Weak Cues and Strong Rhetoric: How Unstructured Opinions Reflect Elite Messages in the case of Energy Policy

Heather E. Hodges1

Mary Collins2

Abstract: This research utilizes a survey experiment of nearly 1,000 individuals located along the proposed Keystone XL route to better understand public opinion formation in the case of energy policy. In addition to partisanship and cultural cognition, we incorporate details regarding trust and approval of the government, individual financial circumstances, and news consumption and behavior. We use two cases to evaluate these considerations, offshore drilling and the Keystone XL expansion project. We find that individuals, whose opinions are unstructured by ideology or values, are more susceptible to elite rhetoric in the case of Keystone XL, but this does not hold for offshore oil drilling. This implies that elites may target certain types of issues, as opposed to just certain types of voters, with specific messages in order to shift public opinion in their favor. Finally, this paper places the implications of our findings in light of the Obama Administration’s energy policy goals to understand the role the public is likely to play in the development of current and future energy options and what this means for environmental considerations, such as climate change.

1

1 Doctoral StudentDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of California, Santa Barbarahehodges@gmail.com

2 PhDUniversity of California, Santa Barbara

Introduction

Over the last forty years, U.S. energy consumption has outpaced domestic production,

creating an increasing demand for energy-related imports and a renewed focus on opening

previously unviable domestic reserves (U.S. Energy Information Administration, released

September 2012). Recent U.S. policy directives3 reflect this desired shift towards domestic

energy production, but have not come without protest and demonstrate the extend that the public

can be deeply divided over different options. A recent piece in National Geographic reflects this:

“It's happening in the unlikeliest of places, the oil states of Oklahoma and Texas, where environmentalists have joined hands with conservatives furious over how the imperative to build the Keystone XL has trumped the property rights of those in its path.‘I have a real strong objection to a private business coming in and rolling over property owners in Texas,’ said Debra Medina, a vocal critic of TransCanada who ran as a Tea Party candidate for governor of Texas in 2010. ‘If I walked into your driveway and took your car, it'd be theft. How come I can take your [land] and it not be theft?’” (Schulte March 8, 2013).

The case of Keystone XL,4 similar to other energy policies, sparks debate among elites and

publics, highlighting values concerning property, risk, and economics. The result is controversy.

The purpose of this research is to address the following puzzles: 1) In controversial cases, where

information may highlight an array of considerations, how do people arrive at their opinions? 2)

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3 For example, at the State of the Union, President Obama emphasized that his agenda includes developing additional U.S. oil and gas reserves (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address).

4 The Keystone XL expansion project is a proposal to extend the current Keystone Pipeline as well as bring additional tar sands oil from Alberta, Canada to refineries in Oklahoma and Texas. As the pipeline will cross the U.S./Canadian border, State Department approval is necessary.

How does this mechanism change depending on the issue? 3) What is the effect of elite rhetoric

on this process?

While a wide array of research points to potential predictors of public opinion,

explanations are often case dependent, lacking generalizability. Further, they tend to focus on the

ability of the public to utilize heuristics, negating those cases where this pathway is less reliable.

Additionally, one should consider this in light of the particular issue at hand. Levels of

controversy can vary, altering attention and information availability, creating a competitive

context that is likely to cue particular considerations based on underlying values (Chong and

Druckman 2007). This may be an especially important consideration in those cases where values

are in conflict with one another5 (Alvarez and Brehm 2002).

As demonstrated by Smith (2002, Chapter 4), the public knows even less about the

environment and energy policy than other public policy issues. Additionally, there is reason to

believe that the topic does not even lend itself to a well-informed electorate (Smith 2002). Based

on his survey of California public opinion and energy policy, Smith (2002) concludes that there

is no evidence for an “attentive” public, consistency is low, and most opinions “are based on

mental shortcuts and superficial judgments rather than on substantial knowledge and careful

reasoning” (p. 130). Therefore, while the public is likely to greatly rely on their underlying

beliefs and ideologies to formulate their opinions regarding energy, there is no guarantee this will

always be an effective mechanism based on the characteristics of the issue. This argument is

substantiated by the range of studies that have found competing reasons behind public opinion

related to energy policy.

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5 In those cases where values are not aligned, subjects are referred to as conflicted, having unstructured opinions.

Researchers have looked to concern of an energy crisis (Farhar, Unseld, and Vories

1980), personal perceived scarcity (Farhar, Unseld, and Vories 1980), beliefs over potential costs

and benefits of projects (Firestone and Kempton 2007; Ansolabehere and Konisky 2009),

demographics (such as age, income, education, gender) (Firestone and Kempton 2007), trust

(Smith and Marqu 2000), perceived environmental harm (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2009),

NIMBYism6 (Lesbirel 1998), NIABYism7 (Schaffer Boudet 2011), party identification (Jones

and Dunlap 1992), general and issue specific political knowledge (Smith 2002, Chapter 4), and

postmaterialism versus cultural theory (Carlisle and Smith 2005) to explain opposition to or

acceptance of various forms of energy supplies and policies. Each study presents an alternative

explanation for patterns in mass public opinion. Additionally, while a number of studies point to

individual reliance on heuristics such as party ideology and other values, they do not typically

address when and why they fail to work effectively, nor has there been an explanation for the

policy consequences of this. The intent of this research is to further contribute to this

conversation by looking at two otherwise similar energy policy issues.

