Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? What may we ... · become more difﬁcult for philosophy to make its voice heard. In the hectic pace of daily life, philosophy’s long-term

Was dürfen wir glauben?Was sollen wir tun?

What may we believe?What ought we to do?

Konstanz 17.–20. 9. 2012

veranstaltet von derGesellschaft für AnalytischePhilosophie e. V.und dem Fachbereich Philosophie derUniversität Konstanz

Organisationsteam der Universität KonstanzLeitung: Prof. Dr. Wolfgang SpohnWolfgang EgnerGabriele HahnRuth KatzmarekFlorian PresslaberSandra Vatter

Herstellungmentis Verlag GmbHEisenbahnstr. 1148143 Münsterwww.mentis.deAuflage: 600

Fotofotolia.de (VRD)

Webseite / websitewww.gap8.de

E-Mail / [email protected]

Adresse/AddressGAP.8Fachbereich PhilosophieUniversität KonstanzFach D 2178457 Konstanz

GreetingProf. Dr. Schavan Prof. Dr. Töchterle Dr. Dell’Ambrogio

Dear Participants,

The notion of a tri-national endorsement of the Eighth Inter-national Congress of the Society of Analytic Philosophy (GAP)is an excellent idea that we are happy to facilitate, especi-ally given the fact that, first, although the home of GAP isGermany, it also has Swiss and Austrian contingents, and,second, that this congress is being organized in Konstanz atthe similarly tri-national Lake Constance.

Philosophy has shaped Western culture in important ways,and it will (and should continue to) do so in the future. We arewell aware that this has become more and more demanding.The cultural and scientific foundations of our societies havebecome more complex, and under these conditions it has alsobecome more difficult for philosophy to make its voice heard.In the hectic pace of daily life, philosophy’s long-term impactis in increasing danger of going unnoticed.

At the same time, we see that there is a real need for phi-losophical counsel and guidance. We are aware that this can

only come about through the support of academic culture atlarge. After all, complex external effects require an even morecomplex internal machinery. Indeed, society as well as otherscientific fields are particularly curious to learn about this phi-losophical culture that lurks in the background. Please shareit with us and inspire yourself to continue searching for newways to connect up with society and with the other academicdisciplines! The voice of reason, of doubt, and of balance willbe needed forever and everywhere.

Does philosophy lend itself to »alpine« imagery? In anycase, the main questions of the congress »What may webelieve? What ought we to do?« are themselves mountainsto be conquered. We wish you great success in your endea-vors here! And be sure to make known what you see from thepeaks!

Prof. Dr. Annette Schavan

Bundesministerin für Bildung undForschung, Deutschland

Prof. Dr. Karlheinz Töchterle

Bundesminister für Wissenschaft undForschung, Österreich

Dr. Mauro Dell’Ambrogio

Staatssekretär für Bildung und Forschung,Schweiz

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GeleitwortProf. Dr. Schavan Prof. Dr. Töchterle Dr. Dell’Ambrogio

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

dem 8. Internationalen Kongress, den die in Deutschlandbeheimatete Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie mit ihrerschweizerischen und österreichischen Sektion am trinatio-nalen Bodensee in Konstanz veranstaltet, eine trinationaleSchirmherrschaft zu geben, ist eine ausgezeichnete Idee, diewir gerne ermöglichen.

Die Philosophie hat die abendländische Kultur maßgeblichmitgeprägt. Sie soll und wird das auch in Zukunft tun. Dassdies anspruchsvoller geworden ist, dessen sind wir uns durch-aus bewusst. Die kulturellen und wissenschaftlichen Grund-lagen unserer Gesellschaften sind vielschichtiger geworden.Unter diesen Voraussetzungen ist es auch für die Philosophiekomplexer geworden, ihrer Stimme Gehör zu verschaffen. Wir-kungen, die auf Dauer angelegt sind, laufen mehr und mehrGefahr, in der Hektik des Alltags wenig wahrgenommen zuwerden.

Gleichwohl sehen wir, dass das Bedürfnis nach kritischerBegleitung und Beratung durch die Philosophie gewachsen ist.

Uns ist bewusst, dass solche Gedanken und Hinweise Ergebniseiner viel größeren, dahinter stehenden akademischen Kultursind. Schließlich bedarf eine komplexe Außenwirkung immereines noch komplexeren inneren Räderwerks. Gerade auf diesedahinter stehende Kultur sind die Gesellschaft und die anderenWissenschaften neugierig. Lassen Sie uns daran teilhaben undlassen Sie sich dafür begeistern, immer wieder neue Wege indie Gesellschaft und in die anderen Wissenschaften zu suchen!Die Stimme der Vernunft, der Abwägung und des Zweifelswird immer und überall gebraucht.

Neigt die Philosophie zu alpiner Metaphorik? Die Titelfragendes Kongresses »Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun?«sind jedenfalls auf einen Gipfelsturm hin angelegt. Dabei wün-schen wir Ihrem Kongress einen großen Erfolg! Und machenSie öffentlich, was Sie dort oben gesehen haben!

Prof. Dr. Annette Schavan

Bundesministerin für Bildung undForschung, Deutschland

Prof. Dr. Karlheinz Töchterle

Bundesminister für Wissenschaft undForschung, Österreich

Dr. Mauro Dell’Ambrogio

Staatssekretär für Bildung und Forschung,Schweiz

3

GreetingMayor Boldt

Dear Participants,

We live in an age of information overload. Every day, via nume-rous channels, we are showered with information. Contradic-tory statements are not uncommon. Dearly held convictionsbecome debated issues in no time. While talk show expertsargue about the big issues of our time, we can often remainpuzzled, wondering: »What may we believe?«

Our knowledge is the basis of each small and big decisionwe make. Should we buy margarine or butter? Should wechoose to study economics or philosophy? Our world is richin possibilities, but »what ought we to do?«

Clearly, the eponymous questions of the Eighth Congress ofthe Society for Analytic Philosophy are intimately intertwined.In the following days, they will receive particular scientificattention. Both questions, however, are also central motifsof our daily lives. They are paradigms of the engagement ofknowledge and guidelines to action not only in science, butin society as well.

In the university city of Constance, there is a lively dialoguebetween science and society. The Citizens’ University programwith its many events for interested members of society is anexceptional example of the fruitful exchange between scienceand the community. It is safe to say that the exceptionalatmosphere on the shores of Lake Constance will contributeto the success of GAP.8.

I wish you all a pleasant and eventful time in the city ofConstance and many profound thoughts.

Claus BoldtMayor

4

GeleitwortBürgermeister Boldt

Sehr geehrte Konferenzteilnehmerinnen und Konferenzteilnehmer,

wir leben in einer Zeit des Informationsüberflusses. Täglichprasseln Informationen über viele verschiedene Kanäle aufuns ein. Nicht selten kommt es zu Widersprüchen. Was ges-tern noch als sicheres Wissen galt, wird heute plötzlich infragegestellt. Und während in den Talkshows die Experten übergroße Themen streiten, sind wir oft ratlos: »Was dürfen wirglauben?«

Unser Wissen ist die Grundlage für unsere kleinen undgroßen Entscheidungen. Kaufen wir Margarine oder Butter?Wollen wir lieber Betriebswirtschaftslehre oder Philosophiestudieren? Unsere Welt ist voller Möglichkeiten, aber »wassollen wir tun?«

Man sieht: Die zwei titelgebenden Fragen des achten Kon-gresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie sind engmiteinander verbunden. An den Kongresstagen erfahren siebesondere wissenschaftliche Aufmerksamkeit. Aber die bei-den Fragen sind auch zentrale Themen unseres alltäglichenLebens. Sie stehen für eine konkrete Auseinandersetzung mitder Rolle von Wissen und Handlungsgrundsätzen nicht nur inder Wissenschaft, sondern auch in der Gesellschaft.

In der Universitätsstadt Konstanz wird der Dialog zwischenWissenschaft und Gesellschaft in hohem Maße gelebt. Die Bür-geruniversität und viele Veranstaltungen für unsere Bürgerin-nen und Bürger sind Beispiele für den fruchtbaren Austauschzwischen Wissenschaft und Lebenswelt. Ich bin mir sicher,dass die besondere Atmosphäre hier in der Vierländerregion,am Ufer des Bodensees, zum Gelingen der Tagung beitragenwird.

Ich wünsche Ihnen einen angenehmen und erlebnisreichenAufenthalt in Konstanz und gute Gedanken.

Claus BoldtBürgermeister

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GreetingProf. Dr. Dr. h.c. Rüdiger

Dear Participants,

As Rector of the University of Konstanz – which with its 11 000students represents the smallest and perhaps the finest ofthe six universities to have been successful in both rounds ofthe so-called »German Universities Excellence Initiative« – Iwould like to heartily welcome all of you as participants ofthe 8th International Congress of the Gesellschaft für Analy-tische Philosophie (GAP). I am delighted that our universityhas the privilege of hosting the largest philosophical event inGermany in 2012.

The University of Konstanz is doubly suited for this con-gress. First, given our particular geographic location, the uni-versity suitably embodies the fact that the German-languagephilosophical community also has a very important Swiss andAustrian contingent. Second, our philosophy department (aspart of the so-called »Erlangen-Konstanz School«) was one ofthe pioneers of analytic philosophy in Germany, and it hasremained, I am told, a prime example of analytic philosophydepartments in Germany.

Both as rector of the university and as a physicist by trai-ning, I am particularly interested in the position of philosophywithin the spectrum of the scientific disciplines. The Konstanzmodel has always been centered around the idea that eachof the three chairs in philosophy both methodologically andsubstantially maps onto the three faculties of the university,namely the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the huma-nities. This model seems fitting and indeed recommendablefor other universities, though its realization is becoming evermore difficult. This difficulty stems from both sides of therelationship: the individual disciplines are becoming more and

more specialized and thus tend to marginalize their contactto philosophy, and philosophy itself seems to be becomingmore and more self-contained.

These tendencies can only be counter-acted to a certainextent. When literature scholars and chemists fail to under-stand each other, this seems due to the nature of the disci-plines in question. However, if philosophy is no longer ableto understand other academic fields and vice versa, then animportant connection – perhaps the only remaining one –which may serve (at least indirectly) to bring the disciplinestogether, threatens to be lost.

I realize that you will be discussing many different topics ata congress of this size. However, if I may, I would request thatyou do everything you can, even here, to aim at strengtheningthe connection between philosophy and other disciplines.

Apart from this, I hope that you will enjoy your time at theUniversity of Konstanz (which shouldn’t be too difficult) andthat the congress will be full of exciting ideas and discussi-ons. We would love to welcome you to Konstanz again in thefuture.

Sincerely,

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Ulrich RüdigerRector, University of Konstanz

6

GeleitwortProf. Dr. Dr. h.c. Rüdiger


als Hausherr der Universität Konstanz, der mit 11 000 Studie-renden kleinsten, möglicherweise aber auch feinsten unterden sechs deutschen Universitäten, die in beiden Phasen derso genannten Exzellenzinitiative erfolgreich waren, begrüßeich Sie alle sehr herzlich als Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmerdes Achten Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft fürAnalytische Philosophie. Ich freue mich außerordentlich, dassunsere Universität damit das größte philosophische Ereignisin Deutschland in diesem Jahr beherbergen darf.

Die Universität Konstanz erscheint mir doppelt geeignetfür Ihren Kongress. Zum einen verkörpert sie besser als jedeandere Universität den Umstand, dass Sie eine deutsche Gesell-schaft mit einer schweizerischen und einer österreichischenSektion bilden – allein schon durch unsere geographischeLage. Und zum anderen gehört unser Fachbereich Philosophiezu den wenigen frühen Vorreitern der Analytischen Philoso-phie in Deutschland, unter den spezifischen Vorzeichen der sogenannten Erlanger-Konstanzer Schule, und er ist, so habe ichmir sagen lassen, bis heute ein Aushängeschild der Analyti-schen Philosophie geblieben.

Mich als Rektor der Universität, aber auch als Physiker inter-essiert insbesondere die Stellung der Philosophie im Spek-trum der Wissenschaften. Das Konstanzer Modell war und ist,dass jeder der drei Philosophie-Lehrstühle methodologisch wieinhaltlich in eine unserer drei Sektionen ausstrahlen sollten –in die Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Sektion, in dieGeisteswissenschaftliche Sektion und in die Sektion Politik –Recht – Wirtschaft. Das scheint mir ein stimmiges und auchfür andere Universitäten empfehlenswertes Modell zu sein,gleichzeitig jedoch immer schwerer umzusetzen. Dies liegtwohl an beiden Seiten: während sich die Einzelwissenschaften

immer weiter spezialisiert und die Kontakte mit der Philoso-phie häufig auf ihre Randgebiete verlegt haben, scheint sichdie Philosophie auf der anderen Seite ebenfalls wieder stärkerauf ihre Eigenheit zu besinnen.

Solchen Tendenzen kann man nur in Grenzen entgegenwir-ken: wenn die Anglistik die Chemie nicht versteht und umge-kehrt, so liegt dies gewissermaßen in der Natur der Sache. Aberwenn die Philosophie die Einzelwissenschaften nicht mehr ver-steht und umgekehrt, dann droht ein – vielleicht der einzige –Konnex verloren zu gehen, der alle Wissenschaften indirektnoch miteinander verbindet.

Ich weiß, Sie haben viele Themen auf Ihrem großen Kon-gress zu behandeln. Aber wenn ich einen Wunsch an Sie richtendarf, dann den, dass Sie von Ihrer Seite aus alles tun – auchauf Ihrem Kongress –, diesen Konnex wieder zu stärken.

Ansonsten wünsche ich Ihnen, dass Sie sich an der Univer-sität Konstanz wohl fühlen – das dürfte eigentlich nicht allzuschwer fallen –, und dass Sie einen reichen Kongress vollerinteressanter Ideen und Diskussionen erleben werden.

Und ich würde mich sehr freuen, Sie in der einen oder ande-ren Form wieder hier in Konstanz willkommen heißen zu dür-fen!

Ihr

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Ulrich RüdigerRektor der Universität Konstanz

7

GreetingProf. Dr. Spitzley Prof. Dr. Spohn

Dear Participants,

What may we believe? What ought we to do? These two ques-tions, which are basically a subtle contemporary version ofthe questions that concerned Kant, remain central systematicquestions of theoretical and practical philosophy. They thusset the parameters of the diverse activities of the Eighth Inter-national Congress of the Society of Analytic Philosophy (GAP),to which we cordially welcome all participants at the hospita-ble University of Konstanz on beautiful Lake Constance!

In particular, we are happy to welcome Pof. Dr. RüdigerBittner, the winner of this year’s Frege Prize, Ms. Margret Steg-müller, donor of the Wolfgang-Stegmüller-Prize, and Dr. RafaelHüntelmann, donor of the Ontos-Prize, as well as the winnersof those prizes. The large and densely-packed program calledfor a threefold patronage. We are thus most grateful to theheads of research and education policy of Germany, Switzer-land, and Austria for lending us their support. Furthermore,we are deeply indebted to all those who worked so hard to pre-pare this congress: the program committee, the referees, thecongress organizer, our various assistants, the administrationof the University of Konstanz, and many, many more.

Analytic Philosophy within the German-speaking world isflourishing, as witnessed by the huge number of proposals forcolloquia and the record-breaking number of submissions fortalks and posters that we received this year. We regret thatthe program committee and the referees had to turn downso many qualified proposals, yet there is still a large num-ber of parallel sessions. Even the number of associated self-organized workshops is greater than ever. This year, we aretrying something new by offering poster sessions, which arestill rather unusual in philosophy. If this experiment works, itwill certainly remain part of future GAP congresses.

In any case, this clear boom in analytic philosophy in Ger-many is no reason for complacency. We must always be awarethat our prosperity is merely borrowed from state and society.Nevertheless, we need not always express our gratitude byproving our relevance to state and society; the mind is at itsmost creative when it, freely, is not eyeing such things. Still,the least that may be expected from us is that we do notmerely administrate our questions, but also productively andqualitatively advance them at the highest levels. And in thisrespect we can definitely improve.

But, of course, we may as well show our gratitude bydemonstrating our work’s relevance. Yet this is difficult; itis no longer conceded readily to us. All the more reason tocontinue striving for it! Let us thus pursue the guiding questi-ons of this conference with fervor!

We wish you all the best for an inspiring and fruitful GAP.8Congress,

Prof. Dr. Thomas SpitzleyPresident of the GAP

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang SpohnVice-President and Local Organizer

8

GeleitwortProf. Dr. Spitzley Prof. Dr. Spohn


Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Diese zwei Kantsubtil aktualisierenden Fragen bleiben zentrale systematischeGrundfragen der theoretischen und der praktischen Philoso-phie und bilden so die Leitlinien für die vielfältigen Aktivi-täten des 8. Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft fürAnalytische Philosophie, zu dem wir alle Teilnehmerinnen undTeilnehmer in der gastfreundlichen Universität Konstanz amBodensee herzlich begrüßen!

Besonders begrüßen wir unseren diesjährigen Frege-Preis-träger, Herrn Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Bittner. Sehr herzlich begrüßenwir auch die Träger des Wolfgang-Stegmüller-Preises und desOntos-Preises und ihre Stifter, Frau Margret Stegmüller undHerrn Dr. Rafael Hüntelmann. Das große und dichte Programmbedurfte einer dreifachen Schirmherrschaft. Dass sich die Spit-zen der Wissenschaftspolitik aus Deutschland, Österreich undder Schweiz dazu zusammengefunden haben, dafür sind wirsehr dankbar. Überhaupt sind wir allen, die zur Vorbereitungdieses Kongresses beigetragen haben – dem Programmkomi-tee, den Gutachter(inne)n, der Kongressorganistorin, den Hilfs-kräften, der Verwaltung der Universität Konstanz und vielen,vielen mehr –, zu tiefem Dank verpflichtet.

Die Analytische Philosophie im deutschen Sprachraumblüht und gedeiht! Davon legt das Übermaß an Kolloquiums-vorschlägen und die Rekordzahl an Einreichungen für Vorträgeund Poster beredtes Zeugnis ab. Gutachter(innen) und Pro-grammkomitee haben eine scharfe Auswahl treffen müssen,dennoch gibt es nach wie vor eine große Zahl von Parallel-sitzungen. Auch von den eigenverantwortlich organisiertenangelagerten Workshops gibt es mehr denn je. Eine Neue-rung haben wir mit der Einführung der in der Philosophienoch wenig üblichen Poster-Sessions gewagt. Wenn dieses

Experiment positiv aufgenommen wird, werden sie sicherlichBestandteil künftiger GAP-Kongresse bleiben.

Das offensichtliche Gedeihen ist freilich gar kein Grund zurSelbstzufriedenheit. Es muss uns immer bewusst sein, dassdiese Blüte von Staat und Gesellschaft geliehen ist. Dafür müs-sen wir uns nicht immer mit Relevanz bedanken; der Geistist dann am kreativsten, wenn er, frei, danach nicht schielt.Aber dass wir unsere Fragen nicht verwalten, sondern produk-tiv und mit hoher Qualität voranbringen, darf man von unserwarten. Und da können wir immer noch besser werden.

Und natürlich dürfen wir uns auch mit Relevanz bedanken.Das ist schwierig; sie wird uns nicht mehr ohne weiteres ein-geräumt. Daher dürfen wir in unserem Bemühen auch darumnicht nachlassen. Gehen wir also den Leitfragen unseres Kon-gresses mit aller Leidenschaft nach!

Mit den besten Wünschen für einen anregenden und frucht-baren GAP.8-Kongress,

Prof. Dr. Thomas SpitzleyPräsident der GAP

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang SpohnVize-Präsident und Kongressausrichter

9

Veranstaltungsort /Congress Venue for GAP.8

Universität KonstanzUniversitätsstr. 10D-78464 Konstanzwww.gap8.de

1 Eingang links / Entrance left2 Eingang rechts / Entrance right3 Garderobe / cloakroam upstairs4 Information / i-point caretaker

A6 GAP.8 Congress Counter (17.9.-20.9.)

A6 AudimaxA7 Vortragsräume / lecture roomsC Vortragsräume / lecture roomsD Vortragsräume / lecture roomsK Mensa / CafeteriaK4 Arche / Chinese Restaurant

9A, 9B9C,11

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2

3

4

Directions to Universität Konstanz

Inhalt/Contents

Page

ProgrammGesamtüberblick (chronologisch)

13 ProgrammeOverview (chronological)

ProgrammSektionen (chronologisch)

15 ProgrammeSections (chronological)

HauptvorträgeAbstracts (alphabetisch)

23 Main LecturesAbstracts (alphabetical)

PreisverleihungenProgramm (chronologisch)

27 Award CeremoniesProgramme (chronological)

AutorenkolloquiumAbstracts (alphabetisch)

29 Author’s ColloquiumAbstracts (alphabetical)

KolloquienProgramm und Abstracts (alphabetisch)

31 ColloquiaProgramme and Abstracts (alphabetical)

SektionenAbstracts (alphabetisch)

53 SectionsAbstracts (alphabetical)

PosterÜberblick (nach Sektionen)

Abstracts (alphabetisch)

121 PosterOverview (by section)Abstracts (alphabetical)

WorkshopsProgramm und Überblick (alphabetisch)

137 WorkshopsProgramme and overview (alphabetical)

Sprecher A – Z(mit Zuweisung zu Veranstaltungsform)

145 Speakers A – Z(with reference to type of talk)

Gesamtüberblick / Comprehensive Overview

Mon, Sep 17, 2012 Tue, Sep 18, 2012 Wed, Sep 19, 2012 Thu, Sep 20, 2012

9 a.m.

Colloquia## 1, 2, 3, 4, 5in parallel9–12 a.m.Audimax, A 701–704

Section Talks 59:00–9:45 a.m.

Colloquia## 6, 7, 8, 9, 10in parallel9–12 a.m.Audimax, A 701–704


10 a.m.


11 a.m.


12 a.m. 15 min break 15 min break 15 min break

Poster Session/Lunchtotal 45 min

Poster Session/Lunchtotal 45 min

(poss.: Poster Session)Lunch 45 min

1 p.m. Congress Counter, A 6phone 0049 7531 88 2766Open 1:00 p.m. – 7:00 p.m.Tue + Wed.8:30 a.m.–7:00 p.m.Thursday8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.

15 min break 15 min break 15 min break

Section Talks 11:15–2:00 p.m.



2 p.m.Section Talks 22:00–2:45 p.m.



15 min break 15 min break 15 min break

3 p.m. Book Exhibitionduring the GAP Congresson A 5 area


Section Talks 113:00–3:45 p.m. 3rd Keynote Lecture

Sorensen3:00–4:30 p.m.AudimaxBest Poster Award



4 p.m.

Break4:30–5:00 p.m.

Break4:30–5:00 p.m.

Conference Close4:30 p.m.

5 p.m. OpeningSpitzley, Rüdiger, Boldt 2nd Keynote Lecture

Erkenntnis LectureBlau5:00–6:30 p.m.Audimax

Frege Award CeremonyandAuthors ColloquiumBittner, Buss, Hill5:00–8:00 p.m.Audimax

GAP bus-shuttle to cityKonstanz at 8:30 p.m.

Workshop 2 and 6 starting at5 p.m.Workshops 1, 3, 4, 5 start onFriday.

Workshop office is in RoomC 426For more information have alook at chapter workshops.

5:30

1st Keynote LectureHacker5:30–7:00 p.m.Audimax

6 p.m.

Reception/Dinner6:30–7:30 p.m.7 p.m. Stegmüller / ontos Award

Best Paper Award / 7:00–7:30

7:30Reception7:30–9:00 p.m.

GAP bus-shuttle to cityKonstanz at 9.30 p.m.

Members’ Assembly7:30–10:00 p.m.

GAP bus-shuttle to cityKonstanz at 10.30 p.m.

8 p.m.

9 p.m.

Sektionen Dienstag / Sections Tuesday

Dienstag 13:15–14:00 Dienstag 14:00–14:45

1 Sprachphilosophie / Philosophy of Language

Raum D 436Chair N. Kompa

Nadja El KassarPrimitive Normativität als Antwort auf KripkesRegelfolgen-Skeptiker?

Jaan Kangilaski, Daniel CohnitzUnderstanding a sentence? Knowing its truth-conditions:Why the epistemological determination argument fails

2 Metaphysik und Ontologie / Metaphysics and Ontology

Raum C 427Chair T. Sattig

Alexander SteinbergDefining Global Supervenience

Peter SchulteHow Truth Can Be Grounded in Being: A GroundingTheory of Truthmaking

Raum C 426Chair J. Diekemper

Laura Cecilia PorroKaren Bennett on »difference-minimizing« disputes

Siegfried Hermann JaagHumes Dictum und die Dispositional-Kategorial-Unterscheidung bezüglich natürlicher Eigenschaften

3 Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie / Logic and Philosophy of Science

Raum C 425Chair A. Büter

Alexander GebharterA Formal Framework for Representing Mechanisms?

Jens HarbeckeTwo regularity theories of mechanistic constitution

Raum C 424Chair M. Eronen

Georg SchiemerCarnap’s structuralism reconsidered

Markus SeidelZwischen Relativismus und Absolutismus? Warum einKuhnscher, moderater Relativismus scheitert

Raum C 423Chair A. Eder

Michael Poznic

Wissenschaftliche Repräsentation und Ähnlichkeit

Torsten WilholtIs There Such a Thing as the Reliability of a Method?

4 Philosophie des Geistes / Philosophy of Mind

Raum C 422Chair A. Newen

Philipp HueblConsciousness for Attention

Jonas KleinHorizonal Perceptual Experience in Cognitive Science

Raum C 421Chair A. Stephan

Malte DahlgrünEmotions and Natural Kindhood

Jan SlabyClarifying Enaction

Raum D 435Chair G. Vosgerau

Florian Leonhard WüstholzThinking about Thoughts without Language

Patrice SoomA Functionalist Approach to the Concept of ›Delusion‹and its Sub-Types

5 Erkenntnistheorie / Epistemology

Raum C 336Chair H. Rott

Jochen BriesenReliabilism and Epistemic Circularity

Markus WerningReliablism and the Extra Value of Knowledge

6 Religionsphilosophie und Ästhetik / Philosophy of Religion and Aesthetics

Raum D 431Chair J.M. Fischer

Stamatios GerogiorgakisCombining the Bayesian Argument for the Existence ofGod with Pascal’s Wagerl

Georg GasserPersonal Embodiment and Bodily Resurrection

7 Angewandte Ethik, Politische, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie /Applied Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy

Raum D 430Chair S. Gosepath

Christoph Schmidt-PetriErbschaftssteuern, Obduktionen und die posthumeKonfiszierung von Organen

Julia Apollonia EngelsDas Transplantations-Trilemma und eine Ethik desTötungsverbots

8 Normative Ethik, Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie /Normative Ethics, Metaethics, Theory of Action and Theory of Decision

Raum D 434Chair F. Dietrich

Vuko AndricA New Argument for Subjective Consequentialism

Attila Tanyi, Martin BruderOverdemanding Consequentialism? An ExperimentalApproach

Raum D 433Chair C. Fehige

Niels van MiltenburgTracing the commitments of Libertarianism:Indeterminism without objective probability

Dawa OmettoLibertarian alternative possibilities: why Frankfurt casescontinue to miss the mark.

Raum D 432Chair U. Wessels

Christian PillerWhat Is Goodness Good For?

Johann GudmundssonDas Gute als Objekt des Strebens – Zur konativen Theorieder Güte

15

Sektionen Dienstag / Sections Tuesday

Dienstag 15:00–15:45 Dienstag 15:45–16:30


Raum D 436Chair N. Kompa

Theresa MarxRelevanz statt Wahrheit?

Emanuel ViebahnSpeaker intentions and semantic content

Raum D 435Chair G. Mras

Kristina LiefkeA Single-Type Ontology for Natural Language


Raum C 427Chair N. Wildman

Christian WüthrichWhen the actual world is not even possible

Robert MichelsCan Conceptual Possibilities be MetaphysicallyImpossible?

Raum C 426Chair B. Schnieder

Joshua MuggWhy Dispositions Are Not Second Order Properties

Holger SturmEine allgemeine Theorie der Eigenschaften


Raum C 425Chair A. Büter

Lena KästnerThe Curious Symmetry of Mechanistic Constitution

Beate KrickelMaking Sense of Mechanistic Interlevel Causation

Raum C 424Chair M. Eronen

Jörn WüstenbergDas perspektivische Argument für denwissenschaftstheoretischen Antirealismus

Paul Hoyningen-HueneDer Sackgasseneinwand gegen verschiedene Formendes Realismus: Beispiele

Raum C 423Chair A. Eder

Johannes LenhardThe Changing Relationship Between Simulation andExperiment: The Case of Quantum Chemistry

Richard David, Stephan Hartmann, Jan SprengerThe No Alternatives Argument


Raum C 422Chair A. Newen

Christoph MichelEvaluative object-cognition, attitudes andmetarepresentation

Holger LyreSozialer Externalismus und geteilte Intentionalität

Raum C 421Chair A. Stephan

Wendy WilutzkyIntegrating Evaluation into the Intentionality of Emotion



Thomas GrundmannWhat role can experience play in apriori justification? –A reliablilist account

Magdalena Balcerak JacksonImagination and the A Priori /A Posteriori Distinction


Raum D 431Chair G. Gasser

Ruben SchneiderLeibnizianischer Molinismus: Individuelle Essenzen undmetaphysische Freiheit

John Martin Fischer, Patrick ToddThe Truth about Foreknowledge: A Reply to TrentonMerricks


Raum D 430Chair S. Gosepath

Andreas F. X. WolkensteinWelchen Wert hat Würde? Zur Rolle des Würdekonzeptesin der (Angewandten) Ethik

Sebastian MudersNaturrechtliche und kantianische Konzeptionen vonWürde in der Sterbehilfedebatte



Marcel WarmtKonsequentialistische Theorien und der besondere-Pflichten-Einwand

Magdalena HoffmannWarum dürfen wir unsere Freunde bevorzugen, abernicht unsere Feinde benachteiligen?

Raum D 433Chair C. Fehige

Erasmus MayrFree Will, Capacities and their Exercise

Christoph LumerWillensschwäche – Eine Systematisierung und eineErklärung


Nora KreftLove and Value Judgments

Sebastian KöhlerDo Expressivists have an Attitude Problem?

16

Sektionen Mittwoch / Sections Wednesday

Mittwoch 9:00–9:45 Mittwoch 9:45–10:30


Raum D 436Chair M. Siebel

Roland BluhmDon’t Ask, Look! Linguistic Corpora as a Tool forConceptual Analysis

Maik SührAnalyses as Explanations

Raum D 435Chair R. Busse

Christian FoldeOperator Fictionalism and Logical Neutrality

David DolbyUnderstanding Non-Nominal Quantification


Raum C 427Chair P. Schulte

Joseph DiekemperThe Ontology of Thisness

Johannes KorbmacherEssence and Identity. A Note on Essential Properties andCriteria of Identity


Raum C 425Chair J. Lenhard

Markus Ilkka EronenLevels of mechanisms in neuroscience: A deflationaryaccount

Marie I. KaiserReductive Explanation in Biology

Raum C 424Chair J. Harbecke

Johannes RöhlCausation, Dispositions and Mathematical Physics

Cord FriebeMeta-Ontologie der Raumzeit

Raum C 423Chair T. Wilholt

Jendrik StellingWhen is it rational to believe a mathematical statement?

Carsten Thomas WeigeltThe Frequentist Interpretation of Probability inQuantum Mechanics


Raum C 422Chair M. Baumgartner

Sebastian Joachim MüllerEin Dilemma für modale Argumente gegen denMaterialismus

Daan EversThe causal efficacy of the mental: against thecounterfactual argument

Raum C 421Chair F. Esken

Alexandra ZinckFirst-Third- and Second-Person-Perspective

Theresa Stiller, Saskia Nagel

Über Veränderung und Einheit der Person – EineSynthese analytischer und phänomenologischerÜberlegungen


Raum C 426Chair G. Ernst

Michael SchmitzPractical Knowledge

David LöwensteinWhy Know-how and Propositional Knowledge AreMutually Irreducible

Raum C 336Chair T. Grundmann

Eugen FischerPhilosophical Intuitions, Heuristics, and Metaphors:Towards a Cognitive Epistemology

Romy JasterContextualism and Gradability


Raum D 431Chair W. Lübbe

Christine BratuLiberalismus, Handlungsfreiheit und Autonomie

Rebecca GutwaldIm Namen der Autonomie? Eine kritische Untersuchungdes liberalen Paternalismus am Beispiel von Maßnahmendes kognitiven Enhancements

Raum D 430Chair W. Pfannkuche

Christian NeuhäuserUnternehmen als moralische Akteure

Valentin BeckUnternehmensverantwortung und partielleNormenkonformität


Raum D 434Chair G. Löhrer

Julian FinkThe requirements of rationality: wide or narrow content?

Tim HenningWill I be glad I did it? – Rational Decision, PreferenceChange, and Personality


Julius SchälikeMoralischer Zufall

Michael KühlerSollen, Können und Versuchen

Raum D 432Chair K. Meyer

André GrahleTwo Dimensions of Meaningfulness

Susanne MantelOn why (not) to identify normative reasons withmotivating reasons

17




Raum D 436Chair M. Siebel

Raphael van RielThree Conceptions of Explication – Two In, One Out

David Samuel LaniusHas Vagueness Really No Function In Law?

Raum D 435Chair R. Busse

Elia ZardiniConsequence and Context. The Intercontextual Logic ofSentences

Marta SznajderIntensional verbs – a dynamic approach


Raum C 427Chair A. Steinberg

Nathan WildmanSome Fine Lessons

Thomas SattigPluralism and Determinism


Raum C 425Chair J. Lenhard

Till Grüne-YanoffModelling and How-Possible Explanations

Chrysostomos MantzavinosExplanatory Games

Raum C 424Chair J. Harbecke

Thomas MüllerBranching space-times and general relativity

Roberto CiuniThe Abundance of the future

Raum C 423Chair T. Wilholt

Corina StrößnerStatistical and Non-Statistical Normality


Raum C 422Chair M. Baumgartner

Carlos ZednikFrom extended mechanisms to extended minds

Bettina GutscheMechanistische Erklärung: Reduktiv oder nicht?

Raum C 421Chair F. Esken

Martin HoffmannMenschliche Individualität und personale Identität

Gerhard Christopher BukowMinimality notions in the Theory of Mind-debate


Raum C 426Chair G. Ernst

Pedro SchmechtigInterrogatives Formen des Wissens und reduktiverIntellektualismus

Franz KnappikSelbstwissen als »Maker’s Knowledge«?

Raum C 336Chair T. Grundmann

Alexander DingesAn invariantist explanation of contextualist intuitions

Erik SteiA presuppositional strict invariantist account ofknowledge attributions



Matthias KatzerThe Idea of Global Public Reason

David P. SchweikardThe Justification of Contributory Political Obligations

Raum D 430Chair W. Pfannkuche

Carsten KöllmannLohngerechtigkeit: Tausch oder Verteilung?



Nathaniel SharadinThe Wrong Kind of Reason

Benjamin Paul KiesewetterThe Principle of Decisive Reasons


Benedikt KahmenHow Do We Know What We Intend?

Johannes HimmelreichAction vs. Agency

Raum D 432Chair K. Meyer

Christian KietzmannDer Realismus praktischer Gründe und das Problem derMotivation

Julius SchönherrWhat makes moral values queer?

18




Raum D 436Chair K. Saporiti

Laura DelgadoIs Frege’s Context Principle in Conflict with His Principleof Compositionality?

Robert Sascha SchwartzkopffFrege vs. Moltmann: Why ‚The number of planets is eight‘is an identity statement after all


Raum C 427Chair H. Sturm

Brandon Charles LookThe Fundamental Question of Metaphysics and theQuestion of Fundamentality in Metaphysics

Michael DeA Solution to the Humphrey Objection


Raum C 425Chair M. Thomann

Anna LeuschnerGood dissent, bad dissent. When dissent is hostile toscience

Gertrude Hirsch HadornEpistemic and non-epistemic values in applied science

Raum C 424Chair C. Mantzavinos

Florian SteinbergerLogic, normativity and paraconsistency

Johannes SternModality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth

Raum C 423Chair M. Unterhuber

Allard Tamminga, Sander VerhaeghKatz’s Revisability Paradox Dissolved

Carl George WagnerThe Corroboration Paradox


Raum C 422Chair H. Lyre

Lisa GrunenbergCan Rule-following be blind?

Martin WeicholdWissen Wie: Intelligenz ohne Intellektualismus

Raum C 421Chair M. Pauen

Max Mergenthaler CansecoThe Phenomenal Concept Strategy: still battling thebewitchment of our Intelligence.

Albert NewenAnalyzing Phenomenal Concepts with Mental Files


Raum C 426Chair M. Werning

Michael SchippersProbabilistic Measures of Coherence: A Two-LevelApproach

Julia LangkauReflective Equilibrium and Counterexamples

Raum C 336Chair G. Keil

Christoph KelpTowards a Knowledge-Based Account of Understanding

Christoph BaumbergerDefining Explanatory Understanding


Raum D 435Chair S. Gäb

Patrick ToddDivine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom:Remotivating Incompatibilism

Sebastian GäbSemantischer Realismus und religiöse Sprache



Christian SeidelDefending distributive equality against the social-relational critique

Gabriel WollnerObligations of fairness and natural duties of justiceunder conditions of moderate injustice

Raum D 430Chair P. Schaber

Alexander BagattiniKindeswohl als moralpsychologischer Grundbegriff

Christoph SchickhardtZum Begriff des Kindeswohls. Ein liberaler Ansatz



Jonas PfisterAre there Exclusionary Reasons?

Jan-Christoph HeilingerNon-effective moral reasons

Raum D 433Chair J. Schälike

Jan GertkenKann Notwehr nicht nur moralisch erlaubt, sonderngänzlich unproblematisch sein?

Jörg LöschkeDrei Arten von Hilfspflichten

Raum D 432Chair C. Lumer

Olivier Roy, Albert J. J. Anglberger, Norbert GratzlYou ought to do something! The logic of obligation asweakest permission

Daniel DohrnCounterfactuals and Two Kinds of »Ought«

19




Raum D 436Chair K. Saporiti

Andrei MoldovanRigid definite descriptions

Tobias RosefeldtTalking about things that don’t exist


Raum C 427Chair R. Michels

Jacek Jerzy BrzozowskiDefending Weak Supplementation

David HommenThe ontology of omissions and the problem of omissivecausation


Raum C 425Chair M. Thomann

Anke BüterWertfreiheit, Pluralismus und epistemischeVertrauenswürdigkeit: Das BeispielFrauengesundheitsforschung

Martin CarrierValues and Objectivity in Science

Raum C 424Chair C. Mantzavinos

Ole Thomassen HjortlandTruth, Paracompleteness, and Substructural Logic: Halfas lovely, twice as true

Raum C 423Chair M. Unterhuber

Peter BrösselEin Argument für den Bestätigungspluralismus

Soroush Rafiee Rad, Stephan HartmannUpdating on Conditionals = Kullback-Leibler + CausalStructure


Raum C 422Chair H. Lyre

Arne Martin Weber, Gottfried VosgerauThe arché of Cognition – Grounding Representations inAction

Tobias SchlichtSocial Cognition as know-how

Raum C 421Chair M. Pauen

Anne-Sophie BrüggenThe content of imaginings

Jennifer Michelle WindtAre dreams deceptive experiences? Assessing Cartesiandream skepticism from the perspective of philosophy ofmind


Raum C 426Chair M. Werning

Lars WeisbrodWhy agreement cannot justify peerness: CompletingElga’s non-sceptical Conciliationism by refining his EqualWeight View

Stefan ReiningAre Conciliatory Views about Peer Disagreement Self-Undermining?

Raum C 336Chair G. Keil

Joachim HorvathUnderstanding and Rational Revisability

Frank HofmannHow Gettier helps to understand justification


Raum D 435Chair S. Gäb

Christoph Kurt Mocker

Zur Rechtfertigung religiöser Überzeugungen durchpragmatische Argumente

Marie-Luise RatersDon’t worry – be happy? Ein Konsistenzproblem in derpragmatistischen Religionsphilosophie von WilliamJames



Joachim WündischClimate Change & Virtue Theory: A CautionaryPerspective

Sabine HohlIndividuelle Verantwortung für kollektiv verursachteSchädigungen


Barbara BleischRabentöchter? Rabensöhne? Zur Begründung filialerPflichten

Simone AicherProblems of advance directives in psychiatric care



Francesco OrsiHigher-order Internalism about Moral Judgment

David HorstPractical Knowledge


Vasco CorreiaIllusions and well-being: The costs and benefits ofmisbelief


Martin Rechenauer, Olivier RoyDeontic Logic for Procedural Ethics

Gerog BrunInstitutions and reflective equilibrum—an uneasycombination?

20

Sektionen Donnerstag / Sections Thursday

Donnerstag 13:15–14:00 Donnerstag 14:00–14:45


Raum D 436Chair J. Schulte

Julia Zakkou(Not So Many) Varieties of Disagreement

Wolfgang FreitagMoore’s Paradox and the Manifestation of Belief


Raum C 427Chair J. Korbacher

Anne Sophie SpannCan there be strict biological Identity through Timewithout Aristotelian Substances? A short Examination ofEric T. Olson’s Animalism

Gerhard Christopher Bukow, Markus Pierre KnappitschOrganisms and semiotic reactivity – information in theontology of biology


Raum C 426Chair J. Schmitt

Rico HauswaldWas sind vage natürliche Arten?

Philipp HaueisFuzziness in the Brain. Semantic Vagueness andFunctional Neuroanatomy

Raum C 425Chair A. Leuschner

Marius ThomannEine Logik des Könnens mit Handlungstypen

Stefania CentroneNotes On Mally’s First Deontic Logic and von Wright’sFirst Plausible Logic

Raum C 424Chair A. Gebharter

Nick HaverkampIntuitionism and Incompleteness

Daniel AlscherNegative Resultate über Interpretierbarkeit in RCF

Raum C 423Chair P. Brössel

Matthias UnterhuberModeling the Ramsey Test by Chellas-SegerbergSemantics

Peter FritzConditionals and ACTUALITY


Raum C 422Chair C. Zednik

Michael BaumgartnerIs it possible to experimentally reveal non-reductivemental causation?

Tim Seuchter, Gottfried VosgerauCausal Indexicals in a Mental File Framework

Raum C 421Chair J. Brandl

Eva SchmidtHow We Know Our Senses



Sergi RosellVoluntary Belief on a Strictly Epistemic Basis?

Andrea KruseWas sind epistemische Pflichten?


Raum D 435Chair C. Misselhorn

Lisa Katharin SchmalzriedDie Relevanz des moralischen Werts eines Kunstwerkes



Fabian WendtZur Moralität moralischer Kompromisse

Philipp SchinkGrundelemente einer Theorie sozialer Freiheit



Andreas MüllerIs Metaethical Constructivism Circular?

Matthew BrahamThe Formula of Universal Law: A Reconstruction


Ezio Di NucciDouble Effect and Terror Bombing

Martin HoffmannThomas Buddenbrook und der Vorrang der Moral


Anne BurkardDefending Moral Intuitionism Against DebunkingArguments

21

Aussteller / Exhibitors

Folgende Buchverlage präsentieren ihr Sortiment während der GAP.8 auf der Ebene A5Following publishers are presenting their books during the GAP.8 congress in the area A5:

De Gruyter Verlag - www.degruyter.comKlostermann Verlag - www.klostermann.dementis Verlag - www.mentis.deontos Verlag - www.ontosverlag.deOxford University Press - www.oup.comReclam Verlag - www.reclam.deSpringer Verlag - www.springer.comSuhrkamp Verlag - www.suhrkamp.deSynchron Wissenschaftsverlag der Autoren - www.synchron-publishers.de

Hauptvorträge/Main Lectures

Hauptvortrag M Main Lecture

Montag, 17.09.Audimax17:30–19:00

Peter HackerTwo Conceptions of Language

Monday, 17.09.Audimax5:30–7:00 p.m.

Dienstag, 18.09.Audimax17:00–18:30

Ulrich BlauEwige Rätsel, künftige Mathematik undutopischer Monismus

Tuesday, 18.09.Audimax5:00–6:30 p.m.

Donnerstag, 20.09.Audimax15:00–16:30

Roy SorensenZande Sorites: Illogical Insouciance andInconsistent Verstehen

Thursday, 20.09.Audimax3:00–4:30 p.m.


M BlauEwige Rätsel, künftige Mathematik

und utopischer Monismus

Ulrich BlauCalvinstr. 11, 35037 [email protected]

Die kategoriale Trichotomie TR

Physisch-Konkretesraumzeitlich

intersubjektiv

Psychisch-Mentaleszeitlich

subjektiv

Rein Formalesraumzeitlos

übersubjektiverzeugt alle ewigen Rätsel. Sie werden bis heute(a) praktisch hingenommen,(b) theoretisch verdrängt oder(c) philosophisch vernebelt. Irgendwann vielleicht(d) ernst genommen, reflektiert und grenzenlos verschärft.

(b) (c)

(a)

(d)

apeiron

Drei Beispiele:1. Der Lügner erzwingt den grenzenlos wohlgeordnet oszil-lierenden Reflexionsprozess, den ich in der ReflexionslogikLR analysiert habe. LR erweitert und verfeinert konservativ,zuletzt transdefinit, die klassische Logik, Mengen- und Klassen-theorie.2. Zenons Läufer erzwingt den grenzenlos wohlgeordneteninfinitesimalen Teilungsprozess, der dem strukturlosen Kon-tinuum nie näherkommt. Lügner und Läufer zwangen michzur allgemeinen linearen Zahlentheorie lL*. Sie erweitert undverfeinert konservativ, zuletzt transdefinit, die reelle, ordinaleund kardinale Standardarithmetik. Das war seit Cantor überfäl-lig. Bis heute können die Mathematiker mit so simplen Zahlenwie

w – 1, 1 – w, w. ½, wp

nicht rechnen. (Conway opfert die ordinale Standardarithme-tik, Robinson opfert schon w – 1.)3. Das Subjekt/Objekt-Rätsel. In allen archaischen Verhal-tensbereichen – Atmung, Bewegung, Ernährung, Behausung,Fortpflanzung, soziale Bindung – finden wir die Subjekt/Objekt-Korrelation

80–90 %

K ~subjektiv eher angenehmes Verhalten

biologisch eher zweck-mäßiges Verhalten

Diese physikalisch unerklärliche Korrelation wird seit Dar-win von allen Bewusstseinsfachleuten praktisch hingenom-men und theoretisch verdrängt oder philosophisch vernebelt.Denn die evolutionäre Erklärung für K erfordert Myriaden(vor)menschlicher Urheber, die ihre objektiven Hirnströmenach ihrem subjektiven Glück/Schmerz/Wert-Kompass steu-ern. Wie das? Gibt es neben den objektiv-physikalischenf-Kräften Myriaden subjektiver y-Kräfte? Irgendwann wird

man K und die Physik ernst nehmen und zur uralten mysti-schen Identitätsvermutung f = y kommen:I Alles ist ein zeitlos-absolutes Bewusstsein, das sich durch

den zeitlichen Trick TR in einen kosmischen Prozess ver-wandelt, der sich myriadenfach subjektiv von innen erlebtund objektiv von außen erkennt.

Die strukturelle Synchronisation von Myriaden subjektiv-zeit-lichen Innenwelten mit einer objektiv-raumzeitlichen Außen-welt erzwingt die dritte Kategorie:

Es gibt nur eine zeitlos-absolute Logik & Mathematik, dieselbstexplikativ mehr und mehr reine Bewusstseinsmecha-nik, d. h. Objektivierungsmechanik, subjektiv-zeitlich bewusstmacht und auf jenes unbegreifliche Selbst verweist, das sichim Ich-Jetzt fortwährend zeigt und entzieht.

24


M HackerTwo Conceptions of Language

Peter HackerOxford University (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

Two conceptions of language have dominated philosophicalreflection over the last century on the nature of language andlinguistic understanding, and on the relationship betweenthought and language. The first is the calculus conception,advanced in various forms by Frege, Russell, the early Witt-genstein, Carnap, Dummett and Davidson. The second is theanthropological conception of language, advanced in variousforms by the later Wittgenstein, Strawson, Grice, and Rundle.The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the twoconceptions. The calculus conception assigns priority to thenotions of truth and truth-condition, and to the assertoricmode. The anthropological conception assigns priority to use,meaning and explanations of meaning, and is indifferent tomode. The calculus conception presents understanding as acomputational process, the anthropological conception pres-ents it as akin to an ability.

The disagreements between the two conceptions are explo-red, and the further consequences of each conception are des-cribed.

Sorensen MZande Sorites: Illogical Insouciance

and Inconsistent Verstehen

Roy SorensenWashington University in St. Louis (United States)

[email protected]

While living among the Azande in the 1930s, E. E. Evans-Prit-chard challenged his hosts’ beliefs about witchcraft inheri-tance:

Base step: At least one man in your line of descent is awitch.

Induction Step: If any man in your line of descent is awitch, then so his father and all of his sons.

Conclusion: All of the men in your line of descent are wit-ches.

The Azande accepted the premises. They found the infe-rence compelling. Yet they rejected the conclusion.

When Bertrand Russell alerted Gottlob Frege to an incon-sistency in his Grundgesetze, Frege appreciated the catastro-phe and energetically attempted to revise his beliefs. But theAzande made only cursory efforts to resolve their inconsis-tency. Evans-Pritchard characterized their logical insoucianceas irrational.

My historical thesis is that the ensuing anthropologicaldebate mirrors the debate about the sorites paradox. I favora simple explanation of this parallelism: Evans-Pritchard’s wit-chcraft inheritance argument is a sorites argument – albeit ina form masked by the different ontologies of the Azande andEvans-Pritchard. Evans-Pritchard failed to recognize his witch-craft inheritance argument as a sorites paradox because hewas witchcraft nihilist in a community of witchcraft realists.

Evans-Pritchard’s metaphysics immunized him from the irra-tional response sorites paradoxes provoke from realists. Howe-ver Evans-Pritchard’s comparative lucidity was not due to adistinctive difference in his topic-neutral rationality. Evans-Prit-chard was prone to the same logical insouciance with respectto vague predicates about which he was realist (such as ›heap‹,›bald‹, and ›chicken‹).

My general conjecture is that many of the irrationalitiesthat seem distinctive of alien cultures are actually paradoxesthat are universal to humanity (thanks to the uniformity ofhuman brains). The irrationality of the aliens is real and pro-found; it just not distinctive of those aliens or their cultures.

The universality of the irrationality helps to explain Evans-Pritchard’s surprising success at understanding the Azande.Since he shares their core irrationality, Evans-Pritchard couldsimulate Azande thinking.

25

Preisverleihungen/Award Ceremonies

Montag, 17.09.Audimax19:00–19:30

Stegmüller-Award

Laudationes

Awardees:Miguel HoeltjeWahrheit, Bedeutung und Form. EineAuseinandersetzung mit demDavidson’schen Programm

Stephan KrämerSecond-Order Quantification andOntological Commitment

Moritz SchulzCounterfactuals and Probability

Ontos-Award

Awardee:Alexander SteinbergA Chance for Possibility. An Investigationinto the Grounds of Modality

Monday, 17.09.Audimax7:00–7:30 p.m.

Best-Paper-Award

Mittwoch, 19.09.Audimax17:00–17:15

Frege-Award

Ralf StoeckerLaudatio

Awardee:Rüdiger Bittner

Wednesday, 19.09.Audimax5:00–5:15 p.m

Donnerstag, 20.09.Audimax15:00

Best-Poster-Award Thursday, 20.09.Audimax3:00 p.m.

Autorenkolloquium/Author’s Colloquium

Autorenkolloquium A Author’s Colloquium

Mittwoch, 19.09.Audimax17:00–20:00

Rüdiger BittnerWithout autonomy

Thomas E. HillRüdiger Bittner on Autonomy

Sarah BussAuthenticity and Autonomy: A Meditationon Themes in the Work of Rüdiger Bittner

Wednesday, 19.09Audimax5:00–8:00 p.m.

Autorenkolloquium/Author’s Colloquium

A BittnerWithout autonomy

Rüdiger BittnerUniversität Bielefeld

[email protected]

Leaving aside the ancient, political notion of autonomy, thereare now basically two conceptions of autonomy in existence,Kant’s on the one hand and the understanding of autonomy asself-governance or self-determination on the other, the latteroften explicated with the help of Harry Frankfurt’s higherlevel attitudes. Discussions in the last few decades showed,however, that for different reasons neither conception willstand up. Yet to understand humans as endowed, in one orthe other sense, with autonomy has become a vital part ofthe political thought prevailing in western countries. Thusthe question becomes urgent where the demise of autonomyleaves us in political terms. How are we going to live together,without autonomy?

A BussAuthenticity and Autonomy: A Meditation on Themes in

the Work of Rüdiger Bittner

Sarah BussUniversity of Michigan (United States)

[email protected]

In reflecting on the nature and value of human freedom andautonomy, Rüdiger Bittner offers many provocative obser-vations. Here are some of the claims that provoked me toreexamine my own assumptions:– We cannot impose laws on ourselves; and if we could, the

actions we perform in deference to these laws would not beautonomous.

– Regardless of what any of us may say, it is more import-ant for us to limit the »resistances« against which we must»struggle« in pursuing our ends than to limit our vulnerabi-lity to the power of other end-setters.

– »Freedom is not a human predicament or privilege.«– »There is no other than the ›gross literal‹ sense in which

some piece of behavior is or is not somebody’s.«– »There is nothing in us or about us to guide us.«

These observations link Bittner’s views about freedom andautonomy to his views about both the source of moral requi-rements (no requirements can be grounded in laws we imposeon ourselves) and the conditions of moral responsibility (whe-ther we are accountable for our deeds does not depend onwhether they are »self-determined« in some special sense). Iwill explore some of these connections by exploring the con-ception of the self that underlies them. More particularly, Iwill consider Bittner’s claims that (i) we cannot be more orless »true to« ourselves, (ii) there is no meaningful sense inwhich some aspects of our psyche are »deeper« than others,and (iii) we cannot be divided from ourselves in ways thatmake it possible for us to exercise authority over ourselves.I will challenge these claims, even while conceding that (i)something has gone wrong when we regard »authenticity«as a regulative ideal; (ii) the distinction between »deep« and»superficial« elements of our »motivational set« is irrelevant

to whether we are accountable for what we do; (iii) (a) thereare limits to our capacity for self-alienation and (b) if we havereasons to act in certain ways, these reasons are not groundedin our authority to give ourselves orders.

Hill ARüdiger Bittner on Autonomy

Thomas E. HillUniversity of North Carolina (United States)

[email protected]

In several beautifully written essays, as well as books, RüdigerBittner surveys classic and contemporary conceptions of auto-nomy, arguing that these are untenable and unnecessary. Witha skeptical eye he examines Kantian autonomy, Harry Frank-furt’s idea of free willing, and current conceptions of politicalautonomy and individual autonomy in economic transacti-ons. High-minded general affirmations of human freedom, heargues, are unfounded and not likely to retain their grip ourthinking. Nevertheless, he allows that we can be more or lessfree in a modest (quasi-Hobbesian) sense and that many peo-ple may want more of this freedom from impediments thatmake it difficult or impossible to do various things. Thosewho do, Bittner argues, have reason to fight human subju-gation, including dependent labour as well as slavery, eventhough traditional philosophical grounds for opposing theseare dubious.

While acknowledging the force of some of Bittner’s challen-ges, I want to revisit the idea and role of autonomy in Kant’sethics and broadly Kantian theories. Questions remain aboutthe best way to understand – or reconstruct – Kant’s claimsand argument, and, even more, from a contemporary philo-sophical point of view we may want to inquire further aboutwhat important concerns lay behind its appeal and what sur-vives if Kant’s grand metaphors are taken less literally andhis moral psychology is appropriately de-mystified. Similarly,questions arise about Bittner’s dismissal of various ideas offreedom that are apparently imbedded in ordinary language.The special value of his challenge is that it requires us to workout – charitably but without untenable assumptions – whatis meant and why it seems important. As Bittner says, Kantianautonomy is not the same as the working conceptions of auto-nomy in medicine, politics, and everyday life as philosophers’interpret this. Nevertheless, those who care about either havesome reason to think about how these are connected.

30

Kolloquien/Colloquia

Aggregationism A Dienstag/Tuesday, 18.09.9:00–12:00, Audimax

Vagueness and Ontology B Dienstag/Tuesday, 18.09.9:00–12:00, A 704

Game Theory Meets Philosophy C Dienstag/Tuesday, 18.09.9:00–12:00, A 701

Should open-minded people be dogmatists about justification? D Dienstag/Tuesday, 18.09.9:00–12:00, A 703

Consequence and Consequences –What’s truth got to do with it?

E Dienstag/Tuesday, 18.09.9:00–12:00, A 702

Moral Understanding F Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09.9:00–12:00, Audimax

Truth, Meaning, and the Semantics – Pragmatics Distinction G Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09.9:00–12:00, A 702

Mindreading versus Teleological Reasoning: Two Ways ofUnderstanding Rational Action

H Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09.9:00–12:00, A 703

The Contribution of the History of Philosophy to the Theory ofPerception

I Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09.9:00–12:00, A 701

Perspectivism in the Philosophy of Science and Epistemology J Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09.9:00–12:00, A 704

Kolloquien / Colloquia

A Aggregationism

Imagine that you are faced with a choice between savingone person and saving five different people. Should you savethe greater number? Deontologists attempt to answer thisquestion without an appeal to interpersonal aggregation ofgains and losses. But what is wrong with interpersonal aggre-gation? One answer to this question is the claim that it isnot worse period when five people die than when one persondies. It is just worse to die for each of the persons involved.John Taurek has famously put forward his ›no worse claim‹ inhis meanwhile classical paper »Should the numbers count?«(1977) in order to argue from it to his view that it is not one’smoral duty to save the five (Taurek rather proposes to throw adice). With his ›no worse claim‹, Taurek opposes the view thatcertain consequences of acts are better period than othersand that such valuings can be arrived at by aggregating well-being across persons. This critique radically challenges con-

sequentialism, since it rejects the idea that we can evaluatestates of affairs with regard to their impersonal goodness. Alarge part of the discussion which was prompted by Taurek’spaper was devoted to the question whether and how deonto-logists are able to account for the intuition that saving thegreater number is morally called for. Hereby, the question forthe extent to which aggregationism can be defended againstTaurek’s challenge has not yet been dealt with in satisfactorydepth. By bringing together one of the few defenders of the›no worse claim‹ (Weyma Lübbe), a vigorous opponent of it(Iwao Hirose) and a sophisticated value theorist (Wlodek Rabi-nowicz), this colloquium is meant to start changing this. –The talks and the discussion will be in English.

Organisation: Kirsten Meyer, Thomas Schmidt

Dienstag/Tuesday, 18.09. Aggregationism

9:00–12:00 (Language: English)

Audimax

09:00–09:10 Introduction (Kirsten Meyer/Thomas Schmidt)

09:10–10:00 Weyma Lübbe: The Aggregation Argument: What can we learn from its failure?

10:00–10:50 Iwao Hirose: From ›Better‹ to ›Right‹

10:50–11:10 Coffee Break

11:10–12:00 Wlodek Rabinowicz: Goodness and Numbers

32


A HiroseFrom »Better« to »Right«

Iwao HiroseMcGill University (Canada)

[email protected]

Imagine that you are faced with a choice between saving oneperson and saving five different people. Call this example therescue case. What is the right thing to do? Some philosophersattempt to establish the case for saving the greater numberwithout an appeal to interpersonal aggregation of gains andlosses. One such case is the argument that appeals to impar-tiality and the Pareto principle. I call this the argument forbest outcomes (ABO). According to ABO, (1) the outcome ofsaving the five is strictly better than the outcome of savingthe one, and therefore (2) it is right to save the five. Somepeople would agree with (1) but not (2). This is because theydo not want to accept consequentialism. In this paper, I shallargue that (2) follows from (1) in the rescue case even if wedo not commit to consequentialism.

Consequentialism holds that the rightness or wrongnessof an act is determined by the goodness of its consequence.Non-consequentialist principles reject this. They usually holdthat the rightness or wrongness of an act can be determinedindependently of the goodness of its consequence. The non-consequentialist principles do not necessarily rule out the con-sideration for the goodness of consequence insofar as the non-consequentialist constraints are satisfied. In the rescue case,there are little non-consequentialist constraints. Thus, if weaccept (1), then (2) follows. There is one possible interpreta-tion, according to which saving the five is unfair to the oneperson and this is a violation of non-consequentialist cons-traint. I shall argue that if this interpretation is correct, theonly right act is to let all six people die. This means, I shallargue, that if letting all six people die is wrong, saving thefive is the right act.

A LübbeThe Aggregation Argument:

What can we learn from its failure?

Weyma LübbeUniversität Regensburg

[email protected]

The Aggregation Argument is an argument to the effect that»the numbers count«. This refers to the idea that when it ispossible to save only one of two non-overlapping groups ofequally deserving people, it is better to save the greater num-ber. The Aggregation Argument uses a Pareto Premise, whichsays that saving a more numerous group is better when thesmaller group is contained in it, and an Indifference Premise,which says that saving one person out of an endangered groupis of equal value to saving one other person out of it. Thereexist informal and axiomatized versions of the argument.

The talk starts by presenting the Aggregation Argumentand a counter-argument (already published) which denies theacceptability of the Indifference Premise. The aim is to discussthe relevance of the counter-argument for the general accep-tability of maximizing consequentialism. Maximizing conse-

quentialism says that the rightness of an act is determined bythe goodness of its consequences, the act with the best con-sequences being the right act. The consequences of an act areusually taken to consist in the state of affairs that holds placeas a result of the act. Aggregative consequentialism holds thatthe goodness of states is some function of the values of partsof the states.

The Aggregation Argument presupposes a consequentialistframework. It does not, however, explicitly make assumpti-ons about the values of parts of states – e.g., about the valueof one saved life – or about the nature of the aggregatingfunction. It rests on an ordinal comparison of whole statesonly. The argument against the Indifference Premise, howe-ver, shows that the prima facie plausibility of that premiserests on the fact that such assumptions are implicitly made.The argument also shows that the assumptions are far frombeing trivial, and it suggests the necessity of a more carefulanalysis of the concept of the consequence of an act. Thisanalysis, it is argued, gives rise to serious doubts about theconsequentialist framework in general.

Rabinowicz AGoodness and Numbers

Wlodek RabinowiczLund University (Schweden)[email protected]

In his famous provocative paper (PPA 1977), John Taurekargued against the common-sense view that the numbersshould count in life-saving situations. Frances Kamm respon-ded to this challenge by proposing what she called the Aggre-gation Argument in favour of the view that numbers count(Morality, Mortality, vol. 1, OUP 1993; cf. also Utilitas 2005).Kamm’s argument was defended by Iwao Hirose in a numberof papers (Analysis 2001, Utilitas 2004), while Weyma Lübbedeveloped a defence of Taurek’s view (PPA 2008, cf. also herpaper in the Festschrift for Georg Meggle, mentis 2009).

In my talk, I will target Taurek’s claim that there is some-thing deeply problematic and illegitimate in judgments ofgoodness and betterness period, as opposed to judgmentsof goodness or betterness for someone. That the former aremeaningful and can be legitimate is a basic presuppositionof the Aggregation Argument Hirose is defending and Lübbeis criticizing – at least if we suppose that the premises ofthe argument (Impartiality and Pareto) and its conclusion areinterpreted as axiological claims. as it is usually done. Lübbein her paper on Taurek quite rightly points out the importanceof this issue for his view. So, I think there might be a point todiscuss this matter at some length. I would like to discuss thisproblem from a particular perspective on goodness: more pre-cisely, from the point of view of the fitting-attitude analysisof this notion.

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B Vagueness and Ontology

Vague terms, it is said, are tolerant to marginal changes, admitof borderline cases, give rise to the heap paradox and thuschallenge bivalence. Is there, in addition to semantic vaguen-ess, such a thing as vagueness in rebus? Can objects be vague?Russell has argued that the idea is absurd, since »vaguenessand precision alike are characteristics which can only belongto a representation. They have to do with the relation betweena representation and that which it represents«. Dummett hassung the same tune: »The notion that things might actuallybe vague, as well as being vaguely described, is not properlyintelligible«. Evans has advanced a famous one-page argumentagainst »vague objects«.

In recent years, however, a growing minority of philoso-phers have argued that ontological vagueness can be madesense of. Various ways have been suggested to spell out theidea. Undoubtedly, ordinary physical objects can have fuzzyboundaries, both spatially and temporally, while it may still

sound odd to call them »vague«. But, what exactly is therelation between vagueness and other indeterminacy pheno-mena? What role does Unger’s »problem of the many« play?Does the distinction between vagueness of classification andvagueness of individuation mirror or does it cut across thedistinction between semantic and ontological vagueness? Canproperties, kinds, or propositions be vague? Does every kindof vagueness involve Sorites-susceptibility? These are some ofthe questions that the colloquium will hopefully shed lightupon.

Das Kolloquium wurde kofinanziert durch das von der Volks-wagen-Stiftung geförderte Forschungsprojekt »VernünftigerUmgang mit unscharfen Grenzen« www.unscharfe-grenzen.de.

Organisation: Geert Keil

Dienstag/Tuesday, 18.09. Vagueness and Ontology


A 704

09:00–09:10 Introduction

09:10–09:45 Matti Eklund: Metaphysical Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy

09:45–10:00 Discussion

10:50–11:10 Jonathan Lowe: Ontological Vagueness, Existence Monism, and Metaphysical Realism


10:50–11:00 Break

11:00–11:35 Peter Simons: Vague Kinds and Biological Nominalism

11:35–12:00 Final Discussion

34


B EklundMetaphysical Vagueness and Metaphysical

Indeterminacy

Matti EklundCornell University (United States)

[email protected]

There are good reasons to distinguish between vaguenessnarrowly conceived, the phenomenon that paradigmaticallyshows up in sorites paradoxes, and the broader phenome-non of indeterminacy, which can be taken also to show upin, for example, the case of the open future, or partially defi-ned expressions, or quantum physics. Relatedly, there is rea-son to distinguish between the question of whether meta-physical vagueness is possible and the question of whethermetaphysical indeterminacy is possible. Once these distinc-tions are drawn, it is natural to suspect that metaphysicalindeterminacy is possible but metaphysical vagueness is not.However, as I will discuss, some of the most prominent argu-ments against metaphysical vagueness are equally argumentsagainst metaphysical indeterminacy. My own view is thatmetaphysical vagueness is impossible and I discuss what sortsof arguments may be leveled specifically against the idea ofmetaphysical vagueness. But I also discuss how one might inprinciple argue for the idea of metaphysical vagueness.

B LoweOntological Vagueness, Existence Monism, and

Metaphysical Realism

E. Jonathan LoweDurham University (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

Recently, Terry Horgan and Matjaz Potrc have defended thethesis of ›existence monism‹, according to which the wholecosmos is the only concrete object. Their arguments appeal lar-gely to considerations concerning vagueness. Crucially, theyclaim that ontological vagueness is impossible, and one keyassumption in their defence of this claim is that vaguenessalways involves ›sorites-susceptibility‹. I aim to challengeboth the claim and this assumption. As a consequence, I seekto undermine their defence of existence monism and supporta common-sense pluralist ontology of ›ordinary objects‹ asbeing fully consistent with a thoroughgoing metaphysicalrealism.

Simons BVague Kinds and Biological Nominalism

Peter SimonsTrinity College Dublin (Ireland)

[email protected]

Among biological kinds the most important are species. Butspecies, however defined, have vague boundaries, both syn-chronically owing to hybridization and ongoing speciation,and diachronically owing to genetic drift and genealogicalcontinuity. It is argued that the solution to the problems ofspecies individuation is to adopt a thoroughgoing nominalismin regard to all biological kinds, from molecules to genes togenomes to species to higher taxa. This accommodates all theimportant biological facts while avoiding the legacy problemsof ancient typological taxonomy.

35


C Game Theory Meets Philosophy

Game theory has developed into one of the most import-ant foundational theories of the social sciences. Mathema-tics has been reduced to set theory according to the Bour-baki program; and similarly, the reduction of economics togame theory has far advanced. At the same time applicationshave extended to social and political sciences. Even behavioralscientists have developed great interest. Accordingly, gametheory is not really fixed; mathematical theorizing as well asthe spectrum of interpretations have deepened and widenedin various significant ways in the last decades.

These developments have taken place also in close ex-change with philosophy. A contractualist justification ofmorals must rely on game theory; this is common know-ledge since the work of Rawls. The prisoners’ dilemma, dis-

covered by game theorists, is the core problem of cooperativeor collective rationality. And so forth. Reversely, the theory ofcoordination games, initiated by David Lewis, has become anindependent topic in game theory. So-called epistemic gametheory is originally an economic-philosophical co-production.And so forth again.

