Villarama digest pool.doc

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WILFREDO M. BARON, et al.v.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MAGIC SALES, INC.

G.R. No. 182299, 22 Februar 2!1!, FIRST DI"ISION #"$%%ara&a, 'r.,J.(

Unmistakably, the unauthorized taking of company documents and files, failure to payunremitted collections, failure to surrender keys to the filing cabinets despite earlierinstructions, concealment of shortages, and failure to record inventory transactions pursuantto a fraudulent scheme are acts of grave misconduct, which are sufficient causes forpetitioners dismissal from employment.

Magic Sales, Inc. (MSI) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of tradingconsumer goods such as soap, biscuits, candy, coffee, and juice drinks, among other things,while Jose . Sy is the company!s "resident and #eneral Manager. $n the other hand, %aronet al.claim to be employees of MSI. Sy ordered an in&entory of the company!s stock afternoticing a steady increase in the company!s payables and a decline in its in&estments. Mr

Jo&encio '. aroya, a ertified "ublic 'ccountant and the orporate *inance Manager of MSI,was tasked to conduct a thorough audit of the company!s business. %aron et al.refused tocooperate in the audit process, and thereafter, refrained from reporting for work+onetheless, the audit was completed, and an Internal 'udit eport wassubmitted. 'ccording to the audit team, there were se&eral irregularities in the operations ofMSI. -he accounting system designed by %aron was generally weak and compliance toprocedures was not strictly implemented. -he team was also con&inced that %aron abusedhis authority and took ad&antage of the laity of the system he designed. It likewisebelie&ed that %aron!s subordinates were not honest enough to report the anomalies to themanagement. -he audit team further concluded that there was collusion between %aronand his subordinates and that they benefited from the irregularities.

onse/uently, management informed %aron et al.of the charges against them, to wit(1) serious misconduct and willful disobedience to the company!s lawful orders2 (3) fraud orwillful breach of trust reposed by the employer2 and (4) abandonment or absence withoutofficial lea&e. 'lthough %aron et al.were re/uired to eplain and refute the charges, theyneither rebutted the same nor attended the in&estigation. 5ence, MSI decided to terminatetheir ser&ices. %aron et al. forthwith filed complaints with the +6 'rbitration %ranchagainst MSI. 5owe&er, the complaints of %aron et al.were dismissed for lack of merit. $nappeal, the +6 fa&ored MSI. -he ourt of 'ppeals (') denied the petition for certiorarand their motion for reconsideration.

ISS)ES*

1. 7hether or not %aron et al.were &alidly dismissed on the grounds of gra&emisconduct and loss of confidence

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++AD"ISER*'--. 8+8 %. #$$S"8EDITORINC-IEF* 6'M%8-$ 6. S'+-$S III2 EEC)TI"E EDITOR* 58'98:S 5IS-I+8 . :2 MANAGING EDITOR*;8++8-5 J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+2 ASSOC. MANAGING EDITOR*6''%86 '++8 . 6'SI+'2 ARTICLES EDITOR*'6J$+ .8 #:9M'+2 ASSOC. ARTICLES EDITOR* '+-5$+ $%68S 2 ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITOR * ;I+# J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+ 2ASSOC. ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITORS *;IS-I+8 J'+8 .6I:, J88M'8 +'$+#' 2 RESEARC- EDITOR *S58 "'I#8 '. 6IM2ASSOC. RESEARC- EDITOR*$#8 5IS-$"58 . 88S2 CIRC)LATION MANAGER*$


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3. 7hether %aron et al.were denied of their right to due process when they wereterminated from their employment

-ELD*

"etition DENIED.

Grave Misconduct and Loss of Confidence

Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression ofsome established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful incharacter, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. -he misconduct tobe serious must be of such gra&e and aggra&ated character and not merely tri&ial andunimportant. Such misconduct, howe&er serious, must ne&ertheless be in connection withthe employee!s work to constitute just cause for his separation.

MSI was able to pro&e substantially the eistence of serious misconduct committed by

petitioners to justify their termination from employment. It found that %aron in conspiracywith the other petitioners, orchestrated massi&e irregularities and grand scale fraud, whichcould no longer be documented because of theft of company documents and deletion ofcomputer files. :nmistakably, the unauthori>ed taking of company documents and filesfailure to pay unremitted collections, failure to surrender keys to the filing cabinets despiteearlier instructions, concealment of shortages, and failure to record in&entory transactionspursuant to a fraudulent scheme are acts of gra&e misconduct, which are sufficient causesfor petitioners! dismissal from employment.

-hey are also grounds for loss of trust and confidence under 'rticle 3?3 of the 6aborode, as amended. *or there to be a &alid dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence,

the breach of trust must be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally, knowingly, andpurposely, without justifiable ecuse. -he basic premise for dismissal on the ground of lossof confidence is that the employees concerned hold a position of trust and confidence. It isthe breach of this trust that results in the employer!s loss of confidence in the employee. Inthe instant case, the ourt notes that %aron et al.were holding the following positions7ilfredo %aron @ operations manager, Jomar dela osa and Jefferson dela osa @ salesrepresentati&es, ynthia Junatas and Marife %allesca @ accounting clerks, and 6ourdesabago @ warehouse checker. learly, petitioners were holding positions imbued with trustand confidence, which are deemed to ha&e been reposed on them by &irtue of the nature oftheir work.

Due Process

In the dismissal of employees, it has been consistently held that the twin re/uirementsof notice and hearing are essential elements of due process. -he employer must furnish theworker with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected0(1) a notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissais sought, and (3) a subse/uent notice informing the employee of the employer!s decision todismiss him. -hrough the formal in&estigatory process, the employee must be accorded theright to present his or her side, which must be considered and weighed by the employer.

"ILLARAMA CASE DIGESTS)n$0er$ o3 Sano To&a 4 Fa5u% o3 C$0$% La6


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SANDRA 7. ERIG)EL v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MA. T-ERESA D)M/ITMIC-ELENA

G.R. No. 19!2, 2 Februar 2!1!, EN BANC#"$%%ara&a, 'r.,J.(

When the CO!"!C is e#ercising its $uasi%&udicial powers such as in the present case,the Commission is constitutionally mandated to decide the case first in division, and en banconly upon motion for reconsideration. 'he CO!"!C cannot proceed to conduct a freshappreciation of ballots without first ascertaining the integrity thereof.

"etitioner Sandra 8riguel (8riguel) and pri&ate respondent Ma. -heresa umpit@Michelena (umpit) were mayoralty candidates in 'goo, 6a :nion during the May 1B, 3CCAelections. 'fter the can&assing and counting of &otes, 8riguel was proclaimed as the dulyelected mayor of the Municipality of 'goo.

umpit filed an 8lection "rotest (d Cautelambefore the egional -rial ourt (-)contesting the appreciation and counting of ballots in 'goo. Initially, the - dismissed the

election protest due to umpit!s failure to specify the number of &otes credited to the partiesper proclamation as re/uired by Section 11(c), ule 3 of '.M. +o. CA@B@1D@S. -he protestwas, howe&er, reinstated following umpit!s filing of a motion for reconsideration. e&isionof ballots followed shortly thereafter and was completed. -he results of the re&ision showedthat 8riguel had 11,EA? &otes against umpit!s A,?4F &otes, or a lead of 4,?4F &otes.

$n umpit!s motion, the - conducted a technical eamination of the ballots. -he- issued a decision upholding 8riguel!s proclamation. umpit appealed to the $M868-he case was initially assigned to the Special Second i&ision. $ne of the ommissioners ofthe Special i&ision decided to inhibit himself prompting the "residing $fficer to ele&ate theappeal to the $M868 !n )anc. $M868 !n )anc proceeded to conduct a freshappreciation of the contested ballots. -he ommission !n )anc promulgated a resolutionnullifying 4,A11 ballots cast in fa&or of 8riguel, thus, declaring umpit as the duly electedmayor of 'goo, 6a :nion.

ISS)ES*

1. 7hether the Special Second i&ision of the $M868 gra&ely abused its authoritywhen it automatically ele&ated umpit!s appeal to the $M868 !n )ancafter onlyone commissioner was left to deal with the case

3. 7hether the $M868 !n )anccan proceed to conduct a fresh appreciation of thecontested ballots without first ascertaining the integrity

-ELD*

"etition GRANTED.

Automatic elevation of the appeal to the COMELEC En Banc is invalid

-he $M868, in the eercise of its /uasi@judicial functions, is bound to follow thepro&ision set forth in Section 4, 'rticle I


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best and most conclusi&e e&idence are the ballots themsel&es. It should ne&er be forgottenthough, that the superior status of the ballots as e&idence of how the electorate &otedpresupposes that these were the &ery same ballots actually cast and counted in theelections. -hus, it has been held that before the ballots found in a ballot bo can be used toset aside the returns, the court (or the $M868 as the case may be) must be sure that ithas before it the same ballots deposited by the &oters.

