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Reading Capital with Being andTimeJoel WainwrightPublished online: 31 Mar 2015.

To cite this article: Joel Wainwright (2015) Reading Capital with Being and Time,Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, 27:2, 160-176

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Reading Capital with Being and Time

Joel Wainwright

This essay argues for reading Marx’s Capital with Heidegger’s Being and Time (and viceversa). Yet how might we do so? Being and Time is, after all, typically seen to be ananti-Marxist book. This paper elucidates three areas where reading these bookstogether illuminates our understanding of each, first discussing Marx’s value theory inlight of Heidegger’s conception of ontological difference and then examining eachbook’s treatment of subjectivity. The essay ends by comparing the two books’ politicalconclusions.

Key Words: Capital, Martin Heidegger, Karl Marx, Subjectivity, Value

But as there is no such thing as an innocent reading, we must say whatreading we are guilty of.

—Louis Althusser, Reading “Capital”

Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time is typically read as an anti-Marxist book. Marxistshave concluded, with no less an authority than Adorno (1973), that Heidegger’swork is “fascist into its innermost cells.”1 Even if we could somehow ignore Adorno’scriticism and Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazi party long enough to read Beingand Time with an open mind, several elements will still cause problems for Marxists.Heidegger’s sweeping condemnation of the entire Western tradition—for forgettingthe question of being—includes Marx as much as anyone. And contrary to Marx’sconception of sociohistorical formations, the problematic outlined in division 1 ofBeing and Time seems to foreclose the possibility that historical class processes aredeterminant of being. In its atavistic portrayal of the worldliness of the small ruralproducer and in its unfavorable representation of “the they” (das Man) and urban life,it exhibits the biases of petit-bourgeois romanticism and leaves little room for radicaldemocratic politics.2 Hence, even before we get to being-unto-death in division 2,

© 2015 Association for Economic and Social Analysis

1. Cited by Wiggershaus (1986, 87) and in Berman (2002, 113); compare with Lukács (1980,489–517).2. Hence many Marxist critics have inveighed against Heidegger’s atavism. For instance,Karatani (2003, 99) writes, “Problematizing the loss of Being, Heidegger may have attackedPlato as the instigator of this line of thinking, yet his own positionality was isomorphic to Plato’s—excluding the heterogeneity of the thought that comes from the topos of trade, andinternalizing the denuded skeleton of that thought. For Heidegger, in the end, the loss of Being

Rethinking Marxism, 2015Vol. 27, No. 2, 160–176, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2015.1007795

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there are problems.3 Although many philosophers categorize Being and Time as anessentially apolitical phenomenological analysis of being, for Marxist readers all textsare at least singed by the flames of class politics, and Being and Time seems wellcooked. But before we shelve Being and Time, we Marxists should pay heed to thesewords from a lecture given by C.L.R. James (2009, 93, 102–3; emphasis added) in1966: “Have no doubt whatever that [studying Being and Time] will ultimately be veryeffective in our work … You need not accept Heidegger. You may reject him. But Isuggest that you master him … Marxism has to develop, and this is one of the reasonsthat I bring Heidegger’s work to you.”I will likewise argue for reading Marx’s Capital with Heidegger’s Being and Time

(and vice versa). My central claim reiterates James’s: Being and Time should be afundamental text for us today because reading it allows us to interpret Marxism moreradically. How might we read Capital with Being and Time is the pressing question andthe key, I argue, to an exchange between Marx and Heidegger.Is there any basis for such an engagement? I believe so. Consider the following parallels:

. Mute objects on our shelves, we tend to see Capital and Being and Time as completebooks. Yet each one represents only a fraction of its thinker’s conception for theproject. What I refer to as Capital in this paper is only the first volume—the onlyvolume Marx completed—of a project that was initially sketched to include six ormore volumes. Likewise, what we call Being and Time is composed only of the firsttwo of six planned “divisions” (Heidegger 2010, sec. 8, 37). This is not to suggest thatthese books are unfinished masterpieces (or, still less, that they are inadequate).Rather, these texts show the traces of impossible projects; their incompletenessreveals no simple limitation but something inherent to their problematic. Forstudying them and thinking through their problematic, what we have is sufficient.

. Each book opens, in its first section, with its most difficult and decisive state-ments. The problem at hand—explaining capitalism on the basis of the theory ofvalue, generating anew the question of being through the analytic of Dasein—isformulated in a fashion that implicitly draws on a trio of thinkers who inspiredboth Marx and Heidegger (yet who are not discussed extensively in these twobooks): Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel.4 The immediate stated task of each is to

was equal to the loss of the German agrarian community.” By contrast, C.L.R. James (2009, 92)locates Being and Time against the backdrop of post–World War I Europe: “The great book thatHeidegger has written is Being and Time. I must recommend that you get this book. First of all,why has this philosophical system arrived? It has arrived because of the breakdown of Europeancivilization during World War I, and what is happening today is merely the continuation of that.”3. In an essay intended to explain these sections for a popular audience, Critchley (2009)summarizes: “Being and Time is a long hymn of praise to possibility and it finds its highestexpression in being-towards-death. Heidegger makes a distinction between anticipation(Vorlaufen) and expectation or awaiting (Erwarten). His claim is that the awaiting of deathstill contains too much of the actual, where death would be the actualisation of possibility. Suchwould be a gloomy philosophy of morbidity. On the contrary, for Heidegger, anticipation does notpassively await death, but mobilises mortality as the condition for free action in the world.”4. Marx and Heidegger cite Aristotle approvingly but suggest that his philosophy was marked bya fundamental limitation that has yet to be transcended. By contrast, Kant and Hegel are hardlymentioned in Capital and Being and Time, though these later texts are unimaginablewithout them.