Thus, mutual connections are very rich. The philosophicalrelevance of game theory is large and of deep interest to awider philosophical audience. The talks will discuss this rele-vance form a philosophical, a game theoretic, and a psycholo-gical side in positive as well as critical ways.

Organisation: Wolfgang Spohn

Dienstag/Tuesday, 18.09. Game Theory Meets Philosophy


A 701

09:00–09:30 Brian Skyrms: The Spontaneous Emergence of Meaning

09:30–09:45 Diskussion

09:45–10:15 Ken Binmore: Origins of Fairness Norms


10:30–10:45 Pause

10:45–11:15 Gerd Gigerenzer: Heuristics Meet Philosophy


11:30–12:00 Podiumsdiskussion

36


C BinmoreOrigins of Fairness Norms

Ken BinmoreUniversity College London (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

John Mackie’s Inventing Right and Wrong suggests foundinga naturalistic theory of ethics on anthropological data, usinggame theory as a conceptual framework. This lecture discussessome of the game theory results that are relevant in such anenterprise.

C GigerenzerHeuristics Meet Philosophy

Gerd GigerenzerMax-Planck-Institut Berlin

[email protected]

Like Reinhard Selten, I draw a firm line between game theory –which is for proving theorems, not playing games – and thestudy of how people actually make decisions. Herbert Simonasked: How do humans reason when the conditions for rationa-lity postulated by neoclassical economics are not met? Simonreferred to the world of uncertainty, as opposed to that ofknown risks. My answer is: Humans and other animals relyon simple heuristics, that is, on rules that ignore part of theinformation in order to make better decisions. In my research,I have also asked a normative question: How should humansreason under uncertainty? This program includes (i) the des-criptive study of the heuristics in the adaptive toolbox ofindividuals or cultures, and (ii) the normative study of theecological rationality of specific heuristics. In an uncertainworld (as opposed to known risks), heuristics can be moreaccurate than so-called »optimization methods«; the reasonsfor this can be analyzed in terms of the bias-variance dilemma.I would like to invite philosophers to think about rationalityin an uncertain world.

Skyrms CThe Spontaneous Emergence of Meaning

Brian SkyrmsUniversity of California, Irvine and Stanford University

(United States)[email protected]

The spontaneous emergence of meaning is studied in the con-text of models of signaling. In favorable conditions, the dyna-mics of evolution and the dynamics of simple learning leadto the spontaneous emergence of meaningful signals. We cancharacterize some situations in which optimal signaling willarise and situations in which this is possible but not guaran-teed.

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D Should open-minded people be dogmatists about justification?

Dogmatism is one of the most promising internalist theoriesof justification, but it has only been systematically defendedin recent years, largely inspired by Jim Pryor’s seminal paper»The Skeptic and the Dogmatist« (Noûs 34, 2000). The basicidea of dogmatism is that a belief that p is (prima facie) episte-mically justified if it seems to the relevant subject as if p. Onecan distinguish between local dogmatism that only defendsthis principle for seemings of a particular kind, most notablyperceptual seemings, and global dogmatism that claims thatseemings in general have justificatory power (or, even moreradically, that only seemings have that power). Dogmatismallows, for example, that one can be justified in believing thatgrass is green simply because it seems to one that grass isgreen – no further evidence is needed, and no skeptical hypo-theses must be ruled out. Therefore, dogmatism promises tocombine the intuitive plausibility of internalism with a keyvirtue of externalism, namely the dispensability of meta-justi-fication for one’s beliefs, e.g. of reasons for believing that oneis a reliable perceiver. Like all theories of justification, dog-matism faces a number of formidable objections. Externalistswill complain that there is no constitutive connection bet-

ween dogmatist justification and truth-conduciveness. Inter-nalists will object that dogmatism shares some of the mostpressing problems of externalism, e.g. the possibility of gai-ning absurdly easy meta-justification through bootstrapping.Moreover, seemings may be much too cheap cognitive states.For example, if it seems to a paranoiac that someone persecu-tes her, then this would already suffice to justify her respectivebelief. A related problem is that seemings can sometimes beshaped by one’s desires, and so dogmatism seems committedto the possibility of justified belief on the basis of wishfulthinking.

The three speakers of our colloquium will further exploresome of the problems and prospects of dogmatism. First,Chris Tucker (Auckland) will defend dogmatism against wor-ries from wishful thinking, broadly construed. Then, RogerWhite (MIT) will explore dogmatism’s options with respect tothe problem of bootstrapping. Finally, Jim Pryor (NYU) willdefend a generalized form of dogmatism against Bayesianworries.

Organisation: Joachim Horvath, Thomas Grundmann

Dienstag/Tuesday, 18.09. Should open-minded people be dogmatists about justification?


A 703

09:00–09:10 Welcoming & Introduction (Joachim Horvath)

09:10–09:50 Chris Tucker: If Dogmatism has a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too

09:50–10:30 Roger White: How bad is bootstrapping?

10:30–10:45 Coffee break

10:50–11:30 Jim Pryor: Problems for Credulism

11:30–12:00 Roundtable discussion (chair: Thomas Grundmann)

38


D PryorProblems for Credulism

Jim PryorNew York University (United States)

[email protected]

I’ve defended the view that perceptual beliefs about the exter-nal world are sometimes immediately justified. This is a spe-cies of a genus of views I call »Dogmatism.« According tosome authors, Bayesianism the formal theory together withsome natural interpretive assumptions conflicts with that epis-temology of perception. I argue that the conflict here is muchmore pervasive than is usually acknowledged: that combina-tion of formalism plus interpretive assumptions fits poorlywith informal commitments that are much more widespreadthan Dogmatism about perception. I call this wider family ofviews »Credulism.« The conflict is not remedied by moving toa Jeffrey-conditionalizing form of Bayesianism. I argue thatthe conflict here does not speak against Credulism, but justreflects its having been ignored in the way the Bayesian forma-lism is motivated and interpreted. Instead we should look tomore critical interpretations of Bayesianism, or to more gene-ral formalisms. I express some sympathy for both responses,and consider briefly how they may go.

D TuckerIf Dogmatism has a Problem with Cognitive Penetration,

You Do Too

Chris TuckerUniversity of Auckland (New Zealand)

[email protected]

Dogmatism holds that, in the absence of defeaters, if it seemsto S that P, then S has prima facie justification for P. But sup-pose Wishful Willy is prospecting for gold. He sees a yellowobject and his desire for gold makes it seem to him that it isa gold nugget. Can his wishfully-caused seeming provide hisbelief with prima facie justification? More generally, can see-mings provide prima facie justification when they are cogni-tively penetrated (roughly: caused) by desires and unjustifiedbeliefs? Intuitively, the answer to these questions is no, whichis a problem for dogmatism. Yet before you mock the speckin the dogmatist’s eye, be sure that you don’t have a plankin your own. I argue that, if dogmatism has a problem withcognitive penetration, then lots of other views have similarproblems that are at least as bad. These views include: doxasticconservatism, Wright-styled entitlement views, many coheren-tisms, reliabilism, proper functionalism, and some versions ofrestricted dogmatism that are explicitly designed to avoid thecognitive penetration objection. What’s particularly ironic isthat those who have adamantly objected to dogmatism onthe basis of cognitive penetration tend to have even worsewishful thinking troubles than the dogmatist.

White DHow bad is bootstrapping?

Roger WhiteMassachusetts Institute of Technology (United States)

[email protected]

Dogmatist theories of perceptual justification appear to facethe following objection: If Dogmatism is correct then one canlegitimately gain evidence for the reliability of one’s percep-tual faculties via the use of those very faculties in a way thatseems patently absurd, e.g. by examining a series of coloredobjects and reasoning, »this one is red, and it appears red, thisone is green and it appears green. . . , my vision keeps gettingthings right so surely it is highly reliable.« (This is known asbootstrapping). There are two strategies for responding to theobjection. (i) Argue that Dogmatism can avoid commitmentto the legitimacy of bootstrapping in a way that is consistentand well motivated. (ii) Argue that bootstrapping is not sobad, or at least it is something we will have to live with any-way in other domains. I argue that the first strategy mustfail. The second is trickier. I explore ways in which we mightaccept some forms of bootstrapping while still maintainingthat the reasoning above is unacceptable.

39


E Consequence and Consequences – What’s truth got to do with it?

The colloquium »Consequence and Consequences – What’struth got to do with it?« is devoted to the most central notionin the philosophy of logic, namely the concept of logical con-sequence.

Usually, logical consequence is characterized as necessarytruth preservation. E.g. an inference is said to be logicallyvalid just in case for every model it holds that if the premisesare true in the model, then so is the conclusion.

Our colloquium is concerned with the role the notion oftruth plays in the analysis of logical consequence. Should thestandard characterization indeed be part of the analysis oflogical consequence? Is the notion of consequence perhaps atleast as fundamental as the notion of truth (Peter Schroeder-Heister)? Moreover, is the classical characterization in fact self-evident and independent from other assumptions?

A reason for calling into doubt the classical characterizationof logical consequence comes with the semantical paradoxes.According to dialethism, a doctrine defended by two of ourspeakers (JcBeall and Graham Priest), paradoxical statements

such as the Liar are both true and false. As paraconsistentlogicians they try to avoid the disastrous consequences diale-thism results in from the classical point of view by assuminga non-classical logic that does not license the derivation ofarbitrary conclusions from contradictory premises.

If one combines paraconsistency with the idea that logicalconsequences are truth-preserving, then some very familiarinferential patterns are invalid. (This problem is addressed inJc Beall’s lecture). In particular, modus ponens is no longer avalid rule in the so-called logic of paradox. (Suppose p is bothtrue and false, whereas q is just false. Since p⊃q (»if p then q«)is at least true if p is false, p⊃q is at least true if p is both trueand false. Thus, in the assumed case the two premises p⊃qand p are at least true, whereas q is false.) Another example ofthe problem is given with the inference (discussed by GrahamPriest) from »if A, then ›A‹ is true« and »A« to the conclusion»›A‹ is true«.

Organisation: Heinrich Wansing, Manfred Kupffer

Dienstag/Tuesday, 18.09. Consequence and Consequences – What’s truth got to do with it?


A 702

09:00–09:10 Introduction (Heinrich Wansing)

09:10–10:00 Jc Beall: Logic and Choices

10:10–11:00 Graham Priest: Is the Biconditional of the T-Scheme Material?

11:10–12:00 Peter Schroeder-Heister: What is the proper logic of consequence?

40


E BeallConsequence and Consequences: Logic and Choices

Jc BeallUniversity of Connecticut (United States)

[email protected]

With others, I believe that a consequence of familiar parado-xes is that some things are not consequences of paradox. Lesscryptically: one lesson of the paradoxes is that our logic isparaconsistent (or paracomplete, or perhaps both). But such»para-logics« are notoriously weak. My aim in this talk is todiscuss a new response to such weakness (or, at least, a newway of thinking about an old response to such weakness!). Inshort, there is a difference between logic and inference (Har-man 1986); and Logic sometimes leaves us with »choices«;and we exhibit a »return« to classical inference patterns basedon extra-logical resources. My talk aims to make these ideasclear.

E PriestIs the Biconditional of the T-Scheme Material?

Graham PriestUniversity of Melbourne (Australia)

University of St Andrews (United Kingdom)City University of New York (United States)

[email protected]

It seems to be a truism about truth that ›A‹ is true if and onlyif A. But can we infer A from ›A‹ is true, and vice versa? It isusually assumed that the answer is ›yes‹. In a paraconsistentcontext, this rules out taking the biconditional to be a materialone. This paper explores the opposite possibility.

Schroeder-Heister EWhat is the proper logic of consequence?

Peter Schroeder-HeisterUniversität Tü[email protected]

According to the standard view, consequence means transmis-sion of truth: A consequence statement is valid if its conclu-sion is true given its premisses are true. In this sense truthis the fundamental concept on which consequence is based.From the point of view of proof-theoretic semantics I arguefor reversing this order: Consequence should be taken as a›primordial‹ hypothetical concept which does not rely on acategorical concept such as truth. The proper logic of conse-quence then becomes the logic of consequences, i.e., the logicof consequence statements. I will discuss the implicationsof this view for standard laws of consequence as well as fornotions of inference and (semantic) completeness.

41


F Moral Understanding

The colloquium »Moral Understanding« explores whether andhow recent debates about knowledge vs. understanding andabout epistemic values can shed new light on issues in moralepistemology. In theoretical philosophy, several authors havesuggested that understanding rather than propositional know-ledge should be regarded as the central concept of epistemo-logy since it captures better what we consider a cognitiveachievement. On the one hand, some knowledge (e.g. trivialand irrelevant truths) neither constitutes a cognitive achieve-ment nor contributes to understanding a phenomenon. Onthe other hand, certain cognitive achievements contributeto understanding without constituting knowledge. Idealiza-tions and thought experiments play a crucial role for scien-tific and philosophical understanding although they involvefalse beliefs. Cognitive progress may also be made by develo-ping fruitful categories, but categories are not beliefs. All thisimplies that we acknowledge a plurality of cognitive goals,whose relative significance also depends on pragmatic con-siderations. Consequently, striving for understanding is con-siderably more ambitious than acquiring knowledge. It alsocalls for grasping interconnections between items of know-ledge and for the ability to use information (e.g. arguing

within the framework of a theory, applying results to newsituations and devising suitable (thought) experiments).

The colloquium is based on the assumption that moral theo-ries too primarily aim at understanding rather than know-ledge. Even though the cognitive significance of understan-ding for moral theories has been acknowledged occasionally,there have been hardly any detailed investigations into theconsequences of focusing on moral understanding. First ofall, there is the question of what understanding amountsto in the context of moral theories. More specific questionsinclude: What is the object of moral understanding? Is moralunderstanding factive? What are the epistemic values moraltheories should try to realize? Should pragmatic considerati-ons (e.g. chances for reaching a consensus) shape epistemicgoals of moral theories? Does moral understanding relate in acognitively relevant way to abilities, such as raising relevantquestions, developing illuminating thought experiments andappealing to appropriate examples?

Organisation: Peter Schaber, Christoph Baumberger,Georg Brun, Gertrude Hirsch

Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09. Moral Understanding


Audimax

09:00–09:55 Alison Hills: What is a Moral Expert?

09:55–10:00 Kurze Pause/Short break

10.00–10:55 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord: Moral Know-How and Moral Understanding

10:55–11:05 Pause/Break

11:05–12:00 Gerhard Ernst: The Importance of Moral Understanding

42


F ErnstThe importance of moral understanding

Gerhard ErnstFriedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

[email protected]

Moral knowledge is knowledge about what to do. It typicallytakes the form »It is right for me (in circumstances C) to F«.We can have moral knowledge without having moral under-standing. When someone whom I know to be trustworthy tellsme what to do, I might come to a justified ungettierized truebelief that it is right for me to F (in circumstances C). Nevert-heless, there is something fundamentally defective about thispiece of knowledge: Even if I know that it is right for me toF in C, I might not have a clue as to why it is right for me toF in C. That it is right for me to F in C implies that the bestreasons speak in favor of Fing in C. But you might know thatthe best reasons speak in favor of Fing in C without knowingwhat these reasons are. And when this is the case, you act onwhat, in this connection, has been called a fetish: the merereason that it is right for you to F in C.

In order to be able to do the right thing for the right rea-sons, i.e. to be virtuous, you not only have to know that itis right for you, e.g., to F in C. You also need to know thereasons why it is right for you to F in C, so that the reasonswhich speak in favor of Fing in C can be your reasons for Fingin C. But in order to know reasons you not only have to beaware of certain (natural) facts. You also have to know thatthese facts are reasons, i.e. you have to be able to recognize(natural) facts as reasons. In this paper I shall argue that, atthis point, moral understanding becomes crucial. For knowingthat some (natural) fact is a reason requires being able tolocate the fact in a system of reasons. And being able to do so,in my opinion, is the best candidate we have for what mightbe called »having moral understanding«.

F HillsWhat is a moral expert?

Alison HillsUniversity of Oxford (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

I distinguish a number of different ways in which one couldbe considered a moral expert, both theoretical and practical,with a focus on expertise in moral judgement. I argue thatmoral understanding is crucial to certain particularly import-ant kinds of moral expertise. Distinguishing between impli-cit and explicit understanding, I argue that whilst implicitmoral understanding is sufficient for what I call minimal vir-tue, explicit moral understanding is required for full moralvirtue.

Sayre-McCord FMoral Know-How and Moral Understanding

Geoffrey Sayre-McCordUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (United States)

[email protected]

There is a common, and intuitively attractive, distinction bet-ween knowing that something is the case, and knowing how todo something. This distinction has seemed especially import-ant when it comes to moral (and other »practical«) knowledge,where know-how seemingly takes pride of place. Yet any plau-sible account of moral know-how needs to make sense of howand why the abilities in question count as knowledge. Andit is not clear there is any way to do this without, in effect,reducing knowing how to a kind of knowing that. I explorethe extent to which meeting the challenge is compatible cap-turing what is attractive and important about the originaldistinction.

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G Truth, Meaning, and the Semantics – Pragmatics Distinction

Orthodoxy in philosophy of language has it that semantics isconcerned with truth-conditional meaning of (declarative) sen-tences, while pragmatics deals with use-conditional aspectsof utterances. According to this view, there is a clear cut dis-tinction between the propositional content of sentences onthe one hand, and what is conveyed by sentences or theirutterance in certain conversational settings, on the otherhand. This orthodoxy has come under criticism as it appearsto be unable to give a clear cut analysis of the mechanismsresponsible for the ways in which features of the context ofutterance seem to influence different aspects of meaning innatural language. The purpose of the colloquium »Truth, Mea-

ning, and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction« is to discussproposals of three dominant camps, namely minimalism, inde-xicalism, and pragmaticism and their analyses of how thedistinction between semantics and pragmatics is to be under-stood. Some more general guiding questions are: What is therelation between meaning and truth-conditions? Is propositio-nal content compositional? What are the necessary features ofa context of utterance? And in what ways can they influencethe speaker-meaning of sentences?

Organisation: Elke Brendel, Erik Stei

Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09. Truth, Meaning, and the Semantics – Pragmatics Distinction


A 702

09:00–09:10 Opening

09:10–10:00 Emma Borg: Exploring the mechanisms of linguistic context-sensitivity


10:10–10:50 Zóltan Gendler Szabó: Dyadic Truth


11:10–12:00 Robyn Carston: Linguistic Underdeterminacy, Context and Pragmaticism

44


G BorgExploring the mechanisms of linguistic

context-sensitivity

Emma BorgUniversity of Reading (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

This paper explores a range of mechanisms which have beenposited in philosophy of language in order to explain howlinguistic content becomes sensitive to features drawn from acontext of utterance (namely indexicality, unarticulated con-stituents, modulation, and relativisation of content). I consi-der in what respects these mechanisms differ from one ano-ther and what evidence can be provided that any one of themis required within an adequate semantic theory. It is sugges-ted that positing both unarticulated constituents and a pro-cess like modulation, as some theorists do, is unmotivated,with modulation apparently providing a better solution tovarious problems. It is also argued that relativisation is unat-tractive for various reasons. Thus I suggest that the focus ofdebate should be on indexicality together with the possibilityof semantically relevant modulation of meaning. I then askabout the nature of modulation and explore the implicationsof these findings for semantic theorising in general.

G CarstonLinguistic Underdeterminacy, Context

and Pragmaticism

Robyn CarstonUniversity College London (United Kingdom)

CSMN, University of Oslo (Norway)[email protected]

I take it that the view that linguistically provided contentunderdetermines the utterance content (speaker meaning)recovered by addressees in successful communicative exchan-ges is agreed by virtually everyone working in the field ofsemantics-pragmatics. What remains very much in dispute isthe extent and nature of this short-fall, in particular, whether itincludes components of content that are wholly pragmaticallymotivated (setting aside here cases of conversational implica-ture) or is confined to content whose pragmatic recovery islinguistically indicated (by, for example, indexical elements).The position argued for in this talk is that there is no avoidingthe existence of at least some processes of ›free‹ pragmaticenrichment contributing to what addressees take as the spea-ker-meant propositional content of an utterance and that theremaining questions concern the status of particular cases,whether they are linguistically controlled or free (Carston &Hall, forthcoming).

Among those who accept that pragmatic processes can playthis role in the recovery of utterance content, there are diver-gent views on how these processes work and what they resultin. These divergences hinge to a large extent on differentconceptions of ›semantics‹ and of the role of ›context‹ inutterance comprehension. Contextualists (e.g. Recanati 2004)maintain that the pragmatically-enriched propositional con-tent of an utterance constitutes its (truth-conditional) seman-tics and that this content is determined by context (both lin-

guistic and extra-linguistic). Pragmaticists (e.g. Carston 2008),taking a communicative perspective, maintain that the con-tent that hearers derive (the ›explicature‹) is the outcome ofregular pragmatic inferences geared to the recovery of whatthe speaker meant (her communicative intention). On thisview, the role of context is evidential rather than determina-tive and the resulting content (a hybrid of linguistic meaningand pragmatically inferred meaning) is not the semantics ofanything. Rather, it is simply speaker-meant (or communica-tively intended) content. Semantics is a different matter andcomes in two varieties: a minimalist (often sub-propositional)semantics of linguistic expressions and a truth-conditionalsemantics of (propositional) thoughts, including both explica-tures and implicatures.

Szabó GDyadic Truth

Zoltán Gendler SzabóYale University (United States)

[email protected]

Semantic theories usually employ a triadic notion of truth:they specify the conditions under which a sentence is true in acontext c at an index i. Yet philosophical orthodoxy holds thattruth is absolute. The compromise is forged by two claims.First, that truth belongs primarily to propositions and thereason sentences can have different truth-values in differentcontexts is that they express different propositions in them.So, propositional truth does not depend on context. Second,talk of truth at an index should be paraphrased away: a pro-position it true at a time iff it is, was or will be true when thattime is present and it is true at a possible world iff it wouldbe true if that world were actual. So, propositional truth doesnot depend on index either.

Following Austin, I suggest that the fundamental notionof truth is neither triadic nor monadic. Truth is dyadic: to betrue is to be true of a situation. As a first rough approxima-tion, the semantics works as follows. The semantic value of adeclarative sentence is a property of situations, which I call aproposition. For example, the proposition expressed by ›Samhas the queen of spades‹ in context c is a property p such thatfor all possible situations s, s instantiates p just in case Samhas the queen of spades in s. We also have another function[·]C which assigns to linguistic expressions targets relative tocontexts. Intuitively, the target of an expression in a contextis what the expression is used to talk about in that context.For example, the target of ›Sam has the queen of spades‹ incontext c is a situation – the particular game of poker thespeaker of c is referring to. A declarative sentence S is truerelative to context c iff [S]C instantiates [[S]]C. This semanticsmakes propositional truth context-relative and eschews indi-ces altogether. I argue that it has significant advantages overthe standard theories, both empirically and conceptually.

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H Mindreading versus Teleological Reasoning: Two Ways ofUnderstanding Rational Action

Folk psychology is a powerful tool for understanding humanbehavior. It does so by attributing mental states to humanagents that define standards of rationality and correctness.Actions are thereby evaluated as rational in the light of whatan agent desires and what he believes to be the best wayto satisfy his desires. And actions are evaluated as correct inthe light of norms which an agent understands and to whichhe subscribes. Since folk-psychological reasoning is so entren-ched in our thinking, it is often assumed to be the only wayhow standards of rationality and normative evaluations canbe grounded.

The contributions to this colloquium will reconsider the con-troversy between theory-theory and simulation theory in thelight of a new approach: teleological reasoning. This approachtries to explain rationality and normativity in objective terms,without appealing to the mental states of an agent. An actionis then taken to be rational if it realizes a goal-state that countsas a goal independently of the subjective desires of an agent.

And an action is evaluated as correct if it conforms to a pat-tern that counts as a norm independently of whether an agentunderstands the content of this norm.

Empirical motivation for this teleological approach comesfrom recent work in developmental psychology. There is awealth of empirical evidence indicating that children under-stand actions in teleological terms before they begin to attri-bute beliefs and desires to an agent. While folk-psychologicalreasoning emerges in children only during their fourth year,teleological reasoning can be observed already in infants fromone year on. Josef Perner will start the colloquium by giving anupdate on relevant empirical data. Pierre Jacob will offer a cri-tical examination of this debate from a philosophical point ofview, followed by comments by Johannes Roessler and Hans-Johann Glock.

Organisation: Johannes Brandl, Frank Esken

Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09. Mindreading versus Teleological Reasoning: Two Ways of Understanding Rational Action


A 703

09:00–09:05 Introduction (Johannes Brandl & Frank Esken)

09:05–09:35 Josef Perner: Belief-Desire Psychology and Counterfactual Teleology


09:50–10:20 Pierre Jacob: A puzzle about belief-ascription


10:35–10:50 Coffee break

10:50–11:05 Hanjo Glock (commentator)

11:05–11:20 Johannes Roessler (commentator)

11:20–11:35 Replies from Perner and Jacob

11:35–12:00 General Diskussion

46


H JacobA puzzle about belief-ascription

Pierre JacobInstitut Jean Nicod (France)

[email protected]

Much developmental evidence based on the so-called »stan-dard false belief task« shows that when asked to predict wherean agent with a false belief about an object’s location will lookfor it, children who know the location of the object fail untilthey are well into their fourth year. However, several morerecent experiments based on different paradigms, includingthe violation-of-expectation and anticipatory looking para-digms also show that preverbal human infants are able toreliably represent an agent’s false beliefs. The puzzle is: howto reconcile these more recent findings with the results basedon the standard false belief task? Until very recently therewere two main strategies for solving the puzzle. One strategyis to take the data on preverbal human infants at face valueand show why it is so hard for 3-year-olds to pass the standardfalse belief task. The other strategy is to offer low-level expla-nations for the data on preverbal human infants and deny thatthey are able to represent another’s false beliefs. Recently, athird strategy has emerged based on a so-called »tow-systems«approach to belief-ascription. On behalf of the first strategy, Iwill argue that there is decisive evidence against the secondstrategy and that the third strategy cannot really get off theground.

H PernerBelief-Desire Psychology

and Counterfactual Teleology

Josef PernerUniversity of Salzburg (Austria)

[email protected]

An action is objectively rational if it is the appropriate actionfor reaching a goal. To know whether an action is objectivelyrational one has to figure out from a given goal and current cir-cumstances what the appropriate instrumental action wouldbe. A teleologist uses this scheme for interpreting agents’movements as intentional actions. It is limited, though, tocases where the agent shares the perspective of the teleologistabout what the current circumstances and goals are. When theviews diverge the agent’s actions often become irrational forthe teleologist. Such an agent’s actions can be rationalized(subjective rationality) by considering her subjective beliefsand desires, i.e., with a belief-desire psychology.

When construed as a theory with principles of when mentalstates are created, how they interact, and issue in behaviour(»theory theory«) belief-desire psychology meets an impassewhen it comes to determining the appropriate instrumentalaction to reach a goal. This has to be figured out using one’sown knowledge about the world and can hardly be contai-ned in a theory about the mind – an insight due to simula-tion theory (Heal 1986). Standard simulation theory (Goldman2006) has, however, undesirable features; it relies on pretence(pretend beliefs) and on introspection. As an alternative, teleo-logy can be applied in counterfactual suppositional reasoning

within the agent’s perspective (»teleology in perspective;«Perner & Roessler 2010). This allows the use of one’s own rea-soning about the world, like in simulation, without the needfor pretend mental states or introspection.

I present developmental data showing that, when perspec-tives differ, prediction and explanation of action develops atthe age of about 4 years regardless of whether the perspec-tive difference is due to belief or desire. Four years is also theage at which children master other perspective tasks, whichalso tend to recruit the same cerebral resources in left inferiorparietal regions.

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I The Contribution of the History of Philosophy to the Theory ofPerception

The topic of perception is widely discussed in contemporaryepistemology and philosophy of mind, but it has also beenthe subject of much debate in the history of philosophy: Whatis sensory perception, and in what sense is it epistemicallyrelevant?

In order to answer this question, one must engage one-self with other related questions: Is there a reliable way todistinguish perception from illusion, and if so, how? How isthe relationship between sensory and conceptual elements inperception to be determined, and what significance does thisdetermination have for the possibility of (perceptual) know-

ledge? In what respect(s) is the characterization of perceptionas a »passive« process relevant to the determination of itsepistemological function?

In this colloquium, we intend to discuss three possible ans-wers to these questions that come from different traditionsand epochs in the history of philosophy: the early modernperiod, Kant, and phenomenology. The aim is to look at theadequacy of these various approaches to a contemporarytheory of perception.

Organisation: Dina Emundts, Ursula Renz

Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09. The Contribution of the History of Philosophy to the Theory of Perception

9:00–12:00 (Language: English and German)

A 701

09:00–09:05 Begrüßung und Eröffnung/Welcome and Opening

09:05–09:40 Lisa Shapiro: Hume and Condillac on Consciousness and the Content of Thought

09:40–09:50 Diskussion/Discussion

09:50–10:25 Barry Stroud: Perceptual Knowledge and the Primacy of Judgement


10:35–10:50 Pause / break

10:50–11:25 Gianfranco Soldati: Elements of a Phenomenological Theory of Perception


11:35–12:00 Abschlussdiskussion/Discussion

48


I ShapiroHume and Condillac on Consciousness

and the Content of Thought

Lisa ShapiroSimon Fraser University (Canada)

[email protected]

Hume and Condillac both see themselves as following theEmpiricist programme set out by Locke, and yet their accountsof sensory experience – the foundation of empiricism – divergein interesting ways. For Condillac all sensations are speciesof pleasure and pain; for Hume, though pleasure and painare sensations, not all sensations are pleasant or painful. Thecrux of the difference between Condillac and Hume on thispoint lies in their conception of awareness. For Condillac, asensory experience is essentially owned by a thinking sub-ject, whereas Hume rejects the view that there is a self – orowner – accompanying every thought. Nonetheless, Condil-lac ought not to be taken to suppose a subject’s existingprior to experience, as for him our awareness begins as some-thing quite primitive and develops with our experiences overtime. These different conceptions of awareness would seemto imply different conceptions of the representational con-tent of our sensory experiences. To properly understand whe-rein this difference lies requires a consideration of the roleof force and vivacity in Hume’s account of sensory experi-ence.

I SoldatiElements of a Phenomenological Theory

of Perception

Gianfranco SoldatiFribourg University (Switzerland)

[email protected]

In this paper I shall develop a number of ideas that havetheir origin in Husserl’s theory of perception. I want to arguethat there is room for a phenomenological conception of per-ception and perceptual experience that distinguishes it frommost alternatives that have been formulated so far. Amongthe questions I shall address there is first the issue about Hus-serl’s intentionalism and its supposed opposition to directrealism. I shall argue that Husserl’s epistemic version of directrealism (perceptual experience provide direct justification)does not commit one to support metaphysical direct realism(perceptual experiences do not have genuine correctness con-ditions and depend on their relation to their objects). Theelucidation of Husserl’s epistemology of perception will insiston his notion of perceptual fulfillment, which has to be dis-tinguished from different forms of propositional justification.Perceptual fulfillment, I shall argue, applies originally in thedomain of demonstrative thought, and only derivatively inother domains. It is important to determine what the experi-ence makes manifest in consciousness and thus available as anepistemic basis for judging. Husserl’s inquiries into the role ofattention provide useful insights in this respect. I shall com-pare and contrast them with some more recent work in thatdomain.

Stroud IPerceptual Knowledge and the Primacy of Judgement

Barry StroudUniversity of California at Berkeley (United States)

[email protected]

Broadly ›Kantian‹ views of perception regard judgement orpropositional thought as essential to the possibility of per-ceptual knowledge. Other modern views of perception regardonly things or qualities, not states of affairs, as the properobjects of perception. I think this is what enables broadly›Kantian‹ views to offer the best (perhaps the only) explana-tion of how we know by perception that certain things are soin the world around us.

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J Perspectivism in the Philosophy of Science and Epistomology

In current philosophy of science, the notion of perspectiveand the related idea of perspectivism have become importanttopics. However, the concept of perspective is often unclear inits philosophical application, where it is not merely to be usedin a metaphorical sense. A first goal of the colloquium will the-refore consist in clearly outlining the notion in a philosophicalcontext.

The idea of perspectivity has become crucial in the debateabout scientific representation. Bas van Fraassen’s 2008 bookScientific Representation: The Paradox of Perspective is one ofthe best known examples for this development. On the otherhand, scientific perspectivism had originally been establishedbased on the ideas of perspectival knowledge and scientificobservation. These origins have given room to a number ofdebates: Is perspectivism merely a form of constructivism ormust perhaps collapse into constructivism? Does it imply aform of relativism, or must a proponent of perspectivism, onthe contrary, adopt a version of realism? This leads to thequestion whether scientific perspectivism may establish analternative third position between realism and various formsof antirealism or constructivism in philosophy.

To discuss these questions, the colloquium will bring threeimportant philosophers together: James Conent, Ronald Giereand Paul Teller. James Conent will provide a basis for the col-loquium’s debate by analyzing the concept of perspective andlocating it in the various contexts of discourse in which it isbeing used, presenting varieties of perspectival arguments inphilosophy.

His talk will be followed by Ronald Giere, who associatedperspectivism with a sort of realism that differs from regularrealism while still representing a version of perspectival rea-lism. His paradigm for scientific perspectivism is color vision,which he argues to be analogue to scientific observation.Nonetheless, this relation is still controversial and subjectof debate.

Another important question related to perspectivism is thatof ontology. Paul Teller will address this question in his presen-tation. He argues for a perspectivism of scientific knowledgethat claims that our knowledge is based on »complementaryontologies«, all needed for a robust understanding of reality.

Organisation: Jörn Wüstenberg

Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09. Perspektivismus in der Wissenschaftstheorie und der Erkenntnistheorie/Perspectivism inPhilosophy of Science and Epistemology

9:00–12:00 (Language: English and German)

A 704

09:00–09:15 Einleitung/Introduction (Jörn Wüstenberg)

09:15–10:00 James Conant: Varieties of Perspectivism


10:00–10:55 Ronald Giere: Scientific Perspectivism: Elaborations and Explorations


11:05–11:50 Paul Teller: What Is It to Give an Ontology?


12:00 Mittagspause/Lunch Break

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J ConantVarieties of Perspectivism

James ConantUniversity of Chicago (United States)

[email protected]

The aim of the paper is to distinguish four rather differentphilosophical positions, all of which can be and have beenassociated with the term ›perspectivism‹ and to clarify the dia-lectical relation between these four philosophical positions.The positions in question run the gamut from robust realismto strident anti-realism. That the same term and some of thesame philosophical considerations can be and have been asso-ciated with opposite poles in the realism/anti-realism debatesuggests that there is considerable unclarity in what is at stakein a philosophical position being a version of perspectivism.The primary goal of the paper is to diagnose some of thesources of these unclarities.

J GiereScientific Perspectivism: Elaborations and Explorations

Ronald N. GiereUniversity of Minnesota (United States)

[email protected]

Since the publication of my Scientific Perspectivism, therehave been several lines of criticism coming from apparentlydifferent directions. One line suggests that perspectivism slipsinto constructivism. An opposing line suggests that perspecti-vism presupposes scientific realism. Cutting across these linesis the question whether there are weaker and stronger formsof perspectivism. The weaker form takes perspectivism to bea response to our epistemological situation. There are truthsout in the world, but our methods are not strong enough relia-bly to discover them. We must settle for developing variousperspectives on what the truths might be. A stronger formof perspectivism denies the independent existence of truthsin the world, leaving perspectives as our only option. I willargue for the stronger form.

I would also like to explore perspectivist views in the workof some recent prominent philosophers of science, particularlyFeyerabend, Kuhn, and Putnam. Regarding Kuhn in particular,it is easy to understand his original paradigms as providinga perspective within which scientists formulate hypothesesand design experiments. But his later writings are even moreexplicit, suggesting a form of perspectival realism. My tenta-tive conclusion is that, although the rhetoric of perspectivismhas been absent, perspectivism as a form of conceptual con-structivism has been a widespread view within the philosophyof science for half a century. Here conceptual constructivismis distinguished from a prominent form of social construc-tivism, which is an account of the mechanisms of consensusformation in science. Perspectivism, on the other hand, is com-patible with standard accounts of hypothesis formation andtesting while allowing room for social and other influences intheory choice.

Teller JWhat Is It to Give an Ontology?

Paul TellerUniversity of California at Davis (United States)

[email protected]

We think of the ontologist’s job as that of figuring out, whatis the true ontology of the world. A tough job because, todayand for at least a long time to come, even our best theories arehighly idealized, not true. Consider the example of water: Tounderstand the fluid properties of water we idealize it as a con-tinuous medium, and to understand dispersive, electrolyticand other properties we idealize it as a collection of thermallymoving particles. We think that the particulate ontology is»more nearly right«. I argue against this attitude, urging thatinstead we should think of the two water models both as legi-timate ways of understanding aspects of the world, both ofwhich, given human limitations, we must have for the ourbest available way of getting at the world. And I argue thatthis »water / water« moral applies very generally to all ourtheoretical knowledge. Given that the world is too complica-ted for us to devise theories that are both completely preciseand completely accurate, our theoretical knowledge of theworld is ineliminably pluralistic. The same sort of conclusi-ons apply also to our prescientific, in particular to perceptualknowledge. We have a kind of »reifying instinct« that makesus think intuitively as direct realists. But perception essentiallyinvolves representation, and where representation in sciencealways fails of perfect precision and / or accuracy, the more sodoes this hold for perception. This conclusion is well illustra-ted and supported by what we know of color perception thatis not of some independent, intrinsic properties of externalobjects, but is a complex, approximate, and dynamic relationamong us, perceptual targets and the intervening environ-ment. So the conclusion holds with complete generality: Ourepistemic limitations dictate that, rather than choosing someone correct ontology from among competing rivals, humanknowledge works with complementary ontologies all of whichwe need for a robust but never exact understanding of whatthere is.

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Sektionen/Sections

Sprachphilosophie 1 Philosophy of Language

Metaphysik und Ontologie 2 Metaphysics and Ontology

Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie 3 Logic and Philosophy of Science

Philosophie des Geistes 4 Philosophy of Mind

Erkenntnistheorie 5 Epistemology

Religionsphilosophie und Ästhetik 6 Philosophy of Religion and Aesthetics

Angewandte Ethik, Politische, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 7 Applied Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law andSocial Philosophy

Normative Ethik, Metaethik, Handlungs- undEntscheidungstheorie

8 Normative Ethics, Metaethics, Theory of Action and Theory ofDecision

Sektionen / Sections

7 AicherProblems of advance directives in psychiatric care

Simone AicherUniversität [email protected]

Advance directives are a powerful tool for prospective patientsto manage end-of-life treatment prior to a state of incompe-tence. Since documents of this kind are becoming more andmore popular amongst people who suffer from severe mentalillness, it is worth examining psychiatric advance directives(PADs) in more detail. Professionals like psychiatrists, psycho-logists and social workers sometimes raise critical voices aboutPADs, pointing to implementation problems on the one handand questioning its moral authority on the other hand. Alt-hough patients’ and professionals’ attitudes are appropriatelystudied with the help of empirical research methods, ethicaltheory poses equally important questions about (surrogate)decision-making as well as (precedent) autonomy, paterna-lism, coercion, trust and personal identity which are relevantto the bioethical debate surrounding PADs. It is therefore ofutmost importance in the present debate to consider bothethical theory and empirical research. In this very paper Iwant to address some philosophically relevant questions con-cerning PADs: First of all, I am interested in how psychiatricadvance directives differ from other medical advance direc-tives (e.g. in palliative care) and why it is important to ack-nowledge this difference. Second, I will turn to the bioethicalprinciple of autonomy and the concept of voluntary informedconsent insofar as it relates to the debate surrounding PADs.Finally, I will focus on the problem of (surrogate) decision-making in case of mentally ill patients and the moral authorityof PADs.

3 AlscherNegative Resultate über Interpretierbarkeit in RCF

Daniel AlscherHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

Eine wichtige Frage der Philosophie der Mathematik beschäf-tigt sich mit den Grundlagen der Mathematik. Dabei spielthäufig die Idee eine Rolle, Mathematik oder umfassendere Teil-bereiche auf ein bestimmtes Gebiet zurückzuführen. Mit Hilfeder Logik können solche Reduktionen als Relationen zwischenTheorien formal bestimmt und untersucht werden. Auch unab-hängig von der Frage nach den Grundlagen der Mathematikwerden dabei Einsichten in die Zusammenhänge mathemati-scher Theorien gewonnen.

Im Lichte der Unterscheidung zwischen diskreter und ste-tiger Mathematik und ausgehend von der Menge der reellenZahlen als Paradigma der Kontinua, stellt sich die Frage, inwie-weit eine Theorie der reellen Zahlen als Grundlage anderermathematischer Theorien dienen könnte. Während es auf derHand liegt, bestimmte stetige Objektbereiche (wie geometri-sche Räume oder komplexe Zahlen) auf reelle Zahlen zurück-zuführen, erwartet man von diskreter Mathematik eher, dassihre Reduzierung auf eine Theorie der reellen Zahlen nicht zubewerkstelligen ist. Diese Erwartung soll hier bestätigt wer-

den. Dabei werden als Repräsentationen mathematischer Teil-bereiche prädikatenlogische Theorien erster Stufe mit Identi-tät dienen, als Theorie der reellen Zahlen wird die vollständigeTheorie RCF der reell abgeschlossenen Körper gewählt und derReduzierbarkeitszusammenhang wird durch die intertheore-tische Relation der relativen Interpretierbarkeit formalisiert.Dementsprechend werden negative Resultate über die Inter-pretierbarkeit in RCF gezeigt. Die zu behandelnden Beispielediskreter Mathematik sind Arithmetik, diskrete Ordnungen,Paarfunktionen und Boole’sche Algebren.

Außerdem können diese Ergebnisse einen Beitrag zu einerpräziseren Distinktion zwischen diskreter und stetiger Mathe-matik leisten. Zunächst ist die klassische Unterscheidung mit-tels der Mächtigkeit der zu Grunde liegenden Objektbereiche(diskret – abzählbar, stetig – überabzählbar) wegen des Löwen-heim-Skolem-Theorems auf prädikatenlogische Theorien ersterStufe nicht anwendbar. Ein alternativer Vorschlag ist es nun,gewisse Theorien aufgrund ihrer Interpretierbarkeit in RCF alsTheorien stetiger Mathematik aufzufassen. Ein Argument fürdieses Kriterium besteht dann im Nachweis, dass bestimmteTheorien, welche klassischerweise der diskreten Mathematikzugeschrieben werden, nicht in RCF interpretierbar sind.

Andric 8A New Argument for Subjective Consequentialism

Vuko AndricUniversität Konstanz

[email protected]

Consequentialists argue about how their theory should bestbe understood. Subjective consequentialism is the doctrinethat an act is right if and only if it maximizes expected value,otherwise the act is wrong. Subjective Consequentialism’smost important rival is objective consequentialism. Accordingto objective consequentialism, an act is right if and only if itmaximizes actual value, otherwise the act is wrong.

This paper aims to defend a new argument for subjectiveconsequentialism which I call the argument from limitedtasks. The basic idea is that consequentialism gives you alimited task because the states of affairs you ought to bringabout according to consequentialism are not ideal (in a sensewhich will be specified in the talk). In the case of limitedtasks, agents ought to maximize expected rather than actualvalue. Therefore, consequentialists should accept subjectiveconsequentialism.

Bagattini 7Kindeswohl als moralpsychologischer Grundbegriff

Alexander BagattiniUniversität Düsseldorf

[email protected]

Der Begriff des Kindeswohls, bzw. des kindlichen Wohlerge-hens, wird häufig in öffentlichen Debatten in politischen,medizinischen und pädagogischen Kontexten verwendet. Hier-bei gibt es einen breiten Konsens darüber, dass das Kindeswohlein relevantes und schützenswertes Gut ist. Gleichwohl gibt essowohl auf praktischer als auch auf theoretischer Ebene keine

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einheitliche Meinung darüber, worin das Kindeswohl genaubesteht. Eine philosophische Analyse kann an dieser Stelleweiterhelfen, indem normative und deskriptive Bedingungendes Kindeswohls geklärt werden. In diesem Vortrag soll aufdie Unklarheiten des Kindeswohlbegriffs eingegangen werden,die mit dem Begriff des Wohlergehens – des well-being – einerPerson zusammenhängen.

Ausgehend von der These, dass der Kindeswohlbegriffschwach paternalistisch (auf das beste Interesse des Kindesbezogen) zu verstehen ist, soll untersucht werden, ob undinwiefern sich die allgemeine philosophische Debatte um denBegriff des Wohlergehens einer Person auf eine Analyse desKindeswohlbegriffs übertragen lässt. In einem ersten Schrittwird sowohl eine präferenz utili taris ti sche als auch eineeudämonistische Analyse des Kindeswohlbegriffs zurückge-wiesen. Während die utilitaristischen Ansätze gewissermaßenzu wenig normative Grundlage für eine Bestimmung des Kin-deswohlbegriffs liefern, oszillieren eudämonistische Ansätzezwischen einer zu starken oder zu vagen normativen Grund-lage.

In einem zweiten Schritt wird dann eine mittlere Positionfür eine Bestimmung des Kindeswohlbegriffs vorschlagen, diesich an Maslows Modell der Grundbedürfnisse orientiert, dasfünf menschliche Grundbedürfnisse unterscheidet: physiologi-sche Bedürfnisse, Sicherheit, soziale Bedürfnisse, Individual-bedürfnisse und Selbstverwirklichung. Der Vorteil dieser Posi-tion gegenüber den utilitaristischen Ansätzen liegt darin, dassBedürfnisse im Gegensatz zu Präferenzen einen intrinsisch nor-mativen Charakter haben. Insbesondere die psychologischeForschung und die Bildungsforschung liefern starke empiri-sche Belege dafür, dass Bedürfnisse auf allen fünf Ebenen fürdas Kindeswohl relevant sind. Der Vorteil des Bedürfnis-Ansat-zes gegenüber eudämonistischen Konzeptionen des Kindes-wohls liegt darin, dass deren Stärke (eine robuste normativeGrundlage) bewahrt wird, ohne aber mit deren notorischenProblemen (Elitarismus oder Relativismus) behaftet zu sein.Ich werde argumentieren, dass diese beiden Vorteile guteGründe dafür liefern, einen auf dem Bedürfnisbegriff basie-renden Kindeswohlbegriff anzunehmen.

5 Balcerak JacksonImagination and the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction

Magdalena Balcerak JacksonUniversität Köln

[email protected]

In this paper I argue that imagination provides us with apriori justification and I draw consequences for the traditionala priori / a posteriori distinction.

From an epistemic point of view, imagination is a puzzlingcognitive capacity: When we imagine a red apple we are in alot of ways in a mental state that is similar to the perceptualstate of seeing a red apple. However, while we rely on theinput of the external environment to exercise our capacity ofperceiving, we can exercise our capacity of imagination evenabsent any external input in the philosophical armchair. So,does imagination provide us with any sort of evidence? And ifso, is it a posteriori like the evidence we get from sensory expe-rience, or is it a priori like the evidence we get from reasoningand/or understanding?

Baumberger 5Defining Explanatory Understanding

Christoph BaumbergerETH Zürich (Switzerland)

[email protected]

In spite of the increasing interest in the concept of under-standing, epistemologists have offered little in the way ofits analysis. I propose a definition of explanatory understan-ding. First, I argue with reference to testimonial cases thatin contrast to knowledge why p, understanding why p invol-ves a grasp of the causes or reasons why p that manifestsitself in an ability to explain p as well as an ability to justifyone’s explanation. Since one can have these abilities to a grea-ter or lesser degree, understanding-why is gradual. Second, Iargue that one’s explanation has to answer the facts but incontrast to knowledge-why, understanding-why is not alwaysfactive. Third, I argue that a definition of understanding-why does not need an epistemically external anti-luck con-dition.

As a result, I suggest that S understands why p (to someextent) iff (1) S has the justified true belief that p and herjustification is independent from her explanation of p, (2) Scommits herself to an explanation E which explains p with q,(3) S is (to some extent) able (a) to explain p with q by meansof E and (b) to justify E, and (4) E answers (to some extent)to the facts. Condition (3, a) requires being (to some extent)able (i) to draw the conclusion that p from the informationthat q and, given the information that p, give the explanationthat q, (ii) to explain how q can cause p or be a reason whyp, and (iii) for some p* and q*, similar but not identical top and q, draw the conclusion that p* from the assumptionthat q*, and, assuming that p*, give the explanation that q*.Condition (3, b) requires being (to some extent) able to showthat E (i) is coherent and coheres with background beliefs,(ii) is empirically adequate, and (iii) optimizes explanatorydesiderata.

Finally, I argue against reducing explanatory understan-ding to propositional understanding and indicate how mydefinition can be adapted to objectual understanding.

Baumgartner 4Is it possible to experimentally reveal

non-reductive mental causation?

Michael BaumgartnerUniversität Osnabrück

[email protected]

Arguments of causal exclusion, as most famously advancedby Kim (1989; 2003; 2005), aim to expose a tension withinthe position of non-reductive physicalists, who (among otherthings) endorse the following claims: (i) the domain of thephysical is causally closed, (ii) mental properties non-reduc-tively supervene on physical properties, and (iii) mental pro-perties may be causes of physical effects of their own super-venience bases. The tension revealed by exclusion argumentsexists between the first two claims and the third: it is unclearhow something that is not reducible to the physical domain,i.e. something ultimately nonphysical, could causally affect

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the domain of the physical, even though the latter is causallyclosed.

In recent years, the argumentative strategies adopted bynon-reductive physicalists to immunize their position againstthe threat posed by exclusion arguments have been supple-mented by an experimentalist strategy. Authors as Shapiroand Sober (2007), Woodward (2008), or List and Menzies (2009)argue that the currently very popular interventionist approachto causation – as most exhaustively presented in Woodward(2003) – provides techniques of causal discovery and mode-ling that allow for experimentally confirming the possibilityof non-reductive mental-to-physical causation, i.e. that supplyempirical evidence for claim (iii).

This paper argues that experimentally revealing non-reduc-tive mental-to-physical causation is by far not as straightfor-ward as non-reductive physicalists would like to have it. Inthe first part, I show that standard interventionist techniquesof causal discovery as developed in Woodward (2003) are infact not applicable to cases of mental-to-physical causation.The second part is then concerned with conceivable adapta-tions of interventionist techniques that are custom-built forstructures featuring downward mental causation. However, itwill turn out that these custom-built techniques, in principle,cannot produce empirical evidence that would favor (iii) overits negation. Overall, the paper concludes that the experimen-talist defense of non-reductive physicalism fails.

7 BeckUnternehmensverantwortung und partielle

Normenkonformität

Valentin BeckGoethe-Universität Frankfurt am [email protected]

Ob Unternehmen überhaupt als Subjekte moralischer Verant-wortung gelten können, ist eine immer noch kontrovers debat-tierte Grundfrage der Unternehmensethik. Ich werde in mei-nem Vortrag eine affirmative Antwort auf diese Frage voraus-setzen und mich auf die Anschlussfrage konzentrieren, wie derUmfang von Unternehmensverantwortung genauer zu bestim-men ist. Dazu werde ich in einem ersten Schritt interaktionaleund strukturelle Verantwortung als zwei für die Zuschreibungvon Unternehmensverantwortung wichtige Verantwortungs-formen unterscheiden, die eine unterschiedliche Adressaten-richtung aufweisen. Die Zuschreibung von interaktionaler Ver-antwortung erfolgt mit Blick auf die Normenkonformität desjeweiligen Verantwortungssubjekts in der direkten Interak-tion mit seinen Verantwortungsadressaten. Im Unterschieddazu erfolgt die Zuschreibung von struktureller Verantwor-tung mit Blick auf den Einfluss von Verantwortungssubjektenauf soziale Strukturen, die diese mit ihren Verantwortungs-adressaten verbinden. Es zeigt sich, dass struktureller Unter-nehmensverantwortung ein wichtiger Stellenwert zukommt,auch wenn sie viel seltener als interaktionale Unternehmens-verantwortung zugeschrieben wird und auch in theoretischerHinsicht eher noch unterbelichtet ist.

In einem zweiten Schritt gehe ich ausführlicher auf Mög-lichkeiten ein, den Umfang von interaktionaler und struktu-reller Unternehmensverantwortung unter Berücksichtigungder partiellen Normenkonformität von relevanten Akteurensubstantiell zu bestimmen. Es gilt, interaktionale und struk-

turelle Unternehmensverantwortung in ein adäquates Ver-hältnis zueinander zu setzen und systematisch abzuwägen,wofür Unternehmen unter ungerechten Hintergrundbedingun-gen jeweils interaktional und strukturell verantwortlich sind.Diesbezüglich verteidige ich die These, dass struktureller Ver-antwortung von Unternehmen unter diesen Umständen einvergleichsweise großer Stellenwert zukommt. Unternehmenund insbesondere multinationale Konzerne sind auch struk-turell relativ wirkmächtige Akteure, die ihren Einfluss häufigdirekt auf politischer Ebene geltend machen. Nach der Ver-gegenwärtigung eines Spektrums von unterschiedlich weitgehender interaktionaler und struktureller Unternehmensver-antwortung argumentiere ich dafür, dass Unternehmen ininteraktionaler Hinsicht mindestens dafür verantwortlich sind,geltendes positives Recht nicht zu verletzen, und in struktu-reller Hinsicht, solche Strukturreformen nicht aktiv zu ver-hindern, die Hintergrundungerechtigkeit reduzieren würden.Die Verantwortung von Unternehmen reicht jedoch weiter: Jenach ihren spezifischen Einflussmöglichkeiten können sie ihrermoralischen Verantwortung entweder interaktional durch dieEinlösung eines fairen Anteils nachkommen, der sich durch einkontrafaktisches Szenario vollständiger Normenkonformitätbestimmen lässt, oder aber durch einen positiven Beitrag zustrukturellen Reformen, die zu mehr Hintergrundgerechtigkeitund zu einer Verrechtlichung von interaktionaler Verantwor-tung führen.

Bleisch 7Rabentöchter? Rabensöhne?

Zur Begründung filialer Pflichten

Barbara BleischUniversität Bern (Switzerland)

[email protected]

Sind erwachsene Kinder ihren Eltern in spezieller Hinsicht ver-pflichtet? Gibt es – analog zur »Rabenmutter«, die ihren Nach-wuchs vernachlässigt – auch die »Rabentochter« und den»Rabensohn«, die einen moralischen Fehler begehen, weil siesich nicht (hinreichend) um ihre Eltern kümmern? Dieser Bei-trag untersucht, ob Kindschaft ein Umstand ist, der speziellePflichten generiert. In den ersten drei Abschnitten werdendrei gängige Begründungsmodelle solcher filialer Pflichten kri-tisch diskutiert: das Dankbarkeitsmodell, das Reziprozitäts-modell und das Freundschaftsmodell. Da keines der gängigenModelle abschliessend zu überzeugen vermag, soll im viertenAbschnitt mittels einer Analyse der ›Nicht-Aufkündbarkeit‹ derEltern-Kind-Beziehung ein alternatives Modell entwickelt wer-den: das Identitäts modell filialer Pflichten. Es leitet entspre-chende Verpflichtungen direkt aus der Eltern-Kind-Beziehungab, welche die Identität von Eltern wie deren Söhne und Töch-ter massiv prägt. Dieses identitätsstiftende Moment der Eltern-Kind-Beziehung ist dabei unabhängig davon, ob diese Bezie-hungen gelingen oder nicht. Fokussieren wir auf die Schatten-seiten solcher Relationen, wird umso deutlicher, wie geradederen identitätsstiftender Charakter mit einer extremen Ver-letzbarkeit der Beteiligten einhergeht. Die filiale Pflicht ver-langt deshalb, im Bewusstsein dieser besonderen wechselseiti-gen Verletzbarkeit respektvoll mit den eigenen Eltern umzu-gehen. Eine solche Herangehensweise an filiale Pflichten impli-ziert zweierlei: Erstens lässt sich über deren Inhalt nichts All-gemeines, sondern nur Partikulares sagen, denn jede Bezie-

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hung birgt andere Grade und Formen gemeinsamer Identi-tät und wechselseitiger Verletzbarkeit. Zweitens erweisen sichfiliale Pflichten, so begründet, als nicht-exklusiv für die Eltern-Kind-Beziehung. Vielmehr sind sie reduzierbar auf die gene-relle Pflicht, andere Menschen nicht zu verletzen. Diese Pflichterfährt jedoch in der Eltern-Kind-Beziehung eine ganz beson-dere Wichtigkeit und Ausprägung.

1 BluhmDon’t Ask, Look! Linguistic Corpora

as a Tool for Conceptual Analysis

Roland BluhmTU Dortmund

[email protected]

Ordinary Language Philosophy has largely fallen out of favourand with it the belief in the primary importance of analysesof ordinary language for philosophical purposes. Still, in theirvarious endeavours philosophers not only from analytic butalso from other backgrounds make reference to the use and/ or meaning of terms of interest in ordinary parlance. Indoing so, they most commonly appeal to their own lingui-stic intuitions (in the sense of their active knowledge of theobject language). Not uncommonly, the appeal to individualintuitions is supplemented by reference to dictionaries. Inrecent times, internet search engine queries on expressions ofinterest have become quite popular. Apparently, the attemptis to surpass the limits of one’s own linguistic intuitions byappeal to experts or to factual uses of language. I will arguethat this attempt is recommendable but that its execution iswanting. Instead of appealing to dictionaries and / or internetqueries, philosophers should employ computer-based lingui-stic corpora in order to confirm or falsify hypotheses aboutthe factual use of language. This also has some advantagesover methods employed by experimental philosophy. If theimportance of ordinary language is stressed, the use of lingui-stic corpora is hardly avoidable.

Braham 8The Formula of Universal Law:

A Reconstruction

Matthew BrahamUniversity of Bayreuth

[email protected]

This paper provides a methodologically original and preciserendition of the version of Kant’s Categorical Imperativeknown as the »Formula of Universal Law« (FUL). A formalstructure consisting of possible worlds and games – a »gameframe« – is used to interpret a Kantian maxim and to definethe two tests of FUL: the so-called »contradiction in concep-tion« and »contradiction in the will« tests. The analysis ofthe resulting formal structure demonstrates how FUL fails togenerate the conclusions that Kant thought could be derivedfrom it. In particular, we reinforce existing doubts that Kant’sfamous defence of the duty of beneficence cannot be sustai-ned. Furthermore, we show that certain agent-neutral formsof consequentialism satisfy FUL. We conclude by suggestingthat the problems can be circumvented if we focus on whatwe call »comprehensive« Kantianism, which is the applicationof FUL to systems of maxims rather than to isolated maxims.

Bratu 7Liberalismus, Handlungsfreiheit

und Autonomie

Christine BratuLudwig-Maximilians-Universität München

[email protected]

Häufig wird behauptet, dem Liberalismus als einer Theoriedes wechselseitigen Miteinanders ginge es um den Schutzder individuellen Handlungsfreiheit. Sein normativer Kernge-danke sei daher ein individuelles Recht auf Freiheit, aus demnicht nur den Individuen untereinander, sondern vor allemauch dem Staat gegenüber seinen Bürgern bestimmte Pflich-ten erwachsen. In meinem Vortrag möchte ich zeigen, dassdiese Annahme für den Kontext der politischen Philosophiefalsch ist: Denn der Liberalismus setzt sich nur insofern fürdie Handlungsfreiheit der Bürger gegenüber dem Staat ein,als diese notwendig ist für deren Autonomie. D. h. das Legiti-mitätskriterium, das der Liberalismus an staatliches Handelnanlegt, sichert den Bürgern genau diejenigen Handlungsalter-nativen, die sie brauchen, um autonom handeln zu können;doch sofern eine Handlungsoption keine ist, in der sich dieAutonomie der Bürger manifestieren könnte, muss sie staatli-chen Eingriffen nicht entzogen werden.

Um für diese These zu argumentieren, werde ich in einemersten Teil darlegen, was man grundsätzlich unter deskripti-ver Handlungsfreiheit verstehen sollte. Dafür stelle ich zuerstbestimmte Kriterien auf, denen eine adäquate Explikation desBegriffs der Handlungsfreiheit gerecht werden muss. Hier wirdsich zwar zum einen zeigen, dass keine der gängigen Auffas-sungen von Freiheit all diesen Kriterien genügen kann; zudemwird aber deutlich, dass man insgesamt an einer bestimm-ten Version einer negativen Auffassung von Freiheit festhal-ten sollte. In einem zweiten Teil möchte ich dann darstel-len, dass es, gegeben die zuerst entwickelte Auffassung von

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Handlungsfreiheit, eben nicht diese ist, um deren Schutz esdem Liberalismus geht. Denn das Freiheitsrecht, das klassi-sche liberale ebenso wie libertäre Autoren den Individuengegenüber dem Staat einräumen, schützt vielmehr nur die-jenigen Handlungsalternativen vor staatlichem Zugriff, diefür ein autonomes Leben notwendig sind. Diese Erkenntnisist nicht nur deswegen interessant, weil sie ein weitverbrei-tetes Missverständnis – dem auch viele Anhänger des Libera-lismus anheimfallen – aufklärt: Ausgehend von ihr lässt sichzudem zum einen klären, worin genau der Unterschied zwi-schen Liberalismus und Libertarismus besteht; vor allem abereröffnet sie neue Perspektiven hinsichtlich der Frage, wie manfür den normativen Kerngedanken des Liberalismus argumen-tieren sollte.

5 BriesenReliabilism and Epistemic Circularity

Jochen BriesenUniversität Konstanz

[email protected]

Pretheoretically we hold that we cannot gain justification orknowledge through an epistemically circular reasoning pro-cess. Epistemically circular reasoning occurs when a subjectforms the belief that p on the basis of an argument A, whereat least one of the premises of A already presupposes the truthof p. It has often been argued that process reliabilism doesnot rule out that this kind of circular reasoning leads to justifi-cation or knowledge (cf. the so-called bootstrapping-problemor the easy-knowledge-problem). For some philosophers, thisis a reason to reject reliabilism. Those who try to defend relia-bilism have two basic options: (1) accept that reliabilism doesnot rule out circular reasoning, but argue that circular reaso-ning is not as epistemically »bad« as it seems, or (2) hold onto the view that circular reasoning is epistemically »bad«, butdeny that reliabilism really allows this kind of epistemicallycircular reasoning. After all, reliabilists claim that a belief isjustified (or an instance of knowledge) only if it is the resultof a reliable belief-forming process. And it is at the very leastquestionable whether circular reasoning could constitute sucha reliable process.

Option (1) has been spelled out in several ways, all of whichhave found to be problematic for various reasons. Option (2),however, has not been discussed very widely, and where itis considered, it is usually quickly dismissed. In this paper Iwill thus spell out option (2) in more detail and discuss itsprospects and problems. I will argue that the reasons whyoption (2) has been dismissed are not convincing and thatoption (2) might in fact be a more promising starting point todefend reliabilism than option (1).

Brössel 3Ein Argument für den Bestätigungspluralismus

Peter BrösselJohannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz

[email protected]

Dieses Paper präsentiert ein einfaches Argument für denBestätigungspluralismus, d. i. die Position, dass eine adäquateBestätigungstheorie mehr als ein Bestätigungsmaß benötigt.Hierfür wird zunächst nachgewiesen, dass es keine Bestäti-gungsmaß geben kann, welches alle Aufgaben einer Bestäti-gungstheorie gerecht wird. Konkret wird aufgezeigt, dass inder Geschichte der Wissenschaftstheorie zwei Aufgaben alsdie Kernaufgaben einer Bestätigungstheorie angesehen wer-den. Zum einen soll eine Bestätigungstheorie angeben, welcheTheorien Wissenschaftler im Lichte der Beobachtungsdatenakzeptieren sollen; zum anderen soll eine Bestätigungstheorieangeben, welche Experimente Wissenschaftler ausführen soll-ten, um wissenschaftliche Theorien zu testen. Die Annahme,dass es eine Bestätigungsmaß gibt, welches beiden Aufga-ben gerecht wird, setzt voraus, dass dieses Bestätigungsmaßzum einen angibt, wie akzeptable eine Theorie im Lichteder Beobachtungsdaten ist, und zum anderen angibt, wiesehr die Beobachtungsdaten eine Theorie stützen bzw. schwä-chen. Abschließend wird gezeigt, dass es keine solches Bestäti-gungsmaß geben kann. Als Konsequenz ergibt sich, dass eineBestätigungstheorie, welche beiden Aufgaben gerecht wer-den möchte, mehr als ein Bestätigungsmaß beinhalten muss:eines, welches angibt, wie akzeptable eine Theorie im Lichteder Beobachtungsdaten ist, und eines, welches angibt, wiesehr die Beobachtungsdaten eine Theorie stützen bzw. schwä-chen.

Brüggen 4The content of imaginings

Anne-Sophie BrüggenRuhr-Universität Bochum

[email protected]

Sensory imaginings and perceptual experiences are often con-sidered to be similar mental states. Nevertheless we are typi-cally able to reliably distinguish perceptual from imaginativestates. So what exactly is the difference between perceptualexperiences and sensory imaginings? The main goal of thispaper is to answer this question by elucidating the distinctivenature of imaginative content. To do so I will concentrate onone feature often claimed to distinguish imaginings from per-ceptions, which is the different relation of the subject’s will tothe content of the respective kind of state. While the contentof (veridical) perceptual experiences is dependent on externalfactors and will-independent, imaginings are held to be will-dependent. What is imagined is determined by the subject’sintention.

I will analyze this particular feature of imaginings by recon-sidering a claim about the content of visual imaginings andthe role of imaginative intentions: the so-called Multiple UseThesis of imagination (MULT), which has been endorsed (impli-citly or explicitly) by many authors. MULT claims that thesame mental image can serve different imaginative projects.

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The same mental image can be used to imagine an apple andto imagine a perfect wax replica of an apple. The idea is thatmental images are enriched or accompanied by some other,will-dependent and supposition-like mental states which the-reby fix the overall imaginative content. According to MULT,the will-dependency of imaginings becomes manifest mainlyin the supposition-like states which conceptually grasp mentalimages.

But MULT raised several questions, e.g.: If the same mentalimage can be used in different imaginative projects, what isthe intrinsic content of the »neutral« mental image? Afterreviewing MULT on the basis of this criticism, I will offer analternative account to construe imaginative content and therole of will-dependent imaginative intentions. In the case ofimaginings the subject’s will-dependent intention determineswhat the imagining is an imagining of. The role of the will-dependent imaginative intentions is stronger than assumedby MULT: imaginative intentions do not only accompany men-tal images but rather directly act on their content. So there isno room for »neutral« mental images.

8 BrunIntuitions and reflective equilibrium –

an uneasy combination?

Georg BrunETH & Universität Zürich (Switzerland)

[email protected]

The method of reflective equilibrium (RE) is often charac-terized in terms of intuitions or conceived of as a methodfor justifying intuitions. I argue that the method of REcannot be characterized in terms of intuitions, but can beapplied to intuitions if intuitions are not taken to have anepistemic privilege which makes them immune from revi-sion.

The core of the method of RE is that justification is a matterof agreement between judgements and principles, reached bymutual adjustments. The distinction between judgements andprinciples involves two contrasts: At every stage in a processof developing a RE, (»current«) judgements differ from prin-ciples insofar as judgements include a commitment, whereasprinciples are elements of a proposed systematic account. Asecond contrast can be found between the resulting accountand the (»antecedent«) commitments the RE-process startedout with. If intuitions are to enter this picture, they must playthe role of commitments.

Once RE has been reached, all current commitments canbe derived from principles. Those entertained solely for thisreason are not intuitions since intuitions cannot be producedby conscious inference. Characterizing RE in terms of intuiti-ons is therefore inadequate. Nevertheless, intuitions can beinvolved in a RE as antecedent commitments and in this waycontribute to justification by RE; but justification by RE doesnot exclusively rest on intuitions. Moreover, the method of REcan also be applied to intuitions: an intuition counts as justi-fied by RE iff a commitment with the same content is includedin the commitments that are in RE with the principles. Thisapproach is compatible with the claim that some intuitionsmay prove impossible to give up.

However, some accounts of intuitions are incompatible withthe method of RE. If intuitions are granted not only »initial

credibility« but an epistemic privilege to be immune fromrevision (e.g. reliability or self-justification), then intuitionsmust be justified in some way independent of RE. If moralintuitionism holds that intuitions are justified independentlyof any inferential backing, intuitions again cannot be justifiedby RE.

Brzozowski 2Defending Weak Supplementation

Jacek Jerzy BrzozowskiUniversität zu Köln

[email protected]

The Weak Supplementation Principle is one of the core axiomsof Minimal Mereology. It says that when an object has a pro-per part, it has another proper part that does not overlap withthe former proper part. This is supposed to capture the ideathat if there is a bit of something (a part distinct from thatobject), then there must be a bit more of that object (ano-ther distinct part). The principle is highly intuitive, and haseven been thought to be analytic to parthood. But given thepossibility of certain kinds of multi-location motivated eitherby principles of modal recombination or by the possibility oftime travel, the weak supplementation principle has recentlycome into question. That is, it has been argued that it is pos-sible for there to be objects composed of only a single properpart. I will argue that once we look closer at the nature ofcomposite objects, we can and should resist these argumentsagainst weak supplementation.

