USSBS Report 43, Japanese War Production Industries

8/3/2019 USSBS Report 43, Japanese War Production Industries

1/14

THE UNITED STA TIS .STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

JAPANESEWAR PRODUCTION

.


2/14

THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

JAPANESEWAR PRODUCTIONINDUSTRIES


3/14

III

FOREWORDThe United States Strateg ic Bombh lg Survey was established by the

ecretary of War on 3 November 1944, pursuant to a directive from thelate President Roosevelt , Its mission was to conduct an Impartial andexpert study of the effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be usedin connection with air attacks on Japan and to estab lish a basis for evalu-ating the importance and potentialities of air power a an instrument ofmilitary strategy, fOI' planning the future development of the UnitedStates armed fo rces, and fo r determin ing future economic policies withrespect to the national defense, A summary report and some 200 sup-porting reports containing the findings of the Survey in Germany havebeen published,On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested that the Surveyconduct a similar study of the effects of all types of air attack in the waragainst Japan, submitting reports in duplicate to the Se,cretal''Y of Wal'and to the Secretary of the . avy, The off icers of the Survey during itsJapanese phase were: Franklin D'Olier, chairman; Paul H, itze, Henry. Alexandet, vice-chairmen ; Harry L, Bowman, J, Kenneth Galbraith ,Rensis Likert, Frank A, McNamee, Jr. Fred Searl s, Jr. Monroe E,Spaght, Dr. Lewis R. Thompson, Theodore P. Wright, dlrectors ; WalterWilds, secretary,The Survey's complement provided 101' 300 civil ians , 350 officers, and500 enlisted men, The military segment of the organization was drawnfrom the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and from the Navy to theextent of 40 percent. Both the Arm)' and the Javy gave the Survey allpossible assistance in furn ishing men , uppJie, transpo rt, and info rms-tion, The Survey operated from headquarters estab lished in Tokyo earlyin September 1945 , with subheadqusrters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hirosh imaand Nagasaki, and with mobile teams operat ing in othel' parts of Japan,the is lands of the Pac if ic and the Asia tic mainland.It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime Japanese militaryplanning and xecution, engagement by engagement, and campaign bycampaign , and to secure reasonab ly accu rate statistics on Japan 's econ-omy and war-production, plant by plant, and industry by industry, Inaddition, studies were conducted on Japan's over-all strateg ic plan andthe background of her entry into the war, the in ternal d iscus ions andnego tiations lead ing to her acceptance of uncond itional surrender, thecourse of health and morale among the civilian popu lation, the effective-nes s of the Japanese c ivili an defense organization, and the effects of theatomic bombs. Separa e reports will be issued covering each phase ofthe study.The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japane e military, govern-ment, and industrial officials , Ita lso recovered and transl ated many docu-ments which not only have been useful to the Survey, but also will fur-nish data valuable for other studies. Arrangements have been made totu rn over the Survey' s tiles to tlte Cen tral Intelligence GI'OUP, throughwbich they will be avail able for fur ther examination and dis tr ibution,

This repor was written primarily for the use of the United Statest l' at egic Bombing Survey in the preparat ion of fur ther report s of a morecomprehensive nature. Any conclusions o r opinions exp ressed in th isrepo rt must be con idered as limited to the specific material covered andas subject to further interpretation in the light of further studies con-ducted by the Survey,

II


4/14

MIL1TAllY S C PPLIES DIVISIONJAPA lESE WAR PRODUCTION r DUSTRlES

TABLE OF CONTliNTSI. SCOPE. 11-3

S-5 ~~ ~ ~ , '. r ~~ ~ +

11 . . s u ~ ' [ \lARY . .. ~ .... ~ i ~ r . , ~ ~r , HI. JAPANESE 'MUNITIONS STRENGTH AND NEEDS ... , .. , .. , ,

5 . . . : 7P R O D U C T I O Nt 19~1--45 '... . .V. FACTORS LIMITING JJl.PANESB~VAR PIlOl)U(;TION UrTO 'THE 7- 8IME OF PElIX PRODUCTlON , " .... ,. . .. " .