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execute a critique: in volume 1 of Capital by unraveling the question of value toexplain capitalism as a social formation; in Being and Time by reformulating thequestion of being on the horizon of temporality. Both critiques are ontologicalinsofar as they inquire into the very nature of being, and their realization requirestransforming our conception of the world.

. Certain crucial moves in these critiques occur in parallel. For instance, after openingthe question of being, Heidegger’s (2010, sec. 12–5) existential analysis begins withDasein’s being-in-the-world, which (to simplify) centers upon “worldliness” orDasein’s “factically entangled” being with things. Worldliness emerges neitherfrom nothing nor from God’s will nor from the everyday concept “world” but fromDasein’s practical doing (Heidegger’s examples typically involve tools). Comparewith Capital: after posing the question of value—what is it? where does it comefrom?—Marx examines labor, the production of commodities (including that uniquecommodity, labor power), the congealment of labor power in machinery, and so on.Both critiques therefore begin by raising anew a fundamental question (of value, ofbeing) and then proposing to reanalyze it on the basis of practical, worldly relations.

. These critical analyses are not centered on a particular subject and its consciousbehavior. Marx’s critique of capitalism is not expressed from the vantage of proletarianrationality; Being and Time does not claim to be an authentic representation ofDasein’s consciousness. To put this otherwise, both textsmust finesse their inheritancefrom Descartes regarding the relation between subject and object in order to openspace for their critiques. They begin in the gap between subject and object, anchoredneither by an abstract “humanity” nor by a subject but only by the worldlyengagements of Dasein (Heidegger 2010, sec. 15) and the practical activities ofhumans qua “personifications of economic categories” (Marx 1976, 179).

These points do not exhaust the parallels one might draw, nor do they displace theproblems mentioned in the first paragraph. Yet they demonstrate the viability of acomparative reading. An exhaustive comparative reading would require a monograph. Iknow of no such book, though there have been other attempts to fend for a HeideggerianMarxism.5Myaim ismore limited: Iwill fend for James’s claimbyexamining three instanceswhere reading Capital with Being and Time illuminates our understanding of each text.

1

The first instance concerns Marx’s theory of value. Part 1 of Capital, “Commoditiesand Money,” is generally regarded as the most difficult and Hegelian section. Andmuch like with Being and Time, part 1 contains the entire project in miniature (and itis in their opening parts that each text decisively problematizes representation).

5. Space does not permit me to review four such relevant, recent works: Marcuse (2005), Mei(2009), Pawling (2010), Vattimo and Zabala (2011), and Hemming (2013); see also Stone (1994). Iwill only discuss Jameson’s (2011) Representing Capital, which offers a “depoliticized” readingof volume 1 of Capital. Notwithstanding their merits, none of these works thematically discussCapital alongside Being and Time.

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Consider Capital. Frederic Jameson (2011, 12) writes, “The theory of value is …

Capital’s hermeneutic dimension: it secures the existence, behind all appearances ofprice and market exchange, of those deeper laws which it is the vocation of Marxiantheory to bring to light, and without which the ‘violent fluctuations’ as well as theirreversible expansion of capitalism, along with its emergence and dissolution, canscarcely be understood.”6 Marx’s treatment of value also shares this “dimension” withBeing and Time through its radicalization of hermeneutics. Remember that thepurported method of Being and Time is neither strictly hermeneutical nor pheno-menological but is also, or rather, a radical “destructuring” of traditional ontology.7

Consider this passage from Being and Time’s introduction: “If the question of being isto achieve clarity regarding its own history, a loosening of the sclerotic tradition anda dissolving of the concealments produced by it is necessary. We understand this taskas the destruction of the traditional content of ancient ontology which is to becarried out along the guidelines of the question of being” (2010, 21). The attempt topose anew the question of being in the key of fundamental ontology is called the“existential analytic” in Being and Time. Such “destruction” is necessary because thequestion of being cannot be raised by merely accounting for things we encounter inthe world; such an analysis of beings, which Heidegger calls “ontic,” is alreadycontaminated by the “sclerotic tradition” and presupposes the world as the whereof the encounter, things as the what, and the conscious subject as the who. Hence,Being and Time does not begin with a subject named “Dasein” and an object called“world.”Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein is terminologically and conceptually complex, as it

takes on the entire history of Western metaphysics since Plato. I only wish here toemphasize how the opening of Being and Time moves in parallel with the first chapterof Capital. Let me draw out two points.First, Capital’s value theory has a “quantitative” aspect insofar as it explains the

production of relative surplus value and the exploitation of labor power by capital.This may be distinguished from the “qualitative” aspect of value—that is, the makingof the capital-labor relation as such via historical social processes. This qualitative/quantitative distinction (which structures Marx’s discussions of abstract labor,machinery, and the wage) is introduced in Capital’s sixth sentence—“Every usefulthing … may be looked at from the two points of view of quality and quantity” (Marx1976, 125)—and plays a pronounced role in chapter 1 apropos of value. As I readchapter 1, Capital’s value theory implies a conception of nonhierarchical differencethat exceeds the quality/quantity distinction and asks after the very being ofdifference. This is the point at which Hegel’s dialectic, for some, explains Marx’s

6. See also Jameson (2011, 29, 43, and 133). These curious intrusions of Being and Time intoJameson’s long-awaited book on Capital—Heidegger is even cited before Hegel—can beexplained by extending Jameson’s logic to its radical conclusion: i.e., the reason we shouldread Capital with Being and Time is that they represent the two greatest attempts to grasp theworld under the sway of capitalist modernity.7. The first division of Being and Time (Heidegger 2010, sec. 9–44) entails a “PreparatoryFundamental Analysis of Da-sein”; the second (sec. 45–83) examines “Da-sein and Temporality.”Together with the four projected but unwritten divisions (outlined in sec. 8), Being and Time isintended to destructure the history of ontology upon the horizon of temporality (see sec. 6).

