Warranting Sci Belief

7/24/2019 Warranting Sci Belief

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2/27

* ABSTRACT

The

ways

in which

cientists ccount

for

nd

ustify

heir wn

scientific

iews

are

analyzed

by

examining

n detail

transcripts

f nterviews

ith

biochemists

working n oxidative

hosphorylation.

t s shown that

cientists

se

two

repertoires,

he

empiricist'nd

the

contingent',

o account for heir

eliefs.

The

empiricist

epertoire

erivesfrom

nd

reinforces he

traditional

onception

f

scientific

ationality

ccording

o

whichdata

obtainedfrom

mpersonal,

standardized

outines

re used

to

establish

he

validity

f

hypotheses

nd

to

decide betweencompeting heories.However,when thecontingentepertoires

adopted,

facts' are seen as

depending

n fallible

nterpretative

ork.Both

repertoiresre used in

informal

nteraction,

cientists

moving

flexibly

etween the

two as

they

onstruct ccounts

of

theory-choice.

n view

of this

variability

f

accounts,

it s

concluded that t s

impossible

o

obtain

definitivevidence of

how

theories re

actually

hosen and

that new form f

sociological

nalysis

s

required.An

attempts made

to illustrateuch

an

analysis.

Warranting cientific

Belief

G. NigelGilbert nd MichaelMulkay

Scientists,

ike

other

social

actors,

construct

henature

of

their

actions

and

beliefs

through

he

(largely

verbal)

discoursewhich

theyuse to

express

nd

to

describe

hese

actionsand

beliefs.

The

character nd meaningof scientists' ctionsand beliefs re con-

tinually

n

flux

not

only n

the

ense

hatnew

actions re

regular-

ly

undertaken

nd

newbeliefs

ormed,

utalso in

the

ense

hat he

meaningof

past

actions and

beliefs

is

constantly

evisedand

reconstituted

y the

actors

themselves

s

they

reformulateheir

interpretative

ccounts n

accordance

with

he

requirementsf

new

Social

Studiesof

Science

(SAGE, London

nd

Beverly ills),

Vol.

12

(1982),383-408

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3/27

384

Social

tudies

f

Science

social situations.

As

analysts

of the

social

world

of

science,

t is

therefore

ssential

or

us

to understand

ow

scientists

selanguage,

or moregenerally, ow they rganize heir iscourse, o construct

their

ccounts

of scientific

ction

and

belief.For

in

one

wayor

another

we are

dependent

or

our

knowledge

bout

science

on the

interpretations

f action

and

belief

arried ut

by

participants.

In

this

paper

we

will describe

nd illustrate

ome

of thepro-

cedures

used

by scientists

n

constructing

ccounts

of

theory-

choice.

We showed

n a

previous

paper

that,

t least n our

collec-

tion of interview

ranscripts,

cientists'

ttempts

o account

for

falsebelief realmost lways ignificantlyifferentncontent rom

their

ttempts

o account

for

orrect elief.

Whereas

orrect

elief

is

almost

without

xception

portrayed

s exclusively

cognitive

phenomenon,

s

arising

unproblematically

ut

of rational

ssess-

ments

of

experimental

vidence,

ncorrect

elief

s systematically

presented

s

being

due to the

intrusion

f distorting

ocial

and

psychological

actors

nto he

ognitive

omain.

This

kind

of nter-

pretations, ofcourse,entirelyonsistent ith raditional iewsof

scientific

ationXality,

nd

much

work nthesociology,

history

nd

philosophy

f science

has

incorporated

his

asymmetrical

attern

of accounting

or rror nd

for

orrect

elief

nto ts

analyses.4

y

adopting

this form

f

accounting,

oth

participants

nd

analysts

come

to

present

orrect

cientific elief

s

'objective'

that

s,

as

independent

f

non-cognitive,

social' factors.

However,by

meansof

close

analysis

f a complete

ollection

f

such accounts, akenfrom ur interviewranscripts,e wereable

to

show

clearly

hat

participants'

symmetrical

ccounts

f

correct

and

incorrect

elief

annotbe

accepted

t face

value.

They

cannot

be

taken

as accurate

versions

f how beliefs

were

produced.

This

conclusion

was

basedon the

following

inds

f

considerations:

if-

ferent

cientists

ave

contradictory

ccounts

of the reasonsfor

c-

ceptance

f

a

specific

heory, epending

n

whether

r not

they

c-

cepted t;

individual

cientists

ccounted

for

cceptance

f

a

given

theory uite differently,epending n whether r not theywere

aligning

hemselves

withthat

theory

n

any

particular

tatement;

and

scientists

ften

had a

variety

f different

ccounts

of

error

prepared

n

advance,

to be

brought

nto

play

or

abandoned

depen-

ding

on

their ventual

cientific

udgment

f

whohad been

right

ll

along.

The

general

onclusion

f

our

previous

paper

was

that

cientists

themselves

make use

of

a traditional

conception

of

scientific



4/27

Gilbert

Mulkay:

Warranting

cientific

elief

385

rationality hen

they

ry

o

explain

why

ome

scientists dhere

to

incorrect

eliefs

about the

phenomena

they

are

studying.

ach

scientistnterpretshe actions and beliefsof thosewithwhomhe

interacts n the

assumption hat

those

withwhomhe

agrees

cien-

tifically

have

been guided

by

the

experimental

vidence,

whilst

thosewithwhom

he

disagreeshave

unfortunately

een nfluenced

by

scientificallyrrelevant actors. Thus

each scientist

reates

a

worldwhich

ppearsto conform

o

thetraditional ersion f scien-

tific

rationality. et this does not

mean that

the world of

science

literallyslike

that.

ndeed,to the

nalystwho

examines

arefully

number fsuch nterpretations,heonly onsistent

egularity

ies n

the

pattern

f

interpretation

sedby

scientists. hus

asymmetrical

accounting

or

rror nd

correct elief omes

to be seen as

an

inter-

pretative

procedure

whereby

scientists

onstruct

community

which,

nsofar

s

it

staken o

be

revealed

n

participants' iscourse

about

correct nd

incorrect

elief,

ppears

to

embody

he

conven-

tional

viewof

scientific

ationality.5

In the previouspaper, then, we concentrated n scientists'

attempts

o

explain he

existence f

theoretical rror. n

this

paper

weshall

be

mainly

oncerned

with

heother

ide of

thecoin:

that

s,

how

scientists

ccount

for and

justify

heir

own

scientific

iews,

which, f

course,

hey

normallyake to

be

correct r

as

nearly or-

rect

as is

currently

ossible.We

will

show

that

scientists

se

two

well-developed

epertoires

n

order

oaccountfor

heir

eliefs.

One

of these

repertoires

oth

derives

rom

nd

reinforces

he

standard

conception f scientific ationality.We willalso show,however,

that

scientists

hemselves

egularly

nderminehis

conception

nd

replace

t

with

significantly

ifferent

ersion f

scientific

ation-

ality.

n

this

way,

we

will

try o

extend

our

previous

nalysis

by

beginning

o

show

how

accountsof

correct

elief

re

contingently

accomplishedby

participants s

they

select

from

two

different

interpretative

epertoires.

