Viet Nam-An Electronic Proving Ground

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. My name is MelHotz, and I am Vice Chairman of the TechnicalProgram Committee. I would like to welcome you to thisspecial night session entitled, "Viet Nam-An ElectronicProving Ground." This night session is now well estab-lished as a traditional event at our Aerospace and Elec-

Panel ]Discussion tronics Systems Conference, having been started manyyears ago as part of the MIL-E-CON series. Here is anopportunity for conference attendees and our guests toparticipate together in a session which is of vital interest.Our Panel members have recently returned from assign-

Viet NVam~ An Electron- ments in Viet Nam, and for our Moderator, we havecalled upon an individual who has distinguished himself

ic Proving Ground in our industry, both here and abroad. He received hisbachelor's degree in physics and mathematics fromFriends University in 1930, and his master's degree in

A panel discussion held at the 1966 Aerospace and Electronics Systems physics in 1933 from the University of Michigan. HeConvention, October 4, 1966. Session Moderator: Trevor Clark, brings years of experience gained from responsible posi-Manager, Program Operations, Washington Defense and Space tions with RCA, IT&T, Le Laboratories in Paris, France,Center, Baltimore, Md. Figures mentioned in the text are unavailable Standard Electrica in Lisbon, Portugal, Federal Tele-

for publcation, communications Laboratories, and as Associate Directorof the Southwest Research Institute.

Presently he is manager of program operations for theAerospace Division of the Westinghouse Space and De-fense Center in Baltimore, Md.Our Moderator can count among his honors a U. S.

Navy Certificate of Commendation awarded in 1947, andthe OSRD Certificate of Merit awarded in 1948. In 1960,he was elected as Fellow in our Institute of Electricaland Electronic Engineers.

It is my pleasure at this time to turn the meeting overto our Moderator, Trevor Clark.

Mr. Clark: We are all occupied now with thoughts ofViet Nam. Most of us are concerned with the conception,the development, the fabrication and the delivery ofweapons which are being used by our Armed Servicesthere. Each of you, I am sure, has a question concerningthat equipment, its use, and the people, the environmentin which it is used. We want to give each one of you anopportunity to question the panel.

This session has been organized by Mel Hotz, and onbehalf of the United States Army by Colonel Nemethy,who is on my right. Tonight we have an all-Army panel.However, they will not voice the Army viewpoint, butwill speak from their own personal experience in VietNam, from experience recently gained.We will not name any companies. We will not speak

about any equipment by type numbers. Those are theonly rules that I can give you.

I would like now to introduce to you the panel mem-bers, and in spite of the fact that I received at least fourpages of biographical information on each member, I amgoing to give only a four-line introduction to each one ofthem. Each one is distinguished in his own right, and Iam only going to give those items which are pertinent tothe discussion this evening.Major General W. E. Lotz is currently assigned as

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AEROSPACE AND ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS VOL. AES-33 NO. 5 SEPTEMBER 1967 837

Chief of Communications and Electronics, Department 1100 miles from the northern to the southern border, andof the Army. In Viet Nam recently, the was Assistant as I remember it, that is about the distance between theChief of Staff, Communications/Electronics, U. S. Mili- Canadian and the Mexican border. The narrowest portiontary Assistance Command in Viet Nam. General Lotz. is about thirty miles wide from the sea to the border.

Colonel T. C. Mataxis is currently assigned to the Office In the next slide, I have attempted to show that portionof the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. In of the country which is now North Viet Nam, and whichViet Nam, he was the Senior Advisor to the Second Corps, is largely mountainous. It is quite densely populated, andArmy of the Republic of Viet Nam, and later was Deputy extremely difficult to find any landmarks. I am told thatCommander, 101st Airborne Brigade, U. S. Army. when you fly over it, you cannot tell what part of it you

Colonel Mataxis has been designated to the rank of are in unless you use your instrument system. It is veryBrigadier General. rugged terrain, and extremely difficult for navigation by

Colonel R. G. Jones is currently assigned to the Office, air or by land.Director of Defense, Research and Engineering, which The next slide shows the central portion. Now, whereasmost of us know affectionately as DDR&E. In Viet Nam, the northern portion is mountainous and quite dry, thishe commanded the 12th Aviation Group, U. S. Army. portion is both mountainous, and covered with lushWe are fortunate this evening to have two Colonels vegetation. The trees are sometimes 200 feet high, and

Jones with us. Colonel B. B. Jones is currently assigned to there are sometimes three different layers of vegetationthe Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Mi]itary Operations. between the earth and the sky. You can see the veryIn Viet Nam he was Senior Advisor to the 2nd Infantry narrow portion of the country, and if you look closelyDivision, Army of the Republic of Viet Nam. at the 17th parallel, which is just about where this white

Colonel Jones has also recently been designated to the box comes, you will be able to see a red line which showsrank of Brigadier General. the border between the two countries a very short bor-

Colonel J. G. Hines is currently assigned to the Office der there but because the countries around it are friendlyof the Chief of Research and Development, U. S. Army. to the Viet Cong, or at least passable to them, the borderIn Viet Nam he was Chief, Signal Branch, Military Assis- which must be protected if you are going to protect thetance Advisory Group, and later was J-6 on the MAAG country from invasion or infiltration is extremely long,staff. probably in the vicinity of 2000 miles, rather than the 1200

I might say also that Colonel Hines has had a consider- which represents the geographical distance.able part in the planning for this convention. The sea coast is in places flat, and in some places not

Colonel H. W. Rice is currently assigned to the Office, more than two kilometers are flat before you come to highAssistant Secretary of the Army for Installation and mountains which rise very steeply, and make it necessaryLogistics. In Viet Nam he was Chief of Staff, First to travel along the coast, most of the travel being byLogistical Command, U. S. Army, and prior to that was water, if possible.Senior Advisor to the Director of Communications, Army The next slide shows South Viet Nam, which is theof the Republic of Viet Nam. third environmental condition. This portion of the

Colonel Rice has also recently been designated to the country contains the Mekong Delta. It is covered withrank of Brigadier General. waterways, which are the principal means of transporta-

Lt. Colonel M. M. Moore is currently assigned to the tion. Thousands of miles of these are navigable to smallDefense Communications Agency. In Viet Nam he was boats, and many, many more thousands are navigableSignal Advisor to the 3rd Corps, Army of the Republic to even smaller boats. This is the area where most ofof Viet Nam. the rice is grown. When the monsoon comes, the riceNow, as you can see, we have been able to assemble paddies are covered with water, but in the dry season

here a group of officers, all of senior grade, all having they are extremely dry, and quite passable to man orrecent experience in Viet Nam, who will speak from even to vehicles.their own personal experience. The final slide shows a tracing which we made from

In preparation for this meeting this evening, never this previous map just to show the waterways. These arehaving visited in Asia, let alone in Viet Nam, never having only the principal waterways in South Viet Nam. Thathad the privilege of seeing the equipment that I have portion which is relatively flat, but almost impassable forworked on in actual combat there, I did a little bit of roads, is very passable for small water craft.research on Viet Nam itself. I recalled that when I went In order further to set the tone for this panel discussion,to France in 1938, I was rather astonished to find that the the Army has provided a very short movie which takesFrench were then engaged in a rather considerable con- you from these maps, which set the geographical settingflict in what was called French Indo-China. So tonight I from which we are going to talk, and you will see ratherwant to give you the benefit of a little homework that I typical terrain in the South Viet Nam country.did in trying to localize our thoughts on that country, First there is a short sequence depicting the deltaViet Nam, where the conflict is going on at the moment. region, which is southwest of Saigon. The next sequenceThe next slide, I believe, is a closer view of Viet Nam shifts to the central part of the country, and it shows con-

itself. This shows the entire country. It is approximately ditions existing in a typical rubber plantation area north