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4 BukowMinimality notions

in the Theory of Mind-debate

Gerhard Christopher BukowUniversität Magdeburg

[email protected]

Minimality is a topic in philosophy of science: is it both aworthy epistemological and ontological aim to have minimalexplanations, simplicity, minimal numbers of entities, relati-ons, levels, etc.? So, how to handle minimality and Theory ofMind?

Common examples are: (1) minimal theory of mind, (2)minimal rationality in various, (3) alief (instead of belief), (4)affordances, (5) minimal ontology, (6) fused belief operator,and (7) undemanding mental particulars.

I argue that a justified notion of minimality capturing theessence of Theory of Mind as thought-following can be tied tothe mental model based approach of belief revision (Johnson-Laird and Knauff) and conditional belief. Micro worlds offera theoretically and experimentally controllable environmentthat can be used for scaling agents with respect to minimalityby combining belief attribution- and revision scenarios.

Minimality in »Theory of Mind« shall be defined as theability to follow a few of B’s revisions. This means that one (1)does only realize a few mental models the other can potenti-ally see if one is minimal-minded, (2) possibly cannot realizethe other’s preferences or preferred models or revision style,(3) cannot attribute a globalist point of view to him. Beingminimal in such circumstances may be a severe limit withrespect to making sense of others’ action / thoughts – not-withstanding other not assessable contents like »minimal firstperson content«.

From a philosophical point of view, this scenario shall begiven a deeper analysis by linking it to debates about theinventar of mental states. It captures aspects of conditio-nal belief that can be distinguished from »belief simpliciter«,because here the essence of following is to know someone’s»habits of beliefs«. Attributing conditional belief or prefe-rences implicates understanding justification and defeasiblereasoning in theory of mind.

From a cognitive point of view, it comprises relational reaso-ning about space. It shall be argued for a special role of spacein human thinking and belief attribution in terms of relationsand indexicals. We also investigate this scenario experimen-tally.

Bukow/Knappitsch 2Organisms and semiotic reactivity –

information in the ontology of biology

Gerhard Christopher BukowUniversität Magdeburg

[email protected]

Markus Pierre KnappitschWestfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster

[email protected]

There are many proposals for organism concepts in terms oflists of properties, mereologies, vitals, or functions. This diver-sity of concepts may be unsatisfying for the biologist, andthe susceptibility of organisms to problems of material con-stitution as well as »functions« may be problematical for thephilosopher. We discuss information as another suggestivefoundation for the organism concept and how the choice ofan information concept with respect to biological adequacyinfluences the biological nature and its problems. Our propo-sal is that (1) organism has a central place in the ontology ofbiology, and (2) a local and dynamic information concept isneeded.

Mainly, we propose that inner relations between functionalparts of the organism are informational relations constitu-ted by the semiotic reactivity of these parts – and it is quathese relations that organization and structure are instan-tiated. Information only makes sense in the context of theorganism, i.e. the structure or organization that is held locallyby »interpretation«. This property of »semiotic reactivity« isproposed to be a genuine property of biological things of acertain class, i.e. organisms.

From the viewpoint of biology, information and commu-nication play a key role in our understanding of organisms,but the application of Shannon’s theory of information in thelife sciences faces some significant shortcomings. We summa-rize some of the core problems and show how they effect ourunderstanding of organism-concepts. Then, we agitate for analternative, local and dynamic concept of information, calleddynamic information that has been introduced with suitablemathematical formalism and examples from biology. This newconcept enables us to identify semiotic reactivity as a key pro-perty of organisms. In conclusion, some ontological aspectsof dynamic information will be discussed.

A new understanding of information allows formulatingsome dynamic information theoretic ›necessary properties‹structured things should possess to be an organism. Manyanswers will have to be asked, e.g.: What is the ontologicalstatus of dynamic information? Should we adopt indefiniten-ess concerning organisms or is organismic information »fixed«such that the individuation of organisms is a definite issue?

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8 BurkardDefending Moral IntuitionismAgainst Debunking Arguments

Anne BurkardHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

One way of challenging someone’s moral beliefs is to showthat their sole basis are religious or traditional doctrines whichthe person no longer accepts. Such a challenge can be formu-lated as a debunking argument. These are arguments whichundermine beliefs – in the sense of showing them to be unju-stified (or of removing their justification) – by offering anexhaustive explanation for why they are believed, where theexplanation is independent of the beliefs’ correctness or truthand leaves no room for a justificatory account. Although theuses to which debunking arguments are put in ethics and thetargets they address differ considerably, a dominant theme inrecent discussions has been the support these arguments seemto lend to forms of anti-realism about ethics and normativediscourse in general: Debunking arguments have been put for-ward as a challenge to robust versions of moral or normativerealism, that is, roughly, to positions according to which thereare mind-independent moral or normative facts that serve astruth-makers for the relevant convictions. The targets of thesedebunking arguments are not particular moral or normativebeliefs or contents; rather, the debunking is taken to chal-lenge these beliefs and to judge them unjustified only whenunderstood in a specific, namely a realist way.

Instead of pursuing the metaphysical implications certaindebunking arguments purportedly have, this paper focusesdirectly on the relevance of such arguments for the episte-mic justification of moral beliefs. More specifically, I proposeways to respond to debunking arguments within an intuitio-nist framework. I argue that a plausible form of moral intui-tionism can integrate convincing debunking arguments intoits account of (defeasibly) justified moral beliefs. To do so, Isketch a minimal form of moral intuitionism that can be spel-led out both in realist and anti-realist versions and is mainlymotivated by the logical and semantic autonomy of morality.Before this background, I specify the nature of local and glo-bal debunking arguments, illustrate their use with reference toa number of instructive examples and show how intuitionistscan respond to debunking arguments of both sorts.

3 BüterWertfreiheit, Pluralismus und epistemische

Vertrauenswürdigkeit: Das BeispielFrauengesundheitsforschung

Anke BüterUniversität Bielefeld

[email protected]

Der Vortrag behandelt die Haltbarkeit des Wertfreiheitsidealsals einer Bedingung für die Objektivität und epistemische Ver-trauenswürdigkeit wissenschaftlicher Ergebnisse. Die zeitge-nössische Form dieses Ideals beruht auf einer Reihe spezi-fischer Annahmen – insbesondere der Trennbarkeit kogniti-ver und nicht-kognitiver Werte sowie der epistemologischen

Unabhängigkeit des Rechtfertigungszusammenhangs von Ent-deckungs- und Anwendungszusammenhang – die jeweils pro-blematisch sind. Ich werde gegen letztere Annahme argumen-tieren, dass Werte im Entdeckungszusammenhang indirektEinfluss auf die Rechtfertigung von Theorien nehmen. Dies istdarin begründet, dass wertgeladene Selektionen in der Ent-deckung sich darauf auswirken, welchen Daten eine Theoriegerecht werden und gegen welche Alternativen sie sich durch-setzen muss – und damit letztlich auf Einschätzungen ihrerGeltungsansprüche.

Diese These wird anhand von Beispielen aus der Frauen-gesundheitsforschung erläutert. Dieses Forschungsfeld ent-stand aus der feministischen Frauengesundheitsbewegung der1960er / 70er Jahre, welche sich über die Kritik einer Diskri-minierung von Frauen durch das Gesundheitssystem und diemedizinische Wissenschaft definierte. Mit Bezug auf die Debat-ten um eine Inklusion von Frauen in klinische Studien und umpräventive Wirkungen von Hormonersatztherapie in der Meno-pause wird exemplarisch dargestellt, wie erst der Einbezugeiner feministischen Perspektive in die Medizin Untersuchun-gen und Ergebnisse ermöglichte, die auch zuvor gut bestätigteTheorien in Zweifel zogen.

Letztlich ist damit das Wertfreiheitsideal in seiner heuti-gen Form zumindest ungenügend als normatives Leitbild derWissenschaft, da es der Gefahr systematischer blinder Fleckenaufgrund einer wertbeladenen Vernachlässigung bestimmterPerspektiven in der Entdeckung – und daraus resultierendenEinseitigkeiten in der Rechtfertigung – nicht begegnen kann.Vielmehr erfordert dieses Problem einen Einbezug der sozia-len Ebene von Wissenschaft in ihre normative Betrachtung.Die beste Strategie ist hier die eines Pluralismus in Bezugauf die in der wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft vertretenenWerthaltungen: Nur die Diversität der Beteiligten kann dieGefahr einseitiger blinder Flecken verringern. Die epistemischeVertrauenswürdigkeit wissenschaftlicher Ergebnisse findet ineiner Freiheit der Theoriewahl von nicht-kognitiven Wertenkeine ausreichende Grundlage, sondern muss um eine Betrach-tung des Entdeckungszusammenhangs ergänzt und durch dieBedingung einer pluralistischen Wertvielfalt gesichert werden.

Carrier 3Values and Objectivity in Science

Martin CarrierUniversität Bielefeld

[email protected]

My intention is to clarify the nature of scientific objectivityand of the characteristics of epistemic research, also knownas fundamental research or academic research. I claim thatepistemic research or the epistemic attitude in science can bereconstructed by appeal to values. I wish to explore the roleof values in the test and confirmation procedures of science(also known as the context of justification) and to discuss therole and influence of epistemic and non-epistemic values. Thetrouble with values is that they are mostly partisan and non-universal and are thus feared to undermine the objectivity ofscience. I contrast a Baconian notion of objectivity, expres-sing a detached stance of scientists and a correspondence oftheir views to the facts, with a pluralist notion, involving acritical debate between conflicting approaches. These con-flicts include substantive hypotheses or theories but extend

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to values as well. I argue that pluralism serves to accomplish anon-Baconian form of objectivity that is apt to preserve mostof the intuitions tied to the objectivity of science. However,scientific research needs to be characterized by additional fac-tors, e.g., by the willingness to subject one’s claims to empiri-cal scrutiny and to respect rational argument. To account forsuch features of scientific practice, appeal to shared epistemicgoals is necessary. This is where pluralism is bound to cometo an end. This shared epistemic attitude expresses a commit-ment to the gain of objective knowledge and is embodied inrules adopted by the scientific community concerning the pro-cedures of examining assumptions. These rules do not addressthe evaluation of scientific hypotheses directly but rather thesocial processes that govern the test and confirmation prac-tices in the scientific community. Controversy and strife isas characteristic of research as is unforced consensus forma-tion. My claim is that the two features can be brought intoharmony by placing them at different levels of consideration:at the level of scientific reasoning and at the level of socialconventions regarding how to deal with claims put forwardwithin the scientific community.

3 CentroneNotes On Mally’s First Deontic Logic

and von Wright’s First Plausible Logic

Stefania CentroneUniversität Hamburg

[email protected]

It is by now rather well known that the Austrian philosopherErnst Mally, a pupil of Alexius Meinong, was the first scholarto pose systematic questions about the possibility of a formaltreatment of deontic modalities as well as to attempt an axio-matization of ethics. In his Grundgesetze des Sollens (1926)he tried to find a formal counterpart for statements as forinstance ›A ought to be the case‹, ›It is permitted to do A‹,›It is forbidden (obligatory / non-obligatory / optional / . . . )to do A‹.

Unfortunately, Mally’s axiomatic system for deontic logicderives A ought to be the case iff A is the case (in symbols: a »a,where ›a‹ means ›a is obligatory‹.) This represents a collapse ofobligation, so Mally’s system is not considered – as it stands –to be viable.

Is a formalization of norms (rules) of action possible? In hispaper Deontic Logic (Mind 1951) G. H. von Wright proposed afirst sound formalization of deontic logic. Later on, in his AnEssay in deontic logic and the general theory of action (1968),he rightly stressed the necessity to have symbolic means fordifferentiating between the ›active‹ and the ›passive‹ modeof behavior. »What is required – he says – is a Logic of Actionfounded upon a Logic of Change.«

In this paper we will present and discuss Mally’s system ofdeontic logic, trying to sort out as well as understand his argu-ments, and to sift claims and counterclaims. Next, after brieflyrecalling von Wright’s axiomatization, we will discuss the issueabout differentiating between the ›active‹ and the ›passive‹mode of behavior in connection with Mally’s approach.

Ciuni 3The Abundance of the future

Roberto CiuniRuhr-Universität [email protected]

Supervaluationism holds that the future is undetermined, andas a consequence of this, statements about the future may beneither true nor false. In the present paper, we explore thenovel and quite different view that the future is abundant:statements about the future do not lack truth-value, but mayinstead be glutty, that is both true and false. We will show that(1) the logic resulting from this »abundance of the future« is anon-adjunctive paraconsistent formalism based on subvaluati-ons, which has the virtue that all classical laws are valid in it,while no formula like A & ¬A is satisfiable (though both A and¬A may be true in a model); (2) we present some theoremswhich connect our logic to the logic of probability proposedby Ernest Adams; these theorems suggest that failure of clas-sical inference rules has the same source in both logics; (3)abundance is closer to classical logic than supervaluationism,when it comes to express those important retrogradations oftruth which are underlined by the argument de praesenti adpraeteritum. The point highlighted in (3) keeps some balancebetween the supervaluationist and subvaluationist approach.Such a result was accomplished by Dominique Hyde for sub-valuationist systems in general, by showing that supervalua-tionism and subvaluationism can be taken to be exactly on apar on the loss of classical inferences. However, here we dosomething more: we show that there is an important specificphenomenon (discourse »de praesenti ad preteritum«) w.r.t.which a subvaluationist approach preserves more classical rea-soning than the usual supervaluationist one. The point high-lighted in (2) suggests a probabilistic reading of the notionof »subtruth« (subvaluationist truth) employed in our logic.Thus, »subtrue« would be read as »having a positive probabi-lity«. Our logic can then be conjectured to be the qualitativeground for a quantitative probabilistic reasoning about thefuture. We also briefly discuss this perspective.

Correia 8Illusions and well-being:

The costs and benefits of misbelief

Vasco CorreiaUniversidade Nova de Lisboa (Portugal)

[email protected]

This article critically examines the claim that illusional beliefsmay be beneficial for people’s well-being. Although some stu-dies indicate that positive illusions can promote happinessand adaptive behavior in certain contexts, I argue that suchbenefits tend to be short-lived and that misbeliefs are gene-rally maladaptive from a long-term perspective. While unrea-listic assessments of the available evidence may initially pro-vide a rewarding vision of the self and the world, and evenimprove the subject’s mood and motivation, I show that theytend to undermine the process of deliberation itself and areultimately detrimental to the maximization of people’s pre-ferences. To that extent, it seems reasonable to suggest that

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truthful beliefs are generally preferable all things considered,not only from an ethical perspective but also from a utilitarianone.

4 DahlgrünEmotions and Natural Kindhood

Malte DahlgrünHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

Philosophers of emotion widely view Paul Griffiths’ What Emo-tions Really Are (1997) as the classical scientifically informedstatement of the idea that emotion, and many emotions, failto form a natural kind. I offer a critical re-assessment. Moreo-ver, I criticize the positive taxonomy defended by Griffiths.

Griffiths’ generic claim – that our vernacular category ofemotion fails to form a natural kind – preaches to the conver-ted, rather than pioneering a future psychological science ofemotion. It is not even approximately true that past affectivescientists have treated »the emotions« as a unitary categoryto which novel findings can be reliably extrapolated fromsamples.

Griffiths’ specific claim, on the other hand – that many ver-nacular categories of specific emotions fail to form naturalkinds – misrepresents his core empirical assumptions. By vir-tue of advocating basic-emotions theory in the Darwin-Ekmantradition, Griffiths endorses the paradigm of a view on whichmany emotions are indeed natural kinds. The real challengeto viewing emotions as natural kinds comes from dimensionaltheories. These pursue a longstanding psychological researchprogram ignored entirely by Griffiths.

Griffiths’ basic subdivision of the emotional realm is pro-blematic too. He suggests a fundamental division into basicemotions (BEs) and higher cognitive emotions (HCEs), with»socially sustained pretense emotions« added as a third cate-gory in dubious standing. I argue that there are no pretenseemotions, or at least that Griffiths has not provided the requi-site arguments for positing them. I also adduce considerationssuggesting that Griffiths overstates the discontinuity betweenBEs and HCEs.

3 David/Hartmann/SprengerThe No Alternatives Argument

Richard DavidUniversität Wien (Austria)[email protected]

Stephan HartmannTilburg University (Netherlands)

[email protected]

Jan SprengerTilburg University (Netherlands)

[email protected]

Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists havefound a theory H, they often believe that there cannot bemany distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified?

What should scientists believe about the number of alterna-tives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in thelight of new evidence? These are some of the questions thatwe will address in this paper. We also ask under which condi-tions failure to find an alternative to H confirms the theoryin question. This kind of reasoning (which we call the no alter-natives argument) is rather popular in science and thereforedeserves a careful philosophical analysis.

De 2A Solution to the Humphrey Objection

Michael DeUtrecht University (Netherlands)

[email protected]

One serious objection to Lewisian modal realism, in particularcounterpart theory without overlap, is that it violates import-ant adequacy conditions on an analysis of modality. One suchconstraint, call it the ›Aboutness‹ constraint, is that de re pos-sibilities for an individual s be genuinely about s. What the»genuinely« qualification is intended to rule out are analy-ses according to which de re possibilities for s may be givenwithout (in the analysans) attributing a property intrinsic tos herself. Kripke’s well-known »Humphrey objection« is pre-cisely the objection that Lewis’ counterpart theory violatesAboutness. Lewis responds by claiming that what is importantfor an analysis of de re possibilities concerning an individualsuch as Humphrey need not be genuinely about Humphreyas long as the analysis involves an individual that suitablyrepresents Humphrey. Thus, claims Lewis, Aboutness mista-kenly assumes that representation ought to be identity; i.e.,that in order for s’ to represent s, s’ must be identical to s. I willargue, however, that there are two responses faithful to coun-terpart theory that embrace Aboutness. What is importantabout these responses, moreover, is that they do not requireoverlap which Lewis has strong reasons for rejecting. One ofthe responses undermines an assumption Lewis held concer-ning the temporal structure of possible worlds, viz. that theyare linear, while the other concerns the ontological status oftransworld individuals.

Delgado 1Is Frege’s Context Principle in Conflictwith his Principle of Compositionality?

Laura DelgadoUnivesitat de Barcelona (Spain)

[email protected]

The context principle says that words have meaning only inthe context of the sentences in which they occur. The princi-ple of compositionality says that the meaning of a complexexpression is determined by the meaning of its constituents.These principles can bee seen as conflicting because it seemsthat they explain meaning in opposite ways, for the formerseems to say that the sentence confer meaning to its constitu-ent while the latter says that the meaning of the constituentsconfer meaning to the sentence. It is fairly uncontroversialthat this is what the principle of compositionality says; it is

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less clear, however, what does the context principle express.This is because the context principle is introduced in the Foun-dations as part of different arguments and thus it can be seenas expressing distinct – yet related – principles in each argu-mentative context. I will discuss the different ideas the con-text principle expresses and offer a plausible interpretation ofit.

The second task of assessing the principles’ compatibility iscomplex because at the time the context principle was intro-duced, Frege had not yet made his famous distinction betweensense and reference. But the principle of compositionality hasclear applications for both sense and reference; therefore, wewill need to consider versions of the context principle for boththese notions in order to evaluate whether they are compati-ble. I will explore these versions and discuss their compatibi-lity.

A plausible interpretation of the context principle wouldmake sense of the different ideas that it expresses in the diffe-rent argumentative contexts in which it occurs and also wouldexplain its fundamental role in Frege’s strategy for explainingthe reference of abstract words (in particular, number words).I believe that on the interpretation I offer, the context prin-ciple is compatible with the principle of compositionality.Moreover, I believe that the job the context principle is requi-red to do in Frege’s strategy presupposes compositionality.

8 Di NucciDouble Effect and Terror Bombing

Ezio Di NucciUniversität Duisburg-Essen

[email protected]

I argue against the Doctrine of Double Effect’s explanationof the moral difference between terror bombing and strategicbombing. I show that the standard thought-experiment of Ter-ror Bomber and Strategic Bomber which dominates this debateis underdetermined in three crucial respects: (1) the non-psy-chological worlds of Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber; (2)the psychologies of Terror Bomber and Strategic Bomber; and(3) the structure of the thought-experiment, especially in rela-tion to its similarity with the Trolley Problem. Briefly, (1) Ifthe two worlds are not identical, then it may be these diffe-rences between the two worlds and not the Doctrine of DoubleEffect to explain the moral difference; (2a) if Terror Bomberand Strategic Bomber have the same causal beliefs, then whydoes Terror Bomber set out to kill the children? It may thenbe this unwarranted and immoral choice and not the Doctrineof Double Effect that explains the moral difference; (2b) ifthe two have different causal beliefs, then we can’t rule outthe counterfactual that, had Strategic Bomber had the samebeliefs as Terror Bomber, she would have also acted as TerrorBomber did. Finally, (3) the thought-experiment could also beconstructed so as to be structurally equivalent to the Fat Manscenario in the Trolley Problem: but then the Doctrine of Dou-ble Effect would give different answers to two symmetricalcases.

Diekemper 2The Ontology of Thisness

Joseph DiekemperQueen’s University Belfast (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

This paper seeks to give an account of what it is for an indivi-dual to instantiate thisness (i.e. primitive individual essence).Thisnesses are peculiar entities, and even those who endorsetheir existence and instantiation by objects / entities, havesaid very little about how an individual and its thisness arerelated. My approach is to seek out a model for the instan-tiation of thisness by canvassing realist accounts of the sub-stance / attribute relation, and then by making appropriatemodifications to the most likely candidates in order to accom-modate an individual’s instantiation of thisness (the accountscannot be strictly identical for reasons that I will explain). InSections 1 and 2 I consider two, broadly Aristotelian, ontolo-gies (the first due to Loux and the second to Lowe) as models;and in Section 3 I consider a hybrid Aristotelian ontologywhich combines aspects of both Loux’s and Lowe’s models.What emerges is that the model with the most utility makesthisness redundant in the case of material substances. Here Ilay my cards on the table and acknowledge that although Ithink some entities have thisness (such as events and possi-bly persons), material substances in all likelihood do not. Soalthough the preferred ontology makes thisness redundantin the case of material substances, this is consistent with myown views on thisness, and I suggest that the ontology doesprovide a suitable structure for the instantiation of thisnessin other kinds of entities.

Dinges 5An invariantist explanationof contextualist intuitions

Alexander DingesHumboldt-Universität zu [email protected]

Invariantism in epistemology is the thesis that »knows« inva-riably expresses the same relation in every context of use.As opposed to that, contextualists maintain that »knows«expresses different relations in relevantly different contexts.One major argument for contextualism is based on the ideathat only this view can satisfactorily explain the intuitions wehave with respect to scenarios such as the bank cases by KeithDeRose about when it is correct to ascribe or deny knowledge.In my paper, I want to show that this idea is mistaken byproviding a satisfactory invariantist explanation of our intui-tions.

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8 DohrnCounterfactuals and Two Kinds of »Ought«

Daniel DohrnRWTH Aachen

[email protected]

I take issue with Caspar Hare’s strategy of using counterfac-tuals to deal with puzzles like the Parent’s Paradox: I am toldby my doctor that begetting a child at an earlier time is likelyto result in the child suffering severe life-long health problemsas contrasted to a child begot at a later time. I do not abideby the doctor’s recommendation. My child John has severehealth problems throughout his life. However, I value Johnmore than anything in the world. Given my affection for John,it seems questionable that I ought to have acted differently.But at the same time I acknowledge a sense in which I oughtto have followed the doctor’s advice. How can that be? Todeal with such cases, Hare distinguishes a subjective and anobjective sense of ought:

The Ought of Omniscient Desire: What you oughtOD to do iswhat an omniscient, rational creature with appropriate inte-rests would want you to do.

The Ought of Most Reason: What you oughtMR to do is whatthere is most reason to do.(Hare 2011, 190)

Whereas I oughtOD to have begot a child earlier, I oughtMR

not to have done so. In order to mark the difference betweenoughtOD and oughtMR, Hare resorts to a pattern of embeddedcounterfactuals: to figure out what I oughtMR to have done, Iask:

Given I have acted as I did, if I had not, then if I had, whatwould have been the case?

I pinpoint technical mistakes in Hare’s counterfactual crite-rion. Then I vary the scenario from The Parent’s Paradox suchas to show that the counterfactual criterion misses the real –epistemic- distinction.

1 DolbyUnderstanding Non-Nominal

Quantification

David DolbyUniversität Zürich (Switzerland)

[email protected]

Quantification into non-nominal positions, such as sentenceposition, remains controversial. Many philosophers followQuine in arguing that such there is no genuine quantifica-tion into any position other than nominal position. And thosephilosophers who accept non-nominal quantification disagreeabout how it should be understood. One account is the objec-tual interpretation according to which quantification intogeneral term or sentence position is quantification over adomain of objects, typically properties or propositions. Inthis paper I argue that any truth definition for a languageinvolving objectual non-nominal quantification will appealimplicitly to non-nominal quantification in the metalanguage,and therefore cannot be regarded as illuminating our under-standing of non-nominal quantification.

El Kassar 1Primitive Normativitätals Antwort auf KripkesRegelfolgen-Skeptiker?

Nadja El KassarUniversität Potsdam

[email protected]

Der Beitrag diskutiert und verwirft Hannah Ginsborgs Theorieder primitiven Normativität als alternative Antwort auf SaulKripkes Regelfolgen-Skeptiker. Ursprünglich auf ihre Theorieder Wahrnehmung beschränkt, bildet primitive Normativitätin Ginsborgs jüngstem Aufsatz das Fundament für ihre teil-reduktionistische, naturalistische Antwort auf den Regelfol-gen-Skeptiker. Das Ziel des Papers ist es, zu zeigen, dass Gins-borgs Konzeption keine erfolgreiche Antwort auf den Skeptikerbietet. Die Argumentation erfolgt in drei Schritten. Im erstenSchritt werden die Herausforderung durch den Kripke’schenSkeptiker sowie zwei Standardreaktionen, Dispositionalismusund Anti-Reduktionismus, dargestellt. Der zweite Schritt stelltHannah Ginsborgs Antwort, insbesondere ihr Konzept der pri-mitiven Normativität, vor. Im abschließenden dritten Schrittwerden drei Argumente präsentiert, die nahelegen, dass Gins-borgs Antwort abzulehnen ist: weder gelingt es ihr eine sys-tematisch kohärente Position zu entwickeln, noch vermag siedie von Saul Kripke diskutierten Bedingungen für eine akzep-table Replik auf den Regelfolgen-Skeptiker zu erfüllen. EineGegenüberstellung von primitiver Normativität und ausge-wachsener (full-blown) Normativität wird zudem zeigen, dassHannah Ginsborgs Begriff der primitiven Normativität über-flüssig ist. Das Modell der primitiven Normativität scheitertsowohl als eigenständige Theorie, als auch als Antwort aufKripkes Regelfolgen-Skeptiker.

Engels 7Das Transplantations-Trilemma

und eine Ethik des Tötungsverbots

Julia Apollonia EngelsUniversität [email protected]

Ausgangspunkt meines Vortrags ist die Wiederaufnahme derHirntod-Debatte, die seit dem Bericht »Controversies in theDetermination of Death« des President’s Council on Bioethics1

auch in Deutschland erneut angestoßen wurde2. In der Tatstellt uns die Situation hirntoter Menschen vor ein philoso-phisches Problem, das ich das »Transplantations-Trilemma«nenne und ins Zentrum stelle. Es setzt sich aus drei für sichgenommen sehr starken Sätzen zusammen, die jedoch mitein-ander unvereinbar scheinen:(1) Hirntote Menschen sind noch nicht tot.(2) Einem nicht toten Menschen lebenswichtige Organe zuentnehmen, bedeutet ihn zu töten und ist moralisch verboten.(3) Die Praxis der modernen Transplantationsmedizin ist mo-ralisch nicht verboten.

Mit der Annahme (1) stelle ich meine Überlegungen unterdas Konditional, was es bedeutet, wenn die Zweifel am Hirn-todkriterium berechtigt sind und was daraus für die Trans-plantationsmedizin folgt. Auch Satz (3) möchte ich als prima

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facie gültig annehmen. Das philosophisch interessante Pro-blem steckt in Satz (2), vor allem im zweiten Teil (2b) »dieTötung von Menschen ist (mit wenigen Ausnahmen) mora-lisch verboten«. Daher untersuche ich verschiedene Begrün-dungsansätze für ein grundsätzliches Tötungsverbot. Diesekritische Analyse zeigt, dass diverse Begründungskonzeptedes Tötungsverbots den Handlungsakt »Töten« auf so unter-schiedliche Weise verwenden, dass deutlich wird, dass sieim Grunde ganz unterschiedliche Handlungen meinen undbeurteilen. Gemeinsam ist all diesen Handlungen zwar, dasssie zum Tod eines Menschen führen; der moralische Gehaltjedoch ist nicht immer gleich, auch wenn durch die Verwen-dung des gleichen sprachlichen Begriffs dies suggeriert wird.Eine differenzierte Analyse des Begriffs »Töten« erfordert dem-nach die Einbeziehung des jeweiligen Handlungskontexts. Eszeigt sich, dass die moralische Beurteilung eines Tötungs-akts abhängig ist von dem Zustand, in dem sich eine Personbefindet. Zentrale Kriterien für die Bewertung eines Zustandseiner Person sind nicht ihr am Leben sein, sondern vielmehrdie Frage, welcher Umgang ihr Schaden zufügt und wie ihreWürde geachtet wird. Übertragen auf die Situation hirnto-ter Menschen lautet dann meine These, dass diese sich ineinem Zustand befinden, in dem eine Organentnahme unterbestimmten Bedingungen zwar deskriptiv bedeutet, ihr Lebenzu beenden, moralisch aber deswegen nicht verboten ist, dasie ihnen weder schadet, noch ihre Würde verletzt oder miss-achtet.

1 The President’s Council on Bioethics, Controversies in theDetermination of Death. A White Paper, 2008.

2 Vgl. dazu Stoecker, Ein Plädoyer für die Reanimation derHirntod-Debatte in Deutschland«, Stoecker, »Sind hirntoteMenschen wirklich tot?«; Stoecker, Hirntod. Ein medizinethi-sches Problem und seine moralphilosophische Transformation;Müller, »Revival der Hirntod-Debatte: Funktionelle Bildgebungfür die Hirntod-Diagnostik«. Sogar die deutsche Printmedien-presse bezieht sich in den letzten Monaten mehrfach auf diesesThema. Vgl. z. B. Sahm, Stephan, »Ist die Organspende nochzu retten?«, FAZ.NET, 14. 9. 2010; Görlitzer, Klaus-Peter, »NeueZweifel am Hirntod«, taz.de, 5. 11. 2010; Galaktionow, Barbara,»Den Hirntod sieht man nicht«, sueddeutsche.de, 4. 10. 2010.

3 EronenLevels of mechanisms in neuroscience:

A deflationary account

Markus Ilkka EronenRuhr-Universität [email protected]

In recent years, there has been heated discussion on thenature of mechanistic explanation and the definition of amechanism, but little attention has been paid to the ideaof mechanistic levels. This is unfortunate, since the claimthat mechanistic explanations are multilevel is central to themechanistic explanation paradigm. In this paper, I point outthree fundamental problems in the mechanistic account oflevels: it is too localized, too focused on the part-whole rela-tion while other relations are just as important, and onto-logically undefined. As an alternative, I propose a deflatio-nary account of levels. I argue that the multilevel explana-tions are better understood in terms of the more familiar

and well-defined notions of scale and composition. Mechani-stic explanations are multilevel only in the sense that theyrefer to robust properties and generalizations at differentscales and at different stages in the compositional hierar-chy.

Evers 4The causal efficacy of the mental:

against the counterfactual argument

Daan EversUtrecht University (Netherlands)

[email protected]

Kim (1998) argued that the supervenience of the mental on thephysical, combined with certain other plausible assumptions,leaves no room for mental causation. But there is an increasin-gly popular response (found in Lowe (2008), Andersen (2009),Raatikainen (2010) and Papineau (forthcoming)). It purportsto establish the causal efficacy of mental events on the basisof differences in counterfactuals true of those events and theirsupervenience bases. I argue that this strategy is problematic:it leaves many bodily movements without any cause at all.

Fink 8The requirements of rationality:

wide or narrow content?

Julian FinkUniversität Wien (Austria)

[email protected]

Commonly, we more or less agree about the conditions underwhich a subject violates a requirement of rationality. For exam-ple, if you intend to present a conference paper, yet you donot intend to attend a conference – even though you believethat attending a conference is necessary for presenting a con-ference paper – you violate a requirement of rationality. Like-wise, you violate a requirement of rationality if you believethat you ought to drink less coffee, yet you do not intend todrink less coffee. So much is usually agreed upon.

Disagreement arises, however, if we come to consider howyou can satisfy a requirement of rationality. Consider againmy latter example of violating a requirement. No doubt, youcan satisfy this requirement by forming an intention to drinkless coffee. But can you also satisfy it by ceasing to believethat you ought to drink less coffee?

If your answer to the latter question is ›no‹, then the con-tent of this requirement would be that you intend to drink lesscoffee. The violated requirement governs a proposition expres-sing an individual attitude. Its content would thus be narrow,as I shall put it.

If your answer is ›yes‹, then the content of this requirementwill be wide. The violated requirement would then not governa proposition expressing an individual attitude. Instead, itwould govern a proposition expressing a relation among atti-tudes: if you believe that you ought to drink less coffee, then youintend to drink less coffee.

After discussing various unsuccessful attempts to settlethe wide- and narrow-content question, this paper develops a

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position that I shall call ›wide-content radicalism‹. Utilising anconstitutive account of ›rationality requires‹, I will argue thatthere are no rational requirements that govern propositionsexpressing an individual attitude. Instead, rationality alwaysgoverns propositions expressing relations among a subject’sattitudes.

5 FischerPhilosophical Intuitions, Heuristics,

and Metaphors: Towards a Cognitive Epistemology

Eugen FischerUniversity of East Anglia (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

Psychological explanations of philosophical intuitions canhelp us assess their evidentiary value, and our warrant foraccepting them. To explain and assess conceptual or classifi-catory intuitions about specific situations, some philosophershave suggested explanations which invoke heuristic rules pro-posed by cognitive psychologists (e.g. Hawthorne 2004, Wil-liamson 2005). This approach offers a promising alternativeto the standard approach of experimental philosophy. Thepresent paper develops this alternative in fresh directions: Itmotivates the proposal of a fresh heuristic, and shows thatthis heuristic can explain a class of intuitions that have beenneglected in current debates in the epistemology of philoso-phy – even though their negative assessment can help resolveprominent problems about the mind and perception. By inte-grating results from two hitherto disconnected strands of psy-chological research, on intuitive judgement and on analogyand metaphor, respectively, the paper motivates the proposalof a ›metaphor heuristic‹. Second, it shows that this heuristiccan explain general factual intuitions influential in the philo-sophies of mind and perception. The paper shows that the pro-posed heuristic satisfies all principal requirements imposed bycognitive psychologists in the influential heuristics and biasesresearch tradition, and that explanations employing this newheuristic can reveal whether particular philosophical intuiti-ons are due to the proper exercise of cognitive competenciesor constitutive of cognitive illusions.

6 Fischer/ToddThe Truth about Foreknowledge:

A Reply to Trenton Merricks

John Martin FischerUniversity of California Riverside (United States)

[email protected]

Patrick ToddThe University of Innsbruck (Austria)

Munich School of [email protected]

In this paper we critically evaluate Trenton Merricks’ recentattempt to provide a »new« way of defending compatibilismabout divine foreknowledge and human freedom. We takeissue with Merricks’ claim that his approach is fundamen-tally different from Ockhamism. We also seek to highlight

the implausibility of Merricks’ rejection of the assumption ofthe fixity of the past, and we also develop a critique of theMerricks’ crucial notion of »dependence«.

Folde 1Operator Fictionalismand Logical Neutrality

Christian FoldeUniversität Hamburg

[email protected]

Operator fictionalism about a domain of discourse (e.g. talkabout numbers, possible worlds, or moral properties) is theview that claims made within that domain are best regardedas being correct if and only if they are true according to a sui-table fiction. Operator fictionalism is logically neutral only ifit does not per se commit one to any substantial views aboutthe logic of the respective domain of discourse. Here, I arguethat a careful examination of inconsistent fictions shows that,within the scope of a genuine fiction operator, many validinferences of classical logic do not hold. Accordingly, theseinferences would also be blocked in the respective domainof discourse. Thus, to be an operator fictionalist about thatdiscourse would – contra neutrality – involve special viewsabout the logic applicable to it. Having established that ope-rator fictionalism is not logically neutral, I go on to argue thatsome varieties of operator fictionalism are misguided and inneed of revision.

Freitag 1Moore’s Paradox

and the Manifestation of Belief

Wolfgang FreitagUniversität Konstanz

[email protected]

G. E. Moore once observed that the following sentence is›absurd‹: (1) It is raining, but I believe that it is not raining.

The absurdity assumes a paradoxical air, since the two con-juncts »It is raining« and »I believe that it is not raining« donot appear contradictory; they can, it seems, be jointly true.As Moore says: »It is a paradox that it should be perfectlyabsurd to utter assertively words of which the meaning issomething which may quite well be true.« (Moore 1993, 209)The challenge of Moore’s Paradox is to either dispel the air ofabsurdity surrounding the affirmative utterance of (1) or toprovide an explanation of its absurdity.

The purpose of the paper is to provide a well-founded lin-guistic account of the absurdity on the basis of a theory ofthe manifestation of doxastic states. My argument proceedsin three steps. In section 1, I will make a detour and presentexamples of a Moore-style paradox for assertion and discussthe speech-act-theoretical mechanisms which do away withthis paradox. This excursion serves as a model for my ownapproach to Moore’s original case. In section 2, I sketch atheory of the linguistic expression of mental states, the theoryof manifestatives, and apply the main results to the Mooreansentence (1). The third, and final, section draws attention to

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the fact that the picture complicates because sentences ofthe form »I believe that p« are speech-act-theoretically ambi-guous.

3 FriebeMeta-Ontologie der Raumzeit

Cord FriebeUniversität des Saarlandes

[email protected]

Meta-Ontologie untersucht ontologische Debatten: Ist ein sol-cher Streit gehaltvoll oder bloß einer um Worte? Anwendungs-beispiel ist hier die Raumzeit-Philosophie und die Debatte umPräsentismus vs. Block View. Die metaphysik-kritische Posi-tion, dieser Streit sei irrelevant für die Ontologie der Raum-zeit, wird meta-ontologisch hinterfragt. Der Vortrag zielt danndarauf ab, aus der Analyse dieses Beispiels Allgemeines zumVerhältnis von Metaphysik und Physik zu gewinnen.

3 FritzConditionals and ACTUALITY

Peter FritzUniversity of Oxford (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

Timothy Williamson has recently shown that in any logic ofindicative conditionals which satisfies certain plausible con-ditions and contains an operator A which satisfies a condi-tion he calls ACTUALITY, indicative conditionals are equiva-lent to material conditionals. I argue that this formal resultdoes not indicate that indicative conditionals are in factequivalent to material conditionals. Williamson motivatesthe condition ACTUALITY with the semantics of the actua-lity operator in modal logic, which formalizes the English»actually«. However, I argue that in the context of logicsof indicative conditionals, assuming that an operator forma-lizing the English »actually« satisfies ACTUALITY amountsto assuming that indicative conditionals are equivalent tomaterial conditionals. Thus one cannot apply the formalresult directly to a formalization of English to argue thatindicative conditionals are equivalent to material conditio-nals.

Another way of reaching this conclusion would be to arguethat while »actually« might not have the right semantics, anoperator of the required kind could be introduced by stipu-lation. This could either be done on the level of logic or onthe level of natural language. I argue that neither strategysucceeds. A natural way of implementing the first strategywould be to assume that the logic of indicative conditionalshas a conservative extension satisfying ACTUALITY as well asall of the other conditions required for Williamson’s result. Iargue by analogy with epistemic logic that this assumption isunjustified. In the case of the second strategy, I argue that ifwe introduce the relevant expression to English and representit in the logic in a way that it satisfies ACTUALITY, then on anatural understanding of logical truth, one of the other con-ditions required for Williamson’s result fails. While this mightappear to lead to implausible consequences, I argue that any

such appearance is the consequence of an equivocation bet-ween different conceptions of logical validity.

Gäb 6Semantischer Realismus und religiöse Sprache

Sebastian GäbUniversität Trier

[email protected]

Realismus ist die These, daß die Gegenstände oder Eigenschaf-ten eines bestimmten Bereichs unabhängig von uns existieren,Antirealismus ist die Negation dieser These. Der religiöse Rea-lismus ist der Meinung, daß religiöse Gegenstände wie Gottoder die Seele unabhängig von uns existieren und daß Aussa-gen über sie echte Aussagen und fähig zu objektiver Wahrheitsind, was der Antirealismus bestreitet. Mit Michael Dummettläßt sich behaupten, daß Realismus und Antirealismus seman-tische Thesen sind, die Behauptungen über die Begriffe vonWahrheit und Bedeutung in religiöser Sprache aufstellen. Aus-gehend von diesem Verständnis lassen sich die verschiede-nen Antirealismen in der Religionsphilosophie anhand ihresUmgangs mit dem Wahrheitsbegriff einteilen in starke undschwache, je nachdem, ob sie den realistischen Wahrheitsbe-griff gänzlich aufgeben oder nur modifizieren. Doch beideFormen des religiösen Antirealismus stehen vor dem Problem,den wichtigen Begriff der Rechtfertigung aufgeben zu müssen:Der starke Antirealismus, der den Begriff der Wahrheit für reli-giöse Sprache völlig verwerfen möchte, kann nicht erklären,wie sich Aussagen rechtfertigen lassen können, ohne wahr zusein, der schwache Antirealismus, der den realistischen Wahr-heitsbegriff durch einen pluralen ersetzt, kann nicht erklären,was Konsistenz als notwendige Voraussetzung von Rechtfer-tigung sein soll und wie Rechtfertigung sich als Konsequenzeines Arguments einstellen kann. Dies gilt unabhängig davon,welches Konzept von Rechtfertigung man vertritt, denn dieVerbindung zur Wahrheit ist für jeden Rechtfertigungsbegriffessentiell. Die Folgen für den religiösen Antirealismus sindfatal: Akzeptiert man das Argument, so läuft ein Antirealismusnotwendigerweise auf einen Fideismus hinaus, denn religiöseAussagen sind rein semantisch bereits jeder Rechtfertigungentzogen. Gleichzeitig kann er auch nicht mehr den Ansprucherheben, empirisch adäquat zu sein, denn die in der Religi-onsphilosophie seit Jahrhunderten geführten Debatten überdie Rechtfertigung religiöser Überzeugungen lassen sich nichtmehr erfassen. Schließlich ergibt sich zumindest für den star-ken Antirealismus die Konsequenz, daß aufgrund der engenVerbindung von Wahrheit und Bedeutung religiöse Sprachekeinen Sinn mehr haben kann, sie verliert ihre grundsätzlichekommunikative Funktion und kann daher nicht mehr als Spra-che bezeichnet werden. Somit scheidet der Antirealismus alsakzeptable Theorie religiöser Sprache aus.

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6 GasserPersonal Embodiment and Bodily Resurrection

Georg GasserUniversität Innsbruck (Austria)

[email protected]

I take two constraints to be crucial for any account of bodilyresurrection being faithful to the Christian tradition and phi-losophical reflection.

A metaphysical constraint: Personal identity between pre-and post-mortem existence ought to be secured.

A theological constraint: Christian soteriological reflectionson life after death define the core of human existence by ourrelationships to God and our fellow human beings.

Against this background I analyse three materialist ac-counts of bodily resurrection. I reject the first two accountsand propose substantial amendments for the third one. Theaccounts are:(i) Accounts in the spirit of van Inwagen’s metaphysics.(ii) Accounts relying upon reassembly.(iii)Accounts in the vein of the Constitution View.

I argue that accounts of the first kind like van Inwa-gen’s Body-Snatching-model and Zimmerman’s Falling-Eleva-tor-model run particularly afoul of the theological constraint.Their costs are prohibitive because resurrection seems tomutate either into reanimation or into a kind of divine dupli-cation process.

From my point of view accounts of the second kind likeHershenov’s model of intermitted existence and Davis’ modelof reassembly are questionable from a metaphysical perspec-tive. They rely upon mereological assumptions which mightbe adequate for artefacts but it is doubtful whether they applyto persistence conditions of human persons too.

Finally I introduce the Constitution View as presented byBaker. I will supplement it with a suggestion stemming fromLowe’s account of Non-Cartesian Dualism, according to whichpersonal embodiment is a unique kind of relationship in itsown right. This move shall forestall in particular two objecti-ons Baker’s approach is prone: First, that constitution is notso much a metaphysical rather than an explanatory concept.Second, that Baker’s treatment of the resurrection body is tooliberal because the only persistence condition is the samefirst-person perspective. If our relationships, however, areessential for a Christian understanding of resurrection, then itseems that the body cannot be of secondary importance onlybecause our relationships display to a large extent a bodilycharacter.

For correcting these pitfalls I propose to amend the »thin«concept of personal embodiment with insights from phenome-nology by referring substantially to the notion of Leib. FinallyI shall shortly respond to two objections which might possiblybe raised against this move.

Gebharter 3A Formal Framework for Representing Mechanisms?

Alexander GebharterHeinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf

[email protected]

In this paper I tackle the question of how mechanisms can berepresented within a causal graph framework. I start with afew words on mechanisms and on some of their characteristicproperties, as well as some of the problems these propertiesmay pose for a formal representation. I then concentrate onone of these problems: How can the hierarchic order of mecha-nisms (mechanisms oftentimes consist of submechanisms) berepresented within a causal graph framework? I illustrate ananswer to this question proposed by Lorenzo Casini, Phyl-lis McKay Illari, Federica Russo, and Jon Williamson (2011)and demonstrate on a concrete example that their formalism,though nicely capturing the hierarchic order of mechanisms,does not support another important typical property of nes-ted mechanisms: The more of the structure of a mechanism’ssubmechanisms is uncovered, the more accurate the predic-tions of the phenomena this mechanism brings about willbe. As a last step I sketch an alternative approach that canrepresent the hierarchical order of a mechanism while still sup-porting said strong intuition that better knowledge about amechanism’s substructure leads to more precise predictions. Idemonstrate these two features of this new approach on theabove-mentioned exemplary mechanism.

Gerogiorgakis 6Combining the Bayesian Argument for the Existence of

God with Pascal’s Wager

Stamatios GerogiorgakisUniversität Erfurt

[email protected]

I consider Gwiazda’s arguments concerning the exact numeri-cal values of the Bayesian argument for the existence of Godto be valid and Swinburne’s counter-argument to be ad hoc.In order to rescue Bayesian theism, I propose a reformulationof the Bayesian argument in the spirit of Pascal’s wager. Mymodification makes the probabilities, which Bayesian theismdiscusses, subjective expectations. The reputation of Bayesiantheism is shown not to be worsened by my modification.

Gertken 8Kann Notwehr nicht nur moralisch erlaubt, sondern

gänzlich unproblematisch sein?

Jan GertkenHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

Wenn es moralisch erlaubte Notwehr gibt – sind dann alleFälle erlaubter Notwehr derart, dass moralische Gründe gegendie einschlägige Handlung sprechen, oder kann es dann auchmoralisch unproblematische Formen von Notwehr geben,

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gegen die keinerlei moralische Gründe sprechen? Die zen-trale These des Vortrags lautet, dass der zweite Fall eintretenkann: Manchmal spricht, moralisch betrachtet, nichts dage-gen, einen Angreifer durch Maßnahmen der Selbstverteidi-gung zu schädigen.

Hierfür wird folgendermaßen argumentiert: Nicht immer,wenn Notwehr erlaubt ist, gibt es auch moralische Gründe,die dafür sprechen, sich zu verteidigen. Zum einen fällt esschwer, Kandidaten für solche Gründe zu benennen; zum ande-ren haben Situationen, in denen Notwehr erlaubt ist, nichtzwingend Konfliktcharakter. Wenn moralisch problematischeHandlungen erlaubt sind, dann müssen jedoch auch mora-lische Gründe dafür sprechen, diese Handlungen auszufüh-ren. Prudentielle Gründe können es nicht moralisch erlaubtmachen, etwas zu tun, und weder die Annahme eines Rechtsauf Selbstverteidigung noch der Versuch, sog. exclusionaryreasons im Sinne von Raz ins Spiel zu bringen, stützt die Idee,dass es moralisch erlaubte Handlungen gibt, gegen die Gründevorlegen, ohne dass diese durch weitere moralische Gründeaufgewogen werden.

Im Anschluss an die Entwicklung des Arguments für diegenannte These wird diskutiert, welchen Raum diese lässt,den folgenden Phänomenen Rechnung zu tragen: (i) Auch beimoralisch erlaubter Notwehr ist ein charakteristisches Unbeha-gen angesichts der gewählten Entscheidung angemessen; (ii)eine Person, gegen die man sich in Notwehr verteidigen muss,wird nicht zu ›moralischem Freiwild‹, über das der Akteur freiverfügen kann; (iii) wenn es eine mildere und zumutbare Weisegibt, sich des Angriffs zu entziehen, so ist diese Option gebo-ten. Es wird abschließend gezeigt, dass und wie man diesenAnnahmen einen hinreichenden Sinn abgewinnen kann, ohnevon der zentralen These des Vortrags abzuweichen.

8 GrahleTwo Dimensions of Meaningfulness

André GrahleUniversity of St Andrews (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

Susan Wolf (2010) argues that meaning in life consists inand arises from »active and loving engagement in projectsof worth«. Whether or not one’s life has meaning has to dowith one’s ability to respond adequately to what Wolf callsreasons of love; reasons that have their normative source ina fitting relation of one’s love or attraction for an objectivelyvaluable project. The aim of this presentation is a constructiveone: Accepting the main idea of Wolf’s theory, a position isestablished according to which there is an additional dimen-sion of meaningfulness that does not require the availabilityof reasons of love.

Second-dimensional meaning (as against the first-dimensio-nal meaning captured by Wolf’s view) is made available to oneby others. It is argued that through expressions of admiration,others can address one with a reason to maintain or developfurther one’s admirable properties. In virtue of one’s beingsubjected to such reasons, one’s life has second-dimensionalmeaning. In particular, it is argued that when going throughepisodes of depression and emotional indifference where rea-sons of love are no longer available to one, admiration-basedreasons can come to the rescue. Temporarily at least one’s lifecan be orientated around these reasons.

Grundmann 5What role can experience

play in apriori justification? –A reliabilist account

Thomas GrundmannUniversität Köln

[email protected]

Whether a belief is justified apriori or aposteriori is, accor-ding to the received view, a matter of its source. Whereasapriori justified beliefs are supposed to be based on non-expe-riential sources, aposteriori justified beliefs are supposed todepend on experiential sources. It is currently a highly contro-versial matter whether this is a sufficient criterion of demar-cation. But it seems uncontroversial to claim that non-expe-riential sources are at least a necessary condition for beingapriori justified. Now, in what sense does a source of a beliefhave to be non-experiential to provide us with apriori justifica-tion? Obviously, many paradigmatic cases of apriori justifiedbeliefs are such that empirical factors play an important rolein the their production. Think of conceptual judgments whichare based on a competent use of empirically acquired con-cepts, or think of mathematical judgments that are based onvisual thinking. In all of these cases experience plays a signi-ficant role in bringing about an intuitively apriori justifiedbelief. In order to make sense of these phenomena, Burge(1993) famously distinguishes between (epistemically irrele-vant) enabling conditions and (epistemically relevant) entit-ling conditions. Nevertheless, the foundation of this distinc-tion remained unclear. In my talk, I will suggest a reliabilistcriterion for this distinction. According to this criterion (R),the justification of a belief is non-experiential if and only ifthe reliability of the relevant belief-forming process does notdepend on the reliability of the experience that is involvedin the production of the belief. I will then show that withthis criterion (R) one can make proper sense of many intui-tive cases of apriori and aposteriori justification. Moreover,I will respond to a serious objection from cases which intui-tively seem to be of the apriori kind although the reliability ofperception is required for them. After having dismissed thisobjection, I will conclude by providing some evidence for theclaim that internalists lack a similarly successful criterion todraw the proper distinction between apriori and aposteriorijustification.

Grüne-Yanoff 3Modelling and How-Possible Explanations

Till Grüne-YanoffKTH Stockholm (Sweden)

[email protected]

The paper shows how models that lack a well-supported rela-tion to real-world entities and properties can be justified,beyond the weak role that they might play as heuristic tools.Using conceptual distinctions from the discussion of »how-possibly« explanations, eight types of models are distinguis-hed by their modal qualities of their initial conditions, modelprocesses and model results. For each of these eight modeltypes, contexts and purposes are identified in which the use

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of such a model offers genuine epistemic gain. These respec-tive prospects offer novel justifications for abstract modellingpractices.

4 GrunenbergCan Rule-following be blind?

Lisa GrunenbergUniversität Hamburg

[email protected]

Dispositional accounts of rule-following are promising candi-dates, if we want to explain how rule-following can be blind.However, Paul Boghossian has recently argued that besidesdifficulties in spelling out such accounts in detail there is ageneral problem, which casts doubt on the very idea thatunderlies all dispositional accounts of rule-following. I arguethat his reasoning is fallacious.

In order to show that the difficulties Boghossian envisa-ges do not threaten dispositional accounts in general, I willexplain how dispositional accounts can be spelled out by rely-ing on what Herbert Hart has called a ›reflective critical atti-tude‹. Reflection on the concept of explanation and the notionof having a reason will be necessary to see how dispositionalaccounts can be defended against Boghossian’s more funda-mental criticism.

8 GudmundssonDas Gute als Objekt des Strebens –

Zur konativen Theorie der Güte

Johann GudmundssonUniverstität Leipzig

[email protected]

Unter einer konativen Theorie der Güte wird der Versuch ver-standen, Güte unter Bezugnahme auf den Begriff des Strebensoder Begehrens zu erläutern. Versteht man das Urteil ›X istgut‹ im Sinne von ›X ist gut für S‹, so deutet die konative Theo-rie der Güte die Relation gut für im Sinne von wird erstrebt von.Dass ein X gut ist, bedeutet dieser Theorie zufolge, dass es einS gibt, welches X erstrebt. So wie in dem Urteil ›X ist rot‹ dasX, welches rot ist, von der Röte unterschieden wird, die demroten X zukommt, so wird in einem Urteil der Form ›X ist gut‹das X, welches gut ist – das Gute – von der Güte unterschie-den, die dem guten X zukommt. Konative Theorien der Gütehaben sowohl eine Antwort darauf, was das Gute ist, als auchdarauf, worin dessen Güte besteht. Das, was gut ist, ist das,was erstrebt wird. Und die Güte dessen was gut ist bestehtdarin, dass es erstrebt wird.

In meinem Vortrag differenziere ich zwei Begriffe des Stre-bens. Dem ersten Begriff des Strebens zufolge ist das, waserstrebt wird, dem Streben extern. Man kann vollständig ver-stehen was Streben ist, ohne auf sich auf das zu Beziehen, waserstrebt wird. Dem zweiten Begriff des Strebens zufolge gibtes einen inneren Zusammenhang zwischen dem Streben unddem Erstrebten. So ist Streben nur verständlich als ein Stre-ben hin zur Vollkommenheit des Strebenden. Im Vortrag wirdgezeigt, dass neoaristotelische Kritiken an konativen Theoriender Güte sich lediglich auf den ersten Begriff des Strebens

beziehen. Somit bleibt durch Bezugnahme auf den zweitenBegriff des Strebens der Weg einer aristotelischen konativenTheorie der Güte offen.

Gutsche 4Mechanistische Erklärung: Reduktiv oder nicht?

Bettina GutscheUniversität Mainz

[email protected]

Ist der Ansatz der mechanistischen Erklärung (ME) – bei demkausale Mechanismen für bestimmte Phänomene v. a. in denNeurowissenschaften gefunden werden – ein ausschließlichreduktiver Ansatz? Hat er reduktive Komponenten oder musser gar als völliger Gegenentwurf zum Reduktionismus verstan-den werden? Die Antworten auf diese Fragen hängen davonab, wie Reduktion und Reduktionismus verstanden werden,jedoch auch davon, wie die Vertreter von (ME) ihren Ansatzbeschreiben. Während in einigen Publikationen William Bech-tels und seiner Kollegen (Bechtel 2001; Bechtel 2007; Bechtel &Hamilton 2007) der mechanistische Erklärungsansatz durchausals ein reduktionistischer Ansatz verstanden wird, so ist diesbei den Arbeiten von Carl Craver und seinen Kollegen (v. a.Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000; Craver 2005; Craver 2007)und auch bei neueren Publikationen von William Bechtel undKollegen (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2008; Bechtel 2009; Bechtel2010) nicht der Fall.

Im Folgenden wird anhand der angeführten Texte gezeigt,inwiefern (ME) als reduktiver Ansatz aufgefasst werden kann,danach wird beschrieben, inwieweit (ME) dem Reduktionismusentgegengesetzt ist. Schließlich werden mit Ernest Nagel –dem Begründer der klassischen Reduktion – die verbleibendenreduktiven Komponenten von (ME) beleuchtet. Genauer heißtdas: die »reduktive Sicht der Vereinheitlichung«, die Craver(2007) angreift und der er für die Neurowissenschaften einealternative Form von Vereinheitlichung (»intralevel / inter-level integration«) entgegensetzt, kann im Sinne von Nagel(1961) rehabilitiert werden. Im Fazit wird die Nagel-Reduk-tion in Teilen als mit dem mechanistischen Ansatz kompatibelerachtet.

Gutwald 7Im Namen der Autonomie?

Eine kritische Untersuchung desliberalen Paternalismus

am Beispiel von Maßnahmendes kognitiven Enhancements

Rebecca GutwaldLudwig-Maximilians-Universität München

[email protected]

Im vorliegenden Beitrag möchte ich einen kritischen Blick aufden sog. liberalen Paternalismus werfen. Der Rechtfertigungs-strategie über die liberale Forderung nach Respekt für Auto-nomie sollten meiner Ansicht nach Grenzen gesetzt werden,auch wenn Respekt für Autonomie vermeintlich gewahrt wird.Kritisch zu betrachten sind vor allem die Arbeiten von CassSunstein und Richard Thaler sowie einigen Medizinethikern,

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die einen Autonomie-fördernden bzw. verbessernden Paterna-lismus unterstützen.

Dieser erscheint, so meine Argumentation, vor allem frag-würdig, wenn wir neue, technische Möglichkeiten betrachten,um Autonomie und Entscheidungen (vermeintlich) zu verbes-sern, insbesondere Maßnahmen des sog. »Cognitive Enhan-cements«. Der Einsatz bzw. Förderung dieser Maßnahmenscheint eine logische Konsequenz aus der Befürwortung einesweichen Paternalismus im Stile von Sunstein/Thaler.

Meine These ist jedoch, dass dies nicht der liberalen Grun-didee des Freiheitsschutzes entspricht: nicht alles, was Auto-nomie befördert, muss auch getan werden, selbst wenn dieRisiken gering sind. Vielmehr muss dem Menschen auch dieMöglichkeit eingeräumt werden, eigene Fehler zu machen undIrrtümer zu begehen. Mein Anliegen ist hier vor allem, einekritische Frage gegenüber Theoretikern wie Sunstein/Thaleraufzuwerfen, nämlich, was aus ihrem verbessernden, weichenPaternalismus folgt und inwiefern dieser noch als »liberal«aufgefasst werden kann.

3 HarbeckeTwo regularity theories

of mechanistic constitution

Jens HarbeckeUniversität Witten/Herdecke

[email protected]

A central concept of the mechanistic approach to neurobiolo-gical explanation is that of ›mechanistic constitution‹, resp.›constitutive relevance‹. It is at the heart of the mechanists’model of explanation in the sense that an explanation of aphenomenon in neurobiology is taken to be informative onlyif an adequate description of a mechanism constituting thatphenomenon is achieved. Furthermore, the ontology promo-ted by the mechanists is essentially based on the constitutionrelation.

Despite its centrality and widespread use, it is still quiteunclear what exactly the mechanists take the nature of con-stitution, resp. constitutive relevance to be. A screening ofthe pertinent literature reveals that the terms are used invarious different, sometimes even incompatible ways. Craverhimself, for instance, uses the term ›constitutive relevance‹at times to depict a relation between individuals and pheno-mena, and on other occasions to describe a relation betweenevents and phenomena. Other authors seem to use the notionof supervenience as the mechanists use the notion of consti-tution. Again others appear to identify it with the parthoodrelation.

The clearest and hitherto most explicit analysis of consti-tution has been provided by AUTHOR and Mark Couch, whoindependently have defended a regularity theory of consti-tution. The key idea driving these theories has been to takesome of the formal definitions known from regularity theo-ries of causation and adapt them to the case of constitution.This paper tries to understand in detail the similarities anddifferences of these two regularity approaches.

In a first step, the similarities of the two theories are madeprecise. It is then pointed out that AUTHOR’s definition pos-tulates a condition that rules out spurious constitutive regula-rities whilst Couch’s does not. Morever, Couch’s theory, incontrast to AUTHOR’s account, fails to make precise how

parthood relates to constitution. Finally, the two theoriesdiffer in defining constitution either as (a)symmetrical and(ir)reflexive. Several consequences of these differences are dis-cussed. On the bases of these arguments, AUTHOR’s defini-tion is characterized as better suited for the reconstruction ofactual neurobiological explanations relative both to Couch’stheory and to the above-mentioned alternatives.

Haueis 3Fuzziness in the Brain. Semantic Vagueness and

Functional Neuroanatomy

Philipp HaueisHumboldt-Universität zu [email protected]

Contributing to an »applied« philosophy of science, this papersets out how philosophical theories of vagueness are relevantfor current research in neuroscience. Predicates with vagueextension are found in everyday language (e.g.: ›heap‹; ›bald‹;›red‹) and in the vocabulary of disciplines such as law andgeography (Endicott 2001; Varzi 2001). In neuroscience, con-cepts with fuzzy boundaries (e.g. ›brain area‹) are found in thefield of (human) brain mapping and its accompanying sub-disciplines (anatomy, physiology, functional neuroimaging).Although neuroscientists acknowledge the existence of fuzzyboundaries at different levels of research (Logothetis 2008;Wu et al. 2011), there is little systematic understanding of thetheoretical implications and demarcation from other lingui-stic phenomena such as epistemic uncertainty or ambiguity.Here, philosophical analysis can help to disentangle concep-tual puzzles which result in overlapping issues in empiricalresearch (Hyman 1989). In this paper, I attempt to give suchan analysis by outlining the phenomenon of vagueness in neu-roanatomy for three levels of neuroscientific research, namelyfor the (i) identity conditions for brain regions at the neuronlevel; (ii) voxel activation at the level of intra-region neuronalinteraction measured by the BOLD-signal of functional magne-tic resonance imaging (fMRI) and (iii) community membershipof nodes at the level of functional connectivity between brainregions.

My analysis tries to show that the empirical solutions totackle epistemic uncertainty or ambiguity are inappropriate todeal with vagueness, which is a conceptual issue independentfrom the lack of information (Grice 1989) or technologicalshortcomings (Saxe, Brett and Kanwisher 2010). To give anexample: to reduce intersubject-variability, individual data arenormalized and put into a stereotactic atlas. But that ana-tomical distortion prevents the researcher to find out whe-ther ›region A‹ has an exact or vague denotation. A furtherimplication of my analysis is that if functional subdivisionsand anatomical structure do not map one-to-one, (i) and (iii)have different grades of precision. Hence, the assumption thatfunctional connectivity gives a more »precise« description ofregion boundaries than cytoarchitectonic studies would befalse, because to different issues of vagueness are addressedin each case.

Endicott, T. (2001). Vagueness in Law. Oxford: Oxford Uni-versity Press.

Grice, P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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Hyman, John (1989). The Imitation of Nature. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.

Logothetis, N. K. (2008). ›What we can do and cannot dowith fMRI‹, Nature, 453(7197): 869–878.

Saxe, S.; Brett, M.; Kanwisher, N. (2010). ›Divide and Con-quer: A Defense of Functional Localizers.‹ In. Hanson, S. J.,Bunzl M. (eds.). Foundational Issues in Human Brain Mapping,Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 25–41.

Varzi, A. (2001). ›Vagueness in Geography‹, Philosophy andGeography 4(1), 49–65.

Wu K., Taki Y., Sato K., Sassa Y., Inoue K., et al. (2011). ›TheOverlapping Community Structure of Structural Brain Net-work in Young Healthy Individuals‹, PLoS ONE 6(5): e19608.doi:10.1371 / journal.pone.0019608.

3 HauswaldWas sind vage natürliche Arten?

Rico HauswaldHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

Gängige Theorien natürlicher Arten (insbesondere Essentialis-mus und homeostatic property cluster-(HPC)-Theorie divergie-ren grundlegend hinsichtlich der Frage, ob es so etwas wieVagheit, Unbestimmtheit oder unscharfe Kategoriengrenzenbei natürlichen Arten geben kann. Während Essentialisten aufdiskreten natürlichen Arten bestehen, räumen Vertreter derHPC-Theorie bereitwillig die Möglichkeit »vager« natürlicherArten ein.

Die genaue theoretische Klärung, was »Vagheit« in diesemZusammenhang eigentlich heißt, stellt allerdings bislang einDesiderat dar. Ich will mich in meinem Beitrag dieses Desi-derats annehmen und eine Bestimmung und systematischeModellierung der Vagheit von HPC-Arten vornehmen, wobeiEinsichten und Unterscheidungen aus der vagheitstheoreti-schen Diskussion fruchtbar gemacht werden sollen. Sowohldie HPC- als auch die Vagheitstheorie können, wie ich meine,von diesem bisher kaum geführten Dialog profitieren.

Ich argumentiere (1.) dass die HPC-Theorie als kausal-realis-tischer, d. h. nicht-semantischer Clusteransatz mit dem seman-tischen Externalismus kompatibel ist und dass die die HPC-Ar-ten bezeichnenden Terme direkt, namensartig auf diese refe-rieren. Daraus folgt (2.) dass es sich bei der von diesen Termenaufgewiesenen Vagheit nicht um intensionale, sondern umextensionale Vagheit handeln muss. (3.) argumentiere ich,dass HPC-Arten erfolgreich mithilfe des vagheitstheoretischenBegriffs der »Realisierungslücke« modelliert werden können.Auf dieser Grundlage kann dann (4.) die Parallele zum soge-nannten »problem of the many« verständlich gemacht wer-den. Ein wichtiges Ergebnis besteht in der genauen Differen-zierung und Rekonstruktion unterschiedlicher Vagheitstypen,die für den HPC-Ansatz einschlägig sind, insbesondere: (a) syn-chrone und (b) diachrone Unbestimmtheit von HPC-Arten, (c)»imperfect homeostasis« und (d) die Gradualität des natürli-che-Arten-Konzepts selbst.

Haverkamp 3Intuitionism and Incompleteness

Nick HaverkampUniversität Hamburg

[email protected]

If someone wants to promote a system of inferential rulesfor a class of logical expressions, then she is often seen toincur the commitment to the existence of a model-theoreticsemantics which coheres with the promoted calculus: therehas to be a model-theoretic semantics for which the systemof rules is provably sound and complete. Furthermore, theneed to find a suitable model-theoretic semantics which cor-responds to a given calculus is felt especially strong if thecalculus deviates from the canons of reasoning that are codi-fied in classical logic. With respect to a non-classical systemof inferential rules, there is no guarantee, or so it seems, thatthey really govern meaningful expressions. Hence the effortsof non-classical logicians to come up with suitable semanticswhich correspond to their preferred calculi.

In this talk, I will discuss intuitionistic logic and intuitioni-stic model-theoretic semantics. More precisely, I will deal withthe following two questions:1. Is there a suitable model-theoretic semantics which cor-responds to the intuitionistic calculus of first-order predicatelogic?2. What are the consequences if there is no such semantics?

Relying only on a weak consistency assumption about themodels of a possible model-theoretic semantics, I will provein the first part of my talk that question (i) has to be answe-red negatively: there is no suitable model-theoretic semanticswhich corresponds to intuitionistic logic. Moreover, this resultcan be proved by intuitionistically acceptable means.

