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Western Europe: Looking beyond INFPublished online: 22 Jan 2009.

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Europe

WESTERN EUROPE: LOOKING BEYOND INF

After six years during which the problem of intermediate nuclear forces(INF) modernization dominated discussions in NATO councils, the 1985decisions of Belgium and the Netherlands to go ahead with the cruisemissile deployments in their territories agreed by the Alliance in 1979seemed finally to have laid to rest this perennially troublesome issue. Atthe December meeting of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) theDutch choice - to deploy cruise but to abandon two other nuclear tasks(carrying nuclear bombs and depth charges on F-16 and P-3 aircraftrespectively) - brought an unusually sharp rebuke from the other Allies,who perhaps feared political reverberations in their own countries.However, the harsh language of Ministers and NATO officials seemsunlikely to have any long-term effect on the Dutch decision itself. Nordoes the other Allies' continuation of their nuclear missions seem to bein jeopardy (though whether other countries will have to assume themissions abandoned by the Netherlands remains undecided). Althoughthey would not say so in public, most seemed to accept the Dutchdecision as a political compromise necessary to maintain the viability ofthe centre-right government, which faces elections in May 1986.

The Search for Co-operationThe burden-sharing issue, which had flared again dramatically in 1984as a result of the Nunn Amendment, settled into more constructivechannels during 1985 at least (see p. 40). In part this was due to thesuccessful (from the US point of view) resolution of funding levels andpriorities in the NATO infrastructure programme. The two-fold increasein funding, coupled with increased attention to key deficiencies (such asaircraft shelters and other support for reinforcing aircraft), went a con-siderable way towards meeting Senator Nunn's concerns. The launchingof the so-called Conventional Defence Initiative (CDi) also directedsignificant, if short-term, attention towards meeting some critical short-falls (in items such as ammunition stocks), although few specificimprovements have materialized.

At the same time, a more troublesome trend became apparent - theabandonment in all but rhetoric of the 3% real growth goal enunciatedin 1977-8. With Britain's decision to limit nominal defence increases to2.5% in 1986/7, 1.6% in 1987/8 and 0.9% in 198.8/9 (well below ananticipated inflation rate of 3.5%), and with the adoption of theGramm-Rudman budget initiative in the US (see p. 67), the prospectof real conventional defence improvements in the future is seriously in

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doubt, and a new, more intense controversy over the problem of burden-sharing in NATO looks likely. Indeed, as Congress began to grapple withthe consequences of Gramm-Rudman in early 1986, reductions in UStroop strength in Europe again surfaced as a serious option.

The most hopeful note was sounded at the end of 1985 in the area ofarms production co-operation. This has for a number of years been highon NATO's agenda as an attractive approach to maximizing the effective-ness of the Alliance's costly equipment programmes. The effort to pro-mote such co-operation received a boost in the US with the passage inDecember 1985 of the Nunn and Quayle Amendments which, inter alia,allocated $US 200 million for co-operative arms development pro-grammes and SUS 50 million for testing European systems, as well aseasing legal barriers to European participation in American procure-ment. At the end of 1985 the North Atlantic Council, the DPC and theConference of National Armament Directors (CNAD) all issued strongstatements supporting new steps towards arms co-operation, and the USand its NATO Allies began to make progress in identifying specific pro-jects for future co-operation. (A special meeting of the CNAD in February1986 adopted an agreed list of six projects, which could form the basisfor co-operative funding under the Nunn Amendment.)

Within Europe, co-operation received new impetus in 1985 with therealization, both in government and in the private sector, that in the faceof the economic dominance of the US the very survival of major sectorsof Europe's defence industries could well turn on the achievement ofgreater European collaboration. A number of hopeful signs could beseen, such as the decision by the European Defence Ministers whosecountries make up the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG)to explore co-operative defence research (so-called 'common technologyprojects'), focusing initially on five broad areas: micro-electronics(gallium arsenide); high-strength, light-weight materials; compoundmaterials; image processing; and conventional warhead design. TheEuropean Fighter Aircraft (EFA) project, which had seemed to be nearcollapse in the middle of the year, appeared to be back on track, despitecontinuing reports of disagreements between Britain and Germany overthe weight of the aircraft. Taken together, these efforts were signs thatarms co-operation could be more than just a slogan.