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theory (quantity becomes quality, difference is sublated), but we should considerother interpretations.Reading part 1 of Capital alongside Being and Time suggests a better pair of terms:

the distinction between the “ontic” and the “ontological” (introduced in Heidegger2010, sec. 3–5). The ontic/ontological difference can be glossed in this way: whereasan ontic consideration of a given being merely examines it as a being, an ontologicalquestioning of a being is distinguished by considering its being as such. Heidegger’s(2010, sec. 3) first and most important illustration of the distinction concerns Dasein:as a being, Dasein is distinguished ontically by its being ontological. To restateHeidegger’s example, this is like saying, “It is human nature to question the nature ofhumans” (except that Heidegger’s terms have the benefit of avoiding the trap ofnaturalizing humanism). Heidegger (2010, sec. 2, 6) seeks to reawaken in us therecognition that the “being of being ‘is’ itself not a being.” This move finds its parallelin Capital’s insistent claim in chapter 1 that value is not merely exchange value. Eachbook’s fundamental critique hinges on the problematization of the very conditions ofpossibility of the object, or problem, under analysis; Heidegger’s ontic/ontologicaldistinction thus allows us to appreciate Marx’s analysis of value form, and Capital’sfirst chapter helps to illuminate Being and Time’s problematizing of the “questioning”of the question of being.8

Capital does not begin with production or exchange but with the commodity—theeconomic cell of capitalist society. Unraveling the commodity, Marx (1976, 129)reintroduces us to the distinction between use value and exchange value andproceeds to argue that “the magnitude of the value of any article is … the labour-time socially necessary for its production.” From this, many readers treat the firstchapter of Capital as an exposition of the “labor theory of value,” but that is not so.This errant reading, which applies more to Ricardo’s political economy than Marx’scritique, ignores the way that Marx’s analysis of value proceeds through the firstchapter from the commodity to exchange value and then to value, money, valueform, and finally commodity fetishism. Capital’s passage from the commodity tocommodity fetishism via value form is typically described as a dialectical analysis butcan equally be described as a hermeneutical circle. In 1928 Isaak Rubin (1972;emphasis added) brilliantly corrected the “Ricardian” reading of the value theory inCapital:

The usual short formulation of [Marx’s theory of value] holds that the valueof the commodity depends on the quantity of labor socially necessary forits production; or, in a general formulation, that labor is hidden behind, orcontained in, value … It is more accurate to express the theory of valueinversely: in the commodity-capitalist economy, production-work relationsamong people necessarily acquire the form of the value of things, and canappear only in this material form; social labor can only be expressed invalue. Here the point of departure for research is not value but labor, notthe transactions of market exchange as such, but the production structure

8. C.L.R. James (2009, 95) gestured toward the same argument but never, to my knowledge,developed it.

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of the commodity society, the totality of production relations amongpeople.9

I believe Rubin to be correct, but to emphasize my argument apropos of Being andTime, I claim that the theory of value in Capital is not so much an inversion of thetypical Ricardian argument as its ontological problematization. Simply put, Marx’s“reversal” of bourgeois political economy amounts to questioning how capitalistsociety values things—more precisely, why value is and why we are condemned toproduce it. Adam Smith and David Ricardo did not question the existence of value orits form; for them, commodities simply “had” value of two kinds, use and exchange,full stop. Marx’s overturning of the Smith/Ricardo legacy is executed in chapter 1 ofCapital through his introduction of the syntagma “form of value” (Wertform). Marx(1976, 174n34; emphasis added) writes, “One of the chief failings of classical politicaleconomy … [Ricardo included, is] that it has never succeeded, by means of its analysisof commodities … in discovering the form of value which in fact turns value intoexchange-value.” Why did the form of value have to be “discovered” by Marx? Notonly because classical political economists had failed to see it but also because theform of value cannot be empirically observed yet is capital’s ontology. This helps usappreciate why after “reformulating” the question (of being, of value) each of thesetexts turns immediately to what Rubin (following Marx) calls “the totality ofproduction relations” (in Heidegger’s terms, Dasein’s “environmentality”). In short,Capital is no mere critique of the exploitation of labor but is rather an analysis thatshows why under capitalism labor must acquire the form of value and how thisthereby shapes our lives. Capital is thus a profound analysis of the conditions thatgive form to life, to being.My second observation is that the particular rhetorical maneuver by which each of

these texts sets “destruction” to work hinges on the radicalization of the meaning ofform. The concept of “form,” as applied to value in Capital and being in Being andTime, cannot be contrasted with “content” in the traditional way (hence neither dothey signify quality/quantity). We have already seen that in Capital the decisivetransposition of use/exchange comes in section 3 with Marx’s introduction of “theform of value,” which is what “turns value into exchange-value.” With this move,Capital becomes an attempt to explain the form of value—its existence and itsconsequences for our existence—and Marx’s analysis of value form must be logically apriori to his explanation of surplus value’s expropriation. This could be said to be thefundamental question of Capital, an essentially ontological one. It is thereforenoteworthy that the decisive opening of the ontic-ontological register occurs insection 2 of Being and Time, entitled “The Formal Structure of the Question ofBeing,” where we read: “The question of the meaning of being must be formulated. If

9. See also Karatani (2003) and Karatani and Wainwright (2012). Marx’s theory of value formemerges through his response to Bailey’s critique of Ricardo. Against Ricardo, Bailey argued thatthere was no such thing as “natural value” or “intrinsic value” but instead that value is nothingbut a purely relational system (i.e., exchange value). Marx recognized the correctness of Bailey’scritique of Ricardo’s dogmatism but insisted that we must distinguish between the content andthe form of value, as well as explain the relation between value and money (hence, the antitelosof accumulation).