During the Fall of 2012, a survey experiment was administered to nearly 1,000 residents

from nine midwest states. Two energy options were used in the survey experiment, based on

varying levels of controversy and different points in the agenda cycle. Half of the subjects were

asked about their feelings regarding the approval of the Keystone XL pipeline and the other half

were asked about offshore oil development. A treatment, pro-development rhetoric, was

imbedded in the survey. The results of the survey indicate that partisanship is a robust predictor

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6 “not-in-my-backyard”

7 The feeling that risk due to siting is not just the case of personal self-interest, but can be due to more universal interests; “not-in-anyone’s-backyard.”

of opinions regarding these two issues. Additionally, we find that individuals whose values do

not align internally are more susceptible to elite rhetoric in the case of Keystone XL, but not

offshore oil. This finding implies that certain issues are more disposed to the effects of

unstructured/conflicted opinions. Thus, elites may target certain types of issues, as opposed to

just certain types of voters, with specific messages in order to shift public opinion in their favor.

Theoretical Basis

For over half a century, researchers interested in public opinion have developed

explanations and models for how individuals arrive at their opinions. While some, such as

Downs (1957), have relied on rational choice/utility theory models to predict opinion, others

have pointed to the (ir)rationality of public opinion, arguing that due to limited time, motivation,

and biases, voters at best can be boundedly rational (see Simon 1985). In order to address

limitations on the part of the individual it is thought that the public often relies on cues or

heuristics, pathways that make the connection between the issue or policy option and values and

considerations salient and important to the individual. The following paragraphs will establish

the major drivers of public opinion relevant to this research. Despite the significant advances

present in the field, there is still much to understand as we work toward a generalizable theory of

public opinion regarding energy.

Drivers of Public Opinion

Building on his predecessors,8 Zaller (1992) contends that, in the information

environment, the public receives information which is “unavoidably selective and unavoidably

enmeshed in stereotypical frames of reference” (p. 13). They choose to accept or reject this

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8 Such as Converse (1964), Campbell et al. (1960), Downs (1957), Stimson (1975), Feldman (1988), and Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991).

information based on how it aligns with their ideology, basic beliefs, and values (Zaller 1992).

Thus, heuristics can help to illuminate important connections between underlying ideologies and

current issues (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). For example, party ideology is often cited

as a reliable heuristic for voters. U.S. government affairs are rarely discussed without reference

to well known elites, thus the “sheer accessibility of source cures provides citizens with a simple

means to form policy appraisals” (Mondak 1993, p. 188) as individuals can look to their party

leadership for guidance.9 Furthermore, when a clear division over a policy issue is present at the

elite level these cues are strengthened and the public will divide similarly (Zaller 1994, Chapter

9; Levendusky 2010). Nonetheless, in those cases where there is disagreement at the elite level

that does not split cleanly between parties, reliance on party ideology is less likely to be an

appropriate route to opinion formation (Darmofal 2005).

Hypothesis 1: Partisanship is a reliable predictor of public opinion, but will vary depending on

the extent to which elites provide clear cues to the public.

Risk Perception

The extraction of energy supplies are known to pose risk to life, property, and the

environment. The BP oil spill, pipeline break along the Kalamazoo, and natural gas explosion in

San Bruno, California are just a few examples. The cultural theory of risk perception provides an

understanding for why, in the case of objective measures of risk, individuals attach different

meanings to risk based. This theory has been expanded by the work of Daniel Kahan. His theory

of cultural cognition places individuals into four categories, Hierarchical Individualism,

Hierarchical Communitarianism, Egalitarian Individualism, and Egalitarian Communitarianism.

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9 Campbell et al. (1960) view the political party as the classic voting cue.

In general, individuals who ascribe to individualistic values tend to negate environmental threats,

prioritizing commerce and industry. On the other hand, egalitarian and communitarian values

have a greater tendancy to be suspicious of industry and are more concerned about risk. Risk

perception and cultural cognition have been confirmed in the case of nuclear energy (Wynne

1989, p. 125-128), environmental attitudes more generally (Carlisle and Smith 2005) and others

(see Hunter and Leyden 1995 and Kahan and Braman 2006). This relationship may be mediated

by political knowledge. Individuals with low levels of political knowledge are less capable of

connecting these values to specific opinions than those with high levels of political knowledge

(Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith 2009). Nonetheless, others argue that cultural cognition is a

stronger predictor of risk perceptions than other commonly used variables, such as demographic

characteristics and political orientations (Kahan and Braman 2006; Kahan et al. 2009). For

example, Ripberger et al. (2011) demonstrate that individuals, regardless of levels of political

sophistication, are able to make distinct connections to ideas of hierarchy, individualism,

egalitarianism, and communitarianism, but those with lower political knowledge are slightly less

consistent.

In cases where the multiple drivers of opinion, such as partisanship and cultural

cognition, are aligned, the mass public is likely to easily form coherent policy opinions.

However, in other cases multiple considerations may evoke conflict within the individual. As

discussed, certain issues highlight particular considerations, which may or may not clearly align

with underlying values. For example, in the debate over oil development in the Arctic National

Wildlife Refuge, concern over job creation and national security is stated firmly against concern

over environmental damage. At the elite- and public-levels the division is clear, most

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Republicans being in favor of development and most Democrats opposed. A similar divide is

present in the case of offshore oil development, especially since the BP Disaster heightened

environmental concern.10 One would expect that in such cases, partisanship is likely to align with

other values, such as cultural cognition.