In the second part of my talk, I will defend the followinganswer to question (ii): the fact that there is no suitable seman-tics which corresponds to intuitionistic derivability does notspeak against intuitionistic logic. In particular, I will argue,pace Dummett, that intuitionists can be as happy with Tars-kian model-theoretic semantics as classicists are. The fact thatintuitionistic logic is not complete with respect to this seman-tics does not mean that this semantics fits classical logic bet-ter than intuitionistic logic. The idea that the correctness ofintuitionistic logic depends on a sound and complete model-theoretic semantics is seriously flawed. Completeness resultsmay have aesthetic mathematical value and useful mathe-matical applications but they do not have philosophical orsemantical importance.

Heilinger 8Non-effective moral reasons

Jan-Christoph HeilingerUniversität Zürich (Switzerland)

[email protected]

Moral reasoning aims at identifying the action an agent ismorally demanded to perform in a given situation. Moral rea-sons speak for or against a certain action. If we say an actionis morally demanded, we mean to have moral reasons to doit; if we say it is morally prohibited, we mean to have moral

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reasons not to do it; if we say it is morally permitted, we meanthat no moral reasons speak in favour or against it.

Given the complexity of dilemmatic scenarios, most oftenmultiple moral reasons pertain. They may compete and speakfor or against several, sometimes mutually exclusive actions.Because ultimately a decision has to be made and only onemoral reason (or a cluster of moral reasons speaking in favourof one specific action) can become effective and initiate actionof a moral agent, it has to be asked what happens to the non-effective reasons speaking in favour of an action that ultimatelyis not performed.

I argue that two different strategies can be distinguishedhow to deal with non-effective moral reasons (NEMR). Theycan either be cancelled or their persistence has to be admitted.Further differentiation suggests the following five possibili-ties:1. Cancelling non-effective reasons (»silencing claim«)1.1. The NEMR is overridden by other reasons and is no longera moral reason.1.2. The NEMR dissolves in the overall judgement.1.3. The NEMR looses its prescriptive force, even if it contribu-tes to the evaluation of a non-realised action as partly morallygood (»partial silencing«, insofar as only the prescriptive func-tion, not the evaluative function is cancelled).2. Accepting non-effective reasons (»persistence claim«)2.1. The NEMR persists and demands an additional but theultimately chosen action. It provides a cause for a residualfeeling of remorse and regret in the moral agent.2.2. The NEMR persists and demands an additional but theultimately chosen action. It provides a cause for some degreeof (potentially inevitable) moral guilt.

I will attempt to reject the silencing claim and inquireabout the plausibility of the persistence claim.

8 HenningWill I be glad I did it? –

Rational Decision, Preference Change,and Personality

Tim HenningUniversität Gieß[email protected]

This talk is about a neglected kind of decision problem. Somechoices lead to predictable changes in fundamental utilities.In some such cases, we have clear intuitions as to which choiceis rational. But it turns out to be hard to account for theseintuitions in standard decision-theoretic frameworks. Theseproblems have some interesting implications. I argue thatthe most promising solution to the problem of predictablepreference change is, surprisingly, Kantian in spirit. I beginby discussing an example, and I contrast the case with othercases for which diachronic principles of ratifiability or reflec-tion have been proposed. The changes I discuss are specialbecause they are not induced by conditionalization on newevidence. They do not constitute changes in information butchanges in basic values – or in personality. Recent Kantianauthors have claimed that we have reason to care about a per-son’s preferences because we have reason to respect her. Whenwe respect preferences (even our own ones), we do so becausethis respect is owed to particular persons. This Kantian viewhas the potential to solve the problem of predictable changes

in fundamental utilities. As far as our present preferences areconcerned, we owe it to ourselves to take them into account.But there is, at present, no one to whom we could owe it totake hypothetical later preferences into account (and if we acton our present desires, there never will be anyone to whomwe could owe this).

Himmelreich 8Action vs. Agency

Johannes HimmelreichLondon School of Economics and Political Science

(United Kingdom)[email protected]

Some people argue that talk of collective agency is misguided.They might claim that all action is individual action. There-fore, they might argue collective agency is merely individualagency, strictly speaking. I disagree and argue that agency isnot about doing something. More precisely, collective actionis neither necessary nor sufficient for collective agency. Thisis my first and main claim.

In defending this claim I make a correlated second claim.It concerns what could be called the »redundancy principle«.In short it says that if all collective actions are reducible toindividual actions, then any mentions of collective agency areredundant and should, therefore, be abandoned. My secondclaim is that this principle is wrong.

The main argument considers two examples. Both involvecollections of individuals. The first is the »Tragedy of the Com-mons« case: All individuals in the collection act such that theybring about an event. I argue that this is a case of collectiveaction but not of collective agency. Collective action thereforeis not sufficient for collective agency. The second case is the»Spokesperson« case: one individual acts to bring about anevent, in line with a decision taken by the collection. I arguethat this is not a case of collective action but possibly of col-lective agency. Therefore collective action is not necessary forcollective agency.

I present a third example to suggest that action simplici-ter is not necessary for collective agency. This is the »Bailiff«case: one individual acts to bring about an event, in line witha decision taken by the collection. However, the acting indi-vidual is not a member of the collection. If the collection inthe »Bailiff« case is a collective agent just as the collection inthe »Spokesperson« case is, then no action simpliciter by anymember of the group is necessary for collective agency.

This talk advances the argument that discussions of collec-tive agency should not focus on actions. Instead, I suggestthat cases such as »Bailiff« provide interesting examples whereaction and collective agency can easily become disjoint ratherthan overlapping concepts.

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3 Hirsch HadornEpistemic and non-epistemic values

in applied science

Gertrude Hirsch HadornETH Zürich (Switzerland)

[email protected]

The picture of scientific research as ongoing revisions of theo-ries to improve their merits regarding accuracy, scope, simpli-city and further criteria that make up what is conceived as agood theory dates back to the 1970ies. These criteria functionas epistemic values or standards, since they provide the nor-mative basis to decide on acceptance of theories as part of thebody of scientific knowledge. It has been proposed that theproper role of non-epistemic values, e.g. moral and prudentialvalues, is in evaluating the usefulness of theories to solve real-world problems, which comes after the epistemic evaluationof theories regarding acceptance as part of the body of scien-tific knowledge has taken place. This position assumes thatepistemic values are the same in both fields, basic and app-lied research. I will criticize this assumption and the relatedadditive account of epistemic and non-epistemic evaluationfor applied research while defending the thesis that non-epis-temic values have a role in determining epistemic values inapplied research.

Epistemic values come as an open list of vague criteria,lacking a general ordering. Epistemic values for deciding onacceptance of theories to be used for solving real-world pro-blems may differ from those for acceptance as part of thebody of scientific knowledge regarding (1) how vague stan-dards are specified, (2) what counts as a standard, and (3) howstandards are weighted. Real-world problems are matters orsituations regarded as unwelcome, harmful, or wrong and nee-ding to be overcome. Focussing on accuracy and simplicityas examples, the role of moral and prudential aspects of real-world problems in considering how to determine epistemicstandards in case of deciding on aceptance of theories to beused for solving real-world problems is discussed. Acceptingsuch an integrative account of epistemic and non-epistemicvalues for applied research means rejecting the position ofepistemic standards to be the same for all of science.

3 HjortlandTruth, Paracompleteness,and Substructural Logic:

Half as lovely, twice as true

Ole Thomassen HjortlandLudwig-Maximilians-Universität München

[email protected]

Contemporary work on formal theories of truth are dominatedby two opposing camps –classical theorists and revisionarytheorists. Both positions are reactions to the Tarskian legacy:there can be no consistent theory of truth which is (i) classical,(ii) strong enough to express its own syntax (e.g. has namesfor its sentences), and (iii) includes the unrestricted T-schema.The moral drawn by the classical theorists is that the T-schemain its unrestricted form has to go. In its place they offer arestricted truth predicate. The revisionists, on the other hand,

suggests weakening the logic to consistently accommodatethe full T-schema.

In what follows it is the revisionist theories that will be dis-cussed. Rather than giving arguments against classical theo-ries here, I will focus on comparing different revisionary theo-ries. In particular, I will compare two revisionary strategiesfor an unrestricted theory of truth: paracomplete theories andcontraction-free theories, i.e. logics without the structural ruleof contraction. Ultimately I will argue that a certain typeof contraction-free theory have important advantages overthe more familiar paracomplete theories. These theories, Iargue, come with two considerable benefits: First, unlike para-complete theories they offer a single revisionary solution toboth the Liar paradox and the Curry paradox. Second, con-traction-free logic allows for a truth predicate which can beapplied in suppositional reasoning, or reasoning under ass-umption.

Hoffmann 8Warum dürfen wir unsere Freunde bevorzugen,

aber nicht unsere Feinde benachteiligen?

Magdalena HoffmannUniversität Bern (Switzerland)

[email protected]

Betrachtet man die moralphilosophische Debatte um Partei-lichkeit und Unparteilichkeit aus einer Metaperspektive, fälltauf, dass die Parteilichkeitsbefürworter ausschließlich auf posi-tive Beziehungen (v. a. Freundschaft) fokussiert sind, währenddie negative Beziehung der Feindschaft keine Beachtung fin-det. Diese Eindimensionalität zeigt sich auch am Parteilich-keitsbegriff, der als Bevorzugung expliziert wird, ohne dass dieDimension der Benachteiligung berücksichtigt wird.

Dabei legt der Parteilichkeitsbegriff die einseitige Ausein-andersetzung mit positiven Beziehungen keinesfalls nahe: Inunserer Alltagssprache und verschiedenen Kontexten (z. B. beider Rolle des Richters) greifen wir vielmehr auf einen Partei-lichkeitsbegriff zurück, der symmetrisch ist: Er gilt für positivewie negative Beziehungen gleichermaßen.

Die Diskrepanz zwischen der einseitigen Betonung vonFreundschaft auf Seiten der Parteilichkeitsbefürworter einer-seits und dem symmetrischen Parteilichkeitsbegriff unsererAlltagssprache andererseits irritiert und birgt ein ernstes Pro-blem für die Überzeugungskraft der Parteilichkeitsbefürwor-ter. Denn ihre Argumentation lässt sich vielfach umkehren, sodass sich die Frage aufdrängt: Wenn ich meinen Freund bevor-zugen darf, warum darf ich dann nicht aus demselben Grundmeinen Feind benachteiligen? Solange die Parteilichkeitsbefür-worter diese Frage nicht beantworten, fehlt ihrem Ansatz dieÜberzeugungskraft. Sie stehen also vor der Herausforderung,die Asymmetrie in ihrer Argumentation zu rechtfertigen.

In meinem Vortrag werde ich mich dieses Desiderats anneh-men, indem ich drei denkbare Rechtfertigungsstrategien derParteilichkeitsbefürworter diskutiere, nämlich:1) Die Zurückweisung des Maßstabs der Unparteilichkeit, wel-cher dem Symmetrieverständnis zugrundeliegt,2) Die Neuformulierung des zugrundeliegenden Parteilich-keitsbegriffs mittels einer Explikation, die nicht in ihr Gegen-teil verkehrt werden kann (und entsprechend nicht auf dieAntipoden Freundschaft vs. Feindschaft angewendet werdenkann),

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3) Die Verneinung der bei einer Symmetrie vorliegenden Ähn-lichkeit (unter umgekehrten Vorzeichen) von Freundschaftund Feindschaft.

Von diesen Optionen können 1) und 2) m. E. nicht abschlie-ßend überzeugen. Im Zuge einer Analyse der Beziehungsform»Feindschaft« werde ich stattdessen zum Ergebnis kommen,dass sich Freundschaft in einer Hinsicht von Feindschaft maß-geblich unterscheidet, welche die Asymmetrie rechtfertigt:Anders als Feindschaft ist Freundschaft nicht nur psycholo-gisch, sondern auch moralisch relevant, weil Freundschafteinen intrinsischen Wert darstellt, der zu einem gelingen-den Leben nicht nur prudentiell, sondern auch moralisch bei-trägt.

4 HoffmannMenschliche Individualität

und personale Identität

Martin HoffmannUniversität Hamburg

[email protected]

In der gegenwärtigen Debatte um die Begriffe Person undpersonale Identität lassen sich zwei grundlegende Positio-nen unterscheiden: Auf der einen Seite stehen die Vertretereines mentalen bzw. psychischen Kriteriums personaler Iden-tität (Shoemaker, Parfit), auf der anderen Seite die Vertretereines physischen bzw. Körperkriteriums der personalen Iden-tität (Williams, Thomson, Olson). Die beiden Lager stimmeninsofern überein, als beide den Anspruch vertreten, eine Theo-rie vorzulegen, die Kriterien für die transtemporale Persistenzvon Personen spezifiziert. Sie widersprechen einander, weil dieeinen dieses Kriterium ausschließlich mit Bezugnahme auf psy-chische, die anderen ausschließlich mit Bezugnahme auf physi-sche Eigenschaften formulieren wollen. Beide Kriterien lassensich durch Intuitionen stützen, die in unserer Normalsprachefest verankert sind. Ein Grund dafür, dass keines der beidenLager die Kontroverse zu seinen Gunsten entscheiden kann,liegt offensichtlich darin, dass relevante Intuitionen mitein-ander unverträglich sind, was anhand zahlreicher Gedanken-experimente aufgezeigt werden kann.

Mein Ziel besteht darin, diese scheinbar unauflösliche Kon-troverse einer Lösung näher zu bringen. Das entscheidendeProblem in dieser Kontroverse liegt meines Erachtens in dereinseitigen Konzentration auf den Personbegriff. Meine Ker-nidee lässt sich formulieren wie folgt: Relevant ist hier dieUnterscheidung zwischen Personen und Menschen. Mit Hilfedieser Unterscheidung, so werde ich zeigen, lassen sich eineganze Reihe von Streitpunkten zwischen den Vertretern physi-scher und psychischer Kriterien personaler Identität beilegen.Allerdings löst dieser Nachweis allein noch kein theoretischesProblem. Denn da Menschen und Personen unterschiedlicheIndividuationskriterien haben (ein toter Mensch ist immernoch Mensch, aber nicht mehr Person), liegt die Vermutungnahe, dass die durch die Einführung der Distinktion Mensch/Person gelösten Widersprüche nur verschoben sind und sichnun stattdessen als Konflikte zwischen divergierenden Indivi-duationskriterien darstellen.

Dieses Problem lässt sich nur ausräumen, wenn man dieTheorie personaler Identität entsprechend erweitert. Diesenotwendige Erweiterung fasse ich unter dem Term »menschli-che Individualität«. Im Vortrag werden zwei Explikationsvor-

schläge für wichtige Bedeutungskomponenten eines so ver-standenen Individualitätsbegriffs formuliert.

Hoffmann 8Thomas Buddenbrook

und der Vorrang der Moral

Martin HoffmannUniversität Hamburg

[email protected]

Die Auffassung, dass Handelnde in ihrem Handeln moralischenGründen gegenüber anderen praktischen Gründen den Vor-rang geben sollen – im Folgenden: die Vorrangthese –, ist inder Ethik weithin akzeptiert. In der philosophischen Traditionist Kant einer ihrer herausragenden Vertreter; in der modernenMetaethik hat sie Richard Hare unter dem Schlagwort »over-ridingness« prominent vertreten. In jüngerer Vergangenheitist die allgemeine Geltung der Vorrangthese aber aus verschie-denen Gründen bezweifelt worden. Zu nennen sind in diesemZusammenhang vor allem John L. Mackie sowie – im deut-schen Sprachraum – Dieter Birnbacher und Héctor Wittwer.

Im Vortrag wird diese Kritik entkräftet und eine plausibleVersion der Vorrangthese verteidigt Dabei gehe ich in dreiSchritten vor: Zunächst wird der Status der Vorrangthese dis-kutiert. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass die Vorrangtheseeine Behauptung ist, die in unserem alltäglichen Sprechen undUrteilen über moralische Gründe und über deren Verhältnis zuanderen Handlungsgründen tief verankert ist. Es handelt sichsomit um ein Element der »deskriptiven Metaphysik« unseresalltäglichen Verständnisses von Moral. Relevant ist dieser Hin-weis, weil explizit zugestanden wird, dass der Vorrang mora-lischer Gründe in einem verbesserten – dann aber »revisio-nären« Bild von Moral – möglicherweise nicht mehr besteht.Vor diesem Hintergrund wird dann – zweitens – die Fragegestellt, ob das in der Vorrangthese zum Ausdruck kommendeGebot ein allgemeines Vernunftgebot oder ein moralischesGebot ist. Ich werde zunächst Gründe dafür anführen, dass dieVorrangthese nicht als allgemeines Vernunftgebot aufgefasstwerden kann. Dann werde ich anhand der Darstellung einesin Thomas Manns Buddenbrooks gestalteten Handlungsszena-rios exemplarisch zeigen, dass sich die Vorrangthese sinnvollals moralische Forderung interpretieren lässt. Drittens schließ-lich werden einige Fallbeispiele diskutiert, die die Kritiker derVorrangthese vorbringen, um ihre Unplausibilität zu belegen.Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass diese Fallbeispiele entgegendem ersten Anschein keine schlagkräftigen Belege gegen dieallgemeine Geltung des Vorrangs der Moral darstellen.

Hofmann 5How Gettier helps to understand justification

Frank HofmannUniversität Luxemburg (Luxemburg)

[email protected]

There are Gettier cases for justification. I will describe twosuch cases, cases involving veridical hallucination. An analy-sis of the cases is given, along the lines of (reliabilist) virtueepistemology (cf. Sosa, Greco).

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First, the two cases show that rational, evidenced beliefneed not be justified. Thereby, they show that (what can becalled) ›evidentialist accounts of justification‹ are false. Accor-ding to such evidentialist accounts of justification, a subject’sbelief that p is (prima facie) justified if and only if she pos-sesses some evidence e for p and she bases her belief thatp on her possession of evidence e for p (cf., similarly, Coneeand Feldman who speak of ›well-foundedness‹). A belief thatp has the status of being evidenced, by definition, if and onlyif there is some evidence for p. It is supported by evidence, insome sense; it is in accordance with reasons.

Second, the two cases show that justification has the samekind of abstract structure that knowledge has. In Gettier cases,a certain status is achieved and a corresponding competenceis exercized, but the status is not reached because of the exer-cise of the competence. We get lucky success. In the good,non-Gettier cases, the status is achieved by competence. Forknowledge, the status is being true, and the competence is akind of truth tracking ability (cf. Sosa, Greco). For justification,I submit, the status is being evidenced, and the correspondingcompetence is a reason tracking ability. Exercizing a reasontracking ability makes the resulting belief rational, since rea-son tracking abilities are rational capacities. Thus, a virtue-theoretic account of both knowledge and justification can beprovided.

The two Gettier cases for justification that I describe in-volve veridical hallucination. Things appear perceptually acertain way to the subject, and they really are that way, butonly by mere coincidence. In such a case, the subject can pos-sess evidence (luckily) and form a belief in a rational way, butthe belief need not be justified, intuitively. So being rationaland evidenced is not sufficient for being justified.

7 HohlIndividuelle Verantwortung für kollektiv

verursachte Schädigungen

Sabine HohlUniversität Zürich (Switzerland)

[email protected]

Ich befasse mich in diesem Paper mit folgendem Problem:Inwiefern sind einzelne Individuen für kollektiv verursachteSchädigungen moralisch verantwortlich? Dabei interessiertmich ein bestimmter Typ von kollektiv verursachten Schädi-gungen. Es handelt sich dabei um Szenarien, in denen eine Viel-zahl von Akteuren, die ihr Verhalten nicht untereinander koor-dinieren, einen ähnlichen Typ von Handlung ausführen, wobeijede einzelne Handlung für sich betrachtet unproblematischerscheint, alle Handlungen zusammen (oder eine Teilmengedavon) aber eine Schädigung von Drittpersonen verursachen.Beispiele für solche Szenarien sind durch Passivrauchen ver-ursachte Krankheiten oder Klimawandel. Gemeinsam ist denentsprechenden Szenarien, dass die Schädigung von Drittper-sonen durch den aggregierten Effekt der Handlungen einerVielzahl von Individuen hervorgebracht wird und eine kollek-tive Regulierung der betreffenden Handlungen fehlt. Ein gutesBeispiel ist der Klimawandel, der insofern einen Extremfalldarstellt, als die Beiträge einzelner Personen verschwindendklein sind, aber insgesamt massive Schädigungen drohen. Esgibt in diesem Fall keine – oder zumindest keine angemes-sene – kollektive Abmachung, welche die Schädigung verhin-

dert. Die Schädigung von Drittpersonen könnte jedoch – dasist die Annahme – in den hier diskutierten Situationen ver-hindert werden, wenn zumindest eine Teilmenge der betei-ligten Individuen ihr Verhalten verändern würde. Diese lose›Gruppe‹ von Individuen ist allerdings kein echtes Kollektivund kann nicht als solches angesprochen werden. Aussichts-reicher scheint es, auf die individuellen Pflichten der einzelnenbeteiligten Personen abzuzielen. Hier stellt sich das Problem,inwiefern man eine einzelne Person für den aggregierten Effektder Handlungen aller Beteiligten verantwortlich machen kann.Eine Grundfrage ist, inwiefern es für die moralische Beurtei-lung des Verhaltens eines einzelnen Individuums eine Rollespielt, wie die anderen beteiligten Individuen handeln. Dieanderen Beteiligten haben zum einen Einfluss auf den Effektder Handlungen eines Individuums: Wenn nur eine einzelnePerson einen Offroader fährt oder in den Urlaub auf einenanderen Kontinent fliegt, so ist dies unproblematisch, tundies aber viele Personen, kommt es aber an einem bestimm-ten Punkt zu gefährlichem Klimawandel. Kann man also denHandlungen einer Einzelperson überhaupt einen bestimmtenEffekt zuschreiben? Zudem stellt sich die Frage der Fairness:Wenn viele andere Beteiligte nicht bereit sind, ihr Verhalten zuändern, kann man dann von einer einzelnen Person verlangen,dass sie erhebliche Opfer erbringt, um ihr eigenes Verhaltenanzupassen?

Hommen 2The ontology of omissions and the problem

of omissive causation

David HommenHeinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf

[email protected]

In this talk, I deal with the issue of the ontology and causalityof omissions which is currently heavily debated both in legaltheory and moral philosophy. The dilemma in morality andcriminal law is that many theorists want to preserve a causalrelevance of omissions but endorse an eliminativist view onomissions which is incompatible with omissive causation onalmost any conception of causation. In the first section ofmy talk, I evaluate eliminativists’ strategies to deal with theproblem of omissive causation. Especially, I discuss MichaelMoore’s approach to posit a non-causal dependency-relationto base liability attributions in cases of omission, and rejectit. In the second section of my talk, I consider reductive andnon-reductive versions of realism about omissions. Reductiverealism, which identifies omissions with an agent’s concur-rent actions, has the problem that the causal consequencesof those actions generally seem not to match the causal con-sequences relevant for the moral attributions in question.Reductionist approaches to that problem, however, such asJonathan Schaffer’s account of contrastive causation, threa-ten the objectivity of causation by introducing perspectivicand perhaps even normative criteria into the causal analysis.Hence, the task of the last section is to establish a version ofnon-reductive realism about omissions, which reifies omissi-ons as negative properties of agents, that is both metaphysi-cally acceptable and able to provide a solution to the problemof omissive causation.

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8 HorstPractical Knowledge

David HorstUniversität [email protected]

In her book Intention G. E. M. Anscombe famously claims thatacting intentionally essentially involves knowledge of one’saction. Doing something intentionally is doing it knowingly.In my talk I shall offer an interpretation and defense of herclaim. In doing so, I will, first, clarify the claim that there isan essential connection between knowledge and intentionalaction. Second, I will argue for the negative claim that, ifthere is such an essential connection between knowledge andintentional action, the relevant kind of knowledge cannotbe observational or inferential knowledge. Third, I attemptto show that the knowledge involved in intentional actionmust be practical knowledge, and to specify what a positiveconception of such knowledge must look like.

5 HorvathUnderstanding

and Rational Revisability

Joachim HorvathUniversität zu Köln

[email protected]

Concerning the epistemology of judgments like BACHELORSARE UNMARRIED or ALL KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE, it seems anattractive view that our justification for such judgments istypically provided by understanding alone. In this talk, I willfirst put forward a novel version of this traditional view, andthen defend it against an important objection from the ratio-nal revisability of human judgments.

The view itself can be put as follows:(USJ) Understanding is a sufficient source of justification for

judgments like BACHELORS ARE UNMARRIED or ALL KNOW-LEDGE IS TRUE.

Understanding is understood broadly here, as the cognitiveability to form and entertain mental states with conceptualcontent. A source of justification (SOJ) is sufficient iff it alonesuffices to justify a judgment. But even sufficient SOJs cantypically be substituted or defeated by other sources.

Claims like (USJ) that express a constitutive link betweenunderstanding and justification are by no means uncontrover-sial. One of the main objections takes the rational revisabilityof almost all human judgments as its starting point. Particu-larly troublesome in this respect are cases where even expertsconcerning a judgment to which (USJ) supposedly applies canrationally deny that judgment (cf. Williamson, The Philosophyof Philosophy, ch. 4). Thus, proponents of (USJ) need to arguethat their view is compatible with the following, seeminglyincompatible claim:

(URD) Even someone who fully understands e.g. the judg-ment ALL KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE can rationally deny that judg-ment and even lack any inclination to accept it.

However, I will argue that (URD) is merely an instance ofthe following general truth about SOJs:

(GTS) A subject S who possesses a sufficient source of justi-

fication Q for the judgment J can rationally deny J and evenlack any inclination to accept J.

The argument for (GTS) is that it is true of all standardSOJs, even quite diverse ones like perception and introspec-tion, which strongly indicates that it expresses a general truthabout SOJs. The rational revisability of human judgments istherefore compatible with possessing a sufficient SOJ for thesejudgments, and thus poses no special problem for (USJ).

Hoyningen-Huene 3Der Sackgasseneinwand

gegen verschiedene Formendes Realismus: Beispiele

Paul Hoyningen-HueneLeibniz Universität Hannover

[email protected]

Der Sackgasseneinwand richtet sich gegen den konvergentenEntitäten-Realismus und zugleich gegen bestimmte Formendes Strukturen-Realismus; er wurde »the ultimate argumentagainst convergent realism and structural realism« genannt.Betroffen sind alle Formen des Realismus, die irgendeine Konti-nuität in einer Theorienfolge als Argumentation für eine Formdes Realismus benutzen. Beispielsweise wird im konvergen-ten Entitäten-Realismus die Kontinuität postulierter Entitä-ten über verschiedene Theoriewechsel hinweg als Argumentfür die wirkliche Existenz dieser Entitäten genommen, oderin manchen Formen des Strukturen-Realismus die Kontinui-tät von Strukturen über verschiedene Theoriewechsel hinwegals Argument für die Realität dieser Strukturen genommen.Diese Art der Stützung des Realismus wird vom Sackgassen-einwand angegriffen. Der Sackgasseneinwand besagt, dass diebeobachtete Kontinuität in der Theorienfolge (deren Existenzum des Argumentes willen nicht bezweifelt wird) auch vonder Konvergenz der Theorienfolge zu einer Grenzwerts-Theorieherrühren könnte, die zwar empirisch außerordentlich genauist, hinsichtlich ihrer Entitäten bzw. Strukturen aber keines-wegs die Realität trifft. In diesem Falle würde die beobachteteKontinuität in der Theorienfolge keine Legitimation für ihrerealistische Interpretation liefern, sei es im Sinne des Entitä-ten-Realismus oder des Strukturen-Realismus. Tatsächlich sindkeine Ressourcen erkennbar, die diesen für die betroffenenRealisten unliebsamen Fall ausschließen könnten.

Nach einer kurzen Darstellung des Sackgasseneinwands wer-de ich drei Fallstudien vorstellen, die zeigen, dass die vomSackgasseneinwand ins Auge gefasste Möglichkeit keineswegsnur eine logische Spielerei darstellt, sondern in der Wissen-schaftsgeschichte wiederholt aufgetreten ist.

Erstens: Die Entwicklung der klassischen Mechanik von ca.1740 bis ca. 1900. In diesem Zeitraum war die klassischeMechanik praktisch einhellig anerkannt und wurde aufgrundihrer immer neuen und z. T. unerwarteten Erfolge als endgül-tige Theorie gesehen. Das 20. Jahrhundert zeigte dann, dassdiese Hoffnung verfrüht war.

Zweitens: Die Berechnung der Perihelbewegung des Plane-ten Merkur. Die zunächst überraschende Perihelbewegung desMerkur konnte mittels der Newtonschen Gravitationstheorieim Laufe des 19. Jhdt. in verschiedenen Approximationsschrit-ten sukzessive bis auf 0.7 % berechnet werden. Das Verfahrenkonvergierte, allerdings auf einen grundsätzlich falschen Wert.

Drittens. Die Empirie und Theorie der Infektionskrankheiten

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war seit den Arbeiten von Pasteur und Koch im Kern stabil. DieEntdeckung der Prionen zeigte, dass diese Stabilität trügerischgewesen war.

4 HueblConsciousness for Attention

Philipp HueblHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

What is the relation between consciousness and attention?In a recent debate, Jesse Prinz argues that attention is anecessary condition for consciousness, while Chris Koch andNaotsugu Tsuchiya hold that attention and consciousness areindependent from another. I challenge both views, since theyare either vulnerable to counterexamples, or cross-fade percep-tual focus and attentional focus, as well as access to informationwith access to mental states. As a counterstrategy, I defendthe view that consciousness is necessary for attention. Asused in psychology and the neurosciences, the term »atten-tion« is best understood as denoting a mental mode that onlyoccurs within a field of consciousness. Like breathing, it canbe passive in occurring involuntarily, or active, in being perfor-med voluntarily as an action. Empirical research from problemsolving, masking experiments and the like shows that infor-mation can be processed and stored below consciousness. Inother words, there is information access within the cognitivesystem. However, mental states need to be in the focus of thefield of consciousness in order to be state accessible for theperson, that is, in order to be used for mental actions like deli-berating or imagining, which in turn are necessary conditionsto store complex contents in long-term memory.

2 JaagHumes Dictum und die Dispositional-Kategorial-

Unterscheidung bezüglich natürlicher Eigenschaften

Siegfried Hermann JaagUniversität Luxemburg (Luxemburg)

[email protected]

Die Annahme natürlicher Eigenschaften hat sich für die Erklä-rung der objektiven Ähnlichkeit von Gegenständen, für dieDefinition von Duplikaten und intrinsischen Eigenschaften,für die Konzeption von Naturgesetzen und Kausalität unddie Theorie der Modalität als eminent fruchtbar erwiesen.Überdies findet sie auch außerhalb der Metaphysik erfolg-reich Anwendung, beispielsweise indem sie vielversprechendeLösungen zentraler Probleme der Sprachphilosophie (Putnamsund Kripkensteins metasemantische Paradoxien) und der Er-kenntnis- bzw. Wissenschaftstheorie (Hempels Rabenparadox,Goodmans neues Rätsel der Induktion) ermöglicht.

Weitgehend unabhängig von der Frage, ob es sich bei natür-lichen Eigenschaften um Universalien, Tropes oder natürli-che Klassen handelt, haben sich in der einschlägigen Litera-tur besonders zwei unterschiedliche (Familien von) Konzep-tionen natürlicher Eigenschaften durchgesetzt: Während nachdem Dispositionalen Essenzialismus (z. B. A. Bird & S. Shoema-ker) zumindest einige natürliche Eigenschaften dispositionale

Essenzen haben, hat eine natürliche Eigenschaft nach dem neo-humeschen Kategorialismus (z. B. D. Armstrong & D. Lewis)eine primitive Essenz (Quidditas), die das dispositionale Profilder Eigenschaft nicht mit einschließt. Zur Unterscheidung die-ser beiden Konzeptionen wird üblicherweise zusätzlich HumesDictum herangezogen. Während die Annahme von kategoria-len Eigenschaften per se keinerlei metaphysisch notwendigeVerbindungen zwischen distinkten Entitäten (Humes Dictum)impliziert, hat die Annahme von Dispositionen die Existenzessenzieller und somit metaphysisch notwendiger Verbindun-gen zwischen distinkten Entitäten zur Folge.

Das Hauptziel dieses Vortrags besteht darin, gegen beideKonjunkte des letztgenannten Unterscheidungskriteriums zuargumentieren: Gegen das erste Konjunkt wird anhand dreier(Familien von) Fälle(n) dargelegt, dass zwischen bestimmtenkategorialen Eigenschaften metaphysisch notwendige Verbin-dungen bestehen. Gegen das zweite Konjunkt wird ausgehendvon der Kernthese des Dispositionalen Essenzialismus für dieKompatibilität der Annahme dispositionaler Eigenschaftenmit Humes Dictum argumentiert. Abschließend wird disku-tiert, welche Konsequenzen sich aus diesen Befunden für dieDebatte zwischen Anhängern einer neo-humeschen und denVertretern einer anti-humeschen dispositionalistischen Meta-physik ergeben: Reden die beiden Parteien aneinander vorbei?Wenn nicht, worin besteht die Kontroverse wirklich? WelcheAuswirkungen hat dies auf die Konzeptionen und den modalenStatus von Naturgesetzen und Kausalität?

Jaster 5Contextualism and Gradability

Romy JasterHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

Epistemic Contextualism is the claim that the knowledge pre-dicate is contextsensitive. Jason Stanley objects against thisview that if it were correct, »know« should be gradable inthe same way as for instance ›tall‹ and ›flat‹. I show that thecontextualist is not committed to the gradability of the know-ledge predicate in the first place. I will distinguish betweenwhat I will call pure threshold predicates, which in each con-text either apply simpliciter or not at all, and impure thresholdpredicates, for which context determines whether they applysimpliciter, but which can also be satisfied to certain degrees.Pure threshold predicates are not gradable, but since manyof them are contextsensitive, a lack of gradability does not initself jeopardize contextsensitivity. Pace Stanley, three claimsare going to be established: that the lack of gradability of theknowledge predicate (i) does not jeopardize its contextsensi-tivity, (ii) does not dismantle the relevant analogies between»know« and gradable adjectives, and (iii) is perfectly consis-tent with the idea of varyingly high epistemic standards.

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8 KahmenHow Do We Know What We Intend?

Benedikt KahmenRWTH Aachen

[email protected]

How do you know what you intend? One influential sugges-tion is that intentions, like many other propositional attitu-des, are transparent: One can come to know that one has acertain intention by making up one’s mind about what to do.However, Jonathan Way (2007) and Sarah K. Paul (2011) haveindependently recently raised two objections to the trans-parency thesis: that it cannot explain knowledge of spon-taneous or irrational intentions, and that it cannot explainknowledge of rationally underdetermined intentions. The aimof this paper is to defend a version of the transparency thesisagainst these objections. I argue that they mistakenly presup-pose an exclusively evidential role of what the agent takesto be reasons for action. By appreciating the practical dimen-sion of the transparency thesis and the associated privilege, Iconclude, both objections can be answered.

3 KaiserReductive Explanation in Biology

Marie I. KaiserUniversität zu Köln

[email protected]

The question whether all biological phenomena can ultimatelybe explained in a reductive way is frequently disputed by phi-losophers as well as by biologists themselves. What mattersmost to them is whether explanatory reductionism is corrector not. Only few philosophers are interested in spelling outin detail what it means to explain a biological phenomenonreductively. It seems to me that this is a major shortcomingof the debate since any convincing defense of explanatory(anti)reductionism must be based on a clear and precise under-standing of what a reductive explanation is. In order to fillthis gap I present three main characteristics that distinguishreductive explanations in biology from non-reductive ones.The first and third of the following features are necessaryconditions, whereas the second is a characteristic that is onlytypical of most reductive explanations.

First, reductive explanations refer solely to factors that arebased on a lower level than the phenomenon to be explained.There exists an important subtype of this characteristic. Mole-cular explanations appeal exclusively to factors that are notonly located on a lower level, but on the one fundamental(biological) level of molecules. It is important to note thatreductive explanations in biology are not confined to this typeof fundamental-level explanations.

Second, in reductive explanations the behavior of a systemis typically explained solely in terms of factors that are inter-nal to the system (i.e. to the system’s parts). External factorsthat belong to the environment of the system are either com-pletely ignored or simplified to being mere background orinput conditions.

Third, to explain the behavior of a system in a reductiveway means to appeal to the parts of a system in isolation.

That is, reductive explanations only include information thatis discovered by taking the parts out of the system and byexploring their properties in other contexts than in situ.

These three features clarify the notion of a reductive expla-nation and thereby serve as a useful starting point to assessthe strengths and limitations of explaining biological pheno-mena reductively.

Kangilaski/Cohnitz 1Understanding a sentence | 6= Knowing

its truth-conditions:Why the epistemological

determination argument fails

Jaan KangilaskiUniversity of Tartu (Estonia)

[email protected]

Daniel CohnitzUniversity of Tartu (Estonia)

[email protected]

The determination argument tries to establish that a sen-tence’s meaning is at least a truth-condition. This argumentis supposed to rest on innocent premises that even a defla-tionist about truth can accept. The determination argumentcomes in a metaphysical and in an epistemological version.In this paper we will focus on the epistemological version.We will argue that the apparently innocent first premise ofthe epistemological version of this argument is true only ifunderstood in a way that is actually question-begging. If it isunderstood in a weaker sense (which we take to be the inten-ded sense), it loses its innocence and should be rejected by atruth-deflationist.

Kästner 3The Curious Symmetry of Mechanistic Constitution

Lena KästnerRuhr-Universität Bochum

[email protected]

How do we best explain cognitive phenomena? Throughoutthe past decades, neuroscientists have made significant pro-gress in associating divisions of our brains with specific cogni-tive capacities. Theories of mechanistic explanation promiseto take such scientific practice at face value: they claim expla-nation – at least in the neurosciences – works by identifyingthe mechanisms underlying the explanandum phenomenon.According to the most prominent conception, a mechanism isa whole composed of entities and their activities organized insuch a way that they produce or constitute the phenomenonin question.

The current paper focuses on the relation between a mecha-nism as a whole and its component parts. It investigates theproposed constitutive relation between them and how thisis cashed out in terms of mutual manipulability. Accordingto the mechanistic view, being able to manipulate the beha-vior of a mechanism as a whole through manipulation of apart and a part’s behavior through manipulation of the whole

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mechanism is sufficient to establish constitutive relevance – asupposedly symmetrical relation holding between the mecha-nism and its component parts.

I will argue that this appeal to symmetry, though well rea-soned against the background of scientific practice, raises adilemma. If the mechanist holds onto it, she will be forcedinto a metaphysical puzzle; for part-whole relations clearly arenot symmetrical. If she rejects symmetry, however, she willnot only risk losing her empirical adequacy but also appearsto confront worries about cross-level causation.

7 KatzerThe Idea of Global Public Reason

Matthias KatzerFriedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

[email protected]

This paper explores the idea of a conception of global publicreason that is distinct from public reason appropriate to dome-stic political deliberations in a democratic society. The idea ofpublic reason in a general sense can be understood to meanthat a political regime should be based on principles that »allcitizens may reasonably be expected to endorse«. Inspired byRawls, Joshua Cohen has suggested the idea of global publicreason that applies only to international political conduct andinstitutions and whose standards for what counts as reaso-nable are different from the standards at the domestic level.The paper explores this idea and examines the argumentspresented by Cohen.

In the first part, the paper examines the subject to whichglobal public reason is supposed to apply – the internationalpolitical order. In comparison to public reason at the dome-stic level, three differences are highlighted: the internationalpolitical order is still in the making; its proponents cannot rea-sonably aim at a universal consensus of all existing politicaland moral views to certain principles, but only at a wide con-sensus; and many elements of the international order are notenforced against other societies by coercive means.

In the second part, this description serves to confront Co-hen’s arguments for the view that global public reason con-tains standards which are substantially less demanding thanthose of domestic public reason. The first argument is basedon collective self-determination, the view that citizens havea right to determine their political order, the second on theview that the criteria for political obligation are different fromthose of justice. The third argument points to the value oftoleration and the possibility of reasonable disagreement. Thefourth argument is based on the requirement that a concep-tion global public reason must be widely shareable among theproponents of different political doctrines.

After an assessment of these arguments, the paper con-cludes that they do not support the view that the standardsof global public reason are fundamentally different from thestandards of public reason at the domestic level.

Kelp 5Towards a Knowledge-Based Account

of Understanding

Christoph KelpUniversity of Leuven (Belgium)

[email protected]

The aim of this paper is to provide a novel knowledge basedaccount of understanding. More specifically, an account ofdegrees of understanding is combined with a contextualistaccount of outright attributions of understanding. It is arguedthat this account has an edge over its main non-knowledgebased rivals and that it avoids a number of forceful objectionsthat have been levelled against knowledge-based accounts inthe literature.

Kiesewetter 8The Principle of Decisive Reasons

Benjamin Paul KiesewetterHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

In this paper, I present an argument for the claim that anagent has decisive reason to do something only if she hassufficient reason to believe that she has decisive reason todo it. I argue that this claim follows from the plausible ass-umption that it is always conceptually possible for an agentto respond correctly to her decisive reasons. In conclusion, Idiscuss some implications of this argument (given that someother standard assumptions about reasons hold). One suchimplication is that we are always in a position to be justifiedin believing all truths about what we have decisive reason (orought) to do.

Kietzmann 8Der Realismus praktischer Gründeund das Problem der Motivation

Christian KietzmannUniversität Basel (Switzerland)[email protected]

Als »Realismus praktischer Gründe« bezeichne ich eine Posi-tion, die behauptet, normative Handlungsgründe seien Tat-sachen. Praktische Vernunft wird von diesen Autoren als einVermögen zur Erkenntnis solcher Tatsachen vorgestellt. Beidem, was so erkannt wird, soll es sich aber dennoch um prak-tische Gründe handeln. Sie sollen einen Bezug zum Handelnhaben. Dieser Bezug kann nicht nur darin bestehen, dass siefür Handlungen sprechen. Sie müssen auch, wenn alles gutgeht, zum Handeln motivieren können. Ich kann in der Litera-tur zwei Strategien ausmachen, die das verständlich machensollen. Die erste Strategie (z. B. Thomas Scanlon) glaubt, Über-zeugungen allein könnten vernünftige Handlungen motivie-ren, indem sie diese verursachen. Die zweite Strategie (z. B.R. Jay Wallace) postuliert dagegen ein eigenständiges Ver-mögen des Willens, mit dessen Hilfe sich sein Besitzer unab-

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hängig von seinen Wünschen auf das Verfolgen bestimmterZiele festlegen kann. Ein vernünftiger Wille wird sich dabei anÜberzeugungen über praktische Gründe orientieren. Beide Vor-schläge sind m. E. unbefriedigend. Der kausalistische Lösungs-vorschlag scheitert an einer Variante des Problems abweichen-der Kausalketten, das in anderer Form alle klassischen Wunsch-Überzeugungs-Modelle der Handlungsverursachung plagt. Dervoluntaristische Vorschlag kann dagegen nicht erklären, wie derWille auf die Erkenntnis von Gründen orientiert ist. Ein drittesProblem betrifft beide Vorschläge im gleichen Maße; sie las-sen nämlich beide im Dunkeln, inwiefern normative Gründevon sich aus schon als praktisch gelten können. Im Rest desVortrages versuche ich mich an einer Diagnose der tieferenUrsache dieser Probleme und skizziere eine Alternative. DieProbleme entstehen m. E. deshalb, weil der Realismus norma-tiver Gründe die Erkenntnis eines Grundes von der vernünf-tigen Handlung, für die der Grund spricht, von vornhereinabtrennt. Zu dieser Konzeption praktischer Erkenntnis ist manaber gezwungen, wenn man praktische Gründe als Tatsachenoder Situationsaspekte begreift, die unabhängig vom Han-delnden einfach vorliegen. Ich will deshalb zweierlei vorschla-gen. Erstens sollte es alles eines begriffen werden, ein Zielzu verfolgen und einen praktischen Grund zu kennen, undnicht als zwei verschiedene Dinge. Zweitens sollte man vonder Handlungsmotivation her erläutern, was ein praktischerGrund ist, statt umgekehrt von einer vorgängigen Konzeptionpraktischer Gründe auszugehen und dann zu fragen, wie siemotivieren können.

4 KleinHorizonal Perceptual Experience

in Cognitive Science

Jonas KleinUniversität Osnabrück

[email protected]

It has been drawn on the phenomenological tradition to ques-tion the paradigm of what might be called Standard CognitiveScience (SCS). It is claimed that SCS fails to acknowledgeand account for the richness of our conscious mental life. Iwill test this critical tendency by sketching a way to deve-lop an SCS-account of perceptual experience that is basedon Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological concept of horizon.Husserl introduced this concept to describe the dynamics ofperceptual intentionality. He writes, that the contents of per-ceptual experience comprise actually present as well as merelypossible properties, entities, and aspects. These phenomenolo-gical descriptions can be further explicated by drawing on thework of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who brought in the lived bodyas a structural correlative of the horizon. I shall present seventhesis that capture the idea of the horizon. It will becomeclear, that the mentioned dynamics can be characterised asvariations of perceptual content along three dimensions: deter-mination, accessibility, and acquaintance. These dimensionscan be described in terms of contents and in terms of corre-sponding bodily structures.

To implement the seven theses, I will rely on the generalidea of the Global Workspace Hypothesis (GWT) as put for-ward by Baars (1997). Contents of (perceptual) consciousnessare borne by competing representations of visual and proprio-ceptive as well as memory related subsystems. Modulatory

processes manage the limited resources of consciousness andassign which contents become conscious. The structuring roleof the body is accounted for by giving proprioceptive systemssuch a modulatory role.

Knappik 5Selbstwissen als »Maker’s Knowledge«?

Franz KnappikHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

In neueren Debatten über Selbstwissen bezüglich mentalerZustände, Episoden usw. (»mentales Selbstwissen«) erfreutsich als Alternative zu den oft als unbefriedigend angesehenenPositionen des Wahnehmungsmodells von Selbstwissen (z. B.»innerer Sinn«) einerseits und der behaviouristischen Leug-nung von Selbstwissen andererseits eine sogenannte »rationalagency«-Theorie von Selbstwissen großer Beliebtheit. DieseTheorie deutet mentales Selbstwissen als Ausdruck unsererFähigkeit zu rationaler Aktivität. Demnach haben wir – zumin-dest in zentralen Fällen – deshalb ein autoritatives und nicht-inferentielles Wissen von unseren Überzeugungen, Absichtenusw., weil wir es sind, die diese Zustände im Rahmen rationalerAktivität hervorbringen.

Während die Vertreter von »rational agency«-Theorien dieAnnahme von besonders verlässlichem mentalem Selbstwis-sen – gegen den Behaviourismus – als Bedingung für rationaleÜberzeugungs- und Absichtsbildung plausibel begründen kön-nen, haben sie typischerweise Schwierigkeiten, die Möglich-keit solchen Selbstwissens ohne Annahme eines inneren Sinnszu erklären. Um verständlich zu machen, warum aus unsererUrheberschaft bestimmter rationaler Zustände ein besonderesWissen von diesen Zuständen folgt, wird immer wieder aufdie traditionelle Vorstellung des »Maker’s Knowledge« verwie-sen: wer einen Gegenstand hergestellt hat, hat demzufolgeein privilegiertes Wissen von diesem Gegenstand (z. B. weißder Uhrmacher, der eine Uhr gebaut hat, am besten, wie dieseUhr aufgebaut ist und funktioniert).

Für die Idee, mentales Selbstwissen als einen Fall von »Ma-ker’s Knowledge« zu interpretieren, spricht auch eine möglicheParallele im Fall von sogenanntem Handlungswissen. Es wirdhäufig angenommen, dass wir beobachtungsunabhhängigesWissen von eigenen intentionalen Handlungen haben. Derar-tiges Selbstwissen wäre ein weiterer Fall einer direkten Ver-bindung zwischen Selbstwissen und rationaler Aktivität, undauch hier scheint die Vorstellung von »Maker’s Knowledge«eine Erklärung zu bieten.

Doch obwohl Verterter von »rational agency«-Theorien ger-ne auf »Maker’s Knowledge« verweisen, wird gewöhnlich we-der expliziert, was genau unter »Maker’s Knowledge« zu ver-stehen ist, noch, wie »Maker’s Knowledge« eine Erklärung vonSelbstwissen liefern kann. In meinem Beitrag prüfe ich dieIdee, Selbstwissen der beiden genannten Arten könne im Rah-men einer »rational agency«-Theorie als Fall von »Maker’sKnowledge« erklärt werden, indem ich verschiedene möglicheFormulierungen für »Maker’s Knowledge« unterscheide undin der Anwendung auf Selbstwissen diskutiere. Mein Ergebnislautet: »Maker’s Knowledge« kann in gewissem Maße zur Erklä-rung von Handlungswissen beitragen, nicht aber von menta-lem Selbstwissen.

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8 KöhlerDo Expressivists have an Attitude Problem?

Sebastian KöhlerUniversity of Edinburgh (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

One objection that has been raised for meta-ethical expressi-vism is that expressivists must give an account of the natureof the attitude which constitutes moral thinking, but that anyexpressivist account that attempts to do seems to fail. Callthis objection (following Alexander Miller (Miller 2003:47))the Moral Attitude Problem. In this paper I suggest a strat-egy for expressivists to escape this problem: I argue that theMoral Attitude Problem is a problem that not only arises forexpressivists, but also for meta-ethical cognitivists, and thatexpressivists can use the same resources used by cognitiviststo escape this problem.

7 KöllmannLohngerechtigkeit: Tausch oder Verteilung?

Carsten KöllmannUniversität Zürich (Switzerland)

[email protected]

Es gibt bislang keine Theorie der Lohngerechtigkeit, die sichmit den zeitgenössischen Theorien der sozialen Gerechtigkeitmessen könnte. Ein Grund ist sicher die schon bei Rawls zu fin-dende Annahme, dass Lohngerechtigkeit unter soziale Gerech-tigkeit subsumiert werden könne. Angesichts dieses unbefrie-digenden Zustands scheint es sinnvoll, sich vor der Ausarbei-tung einer solchen Theorie auf die begrifflichen Grundlagenzu konzentrieren. In diesem Sinne will ich eine auf den ers-ten Blick möglicherweise zweitrangig erscheinende Detailfrageuntersuchen, die Klaus Peter Rippe kürzlich aufgeworfen hat.Er meinte, dass die Frage nach dem gerechten Lohn häufigals Frage der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit gestellt werde, dass sieaber tatsächlich als Frage der Tauschgerechtigkeit zu behan-deln sei. Ich bin anderer Meinung, finde aber die Frage wich-tig. Die Unterscheidung selbst geht bekanntlich auf Aristote-les zurück. Der zentrale Unterschied besteht darin, dass wir imFalle der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit relevante Eigenschaften der-jenigen berücksichtigen, unter denen das jeweilige Gut zu ver-teilen ist, während solche Eigenschaften im Falle der Tausch-gerechtigkeit keine Rolle spielen. Das leuchtet besonders ein,wenn man Tauschgerechtigkeit auf unpersönliche Markttrans-aktionen anwendet und den der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit aufverbindlichere Kooperationsbeziehungen. Nun hat Höffe kürz-lich den Begriff der Tauschgerechtigkeit zum Grundbegriff derGerechtigkeitstheorie erklärt, weil der Tausch zwischen Glei-chen der Verteilung durch eine übergeordnete Instanz norma-tiv überlegen sei. In einem ersten Schritt werde ich deshalbprüfen, ob der Begriff der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit damit ganzentfällt. Das ist nicht der Fall. Ich werde ihn vielmehr als gene-ralisierte Tauschgerechtigkeit rekonstruieren. Der Unterschiedbleibt trotz der begrifflichen Reduktion normativ relevant. Imzweiten Schritt werde ich dann die von Rippe aufgeworfeneFrage dahingehend beantworten, dass die »Ware Arbeitskraft«zwar auf dem Arbeitsmarkt angeboten und nachgefragt wirdund insofern der Tauschgerechtigkeit zu unterliegen scheint,

dass aber ihre »Verwertung« im Rahmen kooperativer Arbeits-beziehungen bei der Lohnverhandlung antizipiert wird. Damitist letztlich das Kriterium der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit maß-gebend. Im dritten Schritt werde ich die oben zitierte Ver-mutung, Lohngerechtigkeit könne unter soziale Gerechtigkeitsubsumiert werden, diskutieren. Sie ist falsch, weil sie Gerech-tigkeit von oben herab (top down) verordnen will, währendich mit Höffe einen bottom up-Ansatz für überlegen halte.Damit erhält die Lohngerechtigkeit gegenüber der sozialenGerechtigkeit normativen Vorrang.

Korbmacher 2Essence and Identity.

A Note on Essential Propertiesand Criteria of Identity

Johannes KorbmacherMunich Center for Mathematical Philosophy

[email protected]

The aim of this paper is to provide a formally precise andphilosophically satisfying definition of essential properties.We will mainly be motivated by the more or less Aristoteliannotion of essential properties as properties that a thing cannotlose without changing its identity. Our proposal is to analyzethis intuitive notion using a model-theoretic notion of super-venience on acceptable criteria of identity. The account thatwe are going to propose yields several nice formal properties,and captures the above-mentioned intuitive notion in a verynatural way.

Here, we will only consider one-level criteria of identityfor a kind K, i.e. statements of the form (for all x, y)(if Kxand Ky, then x = y iff R(x, y)).We assume that we have a wayof deciding whether a given criterion is acceptable or not.Now, consider an object a of kind K in a first-order structureM and let L be the corresponding first-order language. First,add a constant c to the language that denotes a. This givesus the new language L(a) and we can canonically construe Mas an L(a)-structure. We say that a non-logical L-formula p[x]expresses an essential property of a in M if and only if for someacceptable identity criterion R[x, y] and all L(a)-structures M’with dom(M) = dom(M’) where c denotes a,

R[x,c]ˆ M = R[x, c]ˆ M’ implies p[c]ˆ M = p[c]ˆ M’.Note that this is essentially a localized form of superve-

nience. Intuitively the definition says that if you want fora to lose its essential properties you will have to change itsidentity as judged by the acceptable criteria of identity.

Given this definition we will prove a few bridging andadequacy results relating this concept to other analyses ofessence. Furthermore, we will give illustrative examples toshow that the so-defined notion coincides with the above-mentioned intuitive notion.

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8 KreftLove and Value Judgments

Nora KreftKarl-Franzens-Universität Graz (Austria)

[email protected]

Theories according to which love is a response to the beloved’svaluable qualities have problems explaining why lovers consi-der their beloveds to be irreplaceable. For if love is groundedin value judgments, it looks as if lovers should be willingto replace their beloveds for relevantly similar or even morevaluable persons; but this is counter-intuitive, because loverswould neither want to, nor think they were allowed to replacetheir beloveds on the basis of comparative value judgmentssuch as these. Harry Frankfurt therefore rejects the idea thatlove is a response to value: according to him, value judgmentsare neither necessary nor sufficient for love, because love isprimarily a volitional rather than a cognitive or emotional atti-tude. More precisely, to love a person means to care for themunconditionally, and thus, to treat them as an irreplaceableend in itself.

In this paper, I am going to argue that Frankfurt’s theory oflove faces an internal dilemma. Apart from intuitive problemswith his account, it turns out that – depending on how weanalyze the concept of ›unconditional care‹ – he either failsto explain the beloved’s irreplaceability himself, or he has togive up his subjectivism and concede that love implies valuejudgments after all. So I suggest that we keep the idea thatlove is a response to value, and I end by laying out ways inwhich value-theories of love can respond to the irreplaceabi-lity-problem.

3 KrickelMaking Sense of Mechanistic

Interlevel Causation

Beate KrickelHumboldt Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

In my paper, I will show that the notion of a level of mecha-nism is compatible with the idea of interlevel causation. Cra-ver and Bechtel (2007) deny the possibility of interlevel cau-sation in the context of the mechanistic approach. Accordingto the mechanistic approach, an object X φ-ing is at a lowermechanistic level than another object S y-ing if and only if X’sφ-ing is a component in the mechanism for S’s y-ing (cf. Craver2007, 189). From this definition it follows that X’s φ-ing and S’sy-ing are related as part and whole. Since a whole and its partscannot causally interact for conceptual reasons, mechanisticinterlevel causation is supposed to be impossible.

Craver and Bechtel raise several objections against the pos-sibility of mechanistic interlevel causation that all stem fromthe idea that causal interactions between a whole and its partswould violate central assumptions about the notion of cau-sation (cf. Craver & Bechtel 2007). These objections and theunderlying line of argument can be summarized in what Iwill call »The Argument Against Mechanistic Interlevel Cau-sation«. I will further show that this argument is not valid.The reason is that Craver’s and Bechtel’s mistake is to assume

that mechanistic interlevel causation is possible only if S’sy-ing and X’s φ-ing in their entirety can causally interact. Iwill argue that if the mechanistic level-relation is understoodto be a relation between processes, then mechanistic interle-vel causation is possible if there are causal relations betweentemporal sequences (events) of S’s y-ing and X’s φ-ing. Sincethese sequences are not necessarily related as part and whole,there are no conceptual reasons to deny the possibility ofmechanistic interlevel causation. Furthermore, it will becomeclear that mechanisms are best described as relating processessince this does justice to the claim that mechanisms are actingentities.

Kruse 5Was sind epistemische Pflichten?

Andrea KruseRuhr-Universität Bochum

[email protected]

Die Frage »Was dürfen wir glauben?« ist eine zentrale Frageder »ethics of belief«. Zu ihrer Beantwortung müssen Nor-men oder Pflichten aufgestellt werden, die angeben, welchesVerhalten unter bestimmten Umständen geeignet bzw. erfor-derlich ist, um bestimmte kognitive Ziele zu erreichen.

Ich möchte diese Frage aus einer epistemischen Perspek-tive betrachten und der Frage nachgehen, was epistemischePflichten sind. Dafür wird zunächst der Begriff der epistemi-schen Pflicht eingeführt, der an die Verfolgung bestimmterepistemischer Ziele gebunden ist.

Es wird weiterhin gezeigt, dass epistemische Pflichten nachihren Erfüllungsbedingungen (subjektive vs. objektiv), ihrerQuelle (institutionell vs. natürlich) oder ihrem Gegenstand(inhaltsbezogen vs. bezogen auf die doxastische Praxis) unter-schieden werden können. Ausgehend von diesen Merkmalenwird eine Taxonomie von epistemischen Pflichten aufgestellt,welche auch die in der Literatur diskutierten epistemischenPflichten umfasst.

Damit epistemische Pflichten der Verfolgung und der Be-wahrung bestimmter kognitiver Ziele, wie dem Wahrheitsziel,dienen können, müssen epistemische Pflichten die doxasti-sche Praxis oder die epistemisch relevanten Eigenschaften derdoxastischen Einstellungen epistemischer Akteure wirksambeeinflussen können. Dafür ist es notwendig, dass epistemi-sche Pflichten normative Kraft aufweisen. Ich werde dafürargumentieren, dass sich die normative Kraft epistemischerPflichten zum einen aus der angenommenen Gültigkeit einerepistemischen Lesart des »Sollen impliziert Können« Prinzipsspeist und zum anderen aus der Möglichkeit konstituiert,einem epistemischen Akteur im Falle eines unentschuldig-ten Verstoßes gegen eine epistemische Pflicht epistemischenTadel zu zuschreiben. Es wird ein Begriff des epistemischenTadels eingeführt, der auf dem Begriff der doxastischen Kon-trolle beruht.

Obwohl epistemische Akteure nicht in der Lage sind, ihredoxastischen Einstellungen willentlich hervorzubringen, wer-den im Vortrag andere Formen doxastischer Kontrolle vorge-stellt, die epistemische Akteure ausüben können.

Angelehnt an der normativen Kraft epistemischer Pflich-ten und den ausführbaren Formen doxastischer Kontrollewerden Adäquatheitskriterien aufgestellt, aufgrund derer dieepistemischen Pflichten ermittelt werden können, die der

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Beantwortung der Frage »Was dürfen wir glauben?« dienlichsind.

Ausgehend von den Adäquatheitskriterien untersuche ich,ob es sich bei der Evidentialismusnorm, welche von epistemi-schen Akteuren fordert, diejenige doxastische Einstellung zueiner Proposition p zum Zeitpunkt t auszubilden, die zu der zut zur Verfügung stehenden Evidenz passt, um eine adäquateepistemische Pflicht handelt.

8 KühlerSollen, Können und Versuchen

Michael KühlerWestfälische Wilhelms- Universität Münster

[email protected]

Soll ich ein ertrinkendes Kind retten oder soll ich nur versu-chen, es zu retten? Soll der Stürmer einer FußballmannschaftTore schießen oder soll er dies nur versuchen? Bei derlei Fragenstehen zwei Überlegungen im Hintergrund: Erstens gehen wirüblicherweise davon aus, dass wir den Erfolg unserer Handlun-gen, sei es mit Blick auf die Durchführung der Handlung selbstoder hinsichtlich der Herbeiführung eines bestimmten Sach-verhalts, nicht vollständig unter unserer Kontrolle haben. DerHandlungserfolg hängt vielmehr auch von äußeren Umstän-den der Welt ab, die wir bestenfalls partiell kontrollieren oderbeeinflussen können. Als Handelnde können wir demnach nichtmehr tun, als entsprechende Handlungsversuche zu unterneh-men. Zweitens gehen wir gemäß dem Prinzip »Sollen impliziertKönnen« davon aus, dass wir das, was wir tun sollen, auch tunkönnen. Wenn unser Können jedoch lediglich Handlungsver-suche umfasst, dann wäre der Inhalt von Sollensansprüchenkonsequenterweise entsprechend einzuschränken. Wir wärensomit generell nurmehr zu (erfolgsunabhängigen) Handlungs-versuchen aufgefordert.

Dieser Argumentation steht allerdings unsere Alltagspra-xis entgegen, in der beispielsweise der Stürmer den an ihnadressierten Sollensanspruch keineswegs bereits durch erfolg-los bleibende Versuche, ein Tor zu schießen, erfüllt. Der Stür-mer soll sehr wohl (erfolgreich) Tore schießen und dies nichtnur versuchen. Auch im Falle des ertrinkenden Kindes bestehtdas Gesollte in dessen (erfolgreicher) Rettung und nicht nur inmeinem gegebenenfalls ebenso erfolglosen entsprechendenVersuch – selbst wenn ich im Nachhinein nicht dafür geta-delt werde, wenn ich das ertrinkende Kind nicht zu rettenvermochte.

Im Vortrag soll die obige, auf den ersten Blick ja keines-wegs völlig abwegige Argumentation deshalb kritisch aufden Prüfstand gestellt werden. In Auseinandersetzung mitden drei wesentlichen handlungstheoretischen Positionen, dasKonzept des Versuchens zu explizieren (volitionaler Ansatz,instrumentalistischer Ansatz und Fähigkeitsansatz), werde ichdafür argumentieren, dass eine grundsätzliche Einschränkungdes Inhalts von Sollensansprüchen auf Handlungsversuchenicht zu überzeugen vermag. Die konzeptionellen Schwierig-keiten eines für eine solche Einschränkung nötigen eigenstän-digen Handlungskonzepts des Versuchens werden zeigen, dasssowohl Handlungsversuche als auch im Anschluss der Inhaltvon Sollensansprüchen als begrifflich davon abhängig zu ver-stehen sind, was versucht bzw. gesollt wird. Weder die Expli-kation von Handlungsversuchen, noch diejenige von Sollens-ansprüchen kommt damit ohne Erfolgsbezug aus.

Langkau 5Reflective Equilibrium and Counterexamples

Julia LangkauUniversity of St Andrews (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

At first glance, reflective equilibrium seems to reduce to anuncontro- versial claim about philosophical methodology: weaim to take into account all information available to builda coherent theory. I argue that a plausible interpretation ofreflective equilibrium entails two non- trivial methodologicalclaims. 1. We assign equal weight to intuitions and principles.2. In a case of a conflict between intuitions and principles,we either drop the first or adjust the second. I discuss howthe method applies to our practice of debating thought expe-riments as counterexamples to philosophical theories in non-normative philosophy. I conclude that reflective equilibriumdoes not correspond with our practice and hence is not trivial.

Lanius 1Has Vagueness Really No Function In Law?

David Samuel LaniusHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

When the American Supreme Court in the case Brown v. Boardof Education used the expression »with all deliberate speed,« itdid so presumably because of its vagueness. Many jurists, eco-nomists, linguists and philosophers have accordingly assumedthat vagueness can be strategically used to one’s advantage.Roy Sorensen has cast doubt on this assumption by strictlydifferentiating between vagueness and generality. Indeed,most arguments for the value of vagueness go through onlywhen vagueness is confused with generality. Sorensen claimsthat vagueness – correctly understood – has no function inlaw and, consequently, judges lie systematically when con-fronted with borderline cases. I argue that both claims arewrong. First, even if vagueness had no function in law, jud-ges would not need to resort to lying. Judges can alwaysbring in linguistic and extra-linguistic arguments to back uptheir decisions, as legal concepts are highly multi-dimensionaland it is not fixed which dimension prevails in a particularcontext. So, even when facing borderline cases, judges canhonestly believe in their verdicts. Secondly, vagueness hasseveral important functions in law; it can be used by the legis-lator to reduce decision costs because it allows some questionsto remain open, while giving general guidance. In a borderlinecase judges and authorities have discretion to decide eitherway, which is needed to do justice to its particularities. Hence,the legislator can delegate power to judges and authoritieswhich might be confronted with situations that the legislatorhad no time to consider or simply did not foresee. In sum-mary, by taking into account the role of the legislator insteadof solely the judge, we find important functions of vagueexpressions in law which are not due to their generality but totheir having borderline cases. Thus, also vagueness, properlyunderstood, does have a function in law.

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3 LenhardThe Changing Relationship

Between Simulation and Experiment:The Case of Quantum Chemistry

Johannes LenhardUniversity of Bielefeld

[email protected]

Simulation modeling seems to involve a particular kind ofexperiment – numerical or simulation experiment. The statusof these experiments is a controversial topic in philosophy ofscience. This talk will not focus on the nature of these expe-riments, but on the relationship between simulation expe-riments, simulation modeling, and laboratory experiments.The relation between them is not fixed, however: Computingtechnology and simulation modeling have been developingin close connection. Over the course of their evolution, theconception of computational modeling has changed and therelationship between simulation and experiment has taken ondifferent characteristics.

Computational quantum chemistry presents a telling casebecause it took a path that reflects the changing relation-ship between simulation and experiment. Three phases of itsdevelopment will be discerned. It started out, prior to digitalcomputers, from the Schrödinger equation, and turned, basedon the use of mainframe computers, into an established sub-discipline of chemistry. The most recent third phase is markedby a steep rise in the distribution and application of computa-tional chemistry. All three phases differ in the conceptions ofcomputational modeling, in the computing technologies theyuse, and in the relationship between simulation and experi-ment. It will be argued that the recent success in applicationsis indeed based on the way experiments are incorporated intocomputational modeling.

3 LeuschnerGood dissent, bad dissent.

When dissent is hostile to science

Anna LeuschnerUniversität Bielefeld

[email protected]

Kuhn once argued that normal science is very productiveas scientists work under a paradigm, i.e. established theo-retical and methodological conditions. Yet in policy-relevantsciences, stakeholders are often involved that make efforts todoubt scientific results by disqualifying scientists, and by crea-ting artificial counter-approaches. Accordingly, scientists inpolicy-relevant fields constantly have to explain and vindicatetheir methodological and theoretical assumptions. Dissentthat is actually epistemically fruitful becomes problematicas its purpose is to defer scientific progress in order to post-pone political regulation measures. Therefore, it is import-ant for political as well as epistemic reasons that there isbroad (social, methodological, and theoretical) pluralism insuch research fields, and that scientists behave with particularresponsibility.

Liefke 1A Single-Type Ontology for Natural Language

Kristina LiefkeTilburg University (Netherlands)

[email protected]

In (Montague, 1970a), Richard Montague defines a formaltheory of linguistic meaning that interprets natural languagesthrough the use of two basic types of objects: individuals andpropositions. In this paper, I present a comparable seman-tic theory that only uses a single basic type of object (hence,single-type semantics). The possibility of the latter has beenconjectured by Partee (2006) to account for the ambiguity bet-ween a noun phrase’s referential and assertoric interpretation(observed in (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999; Cheney and Seyfarth,1990; Snedeker et al., 2007)).

My paper provides ontological support for Partee’s hypo-thesis. To this aim, I first identify a number of semantic requi-rements (i.e. Booleanness, representability, intensionality, andpartiality) on any single basic type and apply them to the setof the simplest Montagovian types. This process enables theelimination of all but one candidate: partial sets of proposi-tions. The remainder of the paper surveys the objects in thisdomain. The paper closes with an assessment of the merits ofsingle-type semantics and pointers to future work.

Look 2The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics and the

Question of Fundamentality in Metaphysics

Brandon Charles LookUniversity of Kentucky (United States)

[email protected]

Why is there something rather than nothing? This question,Leibniz tells us, is the very first question that we ought toask ourselves. Indeed, Heidegger has called it »the fundamen-tal question of metaphysics [die Grundfrage der Metaphysik]«.Wittgenstein, too, seems to be moved to awe: »Nicht wie dieWelt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern dass sie ist«. As funda-mental as this question may be, it is not the question to beaddressed in this paper. Rather, this paper will concern a rela-ted question, one that is arguably even more fundamental: Isnothingness possible? For it is only if nothingness is possiblethat the fundamental question of metaphysics really developsany force.