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it is a—or even the—fundamental question, such questioning needs the suitabletransparency” (Heidegger 2010, sec. 2, 4). Later we come to find that the formulationof such “transparency” is nothing less than the navel of Being and Time’s problematic.Could we not say the same about Capital? Remember that Marx (1976, 175n34)criticizes classical political economy for failing to see “the form of value which in factturns value into exchange-value”—hence economic thought has been confined “tosystematizing in a pedantic way, and proclaiming for everlasting truths, the banal andcomplacent notions held by the bourgeois agents of production about their ownworld.” It is these “banal and complacent notions … about their … world” that Capitalsubjects to withering critique of the sort Heidegger calls “destruction.”Notwithstanding Marx’s visceral contempt for economists’ “banal and complacent

notions,” both Capital and Being and Time insist upon the necessity of beginningwith the usual meanings of the (German) words they call into question. This explainsone of the most challenging aspects of these texts: by beginning with theconventional meanings of their key words (value, being) and then loosening themso that their inherent catachresis may be put to work, these books allow us to askhow value and being are what they are. Marx calls value “value” even though doing soensures that most readers will think “price” every time he writes “value” (the trapbeing, of course, that value both is and is not exchange value). Marx could have triedto avoid the trap by inventing new terms, but this would be meaningless. He knew hewas stuck and therefore sought to write his Critique of Political Economy (Capital’ssubtitle) within and against the inherited discourse of classical political economy.Heidegger too was trapped within Western metaphysics and operates a similar criticalprocedure. We could name this approach an immanent critique in extremis, ordeconstruction avant la lettre; however defined, their procedures open the way forthe force of their analyses—and also, perhaps inevitably, for interpretive confusion.This goes some way toward explaining the apparent classicism of their sources.

Although Marx is more circumspect about it, both books imply that their methodrequires reopening questions (regarding being and value) by enacting what Heideggerdescribes as “the destruction of the traditional content of ancient ontology”—that is,by overturning Western metaphysics as inherited from the Greeks. Both booksstruggle with Aristotle from the opening pages. Marx (1976, 151) praises Aristotle as“the great investigator who was the first to analyse the value-form”; yet Marx alsoclaims that Aristotle failed to grasp the categories of political economy, for the lackof a theory of value.10 Being and Time confronts Aristotle on page two as one of the

10. Marx (1976, 151–2) writes, “‘There can be no exchange,’ [Aristotle] says, ‘without equality,and no equality without commensurability.’ Here, however, he falters, and abandons the furtheranalysis of the form of value. ‘It is, however, in reality, impossible that such unlike things can becommensurable,’ i.e. qualitatively equal. This form of equation can only be something foreign tothe true nature of things, it is therefore only ‘a makeshift for practical purposes.’ Aristotletherefore himself tells us what prevented any further analysis: the lack of a concept of value.”Marx further postulates, “Aristotle himself was unable to extract this fact, that, in the form ofcommodity-values, all labour is expressed as equal human labour and therefore as labour ofequal quality, by inspection from the form of value, because Greek society was founded on thelabour of slaves, hence had as its natural basis the inequality of men and of their labour-powers.”

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great philosophers of the question of being but then laments that he inauguratedthe forgetting of the question.11 In the first section of both Capital and Being andTime we find an attempt to return to Aristotle and overcome the limits ofinherited metaphysics by radicalizing form. One way to appreciate these texts isthus by reading them together as impossibilities organized around the task oftransparently formulating fundamental questions, thereby representing the veryconditions of possibility of representation (of being, of value). In this view eachbook is an extended thought experiment about the form and limits of our inheritedthought. If these works fail, it is to their inestimable credit that they do sosuccessfully.

2

But how can we ground praxis, if we treat it as nothing more than theinessential moment of a radically non-human process? … Surely manwould become what Walter Biemel, in his commentary on Heidegger, calls“the bearer of the Opening of Being.” This is not a far-fetched compa‐rison. The reason why Heidegger paid tribute to Marxism is that he sawMarxist philosophy as a way of showing, as Waelhens says … “that Being isOther in me … [and that] man … is himself only through Being, which isnot him.”

—Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason12

The subject-object distinction is one of those problems that we can neither avoid norresolve. One measure of the strength of a philosophical text is the creativity andsubtlety with which it addresses the problem. By this standard these two books aremasterpieces, and in similar respects.Heidegger’s signature notion of being-in-the-world is incomprehensible from within

a Cartesian view of the world. Descartes introduced a revolutionary break by posingthe question of the cogito, or the subject who thinks.13 Heidegger sought to build hisanalysis in Being and Time on a different basis that did not presuppose a distinctionbetween the thinking subject (cogito) in a world of objects. We read, “Subject and

11. This critique of Aristotle is implicit to Being and Time’s problematic, yet the final division ofBeing and Time, which was to address “Aristotle’s treatise on time as a way of discerning thephenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology” (Heidegger 2010, sec. 8, 35), was neverwritten.12. This is Sartre’s only direct mention of Heidegger in the Critique of Dialectical Reason. Sartredoes not specify where he finds that “Heidegger paid tribute to Marxism,” but I suspect heis thinking of Heidegger’s (1993) “Letter on Humanism”—a response to Sartre’s Marxistexistentialism (among other things).13. Space permits me to review neither the debate surrounding Descartes nor Heidegger’srelation to him, but I contend in passing that Karatani’s argument—that Descartes’s doubt wascompelled by “the temporal and spatial heterogeneity of discourses, and in being-other to thecommunity one belongs to” and therefore that the true “crux of Cartesian doubt = Cogito is thatit was constantly dogged by the other”—could also be made of Heidegger’s path of thequestioning of being.

