o where they would put into prac-tice the revolutionary doctrines they set in motion;Shepherd as the commanding general of Fleet MarineForce. Pacific, Harris as commanding general of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, and Smith as commanding gener-al of the 1st Marine Division. Two colonels assigned tothe board secretariat were particularly influential,Edward C. Dyer and Merrill B. Twining. Dyer, a NavalAcademy graduate and decorated &,ombat pilot, wasmaster of all things aeronautical while Merrill Twining, ahighly regarded staff officer, handled operational theory.Neither a formal member of the board nor its secretariatbut keeping close tabs on what transpired was BrigadierGeneral Gerald C, Thomas. \'audcgnilt's trusted chief ofstaff. Dyer eventually commanded the first Marine heli-copter squadron and Thomas replaced Smith as 1stMarine I )lvision coii'tmander in Korea.

Doctrinal development for ertical assault was done at

Marine Corps Schools located at Quantico. Virginia.First, a hoard headed by Lieutenant Colonel Robert F.Hogaboom laid Out what was needed in a doctimenttitled "Military Requirements for Ship—to—Shore\Ii vcment of Troops and Cargo." Even though no suit-able aircraft were vet available, the thinkers atQuantico came up with new doctrine published asAmphibious Training ,tian,uil .'1, "'\tnphihiousOperations—Ernplovment of Helicopters (Tentative >."One of the drivers ol' this prolect was LieutenantColonel Victor H. Krulak, a tough former paratrooperwho had been wounded in the P;tcil ii, but was alsoknown for his high intellect ,i:J an unsurpassed abili-ty to get things dune. He was a prolific writer and ademanding taskmaster who kept his finger on the pulseof several vital projects including helicopter develop-men t.

I.)espite the nearly unlimited future potential of heli-copters for assault and support of landing forces, therewas ingrained resistance to such a revolution:irv Concept.Must young pilots wanted to fly sleek jets and dogfightenemy aces, not manhandle temperamental aircraft todeliver troops and supplies: experienced fliers w•'erccomfortable with aircraft they already knew well andwere reluctant to give up their tn,istcd planes: and crit-ics claimed helicopters were too slow and vulnerable.Twining took the lead in addressing these problemswhen he pointed out the Marine Corps had far morepilots than planes and noted that the wishes of theindividual were always subservient to the needs iiI theMarine Corps. He also asserted that the speed and vial-nerability of helicopters should not he properly com-pared to fixed.wing aircraft hut to sui-f:iie landing craft(helicopters were both faster and more agile than boatsor amphibious tractors).

All early helicopter advocates were highly motivatedand dedicated men. Their achievements and foresightkept the Marine Corps' reputation for innovation alivedespite severe budgetary constraints and concurrentinter—Service unification battles. In fact. many of themen also played key roles in he 'Chowder Society."whose behind-the-scenes work successl'uhly protectedMarine Corps interests during the bitter" unificationbattles" after the World \Var II.

and "pinwheels." The HO3S-1 hada cruising speed of less than 100miles per hour, a range of about 80miles, could lift about 1,000pounds, and mounted simpleinstrumentation that limited theHO3S to clear weather and day-light operations. This very restrict-

ed flight envelope was acceptablebecause these first machines wereto be used primarily for trainingand testing. They were, however,sometimes called upon for practicalmissions as well. In fact, the firstoperational use of a Marine heli-copter occurred when a Quantico-

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based HO3S led a salvage party toan amphibious jeep mired in anearby swamp.

The first Marine helicopter oper-ational deployment occurred inMay 1948 when five HMX-1 "pin-wheels" flying off the escort card-er Palau (CVE 122) conducted 35

National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-A] 30996

BGen Edward C. Dyet here receivingthe Legion of Merit for meritorious ser-vice as the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing'sG-3 during the Jnchon-Seoul cam-paign, was one of the most influentialmen involved in the adoption of thehelicopter by the Marine Corps. Anaval aviator, he helped to bring theconcept to reality byJbrmula.ting doc-trine and then commanding HMX-1 atQuantico, Virginia.

flights to land 66 men and severalhundred pounds of communica-tions equipment at Camp Lejeune,North Carolina's Onslow Beachduring amphibious command postexercise Packard TI. As the yearprogressed, HMX-l's aircraft com-plement increased by six when theMarine Corps took delivery of twonew types of helicopters, one BellHTL-2 and five Piasecki HRP-ls.The Bell HTL, often called the"eggbeater," was a side-by-sidetwo-seat trainer that could fly atabout 85 miles per hour. It hadtwo distinctive features, a roundedPlexiglas "fishhowl" cockpit can-opy and a single overhead two-bladed rotor. This model had fourlanding wheels and a fabric-cov-ered tail assembly, although laterversions of the HTL mounted skidsand left the tail structure bare. Thelarger Piasecki HRP-1 was a 10-place troop transport whose tan-dem-mounted rotors could push italong at about 100 miles per hour.

The aircraft's unique bent fuselage(overlapping propeller radii meantthe tail rotor had to he mountedhigher than the forward rotor)gave it the nickname "FlyingBanana." Unfortunately, it was atemperamental machine consid-ered too fragile to he assigned tocombat squadrons. The HRP-1 wasinstead relegated to use as a testbed and demonstration aircraftuntil a more capable transporthelicopter could be procured.

During the next two yearsHMX-1 conducted numerous ex-periments, tests, exercises, demon-strations, and public appearances.Helicopters soon became crowdpleasers at air shows and wereinvariably the center of attentionfor dignitaries visiting Quantico.As a result of numerous tacticaltests and performance evaluations,Colonel Dyer recommended thatlight helicopters should be added toMarine observation squadrons.Headquarters agreed, and it was

One of jive Sikorsky 1-1035-Is from HMX-l prepares to landon the Palau (CVE 122) during Operation Packard 11 in May1948. This was thefirst test to determine the value of the heli-

copter in the movement of assault troops in an amphibiousoperation.

