Which way Africa’s CFTA? 19.2 new.pdf · Rarely are Africans themselves given a forum to highlight what they see as press-ing problems, and offer analyses and solutions to tackle

ISSUE Vol. 19 No.2 2016 US$5.00 GB£3.00 €5.00

Which way Africa’s CFTA?

Which way Africa’s CFTA?

Find out what's on the African AgendaTo subscribe, please fill in theform and post it to the address

shown

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTIONRATES

(INDIVIDUALS)

Africa & Global South $35.00

North America & Australia $55.00

Europe €55.00

U.K £35.00

Ghana GH¢9.00

INSTITUTIONAL/ CORPORATE


North America & Australia $70.00

Europe €70.00

U.K £45.00

Ghana GH¢10.00

STUDENTS

Ghana GH¢8.40


North America/Australia $50.00

U.K £30.00

Europe €50.00

The African continent is mostly reported as a land of poverty, civil strife and end-less lines of begging hands. Problems facing the continent are portrayed andcommunicated mostly by foreign eyes through the monopoly-controlled newsmedia.

Rarely are Africans themselves given a forum to highlight what they see as press-ing problems, and offer analyses and solutions to tackle the challenges. By pub-lishing African Agenda, Third World Network Africa aims to provide exactly thatforum. Open your eyes and ears to an African perspective on critical issues suchas trade, the environment, gender and sustainable development.

I wish to subscribe to AFRICAN AGENDA and I enclose A cheque/bank draft payable to Third World Network

AMOUNT ………………………............................................................................................................................................………..............................................……….............................................

NAME: ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................………..............................................………...

ADDRESS: .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................………..............................................

CITY: ...............................................................................................................................................………...... POSTCODE: ........................................................................................................

COUNTRY: .........................................................................................................................................................................................

Send to Third World Network, P.O. Box 19452, Accra-North, Ghana

METHOD OF PAYMENT

Cheque/Bank draft payable to Third World NetworkDirect Bank Transfer: Account Name - Third World Network Bank Address:- Standard Chartered Bank, Foreign Services

Branch High Street, P.O. Box 768, Accra-GhanaAccount No. 2800202240700

CREDIT CARD

Please charge the amount of ................................................................................................. to my credit card

AMERICAN EXPRESS MASTER CARD VISAAccount No.

Signature:................................................................................................................................. Expiry Date:..........................................................................................................................

West Africa Telephone +233 -302- 511189 fax 233-302-511188Email: [email protected] /[email protected]

Note to subscribersAs part of efforts to improve our data management allsubscribers have been allocated identification numbers.

You will always find them on your address labels. Please quote these numbers in all correspondence regarding

your subscription.

The material in this magazine may be freely reproduced and

distributed without prior permission, provided that the source of

the material is attributed to African Agenda ISSN 0855-3378.

Editor-in-Chief: Yao Graham

Editor: Cornelius Adedze

Design: David Roy Quashie

EDITORIAL, SUBSCRIPTIONS AND ADVERTISING:

TWN-Africa

P.O. Box 19452

Accra-North

Ghana, West Africa

Tel: (233) 302 511189/503669/500419

Fax: (233) 302 511188

Email: [email protected]

Website: www.twnafrica.org

TWN INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT

President: Mohammed Iddris

Director: Martin Khor

131 Jalan Macalister

10400 Penang

Malaysia

African AgendaPublished by TWN Africa

page 5 photo : AU’s Commissioner for Trade and Industry

African Agenda is published six times a year by Third World Network (TWN) Africa.TWN is an international network of groups and individuals who seek greater articulation of the needs and rights of the peoples of the Third World, especially marginalised social groups, a fair distribution of the world’s resources and forms of development which are ecologically sustainable and fulfil human needs. TWN Africa is grateful to Oxfam-NOVIB, Development

and Peace, InterPares (Canada), TrustAfrika, Rockefeller Brothers Fund and Rosa Luxemburg Foundation.

COVER

CFTA blues as Africa hastens to establish

Free Trade Area.........................................................................…… page 5

Trade for Economic Justice? The Continental Free

Trade Area and the structural transformation agenda

in Africa.............................................................................………… page 11

DEVELOPMENT

How and why China became Africa's biggest aid donor……. page 13

Increasing economic inequality not inevitable...................…… page 16

Back to square one...............................................................……… page 18

Outflanking the war on drugs.................................................…… page 21

INTERNATIONAL

Is South America's 'progressive cycle' at an end?........................ page 24

Palestinian population needs greater protection...................…. page 27

Land grabbing is killing Honduras' indigenous peoples........… page 31

RIGHTS

Mozambique's movement to end land grabs........................….. page 33

Is the war against drugs a war against women?............................ page 35

Local anger is rising against South Africa's resource curse....… page 37

Contents

Africa's rush to create a ContinentalFree Trade Area (CFTA) leaves alot to be desired. The processes

leading to the establishment of the CFTAhave not been as transparent, participatoryand inclusive. National level discussions,civil society group participation have leftmuch to be desired as the citizenry, themain 'beneficiaries' of the CFTA, have so farnot played any meaningful role in theprocesses outlined so far. There is littlespace in the structures involved with theCFTA for participation by civil societygroups or the private sector. The only pos-sibilities so far seem to be episodic consul-tations with these groups outside any of thenegotiating structures. This could be makeit difficult for citizens to buy into theCFTA..

Furthermore, from what is known ofthe negotiating agenda so far, the CFTAseems more focused on the liberalisation oftariffs and the deregulation of services.There is little space for interface betweenthese issues and the other policy measuresrequired to ensure that CFTA does indeedto contribute to the comprehensive struc-tural transformation and integrationistagenda at the heart of both the Lagos Planof Action and the Abuja Treaty, Even thoseissues that have been identified as PriorityAction Clusters going by the Action Planadopted at the African Union meeting in2012, such as 'trade policy, trade finance,infrastructure, trade information and factormarket integration' - hardly have a look in.

Without attention to these elementsgeared to the productive dimensions ofAfrica's economies, a CFTA that comes inbeing will simply create a giant African mar-ket place with little of African products to

trade in. From this perspective, and in thelight of agreements between Africa and theoutside world, such as the EPA agreementwith Europe, the CFTA will simply facili-tate the movement of products importedfrom Europe and other areas across Africa.

Furthermore, as noted in CFTA blues

as Africa hastens to establish Free Trade

Area (page 5) , there are many challengesthat make the 2017 deadline for the estab-lishment of the CFTA unrealistic and there-fore likely to be missed. Apart from the myr-iad of processes that member countries aresupposed to go through in putting theCFTA in place, with the uneven levels ofexpertise and development, the 2017 dead-line presents a dizzying and frenzied agendathat no matter the good intention and will-ingness of members cannot be met.Additionally, coping with the various bilat-eral and multilateral trade arrangements arealready a task too many for most Africangovernments with their limited human andfinancial resources. There is no doubt aboutthe daunting task the governments of Africaface with regards to negotiating and ratify-ing these trade arrangements. The experi-ences with the EPA, AGOA and WTOamong others speak volumes about thework at stake. The timetable to all intentsand purposes is just not practicable to saythe least.

The question of the RegionalEconomic Commissions, RECs, raiseanother set of issues relating to the coher-ence between an eventual CFTA and theexisting trade and market integration initia-tives in the different regions in Africa. For astart, the RECS as such are not parties tothe negotiations. This raises questions ofthe harmonisation between the REC poli-

cies and the issues being negotiated at theCFTA. More critically, as a free trade agree-ment, the CFTA is a lower level of integra-tion than the customs union already inplace in some regions, such as West Africaand EAC, with their common external tar-iffs. Other RECS like ECCAS (EconomicCommunity of Central African States) andthe Arab Maghreb Union are yet to do so.How and when will the RECs be able toharmonise these different levels of pre-paredness before the introduction of theCFTA?

A more fundamental question is how a

lower level agreement at the continent level,

CFTA, can be harmonised with regional

level agreements which are far ahead with-

out freezing the momentum. This is espe-

cially since the expectation of the Abuja

Treaty was for continent-wide processes to

build on and enhance the progress already

achieved at the regional level. All this is

quite apart from the difficulties faced by the

RECs in terms of their own agenda, and the

challenges of sustaining the policies that

they have already adopted. Different

regions are involved in regional economic

efforts with different dynamics.

Properly conceptualised and imple-

mented, the CFTA can indeed contribute

to Africa's economic integration and help

the continent and its economies meet the

challenges of a global order whose imbal-

ances works against their long-term devel-

opment. As is now proceeding, however,

the CFTA on the table is likely to end up

integrating Africa into the world. That is a

different kind of regional integration -- the

open regionalism promoted by the World

Bank and its acolytes.

EDITORIAL

4 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.19 NO.2

Rushing towards a CFTA

5AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.19 NO.2

Arecent colloquium organized inAccra, Ghana by Third WorldNetwork Africa in collaboration

with the Africa Trade Policy Centre(ATPC) of the UNECA and the AfricanUnion Commission (AUC) and on the,'Continental Free Trade Area: Internalchallenges and external Threats' hasbrought to the fore major challenges thatconfront Africa's plan for a ContinentalFree Trade Area (CFTA).

The CFTA is aimed at urgently movingforward Africa's long-standing integrationand development agenda. It also presentsthe continent with the opportunity toredress the vulnerabilities of Africa'seconomies within the global economicorder manifest in and deepened by theimbalances of the World TradeOrganisation and other multilateral andbilateral trade agreements. Such is theambition of implementers of the CFTA that

at an African Union Summit in January,2012 they gave 2017 as deadline for itsestablishment.

Generally, the CFTA seeks to create asingle continental market for goods andservices, with free movement of businesspersons and investments leading to theestablishment of a Continental CustomsUnion. It is to be achieved through betterharmonization and coordination of tradeliberalization, facilitation of regimes and

CFTA blues as Africa hastensto establish Free Trade Area

COVER

Not to be left out in the global dash for markets, Africa is also at pains to consolidate its market

with the establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by 2017. As the magic date

approaches it is becoming increasingly clear to some that the CFTA in its current form, apart

from an unrealistic deadline, may not be the solution to Africa's development challenges,

writes *Cornelius Adedze.


instruments in the variousRegional EconomicCommunities and acrossAfrica generally. It is hopedthat in the process the chal-lenges of multiple and over-lapping memberships of theRECs will also be resolvedand the regional and conti-nental integration processesexpedited. It is also envis-aged that the CFTA wouldlead to enhanced competi-tiveness of industry andenterprise in general with itsaccompanying opportuni-ties for scale production,huge market access and bet-ter reallocation of resources.

As the march towardsthe CFTA gathers steam, thecolloquium offered amoment for knowledge-sharing, reflection anddebate on the CFTA andrelated trade issues by mem-bers of the Africa TradeNetwork and other CSOsfrom across Africa as well asofficials from Africa TradePolicy Centre and the AUC, UNCTAD andthe South Centre. The presentationsrevolved around, 'Africa in the evolvinglandscape of Global Trade Relations', 'Thethreats of the Mega Regionals: EPA,AGOA, TTP and Africa', 'The CFTAAgenda, Agriculture and Agrarian transi-tion', 'The CFTA and Industrial Policy:Minerals and AMV', 'Trade facilitation andthe CFTA', 'Global Economic and PoliticalInterests', and 'Africa Region and DomesticRepositioning' among others.

The idea of a common market forAfrica is one of the key points in post-colo-nial Africa's search for a united continentbut Africa is still struggling to make it reali-ty. Various attempts have been made overthe years to realize this dream to no avail.Currently, the CFTA is being touted as the'flagship initiative under the AfricanUnion's Agenda 2063…a major effort toboost intra-African trade, consolidateAfrican markets and reinforce regional inte-gration.' In his keynote address to the Accracolloquium, the coordinator of the ATPC,Dr. David Luke highlighted the positivepotential of the CFTA. According to him ithas “the potential to contribute significantlyto sustainable economic growth, infrastruc-

ture development, employment generation,poverty reduction, local and foreign directinvestment, thereby paving the way forstructural change and industrial develop-ment”. Dr. Luke noted that “progress on theaspirations of Agenda 2063 towards 'theAfrica we want' is contingent on changingthe way Africa trades which has profoundimplications for production, investment,enterprise, innovation and sustainabledevelopment”.

Africa is a continent in hurry to achievein five years what it has not been able to putinto place over five decades. Intra-Africatrade has remained small, a paltry 12 per-cent, the lowest it is said among the regionsof the world. Latin America, ASEAN, theEU and North America all have intra-regional trade above 40 percent. With apopulation in the region of 1.3billion (thesecond largest in terms of regions) and aGDP of over USD 3 trillion, Africa stands tomake gains from a consolidated market thatis fed and supplied from within. The CFTAif adopted in 2017 is envisaged to increaseintra-Africa trade to 22 per cent by 2022and could also be a counter-balance toAfrica's small (4 per cent) share of globaltrade.

Explaining the urgencyaround the CFTA, Dr. Lukecited an ATPC study whichshows that 'over 80 per centof Africa's exports to the restof the world is mainlyunprocessed commodities,close to 40 per cent of intra-African exports areprocessed goods.' In his viewthis situation supports theestablishment of the CFTAas it could quicken Africa'sstructural transformationagenda. The ATPCCoordinator however, cau-tioned that this increase inintra-African trade couldonly be significantly strongerif implementation of theCFTA is accompanied byimproved trade facilitationmeasures, including disci-pline on non-tariff barriers.

According to Dr. Lukethe CFTA can be a catalyst toAfrica's economic transfor-mation as it will makeAfrican entrepreneurs tosource 'inputs, intermediate

goods and services from within the conti-nent and to export to neighbouring marketsthereby enhancing both competitivenessand productivity.' He drew attention to theadoption of the Boosting Intra-AfricanTrade (BIAT) Initiative by an AU Summitin 2012. The BIAT significantly identifiesseven clusters - market integration, produc-tive capacity, trade-related infrastructure,trade information, trade facilitation, tradefinance and factor mobility. These are criti-cal if any progress is to be made in themarch to establish the CFTA.

In pursuit of regional integration thevarious regional economic commissions,RECs, were to work towards making theRECs the building blocks. So far SADC,COMESA and EAC have at varying degreesestablished Free Trade Areas. Under theAbuja Treaty of 1991, an African EconomicCommunity is to be in place by 2025.

Over the years, the RECs have madevarying levels of progress on trade liberalisa-tion among their members. Free trade areas(FTAs) are operational in COMESA andEAC. SADC, ECCAS (EconomicCommunity of central Africa States) andECOWAS are also in the process of doingso. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) faces

COVER

AUC Chair - Dlamini-Zuma


COVER

the challenge of establishing a regionaltrade regime after members have signedFTAs with the EU.

The character of and processes for theestablishment of the CFTA were the twoissues of greatest concern to the CSO par-ticipants in the Accra colloquium. Thequestion most asked was whether theCFTA is not just going to reinforce the easyaccess of foreign goods to Africa's markets.They base their concerns on the fact thatthe CFTA in its current form does not seemto be in line with Africa's structural trans-formation agenda but rather a throwback totariff liberalization to facilitate trade acrossthe continent which anybody, African orforeign could take advantage of.

