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OnlinePublicShaming:VirtuesandVices
WearewitnessingincreasinguseoftheInternet,particularsocialmedia,
tocriticize(perceived)moralfailingsandmisdemeanors.Thisphenom-
enonofso-called ‘onlinepublicshaming’couldprovideapowerful tool
forreinforcingvaluablesocialnorms.Butitalsothreatensunwarranted
and severe punishments meted out by online mobs. Drawing on the
workofJohnLocke,aswellasonrecentdiscussionsofsocialnorms,we
analyzethedangersassociatedwiththeinformalenforcementofnorms,
butalsohighlightthepromiseofthispractice.Wethenconsidertwocru-
cialconditionsthatonlinepublicshamingmustmeetinordertobejusti-
fiable:proportionalityandaccountability.Weargue that these require-
mentsareinfactfrequentlyviolated,renderingmostcasesofonlinepub-
lic shamingunjustified.While theuseof onlinepublic shaming against
others’ vices has some apparent virtues, it is currently rarely justified,
givenitsownvices.
Keywords:Accountability;Locke;proportionality;publicshaming;socialnorms
2
1. Introduction
Thephrase“publicshaming”bringstomindstocks,pillories,androttentomatoes.
Butthephenomenonofpublicshaminghaskeptpacewithtechnologicalprogress.
Publicshaminghasgonedigital.TheInternetaffordsunprecedentedopportunities
tocriticizethoseweconsidertohavedonewrong.Ill-advisedtweets,photos,and
Facebook posts regularly go viral and attract streams of criticism. Moreover,
individualsregularlytaketotheInternettodenounceconducttheyhaveobserved
offline, and appeal to others to join them in their condemnation. The list of
(in)famous cases of online public shaming gets longer by themonth – from the
veryearlycaseof“dogpoopgirl”1toamorerecentexampleinwhichavideoofa
customerraciallyabusingapostofficeemployeeinLondonwasputonFacebook
andattractednearlyamillionviews.2
Manyofthosewhohavebeenthetargetofthiskindofonlinepublicsham-
inghave facedsevereconsequences–sufferingdeepdistress,havinggreatdetail
abouttheirprivate livesmadepublic,andlosingtheir jobs. Intellingthestoryof
LindseyStone,whowaspubliclyshamedforajokephotoinwhichsheappearedto
beactingdisrespectfullyatamilitarycemetery,JonRonsonreportsthatStone“fell
into depression, became an insomniac, and barely left home for a year” (2015a,
1“Dogpoopgirl”wasayoungwomaninSouthKoreawho,in2005,refusedtocleanupthe
messafterherdoghaddefecatedonasubwaytrain.See
http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/dog-poo-girl;Solove(2007,1-3).
2Thiswasthenpickedupbythemainstreammediaandreportedinmanymediaoutlets,
nodoubtcausingmillionsmorepeopletoseethevideo.SeeBBCNews(2018).
3
202).3Theseverityoftheconsequencessufferedbythoseshamedonlineisoneof
themainthemesofRonson’sbookaboutthephenomenon,whichvividlyrecounts
severalshamingstories.
However,we should not be too quick to decry all online public shaming.
Thousandsofpeopleparticipateinthispractice,believingthatitcanbeaforcefor
good.Many consider themselves to be upholding valuable standards of conduct,
andrightlycensuringthosewhofallshortofthosestandards.Thiskindofinformal
sanctioning is essential to ensuring the continuation of these standards. Indeed,
somemightarguethatitwouldsurelybewrongtoallowracist,sexist,dangerous,
anddisrespectful conduct togounchallenged.Would thisnotbe toconnivewith
wrongdoing,andperhapsevenmakethosewhooverlooktheseoffencescomplicit?
Onlinepublicshamingcanbeaneffectivewaytocensurewrongdoing,drawatten-
tion to social ills such as racism and sexism, and deter future wrongdoers. As
SamratHanif,whoput the video of the post officeworker being racially abused
online,said,postingthevideowillhopefullymeanthat“thislady”–andothers,we
canassume–“willneverdothisagain”(quotedinBBCNews2018).
This justification for public shaming holds that it is an effective way in
which to enforce valuable social norms – rules of behavior that ought to govern
ourconductinrelationtooneanother.Publicshamingcanhighlightviolationsof
these norms, reaffirm the importance of compliance, help in causing the norm
violatortorepent,anddeterfutureviolations.
In some cases, at least, these beneficial results do indeed occur. In May
2015, Shauna Huntwas interviewing two sports fans live on-air, when shewas
3Ronson(2015b)alsotellsStone’sstory.
4
interruptedbyamanwhosaidintohermicrophone“Fuckherrightinthepussy”.4
Withthecamerastillrolling,Huntproceededtoquestionagroupofmenwhohad
cheeredontheheckler.Askedtoexplainwhyhefounditsofunny,ShawnSimoes
responded: “It’s fucking awesome! You’re lucky there’s not a fucking vibrator in
your ear!” The footage was posted online, and went viral. After having been
shamedinthisway,Simoessentanapologylettertothejournalist,madeadona-
tion to amale-led group seeking tomakemen takemore responsibility to stop
violenceagainstwomen,andvoluntarilyattendedsensitivitytraining(seeHuffing-
ton Post Canada 2015). Irrespective of whether this instance of public shaming
was justifiedall thingsconsidered, itwouldbeamistake tooverlook theseposi-
tives.
Aswehavealready intimated,however, thingsdonotalwaysworkoutso
well.InDecember2013,onherwayfromNewYorktoCapeTowntovisitfamily,
Justine Sacco tweeted “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m
white!”5Shemeant thisasan ironiccommentabout theattitudesofmiddle-class
white Americans towards AIDS, but many observers considered it racist.6Sacco
faced a barrage of online criticism,much of it threatening and abusive, andwas
firedfromherjob–allwhileshewasonaplane,andsounabletodefendherselfor
explainhertweet.
Variouscommentatorshavewarnedoftheexcessivenatureofthepunish-
mentsimposedthroughonlinepublicshaming.DanielSolovewritesthat“Internet
4OuraccounthereisdrawnfromGillis(2015).
5Sacco’sstoryistoldinRonson(2015a,63-77);Ronson(2015c).
6ForSacco’sexplanation,seeRonson(2015a,69).
5
shaminghasatendencytobecomeoverzealous”(2007,95).Further,it“createsan
indelible blemish on a person’s identity. Being shamed in cyberspace is akin to
beingmarked for life…Peopleacquirepermanentdigitalbaggage” (2007,94). In
the same vein, Kate Klonick notes that “the punishments are both extreme and
endless and seem deeply uncalibrated to the transgressions” (2016, 1054). The
storiestoldbyRonsonclearlysupporttheseclaims.
So,whatarewetomakeofonlinepublicshaming,giventhatitsometimes
doesgood,yetsooften isoverzealousandexcessive?Ouraim in thispaper is to
drawupontheresourcesofpoliticalphilosophytoilluminatebothourreasonsto
welcomepublicshaming,duetoitsroleinenforcingvaluablesocialnorms,andthe
rather stringent conditions that we must meet in order for instances of public
shamingtobejustified.