-hus, howe&er ehausti&e the $M868!s findings may appear to be, the same is stilrendered &oid due to its lack of jurisdiction and its failure to ensure that the integrity of theballots has been preser&ed prior to conducting a fresh appreciation thereof. -he ourtreminds the $M868 to be more prudent and circumspect in resol&ing election protests byfollowing the proper procedure, whether in the eercise of its original or appellatejurisdiction, in order not to frustrate the true will of the electorate. $therwise, the &eryfoundation of our democratic processes may just as well be easily and epedientlycompromised.



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FAR EAST BAN: AND TR)ST COM/AN7 #NOW BAN: OF T-E /-ILI//INE ISLANDS(AND ROLANDO BOR'A, DE/)T7 S-ERIFF v. S/S. ERNESTO AND LEONOR C.

CA7ETANOG.R. No. 1;99!9, 2 'anuar 2!1!, FIRST DI"ISION #"$%%ara&a, 'r.,J.(

+t is a general rule in the law of agency that, in order to bind the principal by amortgage on real property e#ecuted by an agent, it must upon its face purport to be made,signed and sealed in the name of the principal, otherwise, it will bind the agent only.

6eonor . ayetano (ayetano) eecuted a special power of attorney in fa&or of herdaughter -eresita . -abing (-abing) authori>ing her to contract a loan from *ar 8ast %ank(%ank) and to mortgage her two (3) lots located +aga ity. -he %ank loaned -abing securedby two (3) promissory notes and a real estate mortgage o&er ayetano!s two (3) properties-he mortgage document was signed by -abing and her husband as mortgagors in theirindi&idual capacities, without stating that -abing was eecuting the mortgage contract forand in behalf of ayetano.

-he %ank foreclosed the mortgage for failure of ayetano and the spouses -abing topay the loan. ' notice of public auction sale was sent to ayetano. -he public auction washeld as scheduled wherein the subject properties were sold to the %ank. Subse/uently, the%ank consolidated its title and obtained new titles in its name after the redemption periodlapsed without ayetano taking any action. More than fi&e (D) years later, -abing, on behalfof ayetano, sent a letter to the %ank epressing the intent to repurchase the properties.-he %ank ga&e ayetano the chance to buy back the properties by joining a bidding to be setin some future date.

5owe&er, ayetano filed a complaint for the nullification of the real estate mortgage

and etrajudicial foreclosure sale, as well as the cancellation of the banks!s title o&er theproperties before the egional -rial ourt (-). 'fter trial, the - rendered judgment infa&or of ayetano. -he ourt of 'ppeals (').

ISS)E*

7hether or not the principal is bound by the real estate mortgage eecuted by theauthori>ed agent in her own name without indicating the principal

-ELD*

"etition GRANTED.

-he issue is not no&el. -he - and the ' are both correct in holding that thedecision in hilippine -ugar !states evelopment Co., "td., +nc. v. oizat, et al., as reiterated+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++AD"ISER*'--. 8+8 %. #$$S"8EDITORINC-IEF* 6'M%8-$ 6. S'+-$S III2 EEC)TI"E EDITOR* 58'98:S 5IS-I+8 . :2 MANAGING EDITOR*;8++8-5 J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+2 ASSOC. MANAGING EDITOR*6''%86 '++8 . 6'SI+'2 ARTICLES EDITOR*'6J$+ .8 #:9M'+2 ASSOC. ARTICLES EDITOR* '+-5$+ $%68S 2 ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITOR * ;I+# J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+ 2ASSOC. ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITORS *;IS-I+8 J'+8 .6I:, J88M'8 +'$+#' 2 RESEARC- EDITOR *S58 "'I#8 '. 6IM2ASSOC. RESEARC- EDITOR*$#8 5IS-$"58 . 88S2 CIRC)LATION MANAGER*$


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in the case of *ural )ank of )ombon /Camarines -ur0, +nc. v. Court of (ppeals, findsapplication in the instant case. -he factual circumstances of said cases are similar to thecase at bar, where an authori>ed agent eecuted a real estate mortgage on the principal!sproperty in her own name without indicating that she was acting on behalf of the principal.

-he ourt ruled on both cases on the legal force and effect of the real estate mortgagein /uestion, by whom and for whom it was eecuted, and whether or not it was &oid.'ccordingly, it is a general rule in the law of agency that, in order to bind the principal bya mortgage on real property eecuted by an agent, it must upon its face purport to bemade, signed and sealed in the name of the principal, otherwise, it will bind the agentonly. It is not enough merely that the agent was in fact authori>ed to make themortgage, if he has not acted in the name of the principal. +either is it ordinarilysufficient that in the mortgage the agent describes himself as acting by &irtue of a powerof attorney, if in fact the agent has acted in his own name and has set his own hand andseal to the mortgage. -his is especially true where the agent himself is a party to theinstrument. 5owe&er clearly the body of the mortgage may show and intend that it shalbe the act of the principal, yet, unless in fact it is eecuted by the agent for and onbehalf of his principal and as the act and deed of the principal, it is not &alid as to theprincipal.

+otwithstanding the nullity of the real estate mortgage eecuted by -abing and herhusband, the ourt finds that the e/uity principle of laches is applicable in the instant case6aches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting apresumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assertit. In the present case, records clearly show that ayetano could ha&e filed an action toannul the mortgage on their properties, but for uneplained reasons, they failed to do so-hey only /uestioned the loan and mortgage transactions in ecember 1FFE, or after thelapse of more than fi&e (D) years from the date of the foreclosure sale. It bears noting that

the real estate mortgage was registered and annotated on the titles of ayetano, and thelatter was e&en informed of the etrajudicial foreclosure and the scheduled auction. Insteadof impugning the real estate mortgage and opposing the scheduled public auctionayetanos! lawyer wrote a letter to the %ank and merely asked that the scheduled auctionbe postponed to a later date. 8&en after fi&e (D) years, ayetano still failed to oppose theforeclosure and the subse/uent transfer of titles to the %ank when their agent, -abingacting in behalf of ayetano, sent a letter proposing to buy back the properties. It was onlywhen the negotiations failed that ayetano filed the instant case. learly, ayetano slept onhis rights.

DENNIS A. B. F)NA v.EEC)TI"E SECRETAR7 ED)ARDO R. ERMITA, et al.G.R. No. 18


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$n $ctober B, 3CCE, "resident #loria Macapagal@'rroyo appointed Maria 8lena 5%autista (%autista) as :ndersecretary of the epartment of -ransportation andommunications ($-). %autista was conse/uently designated as :ndersecretary forMaritime -ransport of the department. *ollowing the resignation of then M'I+''dministrator =icente -. Sua>o, Jr., %autista was subse/uently designated as $fficer@in@harge ($I), $ffice of the 'dministrator, M'I+', in concurrent capacity as $-:ndersecretary. ennis '. %. *una in his capacity as tapayer, concerned citi>en andlawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of %autista!sappointmentHdesignation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the "resident, =ice@"resident, the Members of the abinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any otheroffice or employment. uring the pendency of this petition, %autista was appointed'dministrator of the M'I+' and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such.

ISS)E*

7hether or not the designation of respondent %autista as $I of M'I+', concurrentwith the position of $- :ndersecretary for Maritime -ransport to which she had been

appointed, &iolated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for abinetMembers and their deputies and assistants

-ELD*

"etition GRANTED.

%autista being then the appointed :ndersecretary of $-, she was co&ered by thestricter prohibition under Section 14, 'rticle =II, stating that the "resident, =ice@"resident,the Members of the abinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwisepro&ided in this onstitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenureonse/uently, she cannot in&oke the eception pro&ided in Section A, paragraph 3, 'rticle

Ied in i&il 6iberties :nion.

-he prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section14, 'rticle =II of the 1F?A onstitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the8ecuti&e officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an e@officiocapacity as pro&ided by law and as re/uired by the primary functions of said office. -hereason is that these posts do not comprise Gany other office within the contemplation of theconstitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions onsaid officials. 'part from their bare assertion that %autista did not recei&e any compensation

when she was $I of M'I+', 8rmita et al., failed to demonstrate clearly that herdesignation as such $I was in an e#%officiocapacity as re/uired by the primary functions ofher office as $- :ndersecretary for Maritime -ransport.



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It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an actingand temporary capacity, the words Ghold the office were employed. Such holding of officepertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performsthe duties and functions of the office. -he 1F?A onstitution in prohibiting dual or multipleoffices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to thenature of the appointment or designation, words which were not e&en found in Section 14,'rticle =II nor in Section A, paragraph 3, 'rticle I


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GOODRIC- MAN)FACT)RING COR/ORATION = MR. NILO C-)A GO7 v.EMERLINA ATI"O et al.

G.R. No. 188!!2, 1 Februar 2!1!, FIRST DI"ISION #"$%%ara&a, 'r.,J.(

4ot all waivers and $uitclaims are invalid as against public policy. +f the agreementwas voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on theparties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.