There were also questions about theextent to which the CFTA would seek torespond to the threat posed to Africa'sstructural transformation agenda by theEconomic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)signed by African regions with theEuropean Union. The civil society groupsfurther argued that so far the processestowards the establishment of the CFTAhave not been transparent, consultative orinclusive. Yao Graham Coordinator ofThird World Network-Africa underlinedthat CSO concerns are not restricted toprocess issues only but also issues of sub-stance. There should be national level dis-

cussions on the processes, the form of theCFTA, especially whether it is just abouttrade liberalization or structural transfor-mation, who must be at the negotiatingtable, and how information is disseminatedamong other issues.

A lot seems to be going on at the sametime in all the RECs but there remain seri-ous challenges which if not tackled head-onwill prove stumbling blocks in the way ofthe CFTA. The CFTA even as it hastens toensure an integrated Africa seems to begoing off tangent as far as the remit of theAbuja Treaty is concerned.

The 207 deadline for completing theCFTA was widely deemed unrealistic byparticipants in the colloquium. Some point-ed to the unevenness of the levels of devel-opment and readiness to plug into theCFTA by the various RECs and the individ-ual member countries in support of thisview.

In his presentation Mr. BabajideSodipo of the African Union Commissionsought to explain the time table for theestablishment of the CFTA. He said thereare a number of factors which if not takeninto account will make nonsense of Africa'sintegration efforts. According to him, con-sensus building based on the multilateraltrade system anchored by the World TradeOrganisation, WTO, is fast losing its rele-

vance as mega regional trade agreements,based on reciprocity, are emerging as theorder of the day. The EPA is a testimony tothe preference for reciprocity and the nextversion of the African Growth andOpportunity Act, AGOA, is also likely to bea reciprocal one. Trade arrangements byAfrica with Brazil, China and India alsopoint to reciprocal agreements. In effect,according to Mr. Sodipo, the CFTA will bean immediate and effective response to allthese attempts by Africa's trade partners tolock it in some reciprocal trade agreements.Apart from the likely negative impacts theseagreements will have on Africa's structuraltransformation and development agenda,Africa is also going to be further boggeddown by having to negotiate all these vari-ous multilateral trade arrangements in addi-tion to the CFTA.

Thus sequencing and consolidation ofother initiatives on the continent are othermajor hurdles that need to be cleared for aneffective CFTA. Dealing with the issue ofAfrica's productive capacity, ensuring theCFTA has at its heart structural transforma-tion and not trade liberalization would becritical in arriving at a CFTA beneficial toAfrica and its people.

*Cornelius Adedze is editor of African Agenda.


COVER

• The Assembly 18th Ordinary Summit in January

2012, decided that the CFTA should be

operationalized by the indicative date of 2017,

with the following milestones:

• Finalization of the EAC- COMESA-SADC Tripartite

FTA initiative by 2014;

• The four other AU-recognized RECS (ECOWAS,

CEN-SAD, ECCAS and UMA), to negotiate a

parallel FTA - should they wish to do so, by 2014.

They could also choose to join the CFTA directly

• Consolidation of the Tripartite and other regional

FTAs into a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA)

initiative between 2015 and 2016;

• Establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area

(CFTA) by 2017 with the option to review the

target date according to progress made.

The CFTA Negotiating Principles

The Continental Free Trade Area negotiation process

shall be guided by the following overarching princi-

ples:

i) The CFTA negotiations shall be AU Member

States/RECs/Customs Territories driven with

support of the African Union Commission and its

structures.

ii) RECs FTAs as building Blocs for the CFTA

iii) Reservation of Acquis

iv) Variable geometry

v) Flexibility and Special and Differential

Treatment

Vi) Transparency and disclosure of information

vii) Substantial liberalisation

viii) MFN Treatment

ix) National Treatment

x) Reciprocity

xi) Decisions shall be taken by consensus.

xii) Adoption of Best Practices

Scope of the CFTA

Trade in goods

• Tariff liberalization,

• NTBs,

• RoO,

• Trade Facilitation

• Customs cooperation

• Harmonization of Documents

• Transit & Transit facilities,

• Trade remedies,

• Safeguards

• Standards,

• Technical Barriers 2 Trade

• Sanitary and phytosanitary

• Dispute settlement

• Institutional arrangements

Trade in Services

• Transportation

• Air, maritime

• Financial Services

• banking,

• insurance,

• Tourism,

• Energy,

Other Issues

• Competition policy

• Intellectual Property Rights,

• Investment

• Movement of business persons,

Phase I: Trade in goods and trade in services will

be negotiated concurrently.

Phase II: Other Issues (Investment, IPR,

Competition Policy)

CFTA Road Map


COVER

1. The objectives of the Community shall be:

(a) To promote economic, social and cultural development and

the integration of African economies in order to increase

economic self-reliance and promote an endogenous and self-

sustained development;

(b) To establish, on a continental scale, a framework for the

development, mobilisation and utilisation of the human and

material resources of Africa in order to achieve a self-reliant

development;

(c) To promote co-operation in all fields of human endeavour in

order to raise the standard of living of African peoples, and

maintain and enhance economic stability, foster close and

peaceful relations among Member States and contribute to

the progress, development and the economic integration of

the Continent; and

(d) To coordinate and harmonize policies among existing and

future economic communities in order to foster the gradual

establishment of the Community.

2. In order to promote the attainment of the objectives of

the Community as set out in paragraph I of this Article, and in

accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty, the

Community shall, by stages, ensure:

(a) The strengthening of existing regional economic

communities and the establishment of other communities

where they do not exist;

(b) The conclusion of agreements aimed at harmonising and

coordinating policies among existing and future sub-regional

and regional economic communities;

(c) The promotion and strengthening of joint investment

programmes in the production and trade of major products

and inputs within the framework of collective self-reliance;

(d) The liberalisation of trade through the abolition, among

Member States, of Customs Duties levied on imports and

exports and the abolition, among Member States of Non-

Tariff Barriers in order to establish a free trade area at the level

of each regional economic community;

(e) The harmonisation of national policies in order to promote

Community activities, particularly in the fields of agriculture,

industry, transport and communications, energy, natural

resources, trade, money and finance, human resources,

education, culture, science and technology;

(f) The adoption of a common trade policy vis-à-vis third States;

(g) The establishment and maintenance of a common external

tariff;

(h) The establishment of a common market;

(i) The gradual removal, among Member States, of obstacles to

the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital and

the right of residence and establishment;

(j) The establishment of a Community Solidarity, Development

and Compensation Fund;

(k) The granting of special treatment to Member States classified

as least developed countries and the adoption of special

measures in favour of land-locked, semi-land-locked and

island countries;

(l) The harmonisation and rationalisation of the activities of

existing African multinational institutions and the

establishment of such institutions, as and when necessary,

with a view to their possible transformation into organs of the

Community;

(m) The establishment of appropriate organs for trade in

agricultural and cultural products, minerals, metals, and

manufactured and semimanufactured goods within the

Community;

(n) The establishment of contacts and the promotion of

information flow among trading organisations such as State

commercial enterprises, export promotion and marketing

bodies, chambers of commerce, associations of businessmen,

and business and advertising agencies;

(o) The harmonisation and co-ordination of environmental

protection policies; and

(p) Any other activity that Member States may decide to under

take jointly with a view to attaining the objectives of the

Community.

Article 6

Modalities for the establishment of the Community

1. The Community shall be established gradually in six (6)

stages of variable duration over a transitional period not

exceeding thirty-four (34) years.

2. At each such stage, specific activities shall be assigned and

implemented concurrently as follows:

(a) First Stage:

Strengthening of existing regional economic communities

and, within a period not exceeding five (5) years from the date

of entry into force of this Treaty, establishing economic

communities in regions where they do not exist;

Objectives of the African Economic Community


COVER

(b) Second Stage:

(i) At the level of each regional economic community and

within a period not exceeding eight (ii) years, stabilising

Tariff Barriers and Non-Tariff Barriers, Customs Duties

and internal taxes existing at the date of entry into force

of this Treaty; there shall also be prepared and adopted

studies to determine the time-table for the gradual

removal of Tariff Barriers and Non-Tariff Barriers to

regional and intra-Community trade and for the gradual

harmonisation of Customs Duties in relation to third

States;

(ii) Strengthening of sectoral integration at the regional and

continental levels in all areas of activity particularly in the

fields of trade, agriculture, money and finance, transport

and communications, industry and energy; and

(iii) Co-ordination and harmonisation of activities among the

existing and future economic communities.

(c) Third Stage:

At the level of each regional economic community and within

a period not exceeding ten (10) years, establishment of a Free

Trade Area through the observance of the time-table for the

gradual removal of Tariff Barriers and Non-Tariff Barriers to

intra-community trade and the establishment of a Customs

Union by means of adopting a common external tariff.

(d) Fourth Stage:

Within a period not exceeding two (2) years, co-ordination

and harmonisation of tariff and non-tariff systems among the

various regional economic communities with a view to

establishing a Customs Union at the continental level by

means of adopting a common external tariff.

(e) Fifth Stage:

Within a period not exceeding four (4) years, establishment

of an African Common Market through:

(i) The adoption of a common policy in several areas such as

agriculture, transport and communications, industry,

energy and scientific research;

(ii) The harmonisation of monetary, financial and fiscal

policies;

(iii) The application of the principle of free movement of

persons as well as the provisions herein regarding the

rights of residence and establishment; and

(iv) Constituting the proper resources of the Community as

provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 82 of this Treaty.

(f) Sixth Stage:

Within a period not exceeding five (5) years:

(i) Consolidation and strengthening of the structure of the

African Common Market, through including the free

movement of people, goods, capital and services, as well

as, the provisions herein regarding the rights of residence

and establishment;

(ii) Integration of all the sectors namely economic, political,

social and cultural; establishment of a single domestic

market and a Pan-African Economic and Monetary

Union;

(iii) Implementation of the final stage for the setting up of an

African Monetary Union, the establishment of a single

African Central Bank and the creation of a single African

Currency;

(iv) Implementation of the final stage for the setting up of the

structure of the Pan-African Parliament and election of

its members by continental universal suffrage;

(v) mplementation of the final stage for the harmonisation

and co-ordination process of the activities of regional

economic communities;

(vi) Implementation of the final stage for the setting up of the

structures of African multi-national enterprises in all

sectors; and

(vii) Implementation of the final stage for the setting up of the

structures of the executive organs of the Community.

3. All measures envisaged under this Treaty for the promo-

tion of a harmonious and balanced development among

Member States, particularly, those relating to the formulation

of multi-national projects and programmes, shall be imple-

mented concurrently within the time period specified for the

attainment of the objectives of the various stages outlined in

paragraph 2 of this Article.

4. The transition from one stage to another shall be deter-

mined when the specific objectives set in this Treaty or pro-

nounced by the Assembly for a particular stage, are imple-

mented and all commitments fulfilled. The Assembly, on the

recommendation of the Council, shall confirm that the objec-

tives to a particular stage have been attained and shall approve

the transition to the next stage.

5. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding para-

graph, the cumulative transitional period shall not exceed

forty (40) years from the date of entry into force of this

Treaty.


COVER

In 2012, the African Union agreed toestablish the Continental Free TradeAgreement (CFTA): a key African ini-

tiative aiming to urgently take forward theagenda for integration and developmentthat has characterized continental aspira-tions since the formation of theOrganisation of African Unity in 1963.Intended to be finalized in 2017, the CFTArepresents a pivotal opportunity to redressthe vulnerabilities of Africa's economieswithin the global economic order. If suc-cessful, the CFTA - Africa's “own megare-gional,” a common market of over a billionpeople with combined GDP of over USD 3

trillion- canserve as powerful leverage forAfrican economies in the face of WTO dic-tates and constraining economic arrange-ments with the European Union and theUnited States.

The creation of the CFTA, if comple-mented by trade facilitation measures,could more than double the share of Africa'strade within itself by 2022, according to theAfrican Union Commission. This would beimmensely significant for a continentwhose intra-regional trade, at approximate-ly 12%, is significantly lower than the intra-regional trade that takes place in Asia, LatinAmerica, or Europe. The CFTA has the

potential to support Africa's economictransformation by enhancing competitive-ness and productivity of African goods andservices, circulating what Africaneconomies are producing to neighboringmarkets and beyond.

African governments are currentlynegotiating the shape and form of theCFTA through quarterly AU meetings andthe work of a technical support group. Adraft text has yet to be released, but updatesfrom the negotiating forum indicate thatthe emphasis of the CFTA will be on tradeliberalization: lowering tariffs and thereforeeconomic barriers to exchanging goods and

Trade for Economic Justice?The Continental Free Trade Area and the

structural transformation agenda in AfricaWill the CFTA deliver economic justice to the people of Africa? Will it promote the structural

transformation that Africa so desperately needs, asks *Kathryn Tobin.


COVER

services within the continent. So far the dis-cussions around creating the CFTA havenot been accompanied by sufficient atten-tion to the linkages between the forthcom-ing common markets and its relationship tofundamental sectors of the economy:finance, investment, agriculture, employ-ment, gender equality.

Beyond Tariff Liberalization: A

CFTA for DevelopmentA CFTA consisting of opening markets

- of trade liberalization on its own - will notlead to structural transformation of Africaneconomies. Trade does not drive manufac-turing by default; facilitating the exchangeof goods without supporting the produc-tion of those goods will not contribute tomeaningful development of Africaneconomies. Therefore, the CFTA mustencompass an agenda beyond tariff liberal-ization, including interventionist industrialand agricultural policy. This must supportdomestic productive capacity and agrariantransformation, to develop manufacturingand agro-processing within domesticeconomies rather than continuing theexport of raw materials and products. Inparticular, with agriculture as the largestsector in most African economies in termsof livelihoods, employment and incomes,the UN Economic Commission for Africa(UNECA) is calling for an agreement onagriculture within the CFTA, to ensurecoherence with agreed continental policyframeworks - such as the MalaboDeclaration and the Comprehensive AfricaAgriculture Development Programme(CAADP) - thatmake provisions forenhancing food security, rural develop-ment, productivity and enhanced participa-tion in agricultural value chains. This is keyin supporting the right to food of Africanpeoples as well as their food sovereignty,while simultaneously creating options foragricultural economies to benefit from theCFTA.

In addition to not being the sole enginefor structural transformation in Africa, tariffliberalization alone may end up worseningthe economic situation - especially forAfrican countries with relatively lower lev-els of domestic productive capacity. As thelast remaining instrument in African coun-tries' policy toolbox, tariffs help to raise rev-enue, enable control of prices to privilegelocal products both to promote local con-tent and to protect against flooding ofimports. Abolishing or significantly reduc-ing tariffs will eliminate the leverage of

African governments in protecting theirown farmers and consumers; yet tariff liber-alization is at the heart of many of the agree-ments signed by these governments eitherthrough the Economic PartnershipAgreements with the European Unionand/or bilateral investment treaties withthe US. As Africa's RECs have alreadyagreed to give preferential treatment togoods coming from Europe and the US, theestablishment of a CFTA will expand themarket for those incoming goods.

