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8/3/2019 USSBS Report 79, Ships Bombardment Survey Party
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/ussbs-report-79-ships-bombardment-survey-party 1/9
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8/3/2019 USSBS Report 79, Ships Bombardment Survey Party
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/ussbs-report-79-ships-bombardment-survey-party 2/9
U. S. Stratogic Bombing Survey
Report "I Ship" Bomb.rdment Survey Party
~
ICONFIDENTIAL
FonEWORD
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey
was establish d by the Secretary of War on 3
November, 19'14, pursuant to a Directive from
the late President Roosevelt. Us mission was
to conduct an impartial and expert study of the
effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be
used in connection with ail' attacks on Japan
and to establish a basis for evaluating the irn-
portance and potential ities of air power as an
inst rument of military s tra tegy , f or p lann ing
the future development of the United States
armed forces, and for det ermi ni ng fut ure eco-
nomi c policies with respect to the national de-
fense. A summary report and some 200 sup-
porfing reports containing the f ind ings of theSurvey in Germany have been publi shed .
On Hi August 1945, President Truman re-
quested that the Survey conduct a similar
study of the effects of all types of air attack in
the war against Japan, submitt ing repor ts in
duplicate to the Secretary of War and to the
Secretary of the Navy. The officers of the Sur-
vey dur ing i ts Japanese phase were :
Franklin D'Olier, Chairman
Paul R Nitae, Vice-Chairman
Henry C. Alexander, Vice-Chairman
Waltel' Wilds, Secretary
Harry L. Bowman,
J. K. Galbraith,
Ransis Likert,
Fr ank A. McNamee,
Fred Searls, Jr.
Monroe Spaght,
Dr. LOllis R. Thompson,
Theodore P. Wright, Directors
The Survey 's complement provided fOI" 300
civilians, 350 officers, and 5 0 enlisted men.
The military segrn nt of the organization was
drawn from the Army to the extent of 60 per
cent, and from the Navy to the extent of 40pel' cent. Bo h the Army and the Javy gave
the Survey all possible assistance ill furnishing
men, supp lies, t ransport and informat ion. The
Survey operated f rom headquarters established
in Tokyo early in September, 19~5, with sub-
headquar ter s in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima and
Nagasaki , and with mobile teams opera ting in
other part s of Japan, the i slands of the Pacific,
and the Asiat ic ma in land.
It was possible to reconstruct much of war-
time Japanese military planning and execution,
engagement by engagement and campaign by
campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate
s tatist ics on Japan's economy and war-produc-
tion plant by plant, and industry by Industry.
In addi tion , stud ie were conduc ted on Japan' s
overall strategic pl ans and the background of
her ent ry into the war, the inter nal d is cussions
and negot iations leading to her acceptance of
uncondi t ional sur rende r, the cour se of heal th
and morale among the civili an population. the
e ff ec tiveness of the Japanese civi li an def ense
organizat ion and the effects of the atomic
bombs. Separate repor ts will be issued covering
each phase of the tudv.
The Survey int errogated more than 700 Jap-
anese military, government and industrial offi-
cials. It also recovered and translated many
documents which have no only been useful to
the Survey, but will a lso f urn ish data valuable
for other studies. Arrangements are beingmade to tUI"l1 over the Survey' s fl Ies to a per-
rnanent government agency where t hey wi ll be
a vailable fOI' fur ther examination and dis tr ibu-
tion.
PAGE i
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U . S . S I ,a l eq i c B Q " b in q S " r ve r
Repor t o f Ship,:' Bombard",ent Survay Party
CONFIDENTIAL
ACKNOWLE,DGMENT
Data presented herein were gathered almost enti rely in the
field during the period 2 October to 25 November 1945 by member s
of the Ships' Bombardment SUI 'Vey Party, l is ted below, each of
whom made important contri but ions to the report which foll ows:
Cap t. N. A. Chap in , USN
Lt. R. G. Grassy, USNR
Lt. J. D. Coker , USNR
Lt. M. E . Pauley , USNR
Lt. C.W. Shumake r, USNRLt. (jg) J.L. Decker, USNR
Lt. (jg) O. Sutermeister, US1>."R
Lt . (jg) H . V . Allen, r-,USNH
Ens. T. M..Nolen, USNR
Ens. W. K. Kreider, USNR
Walke)', T. L., Sp(X)lc
Bleckman, M. , P h o j) .f ic
Get tys, R. A., Pholl'llc
Eanson, D. W., Pho~nc .