F ,I ,CTORS .AFFECTING THE DEOl-INB OF , JAPANESE WAR PRODUC-. 1'1.ON FROM1944 TO TFlE EN.DOF THE W,IR , " 8-15

A, Steel , ".. 8-9B. Other i\letals , ' , . .. 9-10C. Tt'anspodation , . , ,, 10-11D. Labor ,., .. ".",., ,... 11E. Dispersion , 11-13F. Bomb Damage , ,.................... 18-15

rv,

"1,

JAPANESE WAR PRODUCrION INDUSTRIEScut in produet ton oJ those mi li tary supplies .0 such hig lt pr iori ty chat they would othe~w.l sewithstand the effects of the eurrent rest ri ct iveaconomtc forces . Of these foul' objectives, the1!I~I' two were met Strategic bombing didsucceed both in has tening and in intens ifyingthe decline in war production, and in prevent-~g the Japanese from saving the productlouof hi.ghprio!'i ty items from the general de-cline.The principal forces operating to j'estrictJapanese war prcduetion, prior to the adventof intensified ail, attack, were shortages o:tsteel and other raw materials, lack of localtransportation, lack of skilled workers, andabsenteeism, III the field of mel'chantandnaval sil ipbuildiJJ,g, motor . ..ehicle production,and most types of Al'my and Navy ordnanceproduction , lack of s teel was primal'Uy respon-sible for the decli.ne of output in late 1944 andearly 1945. The drep in output of aircraftlil'll' ough the end of 1944 was principa lly duetoa lack of aircraft engines. and this, in turn,was due to a failure of the supply of ferroalloys and, to a lesser extent, to a lack ofskille d "'0rkers,For the general categories of war produc-tion studied I~el'e, over-all IOS5 of prcducticncapacity tlu:ough physical destruction of plant,maciliJJel'Y, and equipment by bombing was asfollows:

I. ScopeThis report cove rs Japallese Army grourtdand 'ai !' o rdnance: Navy P!lse, surface and ail 'o rdnance: Army and Navy airc~aft; merchantand naval sh i p eeusemctton, repair and eon-version; and motor vehicles. In general, the

discussion ot Japanese requi rements and pro.duction i ll these categories. is confined to tilewar yea rs, with the year 11)41used iil8 a basi sfor comparison of later trends, While theterms militarY suppHes and war productionare usee! throughout the report, only those cate-gories of WIll' pl'oduotioll l is ted above are in-cluded. Other wat- production, sueh as oil andfood, clo th ing, and medical suppl ies fur t roopsis covered In othe r Bombing Survey reports.Unless otherwise noted, yearly data a re by theJapII!1..ese flscal yenr , from April 1 to March31,Six more detailed reports have been preparedcove ring the informa tion combined and sum-marized herein, These are :The Japanese AiI'craft Industry (prepared

by AiI'craft Divisi.on, USSBS)Japanese Army OrdnanceJal)anese Naval OrdnanceJapaneSe Na.val ShipbuildingJapanese Merchant S'hipbuildingThe Japanese Motor Vehicle IndustryFor detailed analys ie of the effects of Japa.~nese war ma te l'iel supply on tIle cour se of thewar, see the Transportatiuu, Ground L'Ogistics,and Air Logist ics. Report s of the Survey.

II. SummaryIntensive s trategic bombing of the JapaneseHome Islands began in i '! 'farch 1945, althoughthe ail'craft industry had been subjected toattack before that time. By the beginning ofMarch, pl'oduction of military supplies wasal-l' eady 20 pe l' cent be low its peak, indicatingthere were :i1ac:toI'Sother than strategic bomb-mg, forcing W,II.1 ' prodUct ion down, The objec-tives of our st!'ategic air fOl'ce were to bringabout an overwhelming and immediat .e dtOI) in

Will' production; . to shut oft ' output of cer tainspecific highpriori ty items of war production;to aceelera te the rate of the existing' decline ofover-all war production; to force a SUbstant ial

Army oednauee.li T IIval OI'd n""cc. . . . . . . . . . . . 28 pe ... entMerchant 'md 110.". 1ships .. 10-U; !,,,,,,"


5/14


6/14

Table 2, below. shows the "clative ,"I'ur ofe ach o f the clIt.cgoriesof war production in eachtiMnl year, based on 1945 prlces ,TA IU .E ~ ..--=.R,~t.a'li~'r,Elle.' a t 1It'-t.Irill prod'ncUoH (1 / ;,ix