838 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AEROSPACE AND ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS SEPTsEMBER 1967

of Saigon. Then finally we will show you some scenes from forces are entrenched in one of the big rubber plantationsthe mountainous regions close to the center of the to the west. The mission of the unit is to land by heli-country. Of course, this is not a comprehensive coverage copter and rid the plantation of the possible force. Airof the entire country, but as you watch it, we hope you observation of rubber plantations is difficult, so the Vietget a feel for the wide variety of environments in which Cong use these areas as assembly points for men andour Armed Forces and the equipment we build are forced supplies.to operate. This is the first time that these sequences have However, by the time friendly informants point outbeen shown publicly. May we have the film, please? enemy hiding places, the guerillas have already fled. The

plantations are honeycombed with dugouts and tunnels(Showing offilm) that are the prime target of our search and destroy mis-

Narrator: The environment of Viet Nam is not sions. The maze of underground passageways is scoured,homogeneous. The terrain varies from alluvial plain to but only a few items like this propaganda brochure areplateaus and jungle covered mountains. The climate discovered.ranges from tropical hot and dry to tropical hot and hu- The central highlands area of Viet Nam varies in ele-mid, depending on the season and the geographical area. vation from 600 to 1600 feet, with a few peaks risingThe Mekong River Delta is a broad, low-lying plain much higher. The area is covered with bamboo and

cut by innumerable rice paddies and wide meandering tropical forests. In the jungle, a human on foot usuallyrivers. The Delta is traffickable for Army personnel moves at a very slow rate, while the rolling open area iscarriers and tanks in many areas during the dry season. suitable for the rapid movement of armored warfare.The monsoon rains, however, turn the Delta into a morasssutal onyfrfo oeetadtakdapiiu Ladies and gentlemen, the rest of this meeting is yours.suitableo fri Bowlmofient Nam,pacicionso I have a number of questions which have already been

vehicles. As the handed in, and I would like to begin always with thethis area is vital to government plans to defeat the Viet senior panel member, so I have a question which is

Included witinth Dltaara retwoditictve addressed to General Lotz: General Lotz, are communi-Included within the Delta area are two distinctive caio reureet in th inugec eniometdfgeographical features, the Plain of Reeds and the Man- cation frem entsin the isrg entgrove Swamps. The Plain of Reeds, extending from theMekong River in the west to Long An province in the General Lotz: Thank you very much, Trevor. I thoughteast, lies between the Cambodian border and the rich until the question was asked that I was at a meeting ofrice land to the south. This apparent wasteland of aquatic the National Geographic Society.grasses and marsh lands provides innumerable routes by I might say in anticipation of such a question that Iwhich the Viet Cong can infiltrate men and supplies to was warned that I would probably get an introductorysupport operations in the Delta. question to lay the framework for discussion this evening.The mangrove swamps of the special zone appear deso- I have a few notes, and as a surprise for our Moderator,

late and deserted from the air. This is an active opera- I also have a film which has never before been shown intional area, however, for at least two Viet Cong battal- public. But it addresses the subject of communications inions, which maintain in addition to their own facilities, Viet Nam.transient camps, rest areas, and hospitals supporting Viet Before showing this film, however, I would like toCong units in adjacent areas. They also operate a special characterize some of the highlights which confront aforce with the mission of attacking and sinking shipping systems designer of a communications system in Viet Nam,in the channel connecting Saigon with the South China because I think it might be of interest to you some ofSea, in an attempt to close the approach to this vital port. these characteristics which we have to accomplish in ourThe rain-forest-covered plains and mountains of Viet operations there.

Nam provide sites in which the Viet Cong can establish First of all, I hardly need remind the group that istheir strongholds, build their schools and training centers, here this evening that World War II and Korea weretrain and indoctrinate their troops, and operate hospitals fought a decade or two ago, and that in the interveningand rest areas. Concealed by the foliage and far from period, the state-of-the-art in electronics has gone for-clearings where helicopters may land troops, and difficult ward by leaps and bounds. As a matter of fact, Worldto detect from the air, these base areas present formidable War II is what we would refer to as the Stone Age in ourchallenges to successful ground operations. business. But with the introduction of faster, more reli-The so-called Iron Triangle just north of Saigon, like able communications to the American public, we also

so much of Viet Nam, enjoys a warm climate and heavy have a change in the methods of management occurringrainfall favoring the rapid growth of vegetation, most of among all branches of American industry and effort. We,which is rice cultivation, two crops a year. It is also the too, in the military, have adapted ourselves to computers,location of the big rubber plantations. to high-speed data transmission, to more frequent tele-Members of the 101st Airborne Division are briefed at phone contact between individuals of different echelons.

the command post outside the city of Ben Cat in the Iron Therefore, our own management techniques require thatTriangle area. Word has been received that Viet Cong we provide standards of communication service to the

PANEL: VIET NAM-AN ELECTRONIC PROVING GROUND 839

military which approach those which are used by business, provide an interface between the highly automated sys-commerce, and industry in the United States. tems of data, record traffic, and voice communications

This means that we have to handle increased volumes that exist in this country to those that we have in South-of traffic. We have to be assured of more reliable service. east Asia. We must be able to cope with the increasedWe have to have higher speed service, and we must be volume, the decreased handling time, and we must pro-able to cope with much more complex types of data. vide an extraordinary degree of quality. This certainlyNow, the rather special considerations which are more imposes a great challenge. Very fortunately, the state-of-

or less peculiar to the war in Viet Nam I should high- the-art is such that we can respond to it.light. Back in World War II, ground battles were fought In the long-lines area, there is a difference betweenon front lines. Communications from the combat area previous wars. In all prior wars, headquarters, bases, andradiated rearward to headquarters, bases and depots depots behind front lines moved as the front lines moved.along well-defined axes of communication. Now, in Viet In Viet Nam, because we are dealing with an area prob-Nam we are confronted with a different situation. Here lem, we have the bases, headquarters, and depots inwe are fighting an area-type war. Combat on either a small relatively fixed locations, and although we do not haveor a large scale can break out at any time at any place the problem of constantly providing them with com-in Viet Nam, in a hamlet, along a roadway, in a village. munications in new locations, the other problems make

In order that the military commander can know of this the problem of long lines about as serious or worse thanengagement, and in order that he can react to it, we must it ever has been before.literally have a communication system which blankets the For example, in all previous wars, our long-lines sys-country. According to our old standards, military govern- tems have traversed secure areas, but in Viet Nam we doment was something we got into after the ground battle not hold the intervening terrain between the enclaves,was over, and it was a follow-on to military operations. the bases, the depots, and the headquarters. Therefore,Later civilian government was reinstituted. This is not we cannot use aerial or buried cables. We cannot usetrue in Viet Nam. In the counter-insurgency environ- open wire lines. We cannot use line-of-sight equipmentment, the economic, political, and social development of unless we are prepared to seize and to hold critical piecesthe indigenous people goes hand-in-glove with military of terrain necessary for bringing effective use of line-of-operations. This means that communications circuits must sight equipment.be provided for this purpose simultaneously with provid- In the film that I will show in a few minutes, there ising communications service to the military forces. an illustration of one of these sites.