Asadoor ian, R., Pho:1l'I1c
F uU er , H . K ., Y 2eMitchell, L. I ., .Sp(X) 3c
Schlessinger, A. J., Slc
Scanlon, C. J., Sic
Gato, W. R., Sgt., AUS
Hanamura, G. R. , S/Sg'l;, AUS
Price, S . V. , Cpl. , AUS
III connection with preparation of this report, acknowledgment
is made to the Offi ce of the Chief of Naval Operati ons for publica-
tion arrangements ; to the Printing Division of the Executive Off ice
of the Secret:aI 'Y of t he Navy f O I " valuable techn ical adv ice andassistance in printing; to the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Depart -
ment, fo r a id in prepa ring ' man, ' d rawings and sketches ; and to the
War Department for making available photographic processing
mater ials and facilities.
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:t~:t:
U . S . S!,aiegio Bombing Survey
Report ef Ship" Bombordmen! Surv,ey P.rty
CONFIDENTIAL
CONTENTS
FOREWORD, INTRODUCTION, CONCLUSIONS AND GENERAL SUMMARY
ENCLOSURE (A); STUDY OF KA.\\fAlSHl AREA
ENCLOSURE (E): STUDY OF HAMAlI1ATSU AREA
ENCLOSURE (C): STUDY OF HITACHI AREA
ENCLOSURE (0); STUDY OF RAKODATE AREA
ENCLOSURE (E); STUDY OF MORORAN AREA
ENCLOSURE {F}: STUDY OF SHIMIZU AREA
ENCLOSURE (G); STUDY OFSHlONOMISAIU AREA
ENCLOSORE (H); STUDY OF I'mJIMA SAl{[ AREA
ENCLOSURE (I): COlVlMENTS AND DATA ON EFFECTIVENESS OF AiiIl \IUNITION
ENCLOSURE (J): COMll' IENTS AND DATA ON ACCURACY OF FIRfNGS
ENCLOSURE [K): EFFECT OF SURFACE BOl\ffiARDMENTS ON JAPA}.rESE WAR
POTENTIAL
PAG~ v
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CONFIDeNTIAL. S. Slrategic8ombi"9 Su.~.y
Repor!of Ship. Bombardment Surveyh,ty
INTRODUCTION
Immediately fo llowing the end of host il it ies
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and
Pacific Ocean Areas, commenced gathering data
and assembling personnel for evaluation of
naval surface bombardments of J apan by means
of f ield observations, In accordance with recom-
mendati ons of the Commaudel' -in"Chief and
Chief of Naval Opera tions a rrangements were
made for this study to be made by the U. S.
Strategic Bombing Survey .. The Ships' Born.
bardment SUl"ey Part y was formed and oper-a ted d ir ec tly unde r the Sen ior Nava l Member of
the U. S. Strategic Bombing Sun'e,Y.
Tbis repor t i s designed to cover in det ail all
res ults of ships' bornbardmen ts of Japan proper.
Eaeh enclosure of the report i s summarized inorder to make gener al r esul ts quick ly and eas ily
accessible. The great volume of detail has
been ineluded to make avai lable a ll factual da ta
gathered which might prove useful i n future
studies of naval bombardments of i ndustrial
ins ta ll at ions on shore , and in developments to
improve weapons and techn iques used in such
attacks.
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t. . . .. . . .".
".. .".