There are two ways to justify the possibility of nothingness.One can hold, like Leibniz himself, that »nothing is simplerand easier than something« – that is, that nothingness is thenatural or default state of the universe and only an act of will,an act of free creation, can overcome this. Yet, this is less anargument for the possibility of nothingness than it is an articleof faith. (And it assumes the Principle of Sufficient Reasonas well.) Or one can argue, as Thomas Baldwin and othershave done, that it is possible to »subtract« concrete objectsfrom worlds until one has arrived at a world without concreteobjects – an »empty world«. This »subtraction argument« for»metaphysical nihilism« has occasioned a fair bit of discussionin the philosophical literature in the last decade, and it isworth considering seriously.

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It will be argued in this paper, however, that serious consi-deration of the subtraction argument shows that its premisesrest on tendentious and question-begging assumptions aboutontological dependence and the grounding relation. In otherwords, questions of fundamentality in metaphysics reveal thefundamental question of metaphysics to be ill-formed andarguments purporting to show the possibility of nothingnessinvalid. Against the view of metaphysical nihilism, this paperargues for metaphysical aliquidism – the view that there mustbe something.

8 LöschkeDrei Arten von Hilfspflichten

Jörg LöschkeUniversität Bern (Switzerland)[email protected]

Der Vortrag untersucht Hilfspflichten und den jeweiligen Gradan normativer Verbindlichkeit, der in ihnen zum Ausdruckkommt. Entgegen der These der generellen Unterbestimmt-heit von Hilfspflichten wird eine dreifache Differenzierungverschiedener Formen von Hilfspflichten vorgeschlagen, diejeweils durch einen unterschiedlichen Grad an Unterbestimmt-heit und konsequenterweise einen unterschiedlichen Grad annormativer Verbindlichkeit gekennzeichnet sind:1) Situative Hilfspflichten: Diese Hilfspflichten entstehen si-tuativ und sind situativ einlösbar (Beispiel: Rettung einesertrinkenden Kindes). Hier ist der Grad an Unterbestimmtheitgering und der Grad an normativer Verbindlichkeit hoch.2) Projektbezogene Hilfspflichten: Sie richten sich auf morali-sche Projekte. Diese können nicht situativ eingelöst werden,aber es ist grundsätzlich denkbar, dass das entsprechende Pro-jekt abgearbeitet wird (Beispiel: Bekämpfung der Weltarmut).Diese Hilfspflichten erfordern konzertierte Handlungen indivi-dueller Akteure im Rahmen einer moralischen Arbeitsteilung;sind die einzelnen Aufgaben zugeschrieben, ist der Grad anUnterbestimmtheit höher als bei situativen Hilfspflichten, derGrad an Verbindlichkeit ist geringer, kann aber immer nochim Sinne einer Pflicht expliziert werden.3) Konstante Hilfspflichten: Dies sind Hilfspflichten, die nichtrealistischerweise einmal abgearbeitet sind, sondern die sichkonstant an alle moralischen Akteure richten (Beispiel: Förde-rung fremden Wohlergehens). Diese Form von Hilfspflichtenist grundsätzlich durch ein hohes Mass an Unterbestimmtheitgekennzeichnet; gleichzeitig ist der Grad an normativer Ver-bindlichkeit geringer einzuschätzen, als dies bei den erstenbeiden Formen von Hilfspflichten der Fall ist, und diese Formvon Hilfspflichten reicht in den Bereich des Supererogatori-schen hinein.

Der Vortrag schliesst mit weitergehenden Überlegungen,die die Relevanz dieser vorgeschlagenen Differenzierung be-treffen (insbesondere bezogen auf die Felder der internatio-nalen Gerechtigkeit sowie der Frage nach der angemessenenBestimmung von allgemeinen Hilfspflichten und speziellenHilfspflichten, die als Parteilichkeitspflichten zu interpretierensind) und gibt einen allgemein Ausblick auf eine gütertheore-tische einheitliche Begründung dieser Hilfspflichten.

Löwenstein 5Why Know-how and Propositional Knowledge

Are Mutually Irreducible

David LöwensteinFreie Universität Berlin

[email protected]

The distinction between know-how and propositional know-ledge is a piece of common sense. Knowing how to do some-thing seems to be something entirely different from knowingthat something is the case. Nevertheless, it has been sugges-ted that one of these concepts can be reduced to the other.Intellectualists like Jason Stanley (Know How, 2011) try toreduce know-how to propositional knowledge, while practi-calists like Stephen Hetherington (How to Know, 2011) try toreduce propositional knowledge to know-how. In this talk, Iargue that both reductionist programs fail because they makethe manifestations of the knowledge to be reduced unintelli-gible.

If intellectualism is true, it is mysterious how know-how(then a kind of propositional knowledge) can be manifested inways such as riding a bicycle, playing chess, and so on. If suchmanifestations of know-how are nothing but manifestationsof propositional knowledge, they turn out to rely on furtherknow-how, namely the knowledge how to apply those pro-positions to cases. This eventually leads to a vicious regress.The core of this idea stems from Gilbert Ryle (Knowing Howand Knowing That, 1945 and 1949), but I propose a version ofthis argument which survives the objections that have beenvoiced against Ryle.

Conversely, if practicalism is true, it is mysterious how pro-positional knowledge (then a kind of know-how) can be mani-fested in ways such as asserting that p, acting in the light ofsufficient certainty that p, and so on. If such manifestationsof propositional knowledge are nothing but manifestationsof know-how, they turn out to rely on further propositionalknowledge, namely knowledge of at least some defeating andenabling conditions for successfully performinging those acti-vities. This also leads to a vicious regress.

Contrary to both intellectualism and practicalism, weshould take the intuitive distinction between know-how andpropositional knowledge at face value. I suggest that know-how and propositional knowledge are conceptually interde-pendent, and that the proposed criticisms of intellectualismand practicalism can be seen to reveal this fact. Finally, I dis-cuss the implications of this view for the debate about thenature of know-how and propositional knowledge.

Lumer 8Willensschwäche –

Eine Systematisierung und eine Erklärung

Christoph LumerUniversità di Siena (Italy)

[email protected]

Das klassische Problem der Willensschwäche in der abendländi-schen Philosophie ist eigentlich ein Problem i.w.S. rationalisti-scher Handlungstheorien, deren aktuellste Version die Theorieist, daß Absichten Optimalitätsurteile sind. Denn wenn Wil-

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lensschwäche, in Anlehnung an Platon, darin besteht, daß1. man etwas (a) intentional tut, 2. aber glaubt, b zu tunsei besser / optimal, 3. wobei dieser Glaube besser begrün-det ist als der der Absicht zu a zugrundeliegende Glaube und4. man b tun kann – dann ist Willensschwäche, zumindestprima facie nicht möglich: Der Optimalitätsglaube 2 hättezur Ausführung von b führen müssen. Rationalistische Hand-lungstheorien leugnen deshalb entweder die Möglichkeit derWillensschwäche, oder sie entwickeln relativ subtile Differen-zierungen der Bedingungen für Willensschwäche oder Modifi-kationen der Handlungstheorie selbst – wobei diese Differen-zierungen dann meist doch auf eine implizite Leugnung derMöglichkeit der Willensschwäche hinausläuft.

Die philosophische Diskussion der Willensschwäche war inden letzten Jahrzehnten zum einen durch Differenzierungender zuletzt genannten Art geprägt. Auch als Folge dieser Ent-wicklung wurden immer mehr benachbarte Phänomene in dieDiskussion einbezogen, die oft nur schwer von der Willens-schwäche abzugrenzen sind: Wankelmut, Indolenz, Rücksichts-losigkeit . . . Andere Gründe für diese Entwicklung sind, daßmit dem Zurückdrängen i.w.S. rationalistischer Handlungs-theorien das Interesse an (und teilweise auch die Kenntnis)der philosophischen Ausgangsproblematik zurückgegangenist. Schließlich haben eher praktisch psychologische Fragen,vor allem die Diskussion von Selbstkontrollstrategien gegenWillensschwäche immer mehr Gewicht bekommen. Diese Ent-wicklungen zusammen haben zu einer Unübersichtlichkeit derTheorien und Phänomene sowie einer begrifflichen Unklarheitbis Verwirrung geführt.

Der Beitrag verfolgt folgende Ziele: Zum einen soll Wil-lensschwäche von den benachbarten Phänomenen abgegrenztwerden. Zum anderen wird versucht, eine Systematik der inder Diskussion vorgeschlagenen Erklärungsmöglichkeiten derWillensschwäche zu entwickeln. Diese Systematik enthält auchErklärungen, die durch begriffliche Differenzierungen einzel-ner Elemente der Definition der ›Willensschwäche‹ oder Ergän-zungen der Optimalitätsurteilstheorie echte Willensschwächeim klassischen Paradigma erklären wollen. Schließlich solldurch eine Ausarbeitung der zuletzt genannten Ansätze aus-gelotet werden, ob sich die Optimalitätsurteilstheorie so weitverbessern läßt, daß sie empirisch gesicherte Formen der Wil-lensschwäche erklären kann. Ansätze hierzu sind insbesondere:durch unbewußte Absichten verursachte Handlungen oderaffektbedingte Absichten, die sich gegen eher intellektuelleAbsichten durchsetzen.

4 LyreSozialer Externalismus

und geteilte Intentionalität

Holger LyreUniversität Magdeburg

[email protected]

Das Paper besteht aus drei Teilen. Der erste Teil rekapitu-liert den sozialen Externalismus, also die Doktrin, dass dersemantische Gehalt mentaler Zustände nicht allein von deninternen Faktoren eines kognitiven Systems, sondern durchexterne, die soziale Umgebung des Systems betreffende Bedin-gungen determiniert ist. Traditionell ist der soziale Externa-lismus ein sprachbezogener Externalismus, da er sich auf dieFrage bezieht, inwieweit die Bedeutungen sprachlicher Aus-

drücke von den Gebrauchsweisen der Sprecher einer Sprachge-meinschaft abhängen. Da ferner ein einzelner Sprecher keineEinflussmöglichkeiten auf das Sprachgebrauchsverhalten einerganzen Sprachgemeinschaft hat, lässt sich der sprachbezogeneExternalismus als passiver Externalismus charakterisieren.

Im zweiten Teil geht es darum zu zeigen, dass geteilteIntentionalität als grundlegender Mechanismus kooperativenHandelns und sozialer Kognition ebenso auf einen Externa-lismus führt, den man kooperationsbezogenen Externalismusnennen könnte. Er wurde in der Literatur bislang nicht expli-zit betrachtet. Meine These ist, dass es sich beim koopera-tionsbezogenen Externalismus um einen aktiven Externalis-mus handelt, bei dem für das kognitive System aktive kau-sale Einflussmöglichkeiten auf die externen Faktoren beste-hen. Der wesentliche Grund hierfür ist, dass bei kooperati-ven Handlungen der Handlungsplan aus Subplänen bestehenkann, die für die Kooperationspartner unterschiedlich sind undgeeignet ineinandergreifen. Geteilte Intentionalität hängtvon den Kooperationspartnern wechselseitig ab, sie bedingenund beeinflussen einander in aktiver Weise.

Im dritten und letzten Teil soll ausblickhaft gezeigt werden,wie die Ergebnisse der beiden ersten Teile zusammenhängen,denn falls Sprache und Sprachbedeutungen ihren Ursprung ingeteilter Intentionalität haben, wie in der empirischen For-schung mittlerweile weit vertreten, sollte die Nahtstelle zwi-schen aktivem und passivem Externalismus genau hier verlau-fen. In der Tat wird im Grenzfall kleiner Sprachgemeinschaf-ten der mögliche Einfluss jedes einzelnen Sprechers auf diein der Gemeinschaft bestehende Sprachpraxis deutlich. Hierfindet daher de facto ein Übergang vom passiven zum aktivensprachbezogenen Externalismus statt. So gesehen erweist sichder sprachbezogene Externalismus als ein verkappter aktiverExternalismus, der gleichwohl effektiv und für alle praktischenFälle ein passiver Externalismus ist. Das Paper soll somit deut-lich machen, wie Analysen zu geteilter Intentionalität undSprachentwicklung mit bedeutungstheoretischen Analysen inEinklang gebracht werden können, und dabei zu einem vertief-ten Verständnis des semantischen Externalismus führen.

Mantel 8On why (not) to identify normative reasons

with motivating reasons

Susanne MantelUniversität des Saarlandes

[email protected]

Many philosophers believe that motivating reasons and nor-mative reasons must be identical when an agent acts for anormative reason (e.g., Parfit 2011, 37; Broome 2009, 88; Lord2008, and others). They all affirm the Identity Thesis (IT):

(IT): When an agent acts for a normative reason N, she actsfor a motivating reason M such that N is identical with M.

One could gain the impression that (IT) expresses one wide-ly held and unified view about acting for a normative rea-son and that (IT) was rather obviously true. Contrary to thisimpression I argue that two arguments fail in their attemptto show that (IT) is obviously true. I consider two other argu-ments that might succeed in establishing (IT) as true. But,first, these arguments offer two different interpretations of(IT) (which rest on an ambiguity in the term »motivating rea-son«), such that it becomes clear that there are really two

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different views that can be expressed by (IT). This means that(IT) does not express one widely held and unified view aboutacting for a normative reason – it expresses two differentviews. Furthermore, if one or both of these arguments work,(IT) is not as obviously true as many would have thought, asboth arguments rest on substantial premises that are morecontroversial than (IT) is commonly thought to be. I thuschallenge the beliefs that (IT) expresses one widely held viewand that (IT) is obviously true.

3 MantzavinosExplanatory Games

Chrysostomos MantzavinosUniversity of Athens (Greece)

[email protected]

A philosophical theory of explanation should provide soluti-ons to a series of problems, both descriptive and normative.The aim of this essay is to establish the claim that this can bebest done if one theorizes in terms of explanatory games rat-her than focusing on the explication of the concept of explana-tion. The development of the precise meaning of the conceptof scientific explanation occupies centre-stage in all contem-porary approaches. The paper deals with three examples fromthe social sciences – neoclassical economic theory, the theoryof civil wars and econometrics – which show that the unitarymodels of explanation have at best limited application. Thelesson that is drawn is that each of the three main modelscurrently on offer, the unificationist, the mechanistic, and themanipulationist, can accommodate only some of the existingscientific practices in different social scientific domains.

The alternative position that seems obvious and which isadopted is that of an explanatory pluralism. At every momentof time there is a stock of explanations available in a societyproposed by ordinary people »in the wild« or by specialistsorganized formally or semi-formally within specific organiza-tional structures such as churches, universities, etc. This expla-natory reservoir is distributed among diverse individuals andgroups in the society under conditions of a cognitive divisionof labour. The terms of provision, control, and disseminationof explanations in this collective explanatory enterprise areregulated by the different rules that the participants havecome to adopt over time. These rules incorporate the nor-mative standards that guide the processes of discovery andjustification of explanations as well as the modes of their com-munication, dissemination, and adoption. They constitute therules of the explanatory game that the participants are playing.The philosophical project consists in describing and norma-tively appraising the rules that constitute these games. Thisproject is fundamentally liberal, in the sense that participantsand non-participants to the game alike engage in the criticaldiscussion and revision of the rules or to put it in other terms,the project is fundamentally naturalistic – philosophers andscientists equally take part in it.

Marx 1Relevanz statt Wahrheit?

Theresa MarxRuprecht-Carls-Universität Heidelberg

[email protected]

In diesem Paper werde ich entgegen der Auffassung derRelevanztheoretiker dafür argumentieren, dass die Grice-sche Maxime der Qualität nicht durch das allgemeine Rele-vanzprinzip ersetzt werden kann. Die Relevanztheorie kannkeine befriedigenden Erklärungen für sprachliche Phänomenewie metaphorische oder ironische Verwendung von Äuße-rungen liefern, die dem strikten Wahrhaftigkeitsanspruchwidersprechen. Wenngleich die Kritik am griceschen Pro-gramm partiell gerechtfertigt sein mag, stellt sie die Rele-vanztheorie vor weit größere explanatorische Schwierig-keiten hinsichtlich des Verhältnisses von kognitivem Auf-wand und positivem kognitiven Effekt. Ebenso wenig kannman weiterhin von geglückter Kommunikation sprechen,wenn die Relevanzintention den Wahrhaftigkeitsanspruch ver-letzt, den wir als Adressaten an die Äußerung eines Spre-chers stellen, und damit zu unerwünschten Resultaten führt.Ich plädiere daher für eine Revision der Relevanztheorieunter Berücksichtigung der wesentlichen Rolle des Wahr-haftigkeitsanspruchs in der normalsprachlichen Konversa-tion.

Mayr 8Free Will, Capacities and their Exercise

Erasmus MayrUniversity of Oxford (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

Since the 1990s, agential capacities and abilities have gainedincreasing prominence in the free-will debate. A wide range ofphilosophers have come to argue that the conditions for freewill and moral responsibility can be spelt out, at least partly,by reference to the agent’s abilities to act, or to his rationalcapabilities to react rightly to reasons. While, among thosephilosophers, a large number uses the appeal to capacitiesas a ›substitute‹ to the traditional principle of alternativepossibilities, more recently is has been increasingly recognizedthat capabilities can also be used to account for the ›could‹ ofthe alternative possibilities allegedly required for free will.

Focussing on the second line of approach, I want to consi-der two fundamentally opposed versions of spelling out the›could‹ of alternative possibilities in terms of capacities, whichI will call the possession account and the exercise account,respectively. The possession account takes the ›could‹ of the›could have done otherwise‹ requirement to be simply the›could‹ of capacity possession. The exercise account, on theother hand, insists that mere possession of the relevant capa-cities is not sufficient for moral responsibility, but that thecrucial capacity of rational self-government must also havebeen exercised on the occasion and that the action in questionmust have issued from this exercise.

While the possession account is the one standardly adoptedby philosophers who try to spell out the ›could‹ of alternativepossibilities in terms of capacities, I want to argue that it is

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signally inferior to an exercise account. I will then go on todefend this latter account against the objection that it leadsto an infinite regress of capacities.

4 Mergenthaler CansecoThe Phenomenal Concept Strategy:

still battling the bewitchmentof our Intelligence

Max Mergenthaler CansecoFreie Universität Berlin

UC San Diego (United States)[email protected]

Since the 80’s, many antiphysicalist arguments depart froma conceivable epistemic or conceptual gap between physicaland qualitative experiences and go on to refute, on a priorigrounds, physicalism. One promising and prominent line ofdefense argues that these gaps can be explained through acorrect understanding of how phenomenal concepts work:the puzzlement is the result of a conceptual and not, as it issuggested, an ontological difference.1 In short, the strategyoffers a deflationary account of what are probably the mainproblems in contemporary philosophy of mind. We will callthis strategy the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS).

I will briefly show how the PCS responds to the KnowledgeArgument (KA) and then I will defend it from recent critiquesthat deny the mere existence of Phenomenal Concepts (PC)by showing that they rest on a wrong conception of PC’s. Iargue that conceiving PC’s as referring demonstratively andclearly distinguishing fine-grained senses from coarse-grainedextensions solves the issue.

1See Balog (1999, ming); Loar (2003, 2007, 1990); Papineau(2002); Sundström (2011; Stoljar 2005); Byrne (2011); Tye(1997, 2002).

4 MichelEvaluative object-cognition, attitudes

and metarepresentation

Christoph MichelRuhr-Universität [email protected]

This talk suggests a general account of transparent attitudesand their first-personal metarepresentation. A theory of 2nd-order beliefs and their properties centrally depends on the atti-tude-theory we assume. I suggest that attitudes are not innerobjects of recognition or standing dispositions but situationalobject-evaluations that are constructed on the spot. S has anattitude when S evaluates an object o as having a value V. Ourprimary relation towards our object-evaluations is not episte-mic in nature (evaluations are not objects of inner sense) butevaluations can be made objects of cognition. This is whathappens in the ›introspection‹ or metarepresentation of atti-tudes. On the basis of representing object o as having valueV, S can perform a cognitive ascent that leads to a represen-tation and classification of the obtaining evaluative relation.On the basis of representational self-understanding and an

attitude-theory about how value-type V relates to folk-psycho-logical attitude-type F, S can represent his evaluative relationtowards o as »I F o«. Situational object-evaluations are anecessary and sufficient basis for self-knowledge. The evalua-tion-based cognitive ascent leads to epistemically privileged2nd-order beliefs.

Michels 2Can Conceptual Possibilities

be Metaphysically Impossible?

Robert MichelsUniversité de Genève (Switzerland)

[email protected]

The idea that there are conceptual possibilities that are notmetaphysically possible has recently become the target ofsevere criticism. Three arguments that aim to refute this viewhave been presented in Jackson (2011) and Stalnaker (2003).In this talk, I will defend the idea by arguing that these threearguments are not conclusive.

Stalnaker argues that conceptual modality cannot be consi-dered a genuine kind of modality, since the objects it appliesto are mental and linguistic representations that have nothingto do with ways the world might be. I present an objection toStalnaker’s argument that aims to undermine his assumptionthat conceptual and metaphysical possibility and necessityapply to different kinds of objects.

Jackson’s first argument is a reductio that starts from theassumption that water’s being H 2O is metaphysically butnot conceptually necessary and water’s being water is bothmetaphysically and conceptually necessary. He argues thatthis forces us to accept the implausible view that there isa necessary connection between the two distinct propertiesbeing water and being H 2O. I argue that Jackson relies on afalse dichotomy in establishing his conclusion and show thathis argument fails if we eliminate this defect.

Jackson’s second argument aims to establish that concep-tual possibilities cannot both characterize representationalcontent and model credence. The problem with this argumentis that credences should be thought of in terms of subjec-tive probabilities and that subjective probabilities cannot beexplained in terms of conceptually possible worlds.

Mocker 6Zur Rechtfertigung

religiöser Überzeugungen durchpragmatische Argumente

Christoph Kurt MockerLudwig-Maximilians-Universität München

[email protected]

In der religionsphilosophischen Diskussion über die Möglich-keit einer pragmatischen Begründung religiöser Überzeugun-gen in der Tradition der Pascalschen »Wette« besteht einweiter Konsens darüber, dass solche Argumente bestenfallsGründe für eine Praxis der Überzeugungsbildung liefern, sichaber nicht unmittelbar auf die Überzeugungen selbst, d. h. aufdie Begründung von Urteilen beziehen lassen.

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Hier wird der Versuch unternommen, zu zeigen, dass sichgerade diese Beschränkung als aporetisch erweist, und deshalbim Gegenteil pragmatische Argumente nicht auf eine glau-bensbildende Praxis beschränkt werden können, wenn sie gül-tig sein sollen, sondern auch normativ relevant sein müssenfür die religiösen Überzeugungen selbst.

Das ist kein Plädoyer für die Unverzichtbarkeit einer prag-matischen Urteilsbegründung und Rückkehr zu dieser Position.Dass wir etwas für wahr halten sollen, weil es sich als (womög-lich) nützlich erweist, diese Forderung scheitert am unplausi-blen doxastischen Voluntarismus, den sie voraussetzen muss.Vielmehr geht es um die Existenz einer dritten Alternativezwischen der pragmatischen Begründung einer Glaubensan-nahme durch ein Urteil auf der einen und der Glaubensan-nahme durch eine religiöse Praxis auf der anderen Seite: dieRechtfertigung von (bereits) bestehenden religiösen Überzeu-gungen.

Ein solches tertium datur eines »defensiven« pragmatischenArguments zur (bloßen) Rechtfertigung des Gläubigen, dass erglauben darf, erscheint sowohl bescheidener als auch realisti-scher im Vergleich zur herkömmlichen, pragmatischen Anwei-sung oder Empfehlung an den Nicht-Gläubigen, dass er zumGlauben kommen soll(te) und sich dazu einer religiösen Praxiswidmen soll(te), um bei sich nützliche religiöse Überzeugungenzu evozieren.

1 MoldovanRigid definite descriptions

Andrei MoldovanUniversity of Salamanca & LogosUniversity of Barcelona (Spain)

[email protected]

In this paper I address the question concerning the existenceof rigid definite descriptions, that is, definite descriptions thatdenote rigidly de jure. Kripke (1980) has famously argued thatdd’s are non-rigid expressions. However, other authors (nota-bly Bach 1987, Sainsbury 2005) have argued that sentencescontaining dd’s in subject position have readings in whichdd’s behave as rigid expressions. Consider for example thefollowing sentence, which, I maintain, has both a true and afalse readings:(3) The last great philosopher of antiquity might not havebeen the last great philosopher of antiquity.

Other interesting examples include:(4) The winner of the elections could not have been absentfrom the competition.

Certain philosophers, such as Dummett (1973), Stanley(1997), Bach (1987), have argued in a Russellian tradition thatsuch readings are to be explained by postulating scope ambi-guities: the true reading corresponds to the first occurrence ofthe dd taking wide scope relative to the modal operator, andthe false reading corresponds to the same dd taking narrowscope. Sainsbury (2005: 180-8) has argued that the explana-tion should be different: the true reading of (3) and of othersimilar sentences is due to the dd being rigid on that reading,while it is non-rigid on the false reading. I give two argumentsin favor of an explanation of the two readings of (3) and (4)which goes in the line suggested by Sainsbury, and does notgive explanatory import to scope ambiguities. The argumentsare the following (summarized):

(i) the scope ambiguity hypothesis does not give a systema-tic explanation of why incomplete dd’s easily receive referen-tial (that is, wide scope or rigid) readings, while there is suchan explanation for the rigidity hypothesis.(ii) definite descriptions behave rigidly in certain contextwhere there is no modal or other intensional operator in thesentence, and so where there cannot be any scope ambiguity,such as in (10) and (11):(10) The first book on professor J’s bookshelf is his favoritenovel.(11) John was very good at chess because the boy had spentall his childhood practicing.

Muders 7Naturrechtliche und kantianische Konzeptionen

von Würde in der Sterbehilfedebatte

Sebastian MudersUniversität Zürich (Switzerland)[email protected]

Sowohl in der allgemeinen normativen Debatte um die Men-schenwürde wie auch in angewandt-ethischen Diskussionen,in der sie in Argumenten Verwendung findet, spielen natur-rechtlich und kantianisch inspirierte Theorien von Würde einewichtige Rolle. Sofern der Begriff der menschlichen Würdeoder seine dafür gehaltenen Entsprechungen – Heiligkeit oderUnverbrüchlichkeit des menschlichen Lebens, Respekt vor demunbedingten Wert von Personen – überhaupt als sinnvollanerkannt werden, sind beide Theorietypen in der Debatteannähernd immer vertreten. Dabei lassen sich aus der gewähl-ten Begründungsstrategie als Art und Weise, Menschenwürdezu rechtfertigen, Schlüsse bezüglich ihres Schutzbereichs zie-hen: Welche Wesen verfügen über Würde, welche Handlungensind ihnen gegenüber erlaubt oder geboten? Innerhalb dernormativen Debatte erwachsen daraus Argumente, welchedie Angemessenheit eines bestimmten Würdebegriffs anzwei-feln oder einer Begründungsstrategie gar interne Inkohären-zen nachzuweisen versuchen. In angewandt-ethischen Debat-ten setzt sich dieser Disput fort, besonders wenn, wie in derDebatte um Sterbehilfe beide Seiten die Menschenwürde zurStärkung ihrer Position in Anspruch nehmen. Allerdings wider-setzt sich gerade bei diesem Thema die jeweilige Verwendungvon »Würde« scheinbar einer einfachen Zuteilung, durch dieein Begründungstyp einer Seite der Debatte zugeordnet wer-den könnte: finden sich doch auf jeder Seite Vertreter, welchedie jeweilige Tradition explizit aufzugreifen bemüht sind.

Wenn nun aber eine nähere Prüfung der in Anspruch genom-menen Konzeptionen ergibt, dass die Zuordnung zum jeweili-gen Begründungstyp legitim ist, scheint in der Sterbehilfe-The-matik durch die bloße Bezugnahme auf ihn noch keine inhaltli-che Vorentscheidung getroffen. Stellt sich umgekehrt heraus,dass die Implikationen eines bestimmten Begründungstypsentgegen dem ersten Anschein nicht neutral gegenüber derPositionierung in der angewandt-ethischen Debatte sind, ließesich daraus eine Erklärung für den ansonsten kurios wirkenden,beidseitigen Bezug auf Menschenwürde geben. Im ersten Fallliegt darüber hinaus die Vermutung nahe, dass die gewählteKategorisierung der Begründungsstrategie wenigstens für dieZwecke der Sterbehilfedebatte unterbestimmt ist. Der nächsteVersuch würde dann darin bestehen, mehrere Variationen kan-tianischer und naturrechtlicher Würdekonzeptionen zu unter-

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scheiden, die jeweils gegeneinander und gegen ihre Mitbewer-ber in der betrachteten Debatte den gewünschten Unterschiedmachen. In beiden Fällen würde so eine Re-Strukturierung derDebatte ermöglicht, die durch den Fokus auf unterschiedlicheBegründungsstrategien nicht alleine Konfusion hinsichtlichdes Gebrauchs von Menschenwürde vermeidet, sondern einenlohnenden Einstiegspunkt zur Fortführung der Diskussion bie-tet.

2 MuggWhy Dispositions Are NotSecond Order Properties

Joshua MuggYork University (Canada)[email protected]

In this paper I defend C. B. Martin’s identity theory whichsays that intrinsic properties of concrete objects are simulta-neously qualitative and dispositional. Using three argumentsfrom Sydney Shoemaker, I demonstrate there are epistemicdifficulties with logically separating dispositional and qua-litative properties. I use Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson as aparadigm case of such an attempt. The difficulty is that givenan asymmetry relation, the qualitative properties can varywithout necessarily altering the object’s dispositions. Giventhat our interaction with an object is with its dispositions,our knowledge of objects becomes severely limited. As such,we ought not posit qualitative and dispositional properties aslogically distinct. I reject Shoemaker’s reduction of qualitativeproperties to causal powers, concluding that there are bothqualitative and dispositional properties that are not logicallydistinct.

3 MüllerBranching space-times and general relativity

Thomas MüllerUtrecht University (Netherlands)

[email protected]

The theory of branching space-times (BST, Belnap, Synthese1992) develops a previously proposed logical framework forindeterminism, branching time (BT, Thomason, Theoria 1970),in order to provide a mathematically rigorous theory of openpossibilities in a relativistic setting. The core technical idea ofBST is to define modal consistency, i.e., possible co-occurrencewithin a single consistent course of events, via directedness ina partial (temporal-modal) ordering. Histories in the structure(possible courses of events) are maximally modally consistentsubsets.

Despite its relativistic soundness and some applications tophysical theories, BST has not been much referenced in discus-sions of space-time theories, even when such discussions areconcerned with questions of determinism and indeterminism.In fact, BST (or rather, some close relatives) have receiveda fair share of critique based on technical considerations ofthe space-time models of general relativity (Earman in Dieks2008). Most of that criticism shows BST to correspond poorlyto general relativity’s background in differential geometry.

This paper introduces an overarching framework that ismeant to do justice both to the logical aspects of BST and tothe physical considerations supporting space-time theories.We will prove that that framework, which deviates from thementioned theory of BST in some technical details, is truly atheory of branching (in the sense of logic) space-times (in thesense of general relativity).

The main issue we need to deal with is the status of thetopological Hausdorff property: this property generically failsin BST models. It is widely acknowledged that failure of theHausdorff property spells trouble whenever it occurs withina single space-time. A BST model however represents not one,but many space-times. We will give a novel method for pas-ting space-times that is compatible with general relativity’sbackground in differential geometry, and which deviates frompublished accounts of so-called Minkowskian branching struc-tures (e.g., Wronski and Placek, Stud.Hist.Mod.Phys. 2009) in acrucial topological detail. In our structures, which are genera-lized manifolds, modally consistent subsets are specific Haus-dorff submanifolds.

We end with a comment on the role of branching vs. diver-gence in the analysis of indeterminism.

Müller 4Ein Dilemma für modale Argumente

gegen den Materialismus

Sebastian Joachim MüllerUniversität Erlangen

[email protected]

Philosophen wie Kripke (1980) und Chalmers (1996; 2010)haben in den letzten Jahren modale Argumente gegen denMaterialismus vorgebracht. Diese haben jedoch nur wenigeMaterialisten überzeugt. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dassdie Argumente vor einem Dilemma stehen. Je nachdem, wasfür eine Konzeption von metaphysischer Modalität wir haben,können wir entweder nicht wissen, ob die modale Prämissewahr ist, oder die Wahrheit der modalen Prämisse genügtnicht, um den Schluss auf die Falschheit des Materialismuszu erlauben.

Modale Argumente gegen den Materialismus sind anspruchs-voll insofern, als sie Einsicht in Tatsachen ermöglichen sollen,die über das hinaus gehen, was wir aufgrund von Erfahrungund begrifflicher Kompetenz wissen können. Hierzu benötigenwir (i) ein Vermögen, dass uns Wissen über metaphysischeMöglichkeit erlaubt und (ii) eine Konzeption von metaphysi-scher Modalität, die Schlüsse auf Tatsachen zulässt.

Materialistische Argumente fallen in die Kategorie an-spruchsvoller modaler Argumente. Sie sollen zeigen, dass phä-nomenale Zustände keine physischen Zustände sind – waskeine begriffliche Wahrheit zu sein scheint und sich auch empi-risch nicht zeigen lässt.

Das Dilemma für solche anspruchsvollen Argumente ist nunderart, dass sie entweder (ii) leisten können, indem sie eine rea-listische Konzeption von metaphysischer Modalität zugrundelegen. Diese muss plausiblerweise modale Eigenschaften zurGrundlage von Modalität machen. Dann benötigen wir jedochein Vermögen, um herauszufinden, welche modalen Eigen-schaften Dinge haben. Niemand, einschließlich Kripke, dessenArgument so funktioniert, hat bisher ein solches in Aussichtgestellt. Alternativ können sie (i) sichern, indem sie metaphy-

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sische Modalität an begriffliche Modalität und nicht-modaleTatsachen binden. Dann wird jedoch fraglich, ob Wissen übermetaphysische Modalität noch genügt, um anspruchsvollesontologisches Wisssen – wie über die Verschiedenheit physi-scher und phänomenaler Zustände – zu sichern. Weder Chal-mers, der so vorgeht, noch andere Philosophen haben guteGründe gegeben, um dies zu akzeptieren – und es gibt einigenAnlass, um dies zu bezweifeln.

Daher sind die Aussichten auf ein schlüssiges modales Argu-ment gegen den Materialismus schlecht. Dennoch können wiraus Chalmers und Kripkes Argumenten etwas lernen. Der Mate-rialismus sollte als eine These über die modalen Eigenschaftenphysischer und phänomenaler Zustände verstanden werden.

8 MüllerIs Metaethical Constructivism Circular?

Andreas MüllerHumboldt-Universität zu [email protected]

Metaethical constructivists deny that normative judgementsare true, if they are true, in virtue of correctly describing anyindependent normative facts. Instead, they take the truth ofsuch judgements to be mind-dependent, i.e. to depend onour subjective states and activities under certain idealizedconditions. Recently, Russ Shafer-Landau, David Enoch andothers have raised objections to the effect that any adequatemetaethical version of constructivism will turn out to be circu-lar. My aim in this talk is to discuss and eventually refute thisobjection. I start by showing that circularity is aim-relative,i.e. that it depends on what one is trying to achieve with aposition or an argument. This allows us to identify differentversions of the circularity objection by distinguishing diffe-rent aims that constructivists might (be taken to) pursue, suchas defining normative concepts, determining which normativejudgements are true, or explaining how such judgements canbe true. I then discuss the cogency of the circularity objectionwith respect to each of these potential aims and argue that,if understood correctly, constructivism can avoid any proble-matic kind of circularity. The upshot of my discussion goesbeyond defending constructivism against this particular objec-tion. It also illuminates some important but often overlookedaspects of the position and is thus helpful in distinguishingconstructivism from alternative options in metaethics.

7 NeuhäuserUnternehmen als moralische Akteure

Christian NeuhäuserRuhr-Universität-Bochum

[email protected]

Ziel des Papers ist es zu zeigen, dass Unternehmen moralischeAkteure sind und durch die Menschenrechte moralisch ver-pflichtet werden können. Der Argumentationsgang bestehtaus zwei Schritten. In einem ersten Schritt argumentiere ichdafür, dass Unternehmen moralische Akteure sind. Sie habenInteressen, und ihnen werden in der Praxis Handlungsplänezugeschrieben. Dies macht sie zu korporativen Akteuren, weil

individuelle Mitarbeiterinnen als Teil von Unternehmen nachdiesen Interessen und Plänen handeln. Aus moralischer Per-spektive sind die Pläne von Unternehmen und ihr Handelnoft zweifelhaft bzw. schlecht. Da die Pläne von Unternehmenzugeschrieben sind, kann durch eine Änderung dieser zuge-schriebenen Pläne auch beeinflusst werden, was Unternehmenin ethischer Hinsicht tun. Es wäre ein Fehler anzunehmen, dassdafür allein individuelle Akteure adressiert werden müssen,weil es ja individuelle Akteure sind, die den UnternehmenPläne zuschreiben. Der Einfluss auf diesen Zuschreibungspro-zess geschieht, indem Unternehmen direkt als Akteure mitethischen Plänen angesprochen werden. Nur so lässt sich nach-haltig beeinflussen, was Unternehmen wirklich tun, weil nur soUnternehmen nicht mehr nur als zwar planende, aber notwen-digerweise egoistische, sondern als tatsächlich moralfähigeAkteure aufgefasst werden.

In dem zweiten Argumentationsschritt zeige ich, dass Un-ternehmen durch die Menschenrechte verpflichtet werden. Zu-nächst bedarf es irgendeines moralischen Maßstabs, der fürUnternehmen als moralische Akteure geeignet ist. Dabei wiegtein Problem der philosophischen Ethik sehr schwer, nämlichdass es viele konkurrierende ethische Theorien gibt. DiesesProblem kann jedoch minimalethisch zumindest ein Stückweitumgangen werden, indem die in zahlreichen prägenden Kultur-zeugnissen der Menschheit anerkannten Ideen der Menschen-würde und der Menschenrechte zum Ausgangspunkt genom-men werden. Die Menschenwürde stellt die moralische Grund-lage für die Konstruktion der Menschenrechte dar. Unabhängigdavon, welche metaethische Begründung für die Menschen-würde angeführt wird, bringt sie eine zentrale Idee zum Aus-druck: Jeder Mensch muss als gleiches Mitglied der Gemein-schaft der Menschen anerkannt und der Selbstrespekt einesjeden Menschen muss geachtet und geschützt werden. DieseMenschenrechte verpflichten aus völkerrechtlicher Perspektiveprimär Staaten, aus moralischer Perspektive verpflichten siejedoch auch Unternehmen, so möchte ich argumentieren.

Newen 4Analyzing Phenomenal Concepts with Mental Files

Albert NewenRuhr-Universität Bochum

[email protected]

In this paper, it is argued that phenomenal concepts – concei-ved as a specific kind of mental representations – should beclassified as theory-based concepts in contrast to perception-based concepts. Phenomenal concepts are acquired in onto-geny, and they are based on a set of theoretical principles, i.e.a mini-theory about the status of experiences as subjectiveand private. Building upon the notion of a mental file, thisidea of phenomenal concepts is explicated in detail on thebasis of antecedent physicalism, and its explanatory poweris shown at work discussing the knowledge argument. So anew notion of phenomenal concepts in terms of mental filesis spelled out that completely accounts for Mary’s cognitivesituation from a physicalists’ view.

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8 OmettoLibertarian alternative possibilities:

why Frankfurt cases continue to miss the mark

Dawa OmettoUtrecht University (Netherlands)

[email protected]

Libertarians about free will believe that indeterminism is anecessary requirement of human freedom. If an agent actsfreely and responsibly, the libertarian insists, then it musthave been possible for her to do otherwise, and hence determi-nism is incompatible with free will. So-called Frankfurt cases areintended as counterexamples to this position. They are widelybelieved to establish the compatibility of freedom, responsi-bility and determinism. A popular incompatibilist response tothese cases is to abandon the Principle of Alternative Possibi-lities (PAP) that Frankfurt and his successors attack. Freedom,these source incompatibilists claim, is incompatible with deter-minism not because PAP is true, but rather because the agentmust be ›the ultimate source‹ of her action in a way thatdeterminism precludes.

I argue that abandoning the view that freedom requires lee-way, i.e., the existence of alternate possibilities, is an unfruit-ful move for the libertarian. The claim that determinism rulesout sourcehood cannot be defended without focusing on anagent’s ability to actualize one of his alternative possibili-ties for action. The distinction between leeway- and source-incompatibilism has obscured this important fact. On theother hand, the alternate possibilities the libertarian requi-res are not the kind of possibilities attacked by the Frankfurt-cases. This can be brought out by examining an importantambiguity in PAP. What does ›otherwise‹ in ›being able to dootherwise‹ mean? Either it means having more than one optionfor action, or it means having an alternative to performing anaction. I argue that the libertarian in fact only requires, andhas always intended, the latter: freely and responsibly doing Xdoes not mean being able to perform some other free action.The leeway-incompatibilist, as he is usually depicted in thedebate on Frankfurt-examples, is arguably no more than astraw man set up by the libertarian’s opponent. Libertariansshould therefore not abandon PAP altogether, but insteadaccept a revised formulation, to which, I argue, even the mostcompelling Frankfurt cases form no counterexample. This willperhaps allow the libertarian to explain why sourcehood isincompatible with determinism.

8 OrsiHigher-order Internalism about Moral Judgment

Francesco OrsiTartu University (Estonia)

[email protected]

In this paper I aim to make a case for taking seriously anoverlooked version of internalism about moral judgment:

Higher-order Internalism (HOI): It is necessary that, if aperson judges that she is morally required to f, then she is, atleast to some extent, motivated to be motivated to f.

In the first part of the paper I argue that HOI is a plausiblecandidate for articulating the folk conception of the relation

between first-person moral judgments and motivation. I dothis by examining two sets of folk responses: 1) actual respon-ses to described cases of normal, depressed, apathetic, andpsychopathic agents, as reported and discussed in a forthco-ming paper by C. Strandberg and F. Björklund; 2) reasonablyexpected responses to five standard anti-internalist scenariospresented by R. Shafer-Landau. I argue that HOI provides acoherent explanation of why the majority of people respondto the scenarios as they do, or as they are reasonably expectedto do. In a nutshell, people find the combination of sinceremoral judgment and lack of motivation to act less puzzlingwhen a second-order motivation to be thus motivated can beinferred in the agent.In the second part I take up and reply toa few objections to HOI both taken as a folk conception andas an original proposal in the internalism / externalism debateabout moral motivation. In this context I show the strengthsof HOI with respect to other recent forms of so called »defer-red« internalism, where the necessary connection is held to bebetween the moral judgment and either the agent’s previousmotivation to act, or the agent’s belonging to a community ofagents who are normally motivated by their moral judgments.

Pfister 8Are there Exclusionary Reasons?

Jonas PfisterUniversität Luzern (Switzerland)

[email protected]

Are there different kinds of reasons for action? Joseph Razintroduced the concept of exclusionary reasons. An exclusio-nary reason is a second-order reason that excludes other rea-sons and does not outweigh them. The claim that there aresuch reasons has been challenged. Some simply reject thedifference between these kinds of reasons, others try to cap-ture the difference in other terms. Christian Piller argues thatall the examples given by Raz can be explained by so calledattitude-related reasons, i.e. reasons that can only be referredto by mentioning the attitude, as opposed to content-rela-ted reasons. I want to argue that at least in some cases onecan only describe the attitude-related reason by referring toa command, rule or norm, and what a norm is can at leastfor some kinds of norms only be understood as an exclusio-nary reason, as Raz has shown. The claim of the existence ofsuch reasons therefore not only withstands the argument ofattitude-related reasons but is also independently justified.

Piller 8What Is Goodness Good For?

Christian PillerUniversity of York (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

I investigate whether we can engage in moral deliberationwithout needing to make use of a substantial notion of good-ness (often called goodness simpliciter and contrasted withattributive goodness and goodness-for). I won’t try to esta-blish that morality does not need goodness, but I will defendthis idea against the following objections. (1) We need to refer

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to goodness in order to establish the normativity of the rele-vant goodness-for facts. (2) Goodness-for facts conceptuallyentail goodness facts (Moore, Tenenbaum). (3) What is goodfor a human being is partially determined by the value of whatthe person pursues and engages with (Darwall, Scanlon, Raz).(4) Not only consequentialism but moral thought in generalneeds interpersonal comparisons of well-being which use anotion of simple goodness or, rather a notion of simple bet-terness (Arneson). After discussing these objections, I end byreflecting on an objection to the whole project undertakenin this paper. According to a buck-passing or fitting attitudeanalysis of value, once we agree that a person’s well being issuch that it gives us reason to promote it, we also agree thata person’s well-being is simply good. Thus, the idea that wecan do without a notion of goodness and restrict the evalua-tions relevant in moral thought to goodness-for evaluationsis incoherent. I reply with an attempt to rephrase the issuespursued in this paper in a way acceptable to a fitting-attitudephilosopher.

2 PorroKaren Bennett on

»difference-minimizing« disputes

Laura Cecilia PorroUniversity of St Andrews (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

In this paper I critically discuss Bennett’s claim that somedisputes are difference-minimizing. Bennett (2009) argues thatthe disputes about composition and colocation are difference-minimizing. Bennett’s claim in her paper is the following: ifa debate is difference-minimizing, and semanticism does notapply to such debate, then epistemicism applies to it.

In my paper I explore the other direction of this implica-tion, i.e. whether there are cases of debates, such that episte-micism applies to them, but they are not difference-minimi-zing. After discussing the notion of difference-minimizing, Iargue that it is the case that some debates are not difference-minimizing, and yet epistemicism can apply to them.

Moreover, I discuss why parties in a debate are difference-minimizing. I analyse whether difference-minimizing is usefulfor the philosophical enquiry or rather it brings the partiesoff track. This discussion will focus on two main issues, thefirst one is why it is important for any philosophical view tobe able to reconstruct ordinary judgments. The second oneis why it is important for a philosophical view to be able toreconstruct its opponent’s claims.

I argue that difference-minimizing plays a role in makingphilosophical positions understood. However, difference-mini-mizing should be seen only as a side task a philosophical viewmight want to engage in, a task that does not affect and isnot related to the core arguments in favor of the view.

I then analyse Bennett’s definition, if it can be so called, ofdifference-minimizing, and argue that some words are usedloosely, thus making such definition problematic. I argue thatthis has the consequence of making the definition of diffe-rence-minimizing too permissive, and thus more debates thanwe would want to turn out to be difference-minimizing.

Poznic 3Wissenschaftliche Repräsentation

und Ähnlichkeit

Michael PoznicRWTH Aachen

[email protected]

Kann der Begriff der Ähnlichkeit verwendet werden, um einensubstantiellen Beitrag zur Klärung des Repräsentationsbegrifsin den Wissenschaften zu liefern? In diesem Beitrag möchteich mich mit der Kritik des Begriffs der Ähnlichkeit aus prag-matischer Perspektive auseinandersetzen. In den Debattender allgemeinen Wissenschaftstheorie um den Begriff der wis-senschaftlichen Repräsentation stehen sich zwei unterschiedli-che Familien von Positionen gegenüber. Zum einen betonenInformationsansätze die Relation zwischen dem Vehikel derRepräsentation und dem Repräsentierten, dem sogenanntenZielsystem. Zum anderen legen pragmatische Ansätze großenWert auf die Tätigkeiten von Wissenschaftlern. Als paradigma-tische Vehikel der Repräsentation werden von beiden Positio-nen vor allem wissenschaftliche Modelle betrachtet. Modellesind wichtige, vielleicht sogar die wichtigsten Hilfsmittel imProzess des wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisgewinns. Das hatnach Ansicht der meisten Wissenschaftsphilosophen gerademit ihrer repräsentationalen Funktion zu tun. Denn Modelle lie-fern Wissen über Phänomene, weil sie bestimmte Zielsystemein der Welt adäquat repräsentieren. In diesem Zusammenhangscheint eine Einsicht, die in erster Linie Informationsansätzebemühen, evident zu sein. Es ist nur möglich mit Hilfe vonRepräsentationen etwas über die Welt zu lernen, wenn dieseähnlich gegenüber ihren Zielsystemen sind. Aus Sicht der prag-matischen Ansätze wird die Frage nach dem Beitrag des Ähn-lichkeitsbegriffs zur Klärung von »Repräsentation« allerdingsmeist negativ beantwortet, wenn auch manche pragmatischePhilosophen davon sprechen, dass Vehikel ihren Zielsystemenoft ähnlich seien. Eine umfassende und einflussreiche Kritik aneiner Ähnlichkeitsauffassung der Repräsentation in den Wis-senschaften ist von Mauricio Suárez geäußert worden. SeineArgumente sollen in diesem Beitrag untersucht werden.

Rafiee Rad/Hartmann 3Updating on Conditionals =

Kullback-Leibler + Causal Structure

Soroush Rafiee RadTilburg University (Netherlands)

[email protected]

Stephan HartmannTilburg University (Netherlands)

[email protected]

Modeling how to learn an indicative conditional has been amajor challenge for Formal Epistemologists. One proposal tomeet this challenge is to request that the posterior probabi-lity distribution minimizes the Kullback-Leibler distance to theprior probability distribution, taking the learned informationas a constraint (expressed as a conditional probability state-ment) into account. This proposal has been criticized in theliterature based on several clever examples. In this paper, we

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revisit three of these examples and show that one obtainsintuitively correct results for the posterior probability distri-bution if the underlying probabilistic model reflects the causalstructure of the scenario in question.

6 RatersDon’t worry – be happy?

Ein Konsistenzproblem in der pragmatistischenReligionsphilosophie von William James

Marie-Luise RatersUniversität Potsdam

[email protected]

Unter dem Einfluss von Emersons Transzendentalismus be-hauptet William James in The Varieties of Religious Experi-ences von 1901/02 zum einen, dass Religion »leicht und glück-lich« machen könne (dt. 1997, 84). Zur Genese der religiösenErfahrung behauptet James dann jedoch, dass das Phänomender religiösen Erfahrung hinreichend durch Verschiebungspro-zesse im Bewusstsein erklärt werden könnte, wodurch sich derGlaube an eine transzendente Instanz als Ursache der religi-ösen Erfahrung nicht nur als verzichtbar, sondern sogar als irra-tional darstellt. Wie aber soll eine religiöse Erfahrung glücklichmachen können, wenn man gleichzeitig weiß, dass die religi-öse Erfahrung aus dem eigenen Unterbewusstsein stammt undalso vermutlich kein fundamentum in re hat? Schließlich kannman sich nicht dazu überreden, etwas zu glauben, nur weil derGlaube glücklich machen würde. Der Vortrag rekonstruiert ineinem ersten Schritt die beiden Leitthesen der Religionsphilo-sophie von William James vor dem Hintergrund von EmersonsTranszendentalismus. Im Hauptteil weist der dieser Religions-philosophie dann ein Konsistenzproblem nach, indem er zeigt,dass sich die beide Leithesen weder normativ als Ratschlagnoch deskriptiv als Analyse des Phänomens Religiosität sinn-voll miteinander verknüpfen lassen.

8 Rechenauer/RoyDeontic Logic for Procedural Ethics

Martin RechenauerLudwig-Maximilians-Universität Mü[email protected]

Olivier RoyLudwig-Maximilians-Universität München

[email protected]

Procedural justifications play a large role in contemporarysocial and individual ethics. Their basic idea is that norms arejustified if they have been approved by an application of anappropriate procedure. Kantian ethics provides us with the firstexplicit form of this kind of justification: a norm or preceptis justified if it passes the test of the categorical imperative.Modern approaches are the Rawlsian theory of justice, andmore to our current interest, discourse ethics and Scanloniancontractualism.

Deontic logic, on the other hand, has made important advan-ces in the study of normative notions like permissions andobligations. It has allowed to circumscribe the core logical

principles (axioms) governing these deontic notions, and shedlight on the complexity of reasoning about them. Deonticlogicians have furthermore identified a number of potential»paradoxes« or pitfalls arising in many deontic systems.

Up to now, however, procedural normative systems havestayed beyond the scope of contemporary logical analysis,and this is an important gap. It is not clear which logicalprinciples are governing norms stemming from proceduraljustification, how complex are these justification procedures,and whether they fall pray to known deontic paradoxes. Onthe other hand, by leaving out procedurally justified norms,deontic logic misses what is arguably one of the most import-ant views on norms in contemporary ethics.

In this paper we make the first step towards filling this gap.Using apparatus from modern fixed-point logics, we study thelogical properties of obligations and permissions in discourseethics and Scanlonian contractualism. We show that this shedslight on the logical properties of these norms, on the comple-xity of these justification procedures, and that they do fallpray to some of the most well-known deontic paradoxes.

Reining 5Much More Trouble for the Conciliatory View

than Elga Expects

Stefan ReiningUniversitat de Barcelona (Spain)[email protected]

According to the Conciliatory View (CV) on peer disagreement,the most natural reaction to a disagreement about p with anepistemic peer of mine is to move my degree of confidencein p at least a bit in the direction of my peer’s degree ofconfidence in p. A particular version of CV, the Equal WeightView – according to which my peer and I should not onlymove our degrees of confidence in p in the direction of eachother, but also move them in such a way that we meet inthe middle – has been convincingly defended, especially byDavid Christensen and Adam Elga. However, in his 2010 paper»How to Disagree about How to Disagree«, Elga claims thatCV, despite all of its appeal, is ultimately self-undermining,because it offers incoherence advice in certain cases. The casesthat Elga has in mind are those in which the peer disagreementis about the truth or falsity of CV itself.

Elga’s own solution to this problem is to endorse a restric-ted version of CV, according to which it is most rational tobe conciliatory in all cases of peer disagreement, except thosecases in which the disagreement is about CV itself. I will arguethat Elga’s attack on CV fails, but that a modified version ofthe attack reveals that CV faces a much more general problemthan Elga expects – one that cannot be solved by the kind ofrestriction he proposes.

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3 RöhlCausation, Dispositions and Mathematical Physics

Johannes RöhlUniversität Rostock

[email protected]

Philosophers have often denied that the concepts of causeand effect have any role in fundamental physics or othermathematical theories of systems with continuous time evo-lution.There are no causally connected events, just states of asystem, and their time development is described by operatorsor equations. This claim apparently conflicts with causal des-criptions in special sciences and with philosophical accountsthat hold causation to be a relation between events. Such adivergence in a central concept could lead to a disunity ofscience and world. But there seems a chance of reconciliation,as the ontological implications of this mathematical descrip-tion are not obvious. My aim is to show that a world viewwith causal powers or dispositions is able to accommodateboth the viewpoint of mathematical physics and the one ofmanifestly causal descriptions. Firstly it is to be noted thatthe »cause-free« description seems to rest on presuppositi-ons that employ causal notions: (1) The concept of closure,which means that all relevant causal features of interest havebeen taken into account. (2) The Hamiltonian of a system isbased on the properties of the component systems relevantfor their dynamic influences on each other. The ontic basis ofa mathematical description can therefore be analysed in termsof causal properties, because these determine the functionsthat determine the time evolution. An objection is that in fun-damental physics the dynamical properties are connected withsymmetries, so no recourse to causal conceptions is necessary.Against this one can argue that the essence of e.g. charge isonly captured by its being a specific causal power. Besidesthese sonsiderations two arguments from physics are offered:In classical physics a movement of a body is continuouslycaused by an attractive force. Classical forces can be under-stood either as dispositions or as closely tied to dispositions.In quantum mechanics non-classical dispositions, propensi-ties, capture important aspects of the ontology of the field.Thus, an ontology with dispositions as relevant causal factorsallows a unified ontology for both continuous processes andcausal links of discrete events.

1 RosefeldtTalking about things that don’t exist

Tobias RosefeldtHumboldt-Universität zu [email protected]

Are there things that don’t exist? Several answers seem to bepossible here. You can answer ›yes‹ because you are a Mainon-gian and believe that existence is a discriminating propertyof objects, i.e. a property that some objects have and otherslack. You can answer ›no‹ because you are a Quinean andbelieve that to exist just means to be identical to somethingand hence is a property of everything. Or you can be a fan ofsubstitutional quantification and think that you can answer›yes‹ without committing yourself to non-existing things in

any ontologically interesting sense. In this paper, I want tointroduce an alternative to all these views. According to thisalternative, you can answer ›yes‹ to the question but nevert-heless assume that (i) ›exist‹ expresses a property true of allobjects and (ii) ›there are things‹ expresses objectual quantifi-cation. The reason why this is possible is that there is a literalreading of the sentence ›There are things that don’t exist‹ inwhich we are using it to quantify over kinds of things and saythat there are kinds that have no instances. In order to sub-stantiate this claim, I will show that there are many cases inwhich natural language quantifiers such as ›there are things‹,›there is something‹ or ›there are Fs‹ are used to quantifyover kinds of things rather than individual things, and give ananalysis of the intricate syntactical and semantical featuresof sentences in which such quantification occurs. I will thenuse the proposed analysis in order to show that there reallyis the mentioned reading of the claim that there are thingsthat don’t exist and to explain why it has been overseen by somany philosophers. Finally, I will show how useful the insightinto the linguistic structure of our talk about non-existingthings is by arguing that the proposed analysis can be used tocriticize an argument by Timothy Williamson for the existenceof so-called ›bare possibilia‹.

Rosell 5Voluntary Belief on a Strictly Epistemic Basis?

Sergi RosellUniversity of Sheffield (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

This paper discusses a recent proposal by Philip Nickel (2010),according to which we believe voluntarily, in cases of non-con-clusive but adequate evidence, when the conditions of reason-responsiveness, alternative possibilities and self-expressionare satisfied. I argue, on the one hand, that Nickel’s argumentunjustifiedly mixes up two different issues: the rationalityof belief and the voluntariness of belief, of a quite distinctnature. Moreover, Nickel’s interpretation of these cases is adhoc, insofar as he just assigns a role to epistemic character forthat kind of cases. Instead, I offer an integrated alternativeexplanation for those cases in the context of a general accountof belief, which I sketch.

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8 Roy/Anglberger/GratzlYou ought to do something!

The logic of obligationas weakest permission

Olivier RoyMunich Center for Mathematical Philosophy

[email protected]

Albert J. J. AnglbergerMunich Center for Mathematical Philosophy

[email protected]

Norbert GratzlMunich Center for Mathematical Philosophy

[email protected]

This paper investigates the following interpretation of obliga-tions:

A person i ought to do A in a situation S just in case every-thing else i may (and can) do in S is consistent with A.

In such case, A can be called the weakest permission thati has in S. Obligations of this form arise in many contexts.Natural examples of such a reading of obligations arise incases when the deontic notions apply to mutually exclusivealternatives. Take for instance the relatively uncontroversialdecision-theoretic principle that agents should not chooseactions that are strictly dominated by others, viz. actions thatmake the agent strictly worse off than another in all possiblestates of the world. In general, there will be many non-strictlydominated, mutually exclusive alternatives. To say that anagent ought to do all of them would be a blatant violationof the ought-can principle. The more natural reading is thateach individual, non-strictly dominated action is permitted,but that only the disjunction of these action, the weakestpermission the agent has, is obligatory.

In this paper we study the deontic logic of obligationsas weakest feasible permissions. We show that, under thisinterpretation, obligation and permission are not dual noti-ons, and that it gives rise to an interesting interplay betweendeontic and alethic notions. We also discuss the logics’ ade-quacy w.r.t. the paradoxes of (classic) deontic logics, presentcertain plausible extensions and provide a sound and com-plete axiomatization of this logic. We show that our choice ofsemantics – which is an extended neighborhood semantics –helps us to get rid of many of the aforementioned paradoxesbut without loosing a nice philosophical interpretation thesemantics’ components.

2 SattigPluralism and Determinism

Thomas SattigUniversität Tübingen

[email protected]

Pluralists about material objects believe that distinct materialobjects can coincide at a time – that they may exactly occupythe same spatial region and be constituted by the same mat-ter at that time. Pluralism is often accepted for reasons ofcommon sense. It seems obvious, for example, that there may

be a piece of paper and a paper airplane made from the latter,such that the piece of paper exists before the paper plane iscreated or exists after the paper plane is destroyed. The arti-facts in this scenario would appear to be distinct objects thatcoincide at various times.

In this paper, it will be argued that folk-inspired pluralism,as underwritten by broadly Aristotelian ontologies of complexmaterial objects, faces a serious problem concerning determi-nism. The actual world is deterministic just in case there isonly one way in which it can evolve that is compatible withthe actual laws of nature. If determinism about the actualworld fails, we expect it to fail for a reason of physics. Yetcertain common-sense cases of distinct, coinciding objectsaccepted by pluralists seem to show the actual world to beindeterministic on mundane, a priori grounds. It should notbe that easy to establish indeterminism.

First, I shall set the stage for what I call ›the problem ofcheap indeterminism‹ by distinguishing between weak quali-tative determinism and strong qualitative determinism, andby arguing that the strong conception is preferable to theweak one. Then I shall present the problem, which consistsin a priori violations of strong qualitative determinism bycertain common-sense cases of distinct coincidents. Finally,I shall consider various pluralist replies to the problem, andargue that each of them is implausible.

Schälike 8Moralischer Zufall

Julius SchälikeUniversität Konstanz

[email protected]

Der Vortrag befasst sich mit den unterschiedlichen Formendes moralischen Zufalls. Ich vertrete die These, dass lediglichkonstitutiver Zufall möglich ist, ergebnis- und situationsbezo-gener hingegen nicht.

Nach Thomas Nagel liegt moralischer Zufall vor, wenn Fak-toren, die sich der Kontrolle des Akteurs entziehen, seine mora-lische Qualität beeinflussen. Die Möglichkeit moralischen Zu-falls ist unvereinbar dem Kontrollprinzip, dem zufolge ledig-lich Faktoren, die ein Subjekt kontrolliert, auf seine moralischeQualität »abfärben«. Sowohl für die Möglichkeit des morali-schen Zufalls, als auch für das Kontrollprinzip spricht einiges.Die Art und Weise, wie wir im Alltag loben und tadeln, setztdie Existenz von moralischem Zufall voraus. Wir tadeln denfahrlässigen Unfallfahrer stärker als den Fahrer, der genausofahrlässig gehandelt hat, aber glücklicherweise unfallfrei ansZiel kommt. Dies lässt sich jedoch kaum rechtfertigen: ErstKontrolle scheint eine Verbindung zwischen Akteur und Ereig-nis zu stiften, die robust genug ist, damit ein Ereignis ein eva-luatives Licht auf den Akteur wirft. Nimmt man das Kontroll-prinzip jedoch ernst, ergeben sich ebenfalls Probleme. JederFaktor, den man zur Grundlage moralischer Zurechnung zumachen versucht, erweist sich als kausal abhängig von Fakto-ren, die sich der Kontrolle entziehen. Auch eine Entscheidung,die jemand trifft, hätte er nicht getroffen, wenn im Vorfeldetwas dazwischen gekommen wäre. Wäre das Kontrollprinzipgültig, so entzögen sich Akteure offenbar gänzlich der morali-schen Bewertbarkeit.

Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass das Kontrollprinzip aufgegebenwerden muss. Das Fehlen von Kontrolle in Bezug auf Resultate

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führt dazu, dass die Resultate nicht aussagekräftig sind fürdie moralische Qualität des Akteurs. Das Fehlen von Kontrolleunterminiert jedoch nicht immer eine aussagekräftige Rela-tion. Mentale Zustände wie Entscheidungen und auch Hand-lungsdispositionen sind Ausdruck der moralischen Identitäteines Subjekts und sind somit auch aussagekräftig – ganzgleich, ob das Subjekt ihre Genese kontrolliert. Die Frage istlediglich, ob Entscheidungen eine zusätzliche, unabhängigeRolle spielen, oder ob sich ihre Relevanz auf das Epistemischebeschränkt. Im Anschluss an Hume argumentiere ich, dassflüchtige Ereignisse wie Entscheidungen nur dann moralischauf den Akteur abfärben, wenn ihnen etwas Persistierendes –eine Disposition – korrespondiert. Daraus aber folgt: es gibtallein konstitutiven Zufall.

7 SchickhardtZum Begriff des Kindeswohls.

Ein liberaler Ansatz

Christoph SchickhardtUniversität Düsseldorf

[email protected]

Der Begriff des Kindeswohls ist in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-land und westlichen Rechtsstaaten von größter rechtlicher undsozialer Bedeutung. Eltern und Mediziner, Richter und Erzie-her orientieren sich im Umgang mit Kindern täglich unzähligeMale am Kindeswohl. Trotz der enormen rechtlichen und sozia-len Bedeutung des Kindeswohls handelt es sich jedoch umeinen nicht nur in Deutschland unbestimmten Rechtsbegriff!Von einem ethischen Gesichtspunkt aus wirft der Kindeswohl-begriff zahlreiche Fragen auf, die keineswegs nur seine inhaltli-che Definition betreffen, sondern auch seine inhärenten Struk-turen, die Gewichtung seiner unterschiedlichen Inhalte sowieseine begriffliche und metaethische Funktion und Natur – bishin zur Frage, ob aufgrund der mit ihm verbundenen Schwie-rigkeiten nicht vollständig auf den Begriff verzichtet werdensollte. Der Kindeswohlbegriff impliziert neben der Frage nachder guten Kindheit auch die klassische ethische Frage nachdem guten Leben überhaupt. Auch die liberale Ethik, derenVertreter gelegentlich dazu neigen, sich mit der Frage nachdem guten Leben nicht die Hände schmutzig zu machen, musssich der ethischen Herausforderung stellen, die der Kindes-wohlbegriff darstellt. Worin besteht ein liberaler Ansatz bezüg-lich der ethischen Problematik des Kindeswohls? Inhaltlicherscheint es wünschenswert, dass Kinder bzw. die Personen, indie Kinder sich langfristig entwickeln, subjektiv glücklich sind,personale Autonomie entwickeln und möglichst viele Optio-nen und Chancen haben, um in personaler Autonomie ihreneigenen Plan vom Glück zu entwerfen und diesem eigenstän-dig nachzugehen. Die Kindeswohlbestimmung ist eine objek-tive Bestimmung der Interessen von Kindern durch Dritte. Esist jedoch zum einen geboten, dass sie in möglichst großemUmfang die spezifische Individualität jedes einzelnen Kindesberücksichtigt, und zum anderen, dass der Kindeswohlbegriffnicht zum Schutzmantel oder Instrument von anmaßendemPaternalismus oder Moralismus wird. Zuletzt ist aus begriffs-analytischer Perspektive nach der metaethischen Natur bzw.nach den metaethischen Naturen des Kindeswohlbegriffs zufragen, wobei vor allem für eine klare Unterscheidung zwi-schen der allgemein evaluativen und der sensu stricto normati-ven Bedeutungsebene des Kindeswohlbegriffs zu plädieren ist.

Schiemer 3Carnap’s structuralism reconsidered

Georg SchiemerMunich Center for Mathematical Philosophy

[email protected]

Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics is usually identified withhis adaption of Russellian logicism in the late 1920s and early1930s (e.g. Carnap 1930) and, more importantly, with his prin-ciple of tolerance first formulated in Logische Syntax der Spra-che (Carnap 1934). However, recent scholarly work has shownthat Carnap also made significant contributions to the metho-dology and metalogic of formal axiomatics, in particular inhis unpublished manuscript Untersuchungen zur allgemeinenAxiomatik (Carnap 2000), written around 1928, as well as inhis logic textbook Abriss der Logistik (Carnap 1929). While hisearly metalogical work has been investigated in detail (e.g.Awodey & Carus 2001, Reck 2007), no closer attention has sofar been dedicated to the structuralist account of mathema-tics underlying Carnap’s work on »general axiomatics.« Thistalk will investigate Carnap’s mathematical structuralism ofthe late 1920s and early 1930s. The aim here will be twofold.First, to present and clarify Carnap’s main ideas concerningmathematical structures as they are documented in his publis-hed and unpublished work. Second, to reevaluate Carnap’scontributions in light of the modern theories of mathematicalstructuralism. In the first, historical part of the talk we discusstwo distinct notions of the structural content of a mathe-matical theory introduced by Carnap at the time: so-called»Explizitbegriffe« and »model structures«. We consider how thetwo notions are interrelated and also how Carnap’s structura-list account of mathematics relates to his other philosophicalconvictions concerning mathematics, most importantly, hisdeep-rooted logicism. In the second, more systematic partof the talk, Carnap’s early structuralist approach will be dis-cussed in the light of current debates on mathematical struc-turalism. In particular, we attempt to locate Carnap’s viewson the ontological status of abstract structures (conceived as»Explizitbegriffe«) in the spectrum of modern theories, spe-cifically between versions of non-eliminative and eliminativestructuralism. Finally, we propose how a bottom-up account ofstructural properties based on Carnap’s definition by abstrac-tion is more sensitive to actual mathematical practice than thephilosophically motivated versions of structuralism currentlyunder discussion.