On other issues, heuristics derived from elite cues may not clearly correspond underlying

values. For example, the approval process of the Keystone XL pipeline has been controversial,

emphasizing environmental concern, risks to agricultural operations along the route, risks to

private property through eminent domain, the creation of jobs, a decrease in gas prices, and

greater national security. Furthermore, elite cues have been mixed with Democrats both in favor

of and opposed to the pipeline. The Republican Governor of Nebraska, for example, originally

spoke in opposition to the route, facilitating the submission of a new route. In this case,

heuristics may be less reliable. The lack of a clear pathway to opinion formation is even more

likely to present itself for those individuals whose underlying values are in conflict with one

another.

Hypothesis 2: For issues where there is clear division at the elite level and information is clear

and available, individuals can rely on party ideology or cultural cognition or both to arrive at

their opinions.

Hypothesis 3: Conflict, as a result of inconsistent underlying values, influences opinions,

especially regarding controversial issues.

Framing and Elite Rhetoric

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10 For both of these issues refer to Gallup for polling numbers (http://www.gallup.com/poll/146615/Oil-Drilling-Gains-Favor-Americans.aspx).

The discussion thus far has described opinion formation without considering known

framing effects. The influence of framing has been demonstrated in a number of contexts (for

example see Druckman and Nelson 2003; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Chong and

Druckman 2007).11 Individuals will form different opinions depending on the frames used by the

media and elites. Moreover, as noted by Druckman et al. (2010), in most information

environments both cues and frames are present. Thus, a statement made by a party leader may

present a party cue to allow a voter to rely on their party ideology to form their opinion, at the

same time certain aspects of the issue are stressed by the local news pointing to additional

considerations that may be important to the voter. According to Sniderman and Theriault (2004)

and Brewer and Gross (2005), individuals are susceptible to and favor a frame that is consistent

with their values, even rejecting some values and pursuing those contributed by the frame (Lee,

McLeod, and Shah 2008). Thus, in those cases where information is clear and individuals are

able to align their opinions, attitudes, beliefs, and values, they will be less susceptible to framing

effects. However, when this is not the case, as has been argued for controversial issues, framing

will likely play an important role in making some considerations more salient for the individual

over others.

Hypothesis 5: Framing is more likely to have an effect in those cases where there is greater

controversy and in particular for those individuals who are conflicted.

Methodology

Case Selection

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11 For a review of earlier work see Entman 1993.

Two cases were chosen for this research; (1) approval of the Keystone XL pipeline and

(2) expansion of offshore oil drilling. These two cases are similar in a number of ways. Both are

current options for increasing domestic energy production, as noted in President Obama’s 2013

State of the Union Address. Additionally, further development of offshore oil, as well as the

Keystone XL pipeline present primarily localized costs, but local and diffuse benefits. This risk/

benefit profile is similar to other energy technologies, including nuclear power. A Gallup poll

taken March 8-11, 2012 finds that only 24% of Democrats favor increasing production of

traditional oil, gas, and coal supplies, but 59% of Republicans are in favor of this increase. Both

Keystone XL and offshore oil would be considered traditional sources. More specifically, 83% of

Republicans favor increasing offshore oil drilling with only 40% of Democrats in favor. In the

case of Keystone XL, 81% of Republicans believe the government should develop the pipeline,

with 44% of Democrats in agreement. However, when we look at the two cases closer there is

reason to suspect that public opinion formation may differ between them.

The U.S. public has a long history with offshore oil. Since 1954 offshore oil leases in the

Gulf of Mexico have risen steadily, with almost two billion acres leased over time.12 Events such

as the BP Disaster have increased elite and public attention to offshore oil. In response to the

disaster, politicians made strong statements regarding offshore oil, providing cues to members of

the public (Ostrander and Lowry 2012). Furthermore, the public has been polled about offshore

oil since 1990 (Bolson and Cook 2008). As a case, offshore oil theoretically possesses greater

salience due to its long history and triggering events that have increased information

dissemination and resulted in clear elite positions regarding the issue.

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12 See Freudenburg and Gramling (2010) for an indepth historical review of offshore oil in the Gulf of Mexico.

The approval of the Keystone XL expansion project differs from increasing offshore oil

production for one primary reason -- the controversial nature of the issue that has lead to unclear

messaging from elites and triggered competing values and considerations. In 2011, TransCanada

requested approval of the Keystone XL expansion project to the State Department. The

expansion consists of a pipeline running from Alberta down into Oklahoma and continuing on to

refineries in Texas. Industry and third party reports estimate that increased investment in tar

sands could generate $775 billion in GDP and support 600,000 American jobs by 2035. The

direct and immediate benefit is estimated at $20 billion to the American economy and $5 billion

in direct benefits to the states along the route (Parfomak et al. 2011).

Despite these economic benefits, the approval of the expansion project has been highly

contested. The nature of “DilBit” presents greater environmental concern than other crude oil

products (Stansbury 2011).13 Subsequently, individuals and elected officials along the proposed

route have expressed concern over potential contamination of the Ogallala Aquifer, which

supplies the majority of irrigation water to the grain belt.

