VOX - The Final Frontiers: Arctic and Space

THE STUDENT JOURNAL OF POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHYPublished termly by the Club of PEP at the University of YorkVOX

The Final Frontiers

Arctic & Space

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As the pace of globalization increases, our natural resources deplete and both old and new geo-political tensions are revitalized. The human craving for development and enrichment is only modestly tethered by technological and environmental constraints. The two remaining realms of opportunity largely untouched by the human hand are the ‘Final Frontiers’ - Space and the Arctic. Advanced minds are enticed by the highly profitable opportunities presented by these cold, uninhabitable and resource rich places. But how long will they remain cold and uninhabitable? Diminishing environmental and technological constraints have unshackled research and development as the arctic warms and man-made probes land on comets. This condensed autumn issue seeks to discuss what the consequences of our relentless drive into the Final Frontiers are, and discover if there are any viable paths worth taking. Tensions threatening to develop into something greater than disagreement in the Arctic, and the catastrophe of Virgin Galactic’s SpaceShipTwo indicate that as long as substantial risks exist, there must be a debate about our way forward into the unknown.

Starting our discussion, Philip Preoteasa argues that both the public and private sector are vital in our conquest of Space. Next Kjersti Haugland Næs outlines the great risk of conflict escalation in the Arctic unless institutional reform is implemented, especially given Russia’s current military ambitions. Finally Audra Mitchell questions the commonly held belief that Space can be colonized without ethical difficulties.We hope you enjoy reading the experimental topic that we’ve chosen as much as we’ve enjoyed working on it. Perhaps our own venture into a new frontier, we feel it offers something quite different from the standard interdisciplinary issues discussed within Philosophy, Politics and Economics.

An especial thank you must go to Laurie Woodgate for his untiring effort with this untried theme.

Editorial

Editorial tEam

Proof Readers:Nadia SetiabudiIda Sjöberg

Content Editors:Hannah BennettElizabeth Davies

Editors-In-Chief: Raphael ReubenOscar Stenbohm

Front Cover - Tommy Ellassen

Layout Editor: Raphael Reuben

Web Officer:Jack Turner

Phillip JungMartin KábrtThomas McAuliffeJack ReevesThomas TozerKatherine TylerLaurie Woodgate

Journal Secretary: Shuangying Han

Editors-In-Chief: Raphael Reuben & Oscar Stenbohm

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VOX THE STUDENT JOURNAL OF POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY

voxjournal.co.uk

ISSUE XXIV - AUTUMN 2014

VOX is published triannually by the Club of PEP at the University of York and distributed on York’s campus as well as

other universities world-wide.

VOX is an academic journal run by students that provides a platform for the exchange of ideas and offers insight into debates relating to Politics, Economics and Philosophy (PEP).

Planet B (C, D, E…)?Dr. Audra Mitchell

Better Safe Than Sorry: Russian- Arctic tensions and the need for institutional reform Kjersti Haugland Naes

ESSAYS

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Front Cover - Tommy Ellassen

How beneficial to humanity’s advances into the final frontier will the development of private space sector be?Filip Ioan Preoteasa

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VOX | The STudenT JOurnal Of POliTicS, ecOnOmicS and PhilOSOPhy iSSue XXiV - auTumn 2014

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BEttEr SafE than Sorry:

Climate change is rapidly transforming the Arctic region, changing its geostrategic dynamics. Ironically, due to the negative effects of climate change, the previously inaccessible Arctic areas are now becoming available for resource extraction and increased commercial activity. According to estimates from the U.S. Geological Survey, the Arctic could contain approximately 13 percent of the world´s undiscovered oil and up to 30 percent of the world´s undiscovered natural gas resources (Blunden,2009:122). Furthermore, the Arctic holds huge fresh water reserves and other mineral resources. As current changes are generating vast economic opportunities, they are also creating issues due to the renewed geopolitical value. Excluding Russia, the Arctic littoral

states are all NATO- members. Therefore, alongside growing military activity, the NATO states are undertaking closer security and defence cooperation. As the Arctic has long been of importance to Russia, both in terms of economic development and international position, Russia is becoming increasingly attentive to NATO’s presence. Even though security concerns are getting stronger, no institution can address matters related to security. Yet, the Arctic states claim there is no need for reform. Furthermore, once the resources become more accessible for extraction, and military and commercial activity increase, it is unlikely that security concerns will diminish. If anything, tensions will only escalate.

Russian- Arctic tensions and the need for institutional reform

Kjersti Haugland Naes


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This paper will argue that Russia’s contradictory behaviour, combined with the close defence cooperation among Western states, is fuelling mistrust and creating tensions. Current institutions are not adequately dealing with these tensions, as they do not offer a mechanism in which to do so. If the need for institutional reform continues to be ignored, disputes could transform into conflicts. Admittedly it is unlikely that there will be a full- blown military confrontation between the Arctic states. However, the status quo of states jostling for position in anticipation of further evolution in drilling & exploration technology with continuing global warming provides a unique window of opportunity. It will be argued that the current relative lull should be used to form binding institutional structures that will greatly reduce the severity of future conundrums when the situation deteriorates.

A Changing Arctic

The Arctic is mainly made up of ocean, which is covered by a large ice sheet, but it does also consist of some dry land. It covers over a sixth of the world’s landmass (Mõru,2013). No state owns the Arctic, but parts of the Arctic Ocean

could arguably be claimed to be sovereign territory through a geologically proven extension of the surrounding states’ continental shelves. This claim can be made by the Arctic littoral states; Russia, USA, Norway, Denmark (through Greenland) and Canada. There are also three further Arctic states with territory above the Arctic Circle; Sweden, Iceland and Finland (Arctic Centre,2014).