In our previous experience, Korea and World War II, As a consequence, we have been forced to use muchthere were some indigenous communications systems, more sophisticated gear, specifically, tropospheric scatterparticularly long-haul systems, which could be made avail- equipment. The film will illustrate the type of installationable to military forces. I am sure that most of you are that we are using for our relatively fixed troposphereaware that in France, the underground cable system of scatter effort.the French PTT was resurrected, restored, and was used Now a few comments about tactical communications.extensively for long-haul communications. In Korea, we These are the communications that are installed by tac-had the Japanese-installed Mukden cable, which extended tical operating combat elements within their own re-originally through the length of Korea. In Viet Nam, sources. Ground units used to fight shoulder to shoulder.however, what long-haul communication facilities existed, Engagements involved divisions, corps, and armies oper-consisting of primarily open wire and some cables, had ating usually in a relatively restricted area. In Viet Nambeen destroyed by the VC, so we have no recourse to now we find that we have companies, battalions, andindigenous communications. brigades operating in isolated engagements, the sum totalAs a result of this, the U. S. military forces in Viet Nam of which are widely dispersed over the area of Viet Nam.

must provide communications not only for the U. S. This certainly imposes a severe requirement on the typesforce elements, the Army, Navy, the Air Force, the of communications systems.Marines, and the Coast Guard, but also long-haul com- Ground units used to move on foot or by truck. Todaymunications for our allies. In addition, they must provide they move by fixed-wing aircraft and by helicopter. Incommunications for the State Department and its various order that the commander can control this operation, itagencies that are involved in the nonmilitary aspects of has been necessary to install command control centersthe war, and we must provide circuits for the government in aircraft, and the film will illustrate two of these.of Viet Nam to function effectively in its role. Of course, aircraft and naval vessels move faster thanNow, I think in approaching the subject of communica- they did in prior wars, and this means better and more

tions in Viet Nam, it is very convenient to divide it into rapid communications means.three areas. We might consider one to be the trans- I mightcommentthatmuch attention has been paid inPacific communications linking Southeast Asia to the connection with the Viet Nam war to the problems ofUnited States. We can consider long lines as another jungles, mountainous terrain, and to the tropical en-category, and tactical communications as a third. vironment. I need not remind you that we encountered

If we look at the trans-Pacific system, we must today all of these difficulties during World War II. As a gen-

840 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AEROSPACE AND ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS SEPTEMBER 1967

eralization, I would like to say that our equipment is far is nothing makeshift about this command post.better to respond to these extremes of environmental Each seat has its own radio control panel and its ownconditions than it ever has been before. However, these headset. The intercom system is complete. As few as twounusual environmental conditions do complicate our or all of the positions, if need be, can be in on the sameproblem because of the reliability, the quantity, and the conversation. And with nine separate radios, any andrequired speed of service that the communications system all of the positions can communicate with airborne ormust achieve. ground troops at the same time, if they have to.Without further ado, then, I would like to ask if I With this fiying command post, the First Cavalry's

could have that film on communications. commanding general has direct contact with his troops,whether airborne or on the ground, at any strategic loca-

(Showing offilm) tion and at any time he desires.Narrator: Construction of the United States Army These are the helipads at An-Kei. Here at the Camp

worldwide communications facilities continues to move Radcliffe Headquarters of the First Cavalry Division,forward in May and June in Southeast Asia. On the north- Air Mobile, the problem of excessive weight in airborneeast coast, at Da-Nang, Vietnamese women dig founda- command communications equipment is being solved.tion trenches for the integrated wideband communication These technicians are preparing to check out a recentlysystem installation. This system, which primarily uses developed lightweight system installed in this helicopter.tropospheric scatter for radio-wave propagation, pro- The newly designed communications system weighs onlyvides consistent signals over long distances. 150 pounds as opposed to the previously used 600 pounds

Philippine workers are also employed on the job, here of equipment. In addition, this lightweight unit providesseen connecting power cables to a power generator van, the airborne CP with two different radio frequencies, andand aligning a reflector disc. a multiple outlet intercom.

Farther south at Nha-Cong is another IWCS site, and Known as ANARC122, the system is composed of twosimilar locations are surveyed accurately to aim the AMVRC46 radio receiver-transmitters and the intercomgiant dishes toward other relay stations along the route. channels. Three whip antennas mounted beneath theTons of steel I beams are unloaded for use in the con- helicopter fuselage give the command radio system a

struction. Wooden forms are erected for foundations of range of 24 to 32 kilometers. In actual use on a combatmicrowave antenna. mission, this compact communications unit is operated

Pleiku is another link in the communications network. by the commander's F-3 officer, and by the artillery fireSteel rods are assembled in sections to be used in rein- support officer. The commander gives his orders to the

forcing the concrete structures. Here is a portion of the other officers and the helicopter pilot via the intercom.concrete base for a 120-foot antenna. A guard tower is Upon receiving the orders of the commander, the F-3being built for use in providing security for the installa- relays the message to ground commander, using one oftion. the two available channels. Simultaneously the artilleryAt the site of Phu-Lam, fuel tanks are being readied officer can be in contact with the FDC on the other chan-

for operation. These large tanks will hold the fuel neces- nel if desired-an extremely flexible command post in thesary to operate the generators which will supply electric sky.power to the systems. Camp Radcliffe drops away in the distance and theAt Bong-Cau, where considerable progress has already airborne CP heads for the central highlands.

been made, large quantities of steel await assembly at the Another search and destroy mission is about to begin.communications site. This excavation is for the emplace- High above the area where the assault groups will estab-ment of an MRC-85 signal lamp. When these facilities lish a landing zone, the commander and his F-3 evaluateare completed United States military forces will be assured the terrain features below. Map coordinates are studied.of dependable communications in the area. In a low-level examination of the surrounding country-The First Air Cavalry Division has a new flying com- side, a suspected Viet Cong village is located. It is de-

mand post, a specially equipped CV2 Caribou based at cided to call up an artillery fire support mission in theCamp Holloway, Pleiku. The Caribou has nine seats, immediate vicinity of the landing zone.each with its own radio. Before every tactical operation, On the ground at the FDC, the information is receiveda radio cryptoteletype operator checks out the radios and through a PRC25 radio telephone. The mission is plottedthe intercoms. This control panel belongs to the intercom using the data received from the airborne CP. A phonesystem. call is then made to the battery commander, and he isThe radio console panel is up to date in every respect. given complete firing data. The M102 howitzers are made

The electronic equipment on board includes this UHF ready for the mission.radio transmitter-receiver set, six FM radios, of which Then the lightweight air transportable field artillerythis is one, and a high-frequency receiver-transmitter set. goes into action.The aircraft has seven whip antennas mounted on top, Aboard the flying CP the commander observes thewith two conventional antennas down below. In the cabin, shelling of the wooded cover adjacent to the landing zone.sliding map panels are among the many facilities. There By this time, the assault helicopters are arriving at the


objective. As the first wave of choppers reaches the LZ, I have a question for Colonel Mataxis; this again is atroopers of the First Air Cavalry Division leap to the general question: What are some of the problems thatground and begin moving toward the cover of the nearby arise during ground operations in Viet Nam, and how dowood line. you solve them? A very general question. I don't knowThe unit commander receives intelligence from the whether you have a movie prepared on that one or not.

