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1 © BAE Systems and Ericsson 2005. All rights reserved Mikael Fredin - Ericsson Microwave Systems, Sweden Leif Axelsson - Ericsson Microwave Systems, Sweden Andrew McCabe – BAE SYSTEMS ATC, UK Alan Cullen - BAE SYSTEMS ATC, UK The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of their colleagues in BAE SYSTEMS plc, Ericsson Microwave Systems AB and Ericsson Telebit A/S, and the support from the UK, Swedish and Danish MoDs under the EUCLID/Eurofinder programme, Project RTP6.22 (B2NCW). Vulnerability modelling of ad hoc routing protocols – a comparison of OLSR and DSR 5 th Scandinavian Workshop on Wireless Ad-hoc Networks May 3-4, 2005

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1© BAE Systems and Ericsson 2005. All rights reserved

Mikael Fredin - Ericsson Microwave Systems, SwedenLeif Axelsson - Ericsson Microwave Systems, Sweden

Andrew McCabe – BAE SYSTEMS ATC, UKAlan Cullen - BAE SYSTEMS ATC, UK

The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of their colleagues in BAE SYSTEMS plc, Ericsson Microwave Systems AB and EricssonTelebit A/S, and the support from the UK, Swedish and Danish MoDs under the EUCLID/Eurofinder programme, Project RTP6.22

(B2NCW).

Vulnerability modelling of ad hoc routing protocols – a comparison of OLSR and DSR

5th Scandinavian Workshop on Wireless Ad-hoc NetworksMay 3-4, 2005

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Contents• Goals• OLSR/DSR Recap (key points) • Modelling Overview

– Node Model– Simulation Scenarios– Radio model– Jamming model

• Simulation results• Visualisation of jamming• Additional investigations / protocol optimisations• Conclusions

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Goals

• To carry out vulnerability modelling of two contrasting ad hoc routing protocols, one reactive (DSR), and one proactive (OLSR)

• In particular, to investigate the effect a jammer has on a network of static sensors in the following scenarios:– Different network sizes: 30 nodes and 70 nodes– Different jamming powers and duty cycles– Different jammer positions (Central and corner locations)– Medium radio transmit power (~10% packet lost at 250 units)

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OLSR Refresher (key points)

• OLSR is a proactive protocol:– Routing messages are sent at ‘regular’ intervals, regardless of user traffic:

• All nodes broadcast HELLO messages.• Only a subset of the nodes (the MPR nodes) flood TC messages.

• Only the MPR nodes may relay user traffic.• Different message periods may be used

=> trade-off between responsiveness and overheads.

• Option to use link quality information (link layer notifications) from the lower layer, to prevent the use of poor quality links.

• Routing messages may be brought forward (sent immediately) when topology change is detected (e.g. due to mobility, or during startup)

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DSR Refresher (key points)

• Reactive (on-demand) routing protocol– Routing information only exchanged when data is sent– Main mechanisms: route discovery and route maintenance

• Known routes are cached locally in each node (route cache). – If a valid route does not exist in the local cache, a route discovery packet is flooded

across the network. Wait for route reply.

• User packets include source route and maintenance overheads– All user packets carry a full source route as overhead.– Optionally route maintenance can be applied to each packet.

• Route maintenance detects broken links– If a packet cannot be forwarded (broken route) a route error packet is sent back to the

packet source node. – Node that detects the broken link tries to salvage the packet.

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OLSR & DSR: OPNET Implementation

• Results produced using OPNET Modeller environment

• OLSR– Proprietary implementation (platform independent C++ code)

• Interfaced to OPNET 10.5A (PL3) via a custom ‘wrapper’ process • Fully compatible with RFC 3626• Includes an implementation option to enforce a minimal intervals between

successive messages.