The

data we

shall

be

examiningwere

obtained

from

study

f

research n one topic nbiochemistry.hirty-fourcientists ork-

ing on

'Oxidative

Phosphorylation'

r in

closely

elated

reaswere

interviewed

nBritain

nd

the

United

States

n 1979.

Both

authors

participated in

all the

interviews

which

were

recorded

and

transcribed

n

full.6



5/27

386 Social Studies

f Science

A BriefHistory f the

ResearchArea

This section riefly utlines ome of the cientificssueswithwhich

themembers f our nterview

amplewere oncerned.

t is intended

only to provide he ay

readerwith ome background

nformation

about the field o help

n understandinghecomments

made by the

intervieweesbout their esearch.7

The scientists

n

this rea are concernedwith he

formation f a

complex molecule called

ATP (adenosine triphosphate), major

sourceofenergy or nimals,plants nd bacteria.The

mainprocess

whereby his molecule s created n animals and bacteria s called

oxidativephosphorylation.

TP is

formed

y the combination

f

ADP

(adenosinediphosphate)

nd inorganic hosphate.

Since the

early1950s,

t

has

been

accepted hat, n animals, he

process akes

place in smallmembraneous

articles alled mitochondria',

which

are

composed

of

proteins,

nzymes nd lipid and contain

many n-

organic ubstances uch

as calcium,potassium nd sodium, s well

as

phosphate.

Mitochondria ave

two

membranes,

n outer nd an

innermembrane.

n

recent

years t

has

come to be

widely ccepted

thatthe nnermembrane s essential

orthe

formation f

ATP

by

oxidative

phosphorylation.

The synthesis

f ATP

requires nergy,

which

s

stored

n

the

moleculeuntil

t

s needed

for

ther

hysiological rocesses.

During

the

early 1950s,

t

was

recognized

hat a

series

of chemical

oxida-

tion and

reductionreactions

inked

together

ome of the

com-

ponents of mitochondria nto a chain. The operationof this

respiratory

hain

seemedto be

coupled

to

the formation

f ATP.

In

1953 Fennell

proposed

thatthe

respiratory

hain

created

n as

yet

unknown

high

energy

hemical ntermediate' hich

provided

the

energy ecessary

o

bring

ADP and

phosphate

ogether

o form

ATP.

The chemical

ntermediate urned out

to be much

more

elusive

than

anybody

imagined and, although

claims

to have

observed

t have occurred

ven

within

he ast

few

years,

ess

and

lesseffort as beenexpanded n the chemicalhypothesis'ince he

late

1960s.

In

contrast,

he chemiosmotic

ypothesis' roposed

by Spencer

in 1961has

become

widely ccepted

and

in

various

ways Spencer

has become

the

dominant

igure

n the field.

He

was awarded the

Nobel

Prize

in

1978

for

his

contribution

o the

understanding

f

biological energy

ransfer.

he central deas

of the chemiosmotic

hypothesis

re

that the creation

of

ATP

takes

place

in the



6/27

Gilbert

Mulkay:Warranting

cientific

elief

387

mitochondrial

membrane;

hat

the

respiratory

hainis located

in

the membrane nd

operates

o divide

hydrogen

nto electrons

nd

protons; that specifiablenumbers of protons are effectively

transported cross the

membrane,

hereby

reating

gradient

f

protons nd an

electrical

otential

cross the

membrane;

nd that

this

proton

gradient

nd difference

n

electrical

otential,

unnelled

back across the

membrane

hrough particular

tructure,rovides

the

energy

ecessary

o

bind

together

DP

and

phosphate.

Although

pencer's hemiosmotic echanism or he

atalysis

f

ATP

has been

widely dopted

as

basically orrect,

t

has

not

been

acceptedwithout pposition.Moreover, thirdmajorhypothesis

was

proposed by Watson

in

1964. Watson's

idea was that the

energy

necessary

or the formation

f

ATP

was not stored as

a

chemical ntermediate r

as an electro-chemical

radient,

ut

as

changes

n

theconformationr

shape

of the

molecules

n

themem-

brane.

The

division of

ideas

into

these three

mainhypothesess fre-

quently sedbyparticipantsnconstructingistorical ccountsof

the

development

f

the

field.

It

is

in

some

respects

misleading,

however,

because each of

the

hypotheses

has

undergonecon-

siderable

elaboration and

revision.

n

addition, therehave

been

numerous ersions

f each

hypothesis

nd many

ttempts o com-

bine

aspects

of

two

or

more

of

these

heoretical

ositions.

Even to-

day

there

re

manyvariants f the

dominant

hemiosmotic

heory;

many cientists

cceptonly

partofwhat

hey ake

that

heory obe

and others ppearto reject tentirely.

One of

themajor

areas

of

controversy

mongst

hose who do

accept

some version

of the

chemiosmotic

heory

is that of

'stoichiometry'.

his

debate

centres n

precisely ow

many

protons

are

transported

cross the

membrane s one

electron

assesdown

the

respiratoryhain.

In

thenext

ection

f thepaper

we will

examine heaccounts

he

scientists

e

interviewedave us

when

hey xplained

why hey

had

adopted certainknowledge-claimsather han otherswhichhad

been

proposed

n

their

esearch

rea. An

'account' isan

(attempt t

an) explanation f

why

particular elief

s held

by the

speaker r

by another

cientist.

or

instance,

speakermay

provide ccounts

of

why

he

accepts

particularheory nd

why

ther

cientistsre n

error

when

they hink

hatthe

theory s

false.

In thenext

ection,

we will

focus

principallyn

accounts

offered o

showthat

certain

ideas

or

theories re

correct.



7/27

388

Social

tudiesf

Science

When scientists

ccount

fortheir

wn

beliefs,

hey

often

om-

pareand

contrast

heir iews

with ther

ncorrect

iews.As

long

as

they re seeking o explainand justify heir wn (correct) eliefs,

scientists

will

almost always

restrict hemselves

o

an

explicitly

scientific,

echnical

or cognitive

ccount.

In particular,

orrect

belief

s

presented

s

experimentally

upported

nd

incorrect

elief

as lacking

n experimental

upport.

This overtly

echnical

ssess-

ment f pros

and

cons

iscarried

ut

n order

o identify

orrectnd

incorrect

eliefs

s

well as

to justify

he

speaker's

adoption

of the

former.

he technical

haracterization

f incorrect

elief

which

s

partof thisproceduremustnotbe confusedwith accountingfor

error'.Rather,

he haracterization

f ncorrect

elief

nopposition

to correct

elief,

s

thatbelief

which

s

experimentally

njustified,

sets

up

an interpretativeroblem

or he

peaker

namely, ow

to

explain

why

ome

scientists

ometo accept

a belief

which s

scien-

tifically

njustified.

his

problem

s normally

esolved

yreferring

to

the

nfluence

f

non-cognitive

actors.

t

is

this atter

rocedure

of explaining ther

cientists'

cceptance

of

false deas

which

we

call

'accounting

for error'.

The technical haracterization

f

the

scientificnadequacy

of

others'

deas

is

usually

a prelude

o,

but

not dentical

with,

n

account

of

error.

Much

of

the

material

elow

will

consist

f

such

characterizations

f incorrect

s well

as of

cor-

rectbelief.