This possibility is further complicatedby the acquis principle elaborated in theAbuja Treaty, which states that Africancountries cannot offer arrangements to eco-nomic actors outside Africa that are morepreferential than those they offer eachother. In other words, the CFTA will haveto ensure tariff liberalization at levels lowerthan the tariffs being placed on Europeanand American goods, already reduced by70-90%. This severely limits the amount ofrevenue an African government would beable to raise under a CFTA, and trapsAfrican governments between continentalsolidarity on the one hand and bindingagreements with Europe and the US on theother. Megaregional trade agreementsrecently in process elsewhere in the worldfurther complicate this picture, meaningthat Africa as a whole would integrate itsmarkets with the partners in those agree-ments, thereby eliminating their preferen-tial treatment negotiated in the EPAs orBITs.

The CFTA must, therefore, seek torationalize these different trade regimes andachieve policy coherence currently lackingdue to the EPAs and overlapping RECs.Banding together as a continental marketcan allow Africa the leverage required tochallenge existing agreements unfavorableto Africa's structural transformation agendathrough the EPAs, BITs, and the WTO. Itmust also be combined with protectionistmeasures both as a continent and for indi-vidual African countries, taking intoaccount the principle of “variable geome-try”: the acknowledgement that Africancountries begin from different startingpoints in terms of marketable goods andproductive capacity.

ConclusionsMerely opening African countries' and sub-regions' markets to each other - and to theEuropean and/or US goods circulatingwithin them as a result of pre-existing bilat-eral arrangements - will not stimulate the

structural economic transformation sourgently needed on the continent. For theCFTA to ensure meaningful benefits forAfrican farmers, traders, consumers, work-ers, and economies, it must constitute aframework beyond tariff liberalization,accompanied by significant investment indomestic productive capacity and agricul-tural sectors. Combined with the protec-tion of markets (in acknowledgement thatsome African countries are set to benefitmore and quicker than others) and a collec-tive reorganization of Africa's trade arrange-ments with external actors, the CFTA hasthe potential to serve the self-determinationof African economies and peoples.

The CFTA negotiations provide anopportunity for ambitious leadershipamongst African heads of state, to negotiatea continental agreement that supportsAfrica's structural transformation throughindustrialization and the creation of decentjobs, towards a “development” agenda thatis meaningful for African economies andpeople. Further, the CFTA has the poten-tial to tilt existing power imbalances in favorof African economies, driving equity bothwithin Africa along the lines of gender andclass, and between African economies andthose of the powerful global North. As anengine of broad-based regional integration -beyond tariff liberalization - the CFTAcould serve as a fundamental step inimproving the economic situation ofAfrican countries and peoples.

Next month in Nairobi, African andglobal governments and civil society con-vene for UNCTAD 14- the14th Session ofthe United Nations Conference on Tradeand Development. UNCTAD, as perhapsthe sole intergovernmental space to articu-late an agenda responsive to the needs andpriorities of vulnerable countries, providesan important forum for African leaders tobolster this kind of aspirational thinking. Atthis meeting on the African continent,African leaders and civil society can bolsterthe kind of aspirational thinking necessaryfor a truly transformative CFTA, throughregional and global solidarity tosupport theself-determination of African and otherdeveloping country governments and totruly transform their positions in globalstructures of trade, finance, and economicgovernance.

*Kathryn Tobin is Policy Coordinator,Regions Refocus

AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.19 NO.2 13

DEVELOPMENT

The foreign aid arena in Africa hastraditionally been dominated by theOrganisation of Economic Co-

operation and Development (OECD)countries. However, over the last threedecades non-traditional donors such asChina, have emerged.

The increasing importance of non-tra-ditional donors has meant that the econom-ic and political stronghold of western coun-tries in sub-Saharan Africa has gradually

ebbed. China is now the largest non-tradi-tional contributor of aid to sub-SaharanAfrican countries.

In the 1960s Africa provided Chinawith an opportunity to increase its politicaland diplomatic reach. Chinese interest inthe continent came about in part as a resultof political tensions between China and theSoviet Union as well as increased Americanand Japanese competition in Asia. In addi-tion to political motives, Africa presented

China with economic opportunities. Whilethe initial motive for Chinese aid was tostrengthen diplomatic ties, the resourcemotive became an important factor.

China's aid policyAt the onset, China's aid policy was

premised on equality between partners,mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty,respect for obligations and enhancing theself-reliance of Chinese aid recipients.

How and why China becameAfrica's biggest aid donor

By *Kafayat Amusa, Nara Monkam, and Nicola Viegi

Chinese engineers with their African counterparts

DEVELOPMENT


According to China's 2011 white paper onforeign aid:

The main areas of support for China hasbeen in projects in agriculture, industry, eco-nomic infrastructure, public facilities, educa-tion and medical and health care, with theintent on improving recipient countries'industrial and agricultural productivity, lay-ing a solid foundation for their economicand social development, and improvingbasic education and health care.

China's aid policy in Africa underwentmajor reforms between 1994 and 1995.These were effected in three main ways:• New instruments that linked aid, trade

and investment between China and Africa were introduced and implemented.

• Programmes that combined foreign aid with economic cooperation were developed and financed, and

• China refined its portfolio of tools to aid domestic restructuring.The restructuring also saw the creation

of three policy banks. These were China'sdevelopment Bank, China Export-Importbank and China Agricultural Developmentbank. They were all state-owned andenabled the government to provide targetedfinance. The new policy opened the door toan economic and trade strategy. It enabledChinese investments in manufacturing andagriculture, and growth in Chinese assemblyfactories. It also created increased demandfor Chinese exports and allowed China'sincursion into the exploration and invest-ment in minerals and forest resources inAfrica.

Resources as a driverBy 1976 Chinese resource interest was

apparent in numerous sub-Saharan Africancountries. Examples include the construc-tion of the Tan Zam railroad in Zambia inpart to facilitate China's access to copper.There was also the construction of roads incountries like Ethiopia to assist the move-ment of cotton exports to China. China'sview of the resource possibilities in sub-Saharan Africa continues today.

Since 2001 the need to boost Chinesedomestic economic growth has further driv-en China's interest in sub-Saharan Africa'snatural resources.

Examining what drives Chinese aid allo-cation to sub-Saharan Africa, empirical evi-dence suggests that China provides moreforeign aid to oil rich sub-Saharan Africancountries than those that are not oil rich.

Almost half of the top 10 recipients ofChinese aid in the last 10 years gave accessto oil wells and granted first rights toprospect for oil in return. Examples includeAngola and Nigeria.

Providing billions in debt reliefFrom 2000 onwards China further

cemented itself as a major aid role player inAfrica. It established the forum on China-Africa cooperation (FOCAC) which includ-ed 44 African countries. It undertook to pro-vide financing for debt relief, training pro-grammes and investments. The China-Africa Business Council was also estab-lished, which negotiated the cancellation of$1.2 billion in debt.

A number of developments made 2006a watershed year. These included:• the publication of a white paper on

African policy,• the announcement that debt of $1.4

billion would be cancelled,• the creation of a $5 billion fund made

up of soft and commercial loans;• an undertaking to double aid by 2009,

and• an agreement to build 30 hospitals and

train 15 000 people.Between 2000 and 2012, China under-

took more than 1700 projects in over 50African countries amounting to upwards of$75 billion. While this amount is less thanthe $90 billion committed by the US in thesame period, it still represents a significantalternative source of aid financing for thecontinent.

Where the money goes

China's aid in sub-Saharan Africa is var-ied and can be found in almost all sectorsfrom telecommunication to health. Thelargest amount of aid funding goes towards

Chinese donated AU headquarters


DEVELOPMENT

the transport, storage, energy and commu-nications sectors. A significant share, about70%, is geared towards infrastructure devel-opment.

Chinese aid in infrastructure out-weighs that of other donors. It accounts forover 30% of total value of infrastructureprojects in Africa. Sub-saharan Africa's edu-cation and health sectors have also benefit-ed significantly. But the amount committedto these two sectors lags behind others suchas transport and energy. This is possiblydue to the fact that a significant amount ofwestern aid is focused on these two sectors.(see Table 1)

In terms of the largest sub-SaharanAfrica recipients of Chinese aid, Nigeria,Ghana and Sudan have been the top recipi-ents in the last decade. The three countriescombined received around $250 million inaid. The majority goes to energy infrastruc-ture such as oil pipelines.

Governance myth debunkedProminent in the aid debate is the

notion that western donor countries aremore concerned about the degree of gover-nance in recipient countries. Their Chinesecounterparts are assumed to overlook thelevel and type of governance.

At first glance this might be seen to betrue. But it is not necessarily the case.

For both types of donors, recipientcountry governance is important. This con-clusion is drawn from looking at the deter-minants of American and Chinese foreignaid to 31 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Inthe case of the US, both political rights and

civil liberty are considerations in its aid allo-cation decisions to the region. For China,political rights are more important thancivil liberty in influencing who receives aid.

Although the benefits of Chinese aid insub-Saharan Africa are clear in health andinfrastructure projects, including the provi-

sion of medicine, the training of healthworkers as well as the construction of trans-port infrastructure, there are some draw-backs to the aid. While China provides aidfor different projects over a wide spectrum,for the most part it is focused on a few spe-cific sectors. As a result pertinent issues thatenable domestic resource generation in theregion are not necessarily addressed. Thissuggests that there is a need to re-assess thetype of Chinese aid sub-Saharan countriesaccept and to make sure that the aid ties inwith these countries' development agendas.

*Kafayat Amusa, Lecturer in Economics,

University of South Africa, Nara Monkam,Research Director, Africa Tax Institute,University of Pretoria and Nicola Viegi,Professor of monetary economics, University ofPretoria.

This is from Third World Network Features

Table 1: Example of sector pervasiveness of Chinese aid in SSA

COUNTRY SECTOR YEAR PROJECT AMOUNT (US $)

Sierra Leone Telecommunications 2006 Fibre optic 15 millioninstallation

Guinea Health 2008 Construction of 2 billion150 bed hospital

Tanzania-Zambia Transport 2000 Tanzania Zambia 23.5 millionrailway construction

Namibia Transport 2012 Loan for road upgrade 126 million

DRC Budgetary support 2012 Budgetary support 1 billion

Angola Government 2001 Government 50 million

Guinea Bissau Agriculture 2004 Agriculture loan 60 million

Angola Agriculture 2009 Agriculture 1.2 billionDevelopment

Nigeria Agriculture 2012 Cassava flour 200 millionprocessing plant

Equatorial Guinea Minerals / mining 2006 Oil backed loan 2 billion

Africa Debt Relief 2000 Debt Relief 1 billion

Source: Strange et al (2013) Tracking Chinese Development Finance to Africa


DEVELOPMENT

Since the 1980s, the world has beenmoving once again to the greatestlevel of national level income inequal-

ities observed in recorded human history. Astudy by the Credit Suisse ResearchInstitute suggested that the income share ofthe rich has increased at the expense of the'middle class' in most of the world.

Although economic inequality withinsocieties has been with us for a very long

time, inequalities among regions are morerecent. According to the late economic his-torian Angus Maddison, such inequalitiesincreased from about half a millennium ago,before accelerating greatly about two cen-turies ago with the Industrial Revolution.

With colonialism abroad, new forms ofeconomic hegemony accelerated wealthand income inequalities among and withinmany societies. In England, Holland and

Spain in the eighteenth century, the Ginimeasure of income inequality was around50% to 60% - much higher than today.

Traditional communal, cooperativeand collectivist institutions in Europe wereeroded during the sixteenth to nineteenthcenturies, e.g. by the 'enclosure movement'in England.

Economic inequality in the UnitedStates at the time of American independ-

Increasing economicinequality not inevitableInequality has been increasing in recent decades with the rich getting richer at the expense of

the “middle class” in the world, write *Vladimir Popov and Jomo Kwame Sundaram.


DEVELOPMENT

ence in the late 18th century (excludingslaves) was initially lower than in Europedue to the absence of large inherited for-tunes and the availability of abundant landat low cost in the New World. But inequali-ties increased greatly after the mid-19thcentury despite the end of slavery, peakingduring the Gilded Age in the 1920s.

In the US, the ratio of the largest for-tunes to the median wealth of householdsincreased from about 1000 in 1790 to1,250,000 in 1912 (John D. Rockefeller'sfortune of $1 billion), falling to 60,000 in1982, before rising again to 1,416,000 in1999 (Bill Gates' $85 billion fortune)!

Comparison of the wealth of the rich-est men in various countries in differentepochs gives different numbers, but pointsto a similar conclusion: compared to theaverage income in the US, Bill Gates wasrelatively richer than Carnegie andRockefeller. However, Russian tycoonMikhail Khodorkovsky was relatively richerin 2003 -- compared to Russian averageincome -- than all of them, including Gates!

Short 20th centuryNational inequalities peaked in

Western societies in the early 20th century,before declining from the 1920s to the1970s, during historian Eric Hobsbawm's'short 20th century', before rising againsince. This reversal was probably due to thegreater egalitarianism of the socialist coun-tries, with Gini inequality measures averag-

ing 25-30%, following the BolshevikRevolution, the checks to increasinginequalities with the rise of labour, socialistand other egalitarian movements, as well asthe growth of the welfare state, wealth andincome taxation as well as other reforms

and changes discussed by Karl Polanyi.But as Soviet 'socialism' lost its

dynamism from the 1970s and posed less ofa threat, a conservative 'counter-revolution'ensued -- first in the Anglophone West, ledby Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reaganin the 1980s -- weakening workers' move-ments, undermining state capacities andlegitimacy, and strengthening the rich andpowerful's claims to more and new types ofincome.

The income shares accruing to capitaland property increased, at the expense oflabour, with rentier incomes, includingthose accruing to finance or 'intellectualproperty', growing much more than the realeconomy.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989and the USSR in 1991 were among the highpoints of this 'counter-revolution', alsoresulting in the de-legitimization ofKeynesian and development economics.

Government expenditure, especiallysocial spending, stopped growing, withmany social programmes cut, as unemploy-ment rose to levels not seen since the 1930s.Meanwhile, trade unions were defeated incritical industrial actions (coal miners in theUK, air traffic controllers in the US), caus-

ing union strength and membership todecline in the aftermath. The top incometax rates, higher than 50% in the US, UK,Germany and France during 1940-80, havedropped significantly since.

Generally, high profit periods enabledsome income and other transfers, loweringearlier inequalities during the 1950s and1960s. However, the increase in the share ofprofits in national income since the 1980shas contributed to the rising inequality ofrecent decades.