Ourstartingpointisperhapsasurprisingone;itiswiththewritingsofJohn
Locke. While the kinds of public shaming with which we are concerned in this
paper use new technologies, the idea thatwemight haveworries regarding the
enforcementofmoralrulesthroughinformalsanctioningisnotanewone.Indeed,
it is a central insightwithin Locke’sSecondTreatiseofGovernment, and our first
taskwillbetoshowhowhisanalysishelpsustounderstandonlinepublicshaming
asaphenomenon.
Beforeturningtothat,however,itisimportanttonotetwolimitsofourin-
quiry.First,wefocusonthepotentialroleofpublicshaminginupholdingmorally
authoritativesocial norms – extant social norms with which individuals have a
duty to comply, such that violating them is wrongful. We say more about the
natureofsocialnormsandmoralauthoritativenessbelow(seeSection4.1).Butwe
6
donotaddressthequestionofwhatexplainswhyparticularnormsareauthorita-
tive, or indeedwhy social norms can be authoritative at all. These deeper ques-
tionsinmoralphilosophyfallbeyondthescopeofourinquiry.Instead,wehopeit
isuncontroversialthattheexamplesthatweusedoinvolvemorallyauthoritative
norms,suchasnormsagainstracismandsexism.Ourfocusonmorallyauthorita-
tivenormsalsomeansthatwedonotdiscusscomplexitiesthatarisewhennorms
arecontested,orwhenpublicshamingisusedinanefforttoestablishnewsocial
norms.We recognize that this excludes an important range of cases, which are
worthyofsustainedattention.Butwethinkit iscrucial firsttoaddressthemore
straightforward cases of online public shaming directed at violations ofmorally
authoritative social norms. After all, if public shaming were always (or almost
always)impermissible,eveninthosecases,whenthetargetofshaminghasviolat-
edadutytocomplywithamorallyauthoritativenorm,thenitisveryunlikelyever
tobejustifiedinthemorecomplicatedcases.
Asecondlimitofourinquiryisthatwedonotexaminepreciselywhatcon-
stitutes ‘shame’orwhether ‘onlinepublicshaming’ is thecorrect termtouse for
our phenomenon of interest. These are interesting issues, but we lack space to
explorethemhere.Instead,weusetheterm‘onlinepublicshaming’inthewaythat
hasbecomecommon,i.e.torefertotheuseoftheInternettodrawattentiontoand
criticize(perceived)wrongdoing.Ouraimistoidentifyprotantoreasonsinfavor
ofsuchshaming,andtoconsidersomeofthestringentconditionsthatitmustmeet
inordertobejustified.Wearguethatusingonlinepublicshamingagainstothers’
vices has some apparent virtues, but that it is in fact currently rarely justified,
givenitsownvices.
7
2. LessonsfromLocke
Locke argues that in the pre-political “state of nature” every individual has the
righttoenforcethelawofnature,whichisthemorallawthateachofusoughtto
follow.Whilethestateofnatureis“astateof liberty…it isnotastateof license”
(Locke1689,II.II.§6).7Itisgovernedbythelawofnature,accordingtowhicheach
individual isboundtopreservebothherselfandtherestofmankind.Thosewho
violatethelawofnature,forexamplebyharminganother“inhislife,health,liber-
ty, or possessions” (Locke 1689, II.II.§6),may be rightfully punished in order to
preservethesafetyandsecurityofall.Moreover,“Everymanhatharighttopunish
theoffender,andbeexecutionerofthelawofnature”(Locke1689,II.II.§8).With-
outrightsofenforcement,thelawofnaturewouldbeinvain.And,giventhatthe
stateofnatureisa“stateofperfectequality”(Locke1689,II.II.§7),ifanyindividual
hasarighttopunishoffendersthenallmusthavethatright.
Sensibly, Locke insists that theoffender’spunishment shouldnotbearbi-
traryorunlimited.Itmustbe“proportionatetohistransgression,whichissomuch
asmay serve for reparationand restraint” (Locke1689, II.II.§8). Inotherwords,
punishment has specific purposes: making reparations for harm to others and
deterringfutureviolations.Punishmentshouldnotgobeyondwhatisnecessaryto
fulfillthesepurposes(Locke1689,II.II.§12;seealso§§10-11).
Locke recognizes that there is a problem here, however, and he imagines
someoneobjectingtohisviewalongthefollowinglines:
7Bythis,wemeanBookII,ChapterII,§6.Weusethesamenotationalformatthroughout.
8
Idoubtnotbutitwillbeobjected,thatitisunreasonableformentobe
judgesintheirowncases,thatself-lovewillmakemenpartialtothem-
selvesandtheir friends:andon theotherside, that ill-nature,passion
and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence
nothingbutconfusionanddisorderwillfollow(Locke1689,II.II.§13).
Locke readily admits that this is one of the great “inconveniences” of life in the
stateofnature.Variousaspectsofhumanpsychology,includingourvery“passion”
forexactingjustice,makeitlikelythatsomewillbeexcessivelypunished.Equally,
otherswillescapepunishment,duetoour“partiality” towardourselvesand“un-
concernedness”forothers(Locke1689,II.IX.§125).
ThisproblemisexacerbatedbytwofurthercomplicationsthatLockeover-
looks.First,thecontentofthelawofnatureiscomplex,suchthatevenindividuals
who act in good faith andwho do not exhibit partiality toward themselves and
unconcernedness towardotherswill sometimesdisagreeaboutwhethera trans-
gressionhastakenplace.8Thisisbecausethenatureofanindividual’sconductis
sometimesunclear,suchas inthecaseofSacco,whosecommentswereintended
asironic.Thispointisespeciallyforcefuloncewerecognizetheexistenceofwhat
JohnRawlscallsthe“burdensofjudgment”–thatis,themany“hazardsinvolvedin
thecorrect(andconscientious)exerciseofourpowersofreasonandjudgmentin
theordinarycourseofpoliticallife”(1996,55-56).Second,ratherthanunevenness
inpunishmentbeing fairlydistributed, it is instead likely to reflect racist, sexist,
8Inthisway,wearedoubtfulregardingLocke’sclaimthatthelawofnatureis“plainand
intelligibletoallrationalcreatures”(Locke1689,II.IX.§124).Lockeadmitsthatbiaswill
leadtodisagreement,butseemstooverlookreasonabledisagreement.
9
and classist biases, and so be more targeted against members of marginalized
groups.Thosewhoaremorepowerful,andsoenjoygreatercapacitiesforretalia-
tion,arelesslikelytobepunishedthanthosewhoarecomparativelypowerless.