Accounting or TheoryChoicebyAppeal

to

the

Experimental

acts

All the biochemists

we interviewed

were asked

to describe

the

development

of their

own scientific

deas.

These

biographical

details

usually

ulminated

n

a

description

f their urrent

pinions

about

what

was known

about oxidative

phosphorylation.

ften,

they

lso

provided

one

or a

range

of reasons

for those

opinions.

The mostfrequent indof justificationheyusedwas to pointto

the

experimental

vidence

which

hey

aid

supported

heir

osition.

The

following

xample

comes

from researcher

ho

changed

his

beliefs

radically

n the

course

of his career. n order

to assert

the

correctness

f

his

present

deas

and to

explain

why

his beliefs

had

changed,

he

made

an

exceptionally

trong

tatement

f

justifica-

tion:



8/27

Gilbert

Mulkay:Warranting

cientific

elief

389

1.

I can

tell

you

n

my

own case

why

changed.

changed trictly

ecauseof

ex-

periments.

changedbecause

the

Spencer

hypothesisredicts

ertain

hings hat

myhypothesis idn't. And on the otherhand, my hypothesismade certain

predictions

hat

he

Spencerhypothesis

idn't. And it turned ut that

when

you

tookboth of

them nd

tested

hem,

pencer

urned ut to

be

a

whole

ot

more

right han

was.

(Cookson, 36)

This

biochemistresents

imself

s

being wayed

rom

is

own

hypothesis

o

Spencer's

ecause

of the

force

of

experimental

evidence,

vidence

which

upportedpencer's

ut not his

own

hypothesis.

In

the

econd uotation,

e find

very

imilar ccount. The

speaker

gain uggests

hat he

prime

actor

eading

im o

adopt

the chemiosmotic

heory

as

that

he results f

his

experiments

were

n

accordwith is

predictions

rom

hat

heory:

2. The

situationwas

this ..

.

I

was ust

one of

a number f

people

working

with

these

new

ideas.

It

just seemed

that

everything

e

did could be

explained

satisfactorilyy Spencer'stheory,

nd we were

quitehappy ust

to

adopt this

theory nduse

this

s a

framework

orfurther

ests. So

we

said

right,

f

this dea

is right henwe ought o

be able to

show suchandsuch

thing, nd

we would

go

ahead

and

do

it

and

it

would work.

That

gave

us

a

lot of

confidence hat

the

hypothesis

was right.

Crosskey, )

Not

only ne's own

results,

ut lso

others' xperimental

ork

mayprovide

ustification

or

ne's beliefs:

3. They showed that when actose was transported,.. herewas simultaneous

uptake of

protons, protons

and

lactose, simple protons

and

lactose, and

thereforeherewas a

mechanism or

actose

accumulation.Now as far

s I am

aware that s

totally

ovel

ndvery

upportive

or

he

chemiosmoticypothesis.

(Burridge, 11)

Some

nterviewees

intedhat

he

reasons or he doption

f a

theory

ere

ot lways

uite o

straightforward,

lthough

he ole

ofexperimentalvidenceemainsaramountn ustifyinghe or-

rectness

f

their hoice

n

these

ccounts.or

example,he

peaker

in

quotation

our

uggestsirst

hat he

hemiosmotic

ypothesiss

'wonderful'

ecause t

s a 'terrific

eneralization'.

he

hypothesis,

he

says,

s

good for his eason

lone,

whethert s

in fact ight r

wrong. evertheless,

e s then

uick o

point utthat n

addition

to

being

terrific

eneralization,t s alsocorrect,

s shown

y n

accumulating

ody

f

experimental

vidence.One

byone,things



9/27

390

Social tudies

f

Science

have

beenshown

to operate

across

a

membrane'.

4. So Spencercomesalongwith histerrificeneralization, meanthatthat's

what

was wonderful

bout

it, and

it doesn't

matterwhether

e

was right

r

wrong.

He

was clearly

ight

n

the details

n his

working

ut

but he

came

along

with this

chemiosmotic

ypothesis.

The

result

of

thatwas

everything

must

operate

across

a

membrane,

hat

was the

initial

dogma.

Indeed,

one

by one,

things

ave

beenshown

to

operate

across

a membrane.

Jeffrey,

)

In thefollowing

assage,

the

speaker

describes

ow

a colleague

could be

seen

choosing

between

ompeting

heories

nd

gradually,

as

the

experimental

videnceaccumulated, omingto a decision

about

which

s

correct:

5. If

you

actually

ook

at the cceptance

f

t byPerry

ou

see

himnot bothering

at all about

the hemiosmotic

ypothesis

ndthen

you

will eepapers

n

which

he

will, n

the

discussion,

ry o

interpret

heresults

n the

ight

fone

theory

rthe

other ndthenyou

will

find

him omparing

he

wo,putting

he

wo n a table,

n

Reviews

-

you

say

that

the chemicalhypothesis

ccounts

for

this

and the

chemiosmotic ypothesisccountsfor his, nd I remembernone paperhe ac-

tually ut

scores

n

-

you

know,

he hemical

ypothesis

oes this

better

nd the

chemiosmotic

oes that, nd

actually rithmetically

ottinghem

up.

(Burridge,

1:24)

In all thesepassages,

the experimental

vidence

s used

as

an

in-

dependent

nd

unproblematic

tandard gainst

which heories

an

be assessed.

It

is assumed

that data stand

apart

from

nd

are

in-

dependent fanyparticularheory,ndcan therefore

rbitrate

et-

ween

competing

heories.

Because

experimental

vidence

can

be

used

unequivocally

o

justify

r

reject

theory,

t

s not

surprising

that

scientists

uch

as

the

speaker

n the

following assage

suggest

that

generating

uch

evidence

s an

important

ctivity

n

convincing

oneself

nd

others

f

its

truth:

6. There

was

quite

a

lot

to

do

to

really

onvince urselves

hat

we were

bsolute-

ly

right,

nd

there

was

even

more

o do

to

convince

ur

colleagues.

Harold

came

over...

.

He said 'Yes, verynice,verynice,butI won'tbe convinced ntilyou

show

me

a stoichiometric

nflow

f

protons

with actose.'We

set

to,

to do

the

x-

periments

..

and

we

got

a beautiful

nswer,

which

lthough

t's had many

buf-

fets

n the

ast few

years,

ust

in the ast

month

r two t has

been confirmed

s

being

correct

ver

the entire

H

range.

only

did it

at one

pH,

but t seems

cor-

rect,

with

ne

proton

per

actose.

(Roberts,

12-13)

A

problem

an

arise

for

peakers

n

accounting

or hefact

hat

t



10/27

Gilbert

Mulkay:

Warranting

cientific

elief

391

took some

years

before

they

publicly

admittedthat

theyhad

accepted

newly

roposed

heory

which

now

they

elieve

o be

cor-

rect.Othersmaysuggest hat hedelaymight avebeen duetothe

speaker's

inability

o

adapt

to

change,

his

prejudiceagainst

the

theory's

upporters,

r to other

opprobrious

easons. One

way

to

forestall uch

suggestionss

to

explain

that the

delay

n

adopting

the

theory

was to allow

time

for

confirmatory

vidence

o

appear.