The conservative Thatcher-Reagancounterrevolution was undoubtedly suc-cessful on a global scale. Today, capitalismis the only 'show in town', with communistparties involved in managing capitalism togain national advantage. The main choicefor national regimes today is among vari-eties of capitalism, with the nature of stateinvolvement being the subject of fiercedebates.

* Vladimir Popov was Senior EconomicAffairs Officer in the United NationsDepartment of Economic and Social Affairs.Jomo Kwame Sundaram was an AssistantSecretary General for Economic Developmentin the United Nations system during 2005-2015 and received the 2007 Wassily LeontiefPrize for Advancing the Frontiers of EconomicThought. The article is reproduced from Third WorldNetwork Features.

“Government expenditure,especially social spending,

stopped growing, with manysocial programmes cut, as

unemployment rose to levelsnot seen since the 1930s.

Meanwhile, trade unions weredefeated in critical industrial

actions (coal miners in the UK,air traffic controllers in theUS), causing union strength

and membership to decline inthe aftermath. The top incometax rates, higher than 50% in

the US, UK, Germany andFrance during 1940-80, havedropped significantly since.”

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon


Until 1996, poor and heavily indebt-ed countries could only obtaindebt relief from bilateral creditors,

but not from multilateral creditors like theWorld Bank, the International MonetaryFunds (IMF) or the regional developmentbanks. But since governments very rarelygranted debt relief, over 40 poor countriesfound themselves in a veritable debt trap.Economic development became practicallyimpossible. In some cases, the debt burden

was absurdly heavy.By that point, multilateral institutions

had become the most important creditorsfor many countries concerned. The reasonwas that they helped poorer nations maketheir ongoing debt-service payments byissuing them new loans when private andbilateral lenders were no longer willing todo so. Unlike bilateral debt, however, multi-lateral debt was officially considered ineligi-ble for rescheduling.

There was no international treaty orclause in the charters of multilateral institu-tions that prevented them from relievingdebt in cases of excessive indebtedness.Nonetheless, the conventional wisdom wasthat these institutions had to be serviced sothey would remain available as lenders oflast resort and could keep countries afloateven in times of crisis.

Attitudes only began to change in themid-1990s. Sweden and Switzerland organ-

In 2015, the World Bank discontinued its status reports on the implementation of the Heavily

Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. It stated that debt relief had been concluded within

the framework of the initiative for all intents and purposes, and that had been successful. But

was it really? It makes sense to look back, *Jürgen Kaiser.

Back to square one

DEVELOPMENT


DEVELOPMENT

ised a consultation with experts from theWorld Bank and the IMF in 1995, and after-wards the staff of both institutions laid thegroundwork for what would become theHIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries)Initiative. The idea was to cancel all debtsthat exceeded a debt-sustainability thresh-old which Bank and Fund defined. In addi-tion, all other creditors should also canceldebt to varying degrees. Multilateral credi-tors were meant to act last of all. Once theother creditors had issued their write-offs,they would reduce claims only to the extentneeded to make debt levels sustainableonce more.

The World Bank and the IMF were tobe compensated for debt relief. Donorcountries established a trust fund for thispurpose, and the multilateral institutionscontributed some of their operating profitsto it themselves. To talk about “multilater-al” debt relief actually only makes sensebecause they did so to some extent.

It was considerable progress that themultilateral agencies were told to cancel

debt. But when drafting the initiative, theIMF and World Bank undermined theirown goals by trying to keep multilateralcontributions as small as possible:• The debt-sustainability thresholdswere set so high that only six countries wereforgiven rather small sums in the first threeyears.• The World Bank and IMF could onlyrequest that private lenders participate indebt relief, but there was - and still is - nomechanism to exert pressure on them. Oneresult was the rise of vulture funds. Theirbusiness model is to buy government debtat low cost in imminent default and latersue for full payment, including interest.• The Bank and Fund retained a monop-oly on determining debtor countries' needfor relief. In a considerable number of casesthey underestimated that need becausethey predicted absurdly high growth rates.

In 1999, the G8 governments expand-ed the HIPC Initiative at their summit inCologne. The requirements for relief werelowered, so more countries qualified.

Today, the total number is 39. For three ofthem - Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea - actualrelief has not happened and cannot beexpected anytime soon. The reasons areincomplete statehood and questionablegovernance.

To date, the total amount that has beenwritten off is roughly $ 120 billion.However, further reforms were necessary toreach that sum. At the G8 Summit inGleneagles in 2005, the HIPC Initiative wassupplemented by the Multilateral DebtRelief Initiative (MDRI).

ReductionsHIPC had reduced debts to a maxi-

mum debt-to-export ratio of 150 % and amaximum debt service of 15 % of exportearnings. In contrast, the MDRI completelycancelled all remaining debt to the IMF andIDA, the World Bank's branch for the poor-est nations. Moreover, the MDRI alsogranted relief on debt to the African andInter-American Development Banksbecause of concessional lending.

Future uncertain


DEVELOPMENT

The MDRI finally relieved countries tothe degree they needed to get theireconomies going again. Before 1996, thedebt-to-GDP ratio exceeded 100 % in mostcountries concerned. Today, their averageratio is around 20 % - far below the averageof all developing and newly-industrialisingcountries.

From 1999 on, a poverty reductionstrategy was made an important precondi-tion for HIPC debt relief. Governments hadto draft such a strategy in cooperation withcivil society and show how the funds freedup in debt relief would be used to fightpoverty. These strategy papers supplement-ed, but did not replace conventional struc-tural-adjustment programmes.

In some cases, the Poverty ReductionStrategy Papers (PRSP) were not muchmore than a meaningless compilation ofpolitically-correct rhetoric. Malawi andChad are examples. In other countries -Bolivia, for instance - they triggered sub-stantial social processes and ultimately ledto a political paradigm shift.

What next?HIPC success is marred however. The

international financial institutions and theirpowerful members expected debt relief toallow countries to escape the vicious circleof borrowing and over-indebtedness onceand for all. This expectation was unrealistic.The reason is that HIPC was designed tohelp over-indebted countries to access thecredit market again. And when a countrytakes out new loans, there is always a risk of

over-indebtedness and ultimately default.Based on significantly improved debt-

sustainability analyses, the IMF last yearidentified seven of the 36 countries that gotdebt relief as once again being at “high risk”of over-indebtedness. It stated that the riskfor 20 other countries was “moderate”.High risk means that the IMF considersinsolvency likely within the next few yearsunder its baseline scenario. “Moderate” riskmeans a country could become insolvent ifone of the IMF's standard crisis scenariosmaterialises. One such scenario is fallingworld-market prices for an importantexport good.

What will happen in a new debt crisis isas unclear today as it was in 1996. The ParisClub of established creditors only plays amarginal role for many poorer countriestoday. Important new bilateral creditors likeChina, Taiwan or Kuwait have not joinedthe Club, which is dominated by the estab-lished economic powers. Emerging-marketgovernments appreciate the political leewaythat can be gained through strategic anddiscretionary debt-relief policies and do notshow much interest in the “creditor solidar-ity” which the Paris Club promotes.

Since the beginning of this decade,many formerly over-indebted countrieshave sold government bonds on interna-tional capital markets for the first time.Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Zambia,Mozambique, Tanzania and Ghana suc-cessfully did so. Ghana, however, is nowconsidered a high-risk country (see articleby Clara Osei-Boateng and KristinaRehbein - http://www.dandc.eu/en/arti-cle/supposed-model-country-ghana-one-again-struggling-foreign-debt).

Most of the bonds issued by HIPC gov-ernment come with collective action clauses(CACs) that allow restructuring based ondecisions made by the majority of bond-holders. However, coordination betweencreditor groups is normally a bigger prob-lem than coordination within groups, asbecame evident when HIPC was first imple-mented. The consequence was thatperemptory debt relief measures wererepeatedly delayed, so they became muchmore expensive than if restructuring hadtaken place in a timely manner.

In September 2014, developing andnewly-industrialising countries took the ini-tiative to address this situation in the UNcontext. They proposed creating a bindingframework for managing sovereign debtcrises. However, the initiative was blocked

by Germany and a handful of otheradvanced countries.

When asked what will happen if Ghanafor instance once again becomes unable tomake payments, ministries in Berlinanswered that the CACs will then makerescheduling possible. But bonds withCACs only make up less than 20 % of long-term debts in Ghana and other countries onthe brink of crisis. The bonds are not thegreatest burden on the public budgets andbalance of payments.

It is clear that HIPC debt relief is notsupposed to happen again. We are back tosquare one, precisely where we were before1996.

*Jürgen Kaiser coordinates erlassjahr.de, aGerman faith-based campaign that focuses ondebt issues. [email protected] and thearticle is culled from Third World NetworkFeatures.

“Most of the bonds issued by

HIPC government come with

collective action clauses (CACs)

that allow restructuring based

on decisions made by the

majority of bondholders.

However, coordination

between creditor groups is

normally a bigger problem

than coordination within

groups, as became evident

when HIPC was first imple-

mented. The consequence was

that peremptory debt relief

measures were repeatedly

delayed, so they became much

more expensive than if restruc-

turing had taken place in a

timely manner.”

“From 1999 on, a poverty

reduction strategy was made

an important precondition for

HIPC debt relief. Governments

had to draft such a strategy in

cooperation with civil society

and show how the funds freed

up in debt relief would be used

to fight poverty. These strate-

gy papers supplemented, but

did not replace conventional

structural-adjustment

programmes.”


DEVELOPMENT

It's widely acknowledged that the “waron drugs” has failed. A militarisedapproach based on prohibition and

incarceration has stoked staggering levels ofviolence and misery, cost billions of dollars,and failed to reduce either supply ordemand.

In April, the UN General AssemblySpecial Session (UNGASS) will adopt aconsensus position on drug control, but feware expecting a shake-up to the current,conservative, global framework.

That's why some reformers are turningto the Sustainable Development Goals as a

blueprint for the future.Critics of the “war on drugs” campaign

have long evoked the term “harm reduc-tion” to lobby for a more humane approachthat treats addiction as a health problemrather than a crime.

They point to glaring contradictionsbetween the current drug policy frameworkand the new - universally endorsed - globaldevelopment agenda.

Not only has the war on drugs failed,but it has also piled on more of the ills theSDGs seek to address - rights violations,mass incarceration, livelihood destruction,

violence, gang warfare, weakened states,poverty, the spread of HIV, gender discrim-ination… the list goes on.

PipedreamThe SDGs were viewed as a starting

point for solving these problems in a bot-tom-up rather than a top-down way.Experts argue that if some of the 17 devel-opment goals were even halfway met, thenindividuals, communities and states wouldbe more resilient to the destructionwrought by drug abuse and trafficking; andthat if the $100 billion spent annually on

Reform is unlikely at the UNGASS summit, but there's still hope for change

says *Philippa Garson.

Outflanking the war on drugs?

UN Summit


DEVELOPMENT

drug enforcement went towards policiespromoting development instead, then someSDGs may also be easier to attain.

The “drug-free” world the current poli-cy envisages may be a pipedream, whereas aworld in which illicit drugs are managed andcontrolled in less harmful ways may not be.

“The SDGs don't address or solve drugpolicies, but they give us a framework tomore appropriately tackle these issues inways that do not simply create new harms,”says John Collins, editor of the LondonSchool of Economics' After the Drug Warsreport.

Evidence-basedOther recent research papers also put

development at the core of discussions onnew drug policy. In its report, What ComesAfter the War on Drugs, United NationsUniversity (UNU) recommends setting upa working group to come up with new“Global Drug Control Goals”, in much thesame way as the one that paved the way forthe SDGs.

And in a much-lauded paper,Addressing the Development Dimensionsof Drug Policy, the UN DevelopmentProgramme outlines the litany of casualtiesof the war on drugs. It diplomatically quotesUN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)boss Yury Fedotov's own acknowledge-ments of some of the negative outcomes ofthe strategy he has led, and offers somepointers for how drug policy and controlcould be more “development sensitive”.

The authors argue for a greater role forUNDP in helping to create a more “evi-dence-informed, people-centred and devel-opment-centred approach to drug controlpolicy”.

In the LSE paper, Mark Shaw, directorof the Global Initiative againstTransnational Organized Crime, arguesthat a development-oriented, harm-reduc-tion approach should be applied all the wayalong the drugs chain, to the traffickers inparticular and to organised crime in general. “With the arrival of the SDGs, we have thebiggest opportunity in a generation to viewand respond differently to the back-end ofthe drug chain too - the supply side,” he toldIRIN.

Currently the only mention of drugpolicy in the SDGs is in SDG 3.5, prevent-ing and treating drug abuse, under thehealth and wellbeing goal.

And in the current drug policy frame-work, development is narrowly defined as

“alternative development”; referring forexample to finding livelihoods for growersof poppies and cocoa leaves who havebecome impoverished in crop destructioncampaigns. For various reasons, these pro-grammes, which have been criticised astoken window-dressing exercises, havelargely failed to work.

But any excitement about what a morecoherent “development first” approachcould deliver is tempered by the lumberingelephant in the room: the long list of coun-tries that have no intention of budging fromthe existing law enforcement-orientedregime.

These include Iran, Russia, China,India, Japan and a host of other MiddleEastern, Asian and African states.

This is why there is not much optimismthat the three-day jamboree in April - thatwill saw government officials, policy geeksand civil society activists from around theworld descend on New York - will yieldconcrete changes.

Neither is there any real prospect of anoverhaul of the three drug treaties of 1961,1971 and 1988 that govern the currentframework when it comes up for officialreview in 2019, or, for that matter, the keystructures that govern policy: theCommission on Narcotics Drugs and theInternational Narcotics Control Board.

UNGASS is widely expected to resultin a consensus document that upholds theexisting drug control framework but allowsmember states the flexibility to pursue their

own policies and experiment with newones.

This is already happening, with somecountries decriminalising and even legalis-ing cannabis possession and/or cultivation.

And while many European countries(Switzerland, Portugal, Holland for exam-ple) have for years been quietly pursuingtheir own “harm reduction” experiments -like needle exchange programmes that tack-le drug abuse more as a health problemrather than a crime - Latin American coun-tries have been outspoken about the needto abandon the US-led war on drugs.

They bear the brunt of the gang vio-lence and mass displacement this strategyhas inadvertently spawned. It was Mexico,Guatemala and Colombia that in 2012called for UNGASS in the hope of changingthe status quo well before the 2019 policyreview.

This change in tone has yet to filterdown to more relaxed law enforcementpractices in Latin American countries, how-ever, as Catalina Perez and others argue in apaper in the LSE report.

“And in the current drug policy

framework, development is

narrowly defined as “alterna-

tive development”; referring

for example to finding liveli-

hoods for growers of poppies

and cocoa leaves who have

become impoverished in crop

destruction campaigns. For

various reasons, these pro-

grammes, which have been

criticised as token window-

dressing exercises, have largely

failed to work.”


DEVELOPMENT

But the real push for flexibilitycame when the US chose to pursue thispath itself, with moves to stop incarceratingpeople for minor drug offences and withsome of its own states opting to decrimi-nalise and even legalise marijuana.