Allthreeofthesefeaturesareevidentincontemporaryexamplesofonline
public shaming, and so germane to our inquiry. First, those who engage in this
practice typicallydemonstrate “partiality” toward themselvesand “unconcerned-
ness” for others. Second, it is sometimes unclear whether the target has in fact
violated the relevant social norm. Third, participants often exhibit racist, sexist,
andclassistbiases.9
Lockeoffersthepressingproblemswithprivateindividualsenforcingrules
andnormsasacentralreasonthatindividualswouldchoosetoleavethestateof
nature and enter political society. The establishment of “civil government is the
proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature” (Locke 1689,
II.II.§13). Crucially, government provides a “known and indifferent judge, with
authority to determine all differences according to the established law” (Locke
1689,II.IX.§125).Individualsgiveuptheirnaturalrighttopunishtransgressors,in
favor of establishing a centralized authority that promulgates and enforces laws
impartially.Privateenforcementofthelawofnatureisreplacedbygovernmental
enforcement.
Thissolutionisnotavailabletous,however,sinceweareexplicitlyfocused
upon informal sanctions to enforce social norms, rather than on state sanctions.
Social norms are rules that govern the attitudes and behavior of members of a
9Forexample,studiesalsorevealthatonlineabuseisdisproportionatelydirectedat
femalesandmembersofethnicminorities.SeeGardineret.al.(2016).
10
group,specifyinghowmembersofthatgroupought(not)toact.10Theyspecifya
public standard to whichmembers expect one another to adhere. Social norms
concernawiderrangeofconductthanthatregulatedbylaw.Theyincluderulesof
etiquette, manners, fair play, respect, and so on. The norms that we are most
concernedwithareones that regulateconduct thatoughtnotbesubject to legal
regulation. In some cases, this is for principled reasons, such aswhen using the
coercive power of the state would be self-defeating. In other cases, this is for
practicalreasons,suchaswhenthelawistoobluntaninstrument,andsoitwould
be unduly costly to penalize violations of the norm. Informal sanctioningwithin
civil society through public shaming is a vital enforcementmechanismwith re-
spect to thesenorms.Aswith the lawofnaturewithinLocke’sstateofnature, if
individualslacktherighttoenforcesocialnorms,thenwemightfearthatthatthey
willceasetobeeffectiveregulatorsofbehavior.
Thisisnottosuggestthatthestatehasnoroleinregulatingpublicshaming.
Lawsagainstlibelandhatespeechcanpreventitsworstexcesses.The“righttobe
forgotten”mightprovideawaythatpeoplecanescapefrompastnormviolations
and live free fromthe fearof futuresanctions.11Weshouldalsoconsider further
innovative policy solutions, such as laws that provide employees with greater
protectionagainstbeingdismissedforactionsoutsideofworkthataredeemedto
10Forfurtherdiscussionofthenatureofsocialnormsandtheirimportancetowell-
functioningsocieties,seeBrennanet.al.(2013);McTernan(2014).
11TheEuropeanCourtofJusticeendorsedthe‘righttobeforgotten’in2014.SeeWarman
andBarratt(2014).
11
damage their employer’s reputation and profitability.12Crucially, however, all of
these laws are ways to make informal sanctioning less severe or problematic,
rather than the state itself takingover the roleof sanctioning, in theway that it
does within Locke’s account. While the state can endeavor to prevent certain
wrongfulformsofinformalsanctioning,itcannotitselfbethesanctioner,precisely
becauseweareconsideringtheenforcementofinformalsocialnorms.
3. TheRoleofSocialNormsandPublicShaming
Wewill return to Locke later in the paper. The upshot of the previous section,
however, is that thoughLockehelpsus to identify thedangersof informal sanc-
tioning,hissolutionisnotavailableinourcontext.Thisseemstoleaveuswithtwo
options.Wecouldeitherabandonpublicshamingaltogetherorseektoimproveit.
Thefirstoftheseoptionsmightseemattractiveatfirst,sinceitmeansthatwedo
not face themany problems associatedwith this kind of individualized enforce-
ment.Butthiswouldalsobringconsiderablecosts.Inparticular,itrisksundermin-
ingvaluablesocialnorms,whichareessentialforensuringpeacefulandcoopera-
tivecoexistence.Toseewhythismightbeaproblem,wemustsaymoreaboutthe
roleofsocialnormsandthegoodsthatwecanrealizethroughtheirenforcement.
As Solove notes, “Norms bind societies together; they regulate everyday
conduct; they foster civility. They are the oil that reduces the friction of human
interaction… In short, norms are a central mechanism through which a society
exercises social control” (2007, 6). This kindof “social control” is crucial for the
smooth functioningof all societies.While lawsplay an important role in this re-
12WethankXXforthissuggestion.
12
gard, they are not sufficient. We also need informal social norms, which create
stableexpectationsandfacilitatecooperationandconcord.Analysisofsexismand
racismhelpstoillustratethispoint.Eventhoughsexistandracistdiscriminationis
almost universally legally prohibited, pervasive social norms that unjustly privi-
lege the interestsofwhitemencontinuetoexist. It iswidelyacceptedthatover-
coming racial and gender injustices requires us to develop andmaintain better,
egalitarian,socialnorms.13
Externalsanctions,suchaspraise,blame,commendation,andcriticism,are
vitalformaintainingsocialnorms.Whennormsarefunctioningwell,membersofa
grouptakethemtobeauthoritativeorobligatory.Theyacceptandinternalizethe
norms,suchthattheyconsiderthemselvesduty-boundtocomplywiththem,and
are likely to feel guilt or shame if they violate them. Nonetheless, the internal
sanctionsgeneratedbythesemoralemotionsaregenerallyinsufficienttomotivate
compliance with the norms, especially over a longer period of time. External
sanctions are needed to fortify the moral capacities of individuals who cannot
reliably depend on internal sanctions doing the job.14It is this combination of
internalandexternalsanctionsenforcingsocialnormsthatmakes themeffective
as regulators of individuals’ behavior. As Emily McTernan notes, empirical re-
search shows that “social norms are powerful determinants of behaviour, and
securestablepatternsofbehaviourfromthemajorityofthosewhointernalisethe
norm”(2014,95).
13Forexample,seeGheaus(2012);Gheaus(2018).
14Fordiscussionoftheideaofmoralfortification,seeHoward(2017).
13
Publicshaming isone formofexternalsanctionthatcanupholdandrein-
force morally authoritative social norms. In doing so, it plays several valuable
roles.15Mostobviously,itmakestheoffenderawarethatshehasviolatedasocial
norm. Ideally, thiswill leadher to recognize that shehasactedwrongly, feel re-
morse, apologize, seek to make appropriate amends, and commit to complying
with the norm in future. This is the “reparative” role that Locke identifies. The
secondroleofpunishmentidentifiedbyLockeis“restraint”,ordeterrence.Public
shamingcanreducefuturenormviolations,byboththenormviolatorandothers,
since individualsare less likely todisobeysocialnorms if theywillbeexternally
sanctioned for doing so. In this way, public shaming helps to protect potential
victims against future violations. Further, it also demonstrates solidarity with
thosewhoarewrongedbyanormviolation,showingthemthatothersareunwill-
ing to let thewrongdoing go unnoticed and uncriticized. Finally, public shaming
provides a way that we can express our endorsement of valuable social norms,
thus strengthening our shared sense of commitment to those norms, and the
valuestheypromoteorrespect.