Thus the

peaker

n

the

following

assage

accounts

for he

fact

hat

he

did

not

espousethechemiosmotic

heory

ntil ome

years

fter t

was

formulated y

noting

that

at

first

he

theory

was advanced

withouthesupport fanyexperimentalvidence.Later,

however,

he

was

convinced y

Spencer's beautiful

xperiments'.

7. I

consider

myself

airly

usceptible

o new deas.

I

completelygnored pencer

thefirst ew

years,

whenhe

came out

withhis

concept,

imply

ecause

of

my

pre-

judice

against

nyhypothesis hich s

not

advanced

with

nyexperimental

ata.

But

that admit s

prejudice

n

mypart

nd

I

simplygnored

t. When

Spencer

came to

visitme

.. I

was

verympressed

y

not

only

his

brilliance s a

person

but

also bythefact hathehad settled ownto do experimentsnd didbeautifulx-

periments

which to me

were

convincingmainly.

And

that

was

really

the

key

discovery that

the

respiration

n

mitochondria

s

associated withthe move-

ment

of

protons,

1. And 2: the

hydrolysis

f ATP

is

associated

with the

translocation fprotons

nd

that

o me

was

enough,

not to

accept t,but to

take

itvery

eriously, nd

weimmediately

tarted,

r very

hortly

hereafter.

ublic-

ly,

didn'tcome

out

andbelieve ll

of t, but

experimentallye were

tarting o

consider

t...

And to us his

contribution

as very

mportant

ecause

it

started

changing

our

thinking.

We

started hinkingn

termsof

compartments ith

something

hich s

a

structure hich s

closed

rather han

omething

have

been

used toas a biochemist, orkingwith nzymesndsoluble ystems. hat wasthe

key

departure.We

started

ight here

nd then,

hinkingn

terms

f compart-

ments.

Perry,

-3)

The

normalmode

among our

scientists or

ustifyingr

explain-

ing

theory hoice

was by

reference o a

theory's

onsistency

ith

experimental

vidence.

t

is not

surprisingo

find,

herefore,

hat

they

egularly

ccountedfor heir

ejection fa

theory y

reference

to its failure o rationalize xisting videnceor to generate uc-

cessful

xperiments.

8.

You

suggested arlier hat

here

were

easonswhy ou

were

becoming

oubt-

ful

about the

chemical

ntermediate

ypothesis.

. .

.

was

doubtful

nly

because

nothing as

emerged rom

ll these

ttacks. o

if

say I was

doubtful

would

havesaid, well,

t's a

nice

hypothesis,ut

there's

no

evidencefor t. And

then

hat swhat

later aid

about

Spencer's

hypothesis



11/27

392

Social

Studies fScience

for

several

years because the evidencewas not forthcoming

rom xperiment,

untilhe came

up

with

ome really

olid data. (Perry, )

Similarremarks

weremadeby many cientists:

9.

I

think hatup to the timehe

actuallypublished xperiments,

herewaswide

disbelief nd

it was ust another apertheory. o it was

widely isregarded.

ut

thinkwhenhe started ublishing

ata, thatwas a different

atter. Milner,28)

In thesepassages,the speakers

re making

everal laims about

procedures f theory-choicend the connectionbetween heory-

choice and experimentalvidence.

First, hey

maintain hat hey

o

not give serious onsideration

o a theory nless

t is supported y

such evidence.

econd, they tress hat theory

s particularly

er-

suasive

if

it actually generates

new findingsn the laboratory.

Third, hey onsistently

aintain

hat heir wntheoretical hoices

are based

directly

n evaluation

of

the fitbetween competing

theories nd

experimental ata.

On the whole,

n these passages,

speakers treat the experimental vidence as providingan un-

problematic

riterion gainstwhichthe specific

hypothesis an

be

assessed.

t

is,

of

course,

hardly urprising

o find cientists eclar-

ing that hey nd others upport

theory ecause

of the weight

f

corroborative

xperimental

vidence

lying

behind

it

-

this

is,

despitephilosophers'

ong-standing

ebate

over the

problem

f

in-

duction,

he

conventional

iew

of the

relationship

etween

heory

and

experiment.

ut the material bove becomes

more

nteresting

as soon as we note that he same scientists hopresent xperimen-

tal evidence s unproblematic

n some occasions

also

frequently

treat t as

highly

nreliable nd

even as

positively

misleading,

n

otheroccasions.

It

is

to an examination

f

accounts

which tress

this atter

view of

experimental

vidence hat

we turn n the

next

section.

Underminingxperimentalacts

In

quotation

1,

Cookson

justified

his conversion

o

Spencer's

theory

as

being required by

the

experiments.

He

adopted

this

theorystrictly

ecause'

his

experimentsave

the results

redicted

by Spencer's

theory,

ut

not

by

his own

theory.

Yet later n

the

same

interview,

e defends

ome

of his earlier

xperimental

ind-



12/27

Gilbert Mulkay:

Warranting

cientific

elief

393

ings,whichnow

seem to have been

upset

by

another

iochemist's

work,

n the

following

erms:

10.

The

thing

s

that

t

s

very

ard

to

getyour

handson these

hings

hat

you

are

working

n.

Membranes re

extremelyomplicated

nd

it's

hard

to know

that

you've

ever

got

the variables

ll

pinned

down,

so

that

when

you

make

an

obser-

vation, hat hat

bservation

s

really

what

you

think

t

s.

I

am

trying

o think f

a

good example.

All

this

X'

stuffs

perfect. y any

criteria,

p

to a

year

go,

I

don't

think

nybody eading

hat tuffwould have

had

any argument

hat

hose

things ind

to

the

membrane,

ut weren't

ransported.

Because

you had

beenthrough ll

the

controls?

Asmuch s wecould. I frequentlysedto sayto theguys ndespeciallywhen

Gamble

first

hallenged

he

paper,

ook

he can't be

right,

we've

done

everything

we could think f.

He did

something

e didn't think

f,

OK?

(Cookson, 43)

In

this

context, ookson observes

hat,

despite

ll the

efforts

f

an

experimenter

o

produce

valid

data,

other

xperiments

ay

ater

reveal

flaws which

cast

grave

doubts

on

the

interpretation

ne

should

put

on

those

data,

and

may

ndicate hat hedata

should

no

longerbe taken at facevalue. He stresses hatthemeaning f ex-

perimental ata is

remarkably ifficult o establish

onclusively.

However,

he did

not mention

his

earlier,

n

the

passage

from

which

quotation

1

is

taken,

in

which

he

argued

that it

was ex-

perimental

videncewhich

pointed

trictly

o the

superiority

f

one

theory

over

another.

Further n in

the

interview, e

provided

another

adically

ontingent

ccount

of

theory-choice, aintaining

that

truth s

simply

what

most

people are

willing

o

believe

oday.

And that'struth.Tomorrowthepopulationchanges,people are

notwilling

o

believe he

amestuff hat

hey

were

willing obelieve

the

day before

yesterday,hen

ruth

hanges'

Cookson,49). Thus

a

speaker

may

take

'experimental

vidence'as

distinguishingn-

equivocallybetween

wo

theories,

whilst bserving

few

minutes

later

that in

this field t

is

impossible

ever to be

sure

that the

evidence

s

'really

whatyou

think t s'.