Moreover, the approval process has been very politicized. While thirty nine members of

Congress have written letters in support of the project and Secretary Clinton came out in favor of

its approval, NASA’s top climate scientist stated that development of the tar sands would be

“essentially [a] game over” situation given climate realities (Hansen May 9, 2012), the Governor

of Nebraska is opposed to the route, and two prominent unions have also spoken out in

opposition to the project (Schulte August 31, 2011). Of particular importance is the fact that

President Obama has been unclear regarding his position: “My general attitude is, what is best

11

13 In July 2010 the Enbridge pipeline spilled 840,000 gallons of “DilBit” into Michigan’s Kalamazoo River, resulting in a number of medical incidents for the local communities due to heavy metal and chemical exposures (Parfomak et al. 2011).

for the American people? What’s best for our economy both short term and long term? But also,

what’s best for the health of the American people?” (KETV 2011). Currently, the expansion

project is going through additional reviews and environmental assessments and a new route has

been submitted for approval. In response to all of the above, on February 15th, for the first time

in 120 years, the executive director of the Sierra Club lifted its policy against engaging in civil

disobedience, resulting in the immediate arrest of fifty protestors staged outside of the White

House (as reported by Moyers and Company January 4th 2013).

Based on all of the above, Keystone XL can be considered a controversial case. The lack

of prior knowledge/experience, elite debate providing conflicting cues to the public, and the

various interests at stake, make it an interesting case in the ongoing energy debate.

Survey Experiment

A survey of 943 subjects equally distributed along the current and proposed Keystone

route (Illinois, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Kansas, Montana, Texas, and

Missouri) was administered. The survey was conducted online and respondents were drawn from

a panel coordinated by the University of California, Santa Barbara Survey Center in the Fall of

2012. The questionnaire was less than ten minutes in length. The design of the survey allowed us

to acquire information about the subjects cultural cognition, partisanship, political knowledge,

issues of greatest importance, personal finances, media habits, and typical demographics.

The primary dependent variable is support for the given energy policy. All subjects were

given factual information regarding either Keystone XL or offshore oil. Half of the subjects were

exposed to pro-development rhetoric that has been used by members of the Republican Party and

conservative news networks (in red font). The experimental design is shown in Table 1.

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Table 1: Experimental Design

Results

Pipeline Concept (25% of subjects)

The current Keystone Pipeline carries Canadian Tar Sands oil from Canada to Illinois and Oklahoma. The Keystone XL is a proposed expansion project that would connect the Keystone to refineries on Texas’ gulf coast.

Q: From what you know and have read, do you think the U.S. government should or should not approve the building of this pipeline? [definitely should not, probably should not, probably should, definitely should]

Offshore Oil Concept (25% of subjects)

The US has a long history of offshore oil drilling dating back to the late 1800’s and early 1900’s. In 2010 there was a new proposal to open 167 million acres of ocean waters along the Atlantic coastline, the eastern Gulf of Mexico and the north coast of Alaska to oil and natural gas drilling.

Q: From what you know and have read, do you think the U.S. government should continue to expand our offshore oil development? [definitely should not, probably should not, probably should, definitely should]

Pipeline Concept + Treatment (25% of subjects):

The current Keystone Pipeline carries Canadian Tar Sands oil from Canada to Illinois and Oklahoma. The Keystone XL is a proposed expansion project that would connect the Keystone to refineries on Texas’ gulf coast. Approval of this project is necessary to ensure national security, generate a long term domestic energy source, provide much needed jobs, and reduce the cost of gas.

Q: From what you know and have read, do you think the U.S. government should or should not approve the building of this pipeline? [definitely should not, probably should not, probably should, definitely should]

Offshore Oil Concept + Treatment (25% of subjects):

The US has a long history of offshore oil drilling dating back to the late 1800’s and early 1900’s. In 2010 there was a new proposal to open 167 million acres of ocean waters along the Atlantic coastline, the eastern Gulf of Mexico and the north coast of Alaska to oil and natural gas drilling. Approval of this project is necessary to ensure national security, generate a long term domestic energy source, provide much needed jobs, and reduce the cost of gas.

Q: From what you know and have read, do you think the U.S. government should continue to expand our offshore oil development? [definitely should not, probably should not, probably should, definitely should]

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Describing the Sample

Table 2 describes the sample. The average subject is female, white, 48 years old, is a high

school graduate or has received some college education, has an annual income between twenty

and sixty thousand dollars per year, and is fairly politically knowledgeable.14 Based on the

results of the cultural cognition battery (derived from Daniel Kahan and others), 44.6% of the

subjects are egalitarian, 52.2% are hierarchical, 15.9% are communitarian, and 71.8% are

individualists. Together this results in 9.2% of subjects who can be considered egalitarian/

communitarian and 40.6% who can be considered hierarchical/individualists. Most consider

themselves to be independents/moderate (43.4%) and 29.6% consider themselves to be

Republican, with 26.6% seeing themselves as closest to the Democratic Party. Most report that

they seek out news daily or a few times per week. The most widely reported sources for news are

local (33%), FOX (17.9%), CNN (11.7%), and MSNBC and ABC (10.4%).

Based on Gallup Polls “most important issue” question unemployment, health care, the

deficit, gas prices, and the size and power of federal government were most commonly cited.

Only 7.3% of subjects included the environment in their top three. However, when asked

whether protection of the environment should be given priority, even at the risk of curbing

economic growth, 43.6% agreed.