'ti&o et al.are former employees of petitioner #oodrich Manufacturing orporation(#oodrich) assigned as machine or maintenance operators for the different sections of thecompany. Sometime in 3CCB, on account of lingering financial constraints, #oodrich ga&e alits employees the option to &oluntarily resign from the company. Se&eral employees,including 'ti&o et al., decided to a&ail of the &oluntary resignation option. 'ti&o et al.werepaid their separation pay and eecuted their respecti&e wai&ers and /uitclaims.

Some of #oodrich!s former employees, including herein 'ti&o et al., filed complaintsagainst #oodrich for illegal dismissal with prayer for payment of their full monetary benefitsbefore the +ational 6abor elations ommission (+6). espite se&eral conferences, noamicable settlement was reached by the parties. -he 6abor 'rbiter (6') rendered a decisiondeclaring that there was no illegal dismissal but held that #oldrich was still liable to the 'ti&oet al. for their unpaid emergency cost of li&ing allowance (8$6'), 14th month payseparation pay, and ser&ice incenti&e lea&e (SI6) pay. %oth parties appealed to the +6.-he +6 re&ersed and set aside the 6abor 'rbiter!s decision. -he ourt of 'ppeals (')rendered its decision in fa&or of the 'ti&o et al.

ISS)E*

7hether or not the release, wai&er and /uitclaim signed by 'ti&o et al.are &alid andbinding

-ELD0

"etition GRANTED.

It is true that the law looks with disfa&or on /uitclaims and releases by employees whoha&e been in&eigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking toe&ade their legal responsibilities and frustrate just claims of employees. In certain cases,howe&er, the ourt has gi&en effect to /uitclaims eecuted by employees if the employer is

able to pro&e the following re/uisites, to wit0 (1) the employee eecutes a deed of /uitclaim&oluntarily2 (3) there is no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties2 (4) theconsideration of the /uitclaim is credible and reasonable2 and (B) the contract is not contrary+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++AD"ISER*'--. 8+8 %. #$$S"8EDITORINC-IEF* 6'M%8-$ 6. S'+-$S III2 EEC)TI"E EDITOR* 58'98:S 5IS-I+8 . :2 MANAGING EDITOR*;8++8-5 J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+2 ASSOC. MANAGING EDITOR*6''%86 '++8 . 6'SI+'2 ARTICLES EDITOR*'6J$+ .8 #:9M'+2 ASSOC. ARTICLES EDITOR* '+-5$+ $%68S 2 ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITOR * ;I+# J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+ 2ASSOC. ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITORS *;IS-I+8 J'+8 .6I:, J88M'8 +'$+#' 2 RESEARC- EDITOR *S58 "'I#8 '. 6IM2ASSOC. RESEARC- EDITOR*$#8 5IS-$"58 . 88S2 CIRC)LATION MANAGER*$


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to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third personwith a right recogni>ed by law.

+ot all wai&ers and /uitclaims are in&alid as against public policy. If the agreementwas &oluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on theparties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only wherethere is clear proof that the wai&er was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, orthe terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the/uestionable transaction. %ut where it is shown that the person making the wai&er did so&oluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the/uitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recogni>ed as a &alid andbinding undertaking. In the case at bar, both the 6abor 'rbiter and the +6 ruled that 'ti&o et aleecuted the /uitclaims absent any coercion from #oldrich following their &oluntaryresignation from the company.-he contents of the /uitclaim documents that ha&e been signed by the 'ti&o et al. aresimple, clear and une/ui&ocal. -he records of the case are bereft of any substantial e&idence

to show that 'ti&o et al.did not know that they were relin/uishing their right short of whatthey had epected to recei&e and contrary to what they ha&e so declared. "ut differently, atthe time they were signing their /uitclaims, 'ti&o et al.honestly belie&ed that the amountsrecei&ed by them were fair and reasonable settlements of the amounts which they wouldha&e recei&ed had they refused to &oluntarily resign from the said company.

-he considerations recei&ed by the 'ti&o et al.from #oodrich do not appear to begrossly inade/uate &is@@&is what they should recei&e in full. 's correctly pointed out by the+6, the total awards computed by the 6' will definitely e&en be lesser after deducting the14th month pay for the years 3CC3 and 3CC4, which ha&e already been recei&ed by the 'ti&oet al.prior to the filing of their complaints, but which the 6' still included in his computation.

-he difference between the amounts epected from those that were recei&ed may,therefore, be considered as a fair and reasonable bargain on the part of both parties.

CELESTINO A. MARTINE> III v. -O)SE OF RE/RESENTATI"ES ELECTORAL TRIB)NALand BEN-)R L. SALIMBANGON

G.R. No. 189!? (Martine>) and %enhur Salimbangonwere among the candidates for epresentati&e in the *ourth 6egislati&e istrict of ebu"ro&ince. 8dilito . Martine> filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. Martine>filed a petition to declare 8dilito . Martine> a nuisance candidate. 5owe&er, the ommissionon 8lections ($M868) Second i&ision issued its esolution declaring 8dilito a nuisancecandidate only almost one (1) month after the elections. Salimbangon was proclaimedwinner in the congressional elections. Martine> filed an 8lection "rotest(d Cautelam and the



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5ouse of epresentati&es 8lectoral -ribunal (58-) granted his motion to con&ert the sameinto a egular "rotest. -he election protest is based on three hundred (4CC) ballots more orless with only KM'-I+89K or K. M'-I+89K written on the line for epresentati&e which the%oard of 8lection Inspectors (%8I) did not count for Martine> on the ground that there wasanother congressional candidate (8dilito . Martine>) who had the same surname. uring there&ision, ballots with only KM'-I+89K or K. M'-I+89K written on the line forepresentati&e were not counted and temporarily classified as stray.

-he 58- sustained the %8I in considering the ballots as stray.-he 58- dismissedthe election protest, affirmed the proclamation of Salimbangon and declared him to be theduly elected epresentati&e of the *ourth 6egislati&e istrict of ebu. Martine> mo&ed forreconsideration of the ecision, but the 58- denied it.

ISS)E*

7hether not the ballots containing only the similar surname of two (3) candidates becounted in fa&or of the bona fidecandidate by &irtue of in a final judgment declaring a

nuisance candidate after the elections

-ELD*

"etition GRANTED.

%y their &ery nature, proceedings in cases of nuisance candidates re/uire promptdisposition. -he declaration of a duly registered candidate as nuisance candidate results inthe cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. -he law mandates the ommission and thecourts to gi&e priority to cases of dis/ualification to the end that a final decision shall berendered not later than se&en days before the election in which the dis/ualification is

sought. In many instances, howe&er, proceedings against nuisance candidates remainedpending and undecided until election day and e&en after can&assing of &otes had beencompleted.

Martine> now in&okes this ourtLs pronouncement in)autista v. CO!"!Cto the effectthat &otes indicating only the surname of two (3) candidates should not be considered asstray but counted in fa&or of the bona fide candidate after the other candidate with a similarsurname was declared a nuisance candidate.

-he purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed bythe board of can&assers is the lawful choice of the people. 7hat is sought is the correctionof the can&ass of &otes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate.

8lection contests, therefore, in&ol&e the adjudication not only of pri&ate and pecuniaryinterests of ri&al candidates, but also of paramount public interest considering the need todispel uncertainty o&er the real choice of the electorate.+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++AD"ISER*'--. 8+8 %. #$$S"8EDITORINC-IEF* 6'M%8-$ 6. S'+-$S III2 EEC)TI"E EDITOR* 58'98:S 5IS-I+8 . :2 MANAGING EDITOR*;8++8-5 J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+2 ASSOC. MANAGING EDITOR*6''%86 '++8 . 6'SI+'2 ARTICLES EDITOR*'6J$+ .8 #:9M'+2 ASSOC. ARTICLES EDITOR* '+-5$+ $%68S 2 ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITOR * ;I+# J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+ 2ASSOC. ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITORS *;IS-I+8 J'+8 .6I:, J88M'8 +'$+#' 2 RESEARC- EDITOR *S58 "'I#8 '. 6IM2ASSOC. RESEARC- EDITOR*$#8 5IS-$"58 . 88S2 CIRC)LATION MANAGER*$


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candidate and not considered stray, e&en if the other candidate was declared a nuisancecandidate by final judgment after the elections.