We can observe each of these points in the case of Shawn Simoes, who
made sexist remarks to ShaunaHunt live on-air. First, the public shaming of Si-
moeshelpedtoensurethathewasawareoftheseriousnessofhiswrongdoing,for
whichhelaterapologized.Second,hispublicshamingprovidesausefulreminder
of the fate thatan individualmaysufferbyacting in thisway.Nodoubt, thishas
deterredboth Simoes andothers fromacting similarly in the future, and, in this
15Wedisentanglethesedistinctrolesmorecarefullyandingreaterdepthinour[reference
removed].
14
way,ithashelpedtoprotectpotentialvictimsagainstsimilarkindsofsexistcon-
duct. Finally, thosewho shamedSimoeshavedemonstrated their solidaritywith
Hunt,aswellasstrengthenedtheirsharedcommitmenttostampoutthiskindof
sexistbehavior.
Partofwhatenablesonlineshamingtoplaythesevariousrolesisitspublic
nature.Clearly, shamingmustbepublic if it is tostrengthenoursharedcommit-
ment to the norm and deter other prospective violators. Further, holding unac-
ceptable behavior to public view and inviting others to affirm thewrongness of
thatbehaviorisperhapsmorelikelytocausetheoffendertofeelremorseandseek
tomakeamends,becausetheyarelikelytoexperienceagreaterdegreeofguiltand
shamethanwouldbethecaseotherwise.Privatecriticismcanalsoservesomeof
theseroles,ofcourse,andisanotherimportantmeansofsocialnormenforcement.
Butthepublicnatureofonlineshamingenablesittoservesomerolesmoreeffec-
tively,andtoserveotherrolesthatprivatecriticismcannot.
Theupshotofthisanalysisisthatwehavereasonstowelcomepublicsham-
ing, given theway inwhich it can enforce valuable social norms.Moreover, one
mighthavehighhopesforonlinepublicshaminginparticular.Moreinformationis
open to public view than ever before, andwe can disseminate that information
globallyandinstantaneously.Thisenablesordinarypeopletoholdoneanotherto
account,upholdvaluablesocialnorms,andpromotegoodconduct.Thedecentral-
izednatureofonlineshamingmeansthatitcanreflectvaluessharedbyordinary
usersoftheInternet,ratherthantheviewsofpowerfulelites.Onlinepublicsham-
15
ingmightappeartobeanegalitarian,orevendemocratic,formofpublicaccounta-
bilitythatcangivevoicetomembersofmarginalizedgroups.16
Thisrosypictureofonlinepublicshamingdoesnotseemtomatchpresent
reality, however. Nothing that we have said eliminates the worries that Locke
helpedustoidentifyorthatwesawinsomeoftheexamplesabove.Evenifpublic
shamingcanplayvaluableroles,thisdoesnotmeanthatitalways,orevenoften,
does.Weshouldstillhavegraveconcernsaboutthelargenumberofrecentcases
wherepublic shaminghasbeenexcessive, causedseveredistress, andseemingly
givenpeopleanexcusetoletouttheir“ill-nature”(touseLocke’sterm)byinsult-
ingandthreateningtheirtargets.Evenifpublicshaming,includingonlineshaming,
couldbeavaluablepractice,experiencesuggeststhatitisinfactadangerousone,
justasLockemighthaveexpected.Nonetheless,abandoningthepracticealtogeth-
erisnotanunambiguouslyattractiveoption,forthereasonswehavehighlighted
inthissection.
Theseremarkspointtothesecondoptionwementioned:wemightseekto
improve our practices of online public shaming, by developing principles and
guidelines to govern the practice and establishwhen, and inwhat forms, public
shamingisandisnotjustifiable.Inotherwords,thereisaneedforustodevelopa
moralframeworkthatwecanusetoassessthejustifiabilityofinstancesofonline
public shaming. The rest of this paper seeks to contribute to this endeavor, by
16Here,weputasideworriesrelatingtothefactthatmanywebsitesusealgorithmsto
structuretheinformationthatusersreceive,andsotheabilitytoshareinformationisnot
sodecentralisedasitmayfirstseem.Fordiscussion,seeHern(2016).
16
discussingtwoprinciplesthatwillbecentraltoanysuchframework:proportional-
ityandaccountability.
4. Proportionality
WesawearlierthatLockeheldthatthepunishmentofthosewhoviolatethelawof
naturemust beproportionate to the aims of that punishment. The same applies
withrespecttothepublicshamingofthosewhoviolatesocialnorms.Aninstance
of public shaming is justifiable only if it is proportionate. This requires that its
negative consequences are not excessive in comparison with its positive conse-
quences.Thepositiveconsequencesherearethosethatweidentifiedintheprevi-
ous section – causing remorse, deterring future violations, strengthening our
commitmenttoandcompliancewithvaluablesocialnorms,andsoon.Thenega-
tiveconsequencesincludethepsychologicalandreputationalharmstotheshamed
individual, aswell as anymaterial costs that follow, such as the loss of her job.
Klonick,Ronson,andSoloveallarguethatthesenegativeconsequenceshavebeen
disproportionate to the positive consequences in many cases of online public
shaming.
Determiningwhetherthisproportionalityrequirementisfulfilledinapar-
ticular case is a complex matter, which will depend on various contextually-
specific factors.Nonetheless, it remainspossible tomakeanumberofmoregen-
eralpoints.
4.1.Morallyauthoritativesocialnorms
17
Publicshamingthatenforcesasocialnormcanbeproportionateonlyifthatnorm
ismorally authoritative. If the relevant social norm is notmorally authoritative,
thenthereisnovalueinitsenforcementorreinforcement,soimposingburdenson
people by shaming them is always disproportionate.17Social norms aremorally
authoritativewhenindividualsareunderadutytocomplywiththem.Somenorms
generatesuchdutiesbyreflectingpre-existingmoralprinciples.Forexample,we
can justifynormsagainstsexistandracistspeechon thegrounds thatsexistand
racistspeechisitselfwrongful.Ofcourse,whatcountsassexistorracistspeech–
for example,what epithets are sexistor racist –will oftenbedeterminedby the
particularsocialcontext.ThisispartofwhatmakesSacco’scasesodifficult.
Other norms relate to pre-existing moral principles in more complicated
ways.Forexample,wemight think that it ismorallydesirable,orevenrequired,
thattherebesomegenerallyrecognizedwayofdecidingtheorderinwhichpeople
willgetontobuses,sothatpassengersdonotcomeintoconflictwithoneanother.