Conflict was operationalized as characteristic of those individuals whose partisanship is

not in alignment with their cultural cognition. Prior research argues that on average these should

align as they are both underlying values and individuals are motivated by cognitive dissonance15

to align their basic beliefs and ideologies. Because this sample was limited in the number of

14

14 Based on four questions taken from Deli Carpini and Keeter (1996).

15 See Festinger (1957).

identified communitarians conflict was derived from the egalitarian/hierarchical battery. Those

who are Republican, but egalitarian, or Democrat, but hierarchical meet the criteria for conflict

accounting for 10.9% of subjects.

Table 2: Description of Independent Variables

VariableVariable Number of Respondents Percentage

Demographics Female 572 60.7%Demographics

Male 362 38.4%

Demographics

African American 43 4.6%

Demographics

Asian Pacific 12 1.3%

Demographics

Latin American 13 1.4%

Demographics

Native American 16 1.7%

Demographics

White 830 88%

Demographics

Other 17 1.8%

Demographics

Age 17-111 (range) 48.2 (mean)

Demographics

Education Level high school graduate/some college

49%

Demographics

Income $20,000 - $60,000 per year

Partisanship Republican 279 29.6%Partisanship

Independent 409 43.4%

Partisanship

Democrat 251 26.6%

Cultural Cognition

Egalitarian 421 44.6%Cultural Cognition

Hierarchical 492 52.2%

Cultural Cognition

Communitarian 150 15.9%

Cultural Cognition

Individualist 677 71.8%

Cultural Cognition

Egalitarian/Communitarian

87 9.2%

Cultural Cognition

Mixed EI/HC 335 35.5%

Cultural Cognition

Hierarchical/Individualist

383 40.6%

Media Consumption

CNN 110 11.7%Media Consumption

FOX 169 17.9%

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VariableVariable Number of Respondents Percentage

Media Consumption

MSNBC 98 10.4%

Media Consumption

ABC 98 10.4%

Media Consumption

USA Today 12 1.3%

Media Consumption

Huffington Post 21 2.2%

Media Consumption

New York Times 7 0.7%

Media Consumption

Washington Post 2 0.2%

Media Consumption

Local 311 33%

Media Consumption

Other 114 12.1%

Media Consumption

Seeks Out News daily/a few times per week

Most Important Issue

Unemployment 525 55.7%Most Important Issue

Health Care 433 45.9%

Most Important Issue

The Deficit 363 38.5%

Most Important Issue

Gas Prices 285 30.2%

Most Important Issue

Size and Power of Federal Government

239 25.3%

Most Important Issue

National Security 113 12%

Most Important Issue

Energy 72 7.6%

Most Important Issue

Environment 69 7.3%

Most Important Issue

Other** 87.5%

Political Knowledge

Political Knowledge (index)

0-4 (range) 3.077 (mean)

Environment over Economy

Prioritize Environment over the Economy

411 43.6%

Conflict Party Ideology out of align with Cultural Cognition

103 10.9%

**The percentages for “most important issue” are out of 300% as each respondent could choose three issues.

Approval of Energy Policies

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In this study the main dependent variable of concern in support for a given policy. The

breakdown of support based on partisanship is shown in Table 3. An initial inspection shows

differences between the two issues as well as differences in those given the pro-energy

development statements. In general, most are in favor of Keystone XL and offshore oil

development. There are clear differences based on partisanship with greater support found in

Republicans (80.5% of Republicans and 58.7% of Democrats favor the pipeline and 84.8% of

Republicans and 57.9% of Democrats favor offshore oil). The summaries also suggest that the

pipeline treatment was more effective in the case of Keystone XL than offshore oil. When

exposed to pro-pipeline rhetoric 95.8% of Republicans and 72.4% of Democrats favor the policy,

but the increase was less in the case of offshore oil with 88.4% of Republicans and 52.8% of

Democrats being in support of the policy. Formal analysis is conducted to further develop these

initial developments.

Table 3: Approval Based on Party Ideology

Response Pipeline Control

Pro-pipeline rhetoric

Offshore Oil Control

Pro-offshore oil rhetoric

Republican Should Not 9.7% 0% 6.1% 4.3%

Should 80.5% 95.8% 84.8% 88.4%

No Opinion 9.7% 4.2% 9.1% 7.3%

Democrat Should Not 27% 20.7% 31.6% 29.2%

Should 58.7% 72.4% 57.9% 52.8%

No Opinion 14.3% 6.9% 10.5% 18.1%

Independent Should Not 14.3% 13% 18.2% 15.6%

Should 65.5% 69% 65.7% 70%

No Opinion 20.2% 18% 16.2% 14.4%

N 254 229 222 231

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Before proceeding to multivariate analysis, it is important to note that there were a

number of people who had “no opinion.” The breakdown of these no opinion individuals is

shown in Table 4. The 124 respondents who did not provide an opinion regarding approval of

energy development are slightly more Democrat, slightly more egalitarian, have lower political

knowledge, are more likely to be female, more likely to be African American, less likely to

watch Fox News, and more likely to prioritize the environment over the economy.

Table 4: Description of “no opinion” RespondentsApproval of Energy

DevelopmentConcern/Worry Over

DevelopmentOverall Survey

Party ID 4.4 4.4 3.9

IC (avg.) 4.4 4.3 4.4

EH (avg.) 3.2 3.3 3.5

Political Knowledge

2.8 2.5 3.1

Male 29% 20% 38%

White 79% 84% 88%

African American

7% 11% 5%

Fox News 13% 11% 18%

Local News 31% 46% 33%

Environment over Economy

59% 49% 44%

N 124 76 934

Analysis

The following models explore the relationship between the independent variables (party

ideology, cultural cognition, media consumption/behavior, political knowledge, conflict, most

important issue, concern for the environment, and demographics) and the dependent variable

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(approval of energy development). Due to the fact that the dependent variable is ordered and

categorical logistic regression was used to analyze the relationship.