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decided that an even mix of heli-copters and airplanes should beadopted as soon as enough heli-copters and trained personnelwere available. Unfortunately,teething problems grounded eachof the helicopter types at one timeor another, and it was apparentmore reliable aircraft with muchgreater lift capacity would be nec-essary to make vertical assault atrue option in the future. Marinehelicopter detachments participatedin exercises Packard III (1949) andPackard IV (1950). This time peri-od also featured many milestones.Among them were the first overseasdeployment of a Marine helicopterpilot when Captain Wallace D.Blatt flew an H03S-1 borrowedfrom the U.S. Navy during the

American withdrawal from Chinain February 1949; the first unitdeployment in support of a fleetexercise occurred in February1950; and the largest single heli-copter formation to that time tookplace when six 1-IRPs, six HO3Ss,and one HTL flew by Quantico'sreviewing stand in June 1950. Bythat time, Lieutenant Colonel JohnF Carey, a Navy Cross holder whoa dozen years later would lead thefirst Marine aviation unit sent toVietnam, commanded I-IMX-1.The squadron mustered 23 officersand 89 enlisted men; its equip-ment list showed nine HRPs, sixHO3Ss, and three HTLs. Since itsinception the Marine helicopterprogram had garnered many lau-rels, but several vital items

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remained on the agenda—notablythe creation of helicopter squad.-rons for service with the FleetMarine Force and the procurementof a combat-ready transport heli-copter. This was the status of theMarine Corps helicopter programwhen the North Korean unexpect-edly burst across the 38th Parallel.

The commitment of Americancombat troops to Korea on 30 Juneset off alarm bells throughout theMarine Corps. Although the official"word" had yet to he passed, with-in a few hours of the North Koreaninvasion most Marines surmised itwould not be long before theywould be on their way to war.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A55366Piasecki HRP-1 'Flying Bananas" in action during a Basic but technical constraints limited it to demonstration andSchooipre-graduation field pro blem at Quantico, Virginia. training use and no HRP5 saw action in Korea.The I-IRP was the frst Marine Coips transport helicopter,

M arine Helicopter Squadron (HMX-1) is uniquein the Marine Corps hecause it has several dis-tinct titissions and at least three differenteha ins-c )f—command providing guidance and tasking.

1-[MX-1 was the first Marine rotary-wing squadron. Itstood up" at Marine (: rps Airfield Quantico in Virginia

on 1 December 1947 and has been located there eversince. Its activation was the first operational move thatstarted a revolution in Marine aviation and tactical doc-trine.

One interesting insight into the Marines most uniqueaircraft squadnin is the Irequent misunderstanding of itsofficial designation. Although HMX-1 was initially taskedto develop techniques and tactics in connection withthe mc ivenlent of assault troops by helicopter and toevaluate a sniall helicopter as an observation aircraft, the"N" dc 'es not designateS •experinental• as is ofteninferred. The Nighthawks of HMX-1 do perform somedevelopmental tasks, hut their prinvir' missions are 10 pro-'ide helicopter transportation for the President of theUnited States and to support Marine Corps Schools.

The squadron, initially manned by seven officers andthree enlisted men, quickly grew and mustered 18 pilotsand 81 enlisted men when (lie first helicopters. Sikorsky1-1035-Is, arrived. These first primitive machines carriedonly the pilot and up to three lightly armed troops, butthey formed the basis for testing helicopter doctrinedescribed in Marine Corps Schools operational manualP/i/h-il. Eventually, IIMX-l received a mix of earlymodel helicopters with the addition of Piasecki HRPtransports and Bell I ITL trainers to test doctrine before theKorean \Var,

On 8 May lOiS. HMX-l pilots flew from Quantico toNorfolk, Virginia, to hoard the escort carrier Pa/wi (CVE122'c The 1k-on operation as described by HMX-1commanding officer Colonel Edward C. Dyer as a" coni-plete shambles [withl sailors running all over the place inmortal danger of walking into tail rotors, and theMarines were totally disorganized as well. It was completel'icc,llant. there was no organization and no real s\'sienl [inplace]." By the next day, however, the Navy and MarineCorps were using the same basic slup-board flight oper-ations procedures practiced n da\ —circular lines delin-

approach lanes. Five days later, the HO3S-ls delivered 66men and several tons of equipment to Camp Leleune,North Carolina's Onslow Beach during command postexercise Packard II.

The fullowing year a similar exercise employed eightHRPs, three HO3Ss. and a single Hit. During ExercisePackard III, the HRP "1-Icing Banana" troop transportswere carrier borne, the HTL was loaded on an LST forcommand and control, and the 11035s si.iyed ashore asrescue aircraft. The HRPs brought 230 troops and 14.000pounds of cargo ashore even though choppy seasswamped several landing craft and seriously disruptedoperational maneuvers. Many consider this superb per-formance to be the key factor in the acceptance of thehelicopter as a viable ship-to-shore method, thus pavingthe way fur the integration of rotary-wing aircraft intoMarine aviation,

In 1957. I-IMX-1 acquired an unexpected mission—transporting the President of the United Stares.Helicopters were only considered for emergency situationsuntil President Dwight D. Eisenhower used an HMX- 1Sikorsky HtFS Sea Horse helicopter for transportationfrom his summer home on Narragansett Bay. After that.Marine helicopters were routinely used to move thePresident from the White I louse lawn to Andrews AirForce Base, the home of presidential plane "Air ForceOne. hat transport mission became a permanent task-ing in 1976 and continues to this clay.