/EO/LE OF T-E /-ILI//INES v. ROLANDO TAMA7OG.R. No. 18;!;!, 2< Februar 2!1!, FIRST DI"ISION #"$%%ara&a, 'r.,J.(

+n a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must firstbe established6 /10 proof that the transaction or sale took place and /50 the presentation incourt of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. +n a prosecution for illegalpossession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that /10 the accused was in possession ofan item or an ob&ect identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, /50 such possession isnot authorized by law, and /20 the accused was freely and consciously aware of being inpossession of the drug.

olando -amayo was charged with &iolations of &iolation of Sections D and 11 of'rticle II of epublic 'ct +o. F1ED. :pon arraignment, -amayo pleaded not guilty to thecharges against him. -he prosecution presented as witnesses "olice $fficers 'ndres +elson

Sy and esar . ollado of "olice Station B, +o&aliches, ue>on ity. -he witnesses testifiedthat a confidential informant arri&ed at the station and reported that a certain Gonnie wasselling marijuana. 't once, a team was created to conduct a buy@bust operation in thereported area. ight after the echange, "$4 Sy introduced himself as a police officer andplaced -amayo under arrest. 'fterwards, -amayo was brought to the police station togetherwith the confiscated dried marijuana fruiting tops. -here were eight (?) plastic sachetscontaining marijuana fruiting tops reco&ered from -amayo aside from the dried marijuanacontents of the bag. "$4 Sy and "$3 ollado positi&ely identified -amayo and the driedmarijuana lea&es in open court. "$4 Sy identified the tea bag containing marijuana throughhis initials, G'+S.

-he - con&icted -amayo. -he ourt of 'ppeals (') affirmed the con&iction.

ISS)E*

7hether or not -amayo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of &iolating ep. 'ct +o.F1ED

-ELD*

"etition DENIED.

It is a settled rule that in cases in&ol&ing &iolations of the omprehensi&e angerousrugs 'ct, credence is gi&en to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they arepresumed to ha&e performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is e&idence to



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the contrary. In this case, no e&idence was adduced showing any irregularity in any materiaaspect of the conduct of the buy@bust operation. +either was there any proof that theprosecution witnesses who were members of the buy@bust operation team, particularly thosewhose testimonies were in /uestion, were impelled by any ill@feeling or improper moti&eagainst -amayo which would raise a doubt as to their credibility.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must firstbe established0 (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (3) the presentation incourt of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as e&idence. In a prosecution for illegapossession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession ofan item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (3) such possession isnot authori>ed by law, and (4) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being inpossession of the drug.

5ere, the prosecution was able to pro&e the eistence of all the elements of the illegalsale and illegal possession of marijuana. -amayo was positi&ely identified by the prosecutionwitnesses as the person who possessed and sold the marijuana presented in court. In his

testimony, "$4 Sy categorically stated that he bought the marijuana from -amayo. Inaddition, it was duly established that the sale actually took place and more marijuana wasdisco&ered in appellant!s possession pursuant to a lawful arrest. -he marked money used inthe buy@bust operation was likewise duly presented. *urthermore, the marijuana sei>ed from-amayo was positi&ely and categorically identified in open court.

-he ourt gi&es credence to the straightforward testimony of prosecution witness "$4Sy, which clearly established that an illegal sale of marijuana actually took place and that-amayo was the seller.

IRENE SANTE AND RE7NALDO SANTE v.

-ON. EDILBERTO T. CLARA"ALL and "ITA N. :ALAS-IANG.R. No. 1;?91, 22 Februar 2!1!, FIRST DI"ISION #"$%%ara&a, 'r.,J.(

'he total amount of monetary claims including the claims for damages was the basisto determine the &urisdictional amount. 'he other forms of damages being claimed, e.g.,e#emplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation e#penses, are not merely incidental to orconse$uences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in thecomplaint.

=ita ;alashian filed before the egional -rial ourt (-) a complaint for damagesagainst Irene Sante and eynaldo Sante (Santes). In her complaint, ;alashian alleged thatwhile she was inside the "olice Station of +ati&idad, "angasinan, and in the presence of

other persons and police officers, Irene Sante uttered words, which when translated in8nglish are as follows, G5ow many rounds of se did you ha&e last night with your boss,%ertN ou fuckin! bitchO %ert refers to 'lbert #acusan, ;alashian!s friend and one (1) of herhired personal security guards detained at the said station and who is a suspect in the killingof the Santes! close relati&e. -he Santes also allegedly went around +ati&idad, "angasinantelling people that ;alashian is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the aforesaid killing-hus, ;alashian prayed that the Santes be held liable to pay moral damages in the amount



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of "4CC,CCC.CC2 "DC,CCC.CC as eemplary damages2 "DC,CCC.CC attorney!s fees2 "3C,CCC.CClitigation epenses2 and costs of suit.

-he Santes filed a Motion to ismiss on the ground that it was the Municipal -riaourt in ities (M-) and not the - of %aguio that had jurisdiction o&er the case. -he -denied the motion to dismiss. -he - held that the total claim of ;alashian amounted to"B3C,CCC.CC which was abo&e the jurisdictional amount for M-s outside Metro Manila'ggrie&ed, Santes filed a "etition for ertiorari and "rohibition before the ourt of 'ppeals('). Meanwhile, ;alashian and her husband filed an 'mended omplaint increasing theclaim for moral damages from "4CC,CCC.CC to "1,CCC,CCC.CC. Santes filed a Motion toismiss with 'nswer (d Cautelam and ounterclaim, but the - denied their motion5ence, Santes again filed a "etition for Certiorariand "rohibition before the ' claiming thatthe - committed gra&e abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the complaint toincrease the amount of moral damages from "4CC,CCC.CC to "1,CCC,CCC.CC. -he ' heldthat the case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the M- as the allegations show that;alashian was seeking to reco&er moral damages in the amount of "4CC,CCC.CC, whichamount was well within the jurisdictional amount of the M-.

ISS)ES*

1. 7hether the - ac/uire jurisdiction o&er the case

3. 7hether the - commit gra&e abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of thecomplaint

-ELD*

"etition DENIED.

%C Ac&ured Jurisdiction Over the Case

-here is no /uestion that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the M-!sjurisdictional amount has been adjusted to "4CC,CCC.CC. %ut where damages is the maincause of action, should the amount of moral damages prayed for in the complaint be thesole basis for determining which court has jurisdiction or should the total amount of all thedamages claimed regardless of kind and nature, such as eemplary damages, nominadamages, and attorney!s fees, etc., be usedN

In the instant case, the complaint filed is for the reco&ery of damages for the allegedmalicious acts of the Santes. -he complaint principally sought an award of moral andeemplary damages, as well as attorney!s fees and litigation epenses, for the allegedshame and injury suffered by ;alashian by reason of Santes! utterance while they were at apolice station in "angasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on thefacts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++AD"ISER*'--. 8+8 %. #$$S"8EDITORINC-IEF* 6'M%8-$ 6. S'+-$S III2 EEC)TI"E EDITOR* 58'98:S 5IS-I+8 . :2 MANAGING EDITOR*;8++8-5 J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+2 ASSOC. MANAGING EDITOR*6''%86 '++8 . 6'SI+'2 ARTICLES EDITOR*'6J$+ .8 #:9M'+2 ASSOC. ARTICLES EDITOR* '+-5$+ $%68S 2 ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITOR * ;I+# J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+ 2ASSOC. ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITORS *;IS-I+8 J'+8 .6I:, J88M'8 +'$+#' 2 RESEARC- EDITOR *S58 "'I#8 '. 6IM2ASSOC. RESEARC- EDITOR*$#8 5IS-$"58 . 88S2 CIRC)LATION MANAGER*$


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facts constituting the plaintiff!s causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of thecomplaint, that ;alashian!s main action is for damages. 5ence, the other forms of damagesbeing claimed by ;alashian, e.g., eemplary damages, attorney!s fees and litigationepenses, are not merely incidental to or conse/uences of the main action but constitute theprimary relief prayed for in the complaint.

In endoza v. -oriano, it was held that in cases where the claim for damages is themain cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall beconsidered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. In the said case, the respondent!sclaim of "F3F,CCC.CE in damages and "3D,CCC attorney!s fees plus "DCC per courtappearance was held to represent the monetary e/ui&alent for compensation of the allegedinjury. -he ourt therein held that the total amount of monetary claims including the claimsfor damages was the basis to determine the jurisdictional amount.

onsidering that the total amount of damages claimed was "B3C,CCC.CC, the ' wascorrect in ruling that the - had jurisdiction o&er the case.

%C Did Not Commit Grave A!use of Discretion in Allo"in# the Amendment of theComplaint

-he ourt finds no error, much less gra&e abuse of discretion, on the part of the ' inaffirming the -!s order allowing the amendment of the original complaint from"4CC,CCC.CC to "1,CCC,CCC.CC despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari filed beforethe '. 7hile it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be allowedwhen the court has no jurisdiction o&er the original complaint and the purpose of theamendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court, here, the - clearly had jurisdiction o&erthe original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right.



