Villarama Doctrines.pdf

JUSTICE MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.'sPenned Cases

FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. SPS ERNESTO & LEONOR CAYETANO GR No. 179909, January 25, 2010

FACTS: Respondent Leonor C. Cayetano (Cayetano) executed a special power of attorney in favor of her daughter Teresita C. Tabing (Tabing) authorizing her to contract a loan from petitioner and to mortgage her two lots. Petitioner loaned Tabing P100, 000.00, secured by two promissory notes and a real estate mortgage over Cayetanos two properties. The mortgage document was signed by Tabing and her husband as mortgagors in their individual capacities, without stating that Tabing was executing the mortgage contract for and in behalf of Cayetano. Petitioner foreclosed the mortgage for failure of spouses Tabing to pay the loan. The mortgaged properties were sold to petitioner through public auction. Subsequently, petitioner consolidated its title and obtained new titles in its name after the lapse of redemption period. Five years later, Tabing, on behalf of Cayetano expressed the intention to repurchase the properties for petitioner gave respondent the chance to buy back the properties by joining a bidding. Respondent however, filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure sale as well as the cancellation of petitioners title over the properties. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents, holding that Cayetano cannot be bound by the real estate mortgage executed by Tabing unless it is shown that the same was made and signed in the name of principal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not the principal is bound by the real estate mortgage executed by the authorized agent in her own name without indicating the principal.

HELD: NO. It is a general rule in the law of agency that, in order to bind the principal by a mortgage on real property executed by an agent, it must upon its face purport to be made, signed and sealed in the name of the principal; otherwise, it will bind the agent only. It is not enough that the agent was in fact authorized to make the mortgage, if he has not acted in the name of the principal. Neither is it ordinarily sufficient that in the mortgage the agent describes himself as acting by virtue of a power of attorney, if in fact the agent has acted in his own name and has set in his own hand and seal to the mortgage. Notwithstanding the nullity of the real estate mortgage executed by Tabing and her husband, we find that the equity principle of laches is applicable. Records show that respondent could have filed an action to annul the mortgage on their properties, but for unexplained reasons, they failed to do so. They only questioned the loan and mortgage transactions after the lapse of more than five years from date of foreclosure sale.

ZACARIA A. CANDAO, ET AL V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NOS. 186659-710, OCTOBER 19, 2011.

Malversation; elements. The following elements are essential for conviction in malversation cases: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he had custody or control of

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funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (4) he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. All the foregoing elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution in this case. Petitioners have not rebutted the legal presumption that, with the Disbursing Officers (Haron) failure to account for the illegally withdrawn amounts covered by the subject checks when demanded by the COA, they misappropriated and used the said funds for their personal benefit. Zacaria A. Candao, et al v. People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186659-710, October 19, 2011.

JHORIZALDY UY VS. CENTRO CERAMICA CORPORATION, ET AL., G.R. NO. 174631. OCTOBER 19, 2011.

Dismissal; illegal. Resignation is defined as the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by personal reasons to disassociate themselves from their employment. It must be done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. In this case, the evidence on record suggested that petitioner did not resign; he was orally dismissed by Sy. The crucial factor is the verbal order directly given by Sy, the company president, for petitioner to immediately turn over his accountabilities. It is this lack of clear, valid and legal cause, not to mention due process that made his dismissal illegal, warranting reinstatement and the award of backwages. Moreover, the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal just three weeks later is difficult to reconcile with voluntary resignation. Had petitioner intended to voluntarily relinquish his employment after being unceremoniously dismissed by no less than the company president, he would not have sought redress from the NLRC and vigorously pursued this case against the respondents. Jhorizaldy Uy vs. Centro Ceramica Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 174631. October 19, 2011.

BRICCIO RICKY A. POLLO VS. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, ET AL., G.R. NO. 181881. OCTOBER 18, 2011.

Right to privacy; unreasonable search and seizure. This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct. Petitioner questions the legality of the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent. He said this search violated his constitutional right to privacy. The right to privacy is a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Relying on US jurisprudence, the Court noted that the existence of privacy right involves a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). Once the right is established, the next inquiry is whether the search alleged to have violated such right was reasonable. This proceeds from the principle that the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III, is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of unreasonable searches and seizures.