I J ! I '
U,S , Slr • .Iegic Bombing Survey
Rep" r+ ,of Ship. ' Sombardmenl Survey Party
CONFIDE~mAL
CONCLUSIONS
Surface bornbardm eots of Japa 0 proper took
place shortly befcra the Japanese sur render . Iti s not probablethat the economic consequences
of these at taekl l wer e fe lt on the figh ting f ront s
befo r e th e wa I' ended, but there is evid s nee to
indicate that the attacks, in combination with
ether pressures being applied, had considerable
InHuence in lowering th e will to con tinue thewar of the local populations which were sub-
ieted t o gunfire from heavy ships,
Had th e wa t' continu ed, it is es tirnated that
about twenty-two per cent of total Japanese
pig iren production (which in the absence of
further attacks on the steel industry could
othe rwis e have been expected >Inthe ensuing
year) would have been lost because of the
effects of three attacks against pl ants o.f the
iron and steel industry, assuming that the con-dition of the Japanese economy at the time of
the attack continued throughout Blat year.
other surface bombardments appear to have
had l it tl e e ff ec t on the Japanese economic st ruc-
ture as a whole, except to the extent to which
th,ey centr ibuted to increased labor absenteeism
and red u ced labor pre d ue ti vity in the IIteasattacked.
This report demonst rates the v it al ro le which
intelligence informat ion plays in shore born-
bar dment, and the neces si ty fo r ma in tenanea of
an organ iza tion which , among other func tions.
is capable of Identifying key industries in the
enemy's wartime eeonomy, designating the
most vulnerable points of attacks, providing
detailed information on targets seleded for
as sa u l t, and asse ss ing r es uIts.
The Kamalsh l Works of J apan Ir on Company,
Ltd., as 11 result of two bombardments, Incur red
very considerable physical damage, and a 108s
of production equi valent to fromeigh t to twelvemonths' output. Yet no major building in this
],eavy industrial plant was destroyed because
the grea tes t concentration of hHs did nctei xceed
thl rtv-s even per 200 yard square, In the bom-
bardments genem]]y the density of hits was
much lower, pos slbty because of the techn ique
of aiming at different buildings scattered
throughout a target area, or intentionally
spreading the fall of shot to cover an ent ire
target, under the assumption that both aeeur-
acy of f ring and e ffect ivenes s ofamm uni tion
would be greater than t hey actuall y proved tobe, Data en the effectiveness of projectiles in
Enclosure (I) indicate that about forty-two
direct Ilits by sixteen-inch high capacity pro-
ict iles would be required to cause fifty per
cent st ructura l damage to a heavy stee l-framed
building approximately 600 feet long and 150
feet wide. It is concluded that doctrine and
techniques. for attacking industrial targets withsh ips can be conside rably improved by furthe r
st u dy bas e d. Oil rea ppraisal s of weapon effec-
t iveness andaccuracy of firing under varying
conditions, It also appears th a t, although Ieng
and medium range attacks by both da,yand
night can infl ic t conside rable damage, dest ruc-
t ion of p lant s of hel lvy indush 'Y bysuch a tt acks
is not to be expected unless either a very large
amount of ammunition is allotted to the task
or muchgreater accuracy i s obtained. Experi-
ence has shown that it is possible to raise the
l evel of accuracy at theexpense of increasing
the hazard to the firing ships by using shorter
ranges and prolonging firing periods. The ex-
ten t to IVWeh these measu res can be adop ted
will therefore usually be governed by the broad
s tra teg ic a sp ects of th e war as we]] as th e Im-
mediate tact ica l si tuation.
The Ramamatsl l and HH:a ,ehia reas were sub-
jected to hi gh explosi ve and incendiary bomb-
ing as well as to surface bombardment, andstudy of these areas th us permit ted a ce rt aln
degree of compari son of the re la tive e l'Eect ive-
ness of these forms of attack, Because of tile
highly combustible nature of the majority of
the tar get s, I lre s ini ti at ed by incendjm'Y bomb-
ing clearly caused the greatea t amoun t of dam-age. Although a considerable number of fil,{!S
was associated with high exp losive bombing
and gllnfil'f! there were many instances in whichdetonat ion of h igh explos ives defini te ly d id not
in] tiate fires di rectly, even when occurring in
struetures of light wood and paper construction.
it therefore seems probable that, in generat
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U. s. S t ,a t eg i c B omb in g Su r ve y
Repor lol S~ips' Bomb" r dmen t SolVey p.•rty
tires initiated by high explosives were caused
b:\' overturning of cooking fi res. st riking of
VQ IIItiIe and inflammabl e liquids or gases , short
clreui ts, etc. Itappear s tha t development of
major ca libe r incendiar y ammuni tion i s war-ranted, and is a n eeessi ty if sh ips are to be
used. :in the future for large scale bombardment
of industrial piant s Or urban a reas.