Schink 7Grundelemente einer Theorie sozialer Freiheit

Philipp SchinkJohann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

[email protected]

Der vorliegende Vortrag hat die Frage zum Gegenstand, wasplausiblerweise unter dem Begriff der sozialen Freiheit ver-standen werden kann. Angeschlossen wird an die zeitgenössi-sche Diskussion in der Sozialphilosophie und Politischen Phi-losophie wie sie insbesondere im anglo-amerikanischen Raumgeführt wird, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf den sogenannt nega-tiven Freiheitsansätzen liegt. Zunächst soll gezeigt werden,

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dass insbesondere negative Freiheitsansätze darauf abzielen,Freiheit als eine soziale Beziehung zu rekonstruieren – undwas genau darunter zu verstehen ist. Dann wird diskutiertwerden, inwiefern Freiheit zentral über die Abwesenheit vonInterferenzen anderer Akteure bestimmt werden kann. Gegendas Dogma der Nichtinterferenz wird ein Verständnis vonFreiheit als Nichtbeherrschung (freedom as nondomination) inAnschlag gebracht, das in den letzten Jahren vor allem von Phi-lip Pettit entwickelt wurde. Obwohl dieses gewichtige Vorteilegegenüber den Nichtinterferenzmodellen hat, wird schließlichgezeigt, dass Pettits Verständnis von Freiheit als »gesicherterWahlfreiheit« in entscheidender Hinsicht einer kritischen Revi-sion unterzogen werden muss. Ausgehend von dieser Revisionwird schließlich für ein strikt relationales und negatives Ver-ständnis von Freiheit argumentiert, welches die Grundlage füreinen plausiblen Begriff sozialer Freiheit darstellen kann.

5 SchippersProbabilistic Measures of Coherence:

A Two-Level Approach

Michael SchippersUniversität Oldenburg

[email protected]

Probabilistic measures of coherence quantify the coherence ofa given set A of propositions by weighting the respective pro-babilistic dependencies inside A. Prominent candidates havebeen devised by Shogenji (1999), Olsson (2002) and Fitelson(2003). However, there are arguments to the effect that allprobabilistic coherence measures are untenable. We considertwo of those arguments and show where they went wrong.One of them is the so called problem of belief individuation:Moretti & Akiba (2007) argue that the coherence of a set ofpropositions A should not be influenced by the way we indi-viduate the propositions. But this is exactly what happens inthe case of probabilistic coherence measures. We show that itis possible to generalise Moretti & Akiba’s findings to a mul-titude of coherence measures satisfying intuitively desirableconstraints. The second argument, the child’s play objection,stems from Siebel (2005). There it is shown that, accordingto prominent probabilistic coherence measures, the degree ofcoherence of a given set of propositions may easily be increa-sed by adding deductively entailed propositions.

We argue for the existence of different levels of coherence:next to the representational level, which amounts to takingeach given set at face value, there is a content level, whichis constituted by the basic commitments contained in eachbelief set. We show how mixing up these levels causes theabove-mentioned problems. Based on BonJour (1985) andHansson (2006) we underpin our claim to the effect that whilethe calculations leading to Moretti & Akiba’s and Siebel’sformal results are situated on the representational level ofcoherence, the intuitive constraints which they demand aresituated on the content level.

We devise and motivate conceptual distinctions and elabo-rate them formally by means of elementary tools of mathe-matical logic. Afterwards we show in how far our distinctionbetween two levels of coherence is suitable for solving theproblems mentioned above. More precisely, we show that itis possible thereby to account both for the formal results ofMoretti & Akiba (2007) and Siebel (2005) and the intuitions

appealed to by BonJour (1985) and Hansson (2006). In a finalstep we provide examples in support of the usefulness of ourdistinction between different levels of coherence.

Schlicht 4Social Cognition as know-how

Tobias SchlichtRuhr-Universität [email protected]

Debates in the area of social cognition have been domina-ted by Theory-Theory (Gopnik & Wellman 1992) and Simu-lation-Theory (Goldman 2006) for a long time. Despite theirdifferences, these approaches share a common background,namely, the assumptions (1) that social cognition is largely anindividual affair that is achieved by a human being passivelyobserving one or more other human being(s), and (2) thatthere is an epistemic gulf between self and other that mustbe bridged by some explicit mindreading technique, eithertheoretical inference or simulation.

Accordingly, social cognitive neuroscience has identifiedtwo large-scale neural networks that supposedly enable oursocial cognitive capacities. The so-called mentalizing network(midline structures) is supposed to provide empirical supportfor theory-theory, while the so-called mirror neuron networkis supposed to provide empirical support for the simulationtheory (Keysers & Gazzola 2007). But it is unclear how thisdiscrepancy should be interpreted since the evidence has beengathered by the use of paradigms that presuppose the veryframeworks that they are supposed to support.

In this talk, I will develop an alternative to these twoapproaches to social cognition which is based on the premisethat being directly engaged and interacting with others withinsecond-person reciprocal relations – instead of merely obser-ving them – is the principal source of our social understan-ding – rather than inferential processes from the third-personperspective (3PP) or simulation heuristics from the first-personperspective (1PP). The relevant knowledge we bring to bear insocial cognition is knowing how instead of knowing that (seeMcGeer 2001). This approach will be developed as an extensionof the enactive approach to cognition to the social domain.Despite the popularity of this view, its resources have not yetbeen exploited for the social domain (see Ratcliffe 2007 andde Jaegher, Di Paolo, Gallagher 2010 for notable exceptions).The task of this paper is to show (1) how central concepts ofenactive cognitive science translate to the social domain, (2)how this new framework can guide future empirical researchin social neuroscience, and (3) how this view enables us tounderstand social-cognitive disorders like autism.

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6 SchmalzriedDie Relevanz des moralischen Werts

eines Kunstwerkes

Lisa Katharin SchmalzriedUniversität Luzern (Switzerland)

[email protected]

Dürfen wir glauben, dass der moralische Wert eines Kunstwer-kes relevant für dessen Wert als Kunstwerk betrachtet ist? –Um diese Frage zu beantworten, sollte man darlegen, was füreine allgemeine Werttheorie für Kunstwerke man zu Grundelegt. Man kann zwischen zwei Arten von Werttheorien unter-scheiden: monistischen und pluralistischen Werttheorien. Lauteiner monistischen Werttheorie gibt es nur einen einzig ange-messenen Bewertungsmaßstab für Kunstwerke. Gemäß einerpluralistischen Werttheorie gibt es mehrere Bewertungskri-terien, die gemeinsam Auskunft über den Gesamtwert desWerkes geben.

Der monistische Gedanke ist eng mit dem moderaten Auto-nomismus verbunden, wonach der moralische Wert irrelevantfür den Wert eines Kunstwerkes ist. Der radikale Moralismus,laut dem allein der moralische Wert den Wert eines Kunstwerksbestimmt, ist keine überzeugende Variante einer monistischenWerttheorie. Eine vielversprechendere Alternative stellt derradikale Ästhetizismus dar, wonach allein der ästhetische Wertrelevant ist. Der ästhetische Wert ist unabhängig von demmoralischen Wert eines Werkes, weshalb der moralische Wertirrelevant für die Bewertung eines Kunstwerkes ist. Wir akzep-tieren diese autonomistische These. Unsere Kritik setzt ammonistischen Zug des radikalen Ästhetizismus an: Warum soll-te man glauben, nur der ästhetische Wert sei relevant? Ganzgrundsätzlich kann man den monistischen Gedanken in Zwei-fel ziehen.

Im Vergleich zu einer monistischen ist eine pluralisti-sche Werttheorie überzeugender, da sie die Vielschichtig-keit der Kunstkritik besser erfassen kann. Als Kriterien einerpluralistischen Werttheorie schlagen wir einen ästhetischen,einen kognitiven, einen affektiv-antwortabhängigen und einenkunsthistorischen Maßstab vor. Auf Basis dieser Werttheoriewird für die Relevanz des moralischen Werts argumentiert. Dermoralische Wert eines Werkes kann Bewertungen auf Basis deskognitiven, des affektiv-antwortabhängigen und des kunsthis-torischen Massstabes beeinflussen, wie man anhand typischerBewertungen auf Grundlage dieser Kriterien zeigen kann. DieseBeeinflussung fällt kontextualistisch aus, d. h. ein moralischesDefizit kann sich sowohl positiv, als auch negativ auswirken,ebenso wie ein positiver moralischer Wert.

5 SchmechtigInterrogatives Formen des Wissensund reduktiver Intellektualismus

Pedro SchmechtigRWTH Aachen

[email protected]

Es gehört zur gängigen Auffassung in der Erkenntnistheorie,dass Wissens-Zuschreibungen, die ein deklaratives Satzkomple-ment beinhalten (Wissen-dass) im Mittelpunkt des Forschungs-interesses stehen. Im Alltag sind wir hingegen sehr viel häu-

figer mit interrogativen bzw. praktischen Formen des Wissenskonfrontiert. Reduktive Intellektualisten versuchen diesemProblem vorzubeugen, indem sie behaupten, dass praktischesWissen (Wissen-wie) lediglich eine spezielle Unterart von Wis-sen-wh ist (Wissen in Bezug auf eingebettete Fragen: where,who, why, whether etc.). Wobei gleichzeitig angenommen wird,dass alle Zuschreibungen von interrogativem Wissen eine ein-heitliche Basisform besitzen, nämlich auf Wissen-dass zurück-führbar sind. Es stellt sich jedoch die Frage, ob diese (in zweifa-cher Hinsicht) reduktionistische Sichtweise plausibel ist. MeineAntwort lautet: Nein! Weder ist praktisches Wissen eine Unter-art von Wissen-wh noch lassen sich interrogative Formen desWissens auf Wissen-dass reduzieren. In diesem Vortrag wirdes mir hauptsächlich um die Begründung der zweiten Behaup-tung gehen.

Nach einer kurzen Erläuterung der reduktionistischen Stan-dardauffassung von Wissen-wh werde ich drei grundlegendeEinwände vorbringen, die gegen eine mit dem intellektua-listischen Ansatz eng verbundene »Proposition Set Analysis«(PSA) von (indirekten) Interrogativen sprechen. Im Wesent-lichen sollen drei Dinge gezeigt werden: Erstens werde ichein Argument anführen (vgl. Ginzburg 1995), das berechtigteZweifel weckt, ob Zuschreibungen von Wissen-wh überhaupteine »proposition-denoting-manifestation« besitzen. Zweitensargumentiere ich für eine bestimmte Form der Relativität kon-gruenter Antworten, d. h. ich gehe davon aus, dass die epis-temische Hinsicht, gemäß der eine Antwort auf die eingebet-tete Frage des wh-Satzkomplements kongruent erscheint, mitdem Ziel unserer Erkenntnisbemühungen variiert. Entsprechendversuche ich deutlich zu machen, dass die Faktivität episte-mischer Interrogative nicht mithilfe irgendeiner Bedingungpropositionaler Vollständigkeit erklärt werden kann. Drittensstelle ich die Behauptung auf, dass der reduktive Ansatz desIntellektualisten kein prototypisches »setting« für epistemi-sche Interrogative liefert, da es Kontexte der Zuschreibungvon Wissen-wh gibt, die sich nicht mit PSA modellieren las-sen.

Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Einwände wird im abschließen-den Teil des Vortrags kurz angedeutet in welche Richtung maneine adäquate Analyse von interrogativen Wissens-Zuschrei-bungen entwickeln sollte.

Schmidt 4How We Know Our Senses

Eva SchmidtUniversität des [email protected]

I propose a new criterion by which, I hold, subjects recognizeand distinguish their sensory modalities. I argue that, ratherthan appealing to one of the standard criteria (sense organ,proximal stimulus, phenomenal character, or representationalcontent (Grice 1962, Macpherson 2011a)), we need to appealto the criterion of location in the functional architecture of thesubject’s mind at the personal level in order to make sense ofan ordinary subject’s ability to tell which sensory modality isemployed in her occurrent perceptual experience. More spe-cifically, a subject’s mind is functionally organized into diffe-rent faculties, and, seeing as it is her mind, she has a naturalcognitive access to this structure at the personal level; in thespecific case of perceptual experience, perceptual input from

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the world is present to the subject at the personal level asorganized by the different sensory modalities, vision, hearing,touch, taste, and smell.

In my presentation, I motivate and explicate this new cri-terion for distinguishing the senses, in particular its psycholo-gical aspects. Moreover, I show how it can handle problemsraised by empirical findings, such as additional human sen-ses (e.g. the vomeronasal sense) and cross-modal experiences(e.g. the experience of a speaker’s voice emanating from hismouth).

H.P. Grice (1962). ›Some Remarks About the Senses.‹ InR. J. Butler (ed.) Analytical Philosophy. First Series. Oxford: BasilBlackwell.

Fiona Macpherson (2011a). ›Individuating the Senses.‹ InFiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classical and ContemporaryReadings. New York: Oxford University Press.

7 Schmidt-PetriErbschaftsteuern, Obduktionen

und die posthume Konfizierung von Organen

Christoph Schmidt-PetriUniversität Regensburg

[email protected]

In Deutschland wird zur Zeit sehr heftig um eine Neuregelungdes Transplantationsgesetzes gekämpft. Das seit 1997 gel-tende Gesetz sieht eine sogenannte ›erweiterte Zustimmungs-lösung‹ vor: Organe können Verstorbenen nur dann entnom-men (und danach transplantiert) werden, wenn der Verstor-bene selbst oder posthum seine Angehörigen der Entnahmezugestimmt haben. Da mit diesem Verfahren anscheinendweder alle Personen versorgt werden können, die ein Organbenötigen, noch alle Personen zum Spenden bewegt werdenkönnen, die grundsätzlich einer Organspende positiv gegen-überzustehen scheinen, wird inzwischen vielerorts eine ›Wider-spruchslösung‹ favorisiert: Organe sollen auch dann entnom-men werden können, wenn der Verstorbene einer Organent-nahme zwar nicht explizit zugestimmt, ihr aber zumindestnicht explizit widersprochen hat.

Beiden Ansätzen (wie auch der Kompromisslösung ›Äuße-rungspflicht‹) liegt die Annahme zugrunde, dass ein Menschüber seinen Körper auch über seinen Tod hinaus verfügenkann. In diesem Vortrag möchte ich diese Annahme über-prüfen. Ich werde dafür plädieren, dass Organe für potentielleEmpfänger von so großer Bedeutung sein können, dass unterbestimmten – sehr selten eintretenden – Umständen auch dieEntnahme gegen den erklärten Willen des Verstorbenen bzw.seiner Angehörigen moralisch zulässig sein kann (meine Dis-kussion erstreckt sich nicht auf menschliches Gewebe, für dasich eine andere Lösung für angebracht halte). Hierfür werdenzwei m. E. hinreichend ähnliche Konstellationen als Analogienangeführt: erstens das Erheben von Erbschaftssteuern undzweitens die Anordnung von Obduktionen. In beiden Fällenfindet im Zweifelsfall auch gegen den Willen des Verstorbe-nen bzw. seiner Angehörigen ein Zugriff auf sein Vermögenbzw. seinen Körper statt. Beide Regelungen werden zumeistals unproblematisch empfunden, und die jeweiligen Begrün-dungen für die Zulässigkeit sollten in Kombination auch fürmenschliche Organe akzeptiert werden.

Schmitz 5Practical Knowledge

Michael SchmitzUC Berkeley (United States)[email protected]

When practical knowledge is discussed at all in contempo-rary philosophy, since Ryle it has usually been discussed asknow-how in the sense of mere skill. There is a blind spot incontemporary thinking about knowledge for a conception ofpractical knowledge which treats it not as a mere skill, but asknowledge state that, like theoretical knowledge, is concep-tually articulated and even in a sense ›propositional‹ and yetessentially and irreducibly different from theoretical know-ledge that something is the case. This is true even thoughthere are countless examples for this form of knowledge ran-ging from recipes over instructions how to behave in case ofa fire to moral maxims. The contribution defends the realityof states of practical knowledge and characterizes them asbeing prescriptive, as having world-to-mind direction of fit,and as knowledge of means and ends rather than of facts.Practical knowledge, it is further argued, should be thought ofas knowledge-to rather than as knowledge-how, because thereare many other forms of practical knowledge such as knowingwhat to do, and where, when, and why to do it.

Schneider 6Leibnizianischer Molinismus:

Individuelle Essenzen und metaphysische Freiheit

Ruben SchneiderHochschule für Philosophie, München

[email protected]

Spätestens seitdem Alvin Plantinga in seinem Werk »The Na-ture of Necessity« von 1974 die Mögliche-Welten-Erklärungkontrafaktischer Konditionale von David Lewis zur Lösung desTheodizée-Problems heranzog, reüssierten in der analytischenReligionsphilosophie die spätscholastischen Systeme, die im16. / 17. Jahrhundert zur Klärung der Frage nach nach Kohärenzvon göttlicher Vorhersehung und menschlicher Freiheit entwi-ckelt wurden. In diesem Beitrag soll der analytische Molinismusbeleuchtet und seine Charakterisierung als libertarische Posi-tion kritisch untersucht und neu verortet werden. Hierbei wirdvorallem auf die aktuelle Diskussion um anti-molinistische Kon-sequenzargumente und die in ihnen verwendeten Transfer-prinzipien eingegangen. Darüber hinaus soll gezeigt werden,dass die sog. »essence-solution« der berühmten »Grounding-objection« gegen den Molinismus zu einer potenten Lösungausgebaut werden kann, wenn individuelle Essenzen freierAkteure als leibnizianische »vollständige Begriffe« aufgefasstwerden, welche alle kontra- bzw. präfaktischen Freiheitskon-ditionale des jeweiligen Akteurs enthalten. Tatsächlich ent-wickelte Leibniz sein Konzept der vollständigen Begriffe vonIndividuen auf Basis der Debatte um die molinistische scientiamedia. Diese leibnizianischen Individualideen sollen jedoch immolinistischen Kontext nicht als rein aktualistisch aufgefasstwerden, sondern müssen zudem den ganzen Möglichkeitsraumdes jeweiligen Individuums enthalten. Daher wird ein spezi-fisches mathematisches Modell entwickelt, in welchem die

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vollständigen Begriffe als eine nicht-algorithmische Komposi-tion von Auswahlfunktionen konzipiert werden, die auf mögli-chen Weltverläufen operieren. Es zeigt sich, dass der Molinis-mus tatsächlich eine libertarische Position ist, jedoch kann erhöchstens als eine schwache Form von Libertarismus etabliertwerden, für die in einer aktualen Welt keine echte Wahlfreiheit,sondern nur Vollzugsfreiheit im Sinne der Akteurskausalitätbesteht.

8 SchönherrWhat makes moral values queer?

Julius SchönherrHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

John Mackie’s argument from moral queerness has often beentaken to raise doubts about the existence of moral properties,facts and values based on the claim that, if moral proper-ties existed, they would have to instantiate some property»utterly different from anything else in the universe« (Mackie1977, 38). His argument can be put as follows:1. If moral values existed, they would have to instantiateproperty Q.2. Property Q would have to be »utterly different from any-thing else in the universe.«3. It is not reasonable to assume that something exists whichwould have to instantiate a feature »utterly different fromanything else«.

—1. It is not reasonable to assume that moral properties exist.

In this talk, my target will be Q: what it cannot representand what it can represent.

Traditionally, Q has been taken to represent moral proper-ties’ intrinsic reason-givingness. I argue that this popular ideais accompanied by a distinct methodological problem: Thefact that only moral properties are intrinsically reason-givingis trivially true. It is true by virtue of the meaning of »moralproperty«. This, however, is not a result the proponents of theargument from queerness should be intending.

Furthermore, I suggest that the supervenience of intrinsi-cally normative properties on descriptive properties is a morepromising candidate for Q.

2 SchulteHow Truth Can Be Grounded in Being:A Grounding Theory of Truthmaking

Peter SchulteUniversität Erlangen-Nü[email protected]

True propositions are not true simpliciter, they are true be-cause of the way the world is. This intuitive idea has leadmany theorists to embrace the ideas that every true proposi-tion ⟨p⟩ has a truthmaker – an entity whose existence explains⟨p⟩’s truth. But the crucial challenge for truthmaker theoristsis to give a plausible account of the relation that holds bet-ween ⟨p⟩ and its truthmaker. In my talk, I will argue that acertain version of grounding theory can be used to give an

analysis of truthmaking. However, contrary to the claims ofsome grounding theorists (namely, Jonathan Schaffer), suchan account cannot be constructed in a straightforward way,but requires a fundamental revision of standard truthmakertheory.

Traditional necessitation theories of truthmaking face (atleast) two fundamental problems. First, there is the problemof counterintuitive truthmakers: in some cases, the truth of aproposition is necessitated by an entity that does not seem toexplain its truth. Secondly, there is the problem of ontologicalcommitments: if all true propositions have truthmakers whichnecessitate their truth, then we need to postulate entities thatnecessitate the truth of propositions like ⟨the rose is red⟩ or⟨there are no unicorns⟩.

Proponents of grounding theories of truthmaking att-empt to solve these two problems. Standard versions of thisapproach claim that an entiy x is a truthmaker for ⟨p⟩ iff ⟨p⟩’struth is grounded in x. Such accounts, I maintain, manage tosolve the problem of counterintuitive truthmakers, but theycan solve the problem of ontological commitments only atthe cost of abandoning one of the main motivations for trut-hmaker theory – the idea that the truth of a proposition isexplained by its truthmaker.

Fortunately, there exists an alternative, based on a diffe-rent conception of grounding (the »operator view«). As I willargue, an account of truthmaking along these lines is ableto provide fully satisfactory solutions to both of the funda-mental problems, and should therefore be considered as anattractive new version of truthmaker theory.

Schwartzkopff 1Frege vs. Moltmann:

Why ›The number of planets is eight‹is an identity statement after all

Robert Sascha SchwartzkopffUniversity of Oxford (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

In his Grundlagen, Gottlob Frege proposed that a sentencelike

(N) The number of planets is eight,be, pars pro toto, analyzed as an identity statement, i.e. as

a sentence in which two singular terms flank the is of iden-tity (call this the F-Analysis). This analysis is a well-supportedstaple of many discussions in the philosophy of mathema-tics: the F-analysis lends credit to the view – relied upon in,e.g., the (Neo-)Fregeans’ use of Hume’s Principle – that sen-tences of the form ›The number of Fs is the number of Gs‹, areidentity statements as well. In her forthcoming paper ›Refe-rence to Numbers in Natural Language‹, Friederike Moltmannattacks the F-Analysis. Moltmann argues, on broadly linguisticgrounds, that such sentences be analyzed as specificationalsentences: sentences of the form ›XP 1 be XP 2‹ (for some syn-tactic category X) that are neither predications nor identitystatements. Appealing to the influential Question in Disguiseaccount of specificational sentences, Moltmann analyzes (N)as follows: ›the number of planets‹ conceals the question ›Howmany planets are there?‹, whilst ›eight‹ is elliptical for ›Thereare eight planets‹; a sentence in which ›eight‹ isn’t a singularterm (call this the M-Analysis). The viability of the M-Analysiscrucially relies on two assumptions:

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(A 1) (N) is a specificational sentence.(A 2) In (N), ›the number of planets‹ conceals ›How many

planets are there?‹.In my talk, I’ll defend the F-Analysis against Moltmann’s cri-

ticisms by showing that both (A 1) and (A 2) are of questiona-ble plausibility. But if they are, so is the M-Analysis itself. Thus,we should accept the otherwise well-supported F-Analysis.(Neo-)Fregeans will rejoice.

7 SchweikardThe Justification of Contributory

Political Obligations

David P. SchweikardWestfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster

[email protected]

The recently revived debate about political obligation centresaround the following question: What are individuals as citizensof a state obligated to do in view of or for the state? Thisquestion concerns the individual agent in their role as citizenand it aims at those potentially obligatory acts that affectother citizens or the respective state. Examples of politicalobligations are obeying the laws of one’s country, joiningthe army or voluntary social services of one’s country, andvoting in democratic elections. Some of these obligations areconnected with questions of obedience, others with questionsof contribution. In this paper, I expound an account of thejustification of contributory political obligations.

I will argue for the view that citizens are obligated to con-tribute to the maintenance of the institutions of their politi-cal community in so far as they have reasons to value them.On this account the citizens of a democratic state are, forinstance, obligated to vote in elections in so far as they havereason to value the integrity of the electoral procedure, therepresentational structure, the functioning and processes ofmonitoring political institutions, and the integrity of officeholders.

First, I introduce two basic conditions of adequacy, the con-ditions of universality and of particularity, and delineate thespectrum of accounts of political obligation. In a second step,I present a promising candidate, the associativist account,according to which citizens as members of a political associa-tion have certain obligations in virtue of the fact that theyare so associated. In the third section, I criticise associativistaccounts with respect to their commitment to the normativeindependence thesis, i.e. the thesis that associative obliga-tions are grounded in the fact of association and not in thecharacter of the community in question. In the fourth section,I develop a systematic proposal with the reverse focus onthe moral quality of the respective political community andits institutions. I go on to vindicate an account grounded inreasons to value and reasons to contribute which also meets therequirements of universality and particularity.

Seidel 3Zwischen Relativismus und Absolutismus?

Warum ein Kuhnscher, moderater Relativismusscheitert

Markus SeidelUniversität Siegen

[email protected]

Nach der Veröffentlichung des wissenschaftstheoretischenKlassikers Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen wurdeThomas Kuhn von vielen Kritikern der Vorwurf gemacht, seinePosition und im Besonderen seine These methodologischerInkommensurabilität impliziere einen unhaltbaren Relativis-mus und führe dazu, wissenschaftlichen Theoriewandel letzt-lich zu einem irrationalen Unterfangen zu machen. Zur Ver-teidigung Kuhns ist im Zuge der Diskussion um die potenti-ell relativistischen Konsequenzen seiner Wissenschaftstheorievon einigen Autoren der Vorschlag gemacht worden, KuhnsPosition im Sinne eines moderaten oder gemäßigten Relati-vismus zu lesen. Der Beitrag setzt sich mit diesem Vorschlagkritisch auseinander.

Dabei wird dreierlei gezeigt: Zum einen ist es plausibelbereits Kuhns Position in Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revo-lutionen im Sinne eines gemäßigten Relativismus zu beschrei-ben, so dass Kuhns spätere Äußerungen in diesem Kontextnicht als Revision sondern als Elaboration seiner Position in sei-nem Hauptwerk beschrieben werden müssen. Zweitens kanngezeigt werden, dass ein gemäßigter, Kuhnscher Relativismusjedoch an Kuhns eigenem Zirkularitätsargument scheitert: Ent-weder Kuhns Argument ist auf die von ihm angeführten, trans-paradigmatisch geteilten Werte selbst anwendbar, so dassKuhns Relativismus letztlich doch extrem ist, oder nicht, wobeieine solche Ausnahme ad hoc ist. Dieses Dilemma wird anhandeiner Kritik der Arbeiten von moderaten Relativisten wie BerndSchofer und Gerald Doppelt detailliert aufgewiesen. Drittenswird Kuhns These, die eine Konsequenz von Kuhns gemäßig-tem Relativismus sein soll, konstruktiv aufgenommen: DieThese, dass vernünftige Meinungsverschiedenheit zwischenWissenschaftlern möglich ist. Im Bezug auf die aktuelle, inder Erkenntnistheorie geführte Diskussion um Meinungsver-schiedenheit wird gezeigt, dass diese intuitiv plausible Mög-lichkeit im Rahmen einer absolutistischen Konzeption episte-mischer Rechtfertigung zugelassen werden kann – weder dieIdee methodologischer Inkommensurabilität noch die Ideegeteilter, aber verschieden gewichteter Werte ist notwendig,um diese Möglichkeit philosophisch adäquat zu erklären.

Seidel 7Defending distributive equality against

the social-relational critique

Christian SeidelUniversität Erlangen-Nürnberg

[email protected]

Distributive egalitarians believe in at least two claims: First,that a conception of distributive justice is (partially) explai-ned by the idea of distributive equality (DE); and second, thatDE is of intrinsic (and not purely instrumental) value. Againstthis view, some critics – most prominently, perhaps, Elizabeth

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Anderson and Samuel Scheffler – have pointed out that distri-butive egalitarians fail to account for the true value of equa-lity, which rather lies in the idea of equality as a substantivesocial value (ESV). This paper examines the social-relationalcritique of distributive equality and points out two relatedissues which arise from the social-relational argument: Thefirst is the relation between DE and the critics’ more generalconception of equality as a social value (ESV); this boils downto the question of what egalitarianism really is all about and Iwill argue that – contrary to the critics’ claim – DE is actuallyboth conceptually and explanatory prior to ESV. The secondissue is about the way in which one may argue for DE; this is aquestion about the justificatory or argumentative structure ofegalitarian conceptions of distributive justice and I will arguethat – again, contrary to the critics’ claim – the idea of ESVcannot serve as a foundation of DE.

4 Seuchter/VosgerauCausal Indexicals in aMental File Framework

Tim SeuchterHeinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf

[email protected]

Gottfried VosgerauHeinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf

[email protected]

In this paper, we argue that the notion of causal indexicals, ascoined by Campbell (1994), can be understood best if it is spel-led out in a mental file framework, as proposed by Recanati(2005) and Perry (1980, 2000). Causal indexicals, a useful butnot much discussed notion in philosophy, have a high expla-natory value regarding the classification of objects in termsof their action-related properties as well as in terms of accoun-ting for behavior of subjects. In a nutshell, causal indexicalthinking, such as »this is a weight I can easily lift« or »thisis too hot to touch (for me)« relates »causal powers« (deter-mined by the bodily constitution and abilities of subjects) toobjects in respect of potential interactions. Objects are thenclassified according to what the subject can do with them inthe light of its abilities. To get a fine grasp on the concept ofcausal indexicals and its explanatory value, this idea needs tobe spelled out in a larger theory of (indexical) concepts. Sucha framework can be provided by referring to the concept ofmental files. At the very heart of the notion of mental file isthe idea that subjects who entertain epistemically rewardingrelations to objects (e.g. acquaintance) are enabled to gatherand store information about these objects in a mental file.The SELF-file is a specific mental file containing informationabout oneself, gained, inter alia, through first-person epis-temic access (proprioception, introspection). Crucial for themental files account and for the present purpose is the possi-bility of linking files. Two distinct files can be linked and theinformation contained in these files be bound together. Thislinkage, we will argue, works in a similar fashion for causalindexicals: An object file is linked to the SELF-file, the lattercontaining information about the bodily constitution of thesubject (cf. the notion of a body scheme). The result of such alink is that the object file contains information that specifieswhat the subject is able to do with the object.

Sharadin 8The Wrong Kind of Reason

Nathaniel SharadinUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

(United States)[email protected]

On a fairly familiar view, reasons are considerations that countin favor of attitudes and actions. As many philosophers havenoted, however, there is a serious ambiguity in this way ofthinking about reasons. For just as the fact, say, that you’rebetter at tennis than I am might be a reason to believe you’lltrounce me in our next match, so might the fact, say, thatyour teammates have threatened me with a beating unlessI believe it. Both considerations seem – in whatever sense isintended by the original statement – to count in favor of thebelief that you’ll win our next match. But the former consi-derations seem to be the ›right‹ kind of reasons for belief,whereas the latter have the flavor of the ›wrong‹ kind of rea-sons for belief. Similar points can be made, mutatis mutandis,for other propositional attitudes like desire, intention, imagi-nation, and so on. In this paper I argue that current attemptsto explain the distinction between the ›right‹ and the ›wrong‹kinds of reasons fail on grounds either of extensional or expla-natory inadequacy. I propose an alternate account and showhow it is both extensionally adequate to the phenomenon andexplanatory. I conclude with some speculative remarks aboutwhat this alternative proposal tells about the more generalnature of normative reasons.

Slaby 4Clarifying Enaction

Jan SlabyFreie Universität [email protected]

Enactivism is a systems-biology-inspired position in the philo-sophy of mind and in cognitive science that proposes signifi-cant shifts in the conceptual repertoire required to think aboutthe mind. The position’s central tenets concern the natureof conscious experience, which is claimed to be inseparablefrom agency; the constitutive interrelatedness of organismand environment, and an alleged »deep continuity« of mindand life. What has so far hindered a broader reception and sys-tematic assessment of enactivist philosophy has to do with aperceived lack of clarity pertaining to some of its central termsand claims. Most notably, it is notoriously difficult to graspwhat the central concept »enaction« is supposed to mean. Inhow far can conscious experience and intentional agency beseen as inseparable? What does it mean that an agent »bringsforth« its own »world« or »cognitive domain«? In what senseexactly does enaction entail a non-representational understan-ding of intentionality?

In this contribution, a substantial clarification of enacti-vism’s core idea and key terms along with the solution toa central problem is undertaken. The problem concerns thedemarcation between the sophisticated mentality proper tohumans and lower forms of differential responsiveness foundall the way down in the realm of living creatures. The solution

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will be a novel reconstruction of enactivism that is framedmostly in terms of personal level concepts, dealing in parti-cular with dynamic experience-action couplings in humans.Separating the core idea of enaction somewhat from the sys-tems biology context in which it is usually framed, it will beshown that the proper paradigm of enaction is distinctivelyhuman agency, viewed in its full experiential context, i.e. inclu-ding a form of affective self-awareness. This novel rendition ofenactivism allows to conceive of the temporality of consciousexperience in a new way and also offers a reading of the thesisof »enaction as world constitution« that is no longer in dangerof being misread as a kind of idealism.

4 SoomA Functionalist Approach

to the Concept of ›Delusion‹and its Sub-Types

Patrice SoomHeinrich-Heine-Universität

[email protected]

Delusions are key symptoms of many severe mental disor-ders. However, no adequate theoretical definition has beenprovided yet, although the empirical research made conside-rable progresses towards etiological and reductive accountsof delusions. This contribution aims to use the theoreticaltools of philosophy of mind in order to provide a functionaldefinition of the concept of delusion, and to show how thisdefinition may be used to set up a classification of sub-typesof delusions.

The paper starts with a critical evaluation of the DSM–IVdefinition of delusions in order to shape a positive account ofwhat delusion are from a functional point of view. We shallargue that delusions are essentially characterized by theirasymmetrical inferential profile. We improve on this proposalby considering etiological and reductive accounts of delusi-ons, which suggest that two factors are at play, one of themtokening a problematic belief and the second preventing thesubject to reject this belief in spite of its inconsistency withevidence. This suggests that we should consider that all delusi-ons share a specific inferential profile and that the specific etio-logy of different delusions might contribute to individuate(functional) sub-types of delusions.

2 SpannCan there be strict

biological Identity through Timewithout Aristotelian Substances?

A short Examination ofEric T. Olson’s Animalism

Anne Sophie SpannUniversity of Innsbruck (Austria)

[email protected]

Recently, the current debate on personal identity has seen aboom of biological theories construing persons as biologicalwholes in the spirit of Aristotelian hylemorphism. Comparedto the much-criticized psychological Reductionism à la Par-

fit which drops strict numerical identity in favour of mereempirical continuity, these theories have the advantage ofmaintaining strict identity due to their presupposing the exis-tence of substances whose essential features are determinedby natural kinds.

Nevertheless, there are some biological theories which pre-tend to get the same result of retaining strict identity withoutreference to Aristotelian substances, i.e. without Aristotelianessentialism. They claim to explain our strict transtemporalidentity as constituted by special relations of biological conti-nuity, thereby, it seems, combining the advantages of the Ari-stotelian theories with the Complex Theories’ benefit of givinglucid scientific explanations instead of postulating dubiousentities like Aristotelian essences.

But can there really be strict biological identity throughtime without Aristotelian substances? In my paper, I wantto explore this question with a view to Olson’s Animalismwhich appears to be a Complex Theory in that it tries to spe-cify necessary and sufficient conditions for our persistenceand claims to talk about strict numerical identity althoughmaking no explicit use of Aristotelian ideas. I will argue thatOlson’s arguments do not suffice for establishing strict bio-logical identity through time, mainly because Animalism’smaterialistic framework leaves no room for the self-organizingactivity of organisms which Olson takes to be the distinctivefeature of biological life. If it is true that Olson’s Animalism infact is tacitly committed to Aristotelian presuppositions, thiscould be seen as evidence for there being no chance of havingstrict biological identity through time without Aristoteliansubstances.

Stei 5A presuppositional strict invariantist

account of knowledge attributions

Erik SteiRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn

[email protected]

It is often taken to be a weakness of strict invariantism thatit has difficulties explaining the apparent variability of know-ledge attributions exhibited by contextualist case studies. Thecritics of strict invariantism seem to assume that some kind ofvariability in the extension of »knows« is the key to a satisfac-tory analysis of sentences of the form »x knows p (at time t)«.I want to challenge that assumption in my talk and defendthe claim that strict invariantism has the means to explainthe intuitions triggered by the relevant cases. I briefly out-line the phenomenon in question and sketch the basic ideasof truth-conditional analyses. I then propose a novel strictinvariantist explanation which borrows certain aspects fromcontextualist readings of pragmatic presuppositions. I hopeto show that presuppositional strict invariantism is able toprovide a general explanation of the relevant kind of variabi-lity of knowledge attributions and that, therefore, there is noneed for contentious semantic claims about »knows«.

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2 SteinbergDefining Global Supervenience

Alexander SteinbergUniversität Hamburg

[email protected]

What does it mean that certain properties globally superveneon others? The paper criticises the now standard way of spel-ling out the notion in terms of 1-1 correlations between world-domains and proposes a modification that escapes the difficul-ties. It is then shown that, contrary to the standard account,global supervenience is not theoretically dispensable, since itis not equivalent to a form of individual supervenience.

3 SteinbergerLogic, normativity and paraconsistency

Florian SteinbergerLudwig-Maximilians-Universität München

[email protected]

Arguments in favor of paraconsistent logic (and hence againstthe validity of the principle of ex falso sequitur quodlibet(EFQ)) frequently rely on the assumption – a widely sharedassumption – that logic enjoys a certain normative authorityover thought. The argument can be summarized thus: if Ibelieve a number of propositions, I ought (or am permitted)to believe at least those propositions that I recognize to belogical consequences of my beliefs. Since agents may some-times hold inconsistent beliefs (perhaps even rationally so),EFQ cannot be a valid principle of logic. If it were, agentswith inconsistent belief sets, would have an obligation (per-mission) to believe any proposition whatsoever. Hence, EFQmust be rejected along with the classical conception of vali-dity that underlies it. Branden Fitelson recently claimed thatarguments of this form are doomed to failure since there isno bridge principle to be had – i.e. a principle encapsulatingthe supposed normative role of logic by specifying how factsabout logical consequence relate to doxastic norms – satis-fying the joint demands of being sufficiently strong for theargument to go through and sufficiently weak to give a plausi-ble account of the relationship between logic and rationality.In this paper, I propose to put Fitelson’s claim to the test. Dra-wing on work by John MacFarlane, I systematically examinea representative range of candidate bridge principles bothfor their overall cogency and for their ability to support theparaconsistent logician’s argument. I argue that, contrary toFitelson’s conjecture, there are two potential loop holes thelogical revisionist could exploit and sketch the resulting pic-ture of the normative role of logic for thought along withthe attendant philosophical commitments. In closing, I offera number of remarks about the normative status of logic ingeneral.

Stelling 3When is it rational to believea mathematical statement?

Jendrik StellingUniversität Rostock

[email protected]

The traditional answer to the question in the title is: We maybelieve a mathematical statement if we have a proof for it.Otherwise, we should remain agnostic as to its truth value.I want to show that this answer is wrong. In particular, myclaim is this: Either it is rational to believe some mathematicalstatements even though there is no proof for them, or it isirrational to believe some other mathematical statements,even though they have been proved.

We will start by considering the case of a mathematicaloracle—an omniscient entity that can give us the answer toany mathematical question, though it will do so only appro-ximately. (Oracles tend to be difficult like that.) We will thenlook at examples from mathematical practice that mirror thecase of the oracle. In particular, these are the two exampleswe will look at: (a) There is a probabilistic argument for theRiemann Hypothesis due to Denjoy, that results in the claimthat Riemann’s Hypothesis is true with probility one. Thisdoes not imply that the Hypothesis is logically, necessarilytrue, but merely that the chance of it being false is so small asto be zero. (We will discuss what this means.) Mathematicianstypically don’t accept this kind of reasoning. (b) The secondexample is a published and accepted proof within projectivegeometry. It relies on heavy usage of computers, and the aut-hors have taken the time to actually calculate the probabilitythat an unnoticable hardware defect might have resulted in afalse outcome. The probability of that happening is again sosmall as to be essentially zero. Both of these examples sufferfrom very similar defects, yet mathematicians treat them verydifferently. We will try to analyze what the relevant differencemight be, and see what we can infer about the mathemati-cians’ attitudes toward their field of inquiry.

Stern 3Modality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth

Johannes SternLudwig-Maximilians Universität München

Université de Genève (Switzerland)[email protected]

Predicate treatments of modality have been around since thevery beginning of formal philosophizing as can be witnessedby the works of Carnap and Quine. However, since these daysthe predicate approach to modality has been a minority posi-tion, maybe due to an early result of Montague, which alle-gedly shows that basic and intuitive modal principles cannotbe jointly adopted for sake of paradox.

We shall argue that Montague’s theorem does not rule out apredicate treatment of modality in which the basic and intui-tive modal principles are jointly adopted. Moreover, we arguethat if care is taken in formulating the intuitive modal princip-les, we can consistently embrace all modal principles of S 5.The resulting theory does not treat modalities in isolation but

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intimately links them to truth and accordingly the conceptionor theory of modality we end up with depends on the theoryof truth adopted.

We shall investigate the theories of modality the theories FS(»Friedman-Sheard«) and, respectively, KF (»Kripke-Feferman«)give rise to and show amongst other things that both theoriesof modality are adequate from the perspective of modal ope-rator logic. However, there is a decisive difference betweenthe two conception of modality, which is essentially due tothe well-known fact that the so-called inner and the outer logicof KF differ.

4 Stiller/NagelÜber Veränderung und Einheit der Person –

Eine Synthese analytischer undphänomenologischer Überlegungen

Theresa StillerUniversität Osnabrück

[email protected]

Saskia NagelUniversität Osnabrück

[email protected]

Um die Frage nach personaler Identität zu untersuchen, ver-binden wir zwei aktuelle Erklärungsansätze aus der analy-tischen Philosophie und der Phänomenologie, die Kriteriendes Personseins und personaler Einheit beleuchten. Der ana-lytische Ansatz Michael Quantes identifiziert das dauerhafteBestehen des biologischen Organismus eines Menschen alsKriterium lebenslanger personaler Einheit. Der Körper ist derTräger von Zeit- und Selbstbewusstsein, welche Erinnerungs-und Antizipationsleistungen ermöglichen. Hieraus entstehtdie beständige Selbstidentifikation einer Person, da die Erinne-rungen an vergangene Erlebnisse zu der Überzeugung führen,auch zukünftig etwas zu erleben. So kann sich eine indivi-duelle Persönlichkeit entwickeln, welche neben sozialen undkulturellen Umständen auch durch die Beschaffenheit des Kör-pers geformt wird. Die Einheit der Person wird durch die Ver-schränkung von Persistenz und Persönlichkeit erklärt: Mit derEntwicklung der individuellen Persönlichkeit, welche durchBeständigkeit und Beschaffenheit des Körpers beeinflusst ist,entsteht persönliche biografische Kohärenz. Shaun Gallagherund Dan Zahavi explizieren die phänomenologische Posi-tion, dass die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit des Personseinsdurch die kognitiven und erfahrungsbezogenen Fähigkeiteneines Individuums gegeben sind. Das kognitive Vermögendes Bewusstseins befähige einen Menschen zur Wahrnehmungder Zeit und seiner Selbst im Durchleben aller Erfahrungen(»quality of mine-ness in experiencing«). Die gleichbleibendeStruktur dieser Selbsterfahrung ist das Fundament persona-ler Identität über die Zeit hinweg. Wir schlagen vor, beideAnsätze zu integrieren, um eine systematische Perspektiveauf das Phänomen personaler Einheit zu entwickeln. Zusam-men beschreiben die Ansätze den Menschen auf verschiede-nen Ebenen: unter anderem als biologischen Organismus, alskognitives System und in seiner sozialisierten Existenz, wobeijede Ebene ein Zusammenspiel von Veränderung und Stabili-tät aufweist. Für die Erklärung des Personseins und personalerEinheit bedingen Veränderung und Stabilität einander. EinePerson kann sich nur verändern, wenn sie im Laufe der Ver-

änderung dieselbe Person bleibt. Ansonsten würde anstelledessen eine neue, aber an sich unveränderte Person entstehen.Umgekehrt sind für die Beständigkeit der Person in einer sichandauernd ändernden Umwelt Flexibilität und Anpassungs-fähigkeit notwendige Voraussetzungen. Wir argumentieren,dass der entscheidende Schritt für eine Erklärung personalerEinheit das Verständnis dieser Wechselbeziehung ist.

Strößner 3Statistical and Non-Statistical Normality

Corina StrößnerUniversität Konstanz

[email protected]

Logics of normality which have been suggested so far inter-pret normality as typicality. This normality understandingdoesn’t presuppose any statistical frequencies. In this sense,something is normally the case if it is true in the most typicalcircumstances. On the other hand, one might think of norma-lity as majority. In this sense something is normally the caseif it is true in most circumstances. The talk introduces a formallogic of quantitative normality (i.e. normality as majority) andcompares it to qualitative normality (normality as typicality)approaches. It will be argued that a descriptive explication ofnormality must imply statistical majority.

Sturm 2Eine allgemeine Theorie der Eigenschaften

Holger SturmUniversität Konstanz

[email protected]

Verschiedene Autoren haben darauf hingewiesen, dass derAusdruck »Eigenschaft« in der Philosophie systematisch am-big in dem Sinne verwendet wird, als dass er dazu dient, zweiKategorien von Entitäten zu bezeichnen.

Die eine Kategorie besteht aus Entitäten, die zusammenmit der Kategorie der raum-zeitlich lokalisierten Einzeldinge –und eventuell noch Entitäten aus anderen Kategorien – diegrundlegenden Bausteine unserer Welt abgeben. Eigenschaf-ten, so verstanden, bilden die ontologische Grundlage für diequalitative Beschaffenheit der Dinge.

Die zweite Kategorie von Eigenschaften begegnet uns pri-mär im Kontext der Semantik. Eigenschaften werden hier alsEntitäten verstanden, die mit bestimmten sprachlichen Aus-drücken – insbesondere Prädikaten und deren Nominalisie-rungen – assoziiert sind und ihnen dadurch ihre Bedeutungverleihen.

In dem Vortrag werde ich eine allgemeine Theorie der Eigen-schaften vorstellen, der die Annahme zugrunde liegt, dass essich bei den Eigenschaften der ersten Kategorie um eine echteTeilklasse der Eigenschaften der zweiten Kategorie handelt.Das Ziel besteht dabei nicht nur darin, die philosophischeGrundlage für eine solche Theorie zu schaffen, sondern siedarüber hinaus in einem formalen Rahmen zu kodifizieren.

Der Vortrag gliedert sich in vier Teile. Im ersten Teil wirdes darum gehen, für die beiden folgenden Thesen zu argumen-tieren:

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1. Eigenschaften sind basale Entitäten, die sich weder unterRückgriff auf Tropen noch auf Mengen adäquat verstehen las-sen.2. Es ist sinnvoll, davon auszugehen, dass es sich bei den bei-den Kategorien von Eigenschaften nicht um prinzipiell unter-schiedliche Typen von Gegenständen handelt.

Die anderen drei Teile des Vortrags dienen dazu, die Theo-rie sukzessive aufzubauen. Zunächst wird die Basistheorie TBeingeführt, die dann im nächsten Schritt zu einer allgemeinenTheorie TE erweitert wird. Was die formale Gestalt angeht,handelt es sich bei TE um eine axiomatische Theorie, die Ähn-lichkeiten mit bestimmten Systemen der Mengentheorie auf-weist. Im Unterschied zu anderen, an der Mengentheorie ori-entierten Eigenschaftstheorien lässt TE die Existenz der Uni-versalen Eigenschaft zu, also derjenigen Eigenschaft, die aufalles und jeden zutrifft. Es lässt sich zeigen, dass TE konsistentist relativ zu ZF Der vierte und letzte Teil des Vortrags befasstsich mit dem Problem einer modalen Erweiterung der TheorieTE. Es soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, auf welche Weisesich das Zusammenspiel von Eigenschaften und Modalitätenadäquat erfassen lässt, ohne dabei auf so etwas wie möglicheWelten zurückgreifen zu müssen.

1 SührAnalyses as Explanations

Maik SührUniversität Hamburg

[email protected]

In this paper I develop a new conception of analysis. Accor-ding to this conception, an analysis, very roughly, specifiesfor every entitity which falls under a certain concept why itfalls under that concept. I motivate this view by discussingthe second paradox of analysis as stated by Felicia Ackerman.Starting from something which seems to be a correct analysis,the paradox concludes by the substituition of synonyms thata tautology is an analysis. There are several ways out of theparadox. One is to deny that analyses are propositions and toargue that they are sentences or hybrid entities consisting ofa proposition and something (quasi-)linguistic instead. Bothviews fail to appreciate the purpose of analyses. Analyses shallprovide answers to socratic questions concerning the natureof something. But answers in the relevant sense are neithersentences nor hybrid entities consisting of propositions andsomething else but propositions. If analyses are propositions,how do we express them properly? My starting point is theplatitude that analyses are explanations. Although someti-mes one can literally express an explanation wihout using theword »because« (or some translation of it), for example, if oneexplains a theory or the meaning of a word, the explanationof a concept is literally expressed by a because-sentence. The-refore, I propose to literally express an analysis of the conceptF, very roughly, as follows: For every entity which falls under Fit falls under F because it is G. I conclude by discussing someobjections to this proposal. The main worry is that it providesno way out of the second paradox. To dispel this objection, Iargue that in a literal expression of an analysis the expressionfor the analysans must not be synonymous with the expres-sion for the analysandum. In this way the second paradox isavoided (and the first paradox as well).

Sznajder 1Intensional verbs – a dynamic approach

Marta SznajderLudwig-Maximilians Universität München

[email protected]

Intensional transitive verbs (ITVs) such as look for, need orresemble have attracted a lot of attention from formal seman-ticists in the past decades. In my work I challenge the twoassumptions that have shaped the research on ITVs so far:first, that ITVs are evaluated with respect to the belief stateof their agent, and second, that their nonspecific readings arederived from the specific ones. I argue that it is worthwhile toconsider developing a dynamic semantics for intensional verbsto model their behavior in dialogue. The resulting formalismis an update twist of the logic with generalized quantifiersof Barwise and Cooper, where intensional verbs are taken todenote relations between quantifiers as opposed to indivi-duals. Specific readings of sentences with intensional verbsare derived from the model rather than by arbitrary meaningrules. Such a system explains the patterns of use of sentenceswith intensional verbs in a dialogue setting.

Tamminga/Verhaegh 5Katz’s Revisability Paradox Dissolved

Allard TammingaUniversität Groningen (Netherlands)

[email protected]

Sander VerhaeghUniversität Groningen (Netherlands)

[email protected]

W.V. Quine’s holistic empiricist account of scientific inquirycan be characterized by three constitutive principles: noncon-tradiction, universal revisability and pragmatic ordering. Jer-rold Katz (1998; 2002) argues that holistic empiricism suffersfrom what he calls the Revisability Paradox: because the threeconstitutive principles of holistic empiricism cannot themsel-ves be rationally revised, holistic empiricism is incoherent. Inthis paper, we show that Katz’s argument fails. Using Gärden-fors and Makinson’s logic of belief revision based on epistemicentrenchment, we argue that Katz wrongly assumes that thethree constitutive principles are statements within a holisticempiricist’s scientific theory of the world. Instead, we showthat constitutive principles are best seen as properties of aholistic empiricist’s theory of scientific inquiry and argue thatwithout Katz’s mistaken assumption the paradox cannot beformulated. Finally, we argue that our perspective on the sta-tus of constitutive principles is perfectly in line with Quineanorthodoxy.

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8 Tanyi/BruderOverdemanding Consequentialism?

An Experimental Approach

Attila TanyiUniversity of Konstanz

[email protected]

Martin BruderUniversity of Konstanz

[email protected]

According to act-consequentialism the right action is the onethat produces the best results as judged from an impersonalperspective. It is often claimed that this requirement is sodemanding that it is unacceptable for any agent to follow it.The paper breaks with dominant trends in discussing this so-called Overdemandingness Objection both in its understan-ding of the Objection and its approach to it. It understandsthe Objection as claiming that consequentialism is overde-manding because it requires us, with decisive force, to dothings that, intuitively, we do not have decisive reason toperform. Understood in this way, the Objection proposes thatthere exists a widely shared intuition that at least some con-sequentialist demands are unreasonably extreme. The paperempirically investigates this proposition by examining whatpeople think about the practical significance of consequentia-list requirements and how much weight they attach to themwhen faced with moral decisions. In doing so it argues thatthe proposition is in fact not supported by common-sensemorality. Using carefully designed experimental situationsthe paper shows that the majority of people agree that con-sequentialist requirements override their conflicting reasonseven when those requirements are highly demanding.

3 ThomannEine Logik des Könnens mit Handlungstypen

Marius ThomannUniversität zu Köln

[email protected]

Im Rahmen dieses Vortrags wird ein Formalismus zur Modellie-rung des Begriffs praktischer Fähigkeiten vorgestellt, der daszu analysierende Konzept des Könnens durch einen auf Hand-lungsterme anzuwendenden satzbildenden Operator repräsen-tiert. Damit grenzt sich dieser Vorschlag von den zahlreichenin der Literatur verfolgten Ansätzen ab, die wohlgeformte For-meln oder Propositionen als Argumente des fraglichen Opera-tors annehmen. Gleichzeitig erwächst aus dieser Herangehens-weise die Notwendigkeit, eine Ontologie von Handlungstypen,die als Denotate der Handlungsterme dienen können, in denModellbegriff aufzunehmen.

Die Objektsprache der vorzustellenden Logik umfasst nebeneiner Menge von Satzbuchstaben und den booleschen Junk-toren eine Menge von Handlungstermen, zwei satzbildendeOperatoren zur Formalisierung von Fähigkeits- und Handlungs-zuschreibungen sowie termbildende Operatoren. Interpretiertwird diese Sprache über Modellen, in denen mögliche Wel-ten als zeitlich geordnete Mengen von Momenten verstandenwerden. Handlungstypen werden durch ihre Erfolgsbedingun-

gen, Testbedingungen und Realisierungen individuiert. DieseModellierung erlaubt die Formulierung einer Wahrheitsbedin-gung für Fähigkeitszuschreibungen, gemäß der eine Fähigkeitzu haben bedeutet, den fraglichen Handlungstyp unter dafürgeeigneten Bedingungen normalerweise erfolgreich zu reali-sieren.

Nach der Vorstellung des Formalismus’ sollen außerdem dieAbschlusseigenschaften des modellierten Fähigkeitsbegriffsdiskutiert werden. Wie im Rahmen der verfolgten Herange-hensweise zu erwarten, werden diese nicht in erster Liniedurch die logische Struktur von Propositionen bestimmt, alsoz. B. Folgerungs- oder Äquivalenzbeziehungen. Stattdessenergeben sich die Abschlusseigenschaften aus der Struktur derMenge der Handlungstypen, so dass hier auch die Adäquatheitbestimmter strukturgebender Forderungen zu untersuchen istsowie die Möglichkeiten, diese Struktur durch Einführung wei-terer termbildender Operatoren anzureichern.

Todd 6Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom:

Remotivating Incompatibilism

Patrick ToddThe University of Innsbruck (Austria)

Munich School of [email protected]

Nelson Pike’s 1965 paper, ›Divine Omniscience and VoluntaryAction‹, arguing for the incompatibility of divine foreknow-ledge and human freedom, provoked a veritable avalanche ofwork on the issues of God and freedom. Needless to say, Pike’sargument, while accepted by some, was resisted by many.In this paper, I aim to reconstruct and remotivate Pike-stylearguments for incompatibilism. As I see it, the force of thesearguments has not yet been appropriately recognized in thecontemporary discussions about freedom and foreknowledge.I argue that we can make a key comparison between the casesof divine foreknowledge and divine prepunishment – a com-parison that will, I hope, bring out in new and intuitivelycompelling ways the core motivating elements of Pike’s argu-ment, and shed considerable light on the so-called »hard / softfact« distinction. In short, I argue that divine prepunishmentis (very plausibly) incompatible with human freedom, andthat, if divine prepunishment is incompatible with freedom, soalso is divine prebelief. As I hope to show, the argument forthe incompatibility of prepunishment and freedom is exactlyparallel to Pike’s argument for the incompatibility of fore-knowledge and freedom. The relevant question is simple: ifyou have already been justly pre-punished by God for doingsomething, how can you avoid doing it? I investigate threedifferent ›answers‹ to this question – all parallel to answersexplicitly considered by Pike in the foreknowledge case – andfind them all wanting. The upshot is that we have a new wayof motivating the incompatibility of divine foreknowledgeand human freedom.

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3 UnterhuberModeling the Ramsey Test

by Chellas-Segerberg Semantics

Matthias UnterhuberUniversität Düsseldorf

[email protected]

In this talk I introduce Chellas-Segerberg (CS) Semantics, apossible worlds semantics for conditionals, and argue that itcan adequately model a modified Ramsey test and fares in thisrespect better than Stalnaker semantics.

In CS-semantics an accessibility relation R_X between pos-sible worlds is used, where X is an arbitrary set of possibleworlds. A conditional a⇒ b is true at a world in CS- seman-tics iff b is true at all possible worlds, which are accessible byR_‖a‖, where ‖a‖ is the set of possible worlds, at which a istrue.

CS-semantics models the Ramsey test insofar adequately,as R_‖a‖ can be used – as the Ramsey test requires – fordescribing the belief set, which results from putting a hypo-thetically to one’s stock of beliefs (the new belief set). TheRamsey-test states, furthermore, that the conditional a⇒ b

is true iff b follows from the new beliefs set. CS-semanticsalso models this part of the Ramsey test, since it makes a⇒ b

true at a possible world iff b is true in all worlds accessible byR_‖a‖, the new belief set.

For an adequate modeling of epistemic states – as the Ram-sey test requires – we need to start in addition with sets ofpossible worlds X rather than single possible worlds. To modelthis aspect in CS-semantics we can use the following defini-tions: A formula a is true at X iff it is true at all worlds inX. Furthermore, a world is accessible by R_‖a‖ from X iff it isaccessible from some world in X.

Let us explain why CS-semantics fares better than Stalnakersemantics. In Stal- naker semantics to each pair consistingof a world and a formula a single possible world is assignedor else the absurd world, at which all formulas are true. Ifwe aim to model the Ramsey test with Stalnaker semanticsemploying the above definitions, we must, in case we startfrom a singleton set, always end up at a single world or theabsurd world. This is hardly plausible and does not hold forCS-semantics.

8 van MiltenburgTracing the commitments of Libertarianism:Indeterminism without objective probability

Niels van MiltenburgUtrecht University (Netherlands)[email protected]

Libertarians hold, contrary to compatibilists, that free willrequires indeterminism. However, if actions are undetermi-ned, then it may be hard to see how they can be more thanmere matters of chance or luck. But if what human agentsdo is just up to chance, then how can their actions be free?This is known as the luck problem. Perhaps the clearest for-mulation of this problem is the rollback argument (van Inwa-gen 2000). Van Inwagen asks us to imagine an undeterminedagent, Alice, in a binary choice situation that is rolled back,

say, a 1000 times. Because her choice is undetermined, Alicewill choose option A in a one fraction of rollbacks and optionB in another fraction. This provides us with a certain ratio A:B,based on which we can calculate the objective probabilitiesof Alice deciding for A or B respectively. It seems to followthat Alice’s choices are governed by chance, and thus that sheis not a free agent. Very recently, Franklin (2011) has propo-sed that the libertarian can circumvent the rollback argumentif she combines her libertarianism with the causal theory ofaction (CTA). So-called event causal libertarians can argue thatalthough an action is an undetermined event, it is still free aslong as the agent has causal control over it. In my paper I criti-cize Franklin’s solution to the rollback argument. I argue thathis strategy obscures the libertarian requirement of indetermi-nism. Instead I propose a different and more radical strategyfor avoiding the thrust of the rollback argument: libertariansshould abandon the idea that undetermined actions need tohave objective probabilities. However, the idea that actionsdo have objective probabilities is deeply ingrained current ver-sions of CTA. If I am correct, then contrary to what Franklinbelieves, libertarians should look away from CTA, rather thentowards it, if they want freedom instead of luck.

van Riel 1Three Conceptions of Explication –

Two In, One Out

Raphael van RielRuhr Universität Bochum

[email protected]

Ever since Rudolf Carnap introduced the term »explication« inhis (1947 and 1950), the term has been employed by authorswho suggest that when we deal with conceptual issues, weshould abandon the method of conceptual analysis (classicallyconstrued, as concept-decomposition, based on a priori rea-soning). »Explication« became a cover-all term for methodssupposedly differing from conceptual analysis, especially inthe philosophy of science, but also in the philosophy of mindand in metaphysics. Despite its frequent use, the concept ofexplication has attracted little attention. Most authors refer toCarnap’s characterization, which runs as follows (1947, 1950):The explication relation holds between concepts, an explica-tum and an explicandum. Although meaning similarity is notrequired, an explicatum should be suitable for replacing theexplicandum in some contexts (or, as Quine put it (1960),it should be functionally similar to the explicandum). Thepaper argues that these remarks do not yield a sufficientlyprecise picture of explication. Moreover, it sheds light ontoexplication by (i) summarizing the main motivation for aban-doning conceptual analysis and moving towards explication,(ii) identifying three different conceptions of explication, and(iii) showing why at least one of these is highly problematic.Thereby, it contributes to an often neglected, though centraltopic in the field of meta-philosophy.

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1 ViebahnSpeaker intentions

and semantic content

Emanuel ViebahnUniversity of Oxford (United Kingdom)[email protected]

It is a widespread view in contemporary philosophy of lan-guage that speaker intentions determine both the semanticand the communicated content of utterances containing non-automatic indexicals. I will argue against the first part of thisview: speaker intentions should not be taken to determine thesemantic content of utterances containing indexical expres-sions. Adherents of intention-sensitive semantics can appealto two types of intentions as determinants of semantic con-tent: specific intentions directed at the semantic content of anutterance, or communicative intentions that determine boththe semantic and the communicated content of an utterance.With help of a number of examples involving gradable adjec-tives and non-literal speech, I will show that both of theseapproaches have serious problems. Specific semantic intenti-ons require speakers to be over-sophisticated in their use oflanguage and are in many cases theoretically idle. Communica-tive intentions, on the other hand, are not suited to determinesemantic content in non-literal speech: usually many differentsemantic contents can be used to (non-literally) communi-cate a certain proposition, so communicative intentions willnot determine a single proposition as semantic content. Thecommon assumption that gradable adjectives are intention-sensitive should thus be questioned. I will show that simi-lar problems arise for allegedly intention-sensitive referentialexpressions, and argue that this speaks in favour of intention-insensitive semantics. I will look at theories that replace spea-ker intentions with salient features of the context and, findingthem wanting, end by arguing that the examples presentedare best accommodated by a minimal theory of semantics.

3 WagnerThe Corroboration Paradox

Carl George WagnerUniversity of Tennessee (United States)

[email protected]

Among the well-known paradoxes of positive relevance is thefact that two items of evidence, each positively relevant tosome hypothesis, may fail to corroborate each other on thathypothesis. This talk assesses two rather different analyses ofthe corroboration paradox due, respectively, to John Pollockand Jonathan Cohen. Pollock invokes a particular embodimentof the principle of insufficient reason to argue that instancesof this paradox are of negligible probability, and that it istherefore defeasibly reasonable to assume to assume that twoitems of evidence positively relevant to some hypothesis aremutually corroborating. In The Probable and the Provable,his study of scientific and legal reasoning, Cohen identifiessupplementary conditions that are sufficient to ensure thatsuch items of evidence will be mutually corroborating, and heclaims that these conditions account for most cases of mutualcorroboration. Combining a proposed common framework for

the general study of paradoxes of positive relevance with asimulation experiment, we conclude that neither Pollock’s norCohen’s claims stand up to detailed scrutiny.

Warmt 8Konsequentialistische Theorien und der besondere-

Pflichten-Einwand

Marcel WarmtUniversität Kassel

[email protected]

Ein häufig gemachter Einwand gegen konsequentialistischeTheorien ist der besondere-Pflichten-Einwand. Dieser besagt,dass konsequentialistische Theorien unplausibel (kontrain-tuitiv) sind, weil sie keine besonderen Pflichten generierenkönnen, obwohl besondere Pflichten bzw. die daraus resul-tierenden Handlungen moralisch wünschenswert sind. Unterbesondere Pflichten verstehe ich, im Gegensatz zu allgemeinenPflichten, diejenigen Pflichten, die man Personen auf Grundeiner besonderen Beziehung oder vorausgehenden Handlungschuldet.

Mit ihrem Aufsatz RELATIVES AND RELATIVISM haben Jeskeund Fumerton den besonderen-Pflichten-Einwand neu formu-liert. Das Ziel der beiden ist es, zu zeigen, dass auch Konse-quentialisten anerkennen müssen, dass es Situationen gibt, indenen es erlaubt ist, zu Gunsten seiner Vertrauten zu handeln,obwohl eine andere Handlung das allgemeine Wohlergehenmehr fördern würde. Hierauf aufbauend folgern sie, dass Kon-sequentialisten entweder ein radikal relativistisches Konzeptvon Werten vertreten müssen oder aber den Konsequentialis-mus komplett fallen lassen müssen.

In einem ersten Schritt werde ich zeigen, dass es zu derSchlussfolgerung von Jeske und Fumerton eine Alternativegibt, bei der weder der Konsequentialismus verworfen wirdnoch der Konsequentialist relative Werte akzeptieren muss.Die Alternative, welche ich anhand der folgenden drei The-sen entwickle, besteht in einer konsequentialistischen Zwei-Ebenen-Theorie à la R. M. Hare:1. These: In einer moralisch perfekten Welt generieren kon-sequentialistische Theorien eine Gruppe von Pflichten – diequasi-besonderen Pflichten –, die ihrem Inhalt nach mit eini-gen besonderen Pflichten identisch sind.2. These: Der Übergang von der moralisch perfekten Welt zurrealen Welt macht es notwendig, dass konsequentialistische(Ein-Ebenen-)Theorien zu Zwei-Ebenen-Theorien weiterentwi-ckelt werden.3. These: Konsequentialistische Zwei-Ebenen-Theorien generie-ren auch in der realen Welt einige quasi-besondere Pflichten.

In einem zweiten Schritt werde ich zeigen, dass der gegen-über konsequentialistischen Theorien erhobene besondere-Pflichten-Einwand insgesamt nicht haltbar ist, wenn man diePrämisse akzeptiert, dass jede plausible moralische Theorieein Prinzip der Unparteilichkeit beinhalten muss:4. These: Die generierten quasi-besonderen Pflichten – sowohlder moralisch perfekten Welt als auch der realen Welt – deckenden Umfang an besonderen Pflichten ab, die innerhalb jedermoralischen Theorie, die das Prinzip der Unparteilichkeit aner-kennt, widerspruchsfrei gefordert werden können.

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4 Weber/VosgerauThe arché of Cognition –

Grounding Representations in Action

Arne Martin WeberHeinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf

[email protected]


[email protected]

The term »embodied cognition« is currently hotly debatedamongst philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists. Unfor-tunately, this term does not refer to a unified theory or a uni-tary research perspective. Questions like, ›what does »embo-diment« or »to be embodied« mean?‹ are still to be answeredin detail, and the possibility of operationalizing this conceptin empirical research – as well as its explanatory advantagefor theoretical progress – remain unclear. To achieve someprogress in this regard, we clarify theoretical presuppositionsof a certain understanding of »embodied« cognition, namely»grounded« cognition.

To this end, we present grounded action cognition as atheoretical framework for understanding the interdependen-cies of motor control and action-related cognitive processes,like perceiving an action or thinking about an action. By focu-sing especially on this relation between motor control andconceptual and perceptual abilities, we investigate the groun-ding-relation in a direct manner, whilst remaining neutral onthe nature of further cognitive processes, like abstraction, forinstance.