The interest in exploring the resources in the Arctic became stronger in 2008 when the U.S. Geological Survey was released, claiming the region holds large deposits of oil, gas and minerals. At the moment, it would be quite dangerous and difficult to retrieve those natural resources. However, with a further decrease of the icecap and developing technology, the Arctic region poses as a prospective area for oil and gas extraction (Mõru,2013:9). Findings show that there are over 400 oil and gas fields above the Arctic Circle. These account for approximately “40 billion barrels of oil, more than 1100 trillion cubic feet of gas and 8.5 billion barrels of natural gas liquids” (USGS,2008).

“Having a strong functioning forum to address any misunderstandings or concerns regarding security is essential

to ensure lasting cooperation and to effectively counteract tensions. Recent events in Ukraine have clearly shown the need for continuous effective dialogue, as a lack of communication

exasperates the ‘fog of war’ that mars lasting solutions”


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The importance of the Arctic for Russia: Strategic, economic & military

Russian leaders repeatedly refer to the Arctic as an important strategic resource base for Russia. In 2008 Dmitry Medvedev re-emphasised the region’s strategic importance at the Russian Security Council and further stated that Arctic resources were directly linked to Russia’s future performance in global markets. Margaret Blunden argues that Russia’s Arctic objectives are associated with the country’s desire to regain a “great power status”. Furthermore, she claims that the Arctic strategy is a part of a wider goal to create a “northern identity (Blunden,2009:125).

Energy security has been increasingly linked to Russian national security since Putin’s second presidential term. In the 2009 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 (NSS), the importance of energy in regards to security was mentioned more than five times. The strategy furthermore states that Russia’s international position and strength depends upon its resources and energy reserves (Bratukhina,2011:41). Thus, having a strong presence in the Arctic region and securing the resources that may soon become available is of vital

importance to Russia, both in terms of economic development and international position. Moreover, on a strategic and military level the Arctic holds great value as it gives Russia the prospect of ensuring the Russian fleet free access to the Atlantic. This has significance for the maintenance of Russia’s maritime nuclear deterrent forces as the Arctic would be strategically important for an open access to the world’s oceans for Russian submarines (Padrtová,2012:7).

The UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf has yet to approve Russia´s claim for an extension of its continental shelf of 1.2 m km2 due to lacking geological evidence. The disputed area could contain as much as 586 bn barrels of oil, though, not proven. In comparison, Saudi Arabia’s currently proven reserves amount to approximately 260bn barrels (Borgerson, 2008:68). Additionally, Russia’s current energy production is suffering. The West- Siberian oil fields have been in decline since 2007, and Russia is now producing close to its maximum capacity. Thus, Russia is going to have to start expanding its fields or face an overall decline in the coming years (Virtanen,2013:44) (Astrov,2010:i).

“Russia perceives NATO´s presence as part of an “anti- Russian” agenda, trying to

weaken Russia’s position”


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Russian discourse: Mixed signals

Katarzyna Zysk, of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, claims that the NSS strategy includes a clear emphasis on following international law in regards to Russia´s foreign policy and national security objectives in the Arctic (Zysk,2009:3). Though, many official Russian documents claim a commitment to international law and procedures, statements are always backed up with “tougher” alternatives. The NSS states that conflict over energy resources may occur and states further, in paragraph 11, that “in case of a competitive struggle for resources it is not impossible to discount that it might be resolved by a decision to use military might” (Cohen,2011:20). Rob Huebert (with the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies) claimed the Russian attitude to be a

“realistic” one regarding potential conflict. He stated: “The Russians have been talking very cooperatively, but they have been backing it up with an increasingly strong military set of options” (Cohen,2011:20). Further, Admiral Stavridis, who is the NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, stated that Russia’s “assertive conduct in the Arctic and the muscle- flexing where among the factors grabbing the attention of increasingly wary NATO- leaders” (Conley,2012:34).

Rowe and Blakkisrud claim Russia is often portrayed as the “bad guy” that will undermine cooperation in the Arctic. They argue this may be due to Russia’s mixed signals regarding their intensions in the region. Rowe and Blakkisrud use two examples illustrating the contradicting nature of Russia’s approach. In 2007, on a mission to collect geological evidence for


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the claim of extending Russia’s continental shelf, the explorers planted a Russian flag on the seabed below the North Pole (Rowe&Blakkisrud,2013). Artur Chilingarov, explorer, parliamentarian and vice-president of the Russian Geographical Society, further stated after the flag stunt: “The Arctic is ours, and we should demonstrate our presence” (Cohen,2011:15). However, the bilateral resolution of the 40- yearlong dispute between Russia and Norway regarding a maritime delamination line in the Barents Sea, signed in 2010, portrays a different, cooperative image of Russia. It seems as though Russian officials try to pursue a combining approach of illustrating internationally their commitment to international law, and domestically commitment to Russia´s sovereign rights.

Vladimir Putin’s later statements further tangled the picture after the agreement with Norway. At the United Russia party meeting in 2011 he stated Russia would be open to dialogue, but “we will defend our own geopolitical interests firmly and consistently” (Rowe&Blakkisrud,2013). Moreover, at the same time as the West and Russia are in strong disagreement regarding the recent events in Crimea, Putin announced at the end of April (2014) that Russia should be stepping up their presence in the Arctic, and challenge other states exploring the Arctic’s natural resources (Anishchuk,2014). Thus, even though Russia is talking relatively cooperatively, several of their actions suggests otherwise. As Cohen argues; “While paying lip service to international law”, Russian leaders seem to be under the impression that sound display of

power will settle the territorial disputes (Cohen,2011:23).