airborne CP regarding the unmapped village ahead andthe possible location of the enemy. A mortar crew sets Colonel Mataxis: Unfortunately, I have no movie, butup its weapon and prepares to shell the thick cover on I will try.the perimeter of their position. The information they have First, this question is like asking how the elections arereceived from the commander flying overhead is checked going throughout the States. I think you have to ask howagainst their maps. Then firing commences. they are going in New York, California, and several other

In the air, the artillery officer confers with the com- places, perhaps even Georgia or Montgomery County outmander. The troops advancing towards the village en- here.counter dense undergrowth, and progress is slowed as I would like to address myself to the problem of com-they push through clinging weeds and brush. All sense of munications in Viet Nam. This covered quite a perioddirection can be lost in heavy vegetation. A halt is called while I was there. Initially we were in Phase I. It is for-while this platoon gets reoriented. A check is made with tunate we are covering this evening "An Electronic Prov-the airborne command post to make sure the unit is moving Ground-Viet Nam." I think initially, while we wereing in the right direction. out there as advisors in 1964 and the early part of 1965,The airborne commander, observing the location of we were faced with problems that we will face in many

the troops, gives corrective instructions. With compass other parts of the world where we do go in initially asand maps, the platoon moves ahead, reaching the village advisors in an area where the communist insurgency isshortly thereafter. starting.

Tunnels, ever present in the villages of Viet Nam, are At that time we had a few people. We were using stan-located and searched for hidden enemy personnel. While dard American equipment, operating over a very largethe tunnel runner is below ground, security is provided area. We were fighting mainly against guerillas. Againstby posted guards. This complex of underground passages guerillas, it was a case of locating the small units, squads,proves to be empty. and so forth, that they had, and moving in with a largerWith the desertedvillage behind them, the flying cavalry- size Vietnamese force.

men move to the LZ and signal for pickup. The search This changed very radically when the North Vietnameseand destroy mission is completed, and soon the choppers moved their 325th Division into the central highlandsarrive to take the men out. Now satisfied that there are area. If you remember the pictures this is the area in theno Viet Cong in the area, the airborne commander also central part of Viet Nam it is a two-corps area whichreturns to An-Kei. The modern communications system, covers about 45 percent of Viet Nam, and has about 2.5ANARC122 has done its job well. million people in it. There are very dense jungles in the

This radio relay station atop a mountain peak in Viet highlands. As was mentioned, there are three layers ofNam bears the name of the special forces team which canopy, very difficult to travel through, very difficult tolanded here by helicopter in 1964 and built the facility. communicate from.The relay station in Tay-Ninh province has been im- The North Vietnamese moved in an entire division,proved and expanded to keep pace with the increasing consisting of three regiments, and launched a series ofU. S. commitment. Facilities for relaying radio signals attacks which practically overwhelmed the Vietnamese de-are essential to military operations in this hilly region. fenders in the area. At this time the picture completely

Seventeen Americans operate the station, including changed. We were dispersed and forced to get reserves inmembers of a First Infantry Division signal company. The from Saigon.mountain-top team provides radio communications sup- Now, as has been mentioned by General Lotz, ourport to the Third Corps area. communications at this time were geared to the conven-A small Special Forces unit is responsible for supervis- tional type warfare that we had, lines of communication,

inmg the installation's security. A perimeter of sandbags static positions, defended command posts, and so forth.and 81-millimeter mortars protect the station. We were forced into operating in the jungles frequentlyDependents of a company of Vietnamese guards are a hundred miles away from the base camp.

housed in the area. Guards are supervised by two Ameri- I would like you to visualize these forests. They are socan advisors. thick (frequently with canopies 200 feet high), that we

All supplies except water must be brought in by heli- would have an infantry company of 200 men on thecopter, as the mountain top is completely isolated. ground trying to signal to a helicopter overhead by radio.

They would even throw smoke grenades on the ground,Mr. Clark: Thank you, General Lotz. I did not expect and we could not find them under the canopy unless we

that my very innocent question would lead to such a corn- would hover over there for some time. As an expedient,plete answer. soldiers would climb up the trees, cut bamboo poles,


and put their smoke grenades up. So this is very difficult. come from someone who also might have been in VietIt frequently takes an hour to an hour and a half to cover Nam, or at least is acquainted with the structure of the100 meters or 100 yards on the ground. services: Colonel Rice, what is the logistic, maintenance,Now, our problem is to communicate from our central and supply structure in Viet Nam since the tech services

command post out to the man on the ground. I think have been eliminated as such?General Lotz will agree with me that communicating Colonel Rice: Trevor, we have not gotten away fromfrom the States to Saigon, and Saigon to the corps head- ChloeRices Trevor, eve not in away have

quarters is a problem, but when you finally get out to the tech services as such, even though in name they havethe field, and you have that infantry company on the been eliminated. As you know, strategic warfare isg nthefiel,aa radio ttryi com pany onthe directed through the Joint Chiefs of Staff through theground with trying to communicate five times

Joint Command under General Westmoreland but sup-the range of the radio, this is truly difficult. Joit Commanuner Nal Wsmorlnd, but supSo this is one of our major problems, the problem of port of the forces in Viet Nam-the Army, Navy and Air

low-level communications. The way we solved it in Viet Force-is provided unilaterally through each service.Nam basically is by just using common sense. We were Thus the U. S. Army Viet Nam supports the U. S. Armyforced frequently into seizing certain key mountains or logistically and maintenance-wise in Viet Nam.high ground, as was shown in the picture, in the Third Now, und;er the U. S. Army Viet Nam, the mainCorps area. We seized these areas and put our radio logistical unit is the First Logistical Command. I wasstations up on them, preparing for operations in that privileged to be in that command through most of itsarea. Once we established our radio station we would first year of operation It is a command of roughlythen move forward and put our troops into the areas 30000 enlisted men and officers, and about 6000 civilians,where we could communicate with them. and some contract civilians and local personnel. ThisNow, as was shown with the First Cavalry, when they command handles a major portion of the requisitioning,

moved in this was the fall of 1965 they had very supply management, maintenance, and distribution with-modern communications, and the American units were in the country.doing well with them. However, realize that we are not Organizationally the first logistic command is dividedoperating in a sort of war game where we figure out into three enclaves. As was brought out here, Viet Namwhat the problems are and solve them. The guy on the is some 600 miles long with no local roads nor other sig-other side, the North Vietnamese and the VC guerilla, is nificant means of communication. As such, it is somewhatalso a thinking person and pretty clever. So he knows like three islands. If you consider it as three separatewhere it is difficult for us to operate. So what will he islands, I think you can understand the flow of suppliesdo? He will move back in the jungles where helicopters within Viet Nam. There is one base in Saigon, the majorcannot land. He will move back into areas where it is headquarters, another base in Cameron Bay, another onedifficult to communicate and get to. So we were forced north in Qui Nonh. It is through the U. S. Army Vietto go on the ground and cut our way through the jungle Nam's 1st Log Command and its enclave bases that thewith machetes, just operating man against man on the supplies flow.ground. Within each of the enclave bases or support commands,At times, we would be forced further where we could as they are called, we have now what are known as the

not establish radio communications. Then we were forced direct support units. This is a so-called costar, or com-into using helicopters. We were forced into using light bined unit of supply and maintenance, made up ofaircraft with only a company radio tied in to communi- maintenance and supply people, from all former sevencate with the man on the ground. But this is a case of tech services, but it is now a composite organization andusing common sense by the American soldier, his NCO's this is the unit through which your supply and mainte-and his officers; taking the equipment that was given to nance is handled.us, and using it to maintain our own communications. Mr. Clark: Thank you, Colonel Rice.We had a lot of problems in Viet Nam. As I say, one I am going to double up on questions to Colonel Jones.