Its concluded that high explosive projectiles
or bombs are most efficiently used when di-
rected agains t t arget s which ar e h ighly r es ist -
an t eo burn ing. Ag-a inst heavy s teel -framed
butldinga, individual 2,000 pound bombs seem
to be approxima tel :\ ' eigh t t imes as e !fect ive
as s ixteen-ineh high capacity projectiles in pro-
du cing damage when mean a reas of e ffect ive-
nessare compared. Ser ious f ragmen t damage
f rom bombs seems to be conf ined largely to the
immediate vicinity of each hit, while the heavy
f ragments from pro jec ti le s proved capable ofdamaging machines at considerable distances.
Both missiles showed themsel Vel; to be capable
of damaging the heaviest types of industrial
structures. Choice of weapon against suchtarget s. would seem to be governed largely by
deciding whether, in specific circumstances, suf-
PAGE 2
CONFIDENTIAL
l le ient hits can most easily be delivered by ships
or p i noes, and wei ghing the rela t i v e t:is k ~n-
vnIved. Since repor ts of gunnery exerCIses 10-
dicate that at least ninety per cent of hits on
ind iv idua l l arge bui ld ings i s to be expaeted atshort ranges, as compared to an average of
somethi ng legs th lUI 0n e per cent in these
bombardmen ts,i t i s appa rent tha t th i s type of
attackcan be devas tating with great economy
of ammunition and effor t when cireurnstances
permit its use. It is of COU1 ·5O evident that,
considering the enemy economy as a whele, only
II sma ll percen tage of impor tant t arget s will
u s u a l t y be wi thin reach of IItack by sh i ps.
'The damaging cf feet of indiviiiualeigh t-ine h
ani! smaller "pl"ojctiles appears to be roo smallto maH e thelr use prOTIable aga ins t plant s of
heavy industry unless a very great number of
i ll ts cn iad iv idual bui ldings can be obtain ed , o r
unless harassment and not destruction i s thel'I1MJ t desi:red. Incendiary arumunit<ion in the
sma ller ca libe rs , however , should produce r e-
sults comparable to those obtained by incendi-
ary bombing, if used aga inst u r ban a reascr
other inflammable targets.
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CONFIDENTIAL. S. SlrategieBombin.g· Survey
Reper ! o f Ship,' Bembar·dme.nl Survey P.rty
GENERAL SmfMARY
Units of the Thinl Fleet attacked selected
targets. with gunfi re in the ar eas of Karnaiah i,
Hamamatsn , Hitachi , MU1·oran, Sh imizu . Sh i-
enomisaki and Nojima Saki . The primary task
of the first fOUl· named a ttacks was bombard-
men t, and tl,e principal compo n e nts of tag k
units which executed them were, in general,
fast battleships and heavy cruisers. Attacks on
Shimizu, Shionomisaki and Nojima Saki were
secondary tasks car ried out during anti-ship-
'Ping sweeps. They were accomplished" by light
cruisers and destroyers except that the bom-
bardment of Shimizu was eJ:ecuted by destroy-
ers only.
The general mission ass igned to the attacking
units by Commander Third Fleet was to bom-
bard certain vital areas of Japanese malnland
in order to des troy v ital indust ri es , demora li ze
transport ation, and l ower t he will to resist ofthe Japanese people.
Karnaishi, Muroran and Nojima Saki were
not a tt acked by ai rel lCcep t by cover ing and
spot ting p lanes accompanying fi ring sh ips, and
at MU1·01"anby cer tain car rier planes engaged
primarily in a strike on snipping in Tsugaru
S trai ts, 0 ther areas vis ited by th i s su rvey party
were subj ected to maj or a il : atta cks as well as
sur faee bombardment, making it necessary tostudy a ll damage to sh ips' t arget s in these a reas
in order to differentiate damage caused by
bombing and gunfire,
At Hitachi and Hamamatsu British task
un it s took p ll l·t in the bombardments but ope r-
abed independently. HMS NEWFOUNDLAND
and HMNZS GAMBIA participated in the sec-
ond bombardment of Kamaishi.