Russian perception of Arctic relations and NATO presence

“Arguably, Russian leaders fear strategic isolation and interpret Western defence collaboration as a direct threat to national security.”

A report from 2004 by the Russian State Council revealed a highly suspicious approach towards the other Arctic actors, especially NATO and the United States. They were portrayed as having hidden agendas of monitoring Russian activity, posing as a direct threat to Russian national security. Zysk claims through an analysis of Russian security policy discourse, that Russia is increasingly regarding Norway as an actor trying to undermine Russia´s position in the Arctic. This has been triggered by Norway´s close cooperation with NATO and encouraging more NATO presence (Zysk,2008:82)(Flake,2013:48). That NATO is to be involved to some extent in Arctic security is rather obvious as four out of the five Arctic littoral states are members of the organization. However, a strong NATO presence in the region does pose some problems. It


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is mainly Norway and Denmark that support increased NATO presence. After the annual Cold Response NATO exercise in 2009 where 13 countries participated with more than 7000 soldiers in the north of Norway, Russia declared that increased NATO presence could potentially erode cooperation efforts (Blunden,2009:131).

In 2008 the Russian Ministry of Defence stated that Russia was planning to create an Arctic Special Forces Unit, which would defend the northern policy and the state’s continental shelf. Lieutenant General Shamanov, who is responsible for the military training at the Ministry of Defence, claimed that this idea occurred when several states disagreed with Russia’s Arctic claims (Zysk,2008:84). Moreover, at a meeting between Chilingarov and Putin in 2004, Putin described the Arctic as a “disputed territory, rich in natural resources, where a serious fight of interests between rivals is taking place” (Zysk,2008:84). According to Rob Huebert, Russia’s behaviour is becoming increasingly assertive and possibly even aggressive (Huebert,2009:23&Roberts,2010:958). Russia’s more assertive actions were partly demonstrated through Putin’s orders to reopen a Cold War military naval base, Novosibirsk, last year, sending 10 warships and four nuclear- powered icebreakers to the base.

What further got the attention of the other Arctic states was Putin’s decision to send long-range strategic bomber patrol flights over the region, which had been suspended since the end of the Cold War. This clearly gave relatively mixed signals, and illustrated a rather unpredictable

Russian behaviour. While increasingly placing emphasis on cooperation and international law, Russia is also choosing to go through with actions that come across as assertive. Moreover, a year later, in 2008, Russia decided to send its Northern Fleet to patrol the Arctic waters, the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Blunden,2009:126). Former U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton criticized the re- opening of the Novosibirsk naval base and stated that this was interpreted by the USA as an attempt by Russia to militarize the Arctic (Mikkola,2014).

Furthermore, recent events may have had a somewhat negative impact on Arctic relations. Arctic cooperation has been built on good bilateral and regional collaboration over the last decades; the crisis in Ukraine might become a major setback for the efforts made. Not only has Canada chosen not to attend the latest Arctic Council meeting in Moscow, a formerly annual naval exercise between Norway, USA and Russia has also been cancelled due to events in Ukraine (Mikkola,2014). Though, environmental and research collaboration seem to be continuing as normal, there is no denying that recent events have created some tensions. Iceland’s Prime Minister, Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, stated at the end of March (2014) that Russia’s actions in Ukraine could cause problems for Arctic cooperation (Mikkola,2014). Mikkola and Käpylä argue that political crises elsewhere may very well affect Arctic relations and could potentially trigger a conflict (Mikkola&Käpylä,2013).


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Margaret Blunden claims that expanding the role of NATO in the region might make Russia feel strategically isolated. Russian Foreign Minister, Lavrov, expressed his unease with NATO gaining a security role at a press conference following the talks with the Icelandic Foreign Minister in 2011. He further claimed that Russia viewed the Arctic as a “zone of peace”, not needing a military component. At the same time Russia was increasing its combat capabilities to convey a strategic deterrence and demonstrate ability of sound military presence. Consequently, it appears as though some parts within the Russian military and political elite still view NATO as a extensive threat. In May 2011, Russia’s first Arctic Special Forces brigade was revealed with Russia claiming the forces provided a balance to NATO’s presence (Wezeman,2012:9). Representatives of the Northern Fleet, military experts

and the State Council had been stating that Russia was experiencing increased military pressure by NATO´s presence in the Arctic (Zysk,2008:81). For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the Russian Navy is escalating its activity and presence in the Arctic (Cohen,2011:21). After having Russian bomber air patrols breach into NATO airspace on several occasions, NATO aircrafts have started to shadow Russian air patrols. In May 2010, four NATO fighters followed two Russian bomber air patrols doing a routine mission over the Arctic and the Atlantic, making it the largest number of NATO jets to ever follow Russian strategic bombers (Conley,2012:32)(RIANovosti,2010). Conley argues that Russia perceives NATO´s presence as a part of an “anti- Russian” agenda, trying to weaken Russia’s position (Conley,2012:34). Thus, coordinating defence strategies with Russia


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would be an important measure in order to avoid misunderstandings and feelings of strategic isolation.