of our major ones is this problem of maintaining com- They doubled up on Colonels Jones for me, so I am goingmunications. If you do not have communications, you to double up on questions to them.cannot let your command post know when you need your First, for Colonel Guy Jones: How do you discern fromfood, when you need more radio batteries, when you need the air a jungle path through which troops and materielyour fire support, air strikes, artillery, and so forth. As of the enemy are moving?you could see with the First Cavalry in the picture, we arecoming up with new developments in that area. But in Colonel R. Jones: That is a loaded question, Trevor.the meantime, our people are doing the best they can and This has caused a lot of people a lot of thinking for ausing common sense on this. It has been working out long period of time. You read the newspapers and I do,

pretty well. too, and you know the problems that we have had withthe so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail, which runs through

Mr. Clark: Thank you, Colonel Mataxis. this very rough covered country. We have lots of peopleI have a question for Colonel Rice, and this appears to in the air over Viet Nam, as you can see from the pictures


in the newsreels, and most of what they are doing is This was much worse in the past than it is now, be-looking for other people on the ground. If you have got cause as we develop our facilities, we put down some kindlayers of canopies, all you can hope for is that the layers of a hard surface, or membrane or other type of dustof canopies run out somewhere, and you can get some palliative, which does a great deal to keep the sand prob-idea of what is going on underneath. lem under some degree of control. But even in the states,

I cannot give you a much better idea than that with- even at Fort Bragg, which is certainly a very sandy placeout getting far past what I am afraid I should talk about all by itself (if any of you have had the pleasure of beingright here. out on some of those drop zones), you know that we

have the sand problem too. Whatever we can do to keepMr. Clark: Thank you. Now, before I ask this next the sand, not only from getting into our communications,

question of Colonel Bruce Jones, I want to refer back to but of course into our turbine engines, into everythingsome notes that I made and did not give you when I was that moves or every place where we have friction, istalking about the slides. certainly a very worthwhile objective.The area of Viet Nam is 127 000 square miles. Some I think we are getting on top of it. As I say, there is

people have compared that to the area of Maryland, a great deal done to keep the sand down, but we will neverDelaware, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, I believe. About really lick it until we get our equipment as nearly sand65 000 square miles of this is in South Viet Nam, and proof as we possibly can.about 62 000 in North Viet Nam. The population ofViet Nam total is about 31.5 million people, and as near Mr. Clark: Thank you. Now, again for Colonel Bruceas can be estimated, about 15.7 million of those are in Jones: How do you determine that an uncharted villageSouth Viet Nam, and about 16.2 million in North Viet is friend or fore?Nam.

I found out one very interesting thing. The Vietnamese Colonel B. Jones: I think that question is pretty diffi-submitted to a French protectorate in 1884, and this cult. It has been worked over in the U. S. newspaperslasted until 1954, or about 70 years, if my mathematics quite a bit. However, obviously it becomes very clearis right, and during most of that time I suspect that there that the village is friend or foe when you receive fire fromwas fighting of one kind or another going on, with the it. That makes it pretty simple.exception of the time between 1945 and 1954, when the In the area that I was in, I was advisor for a divisioncountry was occupied by the Japanese. In 1954, the that had two provinces. With the structure there, we hadFrench protectorate ended with a very costly defeat to a division commander, who was a Vietnamese general,the French. who I worked with. Then we had, of course, on the civilNow, thinking about these 15.7 million South Viet- side, two province chiefs, or what you might roughly

namese, Colonel Bruce Jones: What sort of communica- equate with governors. In our particular case, we nevertions systems and equipment are used by the Republic of struck a village, so far as I can determine, by air or byViet Nam forces? artillery, unless that village first of all, of course, if we

got fire from it, that is a different situation-but we neverColonel B. Jones: Well, Trevor, as you certainly know, struck that village unless the Vietnamese command ap-

practically all the equipment that the ARVaaN, the proved striking that village. In other words, a request forpopular forces and the regional forces have has been fire would come in, or, we will say, an Air Force typefurnished by the United States. So of course, their thought that he saw something in a village. We had theweapons, and in particular their communications are U. S. communications back to our tactical operations center,equipment. and before a village was struck, this approval was re-

I think I would describe their communications equip- ceived from the Vietnamese.ment as the post-World War II communications equip- Therefore, they know what they control, and then ifment that we found in the U. S. Army division prior to they do not control the village, and they have informa-this most recent family of communications equipment; tion, sometimes better information than we do, if theyin other words, the PRC6, PRC10, ANGRC9, that type approved it it would be struck. But how do you determineof equipment. yourself on the ground? It is very difficult to determine

whether it is friend or foe when you are walking up to it.Mr. Clark: Thank you. Now, switching back to If you receive fire from it, that is pretty obvious. But I

Colonel Guy Jones again, here is a question which relates have no experience with U. S. units per se, just exactlyto aircraft and its equipment, and also to the environ- how they did it, but this is the way we did it in the areamental conditions. Colonel Guy Jones: How degrading where the Vietnamese were operating, and of course mostis the sand on or to aircraft electronic equipment? of the support was U. S. support.

Colonel R. Jones: This is a major problem area, Mr. Clark: Colonel Guy Jones wanted tocomment onwithout any doubt. Not only do we have the problem of that question also.the sand that exists in nature, but when you have as manyhelicopters flying around as we have, this of course Colonel R. Jones: Yes. This illustrates something thatmultiplies the problem by a large factor. deserves re-emphasis. In the first place, it describes the

844 IEEI3 TRANSACTIONS ON AEROSPACE AND ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS SEPTEMBER 1967

kind of mental orientation which is so difficult for people There are very few exceptions to that rule of good reputa-when it comes to an understanding of the situation in tion. I know of only one exception.Viet Nam. The principle of shooting first and asking Based on comments that I have heard, reports that Iquestions later is pretty well imbedded in most of our have read, and equipment I have seen, I believe that theminds when we talk about a regular type of war, but over answer to the question is "yes," that field commands arehere this will not go. It just will not do. You have got to satisfied with the response by industry.let the guy with the black hat make the first hostile move,because he does not always have his black hat on. That Mr. Clark: The second question I would like to haveis the real problem. So the image of the tiger which we you answer at this time is: Are there any unusual en-in the military have long used to describe, let us say, a vironmental conditions in Viet Nam that are not ade-hot pilot or somebody whom we thought was the ideal quately simulated in the laboratory, and are there spe-soldier is not really so good when you think about it. A cific conditions that ought to be stressed?better image is that of the frontier marshal, who lets the Colonel Hines: Well, one usually associates with thatbad guy draw first and then cleanly drills him with a part of the world the problem of heat and humidity, andlittle hole right between the eyes in a very professional dust. These are not conditions that we have not encoun-manner. I think this is what we have got to understand tered before. We encountered them in World War II inwhen you talk about the problem of-I will not use the the Pacific. At that time we learned a great deal about howword "war"-the fighting in Viet Nam. Thank you very to design equipment for these rough environmental con-much. ditions, and I might say we are still learning.