In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, the court needs to balance the invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of privacy against the governments need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace. A public employers intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable. Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose. The search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.

Applying the above standards and principles, the Court then addressed the following issues: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the respondent Civil Service Commission Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer, reasonable in its inception and scope? Here, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include: (1) the employees relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item.

The Court answered the first issue in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC, he normally would have visitors in his office. Even assuming that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, the same is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers. The CSC had implemented a policy that puts its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers. Under this policy, the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that computer resources were used only for legitimate business purposes.

On the second issue, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in connection with an investigation of work-related misconduct. Under the facts obtaining, the Court held that the search conducted on petitioners computer was justified at its inception and in scope. Briccio Ricky A. Pollo vs. Chairperson Karina Constantino-David, et al., G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011.

PACITA CAALIM-VERZONILLA V. ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA. A.C. NO. 6655. OCTOBER 11, 2011.

Attorney; misconduct. With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state the true consideration of the sale so as to reduce the


capital gains and other taxes due on the transaction, respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful statement in a public document for an unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount much lower than the actual price paid for the property sold, respondent abetted in depriving the Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due. Not only did respondent assist the contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance of the law, he likewise displayed lack of respect for and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment. By notarizing such illegal and fraudulent document, he is entitling it full faith and credit upon its face, which it obviously does not deserve considering its nature and purpose. Respondents actions violated not only Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Responsibility, but pertinent sections of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice as well. Thus, respondent is meted the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years. Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla v. Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua. A.C. No. 6655. October 11, 2011.

TOMAS P. TAN, JR. V. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA. A.C. NO. 9000. OCTOBER 5, 2011.

Attorney; grave misconduct. Respondent attorney was found to have violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondents actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money to her through the use of documents and false representations and by taking advantage of her education and complainants ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by complainant, he would have never granted the loan to respondent were it not for respondents misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the property and that complainant could register the open deed of sale if respondent fails to pay the loan. By her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainants perception of the legal profession but the publics perception as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which she may be disciplined. Tomas P. Tan, Jr. v. Atty. Haide V. Gumba. A.C. No. 9000. October 5, 2011.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CONRADO LAOG Y RAMIN, G.R. NO. 178321, OCTOBER 5, 2011.

Abuse of superior strength. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to his unarmed victim. As aptly observed by the appellate court: it has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressors natural


strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog y Ramin, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011.

ENGR. JOSE E. CAYANAN VS. NORTH STAR INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL, INC. G.R. NO. 172954. OCTOBER 5, 2011

Check; issuance for consideration. Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration which may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, it is presumed that every party to an instrument acquires the same for a consideration or for value. As petitioner alleged that there was no consideration for the issuance of the subject checks, it devolved upon him to present convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption and prove that the checks were in fact issued without valuable consideration. Sadly, however, petitioner has not presented any credible evidence to rebut the presumption, as well as North Stars assertion, that the checks were issued as payment for the PHP 3,662,869.29 (US$85,000) petitioner owed. Engr. Jose E. Cayanan vs. North Star International Travel, Inc. G.R. No. 172954. October 5, 2011

CITY GOVERNMENT OF TUGUEGARAO, REPRESENTED BY ROBERT P. GUZMAN V. RANDOLPH S. TING, G.R. NOS. 192435-36, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011.

Appeal; legal personality to appeal Sandiganbayans dismissal of case. The crucial issue in this case concerns petitioners legal personality to challenge before the Supreme Court the dismissal by the Sandiganbayan of the criminal cases against respondent. Petitioner is not the proper party to file the present action. Section 4 (c) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, clearly provides that in all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. A private complainant in a criminal case before the Sandiganbayan is allowed to appeal only the civil aspect of the criminal case after its dismissal by said court. Petitioner is not even the offended party or private complainant in the main case. While petitioners name was included in the caption of the cases as private complainant during the preliminary investigation and re-investigation proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman, it is the City of Tuguegarao which suffered damage as a consequence of the subject purchase of lands by respondent and, hence, is the private complainant in the main case. City Government of Tuguegarao, represented by Robert P. Guzman v. Randolph S. Ting, G.R. Nos. 192435-36, September 14, 2011.