In 2008 the five Arctic littoral states met in Ilulissat, Greenland, for a conference regarding Arctic governance. Through the Ilulissat Declaration they affirmed their commitment to the already existing framework provided by the Law of the Sea Convention. The five states, furthermore, agreed that they “see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean” (Ilulissat Declaration,2008:2). However, both academics and officials from non- Arctic states have claimed that there are a number of issues with the current institutional regime (Mõru,2013:12). Crucially, neither the Law of the Sea Convention nor the Arctic Council can discuss or address any form of security issues (Borgerson,2008:72). Margaret Blunden argues that by declaring the current regime sufficient, the regarding states were embracing their immediate national interests rather than long-term development (Blunden,2012:124). Having a strong functioning forum to address any misunderstandings or concerns regarding security is essential to ensure lasting cooperation and to effectively counteract tensions. Recent events in Ukraine have clearly shown the

need for continuous effective dialogue, as a lack of communication exasperates the ‘fog of war’ that mars lasting solutions.

The institutions in the Arctic have one common trait; none of them were perfectly designed to tackle the changes and challenges in the region. They have a focus that is too narrow. Though, the Arctic Council deals with environmental issues and search and rescue coordination, while the Law of the Sea Convention deals with territorial disputes, several issues remain outside of these institutions’ authority. The challenge of splitting up one of the world’s most geologically complex continental shelves among five states, all with competing claims, and resolving the issue of jurisdiction over the new maritime routes are all problems difficult to effectively tackle under the current regime.

The Arctic Council also lacks real authority in its current state, as it can only pass voluntary recommendations. Professor Donald Rothwell argues that the Arctic is in need of an overarching binding treaty framework, claiming that the governance structures have until now “been through reliance upon “soft law” mechanisms and arrangements with an avoidance of hard law treaty frameworks” (Rothwell,2008:10). The Law of the Sea Convention is recognized international law, but there

“Institutional reform should be attempted in order to pre-emptively

mitigate future disagreement.”


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is no overarching authority to ensure its implementation and compliance. Especially in cases of national economic interests, non-binding agreements are weak. Even though the Arctic littoral countries have assured that they will be fully committed to international law, the USA has not ratified the Law of the Sea Convention. US reluctance to make any binding commitments reflects the need for structured dialogue in the face of growing strategic interest. As Conley argues, it will be impossible to effectively tackle the challenges without a regime that includes all the relevant actors and that is, moreover, recognized by all. Despite this, the Arctic coastal states claim there is no “governance problem“(Conley,2012:15). Though, having robust institutions will not necessarily mean that there will be no conflict. It will, nevertheless, give actors a better chance of solving or mitigating issues through having a forum where they can be discussed or negotiated.

Through the evidence discussed, this paper has illustrated that tensions in the Arctic region are increasing due to the contradicting public discourse, rising levels of military activity and Russia’s realist perception of NATO’s presence. This implicates international security, as the tensions are not being sufficiently addressed. Though, NATO’s involvement in the region is currently not substantial, Russia is still wary of its presence. Arguably, Russian leaders fear strategic isolation and interpret Western defence collaboration as a direct threat to national security.

Presently, the main issue is the lack of an institution with the ability to address security related matters. Furthermore, the Arctic institutional regime is in need of strengthening. Arctic institutions lack sufficient authority, have a too narrow focus and is in need of the equal recognition by all the Arctic states. Overall, institutional reform may not necessarily resolve all Arctic issues. Likewise, keeping to the status quo in the region may not inevitably lead to conflict. However, it is better to be safe than sorry; institutional reform should be attempted in order to pre-emptively mitigate future disagreement. This would be mutually beneficial to the involved parties bearing in mind the degeneration of relations in the Cold War. The threat posed by Arctic conflict is global, both in terms of the environment and global security. This should prompt states without Arctic claims to encourage concrete reform. To date, the Arctic institutional regime is not comprehensive enough to meet the future and present challenges of a changing Arctic.

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PlanEt B (C, d, E…)?Dr. Audra Mitchell

Considering the following quote:

“Why build space settlements? Why do weeds grow through cracks in sidewalks? Why did life crawl out of the oceans and colonize land? Because living things want to grow and expand. We have the ability to live in space…therefore we will” (Globus, 2014).

As Ban Ki-Moon responds to world-wide climate protests with the environmentalist slogan ‘there is no planet B’ (Westbrook et

al.,2014), space entrepreneurs are singing a very different tune. At the time of writing, there are multiple schemes underway to colonize outer space.

One might suggest that contemporary space colonization is a continuation of the logics and strategies of modern European modes of imperialism. In typical colonial fashion, these discourses place a great deal of emphasis on ‘expansion’ which, as Arendt contends, is the central tenet of imperialism. Indeed, its

“Space colonization is framed in terms of necessity – an argument from necessity

that takes for granted that human life must continue to exist at all costs.”


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proponents use the term ‘colonization’ quite openly, apparently oblivious to the fact that this term conjures up images of mass-scale oppression, violence and injustice. However, it is not ignorance that underpins the use of this terminology, but rather the belief that this mode of colonization is entirely distinct from previous models in three important senses.

First, despite its overtones of optimism and energy, contemporary space colonization projects are pitched against the prevailing mood of extinction. Space colonization is framed as perhaps the only of maintaining human life beyond the exhaustion of the Earth’s resources and allowing this life-form to reach its full potential (Newitz, 2013). Space colonization projects promise humans the ability to transcend a comprehensively colonized Earth which limits their growth and imposes finitude on the ‘species’. Speaking at the ‘Humans to Mars’ conference in Washington in 2014, NASA Chief Charles Bolden stated that “we are, right now, an Earth-reliant species…but only a multi-planet species can survive for a long period of time” (Gable, 2014)

Space colonisation is framed as a means of protecting humans from threats to their survival. Musk argues that colonizing other planets is akin to taking out insurance on one’s life or possessions: “It’s not because you think you’ll die tomorrow, but because you might” (Carroll, 2013). In this statement, he frames the enterprise of space colonization as one of (highly profitable) speculation against the possible extinction of homo sapiens. “Space colonization is framed in terms of necessity – an argument from necessity that takes for granted that human life must continue to exist at all costs.”

