Warning Lights Flashing Policing in South Africa 2013/14

Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Police26 March 2013

Gareth Newham

Governance, Crime & Justice Division

Institute for Security Studies

• Introduction

• Police Conduct

• Police Performance

• Recommendations

Presentation outline

Introduction

• Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is an independent African policy research institute. Our work is aimed at contributing to a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy and collaborative security.

• The Governance, Crime and Justice Division of the ISS works to inform and influence policy and public discourse on crime, corruption, its prevention and the functioning of the criminal justice system. We do this by conducting research, analysing policy, disseminating information and providing expertise as a contribution towards a safer and secure society.

• Our Vision: A safe and prosperous Africa for all its people.

The importance of police conduct

Modest but consistent scientific evidence supports the hypothesis that the less respectful police are towards suspects and citizens generally, the less people will comply with the law.

Changing police "style" may thus be as important as focusing police "substance." Making both the style and substance of police practices more "legitimate" in the eyes of the public, particularly high-risk juveniles, may be one of the most effective long-term police strategies for crime prevention.”

(L W. Sherman, D Gottfredson, D MacKenzie, J Eck, P Reuter, and S Bushway 1997. Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising. Report to the U.S. Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice, p. 655.)

Police Abuse & the “bad apple” fallacy

• Internationally & historically blaming “bad apples” for police abuses has been common.

• Since the 1970’s – the “bad apples” theory of police abuse has been recognised as inadequate.

• There are no examples of successfully improving policing relying on simply removing “bad apples.”

• “Enhancing police integrity is an organisational and administrative responsibility that goes well beyond culling individual police officials.” (CB Klockers, SK Ivkovic, MR Haberfield (eds) 2004, The Contours of Police Integrity, thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications, p. 7)

• Similarly, there are no examples of successful police reform driven by external civilian oversight agencies.

• Senior police management have to take full responsibility 7 be held directly accountabile for changing the culture, behaviour and performance of the police.

Does the SAPS have a problem with abuse of power?

• In 2001/02 a total of 416 brutality related criminal cases were opened at the IPID against police officials. By 2011/12 this had increased by 313% to 1 722 cases, or an average of five cases each day.

• Of the 720 deaths reported to the IPID in 2011/12, there was evidence of criminality on the part of police in a little 162 cases or one in five cases (22%).

• In 2011/12 SAPS charged 1 050 of their own members for corruption related offences

• ISS research in 2011 identified 50 people who experienced or witnessed police abuse – only one had tried to report it.

• SAPS facing R841 512 000 civil claims in relation to assault & R1,1 billion in relation to shooting incidents.

• Total claims have doubled in last two years to R14,8 billion.• In addition 66% of the adult population think that corruption is a

widespread problem in the police (HSRC)• 41% of population do not trust the police at all (HSRC)• 35% of South Africans interviewed for futurefact in 2012 admitted to

being “scared of the police”.

Is criminally charging police officers the solution?

• In 2011/12 a total of 1 050 police members were charged with various types of corruption, which is an 120% increase compared to the 476 members charged the previous year.

• During 2010/11, of those investigated for corrupt activities, a majority (55%), were suspended. However, in 2011/12 only 8% of those being investigated were suspended.

• IPID, during 2011/12, following their investigations into deaths and criminal matters, they referred 545 cases to the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) as a result of evidence of illegal conduct.

• Only five officers were dismissed and 13 convicted of crimes during this period. It is however, an improvement when compared to the 2008/09 financial year when 912 deaths at the hands of police were investigated and just three officers were dismissed.

• Over the years, there are thousands of police officers who have been criminally convicted but are not dismissed from the SAPS.

• Therefore, we cannot rely on the criminal justice system to deal with the problem.

The SAPS Disciplinary SystemMisconduct and disciplinary hearings finalised 2007/08 to 2011/12

Is the SAPS Disciplinary system the solution?

• Between 2007/08 and 2011/12 the number of finalised disciplinary hearings increased by 2 064 instances or 59%.

• During this period, the total number of SAPS employees grew by 15%. The rate of disciplinary hearings held is increasing at four times the rate of the increase in personnel. This means that there is a substantial increase in disciplinary steps being taken in the SAPS.

• However, the number of hearings ending in a dismissal decreased from 12.2% in 2009/10 to 9.6% in 2011/12

• In 2011/12 over one in three (36%) of the disciplinary hearings held end with no sanction. This is because a total of 2 049 cases were withdrawn or ended in a not guilty verdict.

• The single biggest outcome of a disciplinary hearing in 2011/12 was a “not guilty verdict”. This happened in one out of every five hearings finalised. Moreover, this outcome increased substantially (73%)

• The very high number of suspended dismissals (792) is a cause for concern. It suggests that people who have been dismissed have this sanction suspended. Does this promote discipline in the SAPS?

Failure of the SAPS Disciplinary System to remove violent officers

• There is evidence that the SAPS disciplinary system allows criminally violent officers to remain within the SAPS.