Currently mustering more than 700 personnel, I IMX—I is the largest Marine Corns helicopter squadron. It isdivided into two sections. The "White" side flies twounique helicopters—both specially configured Sikorskyexecutive transports, the VH-3D Sea King and the \:H.430NSeahawk. The 'Green" side provides basic helicopterindoctrination training for ground troops, tests new con-cepts and equipment. and assists the Marine airweapons and tactics squadron. Unlike any other Marinesquadron, IIMN-1 answers to three distinct chains—of—con'unand: the Marine Corps deputy chief of staff for airat Headquarters Marine Corps; the Wlute Ilouse milita'office; and the operational test and evaluation forcecommander at Norfolk, Marine Helicopter Squadron 1 wasnot only the first such Marine unit, it also currently holds

Marine Helicopter Squadron 1

eated danger areas as well as personnel staging areas and a unique place in naval aviation

General MacArthur's formal re-quest for a Marine regimental com-bat team and supporting aviationfinally filtered through officialchannels on 2 July, and five dayslater the 1st Provisional MarineBrigade was activated. BrigadierGeneral Edward A. Craig's 6,534-

man unit included the 5th Marinesas its ground combat element andthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing(Forward Echelon) as its aviationcombat element.

Brigadier General Thomas J.Cushman, a veteran aviator whohad commanded an aircraft wing

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in the Pacific during World War II,was "dual-hatted" as both thebrigade deputy commander andthe commander of the aviationcomponent. The 1st Brigade's1,358-man aviation element wasbuilt around Marine Aircraft Group33 €MAG-33), which included three

squadrons of propeller-drivenVought F4U Corsairs, two day fight-er squadrons (VMF-214 and -323)and one night fighter squadron(VMF[N]-513), The remaining avia-tion units included headquarters,ground support, and air controlpersonnel in addition to an obser-vation squadron.

The observation squadron as-signed to the 1st Marine Brigadewas Marne Observation Squadron6 (VMO-6) commanded by MajorVincent J. Gottschalk. Its missionwas to conduct "tactical air recon-

naissance, artillery spotting, andother flight operations within thecapabilities of assigned aircraft insupport of ground units." This laststatement became a well-exercisedelastic clause under the innovativeguidance of Major Gottschalk, anengineering graduate of the Un-iversity of Michigan who saw sev-eral years sea duty in the Pacificbefore earning his wings. Tn ac-tion, Gottschalk saw to it that prac-tically any flying task in support ofground units, no matter how diffi-cult or outrageous it initially

seemed, fell within the capabilitiesof VMO-6 aircraft. He took com-mand of VMO-6 on 3 July and wasordered to be ready for overseasdeployment only four days later.

Marine observation squadronshad been serving as indispensablecomponents of Marine air-groundcombat teams since the BananaWars. Marine Observation Squad-ron 6 (then called VQ-6M) wasspecifically formed for expedi-tionary duty in Nicaragua in 1928,but it was administratively trans-ferred back to Quantico for duty asa training unit about six monthslater. Marine observation squad-rons went by the wayside in 1933and did not re-emerge until opera-tions moved to the Western Pacificduring World War II. There, flyingsmall, nimble, high-wing, two-seat,single-engined Piper OE "Grass-hoppers" and similar Stinson OY-i."Sentinels" (often called Grass-hoppers as well), VMOs providedaerial reconnaissance and artillery-naval gunfire spotting as well asperforming assorted utility dutieswhile attached to various Marinedivisions. Marine ObservationSquadron 6 was reactivated in1943, saw combat action onOkinawa in 1945, and participatedin the post-war occupation ofNorth China. Upon its return to theUnited States in 1947, thesquadron flew in support of the 1stMarine Division located at CampPendleton, California. The aircraft ofVMO-6 did occasional artilleryspotting and sometimes supportedground maneuvers or performedadministrative duties, hut the mainmission at Camp Pendleton was apractical one—spraying aerialinsecticide. In early June 1950,VMO-6 was assigned to the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing stationed atnearby Marine Corps Air Station ElToro.

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With the arrival of the first warn-ing orders, both Camp Pendleton

Capt Victor A. Armstrong, at the controls of a Sikorsky HO3S-i helicoptet; wasthe officer-in-charge of the VMO—6 helicopter section, the first Marine helicopterunit formed for combat duty. Holder qf the Distinguished Flying Cross foractions in the Pacilic during World War 11, he would attain the rank of majorgeneral and serve as the deputy chief of stajffor air.

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and Marine Corps Air Station ElToro became scenes of bedlam aspeople raced around to gathermaterials and units speedilyabsorbed new personnel. "Moth-balled" weapons and equipmentwere hurriedly broken out of stor-age and readied for use. Trainsand planes brought in personnelculled from posts and stationsacross the United States at allhours of the day and night.Arrivals were welcomed on boardand sent to their new units as soonas the handshakes finished. Spacewas at a premium, as was time.Round-the-clock work scheduleswere instituted, and the unofficialorder of the day became "sleep onthe boat!"

Major Gottschalk was originallytold to form a four-plane, four-offi-cer, and 10-enlisted man detach-ment to accompany the 1stBrigade to Korea. Although thisdetachment was far smaller than awar-strength squadron, just find-ing enough airplanes was not aneasy task. Gottschalk decided totake eight well-worn OYs toensure that four of them would beflyable—the rest would become"hangar queens" until replacementparts or new aircraft were in thesupply pipeline. While the searchfor planes and equipment gotunder way, Gottschalk's orderswere modified on 7 July. Theentire squadron would now begoing and, in accord with earlier

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recommendations, the squadronaircraft mix would also includehelicopters.