Where modern European imperialism claimed to offer ‘civilization’ to the peoples and territories it subjected, space colonization claims to bring the ‘life process’ to the ‘dead’ and seemingly empty landscapes of ‘uninhabited’ space. It suggests that humans must fill the universe with the intelligent, Earth-originating life that Lewis calls the ‘highest fulfillment’ of time, space and matter.

Second, and in a related sense, space colonization is framed as a universal project bringing universal benefit. Building on the notion of a universal subject embodied by international humanitarian organizations and structures, space colonizers claim to act in the name of ‘humanity’, extending its empire (Mitchell,2014) from the international to the interplanetary sphere. A prime example of this is the UN’s Vienna Declaration, which states that “outer space should be the province of all mankind”(UNISPACE III,1999). This slogan simultaneously reflects the idea that outer space is a hinterland to be exploited by ‘humanity’, and that humanity will annex it as a single, unified actor. Moreover, the Vienna Declaration suggests that because outer space transcends national boundaries and interests, it permits “the development of global solutions to address common challenges… [by] providing a vantage point from which to view planet Earth”. In other words, the Earth-alienated viewing platform provided by space colonies enable a kind of cosmopolitanism capable of unifying ‘humanity’ (Burke,2013).

Like its precursors, the figure of universal ‘humanity’ is framed as a benevolent colonizer, as reflected in the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA 2014) slogan: ‘bringing the benefits of space to mankind’. Indeed the Outer Space Treaty clearly states that


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the exploration and use of outer space must be “carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries”, irrespective of their ability to contribute scientifically or financially to these projects. Tellingly, the OST, the EU’s draft code and other key diplomatic documents seek a commitment to distribute the profits and benefits of space colonization across ‘humanity’ (although they are short on prescriptions for effecting the structural changes necessary to accomplish this). We might expect this kind of language from international organizations, but even Planetary Resources argues that “the entire human race will be the beneficiary” of space colonization. Furthermore, it is frequently suggested that space colonies can become refuges for those seeking freedom from political, ethnic or religious persecution (Globus, 2014). In short, these discourses suggest that although space colonization remains a project of instrumental extraction, profit and power-generation, the agent enacting and benefiting from these activities is ‘humanity as whole’.

However, space colonization is seen as a process undertaken jointly by states and private entrepreneurs, and existing international law relating to outer space fails to reflect the extent to which private companies compete with, and may even

usurp, states as the main actors in the colonization of other planets. In this dynamic, states often provide impetus and incentives for risk-taking on behalf of private entrepreneurs who may, in turn, help to resource the expansionist policy of states. This is certainly the case in the development of contemporary space colonization projects. The Canadian-based Space Security Index (Jaramillo, 2013) project notes that “There is an increasingly close relationship between governments and the commercial space sector. Various national space policies place great emphasis on maintaining a robust and competitive industrial base and encourage partnerships with the private sector. The space launch and manufacturing sectors rely heavily on government contracts”.

Yet, developments in technology have made it possible for private companies (several headed by extremely wealthy individuals or small groups thereof ) to undertake capital projects that previously only states could afford. As a result, the space colonization industry is emerging as a poorly-regulated field in which private companies, states and even individuals are laying claim to extra-terrestrial territory. Indeed, Branson concludes his promotional video for LauncherOne with the slogan “Space is Virgin territory”. This is not just a

“A form of colonization that benefits all humans and creates no victims? This simply sounds too good to be

true.”


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kitschy marketing ploy but also a reflection of the commercial territorialism that marks contemporary space colonization.

This leads onto how the history of colonial warfare has raised fears amongst international organizations that similar conflicts might arise in outer space. Both the UN’s Outer Space Treaty (UNOOSA, 2014) and the European Union’s proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (EEAS, 2014) warn of a possible arms race amongst state or non-state actors and emphatically state the Cold War-era demand that space be a non-militarized zone. However, while the OST locates outer space within the scope of international law and prohibits any state or nation from appropriating it, it does not explicitly prevent individuals or private companies from pursuing a policy of ‘first grab’ . The later ‘Moon Treaty’ (UNOOSA, 2014b) seeks to ban the appropriation of the moon or other space objects by any state or individual, excepting international bodies. Yet, as of late 2014 it has gained only 16 signatories, none of which are major ‘space-faring’ countries. This leaves unanswered the question of the right to occupy and exploit outer space – and of whom might possess the authority to grant that right.

Counter to this, and thirdly, the annexation of space by ‘humanity’ is positioned as a form of colonialism with no victims, and is frequently contrasted with modes of colonialism based on the expropriation and enslavement of human subjects. Instead, space colonization is depicted as an attempt to “build new land, not steal it from the natives” (Globus, 2014) – indeed, according to Reinstein“there are no known natives to outer space”. As such, he contends, “in the absence of prior existing property rights…there seems to be nothing inherently immoral about a right of grab”. From this perspective, rather than victimizing one set of humans to benefit another, space colonization is framed as the acquisition of a true terra nullius – a place with no human or other identifiable inhabitants – in order to benefit ‘humanity’ as a self-contained ethical whole.