Cfl"t,U(,H-~t. for f(l(fr pMd, c t i " l " b , l l l i~rolll('tu"j' 19.41-~S1;141 tilliit I!UJ I~U!~-----_.j......::..:..:.... --,__ -f------::"I";;::=.Tp~ 'n Pdftilit r.t. I ; I o ~H"t J 1 hrftn"\I:r~nIIU.,,.~. ~.~" r.".1 :!'I.' : !7.-I I ai- U~ :!U.': '

Arm;, a:rJM:r.I~~ I.'~ lS:.i IU ' . o I . t lU ~$.SN".\1;1ll OT!:ln.ft~.~ ~L lll.t : ! : : ! . . J I :!I. I '!t..l a : J . el i l; . on: :hA n t . l I1 ' . dp . .. . " . . . i'.. ~I .!. 1 6 ,~ ... ~iNn'" .dllp ....".~."".. .t " lolL", 11..4 !&41 1l..'O

_ " : :. " ' :: . '. : _ ' . ; : : :b J : : < :i : :. .. . ; . . : . :_ . : .:. . : . ! , _ ' : : . : :. ....l._.:.:.:_-' !..8 ! ~ . . , 1.1War production reached Its h.ighest level inSeptember 1944. at which time produetion, byvalue, was 332 pereent of the average monthlyrate in 1941. Air,crait production also reachedits peak in September with output 628 percentof th e average monthly rate in 1941. Nav.I'ordnance's per month production in September,

was 528 percent of the average monthly ratein 1941. Na\' )' shipbui ld illg was at i ts h ighestin August and Sepiembet-233 percent of t .heaverage lJlonthly rate in 1941. The highest con-struction. raee for merchant ships was in Jnnu-ary 1944 (508 percent of the average monthlyrate in 1941). Merdant ship constructions lackened offsomewbat after January 1944,but climbed again to480 percentof the averagemonthly rate in 1941 in August 1944, afterwhich it declined .sharply.~rmy ordnance pro-duc tion was a t its highest ' in February 1945(274 pe rcent of the a.verage monthly rate in1941). Motor vehicle production declined from1941 onward and by Sept-ember 194'.1was only36percent of the average monthly rate in 1941.The.re was a 53 pe! .'cent decline in war pro .duct-ion between September 1944 high and

JUly 19~5-the last full month of produc tionbefore the end of the war. 'The magnitude ofthe decline in output of each of the major cate-gories of war production from peak levels tothe July 1945 level is shown below:3dont l l io;[: p m x .PfOdqrtloi ': l

AI~I' '' ' i . ' ._ . . . . Ai'lnJI OMU!I'O:!r *~NII! I ,vaJ 'O ~:r ~' ~+4Mmcbu.t, ..blD:I NaYJ l . . tJ . l pl I l. r_ i U rJ . to r . - lI l e. l i' t I

~n~bt, ~ . , . c ;1Joc;e.bt:u...rJ" 194&. r , .~ 'Sffil:t.C! n;f~r le. . . . . ~r .J&.li~17 J 1 i4 : 4 _ ~_r.Aq,!llllt l l l. c - 'l ' '1.,Pc.:_'IWO ..... ".

It i s hnpo. rtnnt to note tlwt . whi le there was 11$teud}" dealirH! from September 194'1 to JuLv1945. 60 percent of that drop uaine :lIter tilemonth of March l IN5, with the biggest dropoccurring in June 1945 and Ohe next hU'gestdrop in July . ..nIore important than the over-atl rise inmonthly output oI milit:lI'Y suppl ies of o v e i -

Z O O perceut is the shif t in emphas is to produc_.fion of ail" and antiair weapons. While Pro-duction of aU types of mili t. ' l I'Y supplies, exceptmotor vehicles and explosives for Army use,increasedabove the 1941 level, the greater Plll'tof the production expansion was in ail"ct'aft,aircraft weapons and ammunition. The im-portllnce of this trend toward production fOI'air warfare is illustrated by table 3, be low. Inth is tab le war product ion ill each fiscal yeaI 'has been divided into three types, air,gl'ound,and naval surface and underwater. Producsieuof communication and optica l equi pment fornrmy use has beenexcluded from the ea leula,tions in table 3 because no exact division waspossfble between a il' and ground use , but it isclear tha.t here also, the great-er part of theexpanslon was in airCl'af t accessol 'i es and ra-dar for aircraf t detection ,'I'ABLt 3,,--Relati~e .haT., 011l6""IV 'uaT prod".t'io"-lorair. u . -. Twd " a n d .uator U8e. bV fiscal year, liJ~,J-19Mj,("'IoIudrll.U A,""'Y ,.-rodlT~ion f .0'" m'",;""1'i~,, /l),doplical ,oq,dp",."l.)