Summer Walker, who heads UNU'sdrug policy project, predicts that UNGASSwill produce a “consensus documentbetween a number of actors who want dif-ferent things”. But the session is unlikely,she says, to “push any states into new policydirections”.

Unity on human rightsThe UNU report points out, however,

that the UNGASS document will achieveconsensus around concepts like respect forhuman rights and the rule of law, preciselybecause of the ambiguous nature of theseterms.

Different member states have very dif-ferent positions on how to deal with drugaddicts and dealers, for example.

In 2011, Iran executed 540 people fordrug-related offences (80 percent of all

those it executed in thatyear). AmnestyInternational reportedthat it executed almost700 people in the firsthalf of 2015, most ofthem for drug offences.According to UNODC,although traffickingconvictions have beenstable around the world,drug possessionoffences have increasedby 13 percent since2003.

While there is still“no appetite” amongmany other countries toalter their harsh drugpolicies, the hope is thatthese will become lessdefensible when “harmreduction” policies areshown to work, saysCollins. “We can't getconsensus at the inter-national level, but thereis now breathing-roomfor other countries topush ahead with moreliberal policies.”

Shaw cautions, how-ever, that increasing

acceptance of harm-reduction strategies onthe supply side could result in a “subtle con-cession to the hardliners: more talk ofhealth approaches balanced by harder lawenforcement responses.”

He agues that it will be a missed oppor-tunity if a “multi-dimensional harm frame-work” is not also applied to the drug supplychain and to organised crime in general.

This could mean focusing less on howmany people are arrested and how manydrugs are confiscated, for example, andmore on reducing murder rates and nurtur-ing institutions like a free media that helpstates resist the corruptions of drug money.

The future?James Cockayne*, head of the UNU's

office in New York, warns that an era of flex-ibility could result in policy fragmentation.It could see positions becoming even morepolarised over time and provide cover forstates that don't want to abide by humanrights to ignore them in their ongoingcrackdown on drugs.

He also points out that it is hard to run

a global health regime when national poli-cies on how to treat intravenous drug users,for example, differ so much. He and otherscite the possible entry of California, theworld's fifth biggest economy, into alegalised cannabis industry as a potentialgame-changer, but in ways that are impossi-ble to predict.

The UNU report recommends that anew drug policy debate take place outsidethe Commission on Narcotics Drugs,“which too many states see as unrepresenta-tive and beholden to a drug control dis-course that fails to generate coherence withthe UN's other public policy objects, suchas the promotion of peace and security,development and human rights.”

The paper argues that a new temporaryforum should be set up to work towards“more coherent global drug policy”between 2016 and 2019.

The good news is that many noticeableshifts are already under way. Even if theterm “harm reduction” is still not palatableto many states and won't make it into theUNGASS document, its principles arebecoming more widely accepted, say theexperts.

And just as the cross-cutting goals ofthe SDGs bring in every member state andevery level of society, so too is drug policyattracting a wider range of voices - from thecivil society groups that are becomingincreasingly influential in the global debateto the many other UN agencies now com-ing on board, including UNDP, UNAIDS,the World Health Organization, the Officeof the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights, and UN-Women.

“The UNU report recommendsthat a new drug policy debate

take place outside theCommission on Narcotics

Drugs, “which too many statessee as unrepresentative and

beholden to a drug control dis-course that fails to generate

coherence with the UN's otherpublic policy objects, such asthe promotion of peace andsecurity, development and

human rights.”

Drug haul on board ship


The year 2015 ended with significantadvances of the Right in SouthAmerica. Mauricio Macri was elect-

ed President in Argentina, the oppositiongained a majority in the Venezuelan parlia-ment, and Dilma Rousseff is being houndedrelentlessly in Brazil. Then there are theconservatives' campaigns in Ecuador, and itremains to be seen whether Evo Moraleswill obtain a new mandate in Bolivia.

The progressive cycle arose in popularrebellions that brought down neoliberalgovernments (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador,Argentina) or eroded their continuity(Brazil, Uruguay). These uprisings modi-fied the power relations but did not alterSouth America's economic insertion in theinternational division of labour. On thecontrary, in a decade of rising prices for rawmaterials all countries reinforced their sta-tus as exporters of primary products.

The right-wing governments

(Sebastián Piñera in Chile, Álvaro Uribe-Juan Manuel Santos in Colombia, VicenteFox-Enrique Peña Nieto in Mexico) usedthe foreign exchange bonanza to consoli-date the model based on openness to freetrade and privatizations. The centre-leftadministrations (Néstor and CristinaKirchner in Argentina, Inácio Lula da Silva-Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, Tabaré Vázquez-José “Pepe” Mujica in Uruguay, RafaelCorrea in Ecuador) promoted increasedinternal consumption, subsidies to localbusiness owners and social welfare pro-grams. The radical presidents (HugoChávez-Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, EvoMorales in Bolivia) applied models ofimproved redistribution of income and con-tended with sharp conflicts with the rulingclasses.

The progressive cycle allowed demo-cratic conquests and constitutional reforms(Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador) introducing

rights that had been denied for decades bythe ruling elites. And greater tolerance wasdisplayed toward social protest. In thisrespect, the contrast with the more repres-sive regimes (Colombia, Peru) or with gov-ernments that have used the war on drugs toterrorize people (Mexico) is quite striking.

After the defeat of the FTAA many ini-tiatives were taken to forge common struc-tures throughout the area. These includedshared industrialization goals, energy loopsand communications networks. But thoseprograms have languished year after year.

The regional bank, reserve fund andcoordinated currency exchange systemhave never materialized. Norms to mini-mize the use of the dollar in commercialtransactions as well as priority regionalinfrastructure projects have remained onthe drawing boards.

This impotence is synthesized by thefreezing of the Bank of the South. It wasobstructed in particular by Brazil, whichpromotes instead its BNDES and even aBRICS bank. The absence of any commonfinancial institution has undermined theprograms for exchange convergence and acommon currency.

The failures in integration explain thenew impetus that has been given to theTrans-Pacific Treaty. The FTAs reappearwith an intensity rivalled only by the declinein South American cohesiveness. TheUnited States has objectives that are clearerthan they were at the time of the FTAA. Itpromotes an agreement with Asia (TPP)and another with Europe (TTIP) in orderto secure its pre-eminence in strategic activ-ities (research labs, computing, medicine,the military). In the wake of the 2008 col-lapse it has been promoting free trade withrenewed intensity.

The limits of progressivism have beenmost visible in the national attempts toimplement neo-developmentalist policies.

What seemed to be the beginnings of the triumph of the left-leaning parties over the right in

the Latin American political space in the last couple of decades is beginning to unravel much to

the detriment of the left as the rightist parties strike back contends *Claudio Katz.

Is South America's 'Progressive Cycle' at an end?

INTERNATIONAL

Brazilian President : Dilma Rousseff


Those efforts were aimed at turn-ing again to industrialization usingstrategies based on greater state inter-vention, imitating the development ofSouth-East Asia. Unlike the classicdevelopmentalism they have promot-ed alliances with agribusiness and lookto a long period in which to reverse thedeterioration in the terms of trade.

After a decade, they have notmanaged to achieve any of the indus-trialization goals. The expectation ofequalling the Asian advance has dis-solved in the face of the higher profitsgenerated by exploitation of workersin the Far East. The hope of entrepre-neurship by local business people hasfaded as they continue to require stateassistance. The promotion of an effi-cient civil service has been neutralizedby the re-creation of inept bureaucra-cies.

In Brazil the debate has been overwhether the PT government is managing aconservative variant of neo-developmental-ism or a regulated version of neo-liberalism.As it did not have to contend with the crisisand popular rebellion that convulsedArgentina, the changes in economic policywere more limited.

But at the end of a decade the resultsare similar in both countries. The Brazilianeconomy has stagnated and the expansionin consumption has not reduced socialinequality or increased the size of the mid-dle class. There is greater dependency oncommodity exports and a major downturnin industry. Finance capital retains its privi-leges and agribusiness stifles any hope ofagrarian reform.

Dilma introduced the conservativeturn that progressivism avoided inArgentina. She won the election disputingthe adjustment advocated by her rival(Aecio Neves) and then disowned thosepromises under pressure of the markets.She appointed an ultra-liberal Finance min-ister (Joaquim Levy, a replay of the firstLula presidency that began with personali-ties of the same type (Antonio Palocci).

During 2015 this orthodox manage-ment generated increased rates and fees.Dilma justified the cutback in social policiesand maintained the advantages enjoyed byfinanciers as they build their fortunes. Butas the new year opened she replaced thebankers' man with a more heterodox econ-omist (Nelson Barbosa) who promises aslower fiscal adjustment to cushion the

recession. This turn does not portend anexit from the mess created by the conserva-tive policies.

Ecuador has experienced the sameregression from neo-developmentalism.Correa began with a reorganization of thestate that strengthened the internal market.He increased tax revenues, providedimproved social programs, and channelledpart of the rent into public investment.

But later he faced all the limits of anal-ogous experiments and opted for increaseddebt and export promotion. He signed aFTA with Europe, facilitated privatizationof highways, and awarded fully developedoil reserves to the major companies.

The failings of neo-developmentalismhave blocked the progressive cycle. Thatmodel attempted to channel export surplus-es into productive activities. But it encoun-tered resistance from the economic powerand gave in to those pressures.

Throughout the region there was arelaxation in social tensions and the majorconflicts were expressed in the politicalsphere, as in the big resistance mountedagainst rightist attempts to remove Leftgovernments and the huge mobilizationsbacking candidates in election battles. Butthere were no uprisings equivalent to thosein the preceding period. Only the heroicresponse to the coup in Honduras cameclose.

But the principal novelty in this periodwas the social protests in the countries gov-erned by the Centre-Left. In a context ofstrong political pressures from the Right,this outburst from below highlighted popu-lar dissatisfaction.

The defiance was quite striking inArgentina. First there was the extend-ed wave of strikes by teachers and pub-lic sector workers, followed by therefusal to pay a tax imposed on higher-income wage-earners. This discontentset off four general strikes in 2014-2015. The size of these actions sur-prised the leaders of the official tradeunions, who opposed the protest.

In Brazil, the discontent emergedin the July days of 2013. The hugedemonstrations demanding improve-ments in public transportation andeducation convulsed the major cities.These were not just “second genera-tion” claims over and above what wasalready achieved; they expressed afrustration with the conditions of life.This discontent was manifested in thequestioning of the superfluous expen-

ditures associated with the financing of theWorld Cup that could have gone insteadtoward investment in education.

Finally, in Ecuador the social andindigenous mobilizations became more fre-quent in the streets and in the past yearreached a peak in terms of numbersinvolved. Correa responded in a harsh andauthoritarian manner, widening the rift sep-arating the government from broad sectorsof the masses.

They don't bother to investigate theregression of the PT, which has eroded itssocial base by agreeing to the adjustments.In the last election, Dilma won by a slimmargin. Support from the old working-classbase of the PT has declined and been sup-planted by traditional clientelism.

Furthermore, the government is tar-nished by serious corruption scandals.Shady deals with the industrial elite havecome to light that portray the consequencesof governing in alliances with the affluent.Instead of analyzing this tragic mutation,the theorists of progressivism repeat theirtimeless messages in opposition to conser-vative restoration.

A similar regression is observed inEcuador. Correa's management is markedby a big divorce between his belligerentrhetoric and his status quo administration.The President polemicizes against Rightistsand is implacable in his denunciations ofimperialist interference. But day by day hecrosses a new barrier in his acceptance offree trade and his confrontation with thesocial movements.

Here too the analyses of progressivism

INTERNATIONAL

Venezuelan President : Madura


INTERNATIONAL

are limited to redoubled warnings againstthe Right. They overlook the disillusion-ment created by a president who is compro-mised with the establishment agenda. Thisturn explains Correa's recent decision notto seek a new mandate.

The Right prepared its usual denuncia-tions of fraud in order to discredit anadverse election result. But it won, and wasthen unable to explain how it could achievethis victory under a “dictatorship.” For thefirst time in 16 years it obtained a majorityin the parliament and will now try to call avote to revoke Maduro's mandate.

Since they are unwilling to wait until2018, when his term expires, a huge conflictlooms with the Executive power. In theNational Assembly they will promote unac-ceptable demands - free the convicted coupplotters, expose speculation, overturn thesocial conquests - explicitly aimed at harass-ing the President.

In Venezuela there was a redistributionof the rent, undermining the privileges ofthe dominant classes. In Argentina this sur-plus was distributed without significantlyaltering the advantages enjoyed by thebourgeoisie. The popular empowermentthat Chavismo unleashed bears no compar-ison with the expansion of consumerismpromoted by Kirchnerism. And the anti-imperialist project of the ALBA is quiteunlike the conservatism of the MERCO-SUR. But the principal singularity ofVenezuela is derived from the place it occu-pies in the system of imperialist domina-tion. The United States has targeted thiscountry, hoping to regain control of thelargest oil reserves in the continent. It main-tains a strategy of permanent aggression.

This campaign had been unsuccessfuluntil the recent election victory of theRight. Now they are resolved to dust off theplans to overthrow Maduro, combining theerosion in support promoted by Caprileswith the violent removal favoured by López.They are trying to push the governmentinto a chaotic situation in order to stage arepetition of the institutional coup perpe-trated against Fernando Lugo in Paraguay.

The new situation in South Americahas emboldened the Right. It thinks its timehas come and it promises to end the “pop-ulist” cycle and replace “interventionism”with “the market” and “authoritarianism”with “freedom.”

What these messages conceal is theRight's direct responsibility in the devasta-tion suffered during the 1980s and '90s. The

progressive governments the Right is chal-lenging came into being because of the eco-nomic collapse and the social blood-lettingproduced by the neoliberals. The Right notonly portrays that past as a process unrelat-ed to their regimes, it covers up what actual-ly happened in the countries it governs.

It would seem that the only problemsin Latin America are located outside of thatradius. This deception has been construct-ed by the hegemonic news media, whichoverlook any information consideredadverse to right-wing administrations.

The cover-up is shameless and mostpeople are kept in ignorance of any newsrelated to those countries targeted by thedominant press. The media describe theinflation and the currency tensions existingunder these governments, but do not men-tion the unemployment and lack of jobsecurity prevalent in the neoliberaleconomies.

But the grossest omission concerns thefunctioning of the state. The Right objectsto the “discretionary paternalism” practisedby the progressive regimes but ignores thesocial collapse in the narco-states that hasoccurred in conjunction with free trade andfinancial deregulation. Three economiesknown for their openness and attractivenessto capital - Mexico, Colombia and Peru - arenow suffering this corrosion of the state.

Mexico has the highest level of violencein the region. No high-ranking official hasbeen jailed and many territories are con-trolled by criminal gangs. In Colombia thedrug cartels finance presidents, parties andsections of the army. In Peru official com-plicity with drug trafficking has gone to thepoint that sentences have been commutedfor 3,200 people convicted of that offence.