Moreover, contemporary discourses of space colonization claim to do the dirty work of saving human life from extinction ‘safely outside of our delicate biosphere’ (Anderson, 2012) . Just as European colonizers delegated suffering and death to their Others , space colonization is designed to delegate the effects of massive-scale resource extraction to


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planets to Earth’s Others. ConsiderAnderson’s rhetorical question:

“Wouldn’t it be great if one day, all of the heavy industries of the Earth—mining and energy production and manufacturing—were done somewhere else, and the Earth could be used for living, keeping it as it should be, which is a bright-blue planet with lots of green?” (2013)

Similarly, Reinstein argues that “If minerals are extracted from dead asteroids floating through our solar system, perhaps there would be one less strip-mined rain forest. If solar energy is captured and beamed down to Earth’s electric grid, that could be one less oil spill in our oceans. In short, space colonization promises to externalize the processes used by humans to colonize Earth the better to sustain them, in particular through the more comprehensive management of resources. The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space argues that Earth observation (or world-alienation) underscores our sense of the Earth’s fragility and enables more comprehensive management of natural resources and ‘environmental disasters’ (UNOOSA, 2006). From this perspective, space colonization offers incalculable benefits to ‘humanity’, along with the ability to more comprehensively colonize Earth, with no apparent victims.

“A form of colonization that benefits all humans and creates no victims? This simply sounds too good to be true.”

Indeed, Edward Said points out that “every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all others, that its circumstances are special” and has been able to persuade intellectuals of this (Said, 2003). And, as Césaire warns, “no one colonizes

innocently…no one colonizes with impunity either”.

It is beyond the scope of this short piece to explore the various ways in which contemporary space colonization may victimize its subjects. This includes the transportation (voluntary or coerced) of diverse life forms into space, along with their intensive bio-engineering to survive within an unaccustomed environment. Moreover, these forms of space colonization involve the massive terraforming of other planets, an activity which cannot be assumed to be ethically neutral, especially considering the effects of similar activities on Earth. Moreover, as postcolonial theorists from Cesaire and Fanon to Arendt and Mbembe remind us, one of the primary effects of colonization is the dehumanisation of both the colonizer and the colonized. In a context in which the colonizer is the Anthropocene figure of humanity, it is all of humanity, and many other life forms, that are made vulnerable to the violence associated with dehumanisation. (Mitchell, 2014)

What all of this points to is the need for a mode of post- (and maybe also pre) colonial critique that is capable of addressing the colonization of the new new worlds. As this discussion has suggested, existing postcolonial theory can help us to identify and critically examine many of the tenets of this expanding mode of colonialism. However, this body of thought needs to adapt to a form of colonialism in which the subjects and objects are significantly changed, in which the victims of colonial violence are obscured, and in which the scale is massively magnified. In other words, we need to draw on the insights of postcolonial international relations as a starting point for thinking about (post-)


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critique that is capable of addressing the colonization of the new new worlds. As this discussion has suggested, existing postcolonial theory can help us to identify and critically examine many of the tenets of this expanding mode of colonialism. However, this body of thought needs to adapt to a form of colonialism in which the subjects and objects are significantly changed, in which the victims of colonial violence are obscured, and in which the scale is massively magnified. In other words, we need to draw on the insights of postcolonial international relations as a starting point for thinking about (post-)colonial interplanetary relations.

Bibliography

Anderson, E (2012). ‘Asteroids…Alien planets…or your house?’ available online http://www.planetaryresources.com/2012/07/asteroids-alien-planets-or-your-house/

Anderson, E (2013). ‘The Coming Age of Space Colonization’. The Atlantic. Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/03/the-coming-age-of-space-colonization/273818/

Burke, A (2013). ‘The good state, from a cosmic point of view’. International Politics, vol. 50, pp.57-76

Carroll, R (2013). ‘Elon Musk’s mission to Mars’. The Guardian 17/7/13 available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/17/elon-musk-mission-mars-spacex

EEAS, (2014). ‘Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities’ available at http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/outer-space-activities/index_en.htm

Gable, J (2014). ‘How do you build a city in space’. The Guardian 16//5/14, available at http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/may/16/how-build-city-in-space-nasa-elon-musk-spacex?CMP=twt_gu

Globus, A (2014). ‘Space settlements. Spreading life through the solar system’. Available at http://settlement.arc.nasa.gov

Jaramillo, C (2013). Space Security Index 2013: Executive Summary available at http://swfound.org/media/109727/SSI_Executive_Summary_2013.pdf

Mitchell, A (2014). International Intervention in a Secular Age: Re-Enchanting Humanity? Routledge

Mitchell, A (2014b). ‘Making a ‘cene” Available at http://worldlyir.wordpress.com/2014/02/23/making-a-cene/

Newitz, A (2013). Scatter, Adapt, and Remember: How Humans Will Survive a Mass Extinction. Doubleday BooksSaid, E W (2003). Orientalism. Penguin Modern Classics

Westbrook, L. Harrabin R (2014). ‘Climate Change summit: global rallies demand action’. BBC news online, 29/9/14, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-29301969

Unispace (1999). ‘The space millennium: Vienna declaration on space and human development’. Available at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/reports/unispace/viennadeclE.pdf

UNOOSA (2006). ‘Committee on the peaceful uses of outer space’. Available at


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http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_872E.pdf

UNOOSA (2014). ‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’. Available at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html

UNOOSA (2014b). ‘Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’ available at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/moon.html

Asteroid 2012 DA14 and the Eta Carinae Nebula by NASA (http://bit.ly/1moXQIo). Licensed under Creative Commons 2.0 Attribution- Non-Commercial (http://bit.ly/1moXTUG)

Greetings from the Moon by Andrew Forgrave (http://bit.ly/1p9XVvr). Licensed under Creative Commons 2.0 Attribution-Non-Commercial-ShareAlike (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/legalcode)