Eight officers and 30 enlistedmen were pulled out of HMX-1 atQuantico, Virginia, with orders tomove to the West Coast immedi-ately. Captain (later Major Gen-eral) Victor A. Armstrong was theofficer-in-charge of the helicopterdetachment. The other pilots in-cluded Captains George B. Farishand Eugene J. Pope, and FirstLieutenants Arthur R. Bancroft,Lloyd 3. Engelhardt, Robert A.Longstaff, Max N. Nebergall, andGustave F. Lueddeke, Jr. The de-tachrnent's claim to historical famewas that this was the first perrna-nent assignment of a Marine heli-copter unit to the Fleet MarineForce. Contrary to some asser-tions, this detachment was neitherthe first Marine combat helicoptersquadron nor was it the first U.S.helicopter detachment to see coin-bat service—a helicopter element(later designated Flight F) from theU.S. Air Force 3d Air RescueSquadron and carrier-based U.S.Navy helicopters assigned toUtility 1-lelicopter Squadron 1 (HU-1) were already in action in Koreaby the time VMO-6 arrived.

Armstrong's detachment madeits way from Quantico to El Toro,California, leaving on 8 July andreporting for duty on the 10th.Upon arrival, helicopter detach-ment personnel were integratedinto VMO-6, and Captain Arm-strong was named that squadron'sexecutive officer. Because only thepersonnel of the helicopter de-tachment transferred from HMX-1,aircraft had to be found. SixHO3S-1 helicopters were obtainedfrom U.S. Navy sources (two eachfrom Inyokern and Point Mugu,California, and two more from theoverhaul and maintenance facility atSan Diego). Only two days afterreporting in, the helicopter detach-

Department of Defense Photo (U5MC) A1280

A Sikorsky I-103S-1 helicopter transports apassengerfrom one shp to another whilethe convoy carrying the VMO-6 helicopter section is en route to Korea. Marine'9y/jjrlybirds"/lying offthe carrier Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) were routtnely usedto deliver messages and personnel hetween ships.

Sikorsky 11035-1Deparmient of Defense Photo (USMC) A131099

he Sikorsky HO3S-l was the first helicopterassigned to the U.S. Marine Corps. The HO3S wasthe naval variant of Sikorky's model S-51 com-

mercial helicopter. Despite its observation designation, theHO3S was actually a utility aircraft used for a variety ofroles. Among the 46 conceptual uses initially listed byMarine Corps Schools were the ones most used inKorea: search and rescue; aerial reconnaissance; medicalevacuation; and liaison. The U.S. Air Force flew thesame aircraft as a search and rescue helicopter designat-ed H-5F.

The H035 was the lineal descendent of earlierSikorsky designs, the initial FINS trainer and the first des-ignated military observation helicopter (alternatelyknown as the HO2S in naval service and the R-5A to theArmy). The H03S featured a more powerful engine thatgave it added lift and an increased payload. During theimmediate pre-war period, the HO3S proved to he an out-standing rescue craft that often utilized its winch to pulldowned pilots out of the water. Likewise, the H035 wasan excellent observation platform for artillery spotring.

in Korea, its primary uses were as a liaison aircraft andas an aerial ambulance. A first-rate liaison aircraft withgood range, the H035 had a dependable engine, and wasrugged enough that it required relatively little maintenancewhen compared to other rotary-wing aircraft of the day.

Even though the H035 performed yeoman service at

10

the Pusan Perimeter, it had significant shortfalls as acombat aircraft. The tricycle landing gear and its high cen-ter of gravity made the HO3S unstable on all but flat solidterrain; the aircraft could not accommodate interiorstretcher loads; its lack of hack-lit instrumentation pre-cluded extended night and had weather operations; andthe high engine location made aircraft maintenance dif-ficult. Another major drawback was that it required a greatdeal of strength and endurance to handle such a heavyaircraft for an extended period without servo-controls. Inaddition, the single main rotor and long tail assembly com-bined with a centrally located engine mount oftenrequired field expedient ballast adjustments to maintainin-flight stability, so it was not unusual for pilots to keepseveral sand bags or a seahag filled with rocks in thecabin.

Aircraft DataManufacturer: Sikorsky Division of United AircraftCorporationPower Plain: Pratt and Whitney R-985 AN-7 Wasp Jr., 9cylinder, 450 horsepower, radial engineDimensions: Length, 57' 1/2"; height, 12' ii"; rotor, 48'composite construction bladePerformance: Cruising speed, 85 mph; range, 260 milesLilt: Pilot plus two passengers or about 500 pounds ofcargo (excluding fuel)

Helicopters Enter Combat

ment moved to San Diego toboard ship.

The crowded escort carrierBadoeng Strait (CVE 11.6) carrying60 Corsairs, 8 OY Sentinels, and 6Marine helicopters along with theiraircrews sailed for the Far East on14 July. Enroute helicopters wereused for inter-ship supply delivery,mail runs, and personnel transfers.The 1st Marine Brigade was origi-nally slated for a temporary lay-over in Japan where cargo could besorted out then combat loadedand some rudimentary amphibioustraining would be conductedbefore the Marines entered thecombat zone. That was the planuntil the situation in Koreabecame so grave that the 5thMarines was ordered to go direct-ly to the beleaguered SouthKorean port city of Pusan. The avi-ation element was still slated toland in Japan, however, so theships carrying the aviation compo-nent split off and headed for theJapanese por city of Kobe.