This

variability f views

about thenature

of

experimental ata

within singlenterviewranscriptionsnotunusual,buttypical. t

provides a

major reason

for

not

takingscientists'

ccounts of

theory-choice

iterally. or

we

can

hardly onclude

that

scientist

accepted that

such

evidence s

essentially

nconclusive r

that the

cognitive

onsensus o

whichhe

claims

tobelong s

simply

result

of

what

peoplehappento

be

willing o

believe t the

moment. on-

sequently,

nsteadof

trying o

distil

from hese

divergent

ersions



13/27

394

Social

tudies

fScience

of theory-choice

ome

composite

nalyst's

ccountof

how

theory-

choices

were

actually

made,

itseems

more

appropriate

o

begin

by

tryingo identifyhedifferentircumstancesr interpretativeon-

texts

n

which cientists

resent

xperimental

vidence

s either

n

unproblematic

eterminant

f

theory-choice

r

as an inconclusive

factor

which

may or

maynot

have

discernible

heoretical

mplica-

tions.

In

general,

cientists

reat

herelationship

etween

xperimental

data and

theory

s determinate

r

as open-ended,

epending

n

the

interpretative

ork hey

re carrying

ut

at any

particular

uncture.

This canbe seenclearlynthetwoquotations romCookson 1 and

10).

In

thefirst

uotation,

Cookson

is

justifying

is

support

for

chemiosmosis

s

if

the

experimental

vidence

was

entirely

n-

problematic.

By

treating

herelationship

etween

heory

nd ex-

periment

s unproblematic,

e is able

in thispassage

to present

is

previous

act

of theory-choice

nd

his current

cientific

iewsas

both

inevitable

nd scientifically

roper.

Any

suggestion

hatthe

evidencewas

not wholly

onclusive

nmight

e

heardas

weakening

hisattempto explainhis conversion' ochemiosmosisndrequire

him to do

further

xplanatory

work. n the

second

quote,

his

con-

tention

hat

xperimental

esults

n

this rea

are

nconclusive

s used

to

justify

is

previous

bservational

laim,

whichhe

now views

s

having

been successfully

hallenged

by

Gamble.

Gamble's

results

are

taken

to

provide

the

unequivocal

standardagainst

which

Cookson's previous

bservations

re

tobemeasured.

Nevertheless,

Cooksonretains genuinelycientifictatusforhisprevious laims

by

inking

hem

o a

generalized

tatementmphasizing

xperimen-

tal

uncertainty.

hus

in this second

passage

Cookson

makes

his

previous

experimental

mistake understandable,

xpectable,

and

scientificallycceptable

by inking

t to

a

different

haracterization

of

the

relationship

etween

heory

nd

experiment

rom

heone

he

relied

on earlier.

Let

us give

another

llustration

f

the

variability

f scientists'

accountsof therelationshipetween xperimentndtheory.n the

interview

rom

which

he

following

s

taken,

he researcher

rgued

strongly

hat

experimental

ata alone

should

be usedto

determine

the

truth

of theories.

He then maintained

that

this field

was

characterized

y

whatseemed

o himto be an excessive

oncentra-

tion

on the

development

f

theory

s

opposed

to a focuson

careful

experimentation.

t this

point,

he was

asked:



14/27

Gilbert

Mulkay:

Warranting

cientific

elief

395

1

1.

If the

ield

s

like

that,

an

you

assume that

he

right'

heory

s

going

o

win

out

in theend?

In the ongrun,yes. tmaynot beveryoon. You see,theres onething bout

science, here's

no

way

to avoid the

facts

forever.

ventually

whatever

heories

exist,

hey

will

volve

o

whatever

s

something

hatwill

fit. o

you

see

a

situation

in

which

hey

may

swing

ompletely.

ou

may

have one

year,

nd

you

can

say

90o

of

the

people

are

in

chemical

oupling.

That was not too

long

back.

Now

you

can

saythey

re 9OVo

hemiosmotic.

Well,

that

doesn't mean

that

ne or

the

other

was

right,

r

anything

f the

sort. But timewill

tell. Because

eventually

data will

be generated..

What

you're

suggesting,

hen,

s

that n this

ield

this

ong

term ebate at the

theoreticalevel s

in

your

view till

nconclusive?

As far s I

can see

it

s

inconclusive. he data

are

certainly

ot such

s

to draw

conclusions.And no

matter

how

closed

some

people

say

it

is,

it is still

open.

Maybe t's

chemiosmotic,

maybe

t's

not. We

won't know

for

while

yet.

don't

know

what t will

take

to be

sure. But

right ow thedata aren't

clear.

Hawkins,

13)

Hawkins

responds

to

the

suggestion

hat

he

and

his

colleagues

might

nd

up

with

the

wrong

theoryby

asserting

hat

a crucial

feature fscience s that heresno wayto avoid thefacts nd that

theorieswill

evolveto fit

hosefacts.What

s

required

n

this

field,

he

continues,

s

more

data,

from

which

ne

will

eventually

e able

to

draw firm

onclusions

bout

the

correct

heory.

The

theoretical

situation

s

still

unsettled,

e

suggests,

ecause

thedata

are

not

yet

clear.

However,

compare

this point of

view with

the

passage

below,

spoken

only

minutes

efore

n

the

same

conversation:

12. Don tthevarious heories avesomethingo sayabouthowtherespiratory

chain works?

Well

the

theories

on't.

The

experiments

ight.

hetheories

on't.

There'sa

difference

etween

n

experiment

nd a

theory.

You can

generate

undreds

f

different

heories

o

fit

particular

etof

data

and

none of

those, n

anyway,

ay

anything

bout the

original vent.

Hawkins, 9)

In

the

first

passage,

Hawkins

manages to

portray

cience

as

achieving

the

truth,

by

asserting

hat

clear,

theoretically

n-

ambiguousdata willeventuallymerge. n quotation12,

however,

in

seeking

o deny

the

currently

vailable

theories

ny

explanatory

power,

he

so

weakens

he

connection

etween

heory

nd

data

that

it

becomes

difficulto

seehow

any

theoretical

onclusions

an

ever

be

established

y

meansof

data

alone.

In

each

isolated

fragment

f

conversation, he

speaker

produces

plausible

ccounts n

which,n

one

instance,

he

epistemological

tatus

of

scientific

nowledges



15/27

396

Social

tudies

f

Science

preserved

nd,

in the

other

ase, the speaker's

current

ntellectual

views

are

sustained.

But

these

specific

nteractional

ccomplish-

ments re achievedbytreatingherelationship etweenfactand

theory

n

a

highly

lexible

way.

Like Cookson,

Hawkins

ppears

to

choose

between

woradically

ifferent

ersions

f

thisrelationship

in accordance

with

ubtle

changes

occurring

nthe

conversational

context.

In ourtranscripts,

t

is

noticeable

hat

cientists

requently

reat

the relationship

etween

data

and

theory

s

unproblematic

hen

they

re

directly

ngaged

n justifying

heir

wn

choice

of

theory

and treat hisrelationships equivocalwhen ngaged nundermin-

ing another

erson's

choice.