Thereisnomoralrequirementthatthisorderbesetbyaqueuethatisformedona
first-come-first-servedbasis.Wemightimagineasocietyinwhichsomeotherfair
systemisused instead.However, if theprevailingsocialnormis indeedqueuing,
thenwe should take it asmorally authoritative, since it facilitates peaceful bus-
boarding.18Various norms of politeness and respect operate in this way: it is
17ThisconclusionparallelsJeffMcMahan’sclaimthatallunjustwarsaredisproportionate
(2016).
18Moreover,thisexamplealsoshowsthatnotallsocialnormsthataremorallyauthorita-
tivearemorallyrequired,orevenmorallyoptimal.Forexample,let’ssupposewewereto
discoveranewmethodofallocatingseatsonbusesthatwasmarginallyfairerandmore
18
morallydesirabletohavesomenormregardingwhatbehaviorispoliteorrespect-
ful in various situations, and compliance with whatever norm comes to prevail
withinaparticularcontextisthenmorallyrequired,providingthatnormplaysits
rolesufficientlywell.
Animplicationofthisdiscussionisthatdifferentnormscanbepresentand
morallyauthoritative indifferent contextsorwithindifferent communities.19For
example,theremightbedifferentnormsonlineandoffline.Thiscancreatedifficul-
ties when online public shaming is used in response to conduct that occurred
offline.Inorderforsuchshamingtobeproportionate,thenormthatwasbreached
musthavebeenmorallyauthoritativeinthecontextinwhichthetargetedindivid-
ualacted,ratherthanbeinganormthatisdistinctivetoonlineinteraction.Propor-
tionalityrequiresthetargetofpublicshamingtohaveviolatedaduty.
4.2.Narrowproportionality
Someinstancesofpublicshamingareproportionatebecausetheyimposeburdens
uponnormviolatorsthatthose individualsare liable tosuffer,duetotheirviola-
tion of the norm. This is narrowproportionality(McMahan 2009, 20-24; Tadros
2011,356-359).
Anormviolatorcanbeliableonlyifshehasculpablyviolatedthenorm.This
requiresthatshemusthavebeenabletogainknowledgeoftherelevantnormand
efficientthanqueuing.Thiswouldcallintoquestionwhetherthecurrentsocialnormis
morallyoptimal.Butitwouldnot–immediately,atleast–callintoquestionwhether
compliancewiththeexistingsocialnormismorallyrequired.
19SomeofthecomplicationsthatthiscreatesarediscussedinValentini(forthcoming).
19
that her conduct breached that norm in a way that she could have reasonably
foreseen.Herviolationof thenormcan thusbeconsidered toreflectan “illwill”
toward others. This culpability conditionwas clearlymet in the case of Simoes,
whoseconductwasuncontroversiallysexist,andthepostofficecustomer,whose
conductwasuncontroversiallyracist.Itislessclearthatitwasfulfilledinthecase
ofSacco,whosecommentswereintendedtobeironic.
When thinking about public shaming’s negative consequences, one factor
thatwillaffectthemagnitudeofthereputationalandpsychologicalharmsimposed
uponthenormviolatoristhesizeoftheaudiencebeforewhomsheisshamed,and
thenumberofpeoplewhothenparticipateintheshaming.Thoughwehavebeen
talking about public shaming in a generalway, it is important to recognize that
publicitycomesindegrees.Therearebigdifferencesbetweenanindividualbeing
criticizedinfrontofasmallgroupoffriendsorcolleaguesandherbeingchastised
beforethegeneralpublic,throughthemediaorInternet.Oneoftheprimarycon-
cernswithonlinepublicshamingisthefactthatitcanreachsuchalargeaudience,
wherebythousands,orevenmillions,ofpeopleknowaboutandcondemnanorm
violation. Many who have been the target of online public shaming describe a
senseofthewholeworldbeingagainstthem,andtheintenseshame,humiliation,
anddistressthatthiscauses(seeRonson2015a).Thesesevereconsequencesare
oneof the reasons that onlinepublic shamingwill oftenbenarrowlydispropor-
tionate.Evenifindividualsareliabletosuffersomenegativeconsequencesdueto
20
their norm violation, theywill rarely be liable to suffer the kind of distress and
humiliationthatonlinepublicshamingregularlybringsabout.20
Anotherfactorthatmakesasignificantdifferencetowhetherpublicsham-
ing is narrowly proportionate iswhether it is reintegrative.21ToniMassaro pro-
vides an account of shaming practices in pre-World War II Japan and colonial
America,inwhichshearguesthatshamingwas“notunderstoodinthesecommu-
nities as an expression of contempt that permanently renounces or expels the
shame[d]member” (1997, 682). Instead, it showed that norm violationswill be
criticizedandpunished,butwiththeaimofreconcilingtheviolatorandthecom-
munity. Indeed, “the bond between the community and the shamed member is
reinforced… rather than severed” (Massaro 1997, 682). Healthy forms of public
shaming aim at, andmake possible, the reintegration of the norm violator back
intothecommunity,ratherthanpermanentlystigmatizingthem.
Inthesamevein, JohnBraithwaitedrawsadistinctionbetweenreintegra-
tiveanddisintegrativeshaming inthecontextofstate-basedpunishment(2000).
Reintegrative shaming seeks, and is receptive to, repentance on the part of the
shamed.Itfunctionsasameansofmoraleducation,seekingtobringtheoffender
20Thereareimportantquestionsabouthowtounderstandnarrowproportionalityin
casesthatinvolvethesystematicaccumulationofsmallerharms.Wediscussthisissuein
our[referenceremoved].
21Inemphasisingthatreintegrationmakesadifferencetowhetherpublicshamingis
proportionate,wedonotmeantodenythatreintegrationmightalsobeimportantfor
otherreasonsorthatitservesasanindependentconstraintofjustifiablepublicshaming.
Indeed,weargueelsewherethatitisanindependentconstraint,aswellasacontributorto
proportionality.Seeour[referenceremoved].
21
toanawarenessofthewrongnessofherconductandtoproducereformation. In
contrast, disintegrative shaming stigmatizes anddegrades the offender, posing a
threattoherveryidentityandprovidingnomeansofreconciliation.
Onlinepublicshamingcanalienateitstargetsfrombothonlineandoffline
communities.22Itshouldthusmakepossiblereintegrationintowhichevercommu-
nitiesare relevant– that is, intoanycommunity inwhich the individualhas lost
theirgoodstanding.Thisalsoinvolvesreintegrationbothwiththeshamersthem-
selves andwith thewider audience inwhose eyes the individual’s standing has
beenlowered.23
Shamingwillalmostalwaysbenarrowlydisproportionatewhenitisnotre-
integrative.Yetonlinepublicshamingstrugglesinthisrespect,sinceinordertobe
reintegrative it must be carried out in a way that makes clear that it does not
constituteapermanentrejectionof the individual.Thereare limits tohoweffec-
tivelythiscanbedoneusingmediasuchasTwitter,whichseverelylimitthespace
forexplanationandarenotwell-suitedtonuance.Onlinepublicshamingalsooften
22Someonlinepublicshamingaffects its target’sstandingonly intheonlinecommunity,
evenwhentheshamedconductoccursoffline.Butoftenonlineshaminghasclearoffline
effectsaswell,aswehaveseen.