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object are not the same as Da-sein and world” (Heidegger 2010, sec. 13, 60).14 YetHeidegger, like Marx, was trapped by language to commit “fatal” errors like pairingmetaphysical terms in conventional fashion, even when seeking to radicalize ourthinking about their relation.One way to appreciate Kojin Karatani’s argument that “there is no subjectivity” in

Capital (2003, 19) is to look for instances where what might typically be called“consciousness” or “agency” comes into the picture.15 In the preface to the firstedition, Marx (1976, 92) explains, “Individuals are dealt with here only in so far asthey are the personifications of economic categories, the bearers [Träger] ofparticular class-relations and interests. My standpoint, from which the developmentof the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can lessthan any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature heremains, socially speaking, however much he may subjectively raise himself abovethem.”16 A sublime formula: we may strive to “subjectively raise” ourselves abovethe social relations that make us what we are, but they (the relations) are the productof natural history—here, arguably, is Marx’s fundamental ontology. Yet a problemarises, which I take up below. How do we explain consciousness, especially therelation of consciousness to the other—necessary to theorize any conception of classrelations—if not on the basis of the subject qua rational individual?Capital could be described as an analysis of the class dynamics of capitalist society

and thus of two competing subject positions: capital (employer) and labor (employee).But there are two problems with this summation. First, as Jameson (2011) emphasizes,Marx places considerable weight on the argument about the reproduction on anexpanding scale of the unemployed and the Lumpenproletariat. Capital is as much abook about the condition of not being employed as it is about the exploitation of laborin a factory. Not-labor haunts Capital as a necessary precondition for the onset of thevalorization of value and as a distinctly possible form of being-with-capital. So whenwe say that Capital is a book about capital and the proletariat, we should add that it isa book about not-capital and not-labor too. Second, Capital’s analysis of the classdynamics of capitalist society is inherently abstract and must be mediated for anyanalysis of concrete social formations. Taking these two points together, Capital is awork that describes neither an abstract subject nor a specific subject position butrather a peculiar becoming-form of subjection. That is, it analyzes a particular way ofbeing (or form of being in a given historical social formation) where we are thrown into

14. At some later point, when he reread this sentence, Heidegger was so disturbed that headded a marginal note in his book: “Certainly not. So little that even rejecting this by puttingthem together is already fatal” (Heidegger 2010, sec. 13, 56).15. Karatani (2003, 19) elaborates, “In Capital, there is no subjectivity. Even capitalists … areagents of capital’s movement, but not subjects. The same is true of workers. So it is that peopleeither read in Capital the (natural historical) law of history whereby a capitalist societygradually yet apodictically turns into a communist society, or sought motives of revolutionaryacts in pre-Capital texts. As is evident, however, neither method worked.”16. Considering Dasein’s peculiar burden, Heidegger (2010, sec. 29, 131) writes, “Human beingis delivered to Da-sein, appropriated by it. To bear [Tragen]; to take over something from out ofbelonging to being itself.”

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being proletariat—assuming that we are so lucky as to be able to sell our labor power.(A billion would-be proletarians today are not so “lucky.”)17

Similar claims could be made for Being and Time, from which I borrow thisconception of being “thrown” [Geworfen] and which could be described as an elaborateattempt to discern the ontological antecedents to the question of the subject. This isone reason why Being and Time does not tell us how to achieve an authentictemporality or way of being; such a thing presumes a subject, one defined by thislack, which runs counter to the presuppositions of Heidegger’s analysis. Similarly,Capital is often associated with proletarian class consciousness, yet this concept isnever elucidated in the book. Indeed, if proletarian class consciousness automaticallyemerged as a result of capitalist class processes, Capital would be superfluous.More pertinent to my argument is that Capital and Being and Time approach these

problems in parallel, and these paths opened the way to the radicalization of postwarcontinental philosophy. This point is so significant to Jameson that he repeats it inboth Valences of the Dialectic and Representing Capital, books where (symptomat-ically in my view) Heidegger’s name appears frequently (and even before Hegel’s).This is the point that Jameson (2010, 38–9) repeats:

It is worth wondering to what degree the whole immense Heideggerianproblematization of representation has impacted modern dialecticalthought; yet surely the question of representation has marked thefundamental break with traditional philosophy, and constituted thesource of all the multiple philosophical modernisms (if not … of the post-modernisms that followed them). Many of these problems and paradoxeswere already registered concretely in the analysis of Capital and itscausalities and temporalities, its modes of representation and derealiza-tion; but they were not thematized in the philosophies of Marxism thatfollowed.18

I agree. Among other virtues, Jameson’s recent books suggest the importance formodernity of what we might call the misrecognition of the other imposed by theimperfections of worldly being, and he rightly attributes this discovery to Marx andHeidegger.

17. My reference to luck is to invoke the famous passage from chapter 6 of Capital (Marx 1976,270): “In order to extract value out of the consumption of a commodity, our friend the money-owner must be lucky enough to find within the sphere of circulation, on the market, acommodity whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value, whoseactual consumption is therefore itself an objectification of labour, hence a creation of value.”Note how Marx’s critique of the exploitation of labor power (obtaining surplus value) issimultaneously a critique of the very “objectification of labour.”18. Compare with Jameson’s (2011, 5, 43, 133) Representing Capital, where he argues thatMarxism should enrich Heidegger’s critique of representation “with an identification ofmodernity and capitalism.” Yes and no. To be sure, modernity and capitalism are coimplicatedin ways that Heidegger cannot address, but the two are not the same, and Heidegger’s emphasison the former has its own validity and significance. We could say that Capital reflects aninterpretation of modernity as an ensemble of social (class) relations, an interpretation thatallows us to ask the question of being in a way that is foreclosed by Being and Time.