In

all of

the

material

n the

preceding

section,

where scientists

were ustifying

heir

theories,

he

con-

sistency

f

data and

theory

was

treated

s

obvious:

for

nstance,

'thetheory

wouldpredict

omething

nd

we would

go ahead

and

do

it

and

it would

work';

'itwas

a

mechanism

or actose

accumula-

tion and

therefore

..

very

supportive

for

the

chemiosmotic

hypothesis';we set to, to do the experiments...andwe got a

beautiful

nswer';

and so

on. Occasionally,

passing

reference

s

made

in

thesepassages

to

the possibility

f alternative

eadings

f

the

data.

Thus

it

was

noted

that

the

beautiful

nswer'

had

'had

many

buffets

n

recent

years'.

But

thesepossibilities

re

treated

s

tangential

nd

are usually

quickly

explained

away

(see

quote

6);

eventhough

he

diversity

f

judgments

bout

these

results

mong

other

scientists

ften

eems very onsiderable.

n

contrast,

when

scientistsre underminingnother's cientificlaim,they endto

emphasize

that

data

always

require

nterpretation

nd they

how

that,

in

particular

ases,

alternativenterpretations

re

actually

available.

When

scientists

re

directly

ustifying

claim

by

reference

o

experimental

esults,

heir

tatements

re

constructed

so

that the

data

appear

to

speak

for

themselves

nd

to speak

in

favour

f their laim;

whilst

when

cientists

re

ustifying

heir

wn

position

byrejecting

n

alternative

laim,

their tatements

re

con-

structedo as to revealthe nterpretationhich ll (ormost)data

require

nd

to

challenge

he

nterpretation

hich

has been

carried

out by

their

pponents.

This

latter

oint

s

illustrated

n the

following

uotation,

where

the

speaker

re-interprets

ata

(with

which

he has

no

quarrel)

n

a

way

which

uggests

hat

hey

have

no relevance

o thetheory

which

they

re supposed

to

support.



16/27

Gilbert

Mulkay:

Warranting

cientific

elief

397

13. He considered

hathe was

looking

t a

primary jector f

protons

which

was

not

accompaniedby

anything

lse,

and

he was

talking

f backlash

that s

pro-

tons were ejected by the respiratoryhain, chargingup a condenser the

mitochondrial

membrane s a

condenser).

Now

that n fact was not

the

case:

what

he

was

looking

t was

the

uptake

of calcium

by

themitochondria

nd

what

he thought

was

the

capacity

of

the condenser

that s,

you

couldn't

add

more

than a certain

mount

of

oxygen)

was

not

the

capacity

of the

mitochondrial

membrane,

he

electrical

apacity,

but the

amount

of

calcium that was

there.

(Burridge, :11,

12)

On

occasion,

scientists

hemselves

ommenton the

flexibility

withwhich givendatummaybe interpretedo support uitedif-

ferent heoretical

ommitments.his

s true

f

the

following uota-

tion,

in

which

a

proponent

f

one

position

on

the

stoichiometry

issue

comments

n

thereasons

for

the

continuing

ontroversy:

14. The

basic

observation s

agreed

on

-

that f you

add

NEM you

see more

protons.

The

experimentshat are

done to

demonstrate hat this is

real

-

because it's

energetic

hosphate

ransport

r

because

it's

doing

something

if-

ferent are notactuallydonebybothsides, don't think.One sidedoesthem

and

makes some

nterpretation.he other

ide

criticizes hat

nterpretation

nd

does different

xperiments

hich

re then

criticized

y

the

first

ide.

Whydoesn't

one side

repeatthe

experiments

f the

other

ide?

I

think

hat's

basically

because

we expect

we'd get

the same

result.

o there's

not

muchpoint

n

doing t

ust to confirm

ou

can

demonstrate his

particular

effect.

Norton,

25)

This

scientists

describing

situation n

which

he

basic

observa-

tionaldatum, hatyou seemoreprotons fyouaddNEM', istaken

as

common

to

and

agreed by

both

sides.

Nevertheless,

hecon-

troversy

an

continue

because

the

interpretationso

be placed

on

this

fact

differ. he

speaker

alkshere s if

further

xperimentation

and

more

data

are

notalone

enough

o

resolve he

dispute,

ecause

those

data

are

also

opento

alternative

nterpretations.

lsewhere,

however,when

seeking o

justifyhis

theoretical osition

vis-a-vis

that

of

Spencer,

he

moves

owards

more

onventional

iewof

ex-

perimentalvidence nd theory-choice.

15. I'm

fairly

ure shan't

change

his

mind. ...

I

find t

quite

difficulto

argue

about

this,

because

I

cannot

see

how he

cannotaccept

that

our arguments

nd

experimentsre

right.

suspect hat

he has

thesame

problem.

So I

don'tthink

it's a

problem

f

straightcience.

Norton,

23-24.)

Even here,

Norton

continues

o

recognize hat

both

sides to the



17/27

398

Social

Studies

fScience

dispute

are treating

heir

own

data and interpretations

s

un-

problematic.

utthis

balanced

view

generates

problem

for

him,

as he seeksto justify is ownactionsand scientificudgments. f

both

parties

re

being

qually

scientific',

hat s,

if

hisexperiments

do

not eliminate

pencer's

onclusions,

hen

t

s impossible

o

pro-

vide

a clear-cut

cientific

ustification

or

his

own

position.

The

solution

he

adopts

s to

suggest

hat

something

nscientific

s

hap-

pening'.

More

specifically,

e goes

on

tosuggest

hat pencer

s

too

committed

o

this heory

nd

hence

unable

to

respond

bjectively

o

the

available

evidence.

Having

noted

that

data require

nterpreta-

tion,Norton s able to focuson Spencer'sattemptst interpreta-

tion

and

to portray

hem s

unsatisfactory.

It is

a recurrent

eature

f

our

material

hat

cientists

ndermine

each

other's

choices

of theory

by drawing

ttention

o

the

'im-

proper

nterpretation'

f

data.

The

procedures

sedto

gather

ata

are

typically

aid

to

have

been

influenced

by the

researcher's

theoretical

viewpoint,

with

the consequence

that

disconfirming

evidencehas not been collectedor has been disregarded.

n

the

passage

below,

the speaker

firstmakes

a

point

bout

thedesirabili-

ty

of

a

strict

eparation

etween heory

nd

experiment

much

he

same

separation

s

that used in ustifyingheory-choices.

e

then

observes

hat

ome researchers,

hose

who

areover-committed

o

a

theory,

may

not

consider

lternative

nterpretations

f

their esults,

and so

may

fail

to

produce

evidence

which

does

not

fit

with

that

theory.

16.

You

have

to be

very

areful

bouthow you

ook

at

things.

he

theory

hould

never nfluence

hedata.

Ifyoudo

that,

nd

it's

very

ommon

n this

field,

hen

you

are bound

to disaster.

Because

there's

no

way

that

you

can keepfact

nd

fancy

part

any

more.

How

do

you

mean,

that

he

theory

mightnfluence

he

data?

Can

you

give

me

an example?