23Thereisafurtherquestionaboutwhetherpublicshamingshouldfacilitatethereconcili-
ationof anormviolator and thevictim(s)ofhis act.Toanswer thisquestion,wewould
needtoknowmoreaboutthemoralityofforgivenessand,inparticular,whetherthereare
dutiestoforgive.Wedonotcommittoapositiononthishere,beyondtentativelysuggest-
ingthatonlinepublicshamingshouldnotmakesuchreconciliationmuchmoredifficultor
costly.
22
involves abuse and threats, which further undermine reintegration, as well as
beingmorallyreprehensibleinthemselves.
Beyond this, thevery fact thatsomanypeopleparticipate in thecriticism
andexpresstheirdisapprovalmakesitharderforonlineshamingtobereintegra-
tive.Explanations, defenses, andapologies areoften caricaturedor gounnoticed
amongthetorrentofdenunciation.Overcomingthesebarrierstoreintegration is
essentialifonlinepublicshamingistobemoreoftenjustifiable.
4.3.Wideproportionality
Allofourcommentsthusfarhavefocusedonnarrowproportionality,inwhichthe
burdensfallonthosewhoareliable.However,publicshamingalsoimposesnega-
tive consequences on those who are not liable. Reputational and psychological
harms often fall on third parties, such as the norm violator’s associates (her
friends, family,employersetc.).Moreover, thenegativeconsequences that fallon
the normviolator can often exceed that towhich she is liable, aswe havehigh-
lighted.
Nonetheless, itcouldbethattheoverallgoodconsequencesofaninstance
of public shaming greatly exceed the negative consequences that are imposed
uponthosewhoarenotliable.Thismightjustifythepublicshaming.Inconsidering
whetherthisisthecase,weareexaminingwideproportionality.
Lockedidnotrecognize theneed foraseparatestandardofwidepropor-
tionality.However,itisanimportantcomponentofacompleteaccountofpropor-
tionality,sincesanctionsalmostalwaysaffect individualswhoarenot liable. It is
inevitablethatthefamilyandfriendsofasanctionedindividualwillsufferatleast
23
someharm.This is truewith respect to the state’s enforcement of laws (Tadros
2011,356-359), itwouldbe truewith respect to theenforcementofnatural law
withinLocke’sstateofnature,anditisalsotruewithrespecttopublicshaming.24
We should not conclude that sanctions can never be justifiablewhen they harm
third parties in this way, since this would render practically all enforcement of
laws and social norms impermissible. Instead, we should recognize a distinct
standard of wide proportionality, which compares the overall positive conse-
quencesofimposingsanctionstothenegativeconsequencesimposeduponthose
whoarenotliable.
Thestandard forwideproportionality ismuchmoredemandingthanthat
fornarrowproportionality.Thisisbecausenegativeconsequencesaremuchmore
difficult to justifywhenthey fallonthosewhoarenot liable.Thepositiveconse-
quencesofpublicshamingmustbemuchmorevaluablethanthenegativeconse-
quencesinorderforthemtobewidelyproportionate.
Thisisnottosaythatthisstandardisimpossibletomeet.Inatleastsome
casesofonlinepublicshaming,theharmstothirdpartiesmaybefairlysmall,and
the benefits with respect to the enforcement and upholding of valuable social
norms great. Similarly, these benefits might sometimes be sufficient to justify
imposingburdensuponthenormviolatorthatexceedthosesheisliabletosuffer.
Wesuspectthatsuchcaseswillbefairlyrare,butperhapsthisistrueinthecaseof
ShawnSimoes.
24Itisalsotruewithrespecttomilitaryactionsduringwar,whichisthecontextinwhich
muchcontemporarydiscussionofproportionalityoccurs.SeeMcMahan(2009,20-24).
24
There is a further importantworry regarding thewide proportionality of
onlinepublicshaming,however,whichconcernsitssystemiceffects.Evenifsome
individual instances of online public shaming initially appear proportionate, the
regularpracticeofpublic shamingmighthavea ‘chilling effect’.The ideahere is
thatthefearofbeingpubliclyshamedwillleadmanytoretreatfromonlineinter-
actions,ortorefrainfrompostinganythingthatcouldpossiblybeseenascontro-
versial.Theonlineenvironmentwouldthusbecomefarlessactiveanddiscursive,
inawaythatharmseveryone.ThiskindofworryhasbeenexpressedbyRonson.
Hequotes froma friendwhosaid thathewouldnotdarepostmanyofhis jokes
and observations online anymore. The friend told Ronson: “I suddenly feelwith
socialmedialikeI’mtiptoeingaroundanunpredictable,angry,unbalancedparent
who might strike out at any moment” (2015a, 268). The actor and comedian
Stephen Fry has also expressed this worry. In February 2016, Fry quit Twitter,
afterhefacedonlinecriticismforajokehetoldwhilepresentingtheBritishAcad-
emyofFilmandTelevisionAwards(BBCNews2016).Inablogpostexplaininghis
decision, Fry complained that Twitter had become “a stalking ground for the
sanctimoniously self-righteouswho love to second-guess, to leap to conclusions
and be offended – worse, to be offended on behalf of others they do not even
know”(Fry2016).
These concerns are especiallyproblematicwhen the chilling effect occurs
through the silencingofmembersofmarginalizedgroups (rather thanofupper-
class, white men, such as Fry). This is for two reasons. First, it is because it is
membersofthesegroupsthathavethemosttocontributeintermsofmakingour
online environment more discursive. Second, it is because the participation of
25
membersofmarginalizedgroups isvital toanydefenseofonlinepublicshaming
thatappealstoitscredentialsasanegalitarian,orevendemocratic,formofpublic
accountability.
Theideathattheover-zealousenforcementofsocialnormsmighthavethis
kindofchillingeffect,andultimatelylimitindividualityandfreeexpression,isnot
new. Indeed, it isoneof thecentralclaims in JohnStuartMill’sOnLiberty (1859,
especiallychapter III).Millarguesthat individual freedomis threatenednotonly
bytheencroachmentofthestate,butalsobycivilsociety’sinformalsanctions.He
writesthat
Itisnotbywearingdownintouniformityallthatisindividualinthem-
selves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits im-
posedbytherightsandinterestsofothers,thathumanbeingsbecomea
nobleandbeautifulobjectofcontemplation(Mill1859,ChapterIII,§9).
For Mill, the development of individuality was being stifled by undue levels of
societal regulation, including through public shaming, in 19th century Britain.
Ronson and Fry both claim that these dynamics also pose a grave threat in the
contemporaryonlineworld.