ALERT SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC., ET AL. VS. SAIDALI PASAWILAN, ET AL., G.R. NO. 182397. SEPTEMBER 14, 2011.

Termination; illegal dismissal. In the case at bar, respondent security guards were relieved from their posts because they filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against their employer for money claims due to underpayment of wages. The Supreme Court


found that this was not a valid cause for dismissal. The Labor Code enumerates several just and authorized causes for a valid termination of employment. An employee asserting his right and asking for minimum wage is not among those causes.

Termination; abandonment of work. Petitioners aver that respondents were merely transferred to a new post wherein the wages are adjusted to the current minimum wage standards. They maintain that the respondents voluntarily abandoned their jobs when they failed to report for duty in the new location. Assuming that this contention was true, the Supreme Court held that there was no abandonment of work. For there to be abandonment: first, there should be a failure of the employee to report for work without a valid or justifiable reason, and second, there should be a showing that the employee intended to sever the employer-employee relationship. The fact that petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal is indicative of their intention to remain employed with private respondent. On the first element of failure to report for work, in this case, there was no showing that respondents were notified of their new assignments. Granting that the Duty Detail Orders were indeed issued, they served no purpose unless the intended recipients of the orders are informed of such. Therefore, the Court held that there was no abandonment of work in this case. Alert Security and Investigation Agency, Inc., et al. vs. Saidali Pasawilan, et al., G.R. No. 182397. September 14, 2011.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, REPRESENTED ITS PRESIDENT CYRIL DEL CALLAR VS. JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 8, MARAWI CITY, A.M. NO. RTJ-07-2060. JULY 27, 2011

Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge failed to conduct a pre-trial conference contrary to elementary rules of procedure which he should have known all too well considering his long years of service in the bench. Such ignorance of a basic rule in court procedure, as failing to conduct pre-trial, sadly amounts to gross ignorance and warrants a corresponding penalty. As to the allegations of poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal principles in granting the motions for execution pending appeal for flimsy and unsupported reasons, the particular reasons relied upon by respondent judge for issuing the writ of execution pending appeal are so unreliably weak and feeble that it highlights the lack of knowledge of respondent judge with regard to the proper appreciation of arguments. Dire financial conditions of the plaintiffs supported by mere self-serving statements as good reason for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal does not stand on solid footing. It does not even stand on its own. National Power Corporation, represented its President Cyril Del Callar vs. Judge Santos B. Adiong, Regional Trial Court, BR. 8, Marawi City, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2060. July 27, 2011

RUPERTO A. AMBIL JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES/ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO SR. VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 175457/G.R. NO. 175482, JULY 6, 2011.

Sandiganbayan; jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil Jr. is beyond question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado Sr. As to him, a Certification from the Provincial Government Department Head of the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor


Ambil Jr., over whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them the Sandiganbayan. Ruperto A. Ambil Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines/Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175457/G.R. No. 175482, July 6, 2011.

PETRA C. MARTINEZ, IN HER CAPACITY AS GENERAL MANAGER OF CLAVERIA AGRI-BASED MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC. VS. FILOMENA L. VILLANUEVA/OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. FILOMENA L. VILLANUEVA, G.R. NO. 169196/G.R. NO. 169198, JULY 6, 2011.

Public officials; prohibited positions. Respondent in this case was charged with violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act 6713 for solicitation or acceptance of gifts by reason of public office. The CA found that RA 6713 was repealed by RA 6938; thus, respondent was not liable. The SC found the contrary. There was no repeal. The ban on Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) officials holding a position in a cooperative provided in RA 6938 should be taken as a prohibition in addition to those provided in RA 6713 and specifically applicable to CDA officials and employees. True, RA 6938 allows CDA officials and employees to become members of cooperatives and enjoy the privileges and benefits attendant to membership. However, RA 6938 should not be taken as creating in favor of CDA officials and employees an exemption from the coverage of Section 7(d), RA 6713 considering that the benefits and privileges attendant to membership in a cooperative are not confined solely to availing of loans and not all cooperatives are established for the sole purpose of providing credit facilities to their members.