The Right resorts to the same mediaone-sidedness in embellishing Chile's eco-nomic model, which is praised for its priva-tizations, with no mention of the stiflinghousehold debt, job insecurity, and miser-able private retirement pensions, or theslowing growth and rising corruption thatare jeopardizing the education reforms andsocial security promised by Bachelet.

In the last decade, of course, there havebeen social improvements, greater con-sumption and some growth. But that kindof recovery has occurred in other cycles ofbusiness recovery and higher export prices.What has not changed is the profile ofregional capitalism and its adaptation to thecurrent requirements of globalization.

In Brazil, the reaction of the PT was

similar. It did not participate when theprotests began in 2013. It expressed a lackof trust toward the demonstrators and onlyconceded the validity of the marches whenthey became a mass movement. The gov-ernment limited itself to accusing the Rightof encouraging discontent instead of notingthe popular disillusionment with an admin-istration that appoints neoliberal ministers.

This hostility toward the actions in thestreets was a result of the PT's regression.The party has lost its sensitivity to populardemands as a result of its close links withthe business interests and bankers. Its lead-ership manages the economy in the inter-ests of the capitalists and is surprised whenits social base asks for what it has alwaysdemanded.

The same tensions emerged inEcuador in the face of numerous petitionsby the social movements in defense of theland and water. Since their marches coin-cided with the Right's rejection of the gov-ernment's moves to tax the highestincomes, government officials pointed tothe convergence of both actions as the sameprocess of conservative restoration. Insteadof favouring an approach to the social pro-testers in order to forge a common front inopposition to the reactionaries, progres-sivism blindly lined up with Correa.

What is happening in the face of theprotests in these three countries governedby the Centre-Left illustrates how the pro-gressive administrations distance them-selves from the popular movement. That ishow they pave the way for a return of theRight.

The persistence, renewal or extinctionof the progressive cycle in the regiondepends on the popular resistance. Withoutthis dimension it is impossible to ascertainwhether it is the continuation or the close ofthat period. It is a huge error to assesschanges in governments without referenceto the levels of struggle, organization orconsciousness of the oppressed.

The Right has the initiative for now,but the nature of the period as a whole willbe defined in the social battles that the con-servatives themselves will surely precipitate.And the outcome of those conflicts doesnot depend solely on the preparedness tostruggle. A key factor will be the influence ofsocialist, anti-imperialist and revolutionarycurrents.

*Claudio Katz - Excerpts from the 'SocialistProject'


INTERNATIONAL

The United Nations SpecialRapporteur on the situation ofhuman rights in the Palestinian ter-

ritories occupied by Israel since 1967, Mr.Makarim Wibisono of Indonesia, hasstressed the critical need for the interna-tional community to increase its protectionof the Palestinian population.

Mr. Wibisono, who has resignedbecause of Israeli non-cooperation with histask, while presenting his final report to theHuman Rights Council, recalled the well-documented violations related to the Israelioccupation policies and practices in theOccupied Palestinian Territory (OPT),

and appealed to the Government of Israel,as the occupying power, to take practicalsteps to implement protections under inter-national law as it pertains to the Palestinianpopulation living under occupation.

The report was presented at theCouncil's thirty-first session in March.

(Mr Wibisono had submitted his resig-nation to the President of the HumanRights Council on 4 January 2016, andwhich took effect on 31 March 2016. In aUN news release of 4 January, the SpecialRapporteur voiced deep regret thatthroughout his mandate, Israel failed togrant him access to the OPT. Repeated

requests for access, both written and oral,have been unsuccessful. "Unfortunately, myefforts to help improve the lives ofPalestinian victims of violations under theIsraeli occupation have been frustratedevery step of the way," he had said in thenews release.

(During the interactive dialogue in theCouncil last month, a number of speakersexpressed regret over Mr Wibisono's resig-nation in response to the lack of coopera-tion by Israel with the mandate. They calledon the President of the Human RightsCouncil to nominate his successor as soonas possible. They also called on Israel to

A United Nations rights expert laments that Israel has not extended the Palestinians the

protection that they are entitled to under international law in the face of increasing violence

against them writes *Kanaga Raja.

Palestinian population needsgreater protection

Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abass Israel PM Netanyahu


INTERNATIONAL

fully cooperate with the Special Rapporteurand other UN human rights mechanisms.Reportedly, Israel was not present in theroom during the dialogue.)

In his final report, the SpecialRapporteur said that since assuming hismandate in June 2014, he has been struckby the abundant amounts of informationand reports on violations of internationalhuman rights law and international human-itarian law, on the one hand, and the seem-ing inability of the international communityto match what is known of the situationwith more effective protection ofPalestinians in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory.

He noted that year after year, viola-tions of international humanitarian law andof civil, political, economic, social and cul-tural rights continue to be reported.

"Key recommendations to theGovernment of Israel presented by theSecretary-General, the United NationsHigh Commissioner for Human Rights andindependent mandate holders, such as theSpecial Rapporteur, to the GeneralAssembly and the Human Rights Councilremain largely unimplemented."

As an occupied people, under interna-tional humanitarian law, Palestinians in theOccupied Palestinian Territory are "pro-tected persons".

Yet there is a disconnect between therights and protections afforded to themunder international humanitarian law, andinternational human rights law in particu-lar, and actual protection.

The Special Rapporteur emphasisedthat Israel, as the occupying Power, holdsthe primary responsibility for addressingthis disconnect.

The destructive impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is particularly clear intimes of active hostilities, such as in thesummer of 2014 in Gaza, or as has been wit-nessed particularly in the fourth quarter of2015, especially in the West Bank, duringescalations in violence, said the report.

According to the Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs, inOctober and November 2015, the escala-tion of violence resulted in the deaths ofmore than 100 Palestinians and some11,300 injured, and 17 Israeli fatalities andsome 170 injured.

The rights expert reiterated two points,related to the current violence, which areinterlinked. The first is that any wanton actof individual violence, whether committed

by Palestinians or Israelis, is unacceptableand must be investigated and prosecuted inaccordance with international standards.

The second is that the upsurge of vio-lence with serious concerns of excessive useof force by Israeli security forces in the con-text of attacks and alleged attacks byPalestinians and during clashes, and ongo-ing settler violence, is arising within a pre-existing context.

Anyone seeking to quell the unrest,notwithstanding the unequivocal positionthat individual perpetrators of crimes mustbe held responsible, would need to look tothe context and related root causes of theoverall heightened tension.

"To simply condemn individual attacksdoes not offer any viable way out of the vio-lence rolling over the Occupied PalestinianTerritory," said Mr Wibisono.

He reiterated that long-standing Israelipolicies and practices in the OccupiedPalestinian Territory, such as continuedsettlement expansion, the construction ofthe wall, and the blockade of Gaza, are ille-gal under international law and well-knownto entail ongoing and serious violations ofthe human rights of Palestinians.

In his report, the Special Rapporteurdeeply regrets that he has been obstructedin his ability to fulfil his mandate by the lackof cooperation of Israel.

He assumed the mandate as an impar-tial observer and has from the outset madegreat efforts to engage in dialogue with theGovernment of Palestine and theGovernment of Israel.

While the Government of Palestine hasextended full cooperation, the Governmentof Israel has repeatedly sought to justify itsnon-cooperation by referring to its reserva-tions regarding the mandate.

Consequently, despite assurances ofaccess made upon his appointment, and theduty of Israel, as a Member State, to extendcooperation to a special procedure mandateholder, the Special Rapporteur has effec-tively been denied access to the OccupiedPalestinian Territory, Mr Wibisono said.

The Special Rapporteur said he hasraised a number of concerns related to therise in violence in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory, especially of excessive use offorce by Israeli security forces during clash-es and in the context of attacks and allegedattacks by Palestinians.

Ruins of palestine bombed buildings


The situation escalated in October, fol-lowing heightened tensions, and continuedin November and December 2015.

"The upsurge in violence is a grimreminder of the unsustainable human rightssituation in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory and the volatile environment itengenders."

Against the backdrop of illegal settle-ments in the West Bank, including EastJerusalem, the blockade of Gaza, and a gen-eral lack of accountability, including for vio-lations and crimes by Israeli security forcesand settlers, tensions rose further inSeptember and October 2015 followingrestrictions imposed by Israeli authoritieson Palestinians' access to the Al-Aqsa com-pound and what Palestinians viewed asattempts to alter the status quo at the Al-Aqsa compound.

October and November 2015 also sawa wave of protests and violent clashesbetween Palestinians and Israeli securityforces.

Excessive use of force by Israeli securi-ty forces against Palestinians in the contextof attacks and alleged attacks on Israelis,including soldiers, and during clashes, has

been widely reported.The rights expert said that the high

number of Palestinian casualties in individ-ual incidents and during clashes with Israelisecurity forces, since the violence escalated,is extremely worrying.

The Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs reported that, inOctober and November 2015, of some11,300 Palestinians injured, injuries weremainly caused by exposure to tear gas(60%), rubber bullets (23%) and liveammunition (14%).

Of fatalities in the same period, theOffice for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs reported that 60Palestinians, including children, were killedin the context of attacks and alleged attacksagainst Israelis, and 17 Israelis were killed insuch attacks.

In addition, 39 Palestinians were killedin the context of clashes with Israeli securi-ty forces, and three Palestinians were killedin other types of incidents.

The Special Rapporteur is deeply con-cerned at measures employed against thePalestinian population in the context of theescalation of violence.

"While Israeli authorities need torespond appropriately and proportionallyto the deteriorating security situation,measures that are excessive violate interna-tional law and only add fuel to alreadyinflamed tensions."

He noted that in mid-October, theIsraeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedthe approval by the Security Cabinet of anumber of measures, authorizing Israelisecurity forces to "impose a closure on, or tosurround, centers of friction and incitementin Jerusalem".

The measures also provided that wherea punitive demolition has taken place nonew construction would be permitted, thatthe [suspected] perpetrators' propertywould be confiscated and their East

Jerusalem residency rights revoked.Mr Wibisono pointed out that punitive

demolitions of the homes of perpetrators oralleged perpetrators of attacks againstIsraelis are in contravention of internationalhumanitarian law and international humanrights law.

"Israel, as the occupying Power, is pro-hibited from destroying private property inthe Occupied Palestinian Territory."

Such demolitions further constitutecollective punishment, contrary to article33 of the Geneva Convention relative to theProtection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar, affecting not only the perpetrator orsuspected perpetrator, but also the family ofthe targeted person and often families inadjacent homes impacted by the blast of thedemolitions.

According to the Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs,from mid-October to the end of November2015, 11 homes were demolished or sealedin such punitive actions.

This caused the displacement of 80Palestinians, including 42 children.Twenty-six persons living in adjacent build-ings were also temporarily displaced in con-nection with the demolitions.

In East Jerusalem, extensive restric-tions, affecting the right to freedom ofmovement, in the form of roadblocks andcheckpoints were imposed followingapproval by the Israeli Security Cabinet inmid-October 2015.

At the end of November, the Office forthe Coordination of Humanitarian Affairsreported that around 76,000 people in sixPalestinian neighbourhoods in EastJerusalem were still directly affected byadditional checkpoints, roadblocks and anearth mound.

With respect to the right to educationduring the period of increased tensions andclashes, the Special Rapporteur said he hasreceived allegations of schoolchildren andteachers in Hebron being harassed byIsraeli forces and settlers on their way toand from school in October 2015.

The Special Rapporteur stressed theneed to ensure respect for the human rightsof Palestinians. "Responding to the deterio-rated security situation does not permitexcessive measures or measures of collec-tive punishment to be carried out by Israeliauthorities."

The Special Rapporteur reiterated thatit is imperative that Israeli security forcesabide by international standards on use of

INTERNATIONAL

“While Israeli authorities need

to respond appropriately and

proportionally to the deterio-

rating security situation, meas-

ures that are excessive violate

international law and only add

fuel to already inflamed

tensions.”

INTERNATIONAL


force, in particular the Basic Principles onthe Use of Force and Firearms by LawEnforcement Officials.

He renewed the call on Israeli authori-ties to carry out independent, effective,thorough, prompt and impartial investiga-tions into all suspected cases of extrajudi-cial, arbitrary and summary executions.

According to the rights expert, most ofthe human rights violations againstPalestinians in the West Bank, includingEast Jerusalem, are linked to the existenceand expansion of settlements.

Such violations relate to home demoli-tions and the consequent displacement, dis-criminatory supply of water and provisionof access to land, movement restrictions,settler violence and the discriminatory mili-tary court system which Israel applies toPalestinians.

The Special Rapporteur expresseddeep regret that Israel rejected the follow-ing recommendations related to settle-ments: stop the transfer of its population tothe occupied territory and put an end to allmeasures that encourage or perpetuate thesettlements; guarantee the right to housingof the Palestinians in the occupied territo-ries, including East Jerusalem, stopping thedemolition of Palestinian houses and guar-anteeing the property rights of thePalestinian population; and dismantle theseparation wall and halt the expansion ofillegal settlements.

According to the report, in Gaza, thelandscape and the people are scarred bymultiple rounds of hostilities with Israel andkept in a state of de-development by thelong-standing blockade, which constitutescollective punishment contrary to interna-tional humanitarian law.

It has the effect of isolating Gaza,including from the rest of the OccupiedPalestinian Territory, and affects a range ofhuman rights, especially the right to free-dom of movement and the right to an ade-quate standard of living.

The United Nations Conference onTrade and Development (UNCTAD) hasreported: "The over-abstraction and scarci-ty of drinking water have been exacerbatedby crumbling sanitation infrastructure,while the blockade creates chronic short-ages of electricity and fuel, which in turnaggravate contamination and the water cri-sis."

Of the many families hit hardest interms of damage and destruction of theirhomes during the 2014 Israeli military

operation, some 95,000 people were stilldisplaced as of November 2015.

The Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs reported that inOctober 2015 the reconstruction of 10% ofhomes that had been totally destroyed in2014 was under way (over 1,100), while12% of repairs to severely damaged homeshad been completed.

The Special Rapporteur is dismayedthat there appears to be no indication fromIsrael that the blockade will be lifted. TheGovernment of Israel rejected seven recom-mendations expressly on lifting the block-ade or closure of Gaza.

Regarding the treatment of Palestinianprisoners and detainees, including children,under the Israeli military court system, thereport said figures reported by various non-governmental organizations show a sharprise in the number of Palestinians detainedin the month of October 2015, during theescalation of violence.

According to figures published by anIsraeli non-governmental organization, thenumber of Palestinians in the custody of theIsraeli security forces reached some 5,680; arise of more than 400 persons held com-pared to September 2015.

With respect to the situation of childsuspects and detainees, the SpecialRapporteur is astounded at the openly dis-criminatory approach signalled by the rejec-tion by Israel of the following recommenda-tion: take all steps necessary to ensure thatPalestinian children in military custodyreceive the same level of care and have thesame rights as provided by Israeli criminallaw to youth offenders.