As the ships of Navy TaskGroup 53.7 plowed through thePacific, Brigadier General Craigand his operations officerLieutenant Colonel Joseph L.Stewart flew to Korea to attend aseries of command conferences.On 30 July, they learned that uponlanding the Marines would beattached to a U.S. Army task forceassigned to shore up the crum-bling southwest flank of theUnited Nations defense lines.Colonel Stewart called the aviationadvance patty command post inJapan to warn that combat actionwas imminent and requested thatVMO-6 and Marine Tactical AirControl Squadron 2 (MTACS-2) besent on to Korea as quickly as pos-sible. This emergency phone callconfirmed that the situation inKorea was desperate. According-ly, when the Badeong Strait madelandfall on the evening of 31 July

1950, Major Gottschalk receivedword to begin operations at firstlight the next morning.

Marine Observation Squadron6's airplanes and helicopters wentashore on 1 August. The next daythe Marine air elements scattered tothe four winds. The day fightersquadrons boarded a pair of escortcarriers and then sailed for thecombat zone; the night fightersquadron joined an Air Force all-weather squadron at Ttazuke AirBase on Kyushu; VMO-6 groundcrews and their equipment "trans-shipped" to a tank landing ship(LST) for transportation to Korea;and headquarters personnelmoved to Itami Air Base nearOsaka on the island of Honshu.

From Kobe, the helicopters ofVMO-6 proceeded to Itami wheretwo helicopters were assigned toMAG-33 headquarters. Theywould be held in Japan to provideliaison services between the wide-ly scattered aviation units and, atthe same time, be available asemergency replacements if need-ed. The other four H035-ls pro-ceeded to Korea. They made theirway from Itami to Iwakuni AirBase where they stayed overnight.After a detailed situation brief anda hasly final maintenance inspectionat Ashiya Air Base on northernKyushu on the morning of 2August, the helicopters made thehop across the Tsushima Sraits.They landed at an airfield nearPusan, the logistics keystone ofthe United Nations defensiveperimeter.

The outlook in Korea was notgood when they arrived. The hard-pressed United Nations Commandwas struggling to hold onto a 60-by-90-mile area of southeast Koreaknown as the Pusan Perimeter.The North Korean drive south was

11

slowing, hut the outcome of thebattle for the Korean peninsulawas far from certain when the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade waswelcomed on board by EighthArmy commander Lieutenant Gen-eral Walton H. Walker, USA.

At the Pusan Perimeter, theMarine brigade acquitted itselfwell and showcased the combateffectiveness of the Marine air-ground team. The Marines wereused as a "fire brigade" movingfrom place to place to stamp outenemy threats. They spearheadedthe first U.N. offensive in Korea,and then twice threw back NKPApenetrations of the U.N. defensivelines. Marine air hit the enemywhen Corsairs swept out of thesky on the same day that theground element was comingashore at Pusan harbor. Thebrigade then consolidated at atemporary assembly area nearChangwon before mounting thefirst sustained United Nationsoffensive of the war. The initialground action occurred in thevicinity of Chindong-ni from 6 to 9August. From there the Marinespressed south to Kosong beforeturning north to the ChangchonPass after wiping out an enemymotorized regiment during theKosong "Turkey Shoot." On 13August, as they neared Sachon,the Marines were abruptly orderedback to Masan to prepare to seal offan enemy penetration across theNaktong River. Hard fighting atRed Slash Hill and carefully coor-dinated supporting arms firesthrew the North Koreans back.While recuperating at an areadubbed the Masan "Bean Patch,"the Marines had to return to theNaktong bulge to repulse theenemy one more time. Finally, on5 September, the Marines pulledout of the line and returned toPusan so they could mount out tolead MacArthur's amphibious turn-

ing movement at Tnchon.Throughout the campaign, thehard-working HO3S-ls of VMO-6performed a wide variety of tasksand were so indispensable thatMarine and Army commanderswere soon demanding more heli-copters.

Upon its arrival at Pusan on 2August, the VMO-6's forward ech-elon was temporarily billeted in aSouth Korean schoolhouse locatedabout 10 miles west of the portLintil the squadron support ele-ment caught up and a more per-manent, and less crowded, sitecould be occupied. The rear party,which sailed from Kobe on boarda japanese-manned landing ship,actually arrived at Pusan on 4August but could not move out fortwo more days due to the lack oftransportation. Squadron suppliesand equipment were laboriouslyloaded (there was no cargo han-dling machinery at hand) onto thedock then reloaded onto a train

for shipment west to Chinhae on 6August. Chinhae was a SouthKorean naval base, as welt as thefuture home of the Korean MarineCorps, located only a short hopacross the bay from Masan. Thesite of a former Japanese ammuni-tion depot with an airstrip, it wasselected because it was close tothe action, had a 2,600-foot grassand concrete runway (alreadybeing used by a combined US-ROK Air Force training squadron),and included a pair of completedhangars with a third under con-struction. There were enoughQuonset huts to house the men,provide adequate office space,and warehouse supplies. Thisfacility would be VMO-6's homefield and base of operations untilthe 1st Provisional Marine Brigadewas dissolved in early September.

In Korea, VMO-6 would beunder the operational control ofthe brigade but under the adminis-trative control of the wing. This

meant that the brigade, and later thedivision, commander through hisair section would assign daily mis-sions while the aircraft wingwould provide supplies and per-sonnel administration. Unfortu-nately, the helicopters, whichbelonged partially to both, but notfully to the ground or aviationcommanders, seemed to be nei-ther fish nor fowl. To use MajorGottschalk's words to describe thisawkward command and controlsystem: "Observation squadronswere the stepchildren of Marineaviation." This theoretical dichoto-my, however, in no way dimin-ished the practical use of heli-copters. They soon proved theirworth in combat and, in fact,became so indispensable that vir-tually every ground commanderrecommended additional heli-copters be made immediatelyavailable by the time the Marinesdeparted the Pusan Perimeter.