At the same time, the Westland affair not only led to the resignation ofBritish Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine, one of the most forcefuladvocates of European industrial co-operation in NATO councils, butalso illustrated dramatically the domestic political hurdles thatremained to be overcome before the rhetoric of co-operation becomesreality. The Westland affair also cast dark shadows in the US, where thecampaign to promote a European alternative to the Sikorsky rescue planwas seen by some - including many in the Administration - as sympto-matic of more pervasive protectionist and potentially anti-Americanovertones inherent in the new drive towards European co-operation.This same tension could be seen in fears that the IEPG was supplanting

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alliance-wide fora like the CNAD as the arena for developingco-operative projects, to the exclusion of the US, and the suspicion thatseemed to greet Secretary Weinberger's offer of US participation in theEFA. Americans complained that Europeans were overlooking thesignificant progress that had been made in redressing the imbalance inthe 'two-way street' of transatlantic arms purchases - down from a 7:1US advantage a few years ago to at least 3:1 or even to 2.5:1 in the latestfigures. Senior officials on both sides of the Atlantic continued to high-light the importance to NATO of co-operation during a period of tightlyconstrained resources. However, most of them realized that arms co-operation, although healthy for Alliance consensus, was unlikely to pro-vide such cost savings as significantly to ease the growing problemscaused by resource shortages and sharply rising unit costs of equipmentinvolving state-of-the-art technology.

The SDI and EurekaThe issue that threatened most to divide the Alliance in 1985 was theAmerican Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) proposal. The initialEuropean reaction in 1983/4 had been unease - for a number of reasons,including the prospective impact of the SDI on the US-Soviet arms-control process, its impact on European security, and equally important,its impact on Western Europe's own technological base. Many in andout of government feared that US SDI research would accelerate thetrend towards the concentration of high-technology research andexpertise in the United States, leaving Western Europe further behind.The dramatic increase in US funding for key technologies, such as high-energy physics, computer software, optics and microprocessing,threatened to increase America's technological lead, with disturbingconsequences not only for Europe's defence industries, but for thecompetitiveness of the European civilian high-technology sectors aswell.

Reacting to this concern, France launched its Eureka programme inApril, characterizing it as an effort to enlist European governments toprovide financial support for promoting high-technology research inEuropean industry. Through vigorous diplomacy, France ultimatelygained a modicum of support from other European nations, includingendorsement of Eureka at the Milan meeting of the twelve EEC states inJuly. In November a conference of ministers from 16 participatingcountries agreed on ten projects that would form Eureka's initialpriorities, in the areas of educational computers, lasers, anti-pollutiondevices, new materials, robots and manufacturing systems. But effort topersuade the other large European countries, notably Britain and WestGermany, to commit new government funding to Eureka were unsuc-cessful. As a result, it is difficult to predict whether the programme willprove to be much more than a public-relations effort to spotlight andencourage technology research, much of which might well been under-taken in any case.

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Much of the thrust behind Eureka was blunted as a result of thedecisions by many European governments to permit their companies toparticipate in the SDI research programme. By the end of 1985 Britainhad signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the US about Britishindustrial participation in the SDI, and by early 1986 West Germany waswell on the way to reaching agreement with the Pentagon, while discus-sions with Italy were continuing. Most of the other Allies (Belgium,Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands and Norway), as well as Canada andAustralia, refused to enter into government-to-government agreements,but have left the door open to private participation. Even in France,high-technology companies such as MATRA seemed anxious to sharein the windfall, and, despite its public opposition to SDI, the Frenchgovernment announced that it was 'completely in favour' of privateFrench industrial participation.