A rise in Palestinian minors held byIsrael has also been recorded, with some300 of those held by Israel at the end ofOctober 2015 being minors, up from some170 in September 2015.

"Hundreds of Palestinians being held,now including children, often under secretevidence, and for up to six- month termsthat can be renewed indefinitely, is not con-sistent with international human rightsstandards. It is fundamental that those sus-pected of wrongdoing be able to defendthemselves and to challenge the detention.The Government of Israel should promptlycharge or release all administrativedetainees," said Mr Wibisono.

According to the Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in2015, settler-related violence continued at aweekly average rate of two Palestinian casu-alties and three incidents of damage to

Palestinian-owned property.The Office highlighted a marked

increase in settler violence reported in andaround Hebron in October and November2015, with 61 attacks causing injuries toPalestinians or property damage.

Cases of Palestinian fatalities involvingIsraeli security forces and failures to appro-priately investigate and prosecute have alsocontributed to the sense of impunity forcrimes committed against Palestinians.

According to information released inDecember 2015 by an Israeli non-govern-mental organization, even when the IsraeliMilitary Police Criminal InvestigationsDivision has launched criminal investiga-tions into alleged offences by Israeli soldiersagainst Palestinians, indictment rates arelow: reportedly, over the past five years,only 3% of criminal investigations resultedin indictments.

The Special Rapporteur reiterated thatsettlements, the blockade, Palestinian pris-oners and detainees, and accountability arecritical areas to address and urged Israel totake concrete steps towards addressingrelated ongoing violations in the OccupiedPalestinian Territory. - Third WorldNetwork Features.

* Kanaga Raja is the Editor of the South-North Development Monitor (SUNS) inGeneva, Switzerland.The above article is an edited version of anarticle published in the SUNS #8207, 23March 2016.

“Hundreds of Palestiniansbeing held, now including chil-

dren, often under secret evi-dence, and for up to six- month

terms that can be renewedindefinitely, is not consistent

with international humanrights standards. It is funda-

mental that those suspected ofwrongdoing be able to defendthemselves and to challenge

the detention. The Governmentof Israel should promptly

charge or release all adminis-trative detainees.”


Berta Caceres' killing was a symptom, not an isolated incident,

say *Andrea Reyes Blanco and Tim Shenk.

Berta Caceres wasn't the first and,unfortunately, she won't be the last.The world-renowned Lenca leader,

assassinated in March in Honduras for heropposition to government-backedmegaprojects, is one of an increasing litanyof fallen fighters for Indigenous and envi-ronmental rights in Honduras and aroundthe globe.

The pattern of murder and criminaliza-tion of those who would defend land andthe rights of rural people has only becomemore evident. We argue that this patternresponds to the land grab phenomenon thathas intensified since the global financial andfood crisis of 2007-2008.

On March 15 another Honduran envi-ronmental and Indigenous activist was mur-dered. Nelson Garcia was an active memberof the Civic Council of Popular andIndigenous Organizations of Honduras orCOPINH. His murder took place “when hecame home for lunch, after having spent themorning helping to move the belongings ofevicted families from the Lenca indigenouscommunity of Rio Chiquito,” saidCOPINH.

Garcia was a colleague of the recentlyslain Caceres, working with communitiesopposing the Agua Zarca hydroelectric damproject. The Agua Zarca dam project, nowon hold, would provide energy for the

numerous extractive projects slated forHonduras in the coming decade. Since the2009 coup d'etat against President ManuelZelaya, 30% of Honduran territory has beenallocated to mining concessions.

The eviction after which Garcia waskilled was one of many recent violent evic-tions carried out by Honduran militarypolice in Indigenous territories. Elevatedlevels of state violence and disregard for dueprocess are business as usual nowadays inHonduras, according to civil society organi-zations.

In its February 21 report on theSituation of Human Rights in Honduras,t h e I n t e r - A m e r i c a n C o m m i s s i o n o n

INTERNATIONAL

Land grabbing is killing Honduras’indigenous peoples

Working on land that may soon not be yours


INTERNATIONAL

Human Rights or IACHRexpressed concern about thehigh levels of violence andinsecurity in Honduran soci-ety, highlighting risks toIndigenous people. Thereport pointed out that vio-lence against Indigenouspeople has emerged to a largedegree from land grabs. Theviolence is exacerbated by acontext of inequality and dis-crimination, in addition tothe consequent barriers toaccess to justice. Official fig-ures released in April 2013 bythen Attorney General LuisAlberto Rubi indicate that80% of killings in Honduraswent unpunished due to alack of capacity on the part ofinvestigative bodies.

InsecurityAccording to the IACHR, the chal-

lenges that indigenous communities faceare mainly related to: “(i) the high levels ofinsecurity and violence arising from theimposition of project and investment plansand natural resource mining concessions ontheir ancestral territories; (ii) forced evic-tions through the excessive use of force and(iii) the persecution and criminalization ofIndigenous leaders for reasons related tothe defense of their ancestral territories."

Moreover, the IACHR has clearly stat-ed that many of the attacks carried outagainst Indigenous leaders and advocatesare specifically aimed at reducing theiractivities in defense and protection of theirterritories and natural resources, as well asthe defense of the right to autonomy andcultural identity.

Harassment takes the form not only oftargeted criminal attacks, as we have seen inthe case of Berta Caceres, Nelson Garciaand many others, but a much broader netthat has been cast against environmentaland Indigenous leaders. Official state enti-ties, enacting formal legal procedures, haveused the judicial system to catch activists infalse charges, resulting in months or years ofpreventive prison, bogus sentences, legalfees and often a permanent criminal record.In a context in which state violence inter-twines with the violence of internationaleconomic power, corruption and unethicalpractices, hundreds of leaders have beenprosecuted for crimes such as usurpation of

land and damage to the environment. What we see in Honduras is part of the

global land grab phenomenon, a term thatin the words of Phillip McMichael, profes-sor of development sociology at CornellUniversity, “invokes a long history of vio-lent enclosure of common lands to accom-modate world capitalist expansion, but itsits uneasily with the 'free market' rhetoricof neoliberal ideology.” Land grabs are asymptom of a crisis of accumulation in theneoliberal globalization project, which hasintensified since the global financial andfood crisis of 2007-2008. This in turn islinked to an acceleration of a restructuringprocess of the food regime as a conse-quence of a large-scale relocation of agro-industry to the global south.

According to the 2011 Oxfam briefingpaper, “Land and Power, the growing scan-dal surrounding the new wave of invest-ment in land,” recent records of investmentshow rapidly increasing pressure on land,resulting in dispossession, deception, viola-tion of human rights and destruction oflivelihoods. It is a war on Indigenous peo-ples conducted in order to establish moderncorporate capitalism.

DisplacementIndeed, all around the world peasants

and Indigenous people are being displacedfrom their territories in order to developlarge-scale agribusiness, such as massivepalm oil and soy plantations, mining proj-ects, hydroelectric dams and tourist resorts,among other investments. State-sanctioned

violence and impunity createthe conditions for investors toacquire land that would other-wise not be for sale. The resultis a serious threat to the sub-sistence and socio-ecologicalresilience of millions of peo-ple across the world.One of the most dramaticexamples of this process is thecase of the Honduran PalmOil Company Grupo Dinant,which has an extended recordof violence and human rightsabuses associated with thekilling of more than 100 peas-ants in Lower Aguan Valley.Ghe Unified PeasantsMovement of the AguanValley or MUCA waged along battle to defend theirland rights, sustaining many

losses. In addition, international humanrights groups such as FoodFirstInformation and Action Network broughtpressure to bear, and in 2011 the Hondurangovernment was forced to convene MUCAand the company to negotiate a deal.Paradoxically, according to the deal, thefarmers have to buy back the disputed landat market prices (Oxfam 2011).

Land grabbing in Honduras has a longand lamentable history, and related vio-lence has increased dramatically since the2009 coup d'etat. Despite regular violentevictions by state security forces,Indigenous and peasant groups continue topursue their right to control their ancestrallands through land occupations.

Those who are incensed by the killingof Berta Caceres must understand that herassassination was not an isolated event car-ried out by those who had a personalvendetta against her. Rather, Berta, her col-leagues at COPINH and other Indigenousorganizations represent an obstacle forthose who would further a vision of societythat values profit over all else.

* Andrea Reyes Blanco is a Humphrey Fellowat Cornell University, and Tim Shenk is coor-dinator of the Cornell-based Committee onU.S.-Latin American Relations (CUSLAR),cuslar.org.

The article is reproduced from Third WorldNetwork Features.

Honduran President Juan Hernandez


RIGHTS

Activists have come together to protect farmers and communities from losing their land and to

stave off destructive developments, writes *Anabela Lemos.

To corporations, the forest is onlybusiness. To communities, the for-est is everything: trees, medicine,

culture, spirituality. Land-grabbing and theremoval of communities from forests andland breaks the community, displacesaccess to food and water, and uproots theconnection to nature and [local] knowl-edge. If the community structure is broken,if the land - the means of food production -is lost, we lose everything.

Land That Can Only Grow StonesIn Mozambique, where 80% of the

population is campesinos - traditional, fam-ily farmers - companies are taking the best,

most fertile land and moving people to landthat can't grow anything. For example, thecoal mining project in the Tete provincerelocated people from the fertile soil by theZambezi River, with the promise of housesand two hectares of land per family. Theywere moved to an arid place with land thatcan only grow stones, as they say, losingaccess to the land and river their livesdepended on.

When a foreign company wants toextract [natural resources], the governmentgrants them the rights, claiming ownershipof whatever is beneath the ground. Legally,these extractive projects need to be accept-ed by the communities, but the legal system

doesn't work properly.Activists in Mozambique formed

Justiça Ambiental [JA] in 2004 to addressissues of food, water, mining, extraction,forests, and energy as they relate to the cli-mate crises. In 2008, JA became a memberof Friends of the Earth International. JAkeeps civil society informed and bringsawareness to people in cities who are dis-connected from rural areas.

We organize to support farmers andcommunities in taking back their land, theirforests, and their rights and demand thatour government does not jump on theGMO (genetically modified organism)bandwagon. We work on leveraging legal

Mozambique's movement to end land grabs

Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi


RIGHTS

support for communities in the struggleagainst mining, despite repeated instancesof our cases being turned down in thecourts. We are still waging a 14-plus yearfight to stop the Mphanda Nkuwa damfrom being built on the Zambezi River. Weknow that change comes from the groundup and that together we have the power tobuild movements for our collective strug-gles.

“Free” Land and False PromisesThere is an old saying in Africa: the

land doesn't belong to us; it belongs to ourchildren, and the children of our children.

In the past decade, Mozambique hasseen a huge increase in land-grabbing andforeign investment in agriculture and natu-

ral resources, [coupled] with pollution andclimate change. The government decidedthat poverty and hunger would be solved byagribusiness, but everyone knows this is alie. Every time a corporation takes landfrom a campesino farmer, it leads to pover-ty.

The government invites in both eco-nomically developed and developing coun-tries, like Brazil and China, as well as inter-national corporations, saying that there's

plenty of free land. But there is no free landin Mozambique. Land belongs to commu-nities, and if there is no community livingon the land, it belongs to the forest, and ifthere is no forest, then it's the commons.

In reality, the motive behind this busi-ness model is corporate monoculture -everyone farming the same crops on landowned by corporations. And for what? Toexport cash crops to other countries, not togrow food for people here.

Corporations and their governmentrepresentatives go into communities to tryto convince farmers, who don't know abouttheir legal rights, to sell their land or acceptGMO seeds. They make promises of a bet-ter life, but it's a false promise.

By the time we find out about invest-ments or projects, the agreement hasalready been approved and signed, the landhas already been grabbed, or companies arealready testing GMOs. In this turmoil, thereis very little to do other than fight to defendfarmers and communities and demand anend to [land-grabbing] projects. The move-ments are growing here; we've seenadvances.

Pushing Back on a GMO-Friendly

Mozambique[In 2008, the government welcomed

investment in biofuels produced from aplant called Jatropha.] The president cam-paigned widely, and convincing small farm-ers to exchange their land for work. Afterlearning that the GMO seeds were poorquality and the biofuel was not a source ofadditional farm income, farmers successful-ly campaigned against the Jatropha proj-ects, which closed down. Still, many farmerslost their land and ended up with nothing.

In Europe, many countries are banningGMOs, kicking out corporations likeMonsanto, Syngenta, and Dupont. Africa isthe last frontier for these corporations,especially because of weak and corrupt gov-ernments. Last year, Mozambique changedits precautionary laws against GMOs [bysigning the African Regional IntellectualProperty Organization's Plant VarietyProtection Protocol]. Mozambique is nowtesting GM seed [in the Water EfficientMaize for Africa (WEMA) project].

There are signed agreements betweenseveral Southern African DevelopmentCommunity countries to push forward theWEMA project of genetically modifiedcorn, which Monsanto and the [GatesFoundation] are behind. One of the many

resulting problems from this is that theseGMO seeds can't be saved; they need to bebought again [each season].

Organizing Against Agro-

IndustryIn the Nacala Corridor -

Mozambique's most populated area withone of the last tropical forests - the govern-ment offered free land to an agribusiness[venture] from Brazil, Japan andMozambique. Known as ProSavana, themonoculture project would export soy andother cash crops to Japan. [The four mil-lion] campesino farmers in the NacalaCorridor would face massive land grabs.

No information was given toMozambicans; we only found out throughinternational civil society organizations.The National Union of Peasants (UNAC)then began collaborating with groups inJapan and Brazil in a campaign againstProSavana. We sent our representatives toJapan, and together, we brought ourcampesino voice to the government. In2014, we discovered the leaked [secret]plans. [The programme has yet to be offi-cially implemented] but over time, land isslowly being taken.

Mobilization is the Way ForwardOur most important work in Justica

Ambiental is to raise awareness about foodsovereignty, the law, and land rights. Wewant to have control over the food we growand eat, and don't want to rely on imports.

The power is in the hands of the peo-ple. If a farmer doesn't want to give awaytheir land, they can say no - they have thatright. We've seen the power of people onthe ground doing work such as communityforest exploration, which has countereddeforestation and slowly taken control ofsmall forests.

The campesino movement is strong,and we are not accepting this turn towardextractive industry and agribusiness.Solidarity [locally and across borders] is theonly way to strengthen a growing move-ment. We need to support each other andconnect our regional and internationalstruggles to make change together

*Anabela Lemos is Co-founder, CampaignCoordinator, and Board Member of JustiçaAmbiental (JA), the Mozambique branch ofFriends of the Earth. This article is from ThirdWorld Network Features.

“There is an old saying in

Africa: the land doesn't belong

to us; it belongs to our chil-

dren, and the children of our

children. In the past decade,

Mozambique has seen a huge

increase in land-grabbing and

foreign investment in agricul-

ture and natural resources,

[coupled] with pollution and

climate change. The govern-

ment decided that poverty and

hunger would be solved by

agribusiness, but everyone

knows this is a lie. Every time a

corporation takes land from a

campesino farmer, it leads to

poverty.”