The most basic model is presented in Table 5. Those closer to the Democratic Party are

more likely to be opposed to Keystone XL and offshore oil development. Those who

demonstrate conflict (where partisanship is not aligned with cultural cognition) are more likely to

oppose Keystone XL, but not offshore oil development. This finding indicates that in the case of

offshore oil, individuals are able to rely on their values, whether they be partisanship or others, to

reach their opinion, but for the issue of Keystone XL internal conflict between partisanship and

cultural cognition affects opinion choice. Exposure to pro-development rhetoric results in a

statistically significant increase in the likelihood of being in favor of Keystone XL, but the same

is not true in the case of offshore oil. The results of this model point to the significance of

conflict and framing for certain issues over others. This suggests that due to the context of the

Keystone XL issue the public is more responsive to elite messaging.

Table 5 Basic Model: Support for Policy ~ Party Ideology + Conflict + Pro-energy Frame

Keystone XLKeystone XL Offshore OilOffshore Oil

Independent Variable

Value t value Value t value

Partisanship -0.7315(0.1307)

-5.597 -1.1539(0.1415)

-8.1536

Conflict -0.715(0.2971)

-2.407 0.4088(0.3128)

1.3069

Pro-energy Frame 0.4976(0.1943)

2.561 0.1445(0.1972)

0.7327

* significance at +/- 1.96* * standard errors reported in parenthesis

The following model is similar to the basic model, but includes a number of additional

control variables of potential interest. Results for the key variables of interest do not change.

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Additionally, Native Americans and whites are more likely to be opposed to the pipeline than

African Americans. Those who prioritize the environment over the economy are more likely to

be opposed to the pipeline and those who specify the environment as one of the most important

issues are more likely to be opposed to the pipeline.

In the case of offshore oil, those who are closer to the Democratic Party are more likely

to be opposed to development. Texans and Oklahomans are more likely to be in favor than

subjects from Illinois. Those who prioritize the environment over the economy or specify the

environment as one of the most important issues are more likely to be opposed to offshore oil

development. Fox News viewers are more likely to be in favor than those who watch CNN.

Unlike the case of Keystone XL, conflict is not predictive of opinions nor is the exposure to a

pro-energy frame.

The differences between the two groups are surprising and helps to support the

hypotheses. The issue of offshore oil development, with the provision of greater information and

elite cues, allows individuals to utilize traditional pathways to form their opinions. As such, they

are less manipulated by additional information framed to trigger values regarding national

security, energy costs, and jobs. Additionally, whether their cultural cognition is out of line with

party ideology or not, they are still able to use one or the other to reach their opinion. As this was

not the case for those asked about Keystone XL, this implies that the public may be grasping for

cues to make the issue more salient. As such the conflict between partisanship and cultural

cognition influences their decision making as does elite pro-pipeline rhetoric.

Table 6 Model 1: Support for Policy ~ Party Ideology + Conflict + Pro-energy Frame + ControlsKeystone XLKeystone XL Offshore OilOffshore Oil

20

Independent Variable

Coefficient t value Coefficient t value

Partisanship -0.603838(1.653E-01)

-3.652 -0.84494(0.16656)

-5.0728

Conflict -0.682916(3.468E-01)

-1.969 0.22665(0.36558)

0.6200

Pro-energy Frame 0.467418(2.192E-01)

2.133 0.12014(0.22778)

0.5274

Native American -2.740144(8.759E-01)

-3.129 -0.33097(1.41107)

-0.2346

White -1.314128(6.027E-01)

-2.181 -0.27040(0.59697)

-0.4530

Env. vs. Jobs -0.923839(2.394E-01)

-3.859 -1.27406(0.25171)

-5.0616

MOI* (env) -0.98865(3.953e-01)

-2.501 -1.47985(0.51235)

-2.8884

Fox 0.809421(4.474E-01)

1.809 1.11218(0.47210)

2.3558

*abbreviated (most important issue)**standard errors reported in parentheses^many of the non significant variables used in this model are not shown here to ease interpretation (refer to appendix for other coefficient values)

To summarize, partisanship predicts opinions regarding Keystone XL and offshore oil.

Internal conflict and exposure to elite rhetoric affect opinion formation in the case of Keystone

XL, but not for offshore oil drilling. This points to the importance of considering characteristics

of the issue when evaluating public opinion.

Discussion

The results of the analyses help to shed light on public opinion formation. In both cases,

Keystone XL and offshore oil development, party is a robust predictor of opinions. In general,

Republicans tend to be more in favor of development and Democrats tend to be more opposed.

These findings comport with the typical party stances and with the theoretical expectations from

literature on opinion formation.

21

However, the findings of greatest interest come when we look outside party.

An elite pro-development frame results in increased approval for Keystone XL, but not for

offshore oil development. This paper argues that opinions regarding offshore oil are more

structured and consistent and therefore more resistant to framing compared to opinions regarding

Keystone XL. Elites have failed to provide consistent cues to the public regarding the pipeline,

so individuals may be influenced by messages they encounter. They are likely thinking more

“off the tops of their heads.” This suggests that in the case of Keystone XL, elite rhetoric and

messaging may play an especially important role in shifting public opinion.