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S/O1 LEONITO AC)>AR v. A/RONIANO 'OROLAN and -ON. ED)ARDO A. A/RESAG.R. No. 1;;8;8, ; A@r$% 2!1!, FIRST DI"ISION #"$%%ara&a, 'r.,J.(

+t is apparent from the provision of *epublic (ct 4o. 789: that the remedy of appealfrom the decision of the "!) to the *egional (ppellate )oard was available to petitioner.-ince appeal was available, filing a petition for certiorari was inapt. 'he e#istence andavailability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil actionof certiorari.

espondent 'proniano Jorolan (Jorolan) filed an administrati&e case against S"$16eonito 'cu>ar ('cu>ar) before the "eople!s 6aw 8nforcement %oard ("68%) charging thelatter of gra&e misconduct for allegedly ha&ing an illicit relationship with respondentJorolan!s minor daughter.

Jorolan also instituted a criminal case against petitioner before the Municipal -riaourt (M-) for =iolation of epublic 'ct +o. AE1C, otherwise known as the hild 'buse 'ct

"etitioner 'cu>ar denied all the accusations le&eled against him. In support thereof, 'cu>arattached the affida&it of complainant!s daughter, igma '. Jorolan, who denied ha&ing anyrelationship with the petitioner or ha&ing kissed him despite knowing him to be a marriedperson.

'fter due proceedings, the "68% issued a decision finding 'cu>ar guilty of gra&emisconduct. 'cu>ar then filed a petition for certiorari before the egional -rial ourt (-)alleging that he was not gi&en an opportunity to be heard. 5e also a&erred that "68% has nojurisdiction o&er the case with the reason that 'cu>ar ha&en!t been first con&icted in thecriminal case.

-he - rendered a ecision annulling the decision of the "68%. Jorolan ele&ated thecase to the ourt of 'ppeals (') which then rendered its ecision re&ersing and settingaside the trial court!s decision. -he ' found merit in respondent Jorolan!s argument that theetition for certiorari filed by petitioner 'cu>ar before the - was not the proper remedybecause (1) appeal was a&ailable and (3) the issues raised were not pure /uestions of lawbut both /uestions of law and fact. 5ence, this petition

ISS)E0

7hether or not the ' erred in ruling that petitioner!s resort to certiorariwas notwarranted as the remedy of appeal from the decision of the "68% was a&ailable to him

-ELD0

"etition DENIED.+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++AD"ISER*'--. 8+8 %. #$$S"8EDITORINC-IEF* 6'M%8-$ 6. S'+-$S III2 EEC)TI"E EDITOR* 58'98:S 5IS-I+8 . :2 MANAGING EDITOR*;8++8-5 J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+2 ASSOC. MANAGING EDITOR*6''%86 '++8 . 6'SI+'2 ARTICLES EDITOR*'6J$+ .8 #:9M'+2 ASSOC. ARTICLES EDITOR* '+-5$+ $%68S 2 ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITOR * ;I+# J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+ 2ASSOC. ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITORS *;IS-I+8 J'+8 .6I:, J88M'8 +'$+#' 2 RESEARC- EDITOR *S58 "'I#8 '. 6IM2ASSOC. RESEARC- EDITOR*$#8 5IS-$"58 . 88S2 CIRC)LATION MANAGER*$


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-o reiterate, 'cu>ar opted to file a petition for certiorari before the trial court on thepretet that the "68% had no jurisdiction to hear the administrati&e case until the petitioneris con&icted before the regular court. 'ccording to petitioner, although the case filed beforethe "68% was captioned as G#ra&e Misconduct, the offense charged was actually forG=iolation of 6aw, which re/uires prior con&iction before a hearing on the administrati&ecase can proceed. -hus, 'cu>ar insists that the "68% should ha&e awaited the resolution ofthe criminal case before conducting a hearing on the administrati&e charge against him.

-he contention howe&er is untenable. ' careful perusal of respondent Jorolan!saffida&it@complaint against petitioner 'cu>ar would show that the latter was charged withgra&e misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with respondent!s minor daughter, he beinga married man, and not for &iolation of law, as petitioner would like to con&ince this ourt.Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct, moti&ated bypremeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. $n the other hand, G&iolation of lawpresupposes final con&iction in court of any crime or offense penali>ed under the e&ised"enal ode or any special law or ordinance. -he settled rule is that criminal and

administrati&e cases are separate and distinct from each other. In criminal cases, proofbeyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrati&e proceedings, only substantiae&idence is re/uired. 'nd &erily, administrati&e cases may proceed independently of criminaproceedings. -he "68%, being the administrati&e disciplinary body tasked to hear complaintsagainst erring members of the "+", has jurisdiction o&er the case.

It is apparent from the pro&ision of epublic 'ct +o. EFAD that the remedy of appeafrom the decision of the "68% to the egional 'ppellate %oard was a&ailable to petitioner.Since appeal was a&ailable, filing a petition for certiorari was inapt. -he eistence anda&ailability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the a&ailment of the special ci&il action ofcertiorari. orollary, the principle of ehaustion of administrati&e remedies re/uires that

before a party is allowed to seek the inter&ention of the court, it is a precondition that heshould ha&e a&ailed of the means of administrati&e processes afforded to him. If a remedyis a&ailable within the administrati&e machinery of the administrati&e agency, then thisalternati&e should first be utili>ed before resort can be made to the courts. -his is to enablesuch body to re&iew and correct any mistakes without the inter&ention of the court.

:RI>IA :ATRINA T7DE >)>)ARREG)I v.T-E -ON. 'OSELITO C. "ILLAROSA andFANNIE TORREST7

G.R. No. 18?;88, A@r$% 2!1!, FIRST DI"ISION #"$%%ara&a, 'r.,J.'

'he determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of apre&udicial $uestion rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil

case are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of theissues in the civil case would also determine the &udgment in the criminal case.

osemary -orres -y@asekhi (osemary), the sister of petitioner ;ri>ia ;atrina -y@e9u>uarregui!s (e@9u>uarregui) late father 'leander -orres -y, filed a petition for theissuance of letters of administration of the estate of her mother, %ella -orres (%ella), beforethe egional -rial ourt (-). osemary and e@9u>uarregui entered into an amicablesettlement appro&ed by the -. Subse/uently, two (3) of osemary!s alleged siblings, "eter



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-orres -y ("eter) and atherine -orres -y@ha&e> (atherine), filed with the ourt of 'ppeals(') a "etition to 'nnul Judgment 'ppro&ing ompromise 'greement between osemary ande@9>uarregie. "eter and atherine claimed that they are also biological children of the late%ella and are also entitled to participate in the settlement of the latter!s estate. 6ater, pri&aterespondent *annie -orres@-y (*annie), who likewise claimed to be a biological child of the late%ella and therefore also entitled to inherit from her, filed a petition@in@inter&ention in theaction. "eter, atherine and *annie alleged that after the death of %ella, they held discussionson the settlement of %ella!s estate. osemary promised to take care of the processing ofpapers to di&ide the estate in accordance with the law. 5owe&er, osemary wanted to get alarger share of the estate, but they did not agree. "eter, atherine and *annie were not awarethat osemary had filed a petition for the administration and the compromise agreement.osemary falsely a&erred that she and e@9u>uarregui were the only heirs of %ella. $n theother hand, osemary and e@9u>uarregui alleged that "eter, atherine and *annie wereabandoned children and %ella took them in out of pity. 5owe&er, they were not legallyadopted, thus, they were ne&er conferred the rights of legitimate children.

7hile the action for annulment of the compromise judgment was pending before the

', *annie filed a complaint for falsification and perjury against osemary and e@9u>uarrgufor alleging in the pleadings filed in the - that they were the only heirs of %ella. -hree (4)files of information against e@9u>uarregui and osemary were thus filed with theMetropolitan -rial ourt (Me-). e@9u>uarregui then filed a petition for re&iew with theepartment of Justice ($J) and a motion to defer proceedings before the Me- on the groundof the pending appeal before the $J. 'lso, e@9u>uarregui filed a petition for suspension ofproceedings due to prejudicial /uestion. 5owe&er, e@9u>uarregui!s appeal was dismissed bythe $J, while her motions before the Me- were denied by the said court.

e@9u>uarregui then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the -. -he -denied the petition on the ground that there was no prejudicial /uestion. -o elaborate, the

- held that there was no prejudicial /uestion as the /uantum of e&idence in the ci&il actionfor annulment of judgment differs from the /uantum of e&idence re/uired in the criminaaction for falsification of public documents. Moreo&er, e@9u>uarregui!s Motion foreconsideration was also denied by the -. e@9u>uarregui appealed before the ourt of'ppeals (') assailing the -!s orders. -he ' dismissed the petition on the ground thatthe certification of non@forum shopping was signed only by e@9u>uarregui!s counsel and notby e@9u>uarregui herself. e@9u>uarregui!s Motion for econsideration was alsodenied. 5ence, the present recourse.

ISS)ES0

1. 7hether or not the ' erred in dismissing the petition alleging that the certification ofnon@forum shopping was not signed by e@9u>uarregui herself



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3. 7hether or not a prejudicial /uestion eists to allow the suspension of proceedings

-ELD0

"etition GRANTED.