Mr. Clark: Thank you. I have a question for Colonel Regarding any unusual conditions that can not beMoore. This concerns also the Vietnamese people and simulated, we can simulate in our laboratory conditionstheir reaction: How successful has off-the-shelf radio that are more severe than you will find in Viet Nam. Theequipment, that is, the hamlet radio, been in Viet Nam? laboratory, by the way, includes the actual environ-

mental conditions outside of a building. We can run theLt. Colonel Moore: One of the things that General whole gamut of environmental conditions from the Viet

Lotz pointed out was that there were no or very little Nam kind of tropics to desert, to arctic conditions with-indigenous communications in Viet Nam. We did not out ever leaving the United States. This is the fifty Unitedhave a commercial communications system to rely on, States.nor did the Vietnamese. The hamlet radio filled the bill As far as the conditions that should be stressed, it isand filled the void in this area, and provided communica- pretty obvious that, for places like Viet Nam, we are goingtions from the county equivalent back through the to have to look at dampness, humidity, and dust, andequivalent of the state to the corps headquarters. I think design our equipment to make sure that these are takenit did it remarkably well. This is observed in the briefings care of. There is something else that these other gentlementhat take place within the Vietnamese commands. You on the Panel have mentioned as an environmental condi-could attend a briefing at eight o'clock in the morning and tion that we must design for, and that is the terrain or thebe filled in completely on the activities during the night geography. I think we must, and equipment designersin areas where there were no Americans, areas far away must, remember that in getting equipment from onefrom the corps headquarters. This was made possible to place to the other, there is often the problem of carryinga great extent through the off-the-shelf items that were it on the back. In this there is a weight problem in theprovided. equipment itself, and in the power supply. We want to

make sure that the man who is carrying the equipmentMr. Clark: Thank you, Colonel Moore. has as light a pack as possible, and that the batteries heI have a large number of questions for you, Colonel has to carry to keep the equipment operating are as small

Hines. Apparently a large portion of our audience is and as light as possible.engaged in resesrch and development for the military Based on a need that I am sure you recognize, we alsoelectronic equipment. I am going to ask you to take only want to make sure that shelters for equipment, whichtwo of them at this time, and if we have time, we will cannot be taken down the road and must be airlifted,get into some of the others. The first one is: Are field are as small as possible. Sometimes shelters have to becommands satisfied with the response by industry for the air conditioned, and the power for this must be provided,generation of new equipment to fulfill specific require- to keep equipment operating on a 24-hour basis withoutments? burning up or suffocating the operator.

I think these are the environmental conditions that weColonel Hines: I would say that the answer to the must stress, that is, the heat, dampness, dust, and the

question is basically "yes." We have had to ask ndustry weight problem.for a number of off-the-shelf or quick-fix items. Industryresponse has been very good. We have gotten some highly Mr. Clark: Thank you, Jack.useful, very fine-quality equipment in this fashion. Some I have a two-part question for General Lotz, and I amof this equipment has gotten a very good reputation. By almost hesitant in asking this one, but I am going to dothat I mean it has shown up well in operations and tests. it anyway. First: How useful has anti-personnel manned


portable radar proven in field use? Second: What im- around that. They try to find a position deep in the woodsprovements would be recommended for this equipment? where we cannot land our helicopters, conceal themselves,

and from these concealed positions they are then able toGeneral Lotz: Trevor, we crossed you up again. Jack use their radio equipment to pass their commands back

and I traded cards here a few minutes ago. He got a card and forth.he thought was more appropriate for me to answer, and In addition, they use telephones a lot, the way we did inI accepted that. In return, I gave him that card with that World War II. We have run many operations where wequestion on it. have gone in and overrun an entire Vietnamese VC bat-

talion position. For example, down on the coast in centralMr. Clark: Seniority's privilege. Viet Nam at Tuy-Hoa last March, the 101st AirborneColonel Hines: It was a fair trade, I think. overran a battalion CP. We found switchboards, tele-Anti-personnel manned portable radar, to give you a phones, and other material, very similar to the equip-

simple answer, is very useful. We have such a radar. It is ment that I had in my battalion in World War II. It isquite old. We are in the final stages of providing an im- rather old equipment, but they understand the limitations,proved radar, and to answer the second part of your and they do their best to model their tactics on the limita-

question, I have jotted down some things that I think tions of their equipment.this radar improvement should have, not only in the Mr. Clark: Thank you, Ted.upcoming next generation, but also in any follow-on radar. All right, General Lotz, brace yourself: I have heard

There is a real dilemma: How do you improve range that some months ago the Army on the ground was un-while keeping the weight at a minimum? I mention this able to communicate with Air Force planes sent for tacti-because I get back to my previous statement about the cal support, wrong frequencies, modulation, and so forth.weight problem. If you are going to carry a radar on your Has this been corrected? How? I do not know whetherback, you are going to run into an equipment problem. that last is an Indian expression or not.You are also going to run into a power supply problem General Lotz: First of all, my experience in Viet Namagain. Gen e d it of all, my knowledge

I think another very important feature that must be only commenced a little over a year ago, so my knowledgebuilt into any new equipment, and this is based on our of these details cannot be comprehensive. I know duringexperience with the present equipment, is reliability. We my time in Viet Nam of no such difficulty. It might havemust have good reliability. When the operator is out existed.looking down a trail or up in a watch tower or wherever Now, in this connection, it is standard practice forhe happens to be, he wants to be sure that when he flips a Air Force special air support aircraft to be equipped withswitch what happens is exactly what is supposed to hap- the same complement of radio sets that appear in Armypen. Reliability is also a very important feature. aircraft, which are capable of entering the communica-

tion system of the ground personnel. There may haveMr. Clark: Thank you. I have some more for you, been cases where due to management of the frequency

General, but I am going to let you off the hook for a assignments, there may have been a difficulty in communi-minute. cations. I do not know of this problem. It is customary

Colonel Mataxis, do the VC-that probably means that the support aircraft enter the net of the ground unitViet Cong do the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese being supported; since these are on different frequencies,have efficient communications equipment? What man- sometimes there is difficulty in being sure that the pilotner of equipment is it? Could you comment on that, has been prewarned what those frequencies are. But Iplease? think that....

Colonel Mataxis: Yes. I have mentioned initially that Colonel B. Jones: I would like to comment on that, ifwhen we went into the guerilla phase, we were using post- I might.Korean-type radio equipment for our companies, pla- General Lotz: Go ahead, please.toons, and battalions. Now, just as around the world youwill find radios which work basically the same way in Colonel B. Jones: In the division area that I was in, wemost civilian houses, so you will find in most armies had with my division team Air Force forward air con-around the world basically the same equipment. The trollers flying in what the Army calls an L-19 or an 01.North Vietnamese using Soviet Bloc-type equipment per- We had an Army L-19 platoon. We had Marine FACs,haps do not have as much gold plate as we do (the fancy or forward air controllers. Some flew in helicopters, someknobs and so forth), but basically they are using post- flew in the rear seat of an Army L-l9. Additionally weWorld War II, company, platoon, and battalion sets. had Vietnamese L-l9's, and in some cases we had Viet-Now, they do the same thing that I said we do. They namese forward air controllers in the back seat of an

take the limitations of the radios, and tailor their tactics Air Force or Army L-l9.