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To elaborate, let’s open Capital at the point in chapter 7 where Marx is describingthe fact that “dead labor”—the congealed form of previous investments of livinglabor that keep the valorization process humming along—is not seen as dead labor(i.e., is not actually seen as the subjective qualitative result of someone’s life).Nevertheless, Marx (1976, 289; emphasis added) explains, we are forced to becomeconscious of others when things go wrong:

Whenever products enter as means of production into new labour processes,they lose their character of being products and function only as objectivefactors contributing to living labour … the fact that they are the products ofpast labour is as irrelevant as, in the case of the digestive process, the factthat bread is the product of the previous labour of the farmer, the miller andthe baker. On the contrary, it is by their imperfections that the means ofproduction in any process bring to our attention their character of being theproducts of past labour. A knife which fails to cut, a piece of thread whichkeeps on snapping, forcibly remind us of Mr. A, the cutler, or Mr. B, thespinner. In a successful product, the role played by past labour in mediatingits useful properties has been extinguished.

Apropos of this passage, Jameson (2011, 97) comments that Marx here “anticipatesthe phenomenological doctrine of the relationship between consciousness and failedacts.” Jameson cites Being and Time in a footnote, and so far as I can tell, here arethe lines from Being and Time that he has in mind: “It is indeed already an essentialgain for the analysis of the being encountered nearest to us if their specific handycharacter is not omitted. But we must understand further that heedful associationnever has to do with a single useful thing” (Heidegger 2010, sec. 69(a), 322–6).19 Thatis to say, we do not experience “heedful association” on the basis of an engagementwith a specific thing. Rather, “Using and handling a definite useful thing remains assuch oriented toward a context of useful things. If, for example, we look for a‘misplaced’ useful thing, we do not mean by this simply and primarily only what islooked-for in an isolated ‘act,’ but the context of the whole of useful things hasalready been discovered.” Consider Dasein hammering. We should not see thisrelation as occurring merely between a subject and its object, since the relationalitythey share is always already inscribed within a way of being together (“a context ofuseful things”): here, the possibility of hammering, nails, a roof, a home, and so on.In Marx’s (1976, 126) terms we could say that, on one hand, the use value of thehammer (“the usefulness of a thing”) is an absolute singularity—that is, the result ofthe set of sensual properties of the hammer (its weight, shape, “feel” and so on) thatare encountered through practical use in a particular encounter—and, on the otherhand, its use value is determined by the entire ensemble of historical social relationsthat produce particular needs and capacities—that is, one’s need for a home,capacity to purchase or rent, ability to repair a shingle with a hammer—all of which isimplied in Marx’s concept of socially necessary labor time.20 Use value is therefore

19. In footnote 69 Jameson refers us to Being and Time, “chapter four, paragraph 69, subsection A,”which I take to be the passage cited here.20. See Kristjanson-Gural (2003) for a lucid discussion of social necessity in Marx’s value theory.

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always already immediate and historical, singular and social. Neither does theexistence of exchange value explain the relationship between the hammer and thehammerer. To use another illustration, just because someone somewhere actuallymade the plastic case of the pen with which I compose this sentence does not mean thatI have any meaningful relationship with that person, that singularity. I know nothing ofthe other on whom I depend: that is the source of capitalist modernity’s undeniabledynamism. We do not see our worldliness, and that of others, intersecting—until thingsbreak down. In Heideggerian terms, insofar as our world is constituted through ourbeing factically entangled with things, we do not experience “heedful association”toward others in a simple or automatic fashion.21

How does Dasein experience the hammer? “Things that cannot be used, for example, atool that will not work, can be conspicuous only in and for someone using them. Even themost sharp and persistent ‘perception’ and ‘representation’ of things could neverdiscover something like damage to the tool. The using must be able to be hampered sothat something unhandy can be encountered. But what does this mean ontologically?”(Heidegger 2010, sec. 69(a), 338). Heidegger draws out the implication two paragraphslater: “Only because things offering resistance are disclosed on the basis of the ecstatictemporality of taking care, can factical Dasein understand itself in its abandonment to a‘world’ of which it never becomes master” (339).While I appreciate the point Jameson takes from Heidegger, where I would like to

proceed from this line of thinking is different. Heidegger is struggling to characterizethe way things come to matter for us without treating it as a simple problem of therebeing useful objects. What brings out our being in the world with others is the“resistance” we encounter in things, the imperfections of the world: things breaking,missing the bus, and so on. Heidegger’s use of “world” here is not very different fromwhat Marx describes as the “totality of relations” in his studies, though Marx’sconception of relations focuses more precisely on the production and consumption ofcommodities, and in Capital he analyzes this totality as the product of historical classprocesses. This is undoubtedly a crucial difference with Heidegger, yet not one thatprecludes the reading of Capital with Being and Time. If we overstate the differencesbetween these books on this point, we miss one of the ways that reading themtogether clarifies their contributions. Neither posits social relations in capitalistmodernity as existing between multiple self-coherent “I’s” who see other “I’s” in oneanother, but they rather suggest that our being-together is fundamental and emergesout of imperfections, absences, and limitations. There is always the possibility thatsocial relations are grounded in misrecognition and forgetting—indeed, of their notbeing social relations at all. As Sartre (1982, 181) remarks, “Being is Other in me.”

21. I use “world” here in the ontic sense of “the totality of beings which can be objectivelypresent within the world” (Heidegger 2010, sec. 14, 60). Later in Being and Time, Heideggerwrites, “The world is already presupposed in one’s being together with things at hand heedfullyand factically, in one’s thematization of what is objectively present … The relations ofsignificance that determine the structure of the world are thus not a network of forms that isimposed upon some material by a worldless subject. Rather, factical Da-sein, ecstaticallyunderstanding itself and its world in the unity of the There, comes back from these horizons tothe beings encountered in them” (sec. 69(a), 334).