Carrier planes attacked the Hakodata-Aornoni
railway fer ry system 14-15 July, 1911.5.Because
no other nava l uni t o f the Survey was scheduled
to visit Hakodate, t hi s. survey party studied
the e lf·ect o f these s trike s, a lthough ships' gun-
fire played 110 part in them.
The two bombardments of Kamaishi caused
damage which , aecor ding to Japanese offi cial s,
would have required repairs costing about s ixty-
f ive pel"cent of the total . value of physical assets
to r es to re the p lant to i ts p re- at tack condit ion.
Had the Japanese. "planned to continue full scale
prod uct ion i t i ll estimat ed that the equivalen t
of rromeigh t to twelve months' p roduct ion a t
the pre-attack rate would have been lost, be-
c a . use of th e cornbin ed elf,ects of gu n fire and
the crit i cal condi tion of th e .Japan ese economy.
Fi res ini ti at ed by gunfi re extensive ly damaged
the town of Karnai sh i. Re frlge ra ti cn p lant s and
other facilities of the considerable fishing in-
dustry there were destroyed by these fin's.
Widespread damage had been infl lc ted on. the
Hamamatsu nell: by ail " attacks pri or to thesurface bombardment, Gunii.re damaged surviv-
ing' buiIdings. and. equipman t of t he ImperialGovernment Railway Hamamatsu Locomotive
WOl:kS and inca paei ta ted tills el emen t of tile
transport ation system for about three months .
Projectiles :falling in tb.e ra ilway yards caused
interruption of through traffic on the Tokaidomain line forabout t hree days. Slight damage
was also 'inflicted on plants of the Japan "Musical
Instrument Manufacturing Company, Asano
Heavy Industr ial Company, Suzuki Loom Comp-
any, Ltd., Nakajima Airplane Company, Ltd ..
and al l a naval barr acks . . Damage to dwellings,gas, electrical and telephone facilities, and
wa. te r works , al ready extensive thr ough a ir a t-
tacks, was considerably augmented by gunfire .
In Hitachi the Kaigan Plant, which was the
largest plant and head office of the Hitachi
Works of the Hitachi Manufacturing Company,
had been heavily damaged by a B-29 high ex-
plosives' a ttack prior to surface bombardment,
Itwas the re fo re not I[ target for gunfire , Ships '
gunfire moderately damaged the Taga Works
and Mito Works of Hitachi Manufacturing
Company and slightly damaged Yamate Plant
of the Hitachi WOl".ksof Hitachi :NLanuiac.turing
Company and the copper refining section of
Hitaehi Mine. In addition, projectiles, falling in
the urban ar ea caused cons ider ab le damage tohousing and to telephone, power, water and
gas facilities. However, the most extensive
damage In tills urban area was caused by a
B-29 incend ia ry at tack which took place about
one day aftar th e s urface bornba rdment, an d
destroyed 01 " damaged about s even ty-e ight per
cen t of the buil t-u p area, Some Japanese offi -
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U, S,Str.logic Bombing Survey
Report 01 S~ip" Bomb.. dmonl Surv. y Par ty
c ial s conside red tha t the eff ec tiveness of the
inceod ia ry a ttack was increased by the surface
bombardment, because many persons who had
fled from the eitv were no available to fightfires, These of fi~ial s wer e impress ed by this
apparent coordination between our sur face and
air forces.
Targets for surface bombardrnent in the
Muroran a rea were the \Vanish i I ron Works of
Japan Iron Company, Ltd, and the Muroran
Work of Japan Steel Company. Ltd. It ise st imated tha t, had the war continued, damage
inflicted on the former target would have re-
sulted in 10 of production equivalent to about
two and one half months' output of coke, and a
sligh tIl' smaller loss of pig iron, Loss in pro-
duction at the latter target attributable toe ffect s o f bombardment can be roundly tated
as about fo rty per cent o f one month 's output .