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Superimpose two pictures of humanity in space: one in the middle of the 20th century and one in 2014. An empty-looking picture of low human activity in the cold stratosphere of the Earth has faded and been replaced by the image of a highly busy and elaborate network of human space craft and satellites. There has been a great deal of progress in developing the space sector between the time of the USSR’s Sputnik and that of SpaceX’s Dragon capsule. Where we once had a tense, hostile Cold War space race between the only two superpowers, we now see that the cosmos (or at least our localized neighbourhood in the cosmos) is open to a diverse range of countries, with

even “developing” countries such as India developing a space programme and even going to the point of placing an orbiter in position around Mars (Anathaswamy, 2014). Former space adversaries are linking arms and research projects on the multinational International Space Station (ISS), whilst often being resupplied and re-staffed through the employment of private space companies. Humanity’s exploration of space has undoubtedly witnessed changes in circumstance, means and methods. International state agencies cooperate willingly to progress in space whilst space businesses start up, grow and place their hands on the rudder of the human voyage into the final frontier. The

How beneficial to humanity’s advances into the final frontier will the development of

private space sector be?Filip Ioan Preoteasa


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question is whether this nascent influence will be for better or for worse.

In this essay I will contrast the private and public space sectors and their merits, selecting particularly distinguished organizations and/or institutions from either sector to represent each sector. I will conclude that the private space sector and public sector must continue on their present course of cooperation, that the private space sector faces severe limitations in its ambitions but that its involvement instead of the public sector in particular areas would nonetheless be highly beneficial to the exploration and preservation of the final frontier for humanity.

An initial overview of the public-private space divide seems to indicate that the private sector is following a trend of development that will place it ahead of the public one. Public space administrations face budget cuts from austerity regimes, suffer scrutiny from the elected officials that decide their importance or feel the strain of international politics impacting on their projects. Meanwhile new, enterprising pioneers of the private space sector are either filling up the gaps left by national agencies or boldly going forward into new areas of development for the industry, such as tourism. On the one

hand, Richard Branson offers humanity (or rather the most privileged and/or extremely lucky part of it) the most exotic holiday conceived yet in low orbit space, something that no state agency has been enterprising enough to do so far. On the other hand, Elon Musk and his company SpaceX are developing multiple space crafts and launchers, whilst also cooperating directly with NASA on their projects and taking over some of their tasks. In light of political disagreements between Washington and Moscow, NASA ended its deal with the Russian Federal Space Agency, and rather than hitching rides on their launchers to the ISS, awarded SpaceX and Boeing a $6.8 billion contract for transportation to the station (Luscombe, 2014). Admittedly this plan may be temporary depending on the success of NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) rocket that it is currently developing, but it is striking to think that the most prominent and famous space agency to date has to rely on private businesses to sustain its programme (Luscombe, 2011). Is this transition a sign of decay within national space administrations or a feature of a long developing schedule of cooperation and mutual sharing of space duties between the public and private sector?

Between the glamorous, shiny front of the new space companies and the

“The most prominent and famous space agency to date has to rely on private businesses to sustain its programme”


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bureaucracy-mangled, fiscally austere state agencies, one could be forgiven for thinking the former was rising to surpass and supplant the latter. However, a broad look at the purpose of the private space sector projects shows a general modesty when compared to the feats of the public sector. Practically all private sector involvement revolves around the low orbit area of Earth (altitude 160-2,000 kilometres) or of recent the geosynchronous orbit area (35,786 kilometres) and ventures no further. Sure, the most costly part of any space launch is bringing the craft off the surface of the Earth and above the atmosphere, but as Neil deGrasse Tyson stated, going to low earth orbit is “kind of really just driving around the block” at this stage (Fowler, 2012). NASA’s Mars Curiosity rover is a venture into the actual frontier, and the European Space Agency’s (ESA) planned exploration of Jupiters’ moons is even more so. We are interested to know if private space businesses can tackle the frontier and expand it, but low earth orbit hasn’t been a frontier for at least 30 years.

The issue revolves around the question of risk. Nation states have to pave the way on the frontier for the private sector to follow up and establish itself upon space. Private space enterprises have been typically stepping in the well-trodden

footprints of NASA and other space administrations, never really breaking the mould. Only governments and their administrations can assume the kind of gigantic risks implied by pioneering space missions like the Mars rovers or the orbital missions to Jupiter’s moons. As Tyson argues, this aversion to huge risk with no guarantee of returns is a feature of private ventures, one that public ones can circumvent (Fowler and Rodd, 2012).

However, national space administrations typically suffer a motivation problem. The competition between countries today in this area is nowhere near as intense as the Cold War space race because today we do not have the same escalation between the space powers and the risks inherent with the open (even if not directly violent) hostility between the US and USSR are absent. Without the strong impulsive need to defeat one’s technological, ideological and/or military adversary in the space race, countries today follow their space programmes at relatively leisurely paces compared with the drive of the 1960s. This lethargy can be witnessed in the fact that no human being has set foot on the Moon since 1972, and though the Obama administration has promised to bring humans to Mars by the mid-2030s, it is a visibly enormous step-down from the

“Nation states have to pave the way on the frontier for the private sector to follow up

and establish itself upon space.”


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daring days of Kennedy (Chang, 2010). Furthermore, the current administration has cancelled the Constellation program (which intended to bring astronauts to the moon) and has reached out to private investors and companies to take over parts of its missions, such as transportation of NASA astronauts to low-earth orbit (Chang, 2010).