Now, as you can imagine, that is quite a few different To summarize there are the formal ways of gettingpieces of equipment, a few different languages, and three information back in reports, and there are the informaldifferent services in the same area. We also had the Army ways, through people.advisor on the ground, and he had communications with Mr. Clark: Thank you, Jack.at the minimum one of these airplanes, with one type of 'these airplanes, and could pass to another airplane. We I have a double barreled question for Colonel Rice.used not only Marine strike aircraft, but we used Navy Atal ti ntefr ftoqetosfo ifrnusednotonlyMarinestrikeaircraftofw s Ar Fce ustked Nai sources. I am going to combine them into one, because I

sreirtfcarriers, . .AirForest -think they are quite similar: What logistical and main-craft, and we used Vietnamese strike aircraft. So it is my tenance problems are peculiar to Viet Nam, and secondly,personal observation that the air-to-ground communica- . .e

tions areprettygood. ~~~to what extent iS the Army using automatic data process-tions are pretty good. ing in the logistic and administration fields?

Mr. Clark: Did you have anything further, General? Colonel Rice: I could talk all night on those two.

General Lotz: No, I think it was quite well covered. Mr. Clark: Please do not.

Mr. Clark: Thank you. Colonel Rice: The word "peculiar" I think has beenI have a question for Colonel Hines. This again is a mentioned here several times. There is nothing really new

two-part question. You seem to be addicted to these. in terms of maintenance and supply problems in Viet1) Does the user actually get a chance to tell the R&D Nam. It is really the degree to which these problems arepeople what is needed to fight in Viet Nam, or do the being experienced, and the compounding of them, IR&D people tell the user what he thinks should be used? would say, that is going on. I think if we can go back toThat is the first part of the question. the maps that were shown here at the beginning of the

2) What means are used to feed information on com- hour, you can first see the transportation problem. Vietbat effectiveness of weapons to the developer so that im- Nam is halfway around the world. It is 8000 miles fromprovements in design can be made? the West Coast, and something like 11 000 or 12 000 from

the East Coast. From the West Coast, it requires aboutColonel Hines: The basic system that we have in the 19 or 20 days shipping time one way to Viet Nam. This

Army is for the user to specify what he wants. We have a distance and load requirements will tie up maybe 350requirements system that I think quite a few of the gentle- ships for loading and unloading, and for ships going andmen from industry are very familiar with, which includes coming.research plans and documentation, in the form of quanti- Within Viet Nam, there are limited local resources andtative material directed to objectives and quantitative are very few ports, so it is necessary to provide some typematerial requirements. We have a very well established of additional port facilities. We have a mobile port, theprocedure for the user to state what he wants the deso-called DeLong pier. There are a number of those thatveloper to develop. have gone into the country so far.

This does not preclude the developer from going to the There is very little in the way of competent indigenoususer and saying, "Look what I have; do you think you labor. At the stevedore level, you probably saw some ofcould use this?" The user can then, if he so desires say the women in the movies tonight. That is what we use as"Yes, maybe we can test this," or "Yes, we would like one stevedores, women about 90 pounds. They carry much ofof these," or "We will write a requirement for you to give the supplies off the ships, normally in 140 to 150 poundus one of these for our use." loads.

It certainly is not a case of the R&D people developing TheArmyhas introduced a lot of sophisticated gear intosomething and telling the user, "Here, take this and Viet Nam. Considering the two-year tour in Viet Nam foruse it." the soldier and the complexity of the equipment, all typesWhat are means to feed information on combat effec- of complicated problems have resulted.

tiveness of weapons to the developer? There are a num- In addition there is the humidity, sand, and whatnot,ber of ways that information is fed back to the commodity causing rust, corrosion, and erosion types of problems.commands, the developer, for product improvement, for Next, between the three enclaves there is very littlenew developments, or to use in new developments. There intercommunication. This necessitates direct shipmentsare various formal reports that are made, including main- from the States to the enclaves: the amount of inter-tenance reports, logistics reports, combat reports. Some coastal shipping is likewise very small.of the most interesting things that I encounter are reports So to overcome some of these problems, the Armyof combat operations that refer to items I have seen and introduced the Red Ball Express system. You rememberhad some part in the R&D cycle. In addition to reports in World War II it was a trucking system. This time it isthat come back, there are also experienced people that with the airplane. Here, too, is where considerable auto-return and go to represent the user or the developer. matic data processing equipment is utilized.

PANEL: VIET NAMAN ELECTRONIC PROVING GROUN 847

Initially in Viet Nam we had nothing other than some ment, and particularly airplanes. The time has comecard punching machines. In fact these machines still carry when we ought to turn the curve downward and take thea major load. I think at last count when I left First Log, simplest aircraft we have and put our engineering talentwe were using some 200 pieces throughout the Army to work on making it simpler, cheaper, easier to maintain,units. The equivalent rental on such an amount of equip- easier to fly, and all of these things.ment would probably be about three quarters of a million This is the way Army aviation really got its start, asdollars. you well know. The Air Force went off into the wild blue

There was a rather extensive transceiver network within yonder and left us sitting on the ground, so we had to findthe country and linking the States that we could use to some way of getting off. Of course, what we have in Vietprocess cards. As of now, the Army is introducing some Nam today is just the "horse and buggy" era of airof the more sophisticated equipment, the UNIVAC 1005. mobility. It is real difficult for me to look ahead intoI think there may be eight or ten in the country by now, 1980 and tell you exactly what the Army is going to lookand possibly 26 or 27 to come later. NCR 500's are being like. This is just me talking, but I am sure there is notassigned to the direct support units. There are a consider- going to be much left on the ground if present trends areable number of these units scheduled for use. The Navy any indication of what the average ground soldier wouldalso has equipment comparable to the 1005 in its system. like. Whether he is going to be able to get it or not isSo we are involved with a complicated and compound- going to depend upon how well industry and research and

ing type of supply and logistics system, but I think we are development succeed in their efforts to give us cheap,on top of it. Also, I think the measures that are being good air mobility. We want easier ways of doing things,taken with the Red Ball system, the push packages, the easier ways of flying, easier ways of picking up loads. Thespecial roll on-roll off ships are helping to take care of ways we have now are minimal in many cases. We oftenthese measures. use nets to carry tonnages for long distances. We try to

palletize things to make it simpler for the airplanes to pickMr. Clark: Thank you. them up, and not require a lot of loading into and out ofI have a question that I just got for both Colonels the aircraft.

Jones, since they are both sitting together there, and I We try to have equipment which is much lighter. Thiswould like to have each one of them comment on it. It is point has been mentioned a number of times alreadya long question, so that they will have a long time to think tonight. Every pound we can save is a pound of some-about their answers: thing else we can carry. Every pound of communications

It is pretty clear that the use of helicopters for rapid equipment that we can knock off by miniaturizing cir-transport of troops, equipment, and support requirements cuitry, and by using lighter materials (more compact ar-to forward areas or to the scene of a tactical mission have rangements) is money in the bank for us.been very instrumental in the field successes of our troops. You recall the command and control aircraft thatWhat new equipment or functional capabilities are de- General Lotz showed you in his movie. It is a madhousesired and required for helicopters in operation and in pro- if you really do not have good communications, becausecurement to further increase the helicopter's performance you have those five people in there who must talk, notin transport, airborne attack, and troop support roles? only to their own command elements, but to each otherDid I mess that up, or did you understand it? on the intercom within the aircraft; this is the way one of

Colonel B. Jones: Since I am not a flyer, I would like the air mobile operations is really run.to let Guy Jones answer the question. As Colonel Rice said a minute ago, the difference in

communications here is not so much that they are fan-Colonel R. Jones: Well, this is like asking the owner of tastically new problems, but they are much greater in

a Stanley Steamer to draw a picture of a 1967 model auto- degree. The tempo of an air mobile operation is onemobile. I had better not mention any specific types right which moves ahead and unfolds at, let us say, perhapsnow. But you always want more. This is the habitual ten times the rate of a World War II battalion attack.answer that any designer gets when he asks an operator These things have to operate much more quickly. Wewhat he wants. He wants it to go higher, faster, farther, have to be able to get in contact with people, and telldo this, do that, do something else. We have really got them what to do with fewer words and by means of betterto think about it a second time. communications.