10 the eity, damage by gunfire interrup ted rail-way service for three days, and double track
service was not res tored for 'five days . The c ity
water supply was disrupted for about one week,
elect ri c power supp ly for abou t two days, and
damage to the telephone system required about
two months for repair. Itwas reported bl' theJapanese that a total of 2,541 houses was de-
stroyed or damaged. Carner planes had pre-
viou Iy sunk severa l sh ips fa the har bor, dam-
aged a shipyard, and destroyed the only fish
refrigerating plant in the city,
The Shimizu areas had suffered heavily f rom
air attacks prior to bombardment b." destroy-
ers . Gunfire caused slight damage to the Slum-izu Works of the Japan Light Met.'l.LsCompany,
Ltd" to the himizu Works of the Honen OilCompany, L td" and in the urban ana increasedexi st ing damage to telephone and power sys-
tems, Japana e officials reported that a totalof 118 buildings were destroyed or damaged bygunfire,
Targets in the Shionomisaki area were aseaplane base , emergency a irAeld and radiostatinn, and were til-ed on by light ~ruil!ers and
destroyers. S light damage inf licted Onthe sea-
plane base did not affect its operation, Only
one sma ll s tructure and no planes were on theai rfi eld, which was l ight !y h it and rece ived no
sign ifi can t damage. The r ad io stat ion was not
P AG E 4
CONFIDENTIAL
hit, This region consisted largely of open f ields
and hills . Two small vil lages were Dot targets.
Damage to buildings was limited to about seven
destroyed and IIfew others damaged. An inter-e st ing inc iden t in thi s a rea was the finding of
a pattern of U, S, aer ial mines in a field about
one mile from the sea,
A radar station on the crest of a ridge behind
Nojima Saki Lighthcuse, fired on by light
cruisers, was uot hit. Fall of shot was prin-
cil>allyin rice paddies and in a small village
between the radar stat ion and the l ighthouse ,
In thevill.age twenty-two of a total of 180
houses were r eported dest royed or damaged.
Telephone and power service were inter rupted
for a short period.
In the Hakcdate-Aomori area the carrier
p lane st rike on the rai lway fe rry system proved
to have been most effective. Of twelve railway
fe rri es eigh t were sunk, two wer e beached andflooded , and two unde r repai r were damaged.
Thus all railway ferries were inoperable Im-
mediately following this strike. Of 272 sma ll
muter sailers engaged in transporting coal be-
tween Hakodate and Aomor i 149 were repor ted
sunk or damaged. In addition ten steel cargo
ships were reported sunk and seven damaged,
It is estimated that tile most important im-media te eff ec t o f the st rike WaSa reduct ion in
monthly coal shipments between Hokkaido and
Honsh U of at least 115,000 and probably 160,000
metric tons, Inthe city of Hakcdate 397 houses
were reported destroyed in a liI'e initiated bybombs, and n few other structures were dam,
aged, Water power , telephone and transpor-
tation facil it ies were not s ignificantly affected.
Effectiveness of ammunition, calculated from
data in this report, indicates that the a vel'age
amount of structural damage caused by a six-
teen-inch high capacity IlrojecL;1 llit is about
1,400 square feet in heavy steel framed bui l d-
ings, and about 3,200 square feet in wooden
~tructul'~S, Co rr'esponding figure s fo r eigh t-
inch projectiles are about ZEro SqUIIl'!l' f ee t and
400 square feet. 'L'll e equh'alent f igure fo "
heavy steel frame buildings calculated in the
same m.IIn.nel'for the averag 2 ,000 pound GP
bomb h'~ 18 8,800 square feet. The mean area
of e,ffe~tlVeneS8of I I s ixteen-i ller , high capacitypro ject il e fo r s er ious damage (des troyed p lus
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U , S . Str~togic BDmb ing Su r v ey
Report of Ship. Bomb4rdmcnt Survey P4r ty
CONFIDENTIAL
heavy damage) against machi ne tools is 4,900
square feet as contrasted to 8,500 square feet
fo r H 1,000 pound bomb.