I'" '9...: 1~3 1 1 ' . 1 ' 4 , 1 10'6l'"i:~nt P:(! -I "Ce' I 'U. Pereent P~I~l,DL i p . ; 1 I : r 1 "i [~'it' . ,. ~...... ,32.2: 3'l.D . .. . . ; 'I.S ~I.~Gm \ rQ ! l 4r :&9 'JO, ':; 1: l .4: 8.~ ,.~\ ' Vl Io t ur _ _ :1M ,.0 0.8 'S.~ H,,[

The importance of Japanese war pl'odnctiOl1l'el'ative to that of the United States is shownfor a group of selected items in table 4, below.The basi s fol ' comparison ' is the calendar year1944. The i tems li sted 01' th is compariso~ intable 4 cover 67 percent of the value of theJapanese military supplies productlon ceveeedby this r epor t, By converting tll_e Japaneseproduct ion in uni ts of each type 01product intodollars on the bas is of the percentage Japaneseoutput was of American output of the sameproducts , Japanese production of all the i temscovered in table 4 was found to be about 10percent of United States production of thesame items . .

'l'Anu: , !.-il CQ'''lj'''';~O'' vI U"il4j,1 S1"'8""d J"pa.lUcpr"d"lctio" ., .floGled il'"mij 0 / ) ' ; 1 1 ' 1 . ' > 1 / 8"l'p.li08 iorIii "I."da, liM r IOHrl:l"n1.JiI ! IJ"i1l l1'lDfU.nII~J:1l.nh......

largely dictated by changes in Japanese war.s trategy, whic.hcould not eas ily be foreseenlind by the tY Pe ! ! of weapons we employedagainst them. The shortage of raw mate ria ls,par ticular ly s teel, which became acute in 1944dIctated other changes in the production pro-["' l'am which confl ic ted with order ly develop-ment of war production, This latter factorwas especially important in naval shipbuilding . .Another source of trouble was the fact thatboth the Army and the Navy rushed newmodels in to large-scale prcduct ion before the,yhad been tested adequately. When "bugs" de-veloped under operational condi tions in thefield, production was slowed while the neoes-sary ehanges in design were made. New de-velopments were rushed to save time. Theshortage of raw mater ials prevented the manu-facture of suff icient tes t models .Plant capacity and machine tools were im-portant limiting factors in the es,rly years ofthe Will', To a cer tain extent, the problem ofplant capacity could be taken ca re of by takingover fact-or ies formerly used for eiv ili an prod.uets, However, tI.oolspace in commercial ship-yards ( ellgaged in constructing both nava l and

merehantshjps) was increased 53 percent from1941 to 1944 and the l inear footage of buildingways was jncl'eased 27 percent, All of thisexpansion took t ime and it took labor and ma-terials away from the produetieu of finishedmaterials ... One of the principa l reasons gh'enby the Army and Navy ordnanoe arsenals in1941, 1942, and 1943 for failure to live up toproduct ion schedules was the delay in del iveryof machinery needed for expanding production.Recl'u.lting, tr ainin,g, and holding a ll ade-quate labor force to meet produc.t iol l demandscaused the Wa,L"industr ies many di ff icul ti es .Total employment in the a irc rafb lndustrv in-creased 285 percent from 1941 -to the ~d of1944, in. AI