Public officials; misconduct. The prohibition in Section 7(d) of RA 6713 is malum prohibitum. It is the commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Therefore, it is immaterial whether respondent has fully paid her loans since the law prohibits the mere act of soliciting a loan under the circumstances provided in Section 7(d) of RA 6713. Neither is undue influence on respondents part required to be proven as held by the CA. Whether respondent used her position or authority as a CDA official is of no consequence in the determination of her administrative liability. And considering that respondent admitted having taken two loans from CABMPCI, which is a cooperative whose operations are directly regulated by respondents office, respondent was correctly meted the penalty of suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for violation of Section 7(d). Petra C. Martinez, In her capacity as General Manager of Claveria Agri-based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. vs. Filomena L. villanueva/Office of the Ombudsman vs. Filomena L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196/G.R. No. 169198, July 6, 2011.

EFREN L. ALVAREZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 192591, JUNE 29, 2011.

Anti-Graft; undue injury. The term undue injury in the context of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act punishing the act of causing undue injury to any party, has a meaning akin to that civil law concept of actual damage. Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law. Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by a party as he has duly


proved. Efren L. Alvarez vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011.

MARK CLEMENTE Y MARTINEZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 194367, JUNE 15, 2011.

Illegal possession and use of false bank notes. The elements of the crime committed under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code are the following: (a) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments.

Illegal possession and use of false bank notes. In this case, the Supreme Court, citingPeople v. Digoro, reversed and set aside the findings of the lower courts and acquitted petitioner of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. In Digoro, possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz to use the P500 bill. Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge. Mark Clemente y Martinez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 194367, June 15, 2011.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MADS SALUDIN MANTAWIL, ET AL, G.R. NO. 188319, JUNE 8, 2011.

Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drug, what is crucial is the identity of the buyer and seller, the object and its consideration, the delivery of the thing sold, and the payment for it. Implicit in these cases is first and foremost the identity and existence, coupled with the presentation to the court of the traded prohibited substance, this object evidence being an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime of possession or selling of regulated/prohibited drug. There can be no such crime when nagging doubts persist on whether the specimen submitted for examination and presented in court was the one recovered from, or sold by, the accused. Essential, therefore, in appropriate cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. The chain-of-custody requirement, set forth in Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, performs this function which ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody. In Malillin v. People, the Supreme Court ruled that the chain of custody requirements that must be met in proving that the seized drugs are the ones presented in court are as follows: (1) testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into


evidence; and (2) witnesses should describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the item. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no broken chain in the custody of the confiscated shabu. People of the Philippines v. Mads Saludin Mantawil, et al, G.R. No. 188319, June 8, 2011.

HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, ET AL V. ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR, G.R. NO. 170146, JUNE 8, 2011.

Administrative cases; res judicata. Dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability. Res judicata did not set in because there is no identity of causes of action. Moreover, the decision of the Ombudsman dismissing the criminal complaint cannot be considered a valid and final judgment. On the criminal complaint, the Ombudsman only had the power to investigate and file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan.

Double jeopardy; elements. Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. None of these requisites applies where the Ombudsman only conducted a preliminary investigation of the same criminal offense against the respondent public officer. The dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation does not constitute double jeopardy, preliminary investigation not being part of the trial. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al v. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146, June 8, 2011.