RIGHTS

In almost every nation, punitive drug policies have the greatest impact on women who are

already coping with poverty and social neglect, histories of physical and sexual violence, and

marginalization. The UN special assembly on drugs to be held this month provides an important

opportunity for women's rights to be included in the global policies on illicit drugs,

writes *Judy Gitau.

In April 2016, the United NationsGeneral Assembly convened a specialsession on the world drug problem at

the UN Headquarters in New York. Thisconvening is recognition of the need toreview the global policies on drugs, bearingin mind that the current drug regime isbased on 50-year-old conventions that lendthemselves to an antiquated interpretationof the global drug problem. The drugregime, which comprises of three conven-tions overseen by the Commission onNarcotic Drugs, the International NarcoticsControl Board, and the UN Office onDrugs and Crime (UNODC), mostlyfocuses on criminalization and repressivemeasures directed at producers, traffickersand consumers of illegal drugs withouteffectively eliminating supply or consump-tion of these drugs. In fact this approach,which scholars in recent times have referredto as 'broken', fails to consider the uniquenature of the global drug problem whichhas social, economic and even securitydimensions.

A broad observation of the impact ofimplementing the current legal frameworkas it is across the globe illustrates instancesof 'criminalization' and social exclusion ofentire communities viewed to fall withinlocations that produce, supply or use drugs,for example. It has also shown, for purposesof expediency, mass incarceration of drugusers which is found to be both highly inef-fective and strenuous to the justice system.This criminalization process furtherencourages high-risk behaviour such asunsafe injecting by drug users increasingthe risk of spreading HIV, Hepatitis C andother blood-borne diseases. It furtherdeters people in need of drug treatment

Is the war against drugs awar against women?

UN headquarters - New York

RIGHTS


from seeking it and diverts law enforcementresources from focusing on serious crimi-nality. The current global drug policiesreduce personal and government funds thatmight otherwise be available for positiveinvestment in economically strugglingcommunities who then become vulnerableto illegal organizations dealing in drugs.Indeed drug production, trafficking and/orconsumption often results from a variety ofcoercive forces often driven or even neces-sitated by poverty and social neglect.Contemporary drug policies usually over-look these drivers and instead emphasizeeradication and prohibition.

Whilst the discourse to review the lawin April 2016 takes cognizance of all of theabove issues, the broader discussions onreforms of the policy framework on drugsfail to recognize the disproportionateimpact this broken law has had on womenand children. Despite the statistics that alarge majority of those using and traffickingdrugs are men, the understudied and under-researched category that is indeed greatlyaffected by these policies are women andchildren.

IncreaseJust looking at the numbers globally,

for example, the rate of incarceration ofwomen for minor drug-related crime isincreasing at an alarming rate. Indeedwomen, whose role in this illicit drug econ-omy is most often as consumers or low-level sellers often driven by the need to pro-vide for their families, are finding them-selves imprisoned at an unprecedented rate.

Beyond the numbers it is a fair assess-ment to state that women are uniquely vul-nerable to prosecution and incarcerationbased on their relationships with otherswho are involved in the illegal drug traderather than their own leadership or conductin that trade. Owing to poverty and theinability of women in many societies,including, if not especially, in Africa, toaccess basic resources, drug traffickingorganizations that thrive under existingglobal policies often times take advantageand induce such vulnerable women tocourier drugs. It is these women who arethen promptly incarcerated as low-level'criminals' leaving out the more culpableorganizations from the equation. Theseorganizations seek out other vulnerablewomen and the cycle continues.

The penalty of incarceration meted onthe women is doubly penalizing as it often

results either in separation of mothers andtheir children or the incarceration of chil-dren alongside their mothers. Indeed thevast majority of women who are incarcerat-ed around the world for drug-relatedoffenses are mothers and therefore sufferthis plight. Drug policies focusing on pun-ishment not only deprive women of theirfreedom, but also compromise the wellbe-ing of their children. Taking this doubletragedy to its logical, if not illogical conclu-sion, increasingly, punishment as aresponse to drug use also includes removalof children and termination of parentalrights. Women then who took part in thisillicit trade to provide for their children endup losing their children altogether.

The incarceration process further takesaway from the family since women are mostoften the primary care-givers of the family.As such, once imprisoned the family is fur-ther impoverished once again ensuring thecycle of poverty continues with their chil-dren becoming vulnerable including to theillicit drug trade.

Finally the attendant stigma attachedto a woman - and a mother at that - whouses drugs almost certainly ensures shedoes not access medical care or treatment.

Women face significant barriers to access-ing appropriate drug treatment, includinglack of childcare, lack of trauma-informedcare, and threats of arrest if they reveal thatthey are pregnant. Without access tonondiscriminatory healthcare, includingdrug treatment, a woman's chance ofacquiring HIV and Hepatitis C, experienc-ing homelessness, drug overdose, and sig-nificant family rupture all increase. In-factin some jurisdictions drug using women aretargeted for campaigns of sterilization.

These failures of the global policy onillicit drugs have visited an enormous costto women. In almost every nation, punitivedrug policies have the greatest impact onwomen who are already coping with pover-ty and social neglect, histories of physicaland sexual violence, and marginalization.

Previous discussion to reform the glob-al legal framework, though positive, hasfailed to squarely acknowledge the excep-tional challenges women face. On theAfrican front for instance, the AfricanUnion Plan of Action on Drug Control,which maps out context specific measuresfor African countries in their addressing thedrug problem, does not make special provi-sions corresponding to women.

As different government representa-tives and non-state actors convene in Aprilin New York to discuss the global policyframework on illicit drugs, an opportunityhas emerged for countries and regions toconsider health- and human rights-baseddrug policies. Undeniably an opportunityhas arisen for women's rights to be includedin the global policies on illicit drugs. In thepast the UN General Assembly has statedexplicitly that governments not only havethe duty to pass laws that are aimed towardsprotecting women, but that the state shouldalso take responsibility for laws that mayhave unintended consequences of harm.

It is time women held their govern-ments to account.

* Judy Gitau is a Research Fellow with theCentre for Human Rights and Policy Studies.She has previously consulted with the EqualityNow Africa Office, specifically working on theSolidarity for African Women's Rights(SOAWR) coalition on domestication andimplementation of African Union instrumentsin Africa, on the rights of women. She is anadvocate of the High Court of Kenya, ahuman rights practitioner and presently a con-sultant for National Advocates for Pregnantwomen on UNGASS 2016

“Indeed the vast majority ofwomen who are incarcerated

around the world for drug-related offenses are mothers

and therefore suffer thisplight. Drug policies focusing

on punishment not onlydeprive women of their free-

dom, but also compromise thewellbeing of their children.

Taking this double tragedy toits logical, if not illogical con-clusion, increasingly, punish-

ment as a response to drug usealso includes removal of chil-

dren and termination ofparental rights. Women then

who took part in this illicittrade to provide for their chil-dren end up losing their chil-

dren altogether.”


RIGHTS

The latest incident, which claimedthe life of a leading anti-miningactivist, comes as poorer South

Africans feel the effects of soaring food,transport and electricity prices. The miseryand anger is compounded by the fact thatthe government has been shrinking statewelfare grants - not in nominal terms, butafter adjustment for the cost of living.

Growing impatience with economic

conditions has resulted in protests acrossthe country reaching new levels of intensity.Violence against activists also appears to beintensifying.

On March 22 Sikhosiphi “Bazooka”Rhadebe, a grassroots critic of a proposedAustralian dune-mining project on theEastern Cape's Wild Coast, was shot byassailants posing as police officers. Theattack has shaken communities and envi-

ronmentalists. A few weeks before hisdeath, the Amadiba Crisis Committee, alocal activist group, rejected an environ-mental impact assessment by titanium-hun-gry Mineral Commodities Limited, a Perth-based mining firm. The company has previ-ously run into conflict with communities inSierra Leone and Namaqualand.

The death of Rhadebe follows otheracts of intimidation and violence. The week

South African society's conflict with a mainstay of the country's corporate economy - resource

extraction - is permanently on display in the platinum, gold and coalfields in the north and

north-east of the country.Now communities on the country's East Coast are confronting mining

houses. This is the area that supplied Zulu and Xhosa workers to the mines. And now the mines

are coming home, writes *Patrick Bond.

Local anger is rising against South Africa’s ‘resource curse’

A South African mine site


RIGHTS

before, a few hours' drive up theNorth Coast of KwaZulu-Natal, alorry belonging to BonganiPearcewas set alight at midnight.Pearce lives near Somkhele, a vastcoal mine run by Johannesburg-based Petmin. The attack camehours after Pearce led a militantcommunity march to the local coun-cil.

Like the organisation led byRhadebe, Pearce's MpukunyoniCommunity Property Associationrepresents dozens of local villageswhose residents are angered by highlevels of corruption and maladminis-tration. They believe this is largelydue to collusion between local politi-cal elites and mining companies, andthat it is robbing their community ofits livelihood.

Resistance is rising as quickly asthe price of commodities crashes:coal from a $170/tonne peak in 2008 to$50; and titanium from $8.80/kg in 2011 to$3.80. Mining profitability now requiresreplacing the 2002-11 era's rising priceswith much higher throughput - greaterquantity at much lower prices. With this,the metabolism of the conflict is quicken-ing.

Mining is blasting new holes in thesocial fabric.

Protests are increasingly common inareas mainly populated by rural women,including the former KwaZulu homelandstrips to the east and west of the Hluhluwe-iMfolozi game park, an area populated by anumber of coal mining houses. Last weekthe Zululand Anthracite Colliery, untilrecently owned by RioTinto, suffered arsonattacks by residents demanding jobs.

Setting aside ubiquitous corruption,government's two major economic policyweaknesses are excessive fiscal stinginessfor the poor, combined with intensifiedstate investment in mining-supportiveinfrastructure.

After last month's slow-motion-auster-ity budget was announced, 16.5 millionpoor people face cuts in the real value ofgrants by several percentage points.According to the Pietermaritzburg Agencyfor Community Social Action, the cost of apoor household's minimalist monthlyR1,650 food basket rose 9% fromNovember 2015 to January 2016.Annualised, that is more than 25% or, as theorganiser's lead researcher Julie Smith

notes, "eight times higher than the averagemonthly increases over the preceding year."The 3.5% grant increase Finance MinisterPravin Gordhan gave foster-care childrenand 6.1% provided to other dependent chil-dren has already evaporated. In Februaryconsumer price inflation rose to 7%. This isbefore state-owned electricity utility Eskomapplies its 9.4% price hike.

Steeper increases in electricity andtransport, coupled with higher food prices,mean that women are increasingly limitedin the diversity of food they put in theirshopping trolleys.

Food, transport and electricity accountfor about 90% of expenditure for most low-income Pietermaritzburg households, saysSmith. This makes a mockery of the con-sumer price index weighting of less than50% of the total household basket for theseitems. Subsidies for other basic-needs itemshave also been cut, including for municipalservices and housing.

In contrast, Gordhan budgetedR292 billion from 2016-18 for newtransport and logistics infrastructure.This includes the two leading presi-dential strategic projects:• state-owned transport companyTransnet's new coal rail line toRichards Bay, aiming to export 18 bil-lion tonnes; and• its South Durban port-petrochem-ical expansion, aiming to increasecontainer traffic from 2.5 million to20 million annually by 2040.

Gordhan gained the praise of rat-ings agency Moody's senior vice pres-ident Kristin Lindow, who supportsbudget cutting, except when it comesto "preserving growth-supportingcapital spending."

Even setting aside their contribu-tion to growth-sapping climatechange, including KwaZulu-Natal'scurrent drought, do such mega-proj-

ects really qualify?Durban residents have seen billions in

taxpayer funds breed a stampeding whiteelephant herd. These include a World Cupsoccer stadium, convention centre and theuShaka Point development - all requiringongoing subsidisation. Add to this the newKing Shaka airport and Dube Tradeport,which suffer massive overcapacity.

At a Sharpeville Day commemoration,South Durban activists vowed to block theport-petrochemical expansion. This followsrecent protests against container trucks inthe area.

If the state continues to squeeze poorpeople's daily budget and pour subsidiesinto mega-projects serving mining andshipping capital, revolts like these inPresident Jacob Zuma's main patronageprovince will well up with growing vigour.

Like Rhadebe's Amadiba CrisisCommittee and so many other infuriatedeast coast residents, Pearce and theSomkhele activists intimately understandwhy South Africa is “resource cursed”. Andlike others opposed to state capture bydubious corporations and families, thesecommunities vow to keep fighting no mat-ter the rising danger.

* Patrick Bond, Professor of PoliticalEconomy, University of the Witwatersrand inJohannesburg, and Director of the Universityof KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society inDurban. This article was first published atThe Conversation

“If the state continues tosqueeze poor people's daily

budget and pour subsidies intomega-projects serving miningand shipping capital, revoltslike these in President Jacob

Zuma's main patronageprovince will well up with

growing vigour.”

South African President : Zuma

SUBSCRIPTION FORMAnnual Subscription Rates (12 issues) Airmail Surface mail

Developed countries (Institutions) US$60 US$45Developed countries (Individuals) US$45 US$30Third World individuals & groups US$35 US$20For India subscribers: Special rates Rs500(surface airmail). (For address, please see below).

For Malaysia subscribers: Special rates at RM35 per year or RM65 for 2 years (Please send cheques/postal order to Third World Network).

NAME:……………………….……………………….……………………….……………………….……………………….…………………....

ADDRESS:……………………….……………………….……………………….……………………….……………………….……………

……………………….……………………….……………………….……………………….……………………….……………………….……….......

CITY:…………………......……. POSTCODE:………......…..…. COUNTRY:…………..............….....................………….

I would like to subscribe by AIR/SURFACE MAIL and

I enclose the amount of……………………….........................................................

Please charge the amount of …………………...........……. to my credit card

American Express MasterCard Visa

Account No.

Signature:…………………........................……. Expiry Date:……………….......................................……….

SUBSCRIBERS IN INDIA:Payments and enquiries can be made to: the OtherIndia Bookstore, Above Mopusa Clinic, Mapusa 403507, Goa, India.

AUSTRALIA, BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND, UK, USA:You can pay by credit card or cheque/bank draft/international money order in own currency, US$ orEuro. If paying in own currency or Euro, please calculate equivalent of US$ rate. If paying in US$,please ensure that the agent bank is located in USA.

ALL OTHER COUNTRIES:Credit card or cheque/bank draft/ international money order in US$ or Euro.If paying in Euro, please calculate equivalent of US$ rate.If paying in US$, please ensure that the agent bank is located in USA.

CREDIT CARDS ACCEPTED:VISA/MASTER CARD/AMERICAN EXPRESS.

Please send payment/enquires to:

THE WORLD NETWORK131-JALAN MACALISTER

10400 PENANG MALAYSIA

Email: [email protected] .myWebsite:http://www.twnside.org.sg