7/14

On the whole the labor market WIl$ sumcient to meet tI~edemands of Will' industriesas far a total number were concerned, al-though there were temporary bottl enecks inmallY cases. The bigge>lt l abor pr ob lem, how-ever wa the sbortage of skilled worker. Inthe face of increased demand for 'killed work-ers, the availab le supply of skil led men W IIcontinually being cut b~' military draft call~.Transportation diffioulties, partieuhn'ly \l'1~local tr811'portation, became troublesome III1942 and 1943, causing delays in the supply ofraw materials and in the movement of com-ponent from factory to factory. The basi s forthis bottleneck lay inthe inadequate supply oftrucks (mentioned ea rhe r in thi report) andin the poor road network.Copper. nickel, and other minor metals werein short supply almost from the beginning ofthe war. For the most part. the shortage ofthese metals was not so vital as to stop produc-t ion altogether , but forced t ime-consumhlgchanges in design and onen resulted in a lossof quality in the tim hed products.While lack of steel did not affect war pro-duction as a whole until 1944 steel was neverplentiful, and i ts l ack kept down product ionof mall )" low-priority i tems , such as tanks,motor vehicles and beavy artil lery. A sbortageof steel was the primary cause of the dec linein output of motor vehicles af ter 1941. Asearly as 1943, lack of steel was all importantfactor in the shift in naval shipbuilding awayfrom large f leet unit s to dest royers , subma-rmes, and small escort craft .VI . faC'OOI AtJCC'ting m e Decline of Japanese

War Production from 1941 to the End ofme WarA. StulSteel is , more than ally thing else, the basicmaterial in war production. Itis the principalingredient in ships, both naval and merchantguns, ammuni tion, t rucks, and tanks , and it i~important in aircraf t, rad io , radar and opt icalequipment . ' I'be pr incipal exceptions to thi sare explosives and balloon bombs.The cpportunitiaa for substitution to cutdown on steel consumption in war productionare extremely limited. The most ambitious steelsubstitution atiempte4 by the Japanese in theirwar product ion was the wooden ship program

inslitul~d ln 1!N3. Wooden ships accounted f~\"20 P rcent or the to tal value of l~el"Chal lt 91~IPproducticn in the second half of 1944, prrn-ci pally in the sma l lsr type~. The shift by t.heNan' f rOD< con struetd 011 of prun a L'~' fleetun I t< ;to c~nstruction of small cnlft in 1943 and 1944was dictated both by military demands and byhe growing shortage of s teel .QI'er.nll. steel deliveries in Japan fell 39 per-cent in the ApI'il..JlIne quarter of 1945 fromaverage quarterly deliveries in the previousf iscal veal" . DeLi I.eries in th is quarter were 47percel;t below 1\ verage qllalterly deliveri es in1941. And it is estima ted by the Basic Mute-rials Divtsion of the Survey that, had the warcont inued, s teel del iveries would hava fal lenstill fUI' her by the October-December quarter.W al ' production was receiving an ever in~creasing share of total steel throughout thewar. The pe rcentage of stee l deliveries goinginto war produc tion in each fiscal year of the

war was as follows:Pt:rC''1:Nt1941 ....................... ,.... 56

1942 611943 ,............................. 70194,4 .............. ,..... 8 31945 (AprilJ u nc q un roo r) ..... ,.. . . . 85

Increas ing util ization of the available supplywas not sufficieu&to sustain war production atthe levels it had attained by 1944 (about 300percent of production in 1941). The restric-tions of the over-all shortage of steel were notfelt, however, equally by all parts of the warproduc tion program. Items with the highestpriorities, which, generally speaking, werethose connected with air warfare, were ableto get enough steel to maintain productionwithin the limits set by other re strictive fac -tors. In fact, in the case of aircra ft, the grow-i1lg shortage of aluminum had prompted theJapanese to begin experiments with ail 'framesusing light s teel as a subst itu te .The growing over-all s teel shortage, plus thefact that aU'cr aft took an Inereasing propor-tion of deliveries, p laced a res tr ic tive burdenon other war production which was tbe pri-mary cause for the decline in output from peakproduction levels in the fa ll of 1944.Rolled and apecia! s teel deliveries for AI'myground ordnance production in 1944 were 57percent or the 1941 level, although production,in terms of value, WIIS 168 percent eyf 1941.