• On 24 November 2011 Vaalwater policemen Warrant Officer Petrus Lefoka severely assaulted teenager Norman “Herman” Mokau in public. Norman was left in the back of a police van for two hours while unconscious before being taken to hospital.

• The beating was filmed on a cell phone and resulted in W/O Lefoka being criminally convicted for assault with intention to do grievous bodily harm (GBH). Lefoka was handed a suspended sentence of two months imprisonment, with the option of a R2,000 fine, suspended for five years.

• The SAPS internal police disciplinary hearing simply resulted in a fine of R500. Lefoka remains in the SAPS despite a criminal conviction for brutality.

• A Constitutional court judgement handed down on 15 December 2011 upheld an appeal for damages from the Police Minister by 13 year old girl who was raped by an off-duty police official who had a number of criminal convictions for assault

• The judgement in part found that “Despite knowledge of his (the police officer involved) previous convictions he was allowed to continue service. Harm was foreseeable. No steps were taken to prevent it from occurring.” See Case CCT 30/11 2011] ZACC 37 – page 60

Dangers of Mass Recruitment for policing

• SAPS grew rapidly in size from 2002/3 to 2011/12 by 51% (67 035 employees)

• Studies show dangers of mass recruitment (see Skolnick, J.H. & Fyfe, J.J. 1993, Above the law: Police and the excessive use of force New York: Free Press.)

• Police systems take strain (i.e. recruitment, vetting, training, supervision, discipline, performance mgt, etc)

• This results in large numbers of inadequately trained, poorly managed and supported police officials on the streets.

• In turn police misconduct and abuses (i.e. brutality & corruption increase).

• SAPS mass recruitment took place at a time with the weakening & breakdown of internal accountability systems (SAPS Area offices closure, disbandment of the SAPS Anti-Corruption Units, weakening of the SAPS National Inspectorate, etc).

SAPS Personnel Trends2002/03 to 2011/12

SAPS Roadblocks & cordon operations 2002/02 to 2011/12

SAPS Searches & Patrols 2002/03 to 2011/12

Assessing SAPS Performance

• There is no correlation between number of formal SAPS operations recorded & personnel figures or searches undertaken.

• Cordon and search operations dropped from a high of 81 342 in 2005/06 to a low of 20 490 in 2008/09 despite there being 29 575 more uniformed police officials available to the SAPS in this time.

• Increased police interactions with the public (106% in 4 years ending 2011/12) outside of defined operations with direct supervision could allow for more abusive encounters.

The Danger of Mass Arrests

• Since 2007/08, the number of arrests increased substantially by 26% while the overall crime rate stabilised (showing a marginal 1,4% increase).

• In 2011/2012 the police made more than 1,6 million arrests, an increase of 11% compared to the previous year. However, during this year total crime increased by 0.7%.

• There are international studies that have found that while large-scale arrests for petty crimes may decrease crime rates in the short term, this strategy can increase the crime rate in the long term. (Sherman et al, 1997)

• These studies show that most arrests for petty crime do not act as deterrent to individuals, especially if they are unemployed and feel marginalised.

• Rather, such arrests compound alienation and can result in a breakdown of community relations with the police – resulting in further disorder and law breaking.

• It is clear that the strategy of mass arrests is limited to the police & not part of a comprehensive approach towards crime control.

• This is evidenced by the fact that in the past three years when arrests have increased by 18.4%, the total number of cases finalised by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) have decreased by 10%

SA Crime Overview2002/03 to 2011/12

Total Arrests & Court Cases Finalised2002/03 to 2011/12

Key Concerns regarding SAPS Performance Plan for 2012/13

• It ignores any evidence and public perceptions of police abuses in the “Performance Delivery Environment” that frames the plan.

• No mentioning of strengthening criminal & disciplinary investigations and processes.

• No mention is made of improving training, appointments, promotions, rewards or incentives.

• There is no recognition that crime has largely stabilised at a high rate & that current policing methods are not yielding the results required.

• No engagement with the issues raised in the Ministers introduction nor recommendations of the NDP.

Recommendations• The recommendations of the National Development Plan (NDP) to

“professionalise the SAPS” must be developed into a clear plan of action and implemented as a matter of priority.

• This should start with the establishment of a multi-disciplinary “National Police Board” to set objective standards for appointing and promoting police officers.

• Starting at the top of the SAPS, all officers must be assessed against these criteria – where they fail to meet the standards they must be removed from positions of authority.

• These posts should then be filled through a transparent and competitive process.

• Once a new SAPS senior leadership is in place then a clear five year plan of action to professionalise the SAPS through the use of the code of conduct & code of ethics.

• All systems for promoting ethical policing (e.g. training, promotions, etc) and those for enhancing accountability (e.g. Disciplinary system, performance management, etc) must be strengthened based on a clear and measurable plan of action.

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gnewham@issafrica.org

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