An adequate formulation of a prospective theory of groun-ded action cognition requires examination of its concep-tual and ontological implications. To guide further researchtowards an appropriate theory of grounded action cognition,we distinguish between grounding qua acquisition and groun-ding qua constitution of cognitive abilities. On this basis, wedistinguish three possible theoretical conceptions. In additionto these methodological and conceptual analyses, we draw onrecent empirical evidence to motivate our inclination towardsa particular theory. According to this theory certain represen-tations are involved in action cognition and action perceptionthat are not modality-specific as usually proposed by advoca-tes of grounded cognition. What emerges is a comprehensivetheoretical perspective on cognition and the architecture ofthe mind that also presents a significant challenge to anti-representational accounts, namely the challenge to developan equally precise theory of the relations between cognitionand action.

Weichold 4Wissen Wie:

Intelligenz ohne Intellektualismus

Martin WeicholdGeorg-August-Universität Göttingen

[email protected]

Was ist Intelligenz? Laut Gilbert Ryle ist es eine intellektua-listische Legende zu glauben, Intelligenz bestehe nur in dergerechtfertigten Kenntnis wahrer Propositionen, d. h. im Ver-fügen über Wissen-Dass. Vielmehr erstrecke sich Intelligenzauch auf das vom Wissen-Dass grundverschiedene Wissen-Wie.Auch wer z. B. über alles Faktenwissen über Herzoperationenverfüge, könne dieses Wissen-Dass intelligenter oder wenigerintelligent anwenden, d. h. über mehr oder weniger Wissen-Wie verfügen. Diese »anti-intellektualistische« Position ist imJahr 2001 wiederum kritisiert worden: »All knowing how isknowing that. The intellectualist legend is true« schließenJason Stanley und Timothy Williamson ihren mittlerweile klas-sischen Aufsatz »Knowing How« ab. Zwar motivieren Stanleyund Williamson ihren Ansatz vor allem über eine semantischeAnalyse sprachlicher Zuschreibungen der Form »S knows howto A«. In seinem neuen Buch Know How verteidigt Stanley dieintellektualistische Position aber dezidiert auch als eine Ana-lyse der kognitiven Komponente gekonnten Handelns (S. 74):»What makes an action an exercise of skill, rather than merereflex, is the fact that it is guided by the intellectual appre-hension of truths.«

In meinem Vortrag werde ich argumentieren, dass der Intel-lektualismus als Theorie menschlicher Kognition nicht über-zeugend ist, und eine Alternative vorschlagen, die Vorteile desIntellektualismus und des Anti-Intellektualismus miteinandervereint. Nachdem ich zuerst Stanleys Position kurz dargestellthaben werde, werde ich zeigen, dass seine ausführlichen Ver-teidigungen seiner Position vor allem gegen kognitionswis-senschaftlich motivierte Einwände als ebenso wenig überzeu-gend angesehen werden können wie seine positive Argumen-tation. Schließlich skizziere ich einen alternativen Vorschlag,demgemäß – im Gefolge Dennetts – gekonntes Handelns aufverschiedenen Ebenen beschrieben werden kann. Auf einergrobkörnigen Ebene kann die intellektualistische Analyse einehilfreiche Beschreibung darstellen – auch wenn ich eine Klassevon Fällen aufzeigen werde, in der auch alltagssprachlich mitdem Begriff des Wissens-Wie nicht-propositionale Fähigkeitenzugeschrieben werden. Auf einer feinkörnigeren Ebene zeigeich dagegen anhand der Analyse eines komplexen Beispiels,dass die kognitive Komponente gekonnten Handelns so ana-lysiert werden sollte, dass sie zwar propositionales Wisseninvolviert, dass sie aber auch eine genuin praktische Intel-ligenz beinhaltet, die sich nicht in propositionalem Wissenerschöpft.

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3 WeigeltThe Frequentist Interpretation of Probability

in Quantum Mechanics

Carsten Thomas WeigeltUniversität Bonn

[email protected]

In two articles Alan Hájek (1997, 2009) gave thirty argumentsagainst the frequentist interpretation of probability. I wantapply Hájek’s argumentation to the conception of probabilityin quantum mechanics. It is a common feature that probabi-lities in quantum mechanics given by the wave function areunderstood as relative frequencies.

I want show that the conception that probabilities in quan-tum mechanics are relative frequencies is not sustainable.Especially the problems of reference classes, stable relative fre-quencies and irrational probabilities in the frequentist inter-pretation are incompatible with the standard formalism ofquantum mechanics. I will show that if probabilities are under-stood as relative frequencies the only possible interpretationof quantum mechanics is the ensemble interpretation. Theensemble interpretation states that the wave function alwaysrepresents an ensemble. The ensemble interpretation facesthe problem that there is experimental support to the claimthat the wave function is referring to single systems and notonly to ensembles. Recent experiments using superconduc-ting quantum interference devices (SQUID) demonstrate thatif quantum mechanics to be capable of describing elementaryprocesses the reference to single system is necessary.

Using Hájek’s arguments and the experimental support Iwant to make the strong claim that when quantum mechanicsas a fundamental theory is taken seriously an interpretationof probability in quantum mechanics as relative frequenciesmust be given up.

5 WeisbrodWhy agreement cannot justify peerness:

Completing Elga’s non-sceptical Conciliationismby refining his Equal Weight View

Lars WeisbrodUniversität zu Köln

[email protected]

One essential question in the debate about the epistemic signi-ficance of peer disagreement remains: How can our concilia-tory intuitions – that we have to suspend judgment whenbeing confronted with a disagreeing peer – be fulfilled while atthe same time sceptical consequences can be avoided? AdamElga has suggested a promising answer: We only have to sus-pend judgement if we are justified in believing that it is a peerwho disagrees. However, such justification can only be obtai-ned if there is undisputed basis for it, which according to Elgais not the case in complex fields like philosophy. Hence Conci-liationism does not imply scepticism in in this area. However,Elga’s »no undisputed basis at all« assumption has been rejec-ted. I want to show that this assumption is not even necessaryfor Elga’s solution. Although Elga’s conciliatory position, theEqual Weight View (EWV), implicates the contrary, it is notthe case that opinions which the agents agree upon and have

always agreed upon are better suited to justify peerness. Inarguing for this, I aim to complete Elga’s anti-sceptical stra-tegy as well as modify his EWV in a way that it accounts forhitherto unrecognized epistemic features of disagreement.I will give a counterexample to the EWV and then examineRoger White’s reconstruction of it to identify the underlyingerror: It is wrong to assume the subjective probabilities anagent assigns to »I am right« and »my dissenter is right« tobe independent of each other. Hence, the probability P(I amright|Disagreement) cannot be deduced from the simple factthat P(I am right) = P(You are right). Instead direct disagree-ment track record evidence is necessary to justify suspensionof judgment. The dependence of the event is due to the factthat we often share the sources of our cognitive mistakes withour dissenter, which results in an epiphenomenal connectionbetween »I am right« and »You are wrong«. Finally, I will usethis framework to give a thorough explanation of the counter-example and hereby motivate the rejection of agreement as abasis for the peerness assumption further.

Wendt 7Zur Moralität moralischer Kompromisse

Fabian WendtUniversität Hamburg

[email protected]

Simon May hat jüngst zu zeigen versucht, dass es keine mora-lischen Gründe gibt, moralische Kompromisse einzugehen.Ein moralischer Kompromiss ist eine Vereinbarung, bei derbeide Seiten Abstriche von ihren moralischen Überzeugungengemacht haben, um zu einer Einigung gelangen zu können.Pragmatische Gründe, solche Kompromisse einzugehen, gibtes oft. Aber moralische Gründe? Ein Argument dafür, dass esmoralische Gründe gibt, moralische Kompromisse zu machen,basiert auf dem Legitimitätsprinzip des »Rechtfertigungs-Libe-ralismus« (in der einen oder anderen Spielart). Ein solchesLegitimitätsprinzip verlangt, dass mit staatlichen Zwangsmaß-nahmen exekutierte Gesetze allen (vernünftigen) Personengegenüber rechtfertigbar sein müssen, also auch gegenüberPersonen mit zwar vernünftigen, aber falschen moralischenÜberzeugungen. Wenn man ein solches Legitimitätsprinzipakzeptiert, dann scheint es gute moralische, nämlich auf demLegitimitätsprinzip basierende Gründe zu geben, moralischeKompromisse zu machen: Man muss von der eigenen Positionabrücken und auf ihre Durchsetzung verzichten, damit dasGesetz allen vernünftigen Personen gegenüber rechtfertigbarist. May weist dieses Argument zurück, ohne das Legitimi-tätsprinzip zurückweisen zu wollen. Das Legitimitätsprinzipdes Rechtfertigungs-Liberalismus, so May, liefert keine morali-schen Gründe, auf einer zweiten Ebene moralischen Nachden-kens Kompromisse bezüglich einer zunächst auf einer erstenEbene für korrekt befundenen Position zu machen. Vielmehrliefert das Legitimitätsprinzip nach May höchstens »reasonsof correction« schon auf der ersten Ebene moralisch-politi-schen Nachdenkens: Die vermeintliche Kompromisspositionmuss für Rechtfertigungs-Liberale selbst eine als korrekt zubezeichnende Position sein. Ich halte diese Rekonstruktiondes Rechtfertigungs-Liberalismus für irreführend. Zumindesteinige Rechtfertigungs-Liberale werden nicht bestreiten, dasses zu vielen Themen korrekte moralische Positionen gibt. DasLegitimitätsprinzip jedoch bezieht sich allein auf die poli-

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tische Durchsetzung bestimmter Positionen und bestimmtnicht, was die moralisch korrekte Position ist. Deswegen gibtes aus der Perspektive des Rechtfertigungs-Liberalismus in derTat auf einer zweiten Ebene moralischen Nachdenkens morali-sche Gründe, bezüglich einer auf der ersten Ebene moralischenNachdenkens für korrekt befundenen Position Kompromissezu machen.

5 WerningReliablism and the Extra Value of Knowledge

Markus WerningRuhr Universität [email protected]

What makes knowledge more valuable than merely true belief?This question is the heart of Meno’s Problem and the relatedSwamping Problem. Under the assumption of veritism – allthat matters in inquiry is the acquisition of true belief – Gold-man and Olsson (2009) have recently tried to show how theextra value of knowledge might be explained if knowledgeis identified with reliably produced true belief (plus X). Theiraccount distinguishes two possible and, as they claim, inde-pendent solutions: (1) the conditional probability solutionand (2) the type-instrumentalism / value autonomization solu-tion. Both solutions will be critically analyzed in the presentpaper.

G&L’s common idea is that the extra value of reliably pro-duced true belief is due to the inheritance of epistemic value.However, whereas the first solution (advocated by Olsson)proposes a kind of future-inheritance – the extra value of apresent reliably produced belief is inherited from the truthof future beliefs – the second solution (favored by Goldman)appeals to a kind of type-inheritance – the extra value of apresent reliably produced belief token is inherited from thegenerally truth-conducive type to which it belongs. In a recentdebate between Olsson (2009), Goldman (2009), and the Aut-hor (2009) the strengths and weaknesses of the two solutionshave been at issue. To evaluate the conditional probabilitysolution, it is crucial to spell out what it means that a presentreliably produced belief has »the property of making it likelythat one’s future beliefs of a similar kind will also be true.«Three readings have to be distinguished:a) The merely probabilistic reading: The probability of S’shaving more true beliefs of a similar kind in the future isgreater conditional on S’s having the reliably produced truebelief that p than conditional on S’s merely truthfully belie-ving that p.b) The causal reading: S’s reliably produced true belief that pcausally makes it likely that S’s future beliefs of a similar kindwill be true.c) The evidential reading: S’s reliably produced true beliefthat p is indicative of S’s future beliefs being true, providedthe beliefs are of a similar kind.

While (a) is true, it is consistent with a common cause sce-nario and therefore too weak to establish a means-end relationbetween the present belief being reliably produced and thefuture belief being true. It hence does not establish valueinheritance from future truth. Option (b) would be strongenough to achieve value inheritance from future truth, but isfalse generally. Option (c) remains, but has to undergo furtherscrutiny: Is an evidential relation between two states A and

B sufficient to transfer value from B to A, even though therelation is not grounded in a direct causal connection from Ato B?

Wildman 2Some Fine Lessons

Nathan WildmanUniversität Hamburg

[email protected]

This paper examines and rejects three attempted responsesto Fine’s [1994] argument that the notion of essence cannotbe understood in modal terms. The first, derived from DellaRocca’s [1996], relies upon rendering all trivially necessary pro-perties unessential; I show how an unfortunate consequenceof the reply is that no properties are essential to any object –a clear case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater.The second, from Gorman’s [2006], appeals to a purporteddistinction between ›characteristics‹ and ›mere features‹. Idemonstrate that it faces a dilemma: the response either isviciously circular or requires forgoing analysing essence inmodal terms. Finally, the third reply is from Zalta [2005], andturns upon objects both having and encoding properties. Ishow that, while this response easily dismisses two of Fine’scounter-examples, it leaves a second pair untouched; further,I argue that accepting Zalta’s framework requires giving upon analysing essence in terms of modality. I conclude bytaking on-board the lessons learned from examining thesethree unsuccessful responses, specifying what a suitable replyto Fine might look like, and briefly hinting at an avenue themodalist might fruitfully pursue.

Wilholt 3Is There Such a Thing

as the Reliability of a Method?

Torsten WilholtLeibniz Universität Hannover

[email protected]

Reliability is widely taken to be the decisive feature when itcomes to determining the epistemic goodness of a method ortype of inquiry. In this talk, I am going to argue that this takeon epistemic quality management is deeply problematic. Forone thing, I claim that there is no such thing as the reliabilityof a method. For every method or type of inquiry, at least twokinds of reliability are required to characterize its prospectsfor epistemic success. This observation will lead me to a closerinspection of the features that capture what is desirable ina method of inquiry. I am going to argue that a convincingmodel of these features needs to include at least three dimen-sions. The most relevant result of this analysis is that therecan be no linear ranking of methods of inquiry with regard totheir epistemic quality. A common view holds that reliabilityis a simple, one-dimensional measure of how good a method isat getting at the truth. This suggests that the aim of gettingat the truth uniquely determines which of two methodologicalalternatives is the better one. In contradistinction to this, allthree dimensions that I identify are geared towards the aim

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of getting at the truth. Methodological choices are thereforeunderdetermined by truth as the aim of inquiry.

Observations related to my argument have been made be-fore by some authors in the context of the debate on scienceand values. However, the fact that the characteristics determi-ning the epistemic quality of a method come in three dimen-sions has so far not been appreciated. Moreover, my aim inthis talk is to show that the basic problem can be identifiedwithout making any assumptions about the moral respon-sibilities of scientists. The problem is that there can be nolinear measure of purely epistemic goodness. That is why apurely epistemological perspective on methodology is alwaysincomplete.

4 WilutzkyIntegrating Evaluation into

the Intentionality of Emotion

Wendy WilutzkyUniversität Osnabrück

[email protected]

What characterizes all emotions is their pronounced affectiveand inherently evaluative nature and any adequate theory ofemotions must account for how these features characterizethe intentionality of emotions. As a case in point I will dis-cuss the account put forward by Michelle Montague (2009).Montague refers to the cognitive, evaluative and affectivecontents of emotions’ intentionality and attempts to explainhow these relate to one another. Central to her account isthe notion of framing, by which she means to denote notonly a thin content but a kind of thick cognitive content inwhich a state of affairs is represented as bearing a certainrelation to a subject. One and the same state of affairs maybe framed in different ways, e.g. as a success for someone oras a failure for someone else. The framing itself, however, isnot yet evaluative or has any connection to affective contentyet. Instead, the framing first needs to be associated with anevaluative content, which may then bring about a third kindof content, namely the affective phenomenality of emotions.Montague’s account poses two problems. First, the separa-tion of the framing process from the evaluative content of anemotion seems questionable, since the framing of a state ofaffairs is itself already an evaluation of a situation. Secondly,the affective, evaluative and cognitively framed contents ofan emotion appear as distinct objects in emotion experienceaccording to Montague. This is not only phenomenologicallyimplausible but furthermore neglects the way in which theaffective content of an emotion may inform the other aspectsof an emotion’s intentionality. These two points of criticismwill be explicated by contrasting Montague’s account withthose of Bennett Helm and Peter Goldie in these respects. Theoverall conclusion to be drawn from these considerations isthat the evaluative and affective contents of emotions arenot distinct components that need only be added to an other-wise cold or neutral intentionality. Instead, the evaluativeand affective contents of emotion are intertwined and alsofigure in the cognitive content.

Windt 4Are dreams deceptive experiences?

Assessing Cartesian dream skepticismfrom the perspective of philosophy of mind

Jennifer Michelle WindtJohannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz

[email protected]

The problem of dream deception is typically discussed in epis-temology in order to raise doubts about the reliability of sen-sory-based beliefs about the external world. However, onecan also question the adequacy of the dream example itself.I discuss the background assumptions underlying Cartesiandream skepticism and their vulnerability to different types ofobjections. I propose under which conditions dreams can bedescribed as deceptive experiences, namely, first, if they arephenomenal states; second, if they involve a phenomenal self,or a subject of deception; and third, if this phenomenal selfis relevantly similar to the waking self. I briefly argue thatthe first two conditions are fulfilled and then concentrate onthe third condition, arguing that in order for dreams to countas deceptive experiences in an interesting sense, they mustinvolve a dream-self capable of undergoing belief-like states,i.e. of enjoying the phenomenology of occurrent beliefs regar-ding her current conscious state. I then use findings fromempirical dream research to develop three scenarios of dreamdeception. In »deception despite rational cognition«, and assuggested by the Cartesian scenario of dream deception, theoverall perceptual realism of the dream leads the dreamer tofalsely conclude that she is awake. In »deception from corrup-ted cognition«, the dreamer’s failure to realize that she is drea-ming results from bad reasoning. »Retrospective dream decep-tion« shows that dream-induced false beliefs as well as relatedfeelings of doubt and uncertainty can even extend beyondthe borders of sleep into wakefulness. Finally, a majority ofdreams provides no foothold for deception in an interestingsense in that the dreamer does not reflect upon her currentconscious state or form any related beliefs whatsoever. Whilethese examples narrow the scope of the dream argument tocertain types of dreams, they also suggest that dreams can bedeceptive in more various and in some respects more distur-bing ways than suggested by Descartes. Importantly, theyshow that dream deception, as opposed to science-fictionalscenarios of deception, is not only nomologically possible, butactually occurs.

Wolkenstein 7Welchen Wert hat Würde?

Zur Rolle des Würdekonzeptesin der (Angewandten) Ethik

Andreas F. X. WolkensteinUniversität Tübingen

[email protected]

In jüngster Zeit hat sich am Thema »Würde« ein reges Inter-esse ergeben. Mehrere deutschsprachige Veröffentlichungensind hierzu erschienen, und es wird rege diskutiert, was dennWürde eigentlich sei, wie es sich zur Moral verhält, ob es sinn-voll sei, den Begriff der Würde weiter zu verwenden. Menschen-

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würde wird in Zusammenhang mit Menschenrechten gebracht,und wo letztere in ihrer Natur und ihrem Ausmaß umstrittensind, ist dies für den Begriff der Würde weniger der Fall. Wo eszwar möglich ist, dass nicht alles wichtige für den Menschensofort ein Menschenrecht sein muss, ist doch klar, die Würdedes Menschen nicht einfach so bestritten werden kann unddarf. Dennoch gibt es nicht wenige kritische Stimmen, die füreinen zumindest geläuterten Umgang mit der Menschenwürdeim ethischen Kontext plädieren, um dem notorisch unscharfenBegriff nicht noch zum allumfassenden und damit nichtssa-genden Einsatz zu verhelfen.

In dem vorliegenden Paper werden die aktuellen Diskus-sionen um den Menschenwürdebegriff nachgezeichnet. Dieunterschiedlichen Typisierungen des Würdebegriffs sowie dieinhaltlichen Bestimmungen insbesondere des Menschenwürde-begriffs werden einer Kritik unterzogen. Diese Kritik wird sichinsbesondere auf die Frage konzentrieren, woher die norma-tive Kraft stammt, die der Verwendung des Begriffs zukommt.Die zugrundeliegende Überlegung ist die, dass in den genann-ten Ansätzen mehr die Natur der Würde untersucht wird, ohnedabei auf die Rolle innerhalb der Moral zu achten. Das heißt, eswird gefragt werden, welche Rolle im System »Moral« ein solchstarkes Element wie die Würde einnimmt, wie diese Rolle zuerklären ist und welche Schlussfolgerungen sich hieraus für diePhilosophie der Moral ergeben. Schlussendlich werden dieseÜberlegungen anhand eines Beispiels aus der Politischen Phi-losophie und der Angewandten Ethik überprüft. Genauerhinwird gefragt werden, wie sich der nun bestimmte Würdebegriffin sicherheitsethischen Überlegungen anwenden lässt, d. h. inÜberlegungen zur normativen Bestimmung der Herstellungvon Sicherheit.

7 WollnerObligations of fairness and natural duties

of justice under conditionsof moderate injustice

Gabriel WollnerHarvard University (United States)

Universität [email protected]

Just institutions have claims on us. There are two reasonsfor thinking that such claims are warranted. First, one maybelieve that we are under a natural duty of justice to supportand further just institutions. If one believes that it matterswhether or not institutions are just, one also has a reason,almost as a matter of consistency, to support and further justinstitutions. Second, one may believe that by enjoying thebenefits brought about by cooperation through just institu-tions, one incurs an obligation to support these institutions.Individuals who accept and enjoy the benefits brought aboutby cooperation through a just scheme are under an obligationof fairness to reciprocate. They ought to restrict their libertyin the same way as other cooperators, or more generally, dotheir bit in the provision of advantages for all.

But what happens to these reasons to support and complywith an institution if the scheme of cooperation is less thanfully just, say because the rules constitutive of the schemeare unjust, because some of its participants less than fullycomply with their obligations, or because the burdens andbenefits of cooperation are for some other reason distribu-

ted unfairly? Are individuals under the same obligation tocomply and contribute to the provision of advantages if thescheme through which they cooperate does not fully meet thestandards of justice? Are they under a duty of justice to sup-port such a scheme? There is hardly a real world institution orscheme of social cooperation that would qualify as fully just.However, questions about obligations of fairness and dutiesof justice under conditions of injustice have hitherto sufferedrelative neglect. They are the questions that my paper beginsto address: I shall examine what the victims of injustice oweto institutions that are moderately unjust.

Wündisch 7Climate Change & Virtue Theory:

A Cautionary Perspective

Joachim WündischGeorg-August-Universität Göttingen

[email protected]

Implementing strategies to address climate change confrontsus with an enormous collective action problem. Dale Jamiesonargues that in order to avoid large scale defection and the-refore the collapse of any cooperative effort to curb climatechange, utilitarians must become virtue theorists. In essencethis entails, in Jamieson’s view, a renunciation of making one’sown actions contingent on »beliefs about the behaviour ofothers«. It is contingency and the resulting cynical calculati-ons that allow us to rationalize defection. Therefore, Jamie-son argues that only non-contingent and thereby non-calcula-tive approaches to climate change can be effective. Accordin-gly, he understands virtues as »non-calculative generators ofaction«. The development and inculcation of these virtues ismeant as an effective response to climate change.

As a tool to combat climate change virtue change facessevere obstacles. First, even if inculcation is possible it willtake too long to make the approach viable. Second, if timelyinculcation were possible the new values would likely be con-tingent on the behaviour of others thwarting the originalintention of virtue change. Third, given its inherent inflexibi-lity value change is maladapted to deal with the great scienti-fic uncertainty of climate change. Values we choose may needto be updated – a process for which there will be too littletime. Fourth, even a partial solution to the problems of con-tingency and exposure to uncertainty can only be had at thecost of colossal inefficiencies. If we make virtues unfathoma-bly stringent so as to forbid all the emissions but those ofexhaling we may non-contingently and with little exposure touncertainty avoid a climate catastrophe – but at what cost?

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3 WüstenbergDas perspektivische Argument für den

wissenschaftstheoretischen Antirealismus

Jörn WüstenbergUniversität Konstanz

[email protected]

Bas van Fraassen argumentiert in seinem wirkmächtigen Buch»Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective«, dassder Gebrauch von Karten ein Paradigma für die Repräsenta-tion in der Wissenschaft insgesamt liefern kann. (van Fraassen2008) Er will zeigen, dass eine wissenschaftliche Repräsenta-tion über den Bereich der Phänomene hinaus nicht möglich istund damit auch keine Repräsentation von nicht mit menschli-chen Sinnen wahrnehmbaren Entitäten oder Prozessen durchunsere besten Theorien und Modelle. Es lässt sich ein zentralesArgument in diesem Kartengebrauchsparadigma der Repräsen-tation rekonstruieren. Ich nenne es das perspektivische Argu-ment für den Antirealismus der wissenschaftlichen Repräsenta-tion. Die These dieses Arguments ist, dass die Repräsentationauf die Phänomene, also auf Objekte, die mit menschlichenSinnen wahrzunehmen sind, begrenzt ist. Ein wissenschaftli-cher Realismus, der auf die These festgelegt ist, dass wissen-schaftliche Theorien und Modelle Entitäten oder Strukturenjenseits des Bereichs der Phänomene repräsentieren können,wäre unmöglich.

Das Argument kann folgendermaßen formuliert werden:(i) Es gibt keine Repräsentation ohne Gebrauch als Repräsen-tation.(ii) Gebrauch erfordert Selbstlokation des Benutzers in derRepräsentation.(iii)Also (aus i und ii) gibt es nur Repräsentation, wo es Selbst-lokation gibt.(iv) Selbstlokation ist nur in den Phänomenen möglich.(v) Also (aus iii und iv) kann nur im Bereich der Phänomenerepräsentiert werden.

(i) wurde von Goodman vertreten und kann in der aktuellenDebatte (Giere, Suarez, van Fraassen) als allgemein anerkanntgelten. (ii) ist eine Prämisse, die van Fraassen aus dem Karten-gebrauch abzuleiten und auf alle Repräsentationen in der Wis-senschaft zu übertragen versucht. Die Perspektivität besagt,dass wissenschaftliche Repräsentationen immer indexikalischeVerortungen haben. Das Argument für diese Prämisse derSelbstlokation ist durch den Kartengebrauch als Paradigmaunterstützt. Ich zeige nicht, dass diese Prämisse (ii) falsch ist,sondern dass es darauf ankommt, was genau darunter zu ver-stehen ist. Davon wird abhängen, ob die Selbstlokation nur imBereich der Phänomene möglich ist. Auch wenn die Perspek-tivität gilt, folgt (iv) nicht aus (ii), sondern ist eine weiterePrämisse. In der Analyse der Selbstlokation werde ich zeigen,dass sie nicht an den Bereich der Wahrnehmung gebunden ist.Auch wenn wir die Perspektivität der Repräsentation vertre-ten, folgt daraus nicht Antirealismus.

Wüstholz 4Thinking about Thoughts without Language

Florian Leonhard WüstholzUniversität Zürich (Switzerland)

[email protected]

Bermúdez (2003) argues in his Thinking Without Words thatthinking about thoughts is impossible without language. Hol-ding metathoughts necessarily requires a linguistic vehicle,which most conveniently is offered by human public language.His argument is based on three cornerstones. (1) Thinkingabout thoughts requires higher-order intentional attitudeswhich are structured in a way that can sustain the complexityof higher-order intentionality, (2) public language sentencesoffer a cognitive vehicle which can accommodate such struc-tured metathoughts, and (3) there is no sufficiently structurednonlinguistic vehicle which could sustain metacognition. Iwill show that (3) is unfounded. Contrary to Bermúdez’ claimthat the structure of nonlinguistic thought puts a limit onwhat can be cognitively represented, I will argue that he failsto demonstrate the necessary unavailability of metacognitiveprocesses on the nonlinguistic level. While being able to esta-blish that some forms of metacognition (especially what hedescribes as second-order cognitive dynamics) are linguistic innature, there remains a broad realm of other forms of metaco-gnition which is left untreated and is excluded for insufficientreasons. Thinking about thoughts is not restricted to reflec-tive thinking which involves ›a direct and conscious cognitiveaccess to the target thoughts‹ (Bermúdez, 2006, 653). An empi-rically more sensible model of nonlinguistic metacognitionwill be presented. It is designed to show that animals are ableto represent affordances featuring mental state representati-ons (either conceptual or non-conceptual) (Cf. Gibson, 1977).Furthermore, the model, based on the feature-based represen-tational system theory of metacognition (Proust, 2009), is capa-ble of doing justice to the growing body of empirical data,largely gathered by conducting experiments using uncertaintymonitoring paradigms (Smith et al., 2003). These support theclaim that some animals do in fact possess metacognitive abili-ties. Hence, the combination of three factors ultimately weighheavily in against (3) and strongly suggests that Bermúdez’corresponding argument is unsound. Conceptual examinationexposes the problem of using the concept of second-ordercognitive dynamics to explain all metacognitive mechanisms.Empirical data suggests metacognitive abilities in animals anda theoretical framework explains the empirical data in a moreunified way.

Wüthrich 2When the actual world

is not even possible

Christian WüthrichUniversity of California, San Diego (United States)

[email protected]

Contemporary fundamental physics offers compelling reasonsfor the need of a quantum theory of gravity, i.e. a theoryunifying classical general relativity with the quantum physicsof the standard model of particle physics. Approaches to quan-

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tum gravity often involve the disappearance of space and timeat the fundamental level. The metaphysical consequences ofthis disappearance are profound, as is illustrated with DavidLewis’s analysis of modality. As Lewis’s possible worlds areunified by the spatiotemporal relations among their parts, thenon-fundamentality of spacetime – if borne out – suggestsa serious problem for his analysis: his pluriverse, for all itsontological abundance, does not contain our world.

If a Lewisian accepts, in a naturalistic vein, that physicsmay eliminate space and time from the fundamental furni-ture of the world, she can resist the argument by insistingthat an empirical theory cannot coherently deny the existenceof space and time, for all experience is experience of some-thing being located somewhere at some time. I will arguethat theories denying the fundamental existence of spaceand time are not incoherent in this sense, but only if theyentail the non-fundamental, i.e., emergent existence of spaceand time. Unfortunately, this does not suffice to salvage theLewisian account of modality. First, it is insufficient on prin-cipled grounds: a metaphysician will hardly be satisfied withbeing offered what is at best an approximately true accountof modality which ignores the fundamental reality in favourof a description of emergent phenomena. Second, a Lewisiantheory of modality trading in emergent spatiotemporal rela-tions must remain inpotent in binding the basic constituentsof actuality into one and the same possible world. The reasonfor this impotence is straightforward: there are no spatiotem-poral (not even analogically spatiotemporal) relations exem-plified in the fundamental structure, and the basal elementsof this structure cannot be the relata of the emergent space-time relations. Thus, non-spatiotemporal fundamental phy-sics, naturalism, and Lewis’s analysis of modality are incom-patible.

1 Zakkou(Not So Many) Varieties

of Disagreement

Julia ZakkouHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

The notions of a real disagreement and a verbal disagreementplay a decisive role both in the current debate on seman-tic relativism and the latest discussion on metaontology.Recently, attempts have been made to get a clear grasp ofthese notions. But most of them focus only on one of the two.This seems surprising. For on the one hand both notions areoften applied in order to indicate that the other notion is notapplicable. On the other hand, it is clear that they are notexact opposites.

In this paper, I suggest a unified account of both real andverbal disagreements that is suitable for both the debate onsemantic relativism and the discussion on metaontology. Inthe first part, I challenge John MacFarlane’s claim that thenotion of a real disagreement is »dangerously ambiguous«by arguing that only one of three definitions he distinguishesadequately captures our ordinary notion. First, I present thethree definitions that according to him refer to different kindsof real disagreement. Then I argue that under the assumptionof a certain account of propositions they are coextensive andgiven an alternative view on propositions only one of the

three definitions refers to a phenomenon that according toour ordinary notion qualifies as a real disagreement. Lastly, Iconclude that »real disagreement« should be defined in theseterms. In the second part of the paper, I show that, based onthis account, one can give a satisfactory definition of both thenotion of a verbal and a merely verbal disagreement. First, Iintroduce these two definitions. Then I show that they predictthe intuitively correct results for those cases discussed in thecurrent debate on verbal disagreements.

Zardini 1Consequence and Context.

The Intercontextual Logic of Sentences

Elia ZardiniUniversity of Aberdeen (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

The paper traces a particular path through the rich and yetvery much underexplored topic of the effects of the contextdependence of a language on the relation of logical con-sequence operative over that language. It first argues thatvarious considerations, including a few stemming from con-text dependence, speak in favour of taking sentences, ratherthan propositions or utterances, to be the primary bearers ofthe relation of logical consequence. With such background inplace, the paper proceeds to argue that context dependenceplays nevertheless an important role in logical consequence.To take a style of example first discussed by Frege, ›Tomor-row, it’ll be warm‹ taken on Monday entails ›Today, it’s warm‹taken on Tuesday, but the first sentence taken on Mondaydoes not entail the second sentence taken on Wednesday. Suchrole has not been accounted for by the tradition initiated byKaplan that has extensively studied the distinctive logical fea-tures of context-dependent languages, for that tradition hasexclusively focussed on inferences made within a single con-text. The paper attempts to start to remedy this situation, byproposing a family of simple temporal intercontextual logicsthat adequately model the validity of arguments on whichcertain cross-contextual inferences rely. In particular, suchlogics validate the argument from ›Tomorrow, it’ll be warm‹to ›Today, it’s warm‹ in the Fregean example. The logics inva-lidate just about any traditional structural rule (reflexivity,exchange, monotonicity etc.), given the logical significanceacquired by the sequence structure of premises and conclu-sions. The logics are however strong enough to capture inthe form of theorems all the valid arguments of both classicallogic and Kaplan’s intracontextual logic. Finally, the new fra-mework can be exploited so as to introduce new operators intothe object language, such as intercontextual conjunction andimplication, which, contrary to normal (intracontextual) con-junction and implication, perfectly match the metalinguistic,intercontextual notions of premise combination and logicalconsequence, by representing their respective two operandsas taken at different contexts.

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4 ZednikFrom extended mechanisms to extended minds

Carlos ZednikUniversität Osnabrück

[email protected]

Recent discussions of the extended mind hypothesis haveidentified the need for a mark of the cognitive, which speci-fies the sufficient conditions for a system to be a cognitivesystem. Extant proposals for such a mark face a variety ofdifficulties, not least of all the threat of anthropocentrism.In contrast to these extant proposals, I introduce a pragma-tic mark of the cognitive that is rooted in cognitive scientificpractice: a system is a cognitive system if it realizes a mecha-nism that is described in mechanistic explanations of one ormore cognitive phenomena. This mark of the cognitive avoidsmost of the difficulties faced by extant proposals, includingthe threat of anthropocentrism, and offers new ways of resol-ving longstanding problems in the extended mind debate,such as the notorious problem of »cognitive bloat«.

4 ZinckFirst-Third- and Second-Person-Perspective

Alexandra ZinckHebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel)

[email protected]

In the last decade, the debate on theory of mind, the capacityto understand others’ and own mental states, focused on theinterrelation between first-person-perspective (subjective per-spective of the subject on herself and on the world, 1PP) andthird-person-perspective (external perspective on a subject,3PP). However, there is not much known about the second-person-perspective (2PP). Second-person-perspective may bedefined as symmetrical immediate, and non-inferential accessand engagement between two first-person subjects.

I will introduce a characterization of the second-person-perspective employing research from phenomenology, philo-sophy of mind and neuroscience, thereby putting it to the testin in one of its pathological conditions, the autistic spectrum.To that extent, I will examine (i) in how far the capacity ofmindreading (synonymous with theory of mind, i.e. understan-ding others’ mental states) in the second-person-perspectivecan be characterized based on both basic cognitive processesand complex cognitive processes involving meta-representati-ons. Further, (ii) the relation between this capacity of second-person-perspective (2PP) for self-consciousness of introspec-tive mental states (1PP) and for mindreading of others’ mentalstates (3PP) will be explored. On this basis, I (iii) will inves-tigate the interaction between self and other and how thedevelopment of self- and other-consciousness are mediated bya second-person-perspective.

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Poster / Posters

Sektion 1 P 1.1 auf der Straße, AlexanderWahrheit und Norm – Wrights Kritik am Deflationismus

Sprachphilosophie /Philosophy of Language

Ebene A 6

P 1.2 Blumenthal, DavidDie Semantik von Äußerungen über fiktive Kontexte. Versuch einer pragmatistisch-inferentialistischen Analyse

P 1.3 Dänzer, LarsUltra-minimalist semantics and the ›psychological reality‹ of sentence meaning

P 1.4 Gruschke, Daniel /Lanius, DavidTheorien semantischer Vagheit – getestet an semantischer Vagheit im Recht

P 1.5 Harth, ManfredFaultless Disagreement, Relative Truth and Superassertibility

P 1.6 Leahy, BrianLogical Consequence in a Teleosemantic Framework

P 1.7 Prien, BerndIllokutionäre Rollen und die Normativität der Bedeutung

Sektion 2 P 2.1 Mulder, Jesse MerijnThe Essentialist Inference

Metaphysik und Ontologie/Metaphysics and Ontology

Ebene A 6

P 2.2 Oliva Córdoba, MichaelThe point of action

P 2.3 Weber, Marc AndreeTheorien vager Objekte

Sektion 3 P 3.1 Glauer, Ramiro DavidMechanistic Reduction

Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie/Logic and Philosophy of Science

Ebene A 6

P 3.2 Hillerbrand, RafaelaComputer simulation – The future of experiment or theoretical phantasies? Epistemicaspects of numerical experiments

P 3.3 Leerhoff, HolgerWorrall zu Theorienunterbestimmtheit und Strukturenrealismus. Wirklich kein Problem?

Sektion 4 P 4.1 Barner, AlmaContents of the Imagination – A Perspective and Two Selves

Philosophie des Geistes/Philosophy of Mind

Ebene A 7

P 4.2 Conduct, MatthewThe Impossibility of Perfect Partial Hallucinations

P 4.3 Falk, JuliaVon magischen Pilzen und Stimmgabeln im Vakuum

P 4.4 Fink, Sascha BenjaminIs Indeterminacy of Consciousness a Viable Option?

P 4.5 Franken, DirkWoher weißt Du, dass Du es bist, der kein Zombie ist?

P 4.6 Laanpere, TaaviConstructive Memory and Memory Traces

P 4.7 Mölder, BrunoWhat the mind is made of

P 4.8 Rellihan, Matthew JohnA Dilemma for Double-Aspect Theories of Consciousness

P 4.9 Sánchez Guerrero, H. AndrésMixed Emotions in Social Context: Defending the Notion of Caring-With

P 4.10 Schmid, UllaAn Unbelievable Truth, or: Why Beliefs Are No Mental States

P 4.11 Schmitz, LauraThe Role of Direct Perception in Social Cognition

P 4.12 Seitz, Fabian›Embedded Rationalism‹: A Rationalist’s Guide for Naturalizing the Notion of Reason

P 4.13 Tillas, Alex/Seuchter, Tim/Vosgerau, GottfriedMaking the Most of Affordances?

P 4.14 Tooming, UkuWhen do we need to talk about desires?

P 4.15 Wunder, AndreNichtwillentliche Aktivität

Poster / Posters

Sektion 7 P 7.1 Jansen, LudgerHilfe unter Freunden: Pflicht oder Neigung? Über das Handeln in informellen Institutionen

Angewandte Ethik, Politische,Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie/Applied Ethics, PoliticalPhilosophy, Philosophy of Lawand Social Philosophy

Ebene A 6

P 7.2 Meyer, MarcoMorality & Causality

P 7.3 Nagel, Saskia K.Neuronale Plastizität und Autonomie – Chancen und Risiken des zunehmenden Wissens überdie Veränderbarkeit des Gehirns

P 7.4 Schleidgen, SebastianZur Notwendigkeit adäquater Theoriebildung für eine erfolgreiche Umsetzung nachhaltigerEntwicklung

Sektion 8 P 8.1 Céspedes, EstebanÜberdetermination in der kausalen Entscheidungstheorie

Normative Ethik, Metaethik,Handlungs- und Entscheidungs-theorie / Normative Ethics,Metaethics, Theory of Actionand Theory of Decision

Ebene A 6

P 8.2 Mukerji, Nikil S.The Case Against Consequentialism – Reconsidered

P 8.3 Tiefensee, ChristineHow to Defend Expressivism against anti-Archimedeanism

P 8.4 Wagner, VerenaCoercion: an excusing condition?

Die Präsenzzeit der Posterautoren ist Dienstag und Mittwoch in der Regel zwischen 12:15 und 12:45 Uhr.In general, the time of presence of the poster authors is Tuesday and Wednesday, from 12:15 to 12:45 p.m.

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P 1.1 auf der StraßeWahrheit und Norm –

Wrights Kritik am Deflationismus

Alexander auf der StraßeHeinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf

[email protected]

Das Papier setzt sich mit der Kritik Crispin Wrights am Deflatio-nismus, in der Form, in der er z. B. von Paul Horwich vertretenwird, auseinander. Ziel ist es, die deflationistische Positionzu stärken. Dazu werde ich dreischrittig vorgehen: erstenswerde ich knapp in den Hintergrund der Debatte einführen,d. h. die minimalistische Theorie der Wahrheit umreißen undaufzeigen, welche spezifische Frage in der Debatte mit Wrightstrittig ist. Ich werde zweitens Wrights Argument gegen denMinimalismus ausführlich rekonstruieren und möglichst starkmachen. Diese Rekonstruktion wird sehr kleingliedrig erfol-gen, um alle Hintergrundannahmen und Zwischenkonklusio-nen explizit zu machen. Aufbauend auf dieser Rekonstruktionwird dann in einem dritten Schritt Wrights Argument kriti-siert werden. Dabei werde ich mich insbesondere auf folgendePunkte konzentrieren: (i) Wrights Argument dafür, dass wahreSätze berechtigterweise behauptbar sind, scheint zirkulär zusein; (ii) ferner scheint er das Bikonditional, welches im Zitattil-gungsschema auftaucht, anders zu verwenden als der Deflatio-nist; (iii) letztlich bleibt zudem unklar, was genau Wright unter»realen Eigenschaften« versteht. Bezüglich des letzten Punk-tes werde ich drei mögliche Interpretationen diskutieren, diesich jedoch alle als mit Horwichs Position vereinbar erweisenwerden. Zu (i): Wright möchte mittels des Zitattilgungssche-mas zeigen, dass wahre Sätze (und nur wahre Sätze) berechtigtassertibel sind. Bei der Anwendung des Schemas setzt er aberbereits voraus, was erst gezeigt werden soll. (Dies wird anhandder Prädizierbarkeitsbedingungen des Falschheitsprädikatesillustriert.) Zu (ii): aufgrund der unüblichen Verwendung desBikonditionals schlägt mindestens der Versuch, den Deflatio-nismus als inhärent widersprüchlich darzustellen, fehl (weilbei normaler Verwendung kein Widerspruch herleitbar ist). Zu(iii): die Diskussion des Terms »Eigenschaft« wird in einemDilemma münden. Entweder wird ein schwacher Eigenschafts-begriff zugrunde gelegt (dann ist kein Widerspruch herleitbar)oder Wright nimmt einen stärkeren Begriff an (dann bliebeunklar, wie dieser zu explizieren wäre und was einen solchenstärkeren Begriff rechtfertigen könnte).

P 4.1 BarnerContents of the Imagination –A Perspective and Two Selves

Alma BarnerAustralian National University (Australia)

[email protected]

This presentation focuses on how to model contents of theimagination in a centered possible worlds framework. Con-tents of imaginings seem to pose particular challenges totraditional accounts of how to model contents in this fra-mework. These challenges arise because imaginings highlightthat perspectival contents are merely contingently egocentricor de se.

First, some (e.g. visual) imaginings are arguably perspec-tival without being egocentric: in the imagination I can berepresented quasi-visually but from a perspective that is notmy own.

Second, some imaginings are arguably egocentric (de se)but only relative to a counterfactual self: I can imagine beingsomebody else than I actually am, and arguably imaginethings from this person’s own perspective.

These two features sometimes are combined. Some ima-ginings are arguably perspectival without being egocentricbut still egocentric relative to a counterfactual self: I can ima-gine being somebody else than I actually am and imagine mycounterfactual self from the outside.

In this presentation I will argue that, given these two fea-tures, we need to distinguish three different kinds of centersto successfully model contents of the imagination, if we areusing a centered possible worlds framework: one center torepresent the perspective only, one to represent my counter-factual self and one to represent my actual self.

By focusing on examples I will elaborate on the kinds ofcenters, their exact properties and their functional roles.

My proposal can also be understood as a criticism of DilipNinan’s (2008) account of the contents of imaginings in a cen-tered possible worlds framework. More generally, it highlightshow different kinds of centered contents are distinguishable,even in the case of belief or perception for example.

Blumenthal P 1.2Die Semantik von Äußerungen

über fiktive Kontexte.Versuch einer pragmatistisch-inferentialistischen

Analyse

David BlumenthalFreie Universität Berlin

[email protected]

Die Kernfrage meiner Überlegungen lautet: Worauf legen wiruns mit Äußerungen über fiktive Kontexte (kurz: AFKs) – d. i.sprachlichen Performanzen wie meiner Äußerungen des Sat-zes »Asterix ist ein Gallier« – fest? Diese Frage ist relevant,weil zwischen unserer alltäglichen Verwendung von AFKs alswahrheitsfähige Äußerungen und einer ersten, oberflächlichenAnalyse eine eigentümliche Spannung zu bestehen scheint.Denn sind einige AFKs wahr, so scheint daraus zu folgen, dassdiejenigen fiktiven Charaktere, über die sie etwas aussagen,existieren. Diese Folgerung führt jedoch unmittelbar in onto-logische Probleme derart, dass der Begriff der Existenz exzen-trisch ausgeweitet wird.

Ziel ist es, diese Spannungen durch eine Theorie der Seman-tik von AFKs und auf Grundlage einer inferentialistischen Se-mantik, für die nicht gesondert argumentiert wird, aufzulösen.Dazu werden zunächst zwei Forderungen an jede angemesseneTheorie der Semantik von AFKs formuliert. Die erste besagt,dass eine solche Theorie den praktisch konstituierten, inferen-tiellen Beziehungen, in denen AFKs faktisch stehen, Rechnungtragen muss. Die zweite besagt, dass nur auf Gegenständezurückgegriffen werden darf, die in bestimmter Hinsicht onto-logisch unschuldig sind.

Anschließend werden drei klassische Vorschläge diskutiert:– Derjenige von Russell, welcher AFKs als Äußerungen über

bestimmte Mengen fiktionaler Medien versteht.

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– Die verwandten Positionen von Searle, van Inwagen undParsons, die AFKs als Äußerungen über fiktive Gegenständeverstehen.

– Derjenige von Rorty, welcher für einen entspannten Um-gang mit AFKs plädiert.Diese Vorschläge werden als im Lichte der Forderungen als

unangemessen abgelehnt und es wird ein eigener Vorschlagentwickelt, welcher die Probleme der zuvor angeführten ver-meidet. Dieser orientiert sich an der Position Russells, buch-stabiert diese jedoch anders aus. Die Kerngedanken bestehendabei darin, AFKs als Äußerungen über bestimmte Werke zubetrachten, die wesentlich auf Interpretation beruhen, wobeiWerke als Äquivalenzklassen fiktionaler Medien verstandenwerden. Die logische Feinstruktur von AFKs wird nach demModell von De-dicto-Zuschreibungen erläutert, deren Funkti-onsweise wiederum inferentialistisch verstanden wird.

Als Konklusion ergibt sich somit folgendes Konditional:Wenn die inferentialistische Semantik richtig ist, so ist dieentwickelte Theorie der Semantik von AFKs den referiertenklassischen Theorien vorzuziehen, da erstere – anders als letz-tere – den beiden aus ebendieser Semantik abgeleiteten For-derungen gerecht wird.

P 8.1 CéspedesÜberdetermination in der

kausalen Entscheidungstheorie

Esteban CéspedesGoethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main

[email protected]

Zwei allgemeine Theorien der Kausalität, die probabilistischeund die kontrafaktische, werden hier erklärt und mit Gegen-beispielen konfrontiert. Es wird gezeigt, in welcher Verbin-dung diese Analysen mit der evidentiellen und der kausalenEntscheidungstheorie stehen. Newcombs Problem beschreibteine Situation, in der es eine gemeinsame Ursache für zwei ver-schiedene Ereignisse gibt. Die Hauptthese besteht darin auf-zuzeigen, dass ein Problem für die kausale Entscheidungstheo-rie entsteht, das die Form des Überdeterminationsproblemshat. Am Ende ist auch eine Lösung für solche Situationen vor-schlagbar.

P 4.2 ConductThe Impossibility of Perfect Partial Hallucinations

Matthew ConductDurham University (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

I argue that it is impossible to have perfect partial hallucinati-ons of scenes of normal objects. Perfect partial hallucinationsof scenes of normal objects are experiences of arrangementsof normal objects that have elements that are perceptual andelements that are non-perceptual, and which are subjectivelyindiscriminable from entirely perceptual experiences of arran-gements of objects of those kinds. The argument has twostages:(1) Perfect hallucinations of normal objects require the pos-sibility of apparent interaction between what is perceived and

what is hallucinated. If they do not, then it can be revealedthrough reflection that one is not perceiving normal objects.(2) The requirement that perfect hallucinations must accom-modate apparent interaction between what is perceived andwhat is hallucinated precludes the possibility of perfect, par-tial hallucinations. This is because:1. When something in the scene before one, x, moves into

the space apparently occupied by something one is in facthallucinating, y, then one cannot actually be perceiving xat that time, for one will not be aware of the true locationor motion of x because of the truth of (1).

2. Even when something in the scene before one, x, is notmoving into the space apparently occupied by somethingone is in fact hallucinating, y, one cannot actually be per-ceiving x, because of the possibility of such a change inposition of x.

The conclusion is, then, that if one is enjoying a perfect hallu-cination of a scene of normal objects this hallucination mustbe hallucinatory in its entirety. Hence it is impossible to haveperfect partial hallucinations of scenes of normal objects.

Dänzer P 1.3Ultra-minimalist semantics and the

›psychological reality‹ of sentence meaning

Lars DänzerUniversität zu Köln

[email protected]

According to what has recently been labeled the ›ultra-mini-malist‹ view of semantics (UMS), the goal of a semantic theoryis to characterize the standing, context-invariant meaning ofthe expression types of a language, including its sentences.Semantics thereby aims to specify a particular kind of informa-tion available to, and made use of by, the competent speakersof the language in interpreting the utterances of their fel-low speakers – viz. the information that is associated witha sentence token qua token of a particular type and whichis available to competent speakers simply in virtue of theirknowledge of meaning of the sentence type.

The purpose of this talk is to elaborate and rebut a parti-cular objection to this conception of semantics suggested byJeff King & Jason Stanley. Ironically, the objection is a varia-tion on the ›psychological reality‹ argument that has beenemployed by friends of UMS themselves against somewhatless than ultra-minimalist views. In a nutshell, it can be put asfollows: Since the case for UMS rests on the claim that spea-kers make use of the meaning of a sentence S in interpretingutterances of S, it is committed to the view that computinga representation of the meaning of S plays an important rolein the process of utterance interpretation. Yet, a little reflec-tion on possible comprehension algorithms reveals that it isfar from obvious that the process of utterance interpretationmust in fact conforms to such a model. Thus, unless one ishappy to base semantics on a psychological speculation, oneshould reject UMS.

I’ll argue that the right response to this objection is todeny UMS’s commitment to the relevant questionable view ofutterance interpretation. Properly construed, the claim thatthe process of utterance interpretation ›makes use of‹ theinformation encoded by the meaning of a sentence is compa-tible with a wide variety of possible processing algorithms.

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The response stresses the general point long held by DanielDennett that one should not take a characterization of a com-petence at the intentional level to map straightforwardly ontoa corresponding characterization at the algorithmic one.

P 4.3 FalkVon magischen Pilzen

und Stimmgabeln im Vakuum

Julia FalkUniversität zu Köln

[email protected]

Nachdem sich die Philosophie der Wahrnehmung lange Zeitfast ausschließlich dem Sehen gewidmet und anschließendauf andere Sinnesmodalitäten generalisiert hat, mehren sichin den letzten Jahren die Stimmen, die aufgrund philosophischrelevanter Unterschiede diesen Visuozentrismus in Frage stel-len und für jede Modalität eine spezifische Wahrnehmungs-theorie fordern. Auch für die auditiver Wahrnehmung scheinteine Reihe modalitätsspeziefischer Fragen bisher offen geblie-ben zu sein und die Entwicklung einer Theorie des Hörens zurechtfertigen.

Ich möchte für folgende Idee argumentieren:Beim Hören repräsentieren wir bestimmte Außenweltereig-

nisse als auditive Objekte.Diese These ist in mehreren Hinsichten nicht trivial:

i. Sie behauptet eine intentionalistische, im Gegensatz zueiner relationalistischen, z. B. disjunktivistischen Theorieder Wahrnehmung.

ii. Sie handelt von Ereignissen, nicht von gewöhnlichen Ein-zeldingen (z. B. Schallwellen) oder Eigenschaften der Ob-jekte unseres Erkenntnisinteresses (analog zu z. B. Farbenbeim Sehen).

iii. Sie geht von auditiven Objekten aus und steht damit inKonkurrenz zu atomistischen Theorien und solchen, dievon der Wahrnehmung gewöhnlicher Außenweltdingen(Geräuschquellen) ausgehen.

i) Nicht nur bei der Erklärung von Verhalten spielt die Zu-schreibung mentaler Gehalte beim Wahrnehmen eine zen-trale Rolle. Mit von veridischen Wahrnehmungsfällen subjektivnicht unterscheidbaren Halluzinationen hat der Relationalis-mus seit jeher zu kämpfen. Auch seine moderne Variante, derDisjunktivismus, kann solche Fälle nicht befriedigend erklä-ren, in denen sich diese beiden Typen von Zuständen wederauf behavioraler, noch neuronaler oder phänomenaler Ebeneunterscheiden.ii) Ereignisanalysen gehen davon aus, dass nicht Einzeldinge,wie z. B. Schallwellen oder Eigenschaften von Gegenständendie Bezugsobjekte unserer auditiven Wahrnehmung sind, son-dern Interaktionen zwischen Gegenständen und Umgebungs-medium. Neben einer Reihe weiterer Vorteile berücksichti-gen Ereignisanalysen auf elegante Weise, dass beide Elementeunverzichtbar für das letztendliche Resultat eines hörbarenGeräuschs sind.iii) Bei der Objektwahrnehmung spielen eine Reihe von empi-risch gut untersuchbaren Wahrnehmungsleistungen eine ent-scheidende Rolle. Der Hörer ergänzt, verändert, gruppiert undselektiert das Tonmaterial aus der im dargebotenen auditivenSzene unwillkürlich, unbewusst und nach festen Prinzipien.Das wird anhand zahlreicher Befunden aus der auditiven Wahr-nehmungsforschung deutlich. Eine Theorie, die Objekterken-

nung allein mit der Zusammensetzung von Einzelempfindun-gen zu erklären sucht, scheitert hingegen an den unterschied-lichsten Wahrnehmungsphänomenen, wie z. B. an Scheinbewe-gungen und dem Phänomen der Ergänzung virtueller Tonhö-hen.

Fink P 4.4Is Indeterminacy of Consciousness

a Viable Option?

Sascha Benjamin FinkUniversität Osnabrück

[email protected]

Sometimes, we hesitate to assent or dissent to phenomenolo-gical claims like »Dreams are coloured«. So far, an epistemicstrategy and a indeterminacy stategy have been proposedto explain this. The epistemic strategists reject introspectiveomniscience but accept that the statement has a truth-value –we simply don’t know it. The indeterminacy strategists claimthat phenomenological sentences themselves are indetermi-nate concerning their truth value. I construct three differentpossible version of these: (1) A Strawsonian account, (2) aDennettian account, and (3) a Schwitzgebelian account. (1)and (2) lead to phenomenal anti-realism, while (3) is trivial.The possibility to lie about one’s experience, e.g. a hypochon-driac lying about that he feels pain, forces us to reject (2)and (1) concerning general statements. This leads us then toaccept phenomenal realism and interpret hesitance of assentor dissent as either failures of introspective access, failures ofthat specific type of experience, or failures in setting up thephenomenological claim under consideration, i.e. containinga category mistake.

Franken P 4.5Woher weißt Du, dass Du es bist,

der kein Zombie ist?

Dirk FrankenWestfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster

[email protected]

Der sog. Intentionalismus ist derzeit eine der stärksten Posi-tionen innerhalb der Philosophie des Geistes. Sie lässt sich(teilweise) durch folgende Thesen charakterisieren:

Die These von der Transparenz der Erfahrung: In einer be-wussten Erfahrung haben wir von nichts anderem Bewusstseinals von den Gegenständen der Erfahrung.

Die These des direkten Realismus: Die Gegenstände bewuss-ter Erfahrungen (wirklichkeitsgetreuer ebenso wie nicht-wirk-lichkeitsgetreuer) sind physische Gegenstände.

In seinem Aufsatz How Do You Know You are Not a Zombie?hat mit Fred Dretske ausgerechnet einer ihrer bedeutendstenVertreter auf ein bemerkenswertes Problem dieser Positionhingewiesen: Da physische Gegenstände so sind wie sie sind,unabhängig davon, ob jemand ein bewusste Erfahrung vonihnen hat, gilt: Wenn wir uns in unseren bewussten Erfahrun-gen ausschließlich physischer Gegenstände bewusst sind (d. i.wenn die These von der Transparenz der Erfahrung und dieThese des direkten Realismus wahr sind), kann uns nichts, des-

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sen wir uns in unseren bewussten Erfahrungen bewusst sind,einen Hinweis darauf geben, dass wir diese bewussten Erfah-rungen haben. Tatsächlich scheinen wir jedoch gerade dies –in Dretskes Worten – »auf nicht-inferentielle und autoritativeWeise« zu wissen.

Dretskes überraschende Lösung ist, dass dieser Eindruck aufeiner Verwechslung beruhe. Was wir auf nicht-inferentielle undautoritative Weise wissen, sei, wovon wir bewusste Erfahrun-gen haben, nicht aber, dass wir bewusste Erfahrungen haben.

Dretske übersieht in seiner Lösung jedoch einen wichtigenAspekt unseres Selbst-Wissens. Wir wissen nicht nur auf nicht-inferentielle und autoritative Weise, wovon wir bewusste Erfah-rungen haben, wir wissen auf diese Weise auch, dass wir essind, die diese Erfahrung haben. Aus diesem zweiten Aspektdes Selbst-Wissens ergibt sich ein, zu Dretskes ursprünglichemProblem analoges, Problem. Wenn die These von der Trans-parenz der Erfahrung und die These des direkten Realismuswahr sind, kann uns nichts, dessen wir uns in einer Erfahrungbewusst sind, einen Hinweis darauf geben, dass wir es sind,die diese Erfahrung haben. Für dieses Problem gibt es jedochkeine, zu Dretskes ursprünglicher Lösung analoge, Lösung. Wirhaben es dementsprechend mit einem ernsten Problem fürden Intentionalismus zu tun.

P 3.1 GlauerMechanistic Reduction

Ramiro David GlauerUniversität [email protected]

Quite a number of proponents of mechanistic accounts ofexplanation argue that mechanistic explanations are anti-reductionistic, prominently among them Bill Bechtel and CarlCraver. Craver, for instance, argues that mechanistic explana-tion is inherently multilevel. And Bechtel claims, among otherthings, that the organization of a mechanism is an interlevelrelation and that the environment of mechanisms, i.e. aspectsof the higher level, plays a role in mechanistic explanations.But when carefully assessed, none of the arguments identi-fiable for mechanism’s alleged anti-reductionistic character issatisfactory or speaks for a substantial form of anti-reductio-nism. In case of the mentioned arguments, it can be shownthat the multilevel character of mechanistic explanation isto be expected of any micro-reductive explanation; that theorganization of a mechanism is constituted by relations bet-ween components, not between components and the systemas a whole; and that environmental boundary conditions donot make mechanistic explanations non-reductive, but merelyrestrict the scope of reductive explanations. Ultimately, onlyan argument presented by Bechtel to the effect that mecha-nistic explanations are local and stepwise and that, therefore,mechanism is incompatible with a comprehensive reductionof everything to some fundamental level seems to be convin-cing. The result is that mechanistic explanation is a reductiveform of explanation, but that reductions are (bound to be)local or at best regional.

Gruschke/Lanius P 1.4Theorien semantischer Vagheit –

getestet an semantischer Vagheit im Recht

Daniel GruschkeHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

David LaniusHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin

[email protected]

Vage Prädikate sind in natürlichen Sprachen allgegenwärtig.Man muss nach Prädikaten suchen, die sich nicht so verhaltenwie »reich«, »rot« oder »jung«. Prädikatsvagheit ist aus zweiGründen philosophisch interessant: Zum einen lassen vagePrädikate Grenzfälle zu, also Fälle, in denen für kompetenteSprecher, die über alle relevanten Informationen verfügen,unklar ist, ob das fragliche Prädikat zutrifft oder nicht. Zumanderen können vage Prädikate das Sorites-Paradox hervor-rufen. Ein seit der Antike bekanntes Beispiel ist das Prädikat»ist ein Haufen«. Ein einziges Korn ergibt offensichtlich kei-nen Haufen. Ferner kann ein Korn keinen Unterschied dafürmachen, ob eine Ansammlung von Körnern ein Haufen ist.Also ergibt keine noch so große Anzahl an Körnern einen Hau-fen.

Beide Phänomene berühren fundamentale logische Prinzi-pien. Es überrascht daher nicht, dass Prädikatsvagheit in letz-ter Zeit zu einem intensiv bearbeiteten Forschungsgebiet derPhilosophie avanciert ist. Als Ergebnis dessen konkurrierenmittlerweile ein gutes Dutzend Theoriefamilien um Akzeptanzals die richtige Theorie. Doch nach welchen Kriterien soll dieserStreit entschieden werden? Scott Soames hat dazu vorgeschla-gen, die verschiedenen Theorien einfach einem Tauglichkeits-test zu unterziehen; sie also darauf hin zu überprüfen, ob siein außerphilosophischen Gebieten, in denen Vagheit zum Pro-blem wird, anwendbar sind und welche Resultate sie liefern.Diesen Vorschlag greifen wir in unserem Poster auf. Als Test-gebiet haben wir das Recht gewählt, wo das Thema vager Prä-dikate bisweilen unter dem Stichwort »unbestimmte Rechts-begriffe« diskutiert wird. Vagheit ist für das Recht besondersproblematisch, weil Gerichte auch in Grenzfällen begründetUrteile fällen müssen und rechtliche Abgrenzungen, die mit-hilfe vager Prädikate in Rechtsnormen vorgenommen wurden,durch Sorites-Argumentationen unterlaufen werden können.Eine Vagheitstheorie, die diese Probleme im Recht entschärfenoder gar lösen kann, ist vermutlich besser als eine, die dazunicht imstande ist. Wir haben Fuzzy-Logik, Supervaluationis-mus, Epistemizismus und Kontextualismus darauf hin unter-sucht, ob und mit welchem Ergebnis sie im Recht anwendbarsind. Die Resultate präsentieren wir in unserem Poster.

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P 1.5 HarthFaultless Disagreement, Relative Truth and

Superassertibility

Manfred HarthLudwig-Maximilians-Universität München

[email protected]

The aim of this paper is to explore the prospects of a form ofrelativism that is supposed to be an alternative to semanticor formal truth-relativism, a semantic account of some selec-ted region of discourse that relativizes the truth predicateapplied to the propositions of that region. I shall focus onethical discourse, which has the advantage that the possibi-lity of so-called faultless disagreement is not something tobe explained by any relativist theory but, presumably, merelyone option to spell out such a position, viz. formal truth-rela-tivism. Yet I envisage an alternative form of truth-relativismthat I call substantial truth-relativism. It is the view that theproperty of truth has to be relativized rather than the con-cept or the truth predicate. Truth is then conceived of as so-called superassertibility: P is superassertible iff it is assertiblein the actually accessible state of information of the assessorof P and remains so no matter what improvements are madeto it. Moreover, it is supposed that both P and not-P may besuperassertible based on two distinct initial states of infor-mation. However, substantial truth-relativism faces a seriousproblem: its relativized superassertibility predicate doesn’tsatisfy the Equivalence Schema, which is to say that relativesuperassertibility isn’t truth (if it is granted that the validityof the Equivalence Schema is an adequacy condition for anytheory of truth). The only rescue for the envisaged shape ofrelativism, I shall argue, is to abstain from relativizing supe-rassertibility. Yet the question then is whether the resultingposition – I term it superassertibilism – is worth to be calledrelativism at all. Anyway, what kind of account deserves thistitle? Concluding my paper, I argue that superassertibilismis able to embrace epistemic relativism and, moreover, it isin a position to deny rampant realism – which also is able toembrace epistemic relativism – without being committed toaccepting the possibility of faultless disagreement. So, finally,there seems to be no reason to deny superassertibilism thestatus of a genuine relativist position.

P 3.2 HillerbrandComputer simulation –

The future of experimentor theoretical phantasies?

Epistemic aspects of numerical experiments

Rafaela HillerbrandRWTH Aachen University

[email protected]

The success of computational sciences has prompted a heateddebate within philosophy of science on the epistemic status ofcomputer simulations. while some authors see computer simu-lations more as non-empirical phantasies than serious scienti-fic instruments, others articulate the antithetic view and claimthat computer simulations are not only methodologically, butalso epistemically on a par with material experiments.

By introducing a three-fold classification of computer simu-lations as regards their epistemic aim, this paper aims notonly to harmonize this opposing views, but also to provide abridge between the case-study analysis in the field and moregeneralized arguments on the epistemic status of computersimulations per se.

Jansen P 7.1Hilfe unter Freunden: Pflicht oder Neigung?

Über das Handeln in informellen Institutionen

Ludger JansenUniversität Rostock

RWTH [email protected]

John Searle (2005, 2010) mischt in seiner Analyse sozialer Enti-täten Elemente, die zu formellen Institutionen gehören mitsolchen, die zu informellen Institutionen gehören. Zu formel-len Institutionen gehören explizite Statuszuschreibungen unddie damit verbundenen Übertragung »deontischer Kräfte«,also von Rechten und Pflichten. Zu informellen Institutionengehört hingegen die Verankerung in den komplexen Verhal-tensdispositionen, die durch den »Background« konstituiertwerden, d. h. durch die neuronalen Netze unserer Gehirne.

Um diese Analyse aufrecht zu erhalten, müssen auch mitinformellen Institutionen wie Freundschaften genauso Rechteund Pflichten verbunden sein wie mit einer formellen Insti-tution wie einer Ehe. Aber eine Ehe wird explizit geschlossenunter gesetzlich genau bestimmten Bedingungen; für Freund-schaften gilt dies nicht. Trotzdem fühlen wir uns unserenFreunden gegenüber in besonderem Maße verpflichtet. Ver-schiedene Erklärungsstrategien kommen in Betracht:1. Freundespflichten sind bloßer Schein. In Wirklichkeit lie-gen unserem Handeln bloße Verhaltensdispositionen zugrun-de.2. Es gibt Pflichten gegenüber Freunden, aber nicht gegen-über Freunden als solchen (sondern als Spezialfälle von allge-meinen Normsätzen oder aufgrund von individuellen Verspre-chungen).3. Es gibt Pflichten gegenüber Freunden als solchen. Dannaber müssen diese Pflichten ebenso graduell und vage sein,wie das Phänomen der Freundschaft.

Position 1 und 2 sind miteinander kompatibel. Gemeinsamerklären sie sowohl, warum wir sowohl, warum wir nur einigenals Freund beistehen und warum wir uns aber dafür auch ver-pflichtet fühlen. Position 3 scheint mir hingegen mit zu vielenProblemen belastet zu sein und nicht wirklich eine zufrieden-stellende Antwort geben zu können auf die Frage nach demFundament einer bestimmten Freundespflicht. Dies ist nichtnur in Freundschaften so, sondern allgemein in informellenInstitutionen. Und das zeigt, dass man in der sozialontologi-schen Analyse tatsächlich klarer als Searle dies tut zwischenden formellen und informellen Aspekten der sozialen Wirklich-keit unterscheiden muss.