The hard-working Marine heli-copters were used for a wide vari-ety of missions that taxed them tothe limit during the month ofAugust 1950. The most commonuses were for command and con-trol, aerial reconnaissance, med-ical evacuation, and combatsearch and rescue; however, theyalso spotted artillery Fire, dis-pensed emergency supplies, liftedindividuals to remote outposts,and provided high-speed commu-nications wire laying services aswell. An operational pattern soonemerged. Each morning the twoduty helicopter pilots would fly toGeneral Craig's command postwhere they would report to MajorJames N. Cupp, the brigade's airofficer, for tasking. At about noon,these two helicopters would berelieved on station by the othertwo. This aircraft rotation ensured.adequate pilot rest and gaveground crews time for daily main-tenance work. In addition, an ad

The commandin.g officer of VMO-6 holds apre-mission pilot brief during the earlystages of the Korean War. From left to right are Capt George 8, Faith, lstLt EugeneP. Mit/cue, Capt I/iclor A. Armstrong, lstLt Lloyd]. Engelhardt, Maj VincentfGottschalk, Capt Alfred F McCaleb, Jr., 2dLt Edgar F Gaudette, Jr., lstLt GustaveF Lueddeke, Jr., and enlisted pilot TSgt Robert A. Hill.

Department oi Defense Photo (5M A1991

1')

NGDOK

The PusanPerimeter

August-September 1950General Disposition ol

8th Army and North Korean Forces

0 10 20 30Miles

going on a reconnaissance,whether they had any rankon hoard, whether they werecarrying the commandinggeneral out to one of theunits, or whether they weregoing out on an evacuationmission. Since we hadcommunications facilities andthe air officer [did not] wecould. . . keep [him] abreast ofthe situation.

hoc control system evolvedwhereby the helicopter pilotswould check in and out with theMTACS-2 air control section ontheir way to and from assignedmissions. As air traffic controlsquadron commander Major EltonMueller explained:

We maintained the same pos-itive radio contact with thehelicopters that we did withall the other aircraft operat-

ing with us. The division airofficer, however, controlledthe helicopters. When theywent out on a mission, theywould fly by our operatingsite, give us a call—a radiocheck—on our reporting-in-and-out net. . . In this man-ner [we] knew when [they]went out on a mission [and]they would tell us what typeof mission they were goingon, i.e. whether they were

13

Korea was a difficult arena ofoperations due to its rugged ter-rain, weather extremes, and poor-ly developed infrastructure as aer-ial observer Second LieutenantPatrick G. Sivert recalled: "It washot and dusty, the road networkwas very poor, and the countryvery mountainous. There was noapparent pattern of any sort to themountains. . . no particular rangesor draws, compartments, or corri-dors." The Marines were firstgreeted by sweltering heat andchoking dust, but within a fewmonths bitter cold and heavysnow brought south by the so-called "Siberian Express" wouldcreate vastly different operationalchallenges. The already difficulttopography was exacerbated bythe lack of modern hard surfaceroads as well as poor overlandcommunications links. River val-leys provided the only flat spacesuitable for roadways, but theywere susceptible to flash flooding.The lack of reliable telephonecommunications ras also a prob-lem because the short-rangedinfantry radios of the day did notfunction well when out of the line-of-sight. The cumulative result ofthese disparate problems madeKorea an operational nightmare.Luckily, helicopters provided theideal technological fix. They wereunrestrained by the terrain, couldact as radio relays or lay wire athigh-speed, and easily flew over

Department of Defense Photo (usMc) A130163

On 3 August 1950 Istit Gustave FLueddeke, Jr., flew the first commandliaison mission in Korea. In additionto ferrying commanders around, healso logged numerous medical evacu-ations and flew rescue missionsbehind enemy lines.

traffic jams or roadless wilderness.According to Major Gottschalk,

the use of 1-103S helicopters atPusan for command liaison workhad the greatest tactical value.

General Craig faced many unusualcommand circumstances due tothe emergency situation in Korea.Hurried planning, reliance uponoral orders, incomplete intelli-gence, poor communications, andinadequate maps all plagued thebrigade staff. Craig turned to thehelicopter to help solve his prob-lems. While stationed on Guam in1949, he became acquainted withhelicopters when he boriowed acarrier-based Navy HO3S-1 tomake command visits and observefield training, and Craig immedi-ately put this experience to use inKorea. On the morning of 3August 1950, he and his opera-tions officer, Colonel Stewart,climbed into First Lieutenant Gus-tave Lueddeke's waiting HO3S,beginning the first Marine heli-copter flight in an active combatzone. Craig and Stewart were air-borne almost all of that day. The ini-tial leg took them from Pusan 30miles west to the brigade stagingarea at Changwon. Along the way,Lueddeke set down amid someKorean huts to allow Craig to con-

fer with a battalion commanderleading the convoy to its newassembly area. After a few minuteson the ground, Craig continued hisjourney to the actual site selected tobecome his forward commandpost. Next, he flew back to Masanto meet with the Eighth Armycommander and the commandinggeneral of the U.S. Army task forceslated to carry out the first UnitedNations offensive in Korea. On theway home, Craig stopped threetimes to inform small unit troopleaders about the upcoming oper-ation. Although this trip seemsroutine by modern standards, thatwas certainly not true in 1950.Marine Corps historan LynnMontross noted the uniqueness ofthis feat and its impact on thefuture: "Only a helicopter couldhave made this itinerary possible ina period of a few hours. A fixed-wing plane could not have landedin such unlikely spots, and a jeepcould not have covered the sameroute before nightfall over narrow,twisting roads choked with Armyand Marine vehicles." He further

the landing area and indicate wind

Department of Defense Photo (U5MC) A13I 089

A Korean rice paddy serves as a makesh/i landing pad for foreground marka Marine 1-103S-l helicopter The air panels laid out in the direction.