Conflict is present in individuals from both cases, however, unstructured values are only

predictive of opinions in the case of Keystone XL. As these two cases were chosen for their

overall similarity, but important difference due to controversy, we argue that due to the salience

of offshore oil, individuals can effectively arrive at their opinions, regardless of whether or not

their partisanship and cultural cognitions are aligned. When reliable cues are present, heuristics

like party or cognition are useful. In the case of Keystone XL, conflict is associated with less

support for the pipeline, even when controlling for partisanship. Thus, for this issue, particular

types of individuals may be targets of elites hoping to steer policy one direction or the other.

Conclusion

This research views values as paramount to public opinion formation. Specifically, it

argues that individuals will rely on underlying values, such as cultural cognition and/or

partisanship; however, their ability to do so may be dependent on the issue at hand. Where

controversy is present at the elite level, individuals may be less able to arrive at opinions

consistent with their underlying beliefs. This is especially true for those individuals who are

22

internally conflicted. Thus, when an issue is clearly presented and divides along predictable

ideology lines (such as party), individuals should be able to make connections between values

and policy positions, but their ability to do so is reduced when elites fail to provide clear

information and messages.

This research is also concerned with the influence of framing on mass public opinion. As

this survey did not include counter frames, we cannot speak to how differences in information

presented affect the influence of the frame. Nonetheless, there are clear differences found across

these two issues. While national security, jobs, and gas prices have all been used by elites and

media outlets to promote domestic energy production, the frame was only effective in the case of

Keystone XL. For the purposes of this research, elite rhetoric only mattered to the extent that the

context of the issue allowed it.

This finding should be of particular concern given current proposals to increase domestic

energy production as specified by the Obama Administration. In a world of alternative options,

strategies deployed on behalf of elites and interest groups have serious implications for policy

outcomes. The utility of frames and agenda setting is nothing new, yet little work has specified

precisely how issue salience and controversy are likely to determine frame effectiveness. The

evidence found here is also important in the context of climate change. Variations in frames

regarding the uncertainty of climate change science produce alternative opinions (Morton,

Rabinovich, Marshall, & Bretschneider, 2011). Furthermore, Aklin and Urpelainen (2013) show

that pro-clean energy frames are undermined by anti-clean energy frames (Aklin & Urpelainen

2013). Taken together, the public’s response to new, less salient energy proposals will also say

something about their perceptions of climate change and towards mitigation measures.

23

Subsequently, future research is important for teasing out this relationship, especially for those

interested in understanding the direction domestic policy is likely to go in the near future.

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Appendix

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Table 6 Model 1 for pipeline16

Variable Coefficient Standard Error t valueParty ID -0.603838 1.653e-01 -3.652e+00Conflict -0.682916 3.468e-01 -1.969e+00Frame 0.467418 2.192e-01 2.133e+00gender (male) -0.097432 2.266e-01 -4.299e-01racea (sianPac)-3.245648 1.753e+00 -1.851e+00race (laAmer) -0.237377 1.199e+00 -1.979e-01race (naAmer) -2.740144 8.759e-01 -3.129e+00race (other) 13.438297 1.053e-06 1.277e+07race (white) -1.314128 6.027e-01 -2.181e+00polKnow_Index -0.015159 1.131e-01 -1.340e-01state_KS -0.234439 4.209e-01 -5.570e-01state_MO 0.163209 4.805e-01 3.397e-01state_MT 0.790141 4.828e-01 1.637e+00state_NB 0.008093 4.480e-01 1.806e-02state_ND 0.404669 4.801e-01 8.428e-01state_OK 0.489647 4.559e-01 1.074e+00state_SD -0.203366 4.621e-01 -4.400e-01state_TX 0.862585 4.778e-01 1.805e+00income 0.059437 7.632e-02 7.788e-01education -0.250041 1.655e-01 -1.511e+00env. vs. jobs -0.923839 2.394e-01 -3.859e+00MOI (env) -0.988650 3.953e-01 -2.501e+00Fox 0.809421 4.474e-01 1.809e+00MSNBC -0.554690 4.588e-01 -1.209e+00ABC news 0.728867 4.740e-01 1.538e+00USA Today -0.230012 8.922e-01 -2.578e-01Huffington Post -0.097259 7.187e-01 -1.353e-01NY Times 0.954087 1.181e+00 8.081e-01Washington Post 0.481392 3.934e-01 1.224e+00Local 0.036496 4.831e-01 7.554e-02education -0.136372 8.868e-02 -1.538e+00news freq 0.089754 1.523e-01 5.892e-01MOI (unemployment) 0.292036 2.224e-01 1.313e+00MOI (affordable energy) 0.439838 4.005e-01 1.098e+00MOI (gas) -0.113334 2.505e-01 -4.524e-01MOI (national security) -0.426090 3.332e-01 -1.279e+00

Table 6 Model 1 cont. for offshore oil

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16 Age was included in other models but dropped due to the inconsistency of its results