The

theory

nfluencing

hedata. It

ust

means

that

f

you

getvery,

ery

ound

up

in

your

heory,

t feedsback

into he

experiment

n the

ense hatyou

then

do

the

experiment

oo

closely

designed

to the theory

nd you

don't

do

the

ap-

propriate

ontrols.That's one ofthe most obviouserrors.People whoare, for

example,

chemiosmotic

n the extremewill

not bother

o run controls

bout

chemical things

or their

nterpretation

ill

automatically

e as a

membrane

potential

r whatever.

Without

sking

he

question,

Well,

is it

really?'

Because

the

theory

equires

hat here

e

a

membrane

otential

which

has certain

roper-

ties

and,

therefore,

hen

you

see

something

hatbehaves

that

way

t's

assumed

to be

that.

Hawkins,

9-10)



18/27

Gilbert

Mulkay:

Warrantingcientific

elief 399

Hawkins,

n

the course of

justifying

is

own

non-chemiosmotic

beliefs,

ccountsforsomeof the evidencewhich

pparently

up-

ports he hemiosmoticiewbyquestioning hetherlltherelevant

data have been collected.

Doubt is cast

on the

use

of

experimental

data as an infallible

uide

to theselection

f thecorrect

heory

nd

emphasis s

placed

on the

need

for

nterpretation

nd

correct

x-

perimental esign.

The

importance

f

these

atter lements

s

then

used

to undermine he

credibility

f

chemiosmotic

work

and,

by

implication,

o endorse

he

speaker's

own

rejection

f that

heory.

In

these ccounts,

he

divergence

etween

he

peaker's

cientific

viewsand thoseofanother cientists routinelyesolvednfavour

of

the speaker. t is

his

statements

bout the

physical

worldwhich

are

taken o

represent

hereal

physical

world.

Consequently

t

s the

other's failure o

recognize

he

speaker's

version

of the

physical

worldwhich

needs

to be

explained y

referenceo theother's nter-

pretative

nadequacy nd,

in

many

ases, by

reference

o

supposed

non-cognitivenfluences.

his

tendency

o

treatphysical eality s

equivalent

o the

speaker'scurrent

iews,

ombined

with

flexible

repertoire or

depicting he

relationship etweenfact

and

theory,

makes t

possible

for

cientists

o

explain

way

even

very recise

x-

perimental

confirmations' f

theory.

For

example,

n

the next

passage

the

peakeruses the

very recision

withwhich

xperimental

findingsppear to

support theory s

a conclusive ndication

f

the

nadequacy

of

those

findingsnd ofthe

distortingffect f

the

experimenter'sheoretical

ommitment.

17.

The

greatpro-Spencerian esbitt.

Nesbitt'snumbers

lways greewith

what

Spencerwould want. mean,

t's bizarre. o

you get ll thesedifferent

umbers

coming out

and

I

am sure I

could do an experimentnd

produce almost

any

number

wanted .. I think

ne needsto

forget hat kindof

research) nd start

afresh nd

just study he

ndividual pans of

the chainchemically nd see

what

they

re

doing and how they

do it. (Harding,

26-27)

Having

undermined

esbitt'swork

by presentingts

agreement

with heoretical redictions s 'bizarre', n view ofthe diversityf

results

roducedby other

xperiments,nd by

implying

esbitt's

over-commitmento a

theory, he

speakerreturns

o the conven-

tional viewof

experimental acts n

outlining is

own alternative

research

trategy. hus,once again, we

can observe

speakermov-

ing selectively etween

wo views of

experimentalvidence s

he

makes

senseof

divergentindingsn

such a way that

his own scien-



19/27

400

Social

Studies f

Science

tific udgments

come

to appear natural, commonsensical

udg-

ments.Nesbitt's esults

re

presenteds

unconvincing,

espite heir

unusual coincidencewiththeoretical xpectation, yhighlighting

theelement

f spurious

nterpretation'

hich

must,given

hecor-

rectness f

the speaker's

own scientific

osition,

have

attended

their

production.

According o

the speaker's

formulationf

his

alternative

pproach,however,

he

spans

of theredox

chain could

be allowed to speak

for

hemselves.

xperiments

ould

be designed

simply

o reveal

whattheywere

doingand

how

theyweredoing

t'

without ecourse

t all, it

appears,to fallible

nterpretations.

Discussion

We

have tried o

illustrate

bove

someof the

discursive

methods

used

by

scientists

n

furnishingccounts

of theory-choice.

e

have

shown

how scientists

raw

flexibly

n the

course

of semi-formal

conversations

n

two differentersions

f,

or perspectives

n, the

relationship

etween

fact and theory.

On

the one hand, scientists

employ

conventional

mpiricist

onception

f

science,

ccording

to which

data,

obtained

from

mpersonal, tandardized

outines,

are

used

to

establish

he

validity

f

hypotheses

nd to discriminate

unequivocally

etween

ompeting

heories.

rom this

perspective,

researchers

re

expected

o be detached

nd

self-critical;

nd

any

observed

failure'

n

this

respect

an

be

used

as a basis

forunder-

mining knowledge-claim.his is, of course,theconceptionof

science

which s

displayed

most

clearly

n

the

formal

iterature.

n

our more

nformal

material,

his

view

s

typicallydopted

when

he

speaker

is

fashioning direct,

xperimental

ustification

or

his

own scientific

pinions

or

for the

cognitive

fficacy

f science

n

general.

The

great

advantage

of

this

formof account

is

that

it

makes

the

speaker's

scientific

onclusions

appear

entirely

n-

problematic

nd

in

need

of no further

upport.

The

experimental

data are presented s revealingwhat thephysicalworld s really

like;

and the

match

between

data

and

theory

s

skillfully

c-

complished

by

means

of selective

nd

simplified

ormulations

f

both

theseelements.

On the other

hand,

scientists

re also

able

to

depict

he

relation-

ship

between

act

nd

theory

na muchmore

contingent

manner.8

When

this

perspective

s

adopted,

facts

re

no

longer

presented

s

speaking

for

themselves,

ut

are seen

as

depending

ecessarily

n



20/27

Gilbert

Mulkay:

Warranting

cientific

elief

401

interpretationhich

an

always

be

wrong

nd which s all

too

easily

influenced

y

non-cognitive

actors. This

repertoire

or

talking

about fact and theorys similar o the informal epertoire hich

scientists se

to

describe

aboratory ractice

nd in which

reat

m-

portance s attached o

intuition, ersonal

nterest

nd craft

kills.9

From

this alternative

erspective,

he connectionbetween

heory

and the observations

roduced

by

individual raftsmen ith

vary-

ing

degrees f

skill an

easily

be

made

to

appear

much ess

certain,

and

muchmore

dependent

n

highly

ariable

nterpretations.his

perspective

ends

notto

appear

n

theformal iterature.

owever,

t

playsan important art n informalnteraction,ecauseit allows

scientists he

nterpretative

cope

necessary

orthem o

strengthen

their wn

claimsby

rejecting

hose

of

their

pponents.

These

two

perspectives ustnot

be

seen as

furnishingncompati-

ble

abstract

versions

f

the

relationship

etween

fact

and

theory.

As we have

stressed

bove,scientistsmove

flexibly

etween hetwo

as

they

make

sense

of their

ocial world

n

the

act

of

constructing

accounts

of

theory-choice.

hus,

for the

actors,these

two

reper-

toires re

resources o be

drawn

on

as and whentheir

versions

f

events

require.