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In sum, both books can be seen as modernist masterpieces apropos of representation,subjectivity, and technology. Heidegger’s remarks about broken tools may seem far fromMarx’s concerns, but one of the crucial lessons of Capital is that capitalism is a vampire-like social formation that gives over living labor to machinery on an ever-expanding scale.Partly because the societies that attempted to realize the revolution against capital—inRussia, China, Cuba, Vietnam, and elsewhere—have been largely agrarian and poor,twentieth-century communist ideology paintedMarx as the patron saint of heavy industry.Yet Marx was no techno-optimist. The lesson of volume 1 could be summarized in asentenceMarx (1976, 990) wrote in his economic notebooks while preparing Capital: “Therule of the capitalist over the worker is the rule of things over man, of dead labour overthe living, of the product over the producer.” Or as Heidegger (1973, 87) wrote in one ofhis notebooks, “The laboring animal is left to the giddy whirl of its products so that it maytear itself to pieces and annihilate itself in empty nothingness.”

3

The third instance is the most explicitly political and concerns the conclusions ofthese two works. Both Capital and Being and Time are often described, for ratherdifferent reasons, as revolutionary books. But neither specifically prescribes revolu-tionary praxis. Insofar as they discuss revolutionary praxis, it is through the circles ofhermeneutical reasoning. The paradox is that these books—so influential in contem-porary left political theory—have so little to say about revolutionary politics. I willargue that this paradox is a structural condition that both texts share. Since thiscould be mistaken as suggesting that the two books have the same politics, let meaffirm that I do not think they do. But we cannot comprehend their differenceswithout dwelling on this paradox.Let’s return to Capital, to the brilliantly concise chapter 32, where Marx’s (1976, 929)

analysis of the “historical tendency of capital accumulation” precipitates into the formof a prediction: “This expropriation is accomplished through the action of the immanentlaws of capitalist production itself, through the centralization of capitals … Themonopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production which has flourishedalongside and under it. The centralization of the means of production and thesocialization of labour reach a point at which they become incompatible with theircapitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder.” Such is the story of the fall ofcapitalism as told in Capital. Reduced to its essence, it is a simple tale of inherentprocesses going too far. What are these processes? They are the “centralization of themeans of production” (meaning the concentration of money, not only in the economicsense of specific firms and banks but also in space-time and social/state power) and the“socialization of labour” (i.e., the making-proletariat of living labor). The latter is thefundamental ontological motif of Capital, used here to argue that the asymptoticdissolution of precapitalist social relations into the abject and pure state we find underfully developed capitalism—where the majority is divided into proletariat and not-even-proletariat (that is, the unemployed)—will, together with the absolute concen-tration of value, burst the social formation open. This is a clear enough theory of socialtransformation. There are, however, two problems.

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The first—and formerly the more serious for Marxist theory—is that these eventshave not yet come to pass. We are approaching the sesquicentennial of Capital andstill the knell is not sounding. This problem seems to me less acute than it did ageneration ago. The multiplication of millions of would-be proletarians into theglobal labor market has been accompanied by deepening inequality at every scaleand by an extraordinary concentration of wealth, to such an extent that this dynamicunderlies the political-economic crises of our times. But while we can and do see forourselves a growing “centralization of the means of production and … socialization oflabour,” it is difficult to foresee when these processes might “reach a point at whichthey become incompatible with their capitalist integument.” My point here is not anempiricist one—I am not interested in stronger evidence or a better predictive modelthan Capital—but rather a Kantian one concerning the limits of Marxism to anticipatethe conditions of possibility for our knowing that, in fact, another world is possible.To put this otherwise, Capital is no more freed of metaphysics or the limits of reasonthan any other brilliant attempt to think through our condition, Heidegger’s included.The second problem is more serious for contemporary political practices and brings

us back to Marx’s elegant maneuvering around the subject. It is that Capital’sconclusion leaves few guidelines for practical revolutionary activity. Capitalism endswhen “the centralization of the means of production and the socialization of labourreach a point at which they become incompatible with their capitalist integument.”If we reduce Marx’s theory of revolution to this, it is difficult not to fall intoeconomism. We can and should, therefore, consider other texts by Marx, yet we mustalso recognize that Capital’s conclusion is consistent with its mode of analysis, onethat should be reaffirmed. Ergo, reading Capital leaves us with political ambiguity.Much the same could be said for Being and Time, which ends abruptly with a series

of questions that only return us to the book’s starting point: “The existential andontological constitution of the totality of Dasein is grounded in temporality.Accordingly, a primordial mode of temporalizing of ecstatic temporality itself mustmake the ecstatic project of being in general possible. How is this mode oftemporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way leading from primordialtime to the meaning of being? Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being?”(Heidegger 2010, sec. 83, 415). Being and Time thus ends by reformulating one of itscentral propositions as a question. At any rate, Heidegger would spend decadesreflecting upon these uncertain conclusions. I think it is fair to generalize: none of hissubsequent works offers an entirely satisfying answer for Marxists.If this seems to weaken my claim for the political importance of these two works,

let me make two further remarks (which, given the limits of this essay, must remainas mere assertions). First, Capital and Being and Time offer powerful critiques of theidea that our present social order can address the problems these books diagnose.Second, both texts apparently advocate remaking capitalist modernity in favor ofa society of autonomous producers (whose lives are no longer defined solely byproduction). In Being and Time this is only implicit, but it is hard to miss; in Capitalwe find the brief passage at the end of chapter 1 where Marx (1976, 171) asks us to“finally imagine, for a change, an association of free men, working with the means ofproduction held in common, and expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force.” The crucial political