• DSR– Using the standard DSR model supplied with OPNET 10.5A (PL1)

(this model not 100% compliant with DSR draft 9)

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Modelling Overview

Rx

MAC

IP

APP

Tx

ARP

UDP

OLSR

DSR

Node model

• Ad-hoc Nodes contain:• Ad Hoc Routing protocol (OLSR or DSR)• Application process (source/sink of user traffic)• IP stack • Radio communications

• Statistics collected on:• The percentage of user packets sent by each node that are

successfully delivered to their intended destination• Average hop counts for delivered user packets • Routing overhead transmitted onto the network

Tx

Jammer Node Pulse lengthDuty cycleJammer Power

Packetgenerator

• Jammer Node contains:• Packet generator• Radio transmitter

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Modelled Scenarios:• Ad hoc nodes, randomly positioned within 500 x 500 world

• multiple simulation runs: different node positions and user traffic

• Number of nodes: 30, 70• No mobility (nodes assumed stationary)• ‘Medium’ radio power used for ad-hoc transmissions• Jammer node placed at:

– centre of world– one corner of world

• 3 different jammer power used– 10%, 100%, 1000% (relative to ad hoc node transmit power)

• Various jammer pulse lengths and duty cycles• User Traffic: Each node sends one 1024-bit user packet per sec to a random destination

– Used only to monitor traffic route-ability/connection– Not concerned with collision/congestion etc (implementation-

specific)

30 nodes, central jammer (LLN links)

70 nodes, corner jammer (LLN links)

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SNR (jamming) -> BER -> Pr{packet error}

SNR (no Jamming) -> BER -> Pr{packet error}

Model takes account of how much of the packet is jammed:

SNR3SNR2 SNR1

SNR2 -> BER2SNR1 -> BER1

Propagation Model

• SNR-based propagation model• Packet reception probability depends on:

• Distance of transmitter from receiver• Distance of jammer from receiver

=> same for T1, T2 and T3

R J

T2

T1

T3

dist-N dist-J

BackgroundNoise

Jamming InterferenceWanted signal

××××=

hTxBandwidtverlapBandwidthORxAGainPathLossTxAGainTxPowerRxPower

= 22

2

16 DPathLoss

πλ

+

=NoiseBackgroundceNoiseInterferen

werRxSignalPoLogSNR 1010

BER = Function of {modulation type, SNR}

Packet Loss Rate = Function of {BER, no of bits}

Expected Packet Loss RateMedium Power - No Jamming

0.00001

0.0001

0.001

0.01

0.1

1

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450

Propagation Distance

Loss

rate

1384 bits 584 bits Old Model

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• Simulation Results:– User Traffic: Percentage successfully delivered– User Traffic: Average hop count– Routing overhead: Messages transmitted per node – OLSR , DSR , Comparisons – Jammer Effectiveness / Figure of Merit

• Visualisation of jamming

• Additional investigations / optimisations:

• Summary / Conclusions

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User data delivered successfully (30 nodes, jammer in centre)

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User Packets delivered: 30 Nodes, Centre Jammer

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[10% 1% 0.1%] [10% 1% 0.1%] [10% 1% 0.1%] [100%]

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Hop counts (30 nodes, jammer in centre)

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User Packet Hop Counts (30 Nodes, Centre Jammer)

Hop counts (30 nodes, jammer in centre)

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[10% 1% 0.1%] [10% 1% 0.1%] [10% 1% 0.1%] [100%]

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Routing Messages Transmitted (30Nodes, Centre Jammer)Routing Messages Transmitted

(30 Nodes, jammer in centre)

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[10% 1% 0.1%] [10% 1% 0.1%] [10% 1% 0.1%] [100%]

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Jammer Effectiveness (30 Nodes, Centre Jammer)Jammer Effectiveness

30 Nodes : Central Jammer

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Jammer Figure of Merit (30 Nodes, Centre Jammer) Jammer Figure of Merit

30 Nodes : Central Jammer

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(% u

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(avg

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)OLSR DSR

This Figure of Merit emphasises packets lost

per unit of jamming power

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• Simulation Results:– Traffic delivered– Hop count– Routing messages transmitted– Comparisons / Figure of Merit

• Visualisation of jamming

• Additional investigations / optimisations:

• Summary / Conclusions

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Probability of packet loss under Jamming

Depends on: Jammer Tx Power (relative to ad-hoc node transmit power): Relative distance of jammer and source node from the receiving node (key factor): Packet size (weak dependence).