The

formal

ncompatibility

f the two

versions f

'fact

and

theory' oes not

mply hat

cientists'

pecific

nterpreta-

tions are

inconsistent. s we have

shown

elsewhere, eneralized

formulations,

uch

as these two

versions

f

scientific

ationality,

are

applied to

particular

ases bymeans of

specific, d hoc

inter-

pretations.

0

Thus we

would expect

hat,

were an

apparent ncon-

sistencybouttherole of facts n choosingbetween heories o be

noticed

n

thecourseof

conversation, he

speakerwould

be able

to

explain

t

away,perhaps

by

reference o some

supposedly

pecial

feature f

the

theories r

experiments e

was

talking bout.

Cer-

tainly,

one

is not

struck

by

interpretative

nconsistencywhen

discussing

with

cientistshe

relationship

etween

act

nd theory.

Scientists'

se of

twoformally

ivergent

epertoiresnly

becomes

observable

when

the

sociologist

records

and

systematically

x-

aminesscientists' alk.Duringordinaryonversation,hesereper-

toires re

employed

uite

effectivelyo

sustain

hespeaker's

own

scientific

iews

s

well as

the

traditional

onception f

the

connec-

tion

between

fact

and

theory.They are

used to

convey n

overall

impression

hatcorrect

cientific

elief,

which lmost

lways

coin-

cides

with

he

peaker's

views, s

unproblematicallyrounded n

ex-

perimental

ata.

It

has been

noticed

before hat

when

scientistsalk

about

their



21/27

402

Social

Studies f Science

professional

ctions,they

tend

to devise

their ccountsof

those

actions

in accordance

with

their

current scientific

views.

Respondents' actions and those of theircolleagues are made

understandable

n the

light

of what

the speaker

takes to be

ex-

perimentally

nd theoretically

orrect.

n

other

words,scientists'

accounts

of action

and belief

re

systematically

rganized

nways

which both explain

and

provide scientific

ustification

or

the

speaker's

actions,whilst

xplaining

nd condemninghose

of

his

opponents.

Condemnatory

ccounts

chieve

heir ffect

y inking

actions

and beliefs

o contingent

ersonal

and social

factors.

n

such accounts,speakers show' that specific ctionsand beliefs

would have been

otherwise

f it had

not

been forthe

impact

of

scientifically

rrelevantnfluences.

lthough

he

potential ange

of

such contingent

actors s

verywide, the

basic

procedure

f under-

mining

he

scientific

egitimacy

f actions

and beliefs

by showing

them o

be contingent

s highly

epetitive.

2

The kind

of ustificatory

ccount

withwhich

we

have

beenmain-

ly

concerned

n

this

paper

s organized

o 'show'

that he

speakers'

(or

some

other

cientists')

ctions

and beliefs

ould

notproperly

have

been

otherwise.

his

can

be achieved

on some

occasions

by

presenting

articular

ctions

or

udgments

s following

ecessarily

from

procedural

ule

whichcan be

taken

for

granted.

We

have

described

lsewhere

how

Popper's

rules

of

scientific

method

are

regularly

sed

in

this

way

by

the

scientists

e

have

studied.

3

More

frequently,

owever,

ur

scientists

ormulate

heir

ustificatory

c-

countsoftheory-choicenstraightforwardmpiricisterms that

is,

theypresent

heir

ctions

and beliefs

s

following

ecessarily

from

what has

been

revealed

experimentally

o

be

the case

in the

natural

world.

Rule-based

ustifications

nd

empiricist

ustifica-

tions are similar

n

that

they

both

minimize

he element

f

choice

available

to actors

n

reaching

heir cientific

iews. The

actor

is

presented

s

being

forced,

ither

y

some

nvariant

uleof

conduct

or

by

the

natural

world

tself,

o come

to

certain cientific

onclu-

sions. Indeed, it is precisely his interpretativeemovalof the

capacity

for

personal

volition

n

rule-based

nd

empiricist

ccounts

which

makes

them

particularly

ffective

s

justifications

f

scien-

tific ction

and belief.

There s

a

rough,

but

clear,

correspondence

etween

hetwo

par-

ticipants'

repertoires

escribed

n this

paper

and the

two

broad

perspectives

on science

which are available

in the

scholarly

literature

n the

ocial

nature

f

science.

4

Scientists'

mpiricist

nd



22/27

Gilbert

Mulkay:

Warranting

cientific

elief

403

rule-based

ersions f action

and

belief

orrespond

o the

standard

view

of

science

and

scientists'

ontingent

ersions

o

the radical

view of science. We wish to suggestthat these two opposing

analyses

of

science

may

derive heir

evidence' from

he

two

main

repertoires

cientists

se.

Finally,

t

will

helpto

establish he

ignificance

f

this

paper

f

we

compare its

conclusions

o

those

contained

n

the

one

published

study

n

which,

t

least

n

some

of

its

chapters,

similar

nalytical

approach

s

adopted

n

the

nalysis

f

theory-choice.

n

Laboratory

Life,15

Latour

and

Woolgar

suggest

that in

the

early

stages

of

research n a given opic therewillbe various

competing

roposi-

tions

or

hypotheses

which

participants

egard

as

attempts

o

characterize

segment f

the

world

s

yet

not

fully

nderstood.

At

this

tage,

cientific

tatements

re

treated

s

distinct

rom

he real

world.

However,

as

scientific

greements

achieved, o

scientists

come

to

explain the

success of

the

statement

which

has been

ac-

cepted

s

being

due to

its

correspondence ith

he real

world.

From

their

nitial

nception

members f

the

aboratory

re

unable to

determine

whether

tatements

re

true

or

false,

objectiveor

subjective,

highly

ikelyor

quite

probable.

While

the

agonistic

rocess s

raging,

modalities

re

constantly

added,

dropped,

nverted,

r

modified.

Once the

statement

egins o

stabilize,

however, n

important

hange

akes

place.

The

tatement

ecomes

split

ntity.

On

the one

hand it

is

a set of

words

which

represents

statement

boutan

ob-

ject. On

the

other

hand t

corresponds o

an

object

n

tself

which

akeson

a

life

of

tsown.

It

isas if

the

original

tatementad

projected

virtual

mage

of

tself

which

xists

utsidethe

tatement.16

Latour

and

Woolgar

imply

hat

scientists'

wn

philosophizing

tends o

vary

n

accordance

with

he

stage

of

scientific

ebate

and

with

participants'

ositions

n

that

debate.

Depending n

the

argument,

he

aboratory,he

time

ofyear,

nd

the

currency

of

the

ontroversy,

nvestigators

ill

variously

akethe

tand

f

realist,

elativist,

idealist,

ranscendental

elativist,

keptic

nd

so on. 7

If

one

combines

his

tatement

ith

he

previous

uotation,

he

m-

plication

seems

to be

that

scientists

ormulate

heir

ccounts

of

theory-choicen

'realist'

terms

nly

after

ny

controversy

as

set-

tled

nd

after

high

degree

f

consensus

has

allowed

the

real

world

to

cometo

be

seen

as

the

determinant

Documents

Warranting Sci Belief