DR. RUBI LI VS. SPOUSES REYNALDO AND LINA SOLIMAN AS PARENTS/HEIRS OF DECEASED ANGELICA SOLIMAN, G.R. NO. 165279. JUNE 7, 2011

Medical malpractice. An integral part of physicians overall obligation to patient is the duty of reasonable disclosure of available choices with respect to proposed therapy and of dangers inherently and potentially involved in each. However, the physician is not obliged to discuss relatively minor risks inherent in common procedures when it is common knowledge that such risks inherent in procedure of very low incidence. Cited as exceptions to the rule that the patient should not be denied the opportunity to weigh the risks of surgery or treatment are emergency cases where it is evident he cannot evaluate data, and where the patient is a child or incompetent. The court thus concluded that the patients right of self-decision can only be effectively exercised if the patient possesses adequate information to enable him in making an intelligent choice. The scope of the physicians communications to the patient, then must be measured by the patients need, and that need is whatever information is material to the decision. The test therefore for determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patients decision.

Cobbs v. Grant reiterated the pronouncement in Canterbury v. Spence that for liability of the physician for failure to inform patient, there must be causal relationship between physicians failure to inform and the injury to patient and such connection arises only if it is established that, had revelation been made, consent to treatment would not have been given.


There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed consent: (1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment. The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.

The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed medical treatment cannot thus be reduced to one simplistic formula applicable in all instances. Further, in a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent, the plaintiff must prove both the duty and the breach of that duty through expert testimony. Dr. Rubi Li vs. Spouses Reynaldo and Lina Soliman as parents/heirs of deceased Angelica Soliman, G.R. No. 165279. June 7, 2011

MARCELO G. GANADEN, ET AL. V. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NOS. 170500 & 170510-11. JUNE 1, 2011.

Administrative cases; execution of Ombudsman decisions. Petitioners in this case raise the issue of whether administrative decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalties of dismissal and one-year suspension from office are immediately executory pending appeal. The Supreme Court held that it is immediately executory pending appeal. This is the rule provided for under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, dated September 15, 2003, which provides among others: An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course Under this provision, a respondent who is found administratively liable by the Office of the Ombudsman and is slapped with a penalty of suspension of more than one month from service has the right to file an appeal with the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. But although a respondent is given the right to appeal, the act of filing an appeal does not stay the execution of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. Marcelo G. Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 170500 & 170510-11. June 1, 2011.

RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ET AL., G.R. NO. 180141. MAY 31, 2011.

Administrative proceedings; due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. Petitioner here was adequately apprised of the charges filed against him and he submitted his answer to the complaint while the case was still under a pre-charge investigation. When the Office of the Legal Service conducted a


summary hearing on the complaint, petitioner was again duly notified of the proceedings and was given an opportunity to explain his side. He was not denied due process.

Administrative proceedings; length of service as an alternative circumstance. Length of service as a factor in determining the imposable penalty in administrative cases is not always a mitigating circumstance. It is an alternative circumstance, which can mitigate or possibly even aggravate the penalty, depending on the circumstances of the case. Where the government employee concerned took advantage of his long years of service and position in public office, length of service may not be considered in lowering the penalty. The Court will take this circumstance against the public officer or employee in administrative cases involving serious offenses, even if it was the first time said public officer or employee was administratively charged.

Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; requirements; examples. The acts of respondent constitute the administrative offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, which need not be related to, or connected with, the public officers official functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or employee. Under the Civil Service law and rules, there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. However, the Court has considered the following acts or omissions, inter alia, as Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to safe keep public records and property; making false entries in public documents; falsification of court orders; a judges act of brandishing a gun and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation; and a court interpreters participation in the execution of a document conveying complainants property which resulted in a quarrel in the latters family.

Procedural due process; right to cross-examine. While the right to cross-examine is a vital element of procedural due process, the right does not require an actual cross examination but merely an opportunity to exercise this right if desired by the party entitled to it. In this case, while National Police Commission Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 provides that the sworn statements of witnesses shall take the place of oral testimony but shall be subject to cross-examination, petitioner missed this opportunity precisely because he did not appear at the deadline for the filing of his supplemental answer or counter-affidavit, and accordingly the hearing officer considered the case submitted for decision. And even with the grant of his subsequent motion to be furnished with a copy of the complaint and its annexes, he still failed to file a supplemental answer or counter-affidavit and instead filed a motion to dismiss. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011.


Documents

Villarama Doctrines.pdf