Petition must not !e dismissed even if the certification of forum shoppin# "as notsi#ned !$ De()u*uarre#ii herself

#enerally, subse/uent compliance with the re/uirement of a certification of non@forumshopping does not ecuse a party from failure to comply in the first instance. ' certificationof the plaintiff!s counsel will not suffice for the reason that it is the petitioner, and not thecounsel, who is in the best position to know whether he actually filed or caused the filing of apetition. ' certification against forum shopping signed by counsel is a defecti&e certificationthat is e/ui&alent to non@compliance with the re/uirement and constitutes a &alid cause forthe dismissal of the petition.

5owe&er, there are instances when the ourt treated compliance with the rule withrelati&e liberality, especially when there are circumstances or compelling reasons makingthe strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. :pon receipt of the esolution of the 'dismissing her petition for non@compliance with the rules, e@9u>uarregui submitted,together with her Motion for econsideration, a =erification and ertification signed by her incompliance with the said rule. -he ourt deem this to be sufficient compliance especially in&iew of the merits of the case, which may be considered as a special circumstance or acompelling reason that would justify tempering the hard conse/uence of the procedurare/uirement on non@forum shopping.

here e+ists a pre,udicial &uestion- thus the proceedin#s must !e suspended

*or a prejudicial /uestion in a ci&il case to suspend a criminal action, it must appear notonly that said ci&il case in&ol&es facts intimately related to those upon which the criminalprosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in theci&il case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. -herationale behind the principle of prejudicial /uestion is to a&oid two (3) conflicting decisions.

' perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that the ci&il case,'@#.. S" +o. ?A333, pending before the ourt of 'ppeals is principally for thedetermination of the &alidity of the compromise agreement which did not include "eter,atherine, and *annie as heirs of %ella. "eter, atherine, and *annie presented e&idence topro&e that they are also biological children of %ella and 'lejandro. $n the other hand

riminal ase +os. 4B4?13 to 4B4?1B filed before the Me- in&ol&e the determination ofwhether petitioner committed falsification of public documents in eecuting pleadingscontaining untruthful statements that she and osemary were the only legal heirs of %ella. Itis e&ident that the result of the ci&il case will determine the innocence or guilt of thepetitioner in the criminal cases for falsification of public documents. -he criminal cases aroseout of the claim of "eter, atherine, and *annie that they are also the legal heirs of %ella. If itis finally adjudged in the ci&il case that they are not biological children of the late %ella andconse/uently not entitled to a share in her estate as heirs, there is no more basis to proceed



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with the criminal cases against petitioner who could not ha&e committed falsification in herpleadings filed before the - of "asig ity, the truth of her statements regarding thefiliation of "eter, atherine and *annie ha&ing been judicially settled.

MEDISER", INC. v. CO)RT OF A//EALS and LAND-EIG-TS DE"ELO/MENTCOR/ORATION

G.R. No. 11?8, A@r$% 2!1!, FIRST DI"ISION #"$%%ara&a, 'r.,J.'

+t is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations wherethere may be some e#cusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that thesame does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonableattempt at compliance with the rules. (fter all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in avery rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial &ustice.

"etitioner Mediser&, Inc. (Mediser&) eecuted a real estate mortgage in fa&or of hina%anking orporation as security for a loan. -he mortgage was constituted on a lot withimpro&ements located in Manila. Mediser& defaulted on its obligation with hinabank and the

real estate mortgage was foreclosed. 't the public auction sale, pri&ate respondent6andheights e&elopment orporation (6andheights) emerged as the highest bidder for thesubject property.

6andheights filed with the egional -rial ourt (-) 'pplication for "ossession of ea8state "roperty "urchased at an 'uction Sale under 'ct +o. 414D. -he title of the propertywas consolidated in fa&or of 6andheights and the egister of eeds for the ity of Manila6andheights, seeking to reco&er possession of the subject property, filed a &erified omplaintfor 8jectment against Mediser& before the Metropolitan -rial ourt of Manila (Me-). -heMe- of Manila then rendered a ecision in fa&or of 6andheights.

Mediser& appealed the decision to the -. -he - re&ersed the ecision of theMe-. 6andheights filed a Motion for econsideration which was denied. 6andheightsappealed with the ourt of 'ppeals ('), which dismissed the petition alleging that thewritten authority of ickenson -an (-an) to sign re/uired documents of the petition was notattached. 6andheights filed a Motion for econsideration and subse/uently submitted aSecretary!s ertificate stating that the %oard of irectors affirms the authority of -an to filethe "etition for e&iew. -he ourt of 'ppeals issued a resolution granting 6andheights a newperiod of ten (1C) days within which to correct and rectify the deficiencies in the petitionMediser& filed a Motion for econsideration praying that the esolution granting 6andheigtsa new period be set aside and the pre&ious esolution, which dismissed the petition, bereinstated. -he ' issued a esolution reinstating the petition for re&iew. 'fter Mediser&filed a Motion for econsideration, the ' issued a resolution reinstating the petition. Its

Motion for econsideration ha&ing been denied by the ', Mediser& files this petition.

ISS)E0+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++AD"ISER*'--. 8+8 %. #$$S"8EDITORINC-IEF* 6'M%8-$ 6. S'+-$S III2 EEC)TI"E EDITOR* 58'98:S 5IS-I+8 . :2 MANAGING EDITOR*;8++8-5 J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+2 ASSOC. MANAGING EDITOR*6''%86 '++8 . 6'SI+'2 ARTICLES EDITOR*'6J$+ .8 #:9M'+2 ASSOC. ARTICLES EDITOR* '+-5$+ $%68S 2 ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITOR * ;I+# J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+ 2ASSOC. ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITORS *;IS-I+8 J'+8 .6I:, J88M'8 +'$+#' 2 RESEARC- EDITOR *S58 "'I#8 '. 6IM2ASSOC. RESEARC- EDITOR*$#8 5IS-$"58 . 88S2 CIRC)LATION MANAGER*$


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7hether or not the ' erred in reinstating the pre&iously dismissed petition of6andheights

-ELD0

"etition DENIED.

-he re/uirement that a petitioner or principal party should sign the certificate of non@forum shopping applies e&en to corporations, considering that the mandatory directi&es ofthe ules of ourt make no distinction between natural and juridical persons. ' corporation,howe&er, eercises its powers through its board of directors andHor its duly authori>edofficers and agents. "hysical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only bynatural persons duly authori>ed for the purpose by corporate by@laws or by a specific act ofthe board of directors.

:n/uestionably, there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to hold that 6andheights has

substantially complied with the =erification and ertification re/uirements. -he ourt hasheld in a catena of cases with similar factual circumstances that there is substantiacompliance with the ules of ourt when there is a belated submission or filing of thesecretary!s certificate through a Motion for econsideration of the ourt of 'ppeals! decisiondismissing the petition for certiorari.

In(teneo de 4aga University v. analo,the ourt acknowledged that it has relaed

under justifiable circumstances, the rule re/uiring the submission of these certifications andhas applied the rule of substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances with respectto the contents of the certification. It also conceded that if the ourt has allowed the belatedfiling of the certification against forum shopping for compelling reasons in pre&ious rulings

with more reason should it sanction the timely submission of such certification though theproof of the signatory!s authority was submitted thereafter.

-he ourt is aware of the necessity for a certification of non@forum shopping in filingpetitions for certiorarias this is re/uired under Section 1 ule ED, in relation to Section 4ule BE of the ules of i&il "rocedure, as amended. 7hen the petitioner is a corporationthe certification should ob&iously be eecuted by a natural person to whom the power toeecute such certification has been &alidly conferred by the corporate board of directorsandHor duly authori>ed officers and agents. #enerally, the petition is subject to dismissal if acertification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatory!s authority.

5owe&er, the ourt must make a distinction between non@compliance with the

re/uirements for certificate of non@forum shopping and &erification and substantiacompliance with the re/uirements as pro&ided in the ules of ourt. -he ourt has allowedthe belated filing of the certification on the justification that such act constitutes substantialcompliance. In *oadway !#press, +nc. v. C(, the ourt allowed the filing of the certificationfourteen (1B) days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. "and )ank of thehilippines, the ourt reinstated a petition on the ground of substantial compliance e&enthough the &erification and certification were submitted only after the petition had alreadybeen originally dismissed. *urthermore, in


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acknowledged substantial compliance when the lacking secretary!s certificate was submittedby the petitioners as an attachment to the motion for reconsideration seeking re&ersal of theoriginal decision dismissing the petition for its earlier failure to submit such re/uirement.

In the present case, 6andheights rectified its failure to submit proof of Mr. ickson-an!s authority to sign the &erificationHcertification on non@forum shopping on itsbehalf when the re/uired document was subse/uently submitted to the ourt of 'ppeals-he admission of these documents, and conse/uently, the reinstatement of the petitionitself, is in line with the cases the ourt has cited. In such circumstances, the ourt deems itmore in accord with substanti&e justice that the case be decided on the merits.