The efforts of national space agencies are undermined by political and diplomatic tensions and this slows humanity’s progress in space. The recent conflict in Ukraine, particularly Russia’s annexation of Crimea, has caused the US to cease its cooperation with Russia’s space agency in all projects except those aboard the ISS, and ideological differences between the US and China mean that a ban was imposed on any cooperation between NASA and Chinese agencies in 2011 (Johnson-Freese, 2014). Joan Johnson-Freese takes the line that this adversity

rejuvenates and inspires the aspirations of the US in space (Johnson-Freese, 2014). These diplomatic hostilities may have side effects as catalysts for space endeavours if they compel individual nations to promote their space interests against their adversaries.

Yet a thorough consideration of the future of human space exploration, as opposed to that of individual nations, defeats the unwarranted optimism of such a view. Even if a proper space race ignited again between the Earth’s nations, the effects could be catastrophic for the species’ future in space, whereas the competition of private entities in space poses no such threat, since they tend to be motivated by profit and follow actions that increase it. First, we cannot guarantee that hostilities will not extend to and permeate space, but private entities are more motivated to cooperate and generate income through their projects rather than


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waste it in disputes of no relevance to the space industry. Second, the scientific community, which is crucial to the space sector and was the initial driver for the Space Age, is generally vilified by these international conflicts. Scientific research should be as independent as possible from political wrangling, and many NASA scientists made this belief heard when they boycotted a NASA conference as a protest against the ban on Chinese nationals attending or even entering any NASA building (Sample, 2013). Academic progress depends and thrives on cooperation and discussion between academics and these blocks damage science in the public space sector, but the private one is unaffected by such divides, allowing it to develop, and, even more importantly, giving it a greater appeal to scientists and engineers disgruntled with the influence of politics in space. Therefore the international scene is far too volatile to guarantee a secure and sustainable future in space for mankind

One must also try and see how the private and public sectors can and do deal with the looming threat of space debris. The thousands upon thousands of pieces of debris, the flotsam and jetsam of the past 50 years of space exploitation, pose a significant threat to current and future space activity. The most substantial threat is that of a Kessler syndrome: a runaway effect (almost analogous to the runaway greenhouse effect), where the rate at which pieces of debris are destroying satellites and space craft is creating so much new debris that no further launches are required to create debris (Emanuelli et al, 2013). Amazingly enough, international space law has

such a poor grasp on the definition of debris and on the liabilities associated with removing it (since in removing debris, you are effectively damaging another state’s extremely expensive piece of property, since it still belongs to them), that agencies and companies find themselves too reluctant to engage in active debris removal (Emanuelli et al, 2013). For a positive development in that direction we require the impulse of nation states engaged in debate over the legal agenda before any private enterprise can safely enter the stage. Until then, innovative debris removal programs, like JAXA’s (Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency) magnetic space trawler or the Swiss CleanSpace One will be limited to removing the debris of their own respective nations, at best an inefficient state of affairs for international debris removal cooperation (Emanuelli et al, 2013)(Rutkin, 2014). The technology and the framework for enterprises are so nascent and in their infancy that the benefits of private space enterprise will have to wait another decade at least for its rather inert public sector counterpart to establish the tracks for debris removal undertakings.

Nonetheless, even with the more peaceful nature of the private space sector, we still face deGrasse Tyson’s problem that “private enterprise is not going to lead us to the moon” (Fowler and Rodd, 2012). The budgets of state agencies are far better suited to push the boundaries of the final frontier, but they are being downsized in light of the world financial climate and are subject to the will of public elected officials that may have no specialization or firm grasp of the space sector. In the


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space sector there is little to no room for oversight of scientific inaccuracy, so profit runs directly in alignment with technological progress. True, one disadvantage that could arise is that private space companies would not find taking on research projects from academic institutions to be as profitable as say, telecommunications contracts, since it is probably far beyond a university’s budget to pay SpaceX or the Sierra Nevada Corporation to take its laboratory 2,000 kilometres into space. Scientific research will still have to rely on space agencies, both for far reaching projects to the rest of the solar system and for Earth-orbit destinations, but private entities will probably facilitate part of the effort for the latter.

To conclude, I have demonstrated that the private space sector’s expansion will mostly benefit humanity’s position in space since the public sector can and will delegate many of its more basic functions to space businesses. I have also shown that there is a natural limit to this growth due to the private sector’s inability to accumulate either enough capital or assume the risks that actual frontier space projects require. Furthermore, I have raised the pressing issue of space debris and how the benefits of private sector implication can only happen after a fuller development of a public sector framework for coping.

Bibliography

Ananthaswamy, A, 2014. India’s Mars triumph signals a rising space power [online], 26 September. Available at: http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn26276-indias-mars-triumph-signals-a-rising-space-power.html#.VDvMsfldUbM. [Accessed 13 October 2014].

Chang, K, 2010. Obama Vows Renewed Space Program [online], 15 April. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/science/space/16nasa.html?_r=0. [Accessed 14 October 2014]

Emanuelli, M., Chow, T., Prasad, D., Federico, G., Loughman, J., 2013. Conceptualizing an economically, legally and politically viable active debris removal option [online], 11 October. Available at: http://www.swfound.org/media/119724/IAC-13,A6,8,1,x18123_TC.pdf. [Accessed 21 October 2014]

Fowler, J. and Rodd, E., 2012. Neil deGrasse Tyson: Bringing Commercial Space Fantasies Back to Earth [online], 12 September. Available at: <http://bigthink.com/videos/neil-degrasse-tyson-bringing-commercial-space-fantasies-back-to-earth>. [Accessed 10 October 2014].