'I'wenty-seven targets consist ing of ind usti-ial
plants 01' housing a reas were fi red on by heavyships. Of these twenty-two were hit. In day-
light Brings by bat tl esh ips the size of the aver -
age target was about 1.5 million square yards,
or 39.6 of the 200 ym'd squares used on born-
bardment charts. The average percentage of
shot s fi red which fe ll wi th in target boundaries
was 24.9, at an average range 0 28,300 yards,
The approximate average error of the mean
point of impact of shots directed at all targets
during daylight was 249 yards in range and 209
yards in deflection, During night firings by
bat tl esh ips, a t an average range of 24 ,740 yards
and against targets averaging half a million
square yards or 14,8 200 yard squares in size,
the average percentage of bits obtained was
21.6 and the average error of mean point 0' £impact was 280 yards in range and 468 yards
in deflection, The average accuracy of heavy
cruiser firings was slightly less than the aver-
age accuracy obtained by battleships .
The greates t effect of sur face bombardments
on Japanese war potent ial re su lt ed from t lu 'ee
attacks upon two iron and steel works. Itis
e st ima ted that these a tt acks would have caused
a production loss of about 220,000 tons of pig
iron during the year following the attacks, had
the war con tinued under economic condit ions
existing' at the time of the attacks, This Quan-
tity of pig iron is about twenty-two per cent
of the total Japanese production which would
otherwise have been expected in that period,
assuming no further attacks on these plants.
Resu lt s o f bombardments of armament p lant s,
and factories of the electrical, aircrafb, non-
ferrous metals and machine tool industries
were of substantially less significance to the
Japanese economy as a who le .Interrogations Seemed to indicate that even
city and plant officials knew little of what
was transpiring away from their own local-
i ti es . For thi s reason surface bombardments
caused people to wonder what had happened
to their own ships and plane, and with the
realization that 0111 ' ships could approach the
shores of Japan with impunity they knew
with certainty that the progress of the war
was even more unfavorable than they had
suspected. People who had b en subjected
to both major bombing and gunfire in va ri-
ably stated, sometimes without being ques-
tioned, that gunf ir e was more terr ify ing thanei ther HE or incend ia ry bombing , WIlen asked
why they were of this opinion the most
common answer was that there was normally
ample warning before major air attacks, and
the duration of the danger could he judged by
the arriva l and depar tur e of the planes . Surface
bombardments , however , usually came without
warning, the fan of projectiles was more pro-
longed, and people were perplexed and confused
by tile UnCerL'l. inty of where the attack was
coming fr om and how long they would be forced
to endure it . .Although due allowance must be
made for the well known propensity of the
Japanese to provide the answer which they
think an interrogator desi re s, tatements at-
t ributed to them above l ir e consi st ent with. thetenor of statements made to interrogators by
prisoners of war who had undergone bo h
born bin g and gunfire a ttacks in th II Cen tral
Pacific island campaigns, and appear to have
cons iderable bas is in fact ,
This survey party visited Kamal hi, Muroran
and Hakoda te ea rly in October 194';;. In these
localities fear on the part of the inhabitants
was vel'y noticeable, This was particularly
evident a t Muroran, which this par ty vis ited
before arr ival o f the occupation troops, where
women and girls remained in hiding until the
party had been there several day .
In northe rn Japan the ma jori ty of o lder OO}'S
and young men maintained an attitude of aloof
bu t passive . an tipathy , When the party reached
Hamamatsu in the south, this feeling, if it ever
existed in Hamarna tsu, had changed to an ap-
pearance of universal interest and se mingfriendliness,
City and plant officials ever"J'where made
every ef fo r~ to provide and an ticipate requ ire-
ments of the Survey, and in some instances
worked all night to produce needed data. Oc -
casional ly i t was d iffi cul t to conv ince them tha t
the party could not accept gifts Ill" at tend en-
tertainmen ts. The cooperation and in terest
which they d isp layed was part icu la rly sur pr is-
lng in view of the damage which had been
inflicted on thelr establishments,
PAGE S
8/3/2019 USSBS Report 79, Ships Bombardment Survey Party
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/ussbs-report-79-ships-bombardment-survey-party 9/9
U. s. Sirol "9i ~ .Bombi"9 5 Uf'.Y
Repor t 01 S h ip " B om b. r dm . n ! S " rv ey P a rt y
CONFIDENTIAL
.LIST OF REPOftTS
OF
UNITED STA:TES STRATEGIC .BOMBING SURVEY
European War
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