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difference between the texts can be clarified here, with Marx’s emphasis on theassociation’s form—that is, “means of production held in common.” But this differ-ence, though crucial, should not prevent us from seeing parallels too. Jameson (2011,141) argues that Capital’s “Utopian vision of an ‘association of free producers’… impliesmore about Marx’s conception of the uses of Utopia in the construction of hisrepresentation than it tells us about any possible calls to concrete action; and itslanguage is still significantly indistinguishable from that of anarchism.” This can also,I think, be said of the utopian vision implied by Being and Time, where Dasein’s being isno longer tethered to the calculative, inauthentic ordering of vulgar time.To put this more simply, both Capital and Being and Time help us to grasp that

capitalist modernity, in its fatal valorization of growth and efficiency, is set againstautonomous forms of cooperative production. This is one of the central motifs ofCapital; if more difficult to find in Being and Time, it is because of Heidegger’sunwillingness to address the specifically capitalist character of the society he inhabits.That Heidegger’s critical insight shines through nonetheless is revealed by one ofAdorno’s more compelling criticisms of Heidegger, which hinges on this point. Adorno(1973, 17–8) claims, “Heidegger instituted authenticity against the they and againstsmall talk, without deluding himself that there could be a complete leap between thetwo types of existentials that he deals with; for he knew that theymerge into each otherprecisely because of their own dynamism. But he did not foresee that what he namedauthentic, once become word, would grow toward the same exchange-societyanonymity against which [Being and Time] rebelled.” That is to say, Heidegger’s failurewas to lapse into a kind of nostalgic hope that the return of authenticity would meanovercoming capitalist society’s peculiar form of anonymity, where everyone’s time isalways already potentially worth only so much exchange value. I think this is a faircritique, but it can only be made if we first acknowledge Heidegger’s intuition.Heidegger was also like Marx in his acute sensitivity to the ways that the rise of

machinery—the automatization of production, the separation of workers from themeans of production, and so on—brings representation, particularly of time, intocrisis. This goes some way to explaining one of the most beguiling qualities of bothbooks: namely, the multilayered and multitemporal fashion (or the “modernism”) bywhich they move through their analysis. Each text, as we saw, begins by rigorouslyclearing a path of questioning—the very path from which each text derives its criticalpurchase. Yet the immediate stated task at hand (again, explaining capitalism via ananalysis of value form; re-posing the question of being via an analysis of Dasein’stemporality) shifts through the course of the text—or if you would, sinks down, as wefall away from “mere analysis” and as the text calls us to surrender to the thought ofthe problematic. Reading these books to their conclusions (not to say “end,” becauseneither is a complete work) requires us to grasp the purpose of the text anew; we areasked to live or enact the text’s critique in the world. Hence, paradoxically, thecritique that we read these books to grasp—and which initially seems so awesome—isimplied to be already potentially in existence. Each text compels us to ask thequestion: what is it to be? Reading Capital, we ask ourselves, what does it mean to bein a society “in which the capitalist mode of production prevails,” and we discover aworld of endless fluidity, change, expropriation; Being and Time asks us to grasp howour inherited forgetfulness of being hands us over to a world destined to

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inauthenticity and crisis. To be sure, these are different questions and problems. Buttheir differences remain to be explained and, again, their political consequences arenot obvious.To say the least, neither of these books affirms the apparent solutions held out to

us by the powerful. To their credit, they offer no facile alternatives. They ratherimply a possibility of a communism and ecstatic being to come, and yet thecircumstances that are implied in each instance—that is, the conditions of possibilityfor communism and ecstatic temporality—are shown to be wholly inaccessible towhat is commonly called “subjective agency.” Just as we cannot ourselves enact therevolution as portrayed at the end of Capital, Being and Time provides no temporalitythat is not vulgar. The reader is stuck, in vulgar time and in capitalism.What then to do? And does reading these books help us? To reply, we should return to

C.L.R. James’s (2009, 104) lecture, which concludes with the enigmatic argument that“unless Marxism can incorporate … elements [of Being and Time] and still remainMarxism, we will continue saying the things that are said by Engels in Anti-Dühring.”After reading Being and Time, what is it that we Marxists cannot “continue saying”?I think James had in mind rejecting Engels’s (1947, 13) mechanical treatment ofdialectics and his desire to discover “the laws of dialectics [in] nature” by the science ofsleuthing out the negation of negation in every sphere of existence.22 James did notseek to cancel Engels’ negation, i.e., to affirm Dühring. His argument, and mine, is thatwe should return to Marx after reading Heidegger. For reading Capital with Being andTime not only destroys Engels’s (21) call to “make a science of socialism”—a sciencewith disastrous results in the twentieth century—but it also requires that we reopen thequestions of communism: Can we conceptualize a way of being without capitalism? Howcan we live otherwise than in value form? What is it to be communist?These questions take us beyond the scope of this essay, so I conclude with a

reiteration. Capital and Being and Time both extend from a necessarily aporetical,critical principle and conclude with an agentless problematization of this verycondition. Their critiques derive from being in capitalist modernity, and they cannottranscend this horizon. If reading these books together helps appreciate how we arestuck, then that is an accomplishment worth revisiting.

Acknowledgments

Drafts of this paper were presented at the 2012 meeting of the Association ofAmerican Geographers, the 2013 meeting of the MLA Marxist Literature Group, and a2013 meeting of economic geographers at the University of British Columbia hostedby Trevor Barnes. I thank all the participants in these discussions for their questionsand criticisms. Additionally I thank Fred Jameson, Najeeb Jan, Will Jones, Geoff

22. Engels (1947, 131) writes, “What is the negation of the negation? An extremely general—and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important—law of development of nature,history, and thought; a law which, as we have seen, holds good in the animal and plantkingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy … Dialectics … is nothing morethan the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society andthought.”

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Mann, Charles Sackrey, Alberto Toscano, Stephanie Wakefield, Inés Valdez, and ananonymous reviewer for helpful comments and other contributions. Finally I thankTom Pepper for teaching the seminar on Being and Time that provided the project’sinitial impetus.

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