But the European dimension of the 'Star Wars' controversy was notlimited to concern over the SDl's impact on European industry andresearch - which in any event, had lessened somewhat by 1986. Many inEurope continued to worry about its strategic impact on Europeansecurity - its implications for extended deterrence and flexible response.In Britain and France there was, not unnaturally, debate about theimplications of the SDI for those countries' independent nuclear deter-rents. Throughout NATO concern was voiced that a successful ballisticmissile defence might increase the likelihood of conventional war inEurope - a disturbing prospect in the light of the continuing NATOdeficiencies vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact threat.

The Reagan Administration, reacting to these developments, madeincreasing efforts to stress that a ballistic missile shield would includeEurope under its umbrella, and in his Defense Guidance for the next fiveyears Secretary Weinberger gave a high priority to anti-tactical missileprogrammes. But most in Europe remained sceptical, given the techno-logical difficulties and the contrast between the distinctive nature of thethreat to Europe from shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles and thespace-based orientation of the SDI programme. This uncertainty over theUS approach could be seen in the proposal, floated by German DefenceMinister Manfred Worner, to launch a 'European Defence Initiative'which would focus on European research and analysis of the problemsof short- and medium-range ballistic missile defence as well as defenceagainst cruise and stand-off missiles. Meanwhile all sides followedclosely the continuing US-Soviet arms-control discussions for hints as towhether the US was prepared to modify its SDI programme as part of anarms-control agreement.

Other Problems of Co-operationEuropean security co-operation remained an important issue in avariety of fora. European interest in the revitalization of the WesternEuropean Union (WEU) continued in 1985, but some of the moregrandiose expectations were frustrated by the difficulty of co-ordinating

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often conflicting approaches to security policy. In particular, the effortto develop a European consensus on the SDI within WEU failed. Incontrast, the IEPG continued to demonstrate its value in the field ofarmaments co-operation by providing member nations with a forumwithin which to develop candidate projects for inclusion in the co-operative research and development programme established by theNunn Amendment.

The surprising outcome of the Spanish referendum on continuedmembership of NATO (approved by a comfortable margin of 52.5% to39.8%, despite polls which consistently predicted rejection) was animportant watershed for NATO and a major political victory for PrimeMinister Felipe Gonzalez - who had reversed his earlier pledge to pullSpain out of the Alliance and led the fight for approval. Many in theWest had feared that a negative vote might trigger a wave of effortsthroughout Europe to subject continued NATO membership to directelections and erode confidence in the degree of popular support for theAlliance. The elation and relief in NATO capitals and in Brussels wasonly slightly tempered by worry over the terms under which Spain choseto remain in the Alliance - remaining outside the integrated militarystructure and with a ban on basing nuclear weapons in the country - aconcern voiced by Lord Carrington before the vote, when he warned ofthe danger of'a la carte' membership.

The results of the Spanish poll may say more about domestic Spanishpolitics than the true extent of Spanish support for NATO. The vote wasa stinging defeat for the leadership of the conservative Alianze Popularwhich, despite its pro-NATO stance, had urged its voters to abstain andhad Gonzalez an embarrassing defeat. It was also viewed as a convincingmandate for the Socialist Prime Minister who, despite serious divisionsin his own party over the referendum, now seems likely to retain effec-tive political control in Spain.

The dispute between Greece and Turkey over the presence of a Greekbrigade on the contested island of Lemnos continued into 1986. At theDecember DPC meeting, where Turkey blocked adoption of the Greek'country chapter' (NATO's assessment of national forces available to theAlliance) in the force planning documents in response to Greece's effortsto include these troops as part of its NATO commitment; Greeceretaliated by blocking the Turkish chapter. The dispute has already ledto cancellation of several military exercises in the region, and manyNATO officials feared that failure to resolve the disagreement could haveincreasingly disturbing consequences for NATO's efforts to shore up thesouthern flank.