Theseconcernsarisemainlybecausethereiscurrentlysuchahighvolume
ofonlinepublicshamingthatisdisproportionate.Ifshamingoccurredonlywhenit
was proportionate, then Mill’s and Ronson’s worries about its systemic effects
wouldhavelessforce.Thatis,theirwarningshaveforcelargelyduetothefactthat
there iscurrentlysomuchunjustifiedpublicshaming.But that is indeed thepre-
sentreality,andinthatcontextitmightwellbethateveninstancesofonlinepublic
shamingthatinitiallyappearproportionatearecontributingtoanoverallpractice
26
thathasextremelydamagingsystemiceffects,andisthusdisproportionate.Ifthis
is right, then online public shaming will be justifiable much less often than we
mightotherwisesuppose.
4.4.Implications
Muchcontemporaryonlinepublicshamingisdisproportionate,inboththenarrow
andwide senses.What canbedoneabout this? Inourview, themost important
responseshouldbeanincreaseinawarenessregardingtherisksofdisproportion-
ality,andthusofpublicshamingbeingunjustified.MillwroteOnLibertyinorderto
entreat his readers to recognize the proper limits on society’s control over the
individual.Similarly,wehopethatan increasedawarenessof therisksofdispro-
portionalitywillleadpeopletobemorehesitanttoengageinonlinepublicsham-
ing. Importantly, this hesitancy should extend even to caseswhere there clearly
hasbeenaculpablebreachofamorallyauthoritativesocialnorm.Even in those
cases,itmightwellbethataddingone’svoice(orre-tweet)tothecriticismofthe
norm violator will contribute to her and/or others suffering disproportionate
harms.
Inotherwords,weneednewsocialnormsregardingonlineactivity:social
normsthatencourageustobeslowtoconcludethatanindividual isculpable, to
showrestraint incriticism,torefrainfromseekingdisproportionatepunishment,
andtobewillingtooverlookpastinfractions,soastoallowpeopletoberestored
into the online community in good standing.While our concern in this essay is
withthedisproportionateenforcementofsocialnorms,itissocialnormsthatalso
providethemostpromisingsolution.
27
Greaterawarenessaloneisunlikelytobesufficient,however.Wealsoneed
toconsiderwhethercertainnegativeconsequencesarealmostalwaysdispropor-
tionate,andthusoughttoberuledoutcompletely–andperhapslegallyregulated.
Onesuchconsequenceisthenormviolatorlosingherjob.BothSaccoandSimoes
werefired,thoughthelatterwasre-hiredafteranarbitrationpurpose.Whileitis
perhapsunderstandable that firmswant todistance themselves fromemployees
whohavebeenshamed,thiswillalmostalwaysimposedisproportionateburdens
onthenormviolatorandtheirdependents.25Forthisreason,weshouldconsider
tighter legal regulation in this domain, granting employees stronger protection
againstbeingfired.
5. Accountability
Another concept that is central to justified public shaming is accountability –
specifically, the accountability of shamers. It is highly desirable that those who
shame others can themselves be held to account, taking responsibility for their
criticismand itseffects,andbeingopen toresponses,discussion,andcorrection.
Certainly,thetargetofshamingshouldhaveaneffectiverightofreply,andideally
otherindividualswilldotoo.
5.1.Locke,again
25Ofcourse,therearenotableexceptionstothis,suchaswhenanindividualviolatesan
importantprofessionalnorm.Thismayincludecasesinwhichadoctorviolatesconfiden-
tialitynormsoranacademichassexualrelationswithoneofhisstudents.
28
Accountability can help to mitigate the problems that Locke identified, since it
means thatnormenforcersmustbeprepared to justify their actions.Theymust
explainwhy thenormviolatorought tobecriticized,by showing thatavaluable
socialnormhasinfactbeenviolated.Theyalsomustlistentootherpointsofview,
andconsiderthepossibilitythattheymightbemistaken.Thishelpstocombatthe
“partiality” and “passion” that Locke considered central problemswith informal
sanctioning. Further, it acts as a safeguard against inaccurate and unwarranted
criticism,sinceitbothdeterspeoplefromengaginginsuchcriticismandmakesit
easierforerrorstobecorrected.
Indeed,accountabilityispartofLocke’ssolution.Lockearguesthatthein-
conveniencesofthestateofnaturewouldleadpeopletoestablishapublicauthori-
ty that laysdownclear lawsand thenenforces those laws in a transparentway.
Lawsareenforcedbyimpartialjudges,thoseaccusedofcrimesareabletooffera
defense,andthosewhoareconvictedareabletoappeal.Moreover,Lockeargues
thatifthepublicauthorityceasestogoverninafairwaythenthepeoplecanhold
ittoaccountbyrevoltingagainstit,andreplacingtheunjustgovernment.26
TheformalizedaccountabilitythatfeaturesinLocke’ssolutionisnotavail-
ableinourcontext,sincewearefocusingonthejustifiabilityofinformalsanction-
ingwithincivilsociety.Nonetheless,theideathatthosewhosanctionothersmust
themselvesbeabletobeheldtoaccountisanimportantone.Thisisafeaturethat
is often missing from contemporary online public shaming. Indeed, one of the
striking featuresofSacco’s case is thather tweetwentviralwhilst shewasona
plane, accompanied by the hashtag #HasJustineLandedYet (Ronson 2015c). She
26Fordiscussion,seeSimmons(1993,ch.5).
29
hadbeenthenumberoneworldwidetrendonTwitter,andlostherjob,beforeher
plane landed, and thus before she was able to offer any kind of explanation or
defense.
As with proportionality, increasing accountability within online public
shamingiscentrallyamatterofdevelopingnewsocialnorms.Weshouldseekto
create a culture inwhich thosewho engage in public shamingmake themselves
accountable toothers. Inotherwords, theyshould recognizeandrespectothers’
rightofreply,andespeciallythatofthetargetoftheircriticism.Thosewhoaccuse
othersofviolatingsocialnormsshouldbewillingtolistentotheothersideofthe
storyandconsiderwhethertheircriticismsmightbemisplaced.
5.2.Anonymity
Arguably, oneway to increase accountability online is to prohibit, or otherwise
prevent,anonymity.Anonymitymakesitmoredifficultfortheshamed,andothers,
toexercisetheirrightofreply,sinceanonymousshamersshieldthemselvesfrom
criticismbyconcealing their identities.Anonymousshamersarealso likely tobe
emboldenedinawaythatcanleadtoexcessivecriticism.Indeed,thereisempirical
evidence showing that thosewhowrite under the cloak of anonymity aremore
likely to be uncivil. Arthur Santana studied the comments on online newspaper
articles, and found that anonymous comments were significantly more likely to
includepersonalattacks,threats,abusiveorhateful language,epithets,andracist
sentiments.AsSantananotes,hisstudysupportstheconclusionsofrecentpsycho-
logical research, according to which “anonymity can foster a sense of impunity,
lossofself-awarenessandalikelihoodofactinguponnormallyinhibitedimpulses
30
in a way that is markedly inconsistent with a person’s offline self” (2014, 23).
Anonymityrunscountertothekindofaccountability-conducivesocialnormsthat
areneededinorderforonlinepublicshamingtobejustifiable.