Coefficient Std. Error t valueParty ID -0.84494 0.16656 -5.0728Conclict 0.22665 0.36558 0.6200Frame 0.12014 0.22778 0.5274gender (male) 0.36908 0.24490 1.5070race (asianPac) -1.78102 0.92580 -1.9238race (laAmer) -1.17822 1.22506 -0.9618race (naAmer) -0.33097 1.41107 -0.2346race (other) 0.42352 1.00725 0.4205race (white) -0.27040 0.59697 -0.4530political knowledge 0.05347 0.13082 0.4088state_KS 0.58158 0.47375 1.2276state_MO 0.83661 0.46391 1.8034state_MT -0.12887 0.46369 -0.2779state_NB 0.36538 0.49414 0.7394state_ND 0.78144 0.46869 1.6673state_OK 0.97258 0.48346 2.0117state_SD 0.70647 0.46200 1.5292state_TX 1.07078 0.47826 2.2389income 0.11854 0.08206 1.4445education -0.12636 0.16207 -0.7797env. vs. jobs -1.27406 0.25171 -5.0616MOI (env) -1.47985 0.51235 -2.8884Fox 1.11218 0.47210 2.3558MSNBC 0.12846 0.47272 0.2718ABC News 0.18132 0.51269 0.3537USA Today 1.90450 0.99650 1.9112Huffington Post 0.41483 0.88200 0.4703NY Times 2.05077 1.09923 1.8656Washington Post 0.30930 1.36028 0.2274Local 0.22268 0.39249 0.5674Other 0.21871 0.50394 0.4340New Freq. 0.09822 0.10150 0.9676Finances 0.23633 0.16294 1.4504MOI (unemp) -0.22104 0.24754 -0.8929MOI (avail energy) -0.46332 0.38150 -1.2145MOI (gas) 0.44944 0.25612 1.7548MOI (nat. sec.) 0.63801 0.41061 1.5538

Table 7 Model 1 Coefficient Std. Error t valueParty ID -0.71550 0.11294 -6.3351issue 0.28946 0.15032 1.9256

29

Fram 0.28858 0.14897 1.9371gender (male ) 0.02713 0.15748 0.1723racea (sianPac) -2.35634 0.72905 -3.2321race (laAmer) -0.32012 0.82810 -0.3866race (naAmer) -1.88703 0.66593 -2.8337race (other) 0.09193 0.80343 0.1144race (white) -0.86785 0.39016 -2.2243political knowledge -0.01317 0.08078 -0.1631state_KS 0.14392 0.29575 0.4866state_MO 0.65331 0.31257 2.0902state_MT 0.34751 0.31936 1.0881state_NB 0.18081 0.31201 0.5795state_ND 0.60603 0.31705 1.9115state_OK 0.69591 0.30999 2.2450state_SD 0.21279 0.30932 0.6879state_TX 0.96678 0.31913 3.0294income 0.09441 0.05321 1.7744education -0.21567 0.10909 -1.9770env. vs. jobs -0.98510 0.16249 -6.0626MOI (env) -1.08135 0.29713 -3.6394Fox 0.97655 0.30785 3.1722MSNBC -0.33986 0.31328 -1.0848ABC news 0.44595 0.33043 1.3496USA Today 0.55432 0.61875 0.8959Huffington Post -0.02350 0.52219 -0.0450NY Times 1.47235 0.77090 1.9099Washington Post -0.20453 1.25862 -0.1625Local 0.40015 0.26598 1.5045Other 0.10997 0.32863 0.3346News Freq -0.01905 0.06437 -0.2960Finances 0.13694 0.10443 1.3112MOI (unemp) 0.04865 0.15378 0.3164MOI (ava energy) 0.05112 0.26289 0.1945MOI (gas) 0.15160 0.16904 0.8968MOI (nat sec) 0.13011 0.23641 0.5503

Table 7 Model 2 Coefficient Std. Error t valueConflict -0.24437 0.233262 -1.04760issue 0.32479 0.150417 2.15929frame 0.27824 0.149252 1.86426gender (male) 0.07096 0.157334 0.45101racea (sianPac) -1.91360 0.723101 -2.64638

30

race (laAmer) -0.03124 0.833126 -0.03750race (naAmer) -1.53479 0.664806 -2.30863race (other) 0.89164 0.814735 1.09439race (white) -0.38747 0.390971 -0.99104political knowledge 0.02545 0.082275 0.30939state_KS 0.28808 0.295366 0.97532state_MO 0.68523 0.314905 2.17600state_MT 0.44909 0.319129 1.40724state_NB 0.25701 0.310821 0.82687state_ND 0.76870 0.314401 2.44498state_OK 0.73978 0.311752 2.37298state_SD 0.25860 0.311862 0.82922state_TX 1.04971 0.319694 3.28349income 0.10915 0.053178 2.05247education -0.18258 0.108646 -1.68053env. vs. jobs -1.12814 0.162473 -6.94354MOI (env) -1.15694 0.297402 -3.89015Fox 1.49299 0.299714 4.98137MSNBC -0.13501 0.314543 -0.42924ABC News 0.75129 0.332984 2.25625USA Today 0.54546 0.614756 0.88728Huffington Post 0.09447 0.517585 0.18252NY Times 1.12659 0.756213 1.48978Washington Post -0.03812 1.258460 -0.03029Local 0.56847 0.265982 2.13724Other 0.37572 0.331180 1.13448News Freq. 0.01083 0.063585 0.17030finances 0.12570 0.104486 1.20299MOI (unemp) 0.05741 0.153910 0.37298MOI (available energy) -0.05413 0.260430 -0.20784MOI (gas) 0.16671 0.169842 0.98155MOI (nat sec) 0.26733 0.242591 1.10197

31

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