In the first place, we do not want to let pure speed and I have wandered from my subject, but I think I havesophistication be the end of our particular R&D effort covered the general point, Trevor.here. We have got to turn back the clock of sophistica-tion somewhere when we talk about Army equipment, Mr. Clark: I think you did. I think you hit most of thebecause the price of sophistication in Army equipment points, even though it was a long question. Thank you.is much more now than some of our commanders would General Lotz, you and Colonel Hines have been swap-like to pay. So we want to get off this constantly upward- ping questions back and forth, and I do not know whichtrending curve that we see when we talk about equip- one of you has this one: With such variety and numbers


of tactical communications equipment and frequencies added, and the use of CW is reduced. But there is a greatchannels in use, and the great troop mobility, how are dependence on voice, CW, and teletypewriter.frequencies marked? How effective is it, that is, howmuch interference, and if serious, what plans are there to Mr. Clark: Colonel Bruce Jones: How are communica-reduce interference, aside from discipline? tions maintained between the U. S. and Viet Nam forces?

General Lotz: My copy says "how are frequencies man- Colonel B. Jones: I will answer that by describing firstaged." I might point out that this is a highly technical the general background of the Vietnamese unit, and aquestion. There is no reason why I should not answer it, U. S. unit operating in the same general area.and I will give some general clues, but if the individual In the area where I was, this simply came about bywho asked the question would see me afterwards, I can the U. S. commander and the Vietnamese commander,give him the full story, if he is really interested. usually the division commander in the case of the Viet-

First of all, I must point out that the radio spectrum is namese, agreeing to the two areas in which they wouldthe sovereign property of government. We are not at war operate. This necessitated a drawing of boundaries. Theywith the Vietnamese, so therefore we do not seize their would then operate in those two areas.radio spectrum. We must obtain our frequencies through First of all, with every Vietnamese unit, you have athe proper process established by that government for small U. S. team. This is called an advisory team. Whilecontrol of the frequencies. they are advisors, they are also liaison officers. They assist

In the case of the government of South Viet Nam, the the Vietnamese in fire support, and in every other possiblePTT is the government agency that has been delegated the thing you can think of. So you have this American withresponsibility to execute those responsibilities for that the Vietnamese unit on the ground. He has communica-government. However, most of the frequency spectrum of tions with him which he can communicate laterally to themilitary interest has been delegated by the government of U. S. unit. That is the first way that they keep in contact.Viet Nam to the armed forces of Viet Nam, namely, essen- Oral communication between the advisor and the bat-tially the entire spectrum from 30 megahertz up. There- talion commander sometimes presents a problem, but iffore, the assignments in these bands are controlled by the they work together for a short period of time, they canheadquarters of the Viet Nam armed forces where they communicate with each other with few problems.have a J staff element. They have a J-6, a director of com- In the case of most of the operations I participated in,munications electronics. United States frequencies are we had American artillery forward observers with theobtained by negotiation with him. Vietnamese unit. They, of course, could also communi-

I admit that there are great problems concerned with cate back to the U. S. side of the house and, as some ofthe great mobility of the troops, with the great complexity you may know, of course, artillery communications areof equipment, and it does require extraordinary planning, usually pretty good.both of a long-range and day-to-day nature. This is part of So we would also get from this U. S. element with thethe mechanism into which I will not get, but I believe it is Vietnamese, along with their fire support requests, theiraccomplished rather effectively. location.

I would like to point out that the greatest competition Habitually we establish the command posts of the twofor frequencies lies generally, if we exclude the high-fre- headquarters side-by-side. In other words, in the casequency bands, below 100 megahertz, where we have com- where I was, it was a Marine regimental CP, or sometimespetition between U. S. installed television stations in a task force CP, and the Vietnamese, usually the divisionViet Nam. We find in there the tactical FM frequencies, CP, located contiguous to one another. Communicationsand we also find that the prime frequencies for VHF radio there was just a question of moving not even the distancerelay equipment lie in those bands. So here is the portion of this room to talk over or to know what each unit wasof the spectrum that requires rather extraordinary treat- doing.ment. Consequently, our communications were good. The

I do not know that we will ever completely solve these American communications, or course, were better thanproblems on a wide basis, but I believe that we have a sys- the Vietnamese communications, because in my case, thetem in Viet Nam that is serving our present interests. advisors had the new family of radios. So having the new

Mr. Clark: Thank you, General. family of radios, sometimes we would get the informationThis question is for Colonel Moore: Is the Army tacti- from the battalion advisor of what was going on before

cal communications primarily voice or is there a substan- the Vietnamese would get it. But that did not make anytial amount of teletype, facsimile or other nonvoice modes difference. That was part of our job. And I might sayin use? that sometimes the division commander used our equip-

ment. In other cases, when the Vietnamese would put up aColonel Moore: Within the Vietnamese army, at regi- VHF shot, and have three or four channels back to our

mental level and below, the communications are primarily main CP, we were given one of those channels, so we hadvoice, with some CW radio. Above regiment, teletype is an American line back to the switchboard and could go

PANEL: VIETl NAMAN ELECTRONIC PROVING GROUND 849

to Da-Nang or Chu-Lai or wherever we wanted to go out all very fond of. When filled with gas this balloon carriedof the permanent communications setup. an antenna into the air. The user on the ground was

So communications are man-to-man at that level, and pretty happy, because it improved our signal by a factorsince the American has communications, knowing the of about five. But it seems when it came back for furtherfrequency of his lateral or side-by-side unit, he can com- development there were certain deficiencies. I finallymunicate. found out that there were certain difficulties in supplying

Mttype of different an- it, getting it out there, and getting the supply of gas. ThisMr. Clark: Colonel Mataxis, whate of diet is one example illustrating the question that was raised

tenna design emerged from the experience gained in Viet before about the user getting things he did not particu-Nam? larly want or asking for things he did not get. But

Colonel Mataxis: I will go back to the experience factor basically we would elevate our antennas in the trees, oragain. I was just a user of the communications equipment. in an airplane, as a relay station.As I mentioned, our major problems occurred when wewere separated on the ground further than our radios Mr. Clark: Thank you, Ted.could reach. The next problem was caused by hills or Ladies and gentlemen, I think that this has been a verymountains between our stations. The third problem was informative and instructive two hours. We promised thatthe problem actually caused by the dense foliage. (It we would start them on time, and we promised that weattenuated the signals going through.) To solve these would end them on time. We have a very large number ofproblems we used relay stations. We used airplanes to questions that we have not been able to answer, simplyrelay. In some cases we would put some of our company because of lack of time.sets in the aircraft and put an antenna over the side. At I want to thank each one of you for your questions. Iother times, we would just have a soldier climb up a tree can assure you that they will be referred to the Panel, andwith an antenna. that the Panel will read them, and thereby perhaps gainOne of the things we tested was a balloon that we were information on you and your problems.

850 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AEROSPACE AND) ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS SEPTEMBER 1967

Documents

Viet Nam-An Electronic Proving Ground