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/EO/LE OF T-E /-ILI//INES v.'ON'IE ESO7 -)NGO7 et al.G.R. No. 188


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*urthermore, the reliability of "abalan!s memory should not be doubted by the merefact that identification of the appellants at the police line@up happened se&eral days after theincident. It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to a crime is to stri&e to lookat the appearance of the perpetrator and to obser&e the manner in which the offense isperpetrated. Most often the face of the assailant and body mo&ements thereof, creates alasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a witness!s memory. 8periencedictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of &iolence committed right before theireyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals atany gi&en time.

's to appellants! defense of alibi, it cannot pre&ail o&er the positi&e identification ofappellants as the perpetrators of the crime, especially in the face of categorical statementscoming from a credible witness who has no ill moti&es in testifying. "abalan!s testimony wasstraightforward and though she became emotional during the middle part of her testimony,she remained consistent all throughout e&en on cross@eamination. 'ppellants ha&e also notshown any reason for "abalan to testify falsely against them.

-o establish alibi, an accused must pro&e (a) that he was present at another place atthe time the crime was perpetrated, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be atthe scene of the crime. "hysical impossibility Grefers to the distance between the placewhere the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, aswell as the facility of access between the two places. 5ere, appellants failed to satisfy thesaid re/uisites, especially the second. -he crime happened along -aft '&enue, 8rmita, whileappellants claimed to be in their workplace in %acood, Sta. Mesa, at that time. -he distancebetween 8rmita and Sta. Mesa cannot be said as too far that it was physically impossible forappellants not to be at 8rmita, the scene of the crime. 8&en the testimony of their immediatesuper&isor did not help in establishing their defense since ela ru> could not categoricallystate that appellants were at the workplace at the time and date the crime was committed.

obbery was pro&en beyond reasonable doubt. -hough "abalan!s testimony as to the&ictim!s utterance that his cellular phone was taken is only hearsay, the testimony isconsidered an eception to the hearsay rule, the &ictim!s spontaneous utterance being partof res gestae.

*es gestae refers to those eclamations and statements made by either theparticipants, the &ictim or spectator to a crime immediately before, during or immediatelyafter the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statementswere made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by ecitement of the occasionand there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a falsestatement. In the instant case, all the elements of res gestaeare sufficiently established

insofar as the afore/uoted spontaneous utterance is concerned0 (1) the principal act (resgestae) P the robbery and stabbing of the &ictim P is a startling occurrence2 (3) thestatements were made before the declarant had time to contri&e or de&ise, that is, within+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++AD"ISER*'--. 8+8 %. #$$S"8EDITORINC-IEF* 6'M%8-$ 6. S'+-$S III2 EEC)TI"E EDITOR* 58'98:S 5IS-I+8 . :2 MANAGING EDITOR*;8++8-5 J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+2 ASSOC. MANAGING EDITOR*6''%86 '++8 . 6'SI+'2 ARTICLES EDITOR*'6J$+ .8 #:9M'+2 ASSOC. ARTICLES EDITOR* '+-5$+ $%68S 2 ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITOR * ;I+# J'M8S '6$ . 5I9$+ 2ASSOC. ')RIS/R)DENCE EDITORS *;IS-I+8 J'+8 .6I:, J88M'8 +'$+#' 2 RESEARC- EDITOR *S58 "'I#8 '. 6IM2ASSOC. RESEARC- EDITOR*$#8 5IS-$"58 . 88S2 CIRC)LATION MANAGER*$


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minutes after the &ictim was stabbed and his cellular phone was snatched2 and (4) thestatement concerns the occurrence in /uestion and its immediately attending circumstancesP his cellular phone was stolen during the startling occurrence. -he testimony being aneception to the hearsay rule, the trial court did not err in admitting the same.

/EO/LE OF T-E /-ILI//INES v. RA7MOND FABIAN and ALLAN MACALONGG.R. No. 181!

+n the absence of proof of motive to impute falsely a crime as serious as violation ofthe Comprehensive angerous rugs (ct, the presumption of regularity in the performanceof official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the prosecutionwitnesses, shall prevail over appellants self%serving and uncorroborated denial.

-he Marikina ity "olice Station!s 'nti@Illegal rugs Special $peration -ask *orcerecei&ed a call from a certain citi>en regarding a rampant sale of illegal drugs in certainareas in Marikina. 'cting on the report, a team was formed to conduct sur&eillance and buy

bust operations on the areas. -he officers positioned themsel&es on the area and theyspotted 'llan Macalong (Macalong) entering a small alley and after a few minutes emergingthis time accompanied by aymond *abian (*abian). $ne of the officers saw *abian hando&er to Macalong a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, which hesuspected to be shabu.-he police officer then arrested *abian and Macalong and gesturedto the other police officers who assisted him in apprehending the suspects. -he officers thenreco&ered a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance from Macalong!s hand. -hesuspects were charged before the egional -rial ourt (-) for &iolation of theomprehensi&e angerous rugs 'ct.

:pon the merits, the - found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theoffenses charged. $n appeal, the ourt of 'ppeals (') affirmed the decision of the -. -he' found that the inconsistencies *abian and Macalong pointed out were plainly minor andrefer only to collateral matters, which do not touch on the commission of the crime itself ordetract from the positi&e identification of appellants as the culprits in the &iolation of theomprehensi&e angerous rugs 'ct. -he ' also rejected appellants! claim that all themembers of the arresting team should ha&e been presented before the court to testify onappellants! guilt. It held that the proposed testimony of the other members of the team isnot essential for appellants! con&iction as long as the principal witnesses for the State ha&ealready ade/uately testified on the material and essential matters of the charged deli&eryand possession of the prohibited drug. 5ence, this appeal.

ISS)E0

7hether or not *abian and Macalong are guilty for deli&ery and possession of shabu

which is a &iolation the pro&isions of epublic 'ct F1ED or the omprehensi&e angerous

rugs 'ct

-ELD0



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"etition DENIED.

-he ourt sustains the finding of the lower courts that the prosecution sufficientlyestablished appellants! guilt beyond reasonable doubt for &iolations of Sections D and 11 of'rticle II of ep. 'ct +o. F1ED. -he prosecution pro&ed that appellant *abian illegally

deli&ered a plastic sachet containing shabuto appellant Macalong, who knowingly possessedthe same. Moreo&er, the subject drugs were also pro&en to be positi&e formethamphetamine hydrochloride.

-he alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses refer totri&ial or minor matters, which do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution!se&idence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses! honesty. Moreo&er, the allegedinconsistencies on minor details pertain to peripheral matters and do not refer to the actuaoperation itself, that crucial moment when *abian was caught deli&ering shabu to Macalongwho knowingly possessed it. -hus, the ourt sustains the trial court in gi&ing credence tothe testimonies of the prosecution!s witnesses especially since the trial court was in a better

position to e&aluate the witnesses! deportment during the trial.

*urthermore, *abian and Macalong did not substantiate their defense of denial andframe@up. -hey did not present e&idence that the prosecution witnesses had moti&e tocharge them falsely. +either did appellants pro&e that the police officers did not performtheir duties regularly. 's the ourt of 'ppeals held, the defense of denial and frame@up, likealibi, can easily be concocted and is a common and standard ploy in most prosecutions for&iolations of ep. 'ct +o. F1ED.



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/EO/LE OF T-E /-ILI//INES v. ROM)LO GARCIAG.R. No. 1;;;

'he Court has ruled in a number of cases that the lack of lacerated wounds does notnegate se#ual intercourse. ( freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. !venthe fact that the hymen of the victim was still intact does not rule out the possibility ofrape. *esearch in medicine even points out that negative findings are of no significance, sincethe hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus. +n any case, for rape to be consummated,full penetration is not necessary.

''', then fi&e (D) years old, was playing outside their house in Mandaluyong itywhen omulo #arcia (#arcia) called her and brought her to his house, which was right netto '''!s house. #arcia brought ''' to the second floor and remo&ed her clothes. #arciathen inserted his penis into her &agina and after which, #arcia then told her to go home. '''then asked her grandmother %%% to gi&e her a bath but when %%% was about to wash thegenital area of ''', ''' refused. %%% noticed that ''' is co&ering her genital area and wastrembling. %%% became suspicious and asked ''' what happened. ''' said that it was

pierced by a stick. %%% looked at ''' genital and saw it was swollen. %%% brought ''' tothe house of her sister@in@law, , in Makati ity, to inform her of '''!s condition. '''re&ealed to that it was #arcia who abused her.

onse/uently, %%% reported the incident to the "+" Mandaluyong ity "olice Station''' was then eamined by a medico@legal officer. -he report was eplained by the officerand according to the officer the phrase Gto preclude complete penetration by an a&erage@si>ed adult *ilipino male organ in the report means that the hymen was not penetrated byan erect penis, but eplained that in rape cases, a normal finding will not dispro&e that therewas no seual intercourse or abuse.