More broadly, NATO continued to worry about the inadequate levelsof economic and military assistance to the poorer members of theAlliance: Greece, Turkey and Portugal. Despite repeated exhortations atNATO ministerial meetings, only a handful of members have providedsignificant aid, and no co-ordinated, Alliance-wide approach to thesedeficiencies showed signs of emerging.

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The Danish attitude towards NATO and the EEC continued to presentdifficulties as the minority government in Copenhagen struggled tomediate between the demands of its allies and the Folketing. Theparliamentary rejection of the Luxembourg package of EEC reforms, anew source of irritation in European capitals, was reversed on 28February 1986 by a Danish referendum which backed the reforms by56.2% to 43.8%. However, NATO was still upset by Denmark's failure topay its share of the cost of modernizing the Alliance's nuclear forces - afailure which had been sharply criticized by the NATO SecretaryGeneral.

Franco-German Co-operationFranco-German relations were turbulent in 1985, undergoing a series ofadvances and setbacks that demonstrated once again the complexity ofthis important axis in European political affairs. Despite the intensepersonal efforts of the two leaders (President Mitterrand and ChancellorKohl met almost monthly throughout 1985) serious problems plaguedthe effort to enhance co-operation.

Motivated initially by fear of growing German neutralism and paci-fism, caused by the controversy over INF deployments and by theGerman interest in Ostpolitik, Mitterrand had put strengthened Franco-German ties high on his agenda ever since he assumed office. His strongsupport of Bonn's decision to deploy Pershing and his warm personalrelationship with Kohl's predecessor, Chancellor Schmidt, had helpedto strengthen the Paris-Bonn link. Then, just as the threat from theGreens and their sympathizers seemed to have dissipated, a newchallenge appeared, arising from concern at Bonn's growing dependenceon the US and its Atlantacist leanings in security and economic affairs.In the French view, if Europe was to challenge US domination of theWestern Alliance, then it was essential that Germany, Europe's mostpowerful economic engine, should be firmly in the European camp.

Both governments began the year with high hopes for improvingco-operation, but these were threatened by a series of disagreements,ranging from differing attitudes to the SDI programme, via disputes overEEC agricultural policy, to failure to agree on a number of technologicalprojects (the EFA and the French Hermes space shuttle and militaryobservation satellite). In French eyes these differences were more thanminor irritants. Germany's apparent willingness to support the USuncritically over the SDI, and its reluctance to join in 'European' (that is,French) programmes like the shuttle and the satellite, as well as the per-ception that it was lukewarm on Eureka, all tended to exacerbate theFrench fear that Germany was on the verge of casting off its Europeanmoorings.

These tensions reached their peak during the Bonn economic summitin May, when the festering dissension became glaringly public. RolandDumas, the French Foreign Minister observed 'something has failed inthe European motor at the Bonn summit. . . Herr Kohl went off the

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European tracks in order to be a welcoming host for Ronald Reagan'.Many in France felt that Chancellor Kohl had become too beholden toWashington as a result of President Reagan's steadfast decision to gothrough with the visit to the Bitburg war cemetery, thereby sparing theChancellor serious domestic embarrassment. Germans in turn accusedFrance of spoiling the summit through its refusal to agree a date for anew round of international trade talks (proposed by Reagan andendorsed by Kohl) and its announcement - in the middle of the summit- that it had refused the US invitation to participate in SDI.

Yet neither side was prepared to accept the consequences of thisapparent breakdown in bilateral relations. France saw that continuingacrimony could only drive Germany further into the US embrace, whileGermany feared the consequences of too deep an estrangement fromParis and the 'European movement'. In particular Bonn seemed anxiousto nurture the growing French interest in helping to assure German mili-tary security. Within days of the Bonn meeting efforts at reconciliationwere under way; in a special informal summit later that month Kohl andMitterrand poured oil on troubled water, and Germany appeared tomoderate its support for the SDI and show greater enthusiasm forEureka. At Milan in June France and Germany put forward their pro-posal for enhanced political co-operation within the EEC, and, althoughthe fundamental disagreements on the SDI remained unresolved, thevirulence of the dispute began to dissipate.