Note the narrow transition region - due to the rapid BER vs SNR falloff

0 100 200 300 400 5000

100

200

300

400

500

Jammer Distance

Node Separation

Probability of packet loss:Packet Size: 1384 bits; Jammer Power 1000%

0.0%-20.0% 20.0%-40.0% 40.0%-60.0% 60.0%-80.0% 80.0%-100.0%

0 100 200 300 400 5000

100

200

300

400

500

Jammer Distance

Node Separation

Probability of packet loss:Packet Size: 1384 bits; Jammer Power 100%

0 100 200 300 400 5000

100

200

300

400

500

Jammer Distance

Node Separation

Probability of packet loss:Packet Size: 1384 bits; Jammer Power 10%

Background noise asymptote

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Visualisation of Jamming in a 30 node Network

10% jammer power

CentreJammer

100% jammer power 1000% jammer power

Green links: (good) have better than 50% success in both directions.

Red Links: (asymmetric)have better than 50% success in only one direction, worse than 50% success in other direction.

Yellow Links: (bad) worse than 50% delivered in both directions

* Only showing LLN links here *(not so easy to draw for non-LLN case)

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• Simulation Results:– Traffic delivered– Hop count– Routing messages transmitted– Comparisons / Figure of Merit

• Visualisation of jamming

• Additional investigations / optimisations:

• Summary / Conclusions

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Additional investigations / optimisations

• 70 node networks– Jammer in corner/centre

• OLSR minimal intervals– Pulsed jamming can lead to significant increases in the OLSR routing overhead transmitted onto the network.– This can be countered by enforcing a minimum interval between successive OLSR transmissions.– Minimum intervals up to the default message intervals have little adverse effect on user traffic delivery.

• OLSR Link Layer Notification– Hop counts higher when LLNs used– User packet delivery better when LLNs are used– Routing overhead higher when LLNs are used (more MPRs, more hops)

• DSR Route Maintenance, salvaging and retransmissions– User packet delivery better when salvaging is used– User packet delivery also better when retransmissions are used– Routing overhead higher when salvaging and/or retransmission are used– Route maintenance increases the routing overhead but also increases user packet delivery

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• Simulation Results:– Traffic delivered– Hop count– Routing messages transmitted– Comparisons / Figure of Merit

• Visualisation of jamming

• Additional investigations / optimisations:

• Summary / Conclusions

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Summary & Conclusions: Generalities

• Long distance links are more susceptible to jamming than short links.– During jamming, an ideal routing protocol would aim to use a route with

many short hops in preference to a route with a few long hops.– Both protocols tended to use shorter hops when the jamming was

continuous (i.e. when it was clear that certain links were non-operational)– Neither protocol succeeded in converging towards shorter hops in the

presence of pulsed jamming

• In general, OLSR packet delivery rates were better than DSR– Mainly due to OLSR’s use of Link Layer Notifications (LLNs)

• OLSR selected shorter hops which are more robust to jamming– However DSR has salvaging

• No benefits over OLSR under severe jamming, where frequently no alternative route would be available.

• Succeeded in a few cases of less severe jamming.

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Summary & Conclusions: Routing Overhead

• OLSR– With OLSR’s responsiveness to topology changes constrained by

enforcing minimum intervals between successive transmissions:• The overhead increase during jamming is relatively small (typically <30%).• During severe jamming, the overhead falls due to network fragmentation.

– When shorter OLSR minimum intervals were used• The routing overhead increased significantly (by OOM for fast pulsed jamming)• Little change in user traffic delivery performance.

• DSR– Under some jamming conditions there were repeated unsuccessful

searches for unreachable destinations - this causing up to a factor of 10 increase in overhead

• Familiar weakness with reactive protocols• Serious problem due to additional network load and power consumption

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Summary & Conclusions (cont)

• Hop counts– Higher for OLSR than DSR during jamming

• Mainly due to OLSR’s use of LLNs, resulting in OLSR using shorter links but needing more hops.

• Jammer duty cycles– Matching the jamming cycles to the OLSR “HELLO” or “TC” default

message intervals did not provide any additional jammer advantage.• OLSR’s message ‘jitter’ helps to mitigate against this type of attack• Synchronising jamming to actual OLSR emissions would most likely provide a

jammer advantage - not tested as part of this work– DSR does not emit routing messages to a fixed cycle time and is therefore

not additionally susceptible to any specific cycle.

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Summary & Conclusions (cont)

• A possible enhancement to DSR is to flood the “route error” message locally, rather than sending it right back to the source, so that nodes around a failing link are notified sooner.

• Jammer planning– A jammer placed at the geographical centre is more disruptive than a

jammer placed at the corner of the network (as expected).– Using multiple low power jammers is more a power efficient way of

disrupting a network than using a single high power jammer.