14

opined: "A general and his staffcould now make direct. . . contactwith operations at the front as hadnever been possible before [andthis] enabled a commander tokeep in persona] touch with hisforward units since the helicoptercould land virtually anywherewithout asking favors of the ter-rain."

General Craig also said: "Timewas always pressing. Fortunately

helicopters ... were alwaysavailable for observation, corn-rnunications, and controlWithout them I do not believe wewould have had the success we

In addition to command andcontrol, a second valuable tacticaluse for helicopters was visualreconnaissance. A major problemduring the attack toward Sachonwas a scarcity of tactical maps,compounded by the fact that the

only maps readily available wereinaccurate ones created by Jap-anese cartographers sometimebefore World War TI. Villages weremisnamed and misplaced, manyroads were either not shown orwere incorrectly plotted, therewere no contour lines to accurate-ly depict terrain features, and thecomplex grid system was too con-fusing to be of much value.Although no one at Quantico hadpredicted that helicopters mighthave to replace maps for naviga-tion, this is exactly what happenedin Korea. Small unit commandersoften used helicopters to recon-noiter their routes of advance or tolocate good ground for defensivepositions. On the march heli-copters shadowed ground move-ments and provided over-the-hori-zon flank security. In addition,HO3Ss were used to direct artilleryfire, a task made difficult for

15

ground observers due to the poormaps and hilly terrain that fre-quently masked targets.

Another ground support duty,one that had received much play atQuantico, was aerial wire laying. Ahelicopter flying nap-of-the-earthcould put down communicationswife at the rate of about a mile perminute, far faster than a groundparty could do it. The heavy andcumbersome spools presented noproblem for a helicopter, whereasground-based wire layers wereseverely limited as to how muchwire they could carry and whichterrain they could cross. An addi-tional bonus was that by flyingover tree lines or narrow defiles,helicopters could keep the wireoverhead where it was not subjectto destruction by tank treads orartillery bursts. Today, wire layingseems like a small thing but, in thedays before needed two-way radio

The leaders of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, BGenEdward A. Craig, left, and his deputy BGen Thomas fCushman, right, watt in the shade of a Sikorsky HO3S-l. The

National Archives Photo (usMc) I 27-N-A1385

commanding officer of VMO-6 felt that command visitswere missions of the most tactical value during the fightingat the Pusan Perimeter.

• r.141

.

reliability, land line communica-tions was vital for command andcontrol.

Two missions of marginal tacticalvalue had a significant impactupon morale, aerial medical evac-uations and airborne search andrescue. Helicopter evacuations,reported Major Gottschalk: "exert a"cry positive effect on groundtroops since they know theirchances of survival are tremen-dously in-creased. . . . A unit cut offby land [could still] have itswounded evacuated [and] ithelped units by relieving them ofthe necessity of caring for them[thus] freeing more men for fighting.The use of helicopters for rescue ofdowned pilots [was] also impor-

tant in bolstering [air crew]morale."

On 4 August, Marine helicoptersperformed their first aerial medicalevacuation when a Marine wound-ed by an accidental weapon dis-charge was flown from Changwonto the naval hospital train atMasan. The next day helicopterswere called out to deliver waterand rations to an infantry platoonsent to a nearby hilltop to check outreports of an enemy observationparty located there. "Whirlybirds"were used because they coulddeliver the cargo in a matter ofminutes where it would havetaken a carrying party hours tobring up in the rugged terrain andintense heat. Five Marines suffering

severe heat exhaustion and inneed of advanced medical atten-tion were taken out by helicopter

On 8 August, the squadron con-ducted a night helicopter evacua-tion—another first. This was a dar-ing feat because the HO3S did nothave proper instrumentation fornight operations. Disregardingthese limitations, Captain Arm-strong flew off into the fading lightto pick up a critically woundedman and the regimental surgeonof the 5th Marines. The nearlyblind helicopter was guided backby the light of flares and came toearth amid the glow of headlights.This dramatic flight was the first ofmore than 1,000 night evacuationsconducted in Korea.

The first of many Marine helicopter medical evacuations ground transportation could not traverse the rugged icr-occurred when VMO-6 helicopters lifted several severe heat rain and stretcher-bearer evacuation would take too long.casualties to safety. "Whirlybirds" were often used because 1)epartrnenc of Defense Photo (USMC) A2855

16

.-

into the aircraft from odd angles.

As helicopter pilot CaptainNorman G. Ewers later recalled:

Normally, helicopter evacua-tion missions [were] per-fornieci on orders from thedivision air officer who re-lay[ed] the requests from themedical officers of the battal-ions or regiments. Heli-copters Iwerel used to evacuateonly those wh [werel critical-ly wounded and require[d]immediate hospital treatment.The helicopter [madel it possi-ble not only to get the man tothe hospital much morequickly, hut it [provided] amuch easier ride than travelby roads over rough terrain[and] this smoother rideprevent[edi hemorrhages.

Medical evacuations were flownwithout regard for difficult circum-stances. The pilots took off in all

kinds of weather, without the ben-efit of proper instrumentation orhoming devices, and often disre-garded enemy fire in the landingzones. A tribute to the helicopterpilots of VMO-6 was rendered by aground officer: "The flying ofevacuation helicopters from juryrigged and inadequate landingsites was nothing short of miracu-lous he pilots of the obser-vation squadron received far lesscredit than they deserved. Theyused to fly at night [into] frontlinelanding strips where I had troublewalking." Frontline medical offi-cers likewise credited the flyingskills and bravery of the medicalevacuation pilots for saving manylives. The mortality rate in Koreafell to a new low of only two per-cent, less than half the rate ofWorld War II and far below thenearly 50 percent rate prior to theAmerican Civil War, due in largepart to the rapid evacuation of

17

seriously wounded and the mime-diate availability of helicopter-pro-vided whole blood at forwardmedical stations.