France seemed increasingly willing to accept a greater role in thedefence of Germany as the price of enhanced Franco-Germanco-operation. A Socialist party document published in early Julysuggested the possibility of extending the protection of France's nucleardeterrent to Europe - an eventuality welcomed by Chancellor Kohl.The build-up of the French rapid deployment force (Force d'ActionRapide), though of potentially global application, was clearly designedin part to strengthen France's ability to participate in the forwarddefence of Germany. The publicity given to the decision to 'revive' theElysee treaty of 1963 (which provides for regular military contacts be-tween the two nations) and the announcement of plans to hold thelargest Franco-German military exercise since World War II all seemedto be part of an effort by both countries to keep up the momentumbehind security co-operation.

The rhetoric was certainly there. The two Foreign Ministersannounced their intention 'to make 1986 the Franco-German year forEurope' and to make Franco-German co-operation 'the nucleus of thecrystallization of a European Defence policy'. Clearly PresidentMitterrand saw the improvement in relations as an advantage at a timewhen his party was entering the difficult period of parliamentaryelections in March 1986, but how Franco-German co-operation willfare in the potentially divisive post-election climate is more difficult tojudge. The problems that plagued Paris and Bonn throughout thisperiod can be seen at least in part as elements in a larger struggle, as

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Europe casts about to establish a continental identity, both internallyand vis-a-vis the United States, across the whole range of security, tech-nological and economic issues.

More Problems AheadNATO began 1986 with considerable confidence as a result of weatheringthe INF crisis, the progress on the Conceptual Military Framework andthe Conventional Defence Initiative, and its ability to maintain con-sensus during the crucial period before and after the Geneva summit.The US remained unhappy about its European allies' failure to imposesanctions against Libya in response to that country's alleged supportfor terrorism; nonetheless, this did not generate the often acrimoniousdisputes that had accompanied US efforts to impose alliance-wide sanc-tions on the USSR after its invasion of Afghanistan in 1980 and therepression of Solidarity in Poland in 1982.

But many dark clouds lie on the horizon. As a result of congressionalaction in 1985, modernization of US chemical weapons was madecontingent on NATO approval of the United States' programme toreplace existing weapons with the new binary munitions, an issue whichis sure to prove controversial in capitals already scarred by opposition tothe INF deployments. More ominous are the looming difficulties whichwill face NATO as its efforts to accelerate conventional defenceimprovements collides head-on with stringent resource constraints.Many eyes have now turned to the forthcoming series of elections inEurope, which began with the French parliamentary elections in Marchand will include parliamentary elections in the Netherlands and Spainin 1986 and West Germany (and possibly Britain) in 1987. Will theirresults erode the broad political consensus - which is in part a product ofthe common perspectives on security held by most of the governingparties in Europe.

EASTERN EUROPE: FORTY YEARS AFTER YALTAIn the East European context there is a direct connection between theYalta Agreement and Mikhail Gorbachev. In 1985 the fortieth anniver-sary of one coincided with the emergence of the other. It was a year,therefore, for both retrospection and anticipation.

Although there may be little in the text of the Yalta Agreement thatjustifies the frequent charges that it was a 'betrayal' or 'sell-out', the factis that Yalta has generally come to be used as a synonym for what is seenas a mood of Western acquiescence which let Eastern Europe slide underSoviet control after 1945. The fortieth anniversary generated a plethoraof conflicting reviews, full of recriminations, justifications and specula-tion about what might have been; there were also controversial sugges-tions - none of which can be acted upon - for casting off the Yalta

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