-he defense, on the other hand, interposed the defense of alibi. #arcia and hiscommon@law@wife testified that #arcia was fiing the water pump whole day.

-he egional -rial ourt (-) found #arcia guilty of the crime of rape and imposeddeath penalty upon him. In &iew of the eath "enalty imposed by the trial court, the entirerecords of the case were forwarded to the Supreme ourt for automatic re&iew. -he ourtreferred the case to the ourt of 'ppeals (') for appropriate action and dispositionpursuant to the ourtLs pronouncement in eople v. ateo.-he ' reduced the penalty ofdeath imposed by the trial court to reclusion perpetuain &iew of the abolition of the eath"enalty. #arcia appealed to the Supreme ourt. 5ence, this petition

ISS)E0

7hether or not the crime of rape has been sufficiently pro&en

-ELD0

"etition DENIED.



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#arcia insists that the prosecution failed to pro&e his guilt beyond reasonable doubtfor the crime of rape. 5e contends that the trial court hastily disregarded his defense ofdenial, which was sufficient to absol&e him in light of the e&idence on record. 5eemphasi>es that the medico@legal officer testified that there were no signs of swelling on the&ictim!s &agina when she was eamined. #arcia further claims that the &ictim was coachedto make false accusations against him, considering that he was not in good terms with the&ictim!s grandmother. -he ourt finds #arcia!s contentions untenable.

In the present case, ''' categorically testified that appellant directly inserted hispenis into her &agina, causing her to feel pain. '''!s testimony specified the actscommitted by appellant when he &iolated her. %oth the - and the ' are in agreementthat ''' was categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, con&incing, clear and candid in hertestimony and a rape &ictim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous andfrank manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness.

In resol&ing rape cases, primordial consideration is gi&en to the credibility of the&ictim!s testimony. -he settled rule is that the trial court!s conclusions on the credibility of

witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times e&enfinality, unless there appear in the record certain facts or circumstances of weight and &aluewhich the lower court o&erlooked or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, wouldalter the result of the case. 5a&ing seen and heard the witnesses themsel&es and obser&edtheir beha&ior and manner of testifying, the trial court stood in a much better position todecide the /uestion of credibility. 5ere, the ourt note that no such facts or circumstances ofweight and substance ha&e been o&erlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted by the triaand appellate courts.

#arcia!s claim that the criminal complaint was filed against him because he was not ingood terms with '''!s grandmother deser&es scant consideration. -he ourt finds it

incredible for ''' and her grandmother to trump up charges of rape against appellant forthe simple reason that they did not ha&e a harmonious relationship. 7ell@settled is the rulethat testimonies of young &ictims of rape deser&e full credence and should not be so easilydismissed as a mere fabrication.

Moreo&er, it is highly improbable that %%% would allow her granddaughter to beeposed to the ridicule of a public trial, if the charges were not true. 7e note that ''' hasbeen in the custody of %%% since she was an infant, and who treated her as if she were herown daughter. It was thus &ery unlikely that she would sacrifice her own granddaughter, achild of tender years, and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of a public trial for rape, ifshe were not moti&ated by an honest desire to ha&e her daughter!s transgressor punishedaccordingly.



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-he ourt is likewise not persuaded by appellantLs contention that ''' was ne&erseually abused because the medico@legal findings showed that there were no signs ofswelling on the &ictim!s &agina when she was eamined.

-he ourt has ruled in a number of cases that the lack of lacerated wounds does notnegate seual intercourse. ' freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. 8&enthe fact that the hymen of the &ictim was still intact does not rule out the possibility ofrape. esearch in medicine e&en points out that negati&e findings are of no significance, sincethe hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus. In any case, for rape to be consummatedfull penetration is not necessary. "enile in&asion necessarily entails contact with the labia. Itsuffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum ofthe female organ. "enetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the &agina, e&en withoutrupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a con&iction for rape.



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/OL7TEC-NIC )NI"ERSIT7 OF T-E /-ILI//INES, NATIONAL DE"ELO/MENTCOM/AN7 v.GOLDEN -ORI>ON REALT7 COR/ORATION

G.R. No. 18?12, 8


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*irestone pursuant to Memorandum $rder +o. 31B &iolated the right of first refusal grantedto *irestone under its third lease contract with +.

-he - rendered its decision upholding the right of first refusal granted to #5under its lease contract with + and ordering ":" to recon&ey the said portion of theproperty in fa&or of #5. + and ":" separately appealed the decision to the ',howe&er the ' affirmed the decision of the -. %oth the - and the ' applied thisourt!s ruling in olytechnic University of the hilippines v. Court of (ppeals , consideringthat #5 is similarly situated as a lessee of + whose right of first refusal under the leasecontract was &iolated by the sale of the property to ":" without + ha&ing first offered tosell the same to #5 despite the latter!s re/uest for the renewal of the lease andHor topurchase the leased premises prior to the epiration of the second lease contract. -he 'further agreed with the -!s finding that there was an implied renewal of the lease uponthe failure of + to act on #5!s repeated re/uests for renewal of the lease contract, both&erbal and written, and continuing to accept monthly rental payments from #5 which wasallowed to continue in possession of the leased premises.

ISS)E0

7hether or not the ruling in olytechnic University of the hilippines v. Court of(ppealsapplies in this case in&ol&ing another lessee of + who claimed that the option topurchase the portion leased to it was similarly &iolated by the sale of the + ompound infa&or of ":" pursuant to Memorandum $rder +o. 31B.

-ELD*

"etition DENIED

"etitioner + in its memorandum, contended that the ' erred in applying the rulingin olytechnic University of the hilippines v. Court of (ppeals pointing out that the case oflessee *irestone eramics, Inc. is different from the case at bar, because the lease contracttherein had not yet epired while in this case respondent!s lease contracts ha&e alreadyepired and ne&er renewed. -he date of the epiration of the lease contract in said case isecember 41, 1F?F which is prior to the issuance of Memorandum $rder +o. 31B on JanuaryE, 1F?F. In contrast, respondent!s lease contracts had already epired (September 1F??) atthe time said memorandum order was issued.

Such contention does not hold water. 's already mentioned, the reckoning point of theoffer of sale to a third party was not the issuance of Memorandum $rder +o. 31B but thecommencement of such negotiations when respondent!s right of first refusal was stil

subsisting and the lease contracts still in force. "etitioner + did not bother to respond torespondent!s letter informing it of respondent!s eercise of the option to renew andre/uesting to discuss further the matter with +, nor to the subse/uent letter reiteratingthe re/uest for renewing the lease for another ten (1C) years and also the eercise of theoption to purchase under the lease contract.



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In fine, the ' was correct in declaring that there eists no justifiable reason not toapply the same rationale in olytechnic University of the hilippines v. Court of (ppealsinthe case of respondent who was similarly prejudiced by petitioner +!s sale of the propertyto ":". -o entitle the respondent to eercise its option to purchase until $ctober 1F??inasmuch as the May B, 1FA? contract embodied the option to renew the lease for anotherten (1C) years, upon mutual consent and gi&ing respondent the option to purchase theleased premises, for a price to be negotiated and determined at the time such option waseercised by respondent. It is then to be noted that Memorandum $rder +o. 31B itselfdeclared that the transfer is subject to such liensHleases eisting on the subject property.

RENE "ENTENILLA /)SE v. LIGA7A DELOS SANTOS/)SEG.R. No. 18?;8, 1 Mar5 2!1!, FIRST DI"ISION #"$%%ara&a, 'r.,J.'

(s a licensed professional teacher, one is re$uired to strictly adhere to, observe andpractice the set of ethical and moral principles, standards and values laid down in theaforesaid code.


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c. 7hether or not there is substantial e&idence to sustain the complaint and to holdpetitioner liable

-ELD0

"etition DENIED.

he ,urisdiction of the Board of Professional eachers over administrative cases

"etitioner argues that the proper forum to hear and decide the complaint was eitherthe i&il Ser&ice ommission (S) pursuant to S esolution +o. FF1F4E or theepartment of 8ducation (ep8d) pursuant to ep. 'ct +o. BEAC -he ourt does not agree.'n administrati&e case against a public school teacher may be filed before the %oard of"rofessional -eachers@", the ep8d or the S, which ha&e concurrent jurisdiction o&eradministrati&e cases such as for immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. 7hen thelaw bestows upon a go&ernment body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases in&ol&ing

specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is eclusi&e unless it be pro&edthat another body is likewise &ested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodiesha&e concurrent jurisdiction o&er the matter. -he authority to hear and decideadministrati&e cases by the %oard of "rofessional -eachers@", ep8d and the S comesfrom ep. 'ct +o. A?4E, ep. '

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