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P 4.6 LaanpereConstructive Memory and Memory Traces

Taavi LaanpereUniversity of Tartu (Estonia)

[email protected]

In this presentation, I am going to 1) introduce two recentphilosophical analyses of memory – one by Sven Berneckerand another by Kourken Michaelian – attempting to accommo-date developments in cognitive neuroscience of memory and2) evaluate their merits in that aspect. In empirical memoryresearch, it is commonplace to consider memory as an activeand (re)constructive faculty, rather than a passive storagedevice designed to retain unaltered mental contents from pre-vious experiences. Bernecker (and to a lesser extent Michae-lian) wish to maintain a distinction between remembering andother, more constructive mental processes such as confabu-lation or inference, while also acknowledging that a memorystate should not be required to have type-identical contentswith some previous mental state. I argue that while bothaccounts are relatively successful in modifying their contentcondition, there is a tension between constructivist pictureof memory and the causal connection condition proposed byboth authors. Bernecker and Michaelian include the notionof causation through a contiguous chain of memory tracesin their analyses to exclude deviant causal chains from pro-ducing genuine memories. Memory traces are some to-be-specified intracerebral occurrences retaining mental contentsfrom some previous experience. I argue that referring to tra-ces leads to a dilemma – either one makes the notion ofa memory trace too strong, in which case the philosophi-cal analysis would dictate neuroscientists what they shouldbe looking for in the brain; or one makes it too weak, inwhich case it doesn’t help to determine the cases of genu-ine remembering from other forms of representation. Howe-ver, I also find that in Michaelian’s analysis, the introduc-tion of traces is redundant anyway – reference to causationvia »properly functioning memory systems« can be appliedto do all the work that the traces were originally suppo-sed to do, while also appreciating the constructive natureof memory.

P 1.6 LeahyLogical Consequence in aTeleosemantic Framework

Brian LeahyUniversität Konstanz

[email protected]

The aim of this talk is to outline the nature of logical con-sequence in the semantic framework developed in Millikan’sLanguage, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (1984). Itbegins by demonstrating some features of how classical logicunderstands the construction of complex formulae and howthis understanding impacts the resulting theories of logicalconsequence. In particular, complex well-formed formulae(wffs) are constructed by the repeatable application of con-catenation rules to primitive wffs. It then demonstrates howMillikan’s theory understands the construction of formulae

(complex and otherwise). On Millikan’s theory there are noconcatenation rules; signs cannot be broken down into parts.Rather systems of signs can be analyzed into variant and inva-riant aspects with contrary-ranges for each variant aspect. Aparticular sign is the product of each variant aspect takingsome particular value from its contrary-range. Importantly,from this it follows that every sign in a single signalling sys-tem determines values for the same set of variable aspects.From this, and the fact that not every sign in a natural lan-guage determines values for the same set of variable aspects,it follows that not every sign in a natural language is a signin a single signalling system. Rather we should see a naturallanguage as a set of signalling systems.

The paper then shows how this difference forces her to takea different stance on the nature of logical consequence, inparticular because there need not be any logical constants.Logical consequence needs to be understood as a relationshipbetween members of different signalling systems. Fortunatelynatural languages comprise a set of signalling systems, andso relations of logical consequence can hold amongst signalsin a natural language.

The paper concludes by outlining and evaluating two dif-ferent available approaches to logical consequence for theteleosemanticist.

Leerhoff P 3.3Worrall zu Theorienunterbestimmtheit

und Strukturenrealismus.Wirklich kein Problem?

Holger LeerhoffAmt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg

Universität [email protected]

Im Rahmen der wissenschaftstheoretischen Realismusdebattewird von antirealistischer Seite das Argument der Theorienun-terbestimmtheit ins Feld geführt, welches besagt, dass zu jederwissenschaftlichen Theorie dieser widersprechende Alterna-tivtheorien existieren, die den empirischen Phänomenen ingleicher Weise gerecht werden. Eine Variante des Realismus istder Strukturenrealismus, der den realistischen »Glauben an dieExistenz« und an die Wahrheit von Theorien einschränkt: Nichtmehr Entitäten und Strukturen der Wirklichkeit sind ontolo-gisch relevant und für die Wahrheit der Theorien entschei-dend, sondern nur noch die Strukturen. Der Strukturenrealis-mus steht, so dessen Verfechter, im Lichte der antirealistischenArgumente besser dar als der »normale« wissenschaftlicheRealismus. Insbesondere, so Worrall (2009), ist er gegen dasTheorienunterbestimmtheits-Argument immun.

Worrall analysiert dazu das Konzept der empirischen Stüt-zung von Theorien und unterscheidet in diesem Zusammen-hang zwischen empirischer StützungB, die sich nur auf Beob-achtungsdaten bezieht, und empirischer StützungBS, bei derneben den Beobachtungsdaten auch die in der ramseyfiziertenForm der Theorien impliziten Aussagen über Strukturen desUnbeobachtbaren Berücksichtigung finden. Während das Kon-zept der empirischen StützungB in der Literatur weit verbreitetist, ist Worralls Ergänzung um die Strukturebene ein Novum.Auf dieser Grundlage kommt Worrall zu dem Schluss, dassder Strukturenrealismus (anders als der »normale« Realismus)gegen alle relevanten Fälle von Theorienunterbestimmtheit –

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solche empirisch äquivalentenBS Theorien nämlich – immunist.

Es wird sich zeigen, dass Worralls Argumentation zwarschlüssig und plausibel ist, seine Konzeption von empirischerStützungBS – mit der sein Projekt steht und fällt – aber questionbegging ist und zudem skeptischen Einwänden Tür und Tor öff-net: Eine Beurteilung der Strukturkomponente könnte nämlichnur auf Grundlage extraobservatorischer Kriterien erfolgen,die aber weder eindeutige Ergebnisse liefern noch Garantenfür die Wahrheit von Theorien sind. Ein Rückgriff auf die weni-ger problematische empirische StützungB hingegen würde ausdem Strukturenrealismus einen »verkappten Antirealismus«(Worrall) machen. Von einer Immunisierung des Strukturen-realismus vor Theorienunterbestimmtheit kann folglich keineRede sein.

Worrall, J., »Underdetermination, Realism and EmpiricalEquivalence« in Synthese 180, 2009, 157–172

P 7.2 MeyerMorality & Causality

Marco MeyerUniversity of Oxford (United Kingdom)

[email protected]

The following is an implicit methodological assumption inmuch of applied ethics:

M: Causal differences are not, on their own, morally signifi-cant. Causal differences can only be considered morally signi-ficant if a further, moral reason can be given why they aremorally significant.

I argue that this assumption is misguided. One of thepresuppositions of M is that mere causal differences are notamong the moral reasons that can be invoked to justify trea-ting cases morally differently. Rather, M suggests that oncewe have identified the relevant causal differences betweencases, we need to look at a different bucket of reasons, thatexplain why this causal difference matters. In Trolley pro-blems, for instance, we first describe how a case differs fromanother regarding the causal facts, and then we invoke moralprinciples like the mere means principle or the doctrine ofdouble effect to explain the moral significance of this causaldifference.

To show the importance of M in contemporary appliedethics, I look at one instance in which the principle playsa major role in how a debate in applied ethics has evolved:The debate around Michael Otsuka’s argument for the wrong-ness of killing aggressors in self-defense that are not morallyresponsible for their aggression.

I then look at the principle in more general terms, distin-guishing between two different attitudes towards revising ourmoral commitments in the face of arguments revealing thatthe differences between cases we treat morally different are»merely« causal:

Philosophical Revisionism: If a certain factual difference bet-ween A and B is not plausibly morally relevant considered onits own, we should treat A and B as morally on a par.

Philosophical Conservatism: Accept every factual differenceas making a moral difference, as long as it explains enough ofour moral intuitions across a reasonably broad range of cases.

I argue that we should accept neither of these two views.

One of the things we should demand in each individual casefrom the Philosophical Revisionist is an explanation of why ourintuition that certain »mere« causal differences are morallysignificant should be mistaken.

Mölder P 4.7What the mind is made of

Bruno MölderUniversity of Tartu (Estonia)

[email protected]

There are two implicit assumptions in the philosophy of mind.There is the Mentalist Assumption: the mind is solely composedof mental states and the Folk Assumption: mental states areindividuated through folk psychology. Together, these twoassumptions yield the Folk-Mentalist Thesis (FMT): the mindis solely composed of mental states as individuated by folkpsychology.

FMT seems too narrow, for there are several phenomenathat are related to the mind, but seem to be left out by FMT.These include (a) processes happening at the time-scale soshort that the usual conceptual distinctions of folk psycho-logy do not apply; (b) certain psychological structures makingup consciousness and other features of consciousness thatcannot be characterised as mental states (e.g., the unity ofconsciousness, operative intentionality, the affordance of cer-tain situations); (c) intersubjective processes through whichwe understand other people.

FMT can be attacked by criticising the Folk Assumption (byacknowledging the relevance of psychology and the neuros-ciences to the individuation of mental states) and by criti-cising the Mentalist Assumption. In both cases, the crucialquestion is what makes a phenomenon mental. In the firstcase, there is the question how can psychology and neuros-cience play a role in individuating the phenomena that areregarded as mental. In the second case, there is the questionwhy count the troublesome phenomena as mental.

The mental is a concept for which there are multiple suffi-cient criteria: according to the folk psychological criterion, aphenomenon is mental in case it is individuated in folk psy-chological terms; according to the experiential criterion, aphenomenon is mental in case having it is experiencing some-thing.

Given this, psychology and neuroscience can play a rolein the individuation of mental phenomena for two reasons:1) they help to extend and develop folk psychology; 2) theytarget the processes that have effects on experiences and thusthey would be relevant also to what counts as experiential.Accordingly, we can keep the Revised Folk-Mentalist Thesis: themind is solely composed of mental phenomena as individua-ted by folk psychology and its scientific extensions.

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P 8.2 MukerjiThe Case Against Consequentialism –

Reconsidered

Nikil S. MukerjiTechnische Universität München

[email protected]

Critics of consequentialism often point out that the doctrinehas many counter-intuitive implications and should thereforebe rejected. In recent times, consequentialists have increasin-gly used a strategy of »interpretative divergence« to rebutsuch charges. They have made ample use of the conceptualdegrees of freedom that the notion of consequentialism allowsin order to argue that common criticisms do not apply. E.g.,some critics have assumed that the notion of a consequenceis to be understood in an objective (rather than subjective)sense, that it is the aggregate value (rather than other fea-tures) of consequences which matters and that this value isdetermined by a metric of well-being which attaches equalweight to each individuals’ interests. On the basis of these sti-pulations they have pointed out, e.g., that consequentialismviolates the principle Ought-implies-Can, because no agentcan foresee the objective consequences of her acts. They haveprotested that consequentialism is insensitive to distributiveconcerns, as it only considers aggregate value. Or they haveobjected that consequentialism is incompatible with a specialconcern for those near and dear to us, as it forces moral agentsto attach equal weight to everyone’s well-being. Consequen-tialists can dodge these objections simply by pointing out thattheir version of the doctrine employs a subjective notion of aconsequence, does not rely on aggregation and does, contraryto their critics’ assumption, allow us to give special weightto our nearest and dearest. Consequentialists can apparentlydodge each individual objection in that way. Critiquing thedoctrine can, hence, become quite a pesky undertaking. Inmy paper I shall present a new approach to conceptualisingconsequentialism which opens up a new perspective on thedebate. This approach makes it possible to devise a methodof critique from which consequentialists cannot escape usingmere interpretative tricks. Finally, if time permits, I shall pre-sent a tentative case against consequentialism which drawson my method.

P 2.1 MulderThe Essentialist Inference

Jesse Merijn MulderUniversiteit Utrecht (Netherlands)

[email protected]

It is often claimed that principles of individuation imply essen-tial properties of the things individuated: sets are individuatedby their members, hence sets have their members essentially.I analyze this type of inference and defend its cogency undercertain specific conditions having to do with ontology in gene-ral. To that effect, I first discuss this essentialist inferencefrom a formal point of view. It turns that, although there is aform which all principles of individuation have in common, itis not true that any statement of that form licenses essentia-list conclusions, hence there is no valid inference based purely

on that form. However, I argue that there is a viable versionof the essentialist inference nonetheless. The resources for aproper reconstruction of this type of inference can be gathe-red from reflections upon the role principles of individuationplay in the project of the ontologist. An ontology typicallyprovides a list of fundamental categories to which everythingthat exists can be reduced by way of the following recipe:for any non-basic kind K, there is a basic ontological categoryC such that K’s are just C’s satisfying a certain set of con-ditions G. Thus, bachelors are just human beings satisfyingthe conditions being male and being unmarried (roughly).Whether or not the conditions can be satisfactorily spelledout or rather remain vague (for instance, because of ›familyresemblance‹), is irrelevant – the ontologist merely claimsthat the individuation of non-basic kinds of things dependsupon the individuation of the basic categories. The essentia-list inference only goes through when dealing with a principleof individuation for such basic ontological categories. For anynon-basic kind K, we may intelligibly hold that for any givenK it is possible that it is not-K, because its individuation doesnot depend on its being K but rather on the ontological cate-gory to which K reduces – e.g., for any given bachelor it ispossible that he is married. Since the individuation of a basicontological category C is sui generis, no C can possibly fail tobe C. That is precisely what the essentialist inference amountsto. And, since some categories are bound to be basic, someessentialism is simply inescapable.

Nagel P 7.3Neuronale Plastizität und Autonomie –

Chancen und Risiken des zunehmenden Wissensüber die Veränderbarkeit des Gehirns

Saskia K. NagelUniversität Osnabrück

[email protected]

Die moderne Lebenswelt ist geprägt von Prozessen der Indi-vidualisierung und Pluralisierung, die sich in vielen Lebens-bereichen durch einen enormen Zuwachs von Optionen, diedem Einzelnen zur Wahl stehen ausdrücken. Der Raum, in demautonom entschieden werden kann, weitet sich zunehmendaus. Neurowissenschaftliche Forschung leistet einen zentra-len Beitrag zum Wachstum der Optionsspielräume, der Men-schen existentiell betrifft. Sie zeigt die lebenslange Verän-derbarkeit des Gehirns, das durch vielfältige Interventionenbeeinflussbar ist. Neuronale Plastizität eröffnet Potentiale fürklinische Anwendungen, und sie erlaubt gezielte Maßnahmenzur Selbstgestaltung, die von Trainings, Ernährung und Psy-chopharmaka bis zu neurotechnologischen Interventionen rei-chen. Besonders viel diskutiert ist im Bereich der Selbstgestal-tung in letzter Zeit das so genannte Neuro-enhancement, dasden Einsatz von Medikamenten zur Steigerung von Leistun-gen bei Gesunden beschreibt. Die wachsenden Handlungsspiel-räume sind ambivalent zu bewerten: Unbestritten ist der Wertvon Autonomiezuwachs. Die Möglichkeit, selbstbestimmt Ent-scheidungen über seine persönliche Entwicklung treffen zukönnen, ist bereichernd und motiviert, seine Möglichkeitenzu nutzen. Psychologische und ökonomische Studien zeigenjedoch, dass ein Übermaß an Optionen belastet. Die Präsenzder Techniken zur Selbstgestaltung geht einher mit steigenderVerantwortlichkeit für die eigenen Geistesleistungen. Es wird

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eine nahezu grenzenlose Verfügbarkeit des eigenen Seins sug-geriert. Die sich ergebenden Handlungsoptionen für persönli-che Entwicklung führen zu einem neuen Ausmaß an Autono-mie: Es wird nicht mehr nur gewählt, was man haben möchte,wie man sein Leben gestalten möchte, mit wem man seinmöchte, sondern es gilt auch, sich selbst zu gestalten, seineeigenen Persönlichkeit bis ins hohe Alter auszuarbeiten. Werwir sind, wie wir fühlen und handeln, scheint mehr in unse-ren Verantwortungsbereich gerückt und wird es weiter tun.Die Verantwortung für eine Selbstgestaltung, die den eige-nen und fremden Anforderungen entspricht, liegt zunehmendbeim Einzelnen. Diese Verantwortlichkeit droht, den Einzelnenzu überfordern und zu Desorientierung und Stabilitätsverlustzu führen. Ich argumentiere hier für eine sensible Betrach-tung der Verschiebung der Verantwortungsbereiche bezüglichexistenzieller Fragen. Die Chancen, die Plastizität bringt, sol-len genutzt werden. Dafür muss die wachsende Kenntnis überplastische Prozesse durch eine Förderung der Kompetenz zurSelbstbestimmung begleitet werden, um einen wohltuendenUmgang zu ermöglichen.

P 2.2 Oliva CórdobaThe point of action

Michael Oliva CórdobaUniversität Hamburg

[email protected]

Is every action extended in time? Call the view given by anaffirmative view to this question the durational view. It is aview touching upon the metaphysics and ontology of acti-ons and events, and it seems many theorists would happilyaccept it. After all, aren’t all actions either themselves bodilymovements or at least ultimately linked very closely to suchevents? In this talk, I motivate and propose a negative answerby alluding to considerations pertaining to the ontology ofevents, the semantics of achievement verbs and the natureof speech acts. My result will be that we seem to be forcedto admit point actions, i.e. actions with temporal position butwithout temporal extension. Another upshot is that the ideathat necessarily an event is an action only if is under controlof its executor or subject to his or her guidance (cf. Frankfurt1978, 73) will not work – at least not, if (as they most naturallyare) control or guidance are conceived of as being effectivesimultaneously to the execution of the action and are beingunderstood as requiring at least a certain duration.

Frankfurt, Harry G. 1978: ›The Problem of Action‹, in his2009, pp. 69–79.

– 2009: The Importance of What We Care About: Philoso-phical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Prien P 1.7Illokutionäre Rollen

und die Normativität der Bedeutung

Bernd PrienUniversität Vechta

[email protected]

Es gibt eine ausgedehnte Debatte darüber, ob Bedeutungnormativ ist. Diese Frage ist von Gewicht, weil von der Ant-wort auf diese Frage die Möglichkeit einer naturalistischenTheorie der Bedeutung abhängt. In dieser Debatte herrschtweitgehend Konsens darüber, dass es nicht hinreicht, auf dieExistenz von Korrektheitsbedingungen zu verweisen, sonderndass gezeigt werden muss, dass aus dem Umstand, dass einWort etwas bedeutet, Präskriptionen über seinen Gebrauchfolgen. Nun hat es sich allerdings als schwierig erwiesen,aus den unbestrittenen Bestehen von Korrektheitsbedingun-gen allein die Gültigkeit von Präskriptionen abzuleiten. Dassman einen Ausdruck gemäß seinen Korrektheitsbedingungenanwenden sollte, gilt nämlich nur, sofern man die Wahrheitsagen möchte.

In diesem Punkt würde ich letztlich den Argumenten derAnti-Normativisten zustimmen, glaube aber, dass sich aufeinem alternativen Weg zeigen lässt, dass Bedeutung Prä-skriptionen impliziert. Und zwar besteht die Bedeutung vonSprechakten normalerweise nicht nur darin, dass sie einen pro-positionalen Gehalt haben, sondern auch darin, dass sie eineillokutionäre Rolle spielen. Viele dieser illokutionären Rollenlassen sich jedoch nur mit Hilfe normativer Folgen analysie-ren, also so, dass durch sie der Sprecher, der Hörer und andereBeteiligte das Recht oder die Pflicht auferlegt wird, bestimmteHandlungen zu vollziehen.

Die Überlegung, dass zwar nicht aus dem Vorliegen vonBedingungen der Korrekten Anwendung, wohl aber aus demSpielen einer illokutionären Rolle das Gelten von Präskrip-tionen folgt, deutet eine Sichtweise an, nach der zwar einenaturalistische Theorie repräsentationaler Zustände möglichist, wie Tiere und Computer sie anscheinend besitzen, aberkeine naturalistische Theorie von Sprechakten, wie sie vonMenschen vollzogen werden.

Rellihan P 4.8A Dilemma for Double-Aspect Theories

of Consciousness

Matthew John RellihanSeattle University (United States)

[email protected]

Double-aspect theories of consciousness hold that mind andmatter are but two aspects of a single underlying reality.According to these theories, the phenomenal properties ofconscious experience are simply the intrinsic properties of thevery physical objects whose extrinsic, causal properties areinvestigated by science. This is an attractive picture, for itpromises to combine the virtues of dualism and physicalismwithout falling into either extreme. This promise, however,proves illusory. I argue that double-aspect theories are facedwith a dilemma, one horn of which leads us back into dualism,the other horn of which leads us back into physicalism.

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I argue for this dilemma by means of the principle thata state’s intrinsic properties cannot be changed merely bychanging its counterfactual causal role – what would havecaused the state or what the state would have caused in cer-tain counterfactual situations. When we change a consciousstate’s counterfactual causal profile, we thereby change itsextrinsic physical properties. But do we also change its pheno-menal properties? Do we change what it’s like for a consciousbeing to undergo such a state? If we do, then phenomenalproperties are extrinsic after all, and the argument that con-sciousness cannot be reductively explained in terms of morefamiliar physical properties loses all of its bite. If we do not,then consciousness would appear to float free from the phy-sical, and double-aspect theories collapse into a particularlyextreme form of dualism.

I develop this dilemma in considerably more detail, respon-ding to potential objections along the way. Much of my focusis on David Chalmers’ version of double-aspect theory, accor-ding to which it is informational states that have both pheno-menal and physical aspects. Chalmers’ is the most plausibleand detailed version of double-aspect theory yet developed,but, as I show, it faces a particularly virulent form of thisdilemma. I conclude by arguing that it is independently quiteplausible that physical states are constituted by their extrinsicrelations and phenomenal states by their intrinsic propertiesand that it is therefore the dualistic horn of the dilemma thatwe are compelled to choose. Thus, the very dilemma thatrefutes double-aspect theories of consciousness also servesas a powerful argument for a dualistic theory of phenomenalconsciousness.

P 4.9 Sánchez GuerreroMixed Emotions in Social Context:

Defending the Notion of Caring-With

H. Andrés Sánchez GuerreroUniversität Osnabrück

[email protected]

There are situations in which we can easily recognize that thesource of our ›emotional ambivalence‹ lies on the fact thatsome of our interests are purely individual while others areinterests we have in virtue of our constituting certain socialgroups. In this paper, I defend a view on collective affectiveintentionality by showing that these situations do not reallyrender it problematic.

Characterizing those situations in which we are inclined tospeak of a collective affective intentional episode as situationsin which a number of individuals are emotionally actualizinga shared evaluative perspective, I introduce the notion ofcaring-with to refer to a form of human comportment whichdistinctively involves individuals who may be said to ultima-tely be caring about something on behalf of a group they takethemselves to constitute.

I construe the challenge cases of the above-described kindseem to pose to this account in terms of a sort of dilemma.What these situations seem to show is: either that the modeof comportment I call ›caring-with‹ is merely instrumental,or that we have to abandon the idea of a unified and, for themost part, rationally coherent evaluative perspective whichallows us to understand emotions as states that disclose theimport something has to someone.

I begin to answer to this challenge by appealing to thethought that one could be differentially directed towards oneand the same situation by adopting diverse evaluative pointsof view. Subsequently, I make room for the idea that two emo-tions may co-occur in experience in a not merely dispositionalsense by recurring to the distinction between the backgroundand the foreground of an experiential episode. Finally, I tacklethe issue of the aspectuality of the self-conception implicitin our intentional acts and try to dispel the impression thatthe above-mentioned situations necessarily make evident asort of divided evaluative perspective. In so doing, I try toshow that caring-with is a human possibility and a way inwhich one can press ahead into one’s personal possibilitieswhile genuinely caring about a group one takes oneself toconstitute.

Schleidgen P 7.4Zur Notwendigkeit adäquater Theoriebildung

für eine erfolgreiche Umsetzungnachhaltiger Entwicklung

Sebastian SchleidgenLudwig-Maximilians-Universität München

[email protected]

Nachhaltige Entwicklung hat sich in den letzten zwei Jahr-zehnten zu einem allgegenwärtigen Terminus sowie zu einemder zentralen Leitbilder in Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft undWissenschaft entwickelt. Dennoch ist es faktisch nicht gut umdie Umsetzung nachhaltiger Entwicklung bestellt.

Dies ist zunächst darin begründet, dass es sich beim moder-nen Begriff nachhaltiger Entwicklung um ein essentially con-testable concept handelt, mithin um einen normativen Begriff,über deren Wert und Bedeutung sich die gesellschaftlichenAkteure nur im weitesten Sinne einig sind (vgl. Gallie 1956:167–198). Keine Einigkeit wiederum besteht mit Blick auf diekonkrete Bedeutung des Begriffs nachhaltiger Entwicklung.Vielmehr scheinen wir es mit einer Situation zu tun zu haben,in der »[. . . ] fast alles zur Nachhaltigkeit gezählt werden kannund nachhaltig ist« (Stappen 2008: 5). Wo aber keine Einig-keit über die konkrete Bedeutung eines Konzepts vorliegt, isttrivialerweise eine Einigung über die praktische Umsetzungdieses Konzepts ebenso unmöglich. Dies wiederum erschwerteine erfolgreiche Umsetzung nachhaltiger Entwicklung, wennes sie nicht sogar unmöglich macht.

Die Ursache für die Uneinigkeit über die konkrete Bedeutungnachhaltiger Entwicklung nun ergibt sich im Wesentlichen ausdem normativen Charakter des Nachhaltigkeitskonzepts. DieseEinsicht wiederum scheint die schwerwiegende Konsequenz zuhaben, dass Einigkeit über die konkrete Bedeutung nachhal-tiger Entwicklung per se unmöglich ist. Das aber würde auchbedeuten, dass eine erfolgreiche Umsetzung von vornhereinzum Scheitern verurteilt ist.

Vor diesem Hintergrund zeigt mein Poster erstens, dassund warum die Entwicklung von Nachhaltigkeitstheorien zwin-gend notwendig ist auf dem Weg zu einer Einigung über diekonkrete Bedeutung nachhaltiger Entwicklung. Zweitens führeich einen Katalog von Adäquatheitskriterien ein, die die grund-sätzliche Konsensfähigkeit solcher Theorien gewährleistet.

132

Poster / Posters

P 4.10 SchmidAn Unbelievable Truth, or:

Why Beliefs Are No Mental States

Ulla SchmidUniversität Basel (Switzerland)

[email protected]

Beliefs aim at truth (Bernard Williams). Falsities are unbelieva-ble. Sentences of the type ›p is the case, but I don’t believethat p is the case‹ (p & ∼B(I, p)) can neither be believed norasserted, even if they are true. This is a familiar version ofMoore’s Paradox. But why are Moore-paradoxical sentencesunbelievable? And what is its impact on the concept of belief?

In my contribution, I present three attempts to accommo-date Moore’s Paradox in realism with regard to mental states.Realism regarding mental states entails (1) that beliefs aremental phenomena that are objectively identifiable (realistclaim), (2) that psychological concepts represent psychologi-cal states (reference claim), and (3) that identical sentenceshave identical meaning (uniformity claim). I will argue thatMoore’s Paradox cannot be integrated into realism, and that,therefore, realism is wrong.

Whereas a Moore-paradoxical sentence cannot be believedor asserted, it can be supposed or imagined. Although asser-ting / believing the sentence ›p &∼B(I, p)‹ is similar to asser-ting / believing the contradiction ›p &∼p‹, supposing that ›p&∼B(I, p)‹ is not similar to supposing that ›p &∼p‹. Moore’sParadox presents a counter-example to the uniformity claim(3): One and the same content is absurd in one environment,but perfectly fine in another. Identical expressions are notalways identical in meaning.

Moore’s Paradox equally questions the reference claim (2):If the expression ›I (don’t) believe that p‹ was to refer to thepresence (absence) of the belief that p, a Moore-paradoxicalsentence would either not be absurd at all, or, amended by animplicit statement, amount to a contradiction. Both resultsare wrong; hence, Moore’s Paradox overrules the referenceclaim.

Eventually, the realist claim collapses: First, it relies on (2)and (3), and (2) and (3) are wrong. Second, if beliefs wereobjectively identifiable entities, one should be able to enter-tain any attitude towards one’s own beliefs. But one can-not believe a Moore-paradoxical sentence because this wouldamount to ascribing a false belief to oneself and thereby con-tradict the core of the concept of belief, that beliefs aim attruth.

P 4.11 SchmitzThe Role of Direct Perception

in Social Cognition

Laura SchmitzUniversität Osnabrü[email protected]

The question How do we understand other people? has beentraditionally answered by the dominant Theory of Mind (ToM)approach. According to ToM, interpersonal understanding canbe achieved only by gaining access to the mental states hid-den in another person’s mind, i.e. mental state attribution is

essential. Critics of ToM suggest that social cognition usuallyis not a matter of theorizing but one of pragmatic, non-men-talistic interaction. Advocating this alternative view, ShaunGallagher defends an interaction theory (IT) – an accountwhich characterizes a person’s mind not as closed-off but asopenly accessible by means of direct perception of the person’sexpressive behavior (Gallagher, 2005; 2008).

Even though the concept of direct perception plays a crucialrole in his proposal, Gallagher does not clearly define it – areason for misunderstandings and criticism. Hence, answeringthe question whether social phenomena are directly percei-vable or not depends upon a clearer understanding of theunderlying concept of direct perception.

I therefore suggest distinguishing between different typesof perceptual experience: First, there is basic perception,i.e. having basic sensations such as visually experiencing amoving object. Secondly, there is perception as: e.g. the per-ception of the moving object as a moving hand. Then there isperception of action which partly overlaps with perception ofintention: perceiving the moving hand as a waving hand – andpossibly perceiving the intention behind it (i.e. the wavingis a sign of farewell). Finally, there is social perception whichcomprises all those aspects plus the perception of a person’sbody language expressing her mental states: the waving per-son is sad to say goodbye. Of course these types are neit-her experienced sequentially nor do they have clearly definedborders. Additionally, there are inter-individual differences inperceptual ability due to a person’s individual training / expe-rience or cultural background. Thus, some people are able todirectly perceive (social) phenomena which are imperceptiblefor others.

Summing up, I argue that direct perception should beunderstood as a gradational, multilayered experience ratherthan a clear-cut category. Therefore, it seems hardly possibleto draw a line between universally perceptible and impercepti-ble (social) phenomena.

Seitz P 4.12›Embedded Rationalism‹:

A Rationalist’s Guide for Naturalizingthe Notion of Reason

Fabian SeitzGoethe-Universität [email protected]

To analyze the notion of Reason as a natural phenomenon isa still unsolved task. I want to defend the claim that in orderto achieve this, we have to combine both Rationalism andPsychologism. For well-known reasons promoted by Frege,this claim raises some difficulties. On the one hand, it seemsimpossible to derive a rationalistic position from psycholo-gical investigations; on the other, within Psychologism it ishard to comprehend the normative dimension of rationality.I shall offer a diagnosis of these difficulties, as well as presentmy proposal to solve them. I will conclude that (i) withoutRationalism there will be no account of rationality at all, but(ii) the notion of Reason itself entails that empirical investiga-tions are required for an appropriate account. This implicatesthat even a Rationalist has to give support to a naturalisticposition. Such a hybrid I label »Embedded Rationalism«.

133

Poster / Posters

P 8.3 TiefenseeHow to Defend Expressivismagainst anti-Archimedeanism

Christine TiefenseeOtto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg

[email protected]

Expressivists understand their own position as a non-moral,metaethical account. Yet, this understanding has recentlycome under severe pressure from anti-Archimedeans, suchas Dworkin, who proclaim that although it may seem as ifmetaethical accounts are external to moral discourse, they arethemselves built on moral grounds.

My aim is to defend expressivism against what I take tobe the most forceful anti-Archimedean attack, which runs asfollows:(P1) If moral claims are entailed by expressivism, then expres-

sivism is a moral position. (Hume’s Law)(P2) The supervenience thesis is a moral claim.(P3) The supervenience thesis is entailed by expressivism.(C) Hence, expressivism is a moral position.Expressivists are well-advised to take this challenge seriously,as a strong prima facie case can be made for the claim thatexpressivists are committed to each of the three premises.This might be least obvious with regard to (P2). However, Ishow that (P2) also appears to be supported by assumptionsthat expressivists share. The first of these is found in expres-sivists’ recent adoption of minimalism about truth which, inturn, exposes certain metaethical theses as substantive moralclaims. The second concerns the limitation thesis introducedby Blackburn, which arguably rests on moral ascriptions ofmoral (ir)relevance by constraining the supervenience base ofmoral properties.

Despite strong appearances to the contrary, though, Iargue that expressivists can reject (P2). More precisely, Ishow, firstly, that although minimalism does indeed con-vert certain metaethical theses into moral verdicts, this doesnot imply that supervenience is a moral thesis. Secondly,whilst I agree with anti-Archimedeans that the attributionsof moral (ir)relevance which underlie the supervenience the-sis are moral, I argue that these attributions nevertheless donot entail the moral status of supervenience. To demonstratehow this fine balancing act can be achieved, my argumentruns in close parallel to expressivists’ stance on the contestbetween judgement-internalism and judgement-externalism.That is, I suggest that once we understand fully how it can beargued that judgement-internalists win the war even if judge-ment-externalists may win individual battles, we have found ablueprint for the solution to the anti-Archimedean challenge.

Tillas/Seuchter/Vosgerau P 4.13Making the Most of Affordances?

Alex TillasHeinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf

[email protected]

Tim SeuchterHeinrich-Heine-Universität Dü[email protected]


[email protected]

This papers focuses on one of the most controversial notionsin psychology and cognitive science, namely the notion ofaffordances. Our target is to secure the explanatory role thataffordances do have in understanding behavior, while avoi-ding the controversies of ecological psychology in general andof Gibson’s claims in particular. Gibsonians most often try tosecure the explanatory role of affordances by arguing for theobjective nature of affordances and in turn for their directperceivability. We suggest that the explanatory role of affor-dances could be secured on different grounds. Our startingpoint is that affordances are relational properties, which arenot perceived directly but on the basis of the feedback infor-mation that subjects receive when interacting (even uninten-tionally) with their environment. Affordances can be ascribedto objects by agents on the basis of the agents’ unintentio-nal movements as well as their intentions. In this sense, wedepart from traditional ecological psychologists by arguingthat affordances are inherently linked to unintentional move-ments and possible intentional actions. More specifically, itis argued that in virtue of the linkage between affordancesand intentions one could account for the infinite number ofaffordances that any given object could have. Furthermore,perception of affordances and in turn their explanatory valuecould be secured by appealing to objective systematic contin-gencies between movements and perceptual inputs that pro-vide the actor with information about the effects of his/heractions on the environment. It is courtesy of these systematiccontingencies that affordances acquire their objective aspectand are thus perceived universally. For instance, a simple unin-tentional contact with a solid surface suffices for any subjectto gather information about solid objects affording bumpinginto them. On the basis of such unintentionally acquired affor-dances, other affordances could be acquired through intentio-nal movements. Taken together, it is in virtue of this linkagebetween affordances and intentional actions that one couldaccount for the infinite number of affordances that any givenobject seems to have.

134

Poster / Posters

P 4.14 ToomingWhen do we need to talk about desires?

Uku ToomingUniversity of Tartu (Estonia)

[email protected]

In this presentation I give an example of a conceptual genea-logy, pertaining to desires. The larger aim is to show that thegenealogical approach, along the lines of Bernard Williamsand Edward Craig, is also applicable to the concepts of mentalstates in order to demonstrate what they add to the everydaysocial understanding. This can be done by construing a hypo-thetical situation where people lack the requisite conceptsand then ask in what ways the concept in question can enrichthat practice, and what needs it can fulfil. More specifically, Ifocus on Christopher Gauker’s account of propositional atti-tudes which can be interpreted as an exercise in genealogy,having its precedent in the Sellarsian Myth of Jones. I arguethat Gauker’s genealogy, which models the desire-ascriptionson vicarious imperative speech acts, fails to bring out whythere would ever arise a need for the concept of desire. Themain reason is that it doesn’t provide an explanation for thedifference between mere acknowledgments of commands andactual attributions of desires which are also supposed to takeinto account the conative perspective of other people. Butinstead of completely rejecting Gauker’s account of desires, Ipresent a way of amending it. My claim is that the need fortalking specifically about desires enters the scene when thereis a tension between our awareness of another person havingcommanded something and our attribution of a hedonic stateto her which is in tension with the satisfaction condition ofthe command. By accepting that, it is possible to account forthe perspective-sensitivity of desire-attributions and answerthe explanatory need that isn’t gratified by Gauker’s theory.

P 8.4 WagnerCoercion: an excusing condition?

Verena WagnerUniversität Regensburg

[email protected]

An agent who does something that is considered to be morallyblameworthy is excused, if certain conditions are present.Commonly accepted excusing conditions include lack of know-ledge, accident or absence of intention, physical constraint,and coercion. Paradigmatic examples of excusing conditionsthat block moral blame are agents who unintentionally hurtanother person by tripping, after being pushed, or simply bytaking the person for someone else. In my poster presenta-tion, I focus on the latter two excusing conditions, which are,I think, problematic: physical coercion and coerced action.Supported by some examples, I aim at showing that actionsperformed under coercion do not necessarily provide suffi-cient excusing conditions. The common view that coercedactions are to be excused derives its force from a misleadinganalogy that is drawn between physical coercion and coer-ced action. But while physical coercion indeed is an excusingcondition, coerced action, as such, is not. In my presentationI will point out the differences between these two forms of

coercion and I will argue for a definition of coerced action, theconditions of which are not sufficient for excusing the action.I will argue that a further condition must be added in orderto make coerced action excusable. This condition refers to themoral acceptability of an agent’s preference structure thatmakes the agent do something she does not want to do; e.g.to follow the threat »Do F or E happens«. Depending on whatF and E stand for, we do or do not accept the agent’s deci-sion to F. The reason for distinguishing coerced action andexcusable coerced action is this: Whether an agent is coercedinto doing something cannot be decided on moral grounds.But whether an agent is excused for having done something(under coercion) is a matter that has to be decided on moralgrounds. My approach explains why people tend to hold coer-ced action to be excusable in general: they simply take it forgranted that the agent’s preferences are morally acceptable,without realizing this as an independent condition that is notinherent in the concept of coerced action.

Weber P 2.3Theorien vager Objekte

Marc Andree WeberUniversität Freiburg

[email protected]

Ontologische Vagheit oder Vagheit de re ist die Theorie, derzu-folge Vagheitsphänomene ihren Ursprung nicht oder nicht nurin der Sprache haben und die Welt selbst somit vage ist. Was esbedeutet, dass »die Welt selbst« vage ist, lässt sich am Bestenmit Rückgriff auf vage Objekte erläutern: Die Welt ist genaudann vage, wenn es in ihr Objekte gibt, deren räumliche, zeit-liche oder modale Grenzen sich auch dann nicht eindeutigbestimmen lassen, wenn man von sprachlichen oder epistemi-schen Beschränkungen abstrahiert. Eine Definition dieser Artlässt sich allerdings, wie ich darlegen werde, auf zwei Weiseninterpretieren: Man kann ihr zufolge unter vagen Objektenzum einen solche mit Randbereichsunschärfe verstehen, beidenen für manche Atome durch die Beschaffenheit der Weltnicht festgelegt ist, ob sie Teil von ihnen sind, und zum ande-ren vage Objekte als genau diejenigen ansehen, die Identitätzu einer vagen Relation machen. Keine dieser beiden Auffas-sungen vager Objekte impliziert die jeweils andere.

Allerdings ist auch keine von beiden Auffassungen in derLage, die (jeweils verschiedenen) Theorieprobleme auszuräu-men, zu deren Lösung sie überhaupt erst entwickelt wurde.Denn Objekte mit Randbereichsunschärfe haben den Nach-teil, dass ihre Grenzbereiche epistemisch unzugänglich undselbst entweder scharf begrenzt oder hoffnungslos verworrensind. Sie sind daher, so meine erste These, keine natürliche-ren oder klarer individuierten Objekte als die von konkurrie-renden Theorien postulierten Gegenstände. Und Objekte, dieIdentität zu einer vagen Relation machen, funktionieren inder Theorie nur so lange gut, wie man Personen nicht alsvage Objekte auffasst. Tut man dies doch, dann folgt, someine zweite These, dass es unter bestimmten Umständenerstens nicht der Fall ist, dass alle meine Gedanken nur vonmir gedacht werden, und zweitens nicht der Fall ist, dass ichwissen kann, welche von mehreren Personen ich bin.

135

Poster / Posters

P 4.15 WunderNichtwillentliche Aktivität

Andre WunderUniversität Zürich (Switzerland)[email protected]

John Hyman behauptet, dass viele Philosophen die aktiv/passiv Unterscheidung mit der willentlich/nicht-willentlichUnterscheidung vermengen, so dass aktiv und willentlich aufder einen und passiv und unwillentlich auf der anderen Seitegleich gesetzt werden. Nicht-willentliche Aktivität und wil-lentliche Passivität werden deshalb weitestgehend ignoriert.Die Möglichkeit von nicht-willentlicher Aktivität sollten wiraber akzeptieren, so Hyman, weil wir nicht nur von Tieren,die zu willentlichen Handlungen fähig sind, sagen wollen,dass sie etwas tun. Die damit verbundene Vorstellung vonnicht-menschlichen Akteuren teilt Hyman mit anderen Phi-losophen, wie Kenny, Frankfurt und Dretske. Wer oder Wasjedoch außer Menschen noch als Akteur in Frage kommt, dar-über herrscht Uneinigkeit. Für Kenny und Hyman sind es nebenLebewesen auch unbelebte Substanzen (z. B. Salzsäure), wäh-rend Frankfurt und Dretske sich weitestgehend auf belebteAkteure beschränken. Diese Uneinigkeit verweist auf unter-schiedliche Kriterien für die Zuschreibung von Aktivität. Inmeinem Vortrag werde ich die unterschiedlichen Kriterien(Kenny und Hyman einerseits und Dretske andererseits) dar-stellen. Darüber hinaus versuche ich zu zeigen, dass keines derbeiden Kriterien überzeugen kann.

136

Workshops

Philosophical Issues in Belief Revision, ConditionalLogic and Possible World Semantics

W 1 Freitag/Friday, 21.09.09:15–17:50Samstag/Saturday, 22.09.08:30–12:55Raum C 421

Formal Methods in Argument Reconstruction W 2 Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09.17:00–19:40Freitag/Friday, 21.09.09:30–16:00Raum C 422

Causation and Laws in the Special Science.Metaphysical Foundations


Logical and Philosophical Aspects of Real Possibility W 4 Freitag/Friday, 21.09.09:30–18:00Samstag/Saturday, 22.09.09:30–18:15Raum C 423

Immunity to Error through Misidentification andEssential Indexicality


The Scope and Limits of Experimental Ethics W 6 Donnerstag/Thursday, 20.09.17:00–18:45Freitag/Friday, 21.09.09:00–19:00Samstag/Saturday, 22.09.09:00–15:00Raum C 424

Workshops

W 1 Philosophical Issues in Belief Revision, Conditional Logic and PossibleWorld Semantics

The aim of the workshop is to bring together philosophers(related to the GAP, but not limited to it), who work in thearea of belief revision, conditional logic and possible worldssemantics. The workshop shall serve as a platform for theexchange of ideas from these related areas.

Ziel des Workshops ist es, Philosophen aus dem Umfeld derGAP zusammenzubringen, die in den Bereichen Glaubensre-

vision, Konditionallogik und Mögliche-Welten-Semantik arbei-ten. Der Workshop soll als Forum für den Austausch von Ideenaus diesen verwandten Gebieten dienen.

Organisation: Matthias Unterhuber

Freitag/Friday, 21.09.09:15–17:50Raum C 421

09:15–09:2009:20–10:15

10:25–11:20

11:30–12:25

13:30–14:25

14:35–15:30

15:50–16:45

16:55–17:50

Philosophical Issues in Belief Revision, ConditionalLogic and Possible World Semantics(Language: English)

WelcomeIgor Douven (Groningen):Scope Ambiguities and ConditionalsFranz Huber (Toronto):What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case?Matthias Unterhuber (Duesseldorf):Belief Revision from a Conditional Logic PerspectiveHannes Leitgeb (Munich):A New Lottery Paradox for CounterfactualsManfred Kupffer (Frankfurt):Properties of Fat Men – Quantified Modal Logic without Possible IndividualsHolger Andreas (LMU Munich):Paraconsistent Concept Formation in a Belief Revision FrameworkGerhard Schurz (Duesseldorf):Reward and Risk in Reasoning with Uncertain Conditionals

Samstag/Saturday, 22.09.08:30–12:55Raum C 421

08:30–09:25

09:35–10:30

10:50–11:45

11:55–12:50

12:50–12:55

Heinrich Wansing (Bochum):Varieties of ImplicationAndré Fuhrmann (Frankfurt):Knowledge of PossibilitiesSonja Smets (Univ. Amsterdam):Evidence-Based Belief Revision, a Logical AnalysisHans Rott (Regensburg):Two Concepts of Plausibility in Default ReasoningFarewell

138

Workshops

W 2 Formal Methods in Argument Reconstruction

The purpose of this international workshop is to bringtogether researchers who apply formal methods, widely under-stood, to natural language argumentation in order to providea reconstruction which can provide the basis for an evaluation.A related objective is to make the state of the art accessible toaudiences who predominantly reconstruct natural languageargumentation with more traditional formal or informal tools.

Themes addressed at the workshop include: 1. Reconstruc-ting premises and conclusions (logical formalization of indivi-dual sentences and arguments; techniques for identifying andrephrasing premises and conclusions). 2. Reconstructing indi-

vidual arguments (topics, patterns of argument, argumenta-tion schemes, critical questions; reconstruction and evaluationof various types of argument such as inductive arguments,inference to the best explanation, analogies, practical argu-ments; dealing with enthymemes; dimensions of argumentquality). 3. Reconstructing complex argumentation (mappingthe structure of argumentation; evaluating complex argu-ments; argumentation frameworks; dialectical structures).

Organisation: Gregor Betz, Frank Zenker, Georg Brun

Donnerstag/Thursday,20.09.

17:00–19:40Raum C 422

17:00–17:1017:10–17:40

17:40–17:50

17:50–18:1018:10–18:4018:40–19:10

19:10–19:2019:20–19:40

20:15

Formal Methods in Argument Reconstruction(Language: English)

WelcomeCatarina Dutilh Novaes:The formal, the formalized, and the history of logicGeorg Brun:CommentaryDiscussionBreakGeorg Dorn:Logical formalization of argument hierarchiesFriedrich Reinmuth:CommentaryDiscussionDinner


09:30–10:00

10:00–10:10

10:10–10:3010:30–10:5010:50–11:20

11:20–11:30

11:30–11:5011:50–12:0012:00–12:30

12:30–12:40

12:40–13:0013:00–14:0014:00–14:30

14:30–14:40

14:40–15:0015:00–15:1015:10–15:30

15:30–15:40

15:40–16:00

Hans Rott:Argumentation, common ground and presupposition accommodationChristoph Lumer:CommentaryDiscussionBreakHenry Prakken:Argumentation frameworks in AIGregor Betz:CommentaryDiscussionBreakTom Gordon:Evaluating complex legal argumentationMichael Baumgartner:CommentaryDiscussionLunchUlrike Hahn:Bayesian analysis of natural language argumentsFrank Zenker:CommentaryDiscussionBreakDouglas Walton:Formal Aspects of Argument ReconstructionN. N.:CommentaryDiscussion

139

Workshops

W 3 Causation and Laws in the Special Science. Metaphysical Foundations

In recent debates in metaphysics of science, a considerableamount of work has been dedicated to causation and (ceterisparibus) laws in the higher-level or special sciences includingthe life sciences and the social sciences. Assuming some kindof minimal physicalist attitude (such as, at least, non-reduc-tive physicalism), a question arises for accounts of causationand laws in those sciences: how can one explain that thereare causal and nomic facts on the higher-level in a world that

is ultimately described by fundamental physics? To put it ineven more tendentious words: how do these causal and nomicfacts emerge from the physical world? The goal of this work-shop is to explore a metaphysics of causation and laws in thespecial sciences that is able to answer the above-mentionedchallenges.

Organisation: Markus Schrenk, Alexander Reutlinger


09:15–09:3009:30–10:45

10:45–11:1511:15–12:30

12:30–14:0014:00–15:15

15:15–15:4515:45–17:00

17:00–17:3017:30–18:45

Causation and Laws in the Special Science. Metaphysical Foundations(Language: English)

ArrivalBenedikt Kahmen (University of Aachen):Causal Explanations of ActionCoffeeAlyssa Ney (University of Rochester):Fundamental and Derivative Causation »Why metrical properties are not powers«LunchGerhard Müller-Strahl (University of Münster):Explaining Organismic Phenomena in Scientifically Based MedicineCoffeeMarkus Schrenk (University of Cologne):Better Best Systems and the Issue of cp-Laws in the Special SciencesCoffeeHuw Price (University of Cambridge):Retrocausality – what would it take?


09:30–10:45

10:45–11:1511:15–12:30

12:30–14:0014:00–15:15

Andreas Hüttemann (University of Cologne):Why Laws are More Basic than Causal StructureCoffeeJenann Ismael (University of Arizona):Why Causal Structure is More Basic than Global LawsLunchSandra Mitchell (University of Pittsburgh):Biological laws: contingency and stability

140

Workshops

W 4 Logical and Philosophical Aspects of Real Possibility

We live in a world of possibilities. Much of our practical life –planning, deciding, hoping and fearing – only makes sensebefore a background of options to choose from and possibi-lities for what the future will bring: real possibilities in con-crete situations. Such real possibilities are dynamical: theyvanish when they are not actualized. Real possibilities arecommonly represented within branching frameworks such asprovided by the Prior-Thomason account of Branching Timeand Belnap’s theory of Branching Space-Times. In those bran-ching frameworks our world is pictured as a tree of histo-ries branching off from a single past course of events intomultiple possible futures. Work on real possibility has so farbeen mainly technical, e.g., in the formal-logical study of thesemantics of the future tense and the problem of future con-tingents.

In this workshop we want to combine logical and philoso-phical aspects of real possibility. Important logical questionsconcern the interaction of time, modality and quantification.Connected to these logical issues there are questions of inter-pretation: How should a branching structure be understoodin the first place? Are all branches equally real? What is thedifference between branching and divergence? How can indi-viduals be situated within a branching picture? Exploring therelation of real possibility to other notions of possibility isanother desideratum. Metaphysical and physical possibilitiesare prominent in accounts of causality and laws of nature. Therole of real possibilities in metaphysics and in the sciences stillneeds to be assessed.

Organisation: Thomas Müller


09:30–10:0010:00–10:1510:15–11:15

11:15–12:15

12:15–13:3013:30–14:30

14:30–15:30

15:30–16:0016:00–17:00

17:00–18:00

Logical and Philosophical Aspects of Real Possibility(Language: English)

CoffeeIntroductionSara Uckelman:Impossible possibilities in medieval logicNiko Strobach:t. b. a.LunchAntje Rumberg:Real possibilities in a branching frameworkAlex Malpass/Jacek Wawer:A future for the thin red lineCoffeeMichael De:Partial endurantismStephan Torre:Fission and uncertainty about the future


09:30–10:0010:00–11:00

11:00–12:00

12:00–13:3013:30–14:30

14:30–15:30

15:30–16:0016:00–17:00

17:00–17:1517:15–18:15

CoffeeTomasz Placek:On agents’ choicesThomas Müller:Case-intensional branching time: A substantial logicLunchLeszek Wronski:t.b.a.Christian Wüthrich:Humean possibilitiesCoffeeChristopher Hitchcock:The relative a priori and the space of possibilitiesCoffeeDiscussion

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Workshops

W 5 Immunity to Error through Misidentification and Essential Indexicality

The question of self-knowledge asks what is special about theway one knows one’s own mind. One answer is given by thethesis of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM).The thesis holds that introspective self-ascriptions of mentalstates are immune to identification errors. For instance, it isimpossible to have introspective grounds for the belief thatsomeone is hungry yet falsely believe that it is oneself who ishungry.

The primary aim of the workshop is to bring together recentdevelopments in the discussion of immunity to error through

misidentification and explore the connections between IEMand essential indexicality.

The main questions are:– What types of IEM are there? Which thoughts are IEM?– What is the role of identification processes in the explana-

tion of IEM?– Can the absence of identification processes help explain the

essentially indexical nature of certain I-thoughts?

Organisation: Gottfried Vosgerau, Max Seeger


10:00–11:00

11:30–12:30

14:00–15:00

15:30–16:30

17:00–18:00

20:00

Immunity to Error through Misidentification and Essential Indexicality(Language: English)

Gottfried Vosgerau & Max Seeger (Düsseldorf):Welcome and IntroductionJohn Campbell (Berkeley):Another Look at Shoemaker on Self-ReferenceSimon Prosser (St. Andrews):The Structure of Indexical BeliefFrançois Recanati (Paris):Immunity and RelativizationAnnalisa Coliva (Modena):Logical immunity to error through misidentification. What it is and why it mattersWorkshop Dinner


09:00–10:00

10:00–11:00

11:30–12:30

Daniel Morgan (Oxford):What Explains Immunity?Kristina Musholt (London):Immunity to error through misidentification and the content of perceptionMichael Pauen (Berlin):Self-Consciousness and the Immunity to error through misidentification

142

Workshops

W 6 The Scope and Limits of Experimental Ethics

Motivated by the new interest in experimental methods inphilosophy which has been sparked by US-American collea-gues like Joshue Knobe and Joshue Greene, we discuss andexplore the scope of experimental methods in the scientificinvestigation of ethical problems in this workshop. The work-shop features contributions from a broad range of disciplineswhose target questions are of philosophical relevance. Besidesour focus on ethical questions we also discuss contributions

which investigate problems from other philosophical fieldsexperimentally or are otherwise empirically informed ventu-res into philosophical territory. Additionally, we dedicate onesession exclusively to philosophical contributions which criti-cally discuss the role of experimental methods in philosophyin general.

Organisation: Christoph Lütge, Hannes Rusch

Donnerstag/Thursday,20.09.

17:00–18:45Raum C 424

17:00–17:30

17:30–18:15

18:15–18:4518:45

The Scope and Limits of Experimental Ethics(Language: English)

In Medias Res

Christoph Lütge (TU München)Welcome & IntroductionVerena Utikal (FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg)The Attribution of Externalities – An Economic Approach to the Knobe EffectOpening DiscussionInformal get-together


09:00–09:45

09:45–10:30

10:30–11:00

11:00–11:45

11:45–12:30

12:30–13:30

13:30–14:15

14:15–15:00

15:00–15:30

15:30–16:15

16:15–17:00

17:00–17:1517:15–18:00

19:00

Applied Experimental Ethics 1

Matthias Uhl (TU München)Paternalism with HindsightUlrich Frey (JLU Giessen)Environmental Ethics – Value Assignments in the Protection of Species and the Problem ofReliably Measuring such Value AssignmentsCoffee Break

Applied Experimental Ethics 2

Stephan Wolf (ALU Freiburg) Alexander Lenger (GU Frankfurt)Choosing Inequality – An Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Social Immobility on theDemocratic Election of Distributive RulesHannes Rusch & Christoph Lütge (TU München)Smile! Ethical Motivations of Microcredit Lenders?Lunch

On Methodology

Fernando Aguiar (IESA-CSIC Cordoba) Antonio Gaitán (UC3 Madrid)Blanca Rodríguez (UC Madrid)Robust Intuitions and Experimental Ethics: Bringing Reflective Equilibrium to the labAlexander Lenger (GU Frankfurt) Stephan Wolf (ALU Freiburg)The Scope of Behavioral Business Ethics – Preliminary Results from Semi Structured InterviewsCoffee Break

Improving Experimental Philosophy 1

Attila Tanyi & Martin Bruder (Uni Konstanz)Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental ApproachEzio Di Nucci (Uni Duisburg-Essen)The Trolley Problem and the Self-Sacrifice TrilemmaCoffee BreakVerena Wagner (Uni Regensburg)Explaining the Knobe effectDinner at Seerhein Konstanz, Spanierstraße 3, 78467 Konstanz

143

Workshops


08:30–09:15

09:15–10:00

10:00–10:30

10:30–11:15

11:15–12:00

12:00–12:3012:30–13:30

13:30–14:15

14:15–15:00

15:00

Improving Experimental Philosophy 2

Andreas Bunge & A. Skulmowski (Uni Osnabrück)Mapping the Folk Concept of Intentionality: Contexts and Explanations of IntentionalityAscriptionsBenjamin Huppert (Uni Bayreuth)Debunking Arguments and the Psychology of Moral RelevanceCoffee Break

Critical Reflections & Discussion

Nikil Mukerji (TU München)On the Link between Empirical Science and Moral EpistemologyJacob Rosenthal (RFWU Bonn)Experimental Philosophy is Useful – But not in a Specific WayDiscussion on Scope and LimitsLunch

Interdisciplinary Brides

Andre Grimes (Uni / MPI Jena)Moral Tradeoffs through the Lens of Ecological PerceptionSabine Thürmel (TU München)Experimental Ethics and Multi-Agent SystemsGoodbye

144

Sprecher A–Z / Speaker A–Z

M Hauptvorträge / Main LecturesA Autorenkolloquium / Author’s Col-

loquium


A AggregationismB Vagueness and OntologyC Game Theory Meets PhilosophyD Should open-minded people be dog-

matists about justification?E Consequence and ConsequencesF Moral UnderstandingG Truth, Meaning, and the Seman-

tics – Pragmatics DistinctionH Mindreading versus Teleological

Reasoning: Two Ways of Understan-ding Rational Action

I The Contribution of the History ofPhilosophy to the Theory of Percep-tion

J Perspectivism in the Philosophy ofScience and Epistemology


1 Sprachphilosophie / Philosophy ofLanguage

2 Metaphysik und Ontologie / Meta-physics and Ontology

3 Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie /Logic and Philosophy of Science

4 Philosophie des Geistes / Philoso-phy of Mind

5 Erkenntnistheorie / Epistemology6 Religionsphilosophie und Ästhetik /

Philosophy of Religion and Aesthe-tics

7 Angewandte Ethik, Politische,Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie /Applied Ethics, Political Philoso-phy, Philosophy of Law and SocialPhilosophy

8 Normative Ethik, Metaethik, Hand-lungs- und Entscheidungstheorie /Normative Ethics, Metaethics,Theory of Action and Theory ofDecision

Halbfett geschriebene Ziffern oder Buchstaben verweisen auf die Vortragssiglen, die Zahlen in Klammern auf die Seitenzahl.

AAicher, Simone 7 (54)Alscher, Daniel 3 (54)Andric, Vuko 8 (54)Anglberger, Albert J.J. 8 (98)auf der Straße, Alexander P 1.1 (123)

BBagattini, Alexander 7 (54)Balcerak Jackson, Magdalena 5 (55)Barner, Alma P 4.1 (123)Baumberger, Christoph 5 (55)Baumgartner, Michael 4 (55)Beall, Jc E (41)Beck, Valentin 7 (56)Binmore, Ken C (37)Bittner, Rüdiger A (30)Blau, Ulrich M (24)Bleisch, Barbara 7 (56)Bluhm, Roland 1 (57)Blumenthal, David P 1.2 (123)Borg, Emma G (45)Braham, Matthew 8 (57)Bratu, Christine 7 (57)Briesen, Jochen 5 (58)Brössel, Peter 3 (58)Bruder, Martin 8 (110)Brüggen, Anne-Sophie 4 (58)Brun, Georg 8 (59)Brzozowski, Jacek Jerzy 2 (59)Bukow, Gerhard Christopher 2 (60)Bukow, Gerhard Christopher 4 (60)Burkard, Anne 8 (61)Buss, Sarah A (30)Büter, Anke 3 (61)

CCarrier, Martin 3 (61)

Carston, Robyn G (45)Centrone, Stefania 3 (62)Céspedes, Esteban P 8.1 (124)Ciuni, Roberto 3 (62)Cohnitz, Daniel 1 (80)Conant, James J (51)Conduct, Matthew P 4.2 (124)Correia, Vasco 8 (62)

DDahlgrün, Malte 4 (63)Dänzer, Lars P 1.3 (124)David, Richard 3 (63)De, Michael 2 (63)Delgado, Laura 1 (63)Di Nucci, Ezio 8 (64)Diekemper, Joseph 2 (64)Dinges, Alexander 5 (64)Dohrn, Daniel 8 (65)Dolby, David 1 (65)

EEklund, Matti B (35)El Kassar, Nadja 1 (65)Engels, Julia Apollonia 7 (65)Ernst, Gerhard F (43)Eronen, Markus Ilkka 3 (66)Evers, Daan 4 (66)

FFink, Julian 8 (66)Fink, Julian P 4.4 (125)Fink, Sascha Benjamin P 4.4 (125)Fischer, Eugen 5 (67)Fischer, John Martin 6 (67)Folde, Christian 1 (67)Franken, Dirk P 4.5 (125)Freitag, Wolfgang 1 (67)

Friebe, Cord 3 (68)Fritz, Peter 3 (68)

GGäb, Sebastian 6 (68)Gasser, Georg 6 (69)Gebharter, Alexander 3 (69)Gerogiorgakis, Stamatios 6 (69)Gertken, Jan 8 (69)Giere, Ronald N. J (51)Gigerenzer, Gerd C (37)Glauer, Ramiro David P 3.1 (126)Grahle, André 8 (70)Gratzl, Norbert 8 (98)Grundmann, Thomas 5 (70)Grunenberg, Lisa 4 (71)Grüne-Yanoff, Till 3 (70)Gruschke, Daniel P 1.4 (126)Gudmundsson, Johann 8 (71)Gutsche, Bettina 4 (71)Gutwald, Rebecca 7 (71)

HHacker, Peter M (25)Harbecke, Jens 3 (72)Harth, Manfred P 1.5 (127)Hartmann, Stephan 3 (63)Hartmann, Stephan 3 (95)Haueis, Philipp 3 (72)Hauswald, Rico 3 (73)Haverkamp, Nick 3 (73)Heilinger, Jan-Christoph 8 (73)Henning, Tim 8 (74)Hill, Thomas E. A (30)Hillerbrand, Rafaela P 3.2 (127)Hills, Alison F (43)Himmelreich, Johannes 8 (74)Hirose, Iwao A (33)


Hirsch Hadorn, Gertrude 3 (75)Hjortland, Ole Thomassen 3 (75)Hoffmann, Magdalena 8 (75)Hoffmann, Martin 4 (76)Hoffmann, Martin 8 (76)Hofmann, Frank 5 (76)Hohl, Sabine 7 (77)Hommen, David 2 (77)Horst, David 8 (78)Horvath, Joachim 5 (78)Hoyningen-Huene, Paul 3 (78)Huebl, Philipp 4 (79)

JJaag, Siegfried Hermann 2 (79)Jacob, Pierre H (47)Jansen, Ludger P 7.1 (127)Jaster, Romy 5 (79)

KKahmen, Benedikt 8 (80)Kaiser, Marie I. 3 (80)Kangilaski, Jaan 1 (80)Kästner, Lena 3 (80)Katzer, Matthias 7 (81)Kelp, Christoph 5 (81)Kiesewetter, Benjamin Paul 8 (81)Kietzmann, Christian 8 (81)Klein, Jonas 4 (82)Knappik, Franz 5 (82)Knappitsch, Markus Pierre 2 (60)Köhler, Sebastian 8 (83)Köllmann, Carsten 7 (83)Korbmacher, Johannes 2 (83)Kreft, Nora 8 (84)Krickel, Beate 3 (84)Kruse, Andrea 5 (84)Kühler, Michael 8 (85)

LLaanpere, Taavi P 4.6 (128)Langkau, Julia 5 (85)Lanius, David Samuel 1 (85)Lanius, David Samuel P 1.4 (126)Leahy, Brian P 1.6 (128)Leerhoff, Holger P 3.3 (128)Lenhard, Johannes 3 (86)Leuschner, Anna 3 (86)Liefke, Kristina 1 (86)Look, Brandon Charles 2 (86)Löschke, Jörg 8 (87)Lowe, E. Jonathan B (35)Löwenstein, David 5 (87)Lübbe, Weyma A (33)Lumer, Christoph 8 (87)Lyre, Holger 4 (88)

MMantel, Susanne 8 (88)Mantzavinos, Chrysostomos 3 (89)Marx, Theresa 1 (89)Mayr, Erasmus 8 (89)Mergenthaler Canseco, Max 4 (90)Meyer, Marco P 7.2 (129)

Michel, Christoph 4 (90)Michels, Robert 2 (90)Mocker, Christoph Kurt 6 (90)Mölder, Bruno P 4.7 (129)Moldovan, Andrei 1 (91)Muders, Sebastian 7 (91)Mugg, Joshua 2 (92)Mukerji, Nikil S. P 8.2 (130)Mulder, Jesse Merijn P 2.1 (130)Müller, Andreas 8 (93)Müller, Sebastian Joachim 4 (92)Müller, Thomas 3 (92)

NNagel, Saskia K. 4 (108)Nagel, Saskia K. P 7.3 (130)Neuhäuser, Christian 7 (93)Newen, Albert 4 (93)

OOliva Córdoba, Michael P 2.2 (131)Ometto, Dawa 8 (94)Orsi, Francesco 8 (94)

PPerner, Josef H (47)Pfister, Jonas 8 (94)Piller, Christian 8 (94)Porro, Laura Cecilia 2 (95)Poznic, Michael 3 (95)Prien, Bernd P 1.7 (131)Priest, Graham E (41)Pryor, Jim D (39)

RRabinowicz, Wlodek A (33)Rafiee Rad, Soroush 3 (95)Raters, Marie-Luise 6 (96)Rechenauer, Martin 8 (96)Reining, Stefan 5 (96)Rellihan, Matthew John P 4.8 (131)Röhl, Johannes 3 (97)Rosefeldt, Tobias 1 (97)Rosell, Sergi 5 (97)Roy, Olivier 8 (96)Roy, Olivier 8 (98)

SSánchez Guerrero, H. Andrés P 4.9

(132)Sattig, Thomas 2 (98)Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey F (43)Schälike, Julius 8 (98)Schickhardt, Christoph 7 (99)Schiemer, Georg 3 (99)Schink, Philipp 7 (99)Schippers, Michael 5 (100)Schleidgen, Sebastian P 7.4 (132)Schlicht, Tobias 4 (100)Schmalzried, Lisa Katharin 6 (101)Schmechtig, Pedro 5 (101)Schmid, Ulla P 4.10 (133)Schmidt, Eva 4 (101)Schmidt-Petri, Christoph 7 (102)

Schmitz, Laura P 4.11 (133)Schmitz, Michael 5 (102)Schneider, Ruben 6 (102)Schönherr, Julius 8 (103)Schroeder-Heister, Peter E (41)Schulte, Peter 2 (103)Schwartzkopff, Robert Sascha 1 (103)Schweikard, David P. 7 (104)Seidel, Christian 7 (104)Seidel, Markus 3 (104)Seitz, Fabian P 4.12 (133)Seuchter, Tim 4 (105)Seuchter, Tim P 4.13 (134)Shapiro, Lisa I (49)Sharadin, Nathaniel 8 (105)Simons, Peter B (35)Skyrms, Brian C (37)Slaby, Jan 4 (105)Soldati, Gianfranco I (49)Soom, Patrice 4 (106)Sorensen, Roy M (25)Spann, Anne Sophie 2 (106)Sprenger, Jan 3 (63)Stei, Erik 5 (106)Steinberg, Alexander 2 (107)Steinberger, Florian 3 (107)Stelling, Jendrik 3 (107)Stern, Johannes 3 (107)Stiller, Theresa 4 (108)Strößner, Corina 3 (108)Stroud, Barry I (49)Sturm, Holger 2 (108)Sühr, Maik 1 (109)Szabó, Zoltán Gendler G (45)Sznajder, Marta 1 (109)

TTamminga, Allard 5 (109)Tanyi, Attila 8 (110)Teller, Paul J (51)Thomann, Marius 3 (110)Tiefensee, Christine P 8.3 (134)Tillas, Alex P 4.13 (134)Todd, Patrick 6 (67)Todd, Patrick 6 (110)Tooming, Uku P 4.14 (135)Tucker, Chris D (39)

UUnterhuber, Matthias 3 (111)

Vvan Miltenburg, Niels 8 (111)van Riel, Raphael 1 (111)Verhaegh, Sander 5 (109)Viebahn, Emanuel 1 (112)Vosgerau, Gottfried 4 (105)Vosgerau, Gottfried 4 (113)Vosgerau, Gottfried P 4.13 (134)

146


WWagner, Carl George 3 (112)Wagner, Verena P 8.4 (135)Warmt, Marcel 8 (112)Weber, Arne Martin 4 (113)Weber, Marc Andree P 2.3 (135)Weichold, Martin 4 (113)Weigelt, Carsten Thomas 3 (114)Weisbrod, Lars 5 (114)Wendt, Fabian 7 (114)

Werning, Markus 5 (115)White, Roger D (39)Wildman, Nathan 2 (115)Wilholt, Torsten 3 (115)Wilutzky, Wendy 4 (116)Windt, Jennifer Michelle 4 (116)Wolkenstein, Andreas F. X. 7 (116)Wollner, Gabriel 7 (117)Wunder, Andre P 4.15 (136)Wündisch, Joachim 7 (117)

Wüstenberg, Jörn 3 (118)Wüstholz, Florian Leonhard 4 (118)Wüthrich, Christian 2 (118)

ZZakkou, Julia 1 (119)Zardini, Elia 1 (119)Zednik, Carlos 4 (120)Zinck, Alexandra 4 (120)

147

Documents

Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? What may we ... · become more difﬁcult for philosophy to make its voice heard. In the hectic pace of daily life, philosophy’s long-term