Unfortunately, the HO3S-1 was acivilian model aircraft adopted foruse as a military machine; it was notdesigned to be a flying ambulanceand, thus, poorly configured to heused as such. Marine groundcrews in Korea quickly modifiedthe HO3Ss to carry stretcher cases.The starboard observation win-dow was removed and strapssecured the stretcher in flight, butstill a wounded man's legs pro-truded from the cabin. This was aminor annoyance that summer, hutduring cold-weather operationsseveral cases of frostbitten feetand lower legs caused by thesevere airborne wind chill wererecorded. In addition, the wound-ed man most often had to beloaded into the helicopter from aposition above the heads of thestretcher-hearers, a ponderous andawkward process. inside thecabin, the pilot had to make quickballast adjustmenLs to ensureproper trim on the way home.Another problem was the HO3S-l's high profi[e and unstable tricy-cle landing gear; at least one HO3Stipped over while idling on roughground. Although all agreed thatthe HO3S was invaluable in emer-gencies, there was room formechanical improvement. Thiswas handled in two ways. First,requests for immediate deploy-ment of an off-the-shelf medicalevacuation helicopter, the BellHTL trainer, were sent up thechain-of-command. Second, Si-korsky Aircraft made design modi-fications to its newest observationhelicopter, the developmentalmodel S-52, which reached thefleet as the HO5S.

One mission of mercy for whichthe HO3S was perfectly suited wasthe rescue of downed pilots.

National Archives Photo (UsN) 8O-G-420545

The Sik'orskv HO3S-1 was a civilian model helicopter acquired for use as an obser-vation aircraft. Unfortunately, the aircraft was poorly configured for medicalevacuations, which often required Marines and Navy Coipsmen to lft patients

Helicopters were virtually the onlymeans by which a downed pilotcould be snatched from behindenemy lines and returned safelyhome within hours. The HO3S'sside-mounted winch was an idealtool for pulling an unfortunate avi-ator from the chilly waters off theKorean coast. The pilot or hiscrewman located the downed manand then the helicopter hoveredoverhead while the stricken manwas lifted to safety. LieutenantLueddeke made the first of theserescues on 10 August while con-ducting a ground reconnaissancewith the brigade commander onboard. Second Lieutenant DoyleH. Cole's Corsair was struck byground fire during a strafing run.Cole was unable to make it back tothe Badoen.g Strait, so his planeplunged into the water. Luckily, hewas able get out and inflate his liferaft before the plane sank.Lueddeke's helicopter quicklyrushed toward the sinking planeto affect an airborne rescue.

General Craig winched the soakedpilot up into the helicopter asLueddeke hovered over thewreckage. Once safely inside thegrinning pilot slapped his benefac-tor on the back with the words"Thanks, Mac" before he noticedthe general's rank insignia andwas able to render proper honors.The unperturbed senior officersimply replied: "Glad to be of ser-vice, Lieutenant."

Not every rescue had such ahappy ending. Later that same dayLieutenant Lueddeke was sent torescue another VMF-323 pilot.This time the downed flyer wasCaptain Vivian M. Moses whoseplane had been hit by antiaircraftlire in enemy territory. Lueddekeskillfully negotiated a low-levelapproach behind enemy lines topick up the stranded pilot andreturned him to Chinhae for anovernight stay. The next morning,Moses rernrned to his ship where hepromptly volunteered to fly anoth-er combat mission. Ironically, he

was shot down once again beforethe helicopter that delivered himreturned to action. His planecrashed into a rice paddy andflipped over when it struck thedike. Captain Moses was knockedunconscious as he fell from theplane and drowned before heli-copter pilot Captain Eugene J.Pope could save his life. Sadly,Vivian Moses became the firstMarine pilot to die in combat inKorea.

On 7 August, the first Marinehelicopter came under fire whenthe commanding general's 1-1035-1was caught in an enemy artillerybarrage. Luckily, the planeemerged undamaged after drop-ping General Craig off. The firstcombat damage to a Marine heli-copter occurred a week later whenan H035-i lost its windshield whileevad-ing enemy antiaircraft fire, No"whirlybirds" were lost to enemyfire during the 580 missions flownby the helicopter section of VMO-6during the fighting at Pusan.

On 12 August, the Marineadvance toward Sachon wasabruptly halted due to a break-through that penetrated the U.N.lines near Miryang on the NaktongRiver. The situation was so criticalthat a battalion of the 5th Marineswas immediately ordered north tocounterattack. Once again, thehelicopter proved invaluable as aliaison vehicle. The battalion com-mander and the brigade opera-tions officer mounted FirstLieutenant Robert LongstafrsHO3S-1 to rendezvous with a U.S.Army representative. They flew tothe appointed place but could notlocate their man. Luckily, theywere able to orbit the area untilthey found a reconnaissance unit,which was able to contact their di-vision headquarters. The Marineswere told that instead of joiningthe Army unit as planned theyshould instead "look the situation

Marines refuel a WvTO-6 helicopter in a rice paddy during the fighting in the PusanPerimeter. When a helicopter could not make it hack to base, 55-gallon drumsoffuel and a supply qf oil had to he trucked out to the makeshtft landing pad.

Marine corps Historical center Photo collection

18

Whirlybirds US Marine Helicopters in Korea PCN 19000410500_1Whirlybirds US Marine Helicopters in Korea PCN 19000410500_2Whirlybirds US Marine Helicopters in Korea PCN 19000410500_3