to many related social issues that complements the author’s previous work onthe parent and child relationship. The study provides a very valuable pastoralcontribution for families and a scholarly analysis for related professional andreligious ministries.

Center for Health Care Ethics, St. Louis University Gerard Magill

Vices, Virtues and Consequences: Essays in Moral and Political Philosophy. By PeterPhillips Simpson. Pp. xii, 283, Washington DC, Catholic University of AmericaPress, 2001, d46.50.

It is a rare pleasure to read a book that combines the elegance and rigour of the best ofanalytic philosophy with the imaginative breadth and radical seriousness of some ofits rivals. Simpson’s arguments are shaped in particular by a careful reading ofAristotle and Aquinas. Modern philosophy tends to ignore the pre-modern traditionand caricature ethics as a debate between Kant and the utilitarians. Simpson,however, finds these opponents unexpectedly similar: he provides a brilliant andconvincing argument that Kant’s theory, too, is ultimately grounded in the(Machiavellian) belief that human inclinations are naturally ‘bestial’ and selfish,while human beings are incapable of recognizing the real goodness in the world.Kant’s account of duty is revealed as a rather desperate attempt to relocate thetraditional notion of the noble in a formal principle.Simpson is careful to distinguish himself from some of those known as ‘neo-

Aristotelians’ or ‘Thomists’, arguing, for example, that Alasdair MacIntyre is rightlycharged with relativism. Finnis and Grisez, on the other hand, develop a genuinelyrealist theory of natural law, but would benefit from a more precise attention to StThomas. In particular, Thomas carefully analyses the relations between thought anddesire and between theoretical and practical thinking. This enables him to say that theclaim ‘x is good’ is both a descriptive truth and a guide to action. Therefore, unlikeFinnis and Grisez, he does not need to accept the modern version of the ‘naturalisticfallacy’. He is also able to distinguish the questions, ‘How do we acquire thetheoretical judgement that (e.g.) life is good?’ and ‘Is the practical judgement self-evident or not that (e.g.) life is a good to be pursued?’ Contemporary discussion,however, is blurred by the confusing of these two questions.What then counts as a good? On this question, Simpson shows that many neo-

Aristotelians are profoundly unAristotelian; for they fail to recognize both thatAristotle treats the virtues as intrinsically rather than instrumentally worth havingand that what the virtues are is something that can be reliably grasped only by‘gentlemen’. Following Cicero, who like Aristotle treats justice as good in itself,Simpson is able to articulate a non-consequentialist response to the claim that thereare occasions when one ought to take innocent life.In the second part of the book Simpson goes on to apply Aristotelian arguments to

contemporary political debate. His guiding thesis is that ‘liberalism is properly athome at the level of the state but not at the level of the community. If communities aregoverned by its principles they will be destroyed; if states are not governed by itsprinciples they will be tyrannies’. This attentiveness to different types of communityenables Simpson to reject the liberal principle that political communities should notengage in moral education. They ought to do this, at the appropriate level (first of all,in the family) because the virtues are required for happy lives, and in particular forgenuine freedom. Within small communities, personal knowledge make possibleresponsible moral education.For similar reasons, elections are best limited to small communities, where

candidates can be chosen because of their genuine abilities rather than their party’s

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propaganda. Simpson goes on to analyse our current political system as Aristotle’s‘demagogic oligarchy’. The modern doctrine of the separation of the legislature,executive and judiciary obscures the Aristotelian point that it matters which classes aswell as which individuals hold power. We are ruled, in all three ways, by the rich.Simpson concludes, with surprising plausibility, that some of Aristotle’s suggestionsfor making polities more democratic, such as the lot, might be highly effective today.The last part of the book discusses the topics of abortion, just war and work. One

group of anti-abortion protesters charged with breaking the law known as Freedomof Access to Clinic Entrances argued in their defence that this law was unjust. Theywere condemned on the assumption that the breaking of a law in itself is anarchic intendency. Simpson points out that the US Constitution itself, which underpins all USlaw, depends upon the principle that unjust laws should not be obeyed.There follows a subtle and nuanced exploration of the precise ways in which

traditional just war teaching might justify certain uses of violence in Northern Ireland,while clearly ruling out others. The discussion is impressive both for the careful detailof its conclusions and for its combination of moderation and passion. The bookconcludes with a brief foray into explicit theology, reflecting on Catholic teachingabout work.

University of Leeds, Trinity and All Saints College Margaret Atkins

Still Interpreting Vatican II: Some Hermeneutical Principles. By Ormond Rush.Pp. xii, 125, Paulist Press, 2004, $12.95.

In the last few years there has been an increasing interest in what might be termed thehermeneutical analysis of the Second Vatican Council and the texts that the Councilproduced. This interest has coincided with the fortieth anniversaries of thepromulgation of the various documents and it has been further stimulated by somerenewed controversy about the ‘correct’ interpretation of the Council and of itsdocuments. The short, yet concentrated book by Ormond Rush, provides a valuablecontribution to the ongoing discussion about interpreting the Council, especially froma more theoretical point of view concerning the nature of hermeneutics and thenecessary procedures for any hermeneutical analysis.Rush maps out his method and approach in the Introduction to the book. Any

hermeneutical analysis requires a number of layers and approaches, usingphilosophical, literary and historical hermeneutical tools to arrive at a theologicalhermeneutic. In particular, he suggests that the process of reception is fundamental, yetthis has often been neglected in discussions about the Council and its interpretation.Reception is defined as ‘the assimilation and ‘‘making one’s own’’ of another reality’(page 3). The following three chapters of the book suggest a method for thehermeneutical analysis of the Conciliar texts following three key stages: to establish ahermeneutic first of the authors, then of the texts themselves and finally of the receiver.Chapter One examines the intention of the authors of the texts in some detail, for

this intention reveals the ‘mind’ or the ‘spirit’ of the Council. This intention is an‘event’, an event of reception; or, better put, a number of receptions. In particular, it isthe retrieval of a great Tradition that involves both a continuity and a rupture setwithin the Council’s own historical consciousness and the Council’s desire to be opento the working of the Holy Spirit. A number of theological approaches were exploredafresh at the Council (such as Thomism or Augustinianism) and there was an attemptto develop a new theological consensus or currency. However, the process of receivingthese intentions of the authors and of reaching a new synthesis Rush suggests, did notreally occur at the Council and has, in fact, been left to future interpreters of theCouncil.

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