Interestingly,someonlineforadonotpermitanonymity.Somenewspaper
websitesrequirecommenterstousetheirrealnames,andFacebookrequiresthat
usersusetheirauthenticnameandidentity.Facebookexplicitlyjustifythispolicy
onaccountabilitygrounds:“Whenpeoplestandbehindtheiropinionsandactions
withtheirauthenticnameandreputation,ourcommunityismoreaccountable”.27
Weshouldcertainlybeskepticalofthesincerityofthisjustification,giventheway
inwhich thispolicyenhancesFacebook’s ability togeneratemoreaccuratemar-
keting data. Nonetheless, the policy might serve to increase accountability. For
example,SamratHanifwaseasilyidentifiableasthesourceofthepostofficevideo,
and was asked to comment on his decision to post the video online by several
mediaoutlets.
However,therearealsoconsiderationsinfavorofanonymity.Theabilityto
writeanonymouslyallowsindividualstoexpressunpopularviewswithlessfearof
being personally attacked or criticized. People can have legitimate reasons for
wantingtobeabletoexpressviewsorrevealfactsaboutthemselveswithoutbeing
identifiable. Those who are more vulnerable might be more likely to interact
onlineiftheycandosoanonymously.Insupportofthis,thereisevidencethatlinks
anonymity to increases in the number of participants and the range of views
articulatedwithinonlinediscussions(McCluskeyandHmielowski2011).
27Facebook’s‘CommunityStandards’,availableat
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards.
31
Perhaps ironically, theseconsiderations in favorofanonymityarepersua-
sive partly because online discussion and criticism is so often conducted in an
objectionableway.Therewouldbe lessneed for anonymity if disproportionality
werenotsorife.Thoughanonymityhasbeenshowntocontributetotheseprob-
lems, itmightalsobe justified in lightof thosesameproblems.At thevery least,
anonymity’sbenefitsaregreaterintheunjustworldinwhichwelive.
Insomecontexts,theremaybeamiddleway.Thepopularphilosophyblog
Daily Nous allows anonymous comments, but only on two conditions.28First,
anonymouscommentersmuststill submita realemailaddress,which isnotdis-
played publicly but is seen by thewebsitemoderator. Second, anonymous com-
mentersmustuseaconsistentname(or“handle”)inalloftheircomments.29These
conditions ensure that individuals can be associatedwith all of their comments
and that themoderator can contact even anonymous commenters, if necessary.
This policy attractively combines the benefits of anonymity with the virtues of
accountability.Anobviousdrawback,however,isthatitrequiresanactivemoder-
ator,whocanenforcethepolicy.Thismightnotalwaysbepossible.Nonetheless,
wewouldenhanceaccountabilityiftheprevailingsocialnormencouragedindivid-
ualstoadoptaconsistentonlineidentity.
5.3.CollectiveHarms
28Seehttp://dailynous.com/comments-policy/.
29Thispreventsso-called“sockpuppeting”.See
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sockpuppet_(Internet).
32
Even putting all of these problems aside, a further issue remains. Online public
shamingiscarriedoutbyalargenumberofdisparateindividuals,manyofwhom
dolittlemorethanre-tweetanother’scriticism.Whiletheoverallburdenssuffered
bytheshamedmightbegreat,thecontributionofeachindividualshamerisvery
small.WhereasLocke’spublic authorityprovides a single institution that canbe
heldaccountableforitsenforcementofthelaw,thedecentralizednatureofonline
publicshamingmeansthatnoparticularparticipantcanbeheldtoaccountforthe
fullextentofaninstanceofshaming.
Publicshamingisnottheonlyphenomenonthathasthisfeature.Incasesof
so-called“collectiveharms”,theactionsofalargegroupofindividualscauseharm,
yet the contribution of each individual is negligible (Kagan 2011; Nefsky 2012;
Spiekermann2014).Inmanycasesofcollectiveharm,itseemsthatnoindividual’s
actionmakesanydifferencetotheoutcome.Whetherornotonemoreindividual
participatesinonlinepublicshamingprobablymakesnoperceptibledifferenceto
thenegativeconsequencesfortheshamed.Yettheoveralleffectoftheseindividu-
als’ actions is large.As several philosophershavepointedout, someof themost
importantproblemsfacinghumanitytoday,suchasanthropogenicclimatechange
andunjustworkingconditions,sharethis“collectiveharm”structure.
Thereareat leasttwoquestionsthatarisewhenweconsidercasesofcol-
lective harms. First, can we hold collectives accountable for harmful outcomes
when they are not organized and lack structures for collective decision-making
(Miller 2007, ch. 5; Lawford-Smith2015)? Second, canwe view an individual as
havingactedwrongly incaseswhereawrongoccurredbuther individualaction
didnotmakeanydifferencetotheoutcomecausedbythegroupasawhole?We
33
lackspacetoexaminetherichphilosophicalliteraturediscussingthesequestions.
Sufficetosaythatthesedebatesarehighlyrelevanttoanormativeassessmentof
onlinepublicshaming,andone’sviewsonthesequestionswilldeterminewhether
onebelieves that shamerscanbeheldaccountable for theeffectsof instancesof
shaming. If they cannot be properly held accountable, then this might lead one
seriously to questionwhether online public shaming is ever justifiable. This is a
particularlystrongconclusionbecausethenatureofpublicshamingasacollective
harm is a structural feature of the practice, rather than something that can be
alteredthroughregulationorbettersocialnorms.Theimportanceofthecollective
harmissuewithrespecttopublicshamingshouldthusbeobvious.
6. Conclusion
Wehavenotbeenabletodiscussallofthenormativelysalientfeaturesofonline
public shaming in this paper.However,wehavehighlighted someof the central
elements that any assessment of online public shamingmust contain, and have
indicatedthewaysinwhichtheseelementsaffectthejustifiabilityofthepractice.
Aswehavesoughttoemphasizethroughout,socialnormsarevital toour
livingcivilizedlivestogether.Theirenforcementthroughpublicshaming,including
online,canservejustifiedpurposes,byupholdingvaluablenorms.However,online
public shaming also brings great risks of unaccountable, unrestrained, mob-like
attacks on individuals. Such condemnation can be disproportionate, and thus
unjustified, even if its target has culpably violated amorally authoritative social
norm.Creatingtheconditionswheresocialnormscanbeupheldonlineinvaluable
ways is itself a matter of creating new and better social norms regarding our
34
online conduct. Social norms could thus provide the solution to the problem of
theirownenforcement.Whethersuchnormswillinfactdevelop,however,isvery
difficulttopredict.Changingthepracticesofthousands,orevenmillions,ofpartic-
ipantsinonlineinteractionsisplainlyahugetask–butitisnotanimpossibleone.
Ifwearecorrect,then,oneofthecentralimplicationsofthispaperisthatfurther
researchintothewaythatonlinenormschangeanddevelopisurgentlyneeded.
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