8

velivcries began to fall olr in the January-March quarter of 19'14 and by the April-Junequarte r of 1945 were 34 percent of the 1943peak Quarter. Production by this quartet hadfallen 40 percent from the January-March1945 high quarter,Rolled and special teel deliveries for air-cl"lIft armament and ammunition, both Armyand NHVY, held up until the October-Decemberquarter of 1944 and then dropped to 79 per-cent and 60 percent of the peak in the twosucceeding quarters. This was roughly (J1l1'-alleled by the decline in production, although inthe ease of Army airc raft armament the pr i-mary reason fOI' the drop in output was bombdamage to the producing plants.In naval ordnance the same story is repeated.Rolled and special steel deliveries .reached theirpenk in the July-September quarte r of 1944and bad dropped 52 percent from that peakby the April-June quarter of 1945. Produc-tion, meanwhile , had fallen 56 percent fromthe peak month of September 1944, to July

1945. In the case of naval ordnance , it is im-portant to note that production in this fieldwas principal!)' to meet a derived demand. Ahsa vy cut in steel and in production was to beexpected in 1945 because the need for a greatmany 1181'alordnance items no longer existed,01' existed on a much smaller scale.In naval sh ipbu llding annual rolled and spe-cia I steel deliveries were as follows:Pi.w Yeti,.. (I.(}OO . f . rm. . )1941 ..................... ' ... 382.5

1942 ........ , .......... , .... 345.71943 .......................... ~16~,G1944 .......... , ....... ' ..... 222.2J945 (AprilJune) .... ,....... 16.2

The shortage of steel began to be felt early in1944. 1t coincided with the need for smallervessels for esc-ort work and, somewhat later, forsuicide boats. By the end of the war, almost theentire naval shipbuilding program was con-fined to small craft where the steel require-ments were low in rela tion to total value.When bhe merchant ship construction planof February 1945 cut total planned tonnage ofsteel ships for 1945 35 percent below thNovember 1944 plan , the pr incipal reason W!lSa recognition of the fact that steel for t.heear li er program was not available. It i s truethat the interdiction of Southern Pacific sealanes rendered the tanker construction plan

7l213"~.6-3

useless, but yard facilities would have beenturned from tanker to cargo ship ccnet rueeionto mee t the need for mainland shipping if thesteel had been avaiJable. Stee l deliveries formerchant sh ips in the highes t year, 1944, wereonly 256 percent above 1941, although construc-tion of steel ships in 1944, in value terms, was314 percent higher than 1941. Deliveries inthe Apl'iL-Junequarter of 1946 were 83 per-cent below the average quarterly rate ill theprevious f iscal year. Cons truction in th ta quar-ter was 68 percent be low the rate in the previ-ous fiscal year.The motor vehicle industry, neglected be-cause its importance to local transportationin the Japanese economy was not recognized,was Limited b)' lack of steel from 1941 on.In the January-March quarter of 1945 steeldeliveries were 32 percent below the previousquarter and 66 percent below the average quar-ter ly rate :in 1941. Deliveries in the nextquarter stayed at about the same level, andalso in this quarter, the unsuccessful dispersionprogram for the industry brought about a col-lapse of production considerably more ser iousthan could have been expected from the steelshortage.While the requirements of the strategy ofdefense of the Japanese home islands did not,in some fields (notably naval ships). requirean e.,\-pend.iture of steel as great a s the ea rlierstrategy of a defense of an overseas empire,these savings compensated only in a small wayfOl" the growing s tr ingency of steel supply. As,1 re sult, lack of stee l was the most importantfactol' in the sharp drop in output of mostitems of war production in 1945, wi th thenotable exception of aircl:lUt.B. Other IIltlttbWhile the Japanese never had ample sup-plies of minor metals theil' shortage did not,in general, have a decisive effect on war pro-duction. Probably the shortage of metals,other than steel, was felt most critically ina ircr aft engine production. Ferro alloys suchas nickel, chromium, molybdenum, tungsten ,cobalt, and vanadium were not available insuff icient quantities as early as 1943. The de-cline ill aircraft engine production in the sum-mer of 1944 was to a large extent due to thelack of f erro alloys and to the production dim-culties a rising from changed alloy specifics-

9


8/14

tions as attempts were made to dodge short-ages in certainof these metals.Supplies of aluminum for nirframe manu-facture \>egan to decline in 19


9/14

uf finish d naval ordnance item" in 1944, andabout 100 producers a.ccouJlte


10/14

and 32 percent of Navy orduunee produetionWIIS inllircrnft arms ; ,nd aireraf t ammunitieu,, 111 II n }>,lI' t of t he' remai n ing ord 11 anee p ro d u e-tion WIIS devoted to o the r aircraft accessaries.such as radio equipmellt. Since the ordnancemanursctnrers, both ArnlY and Nal,)', had beensuccessfu l, through 1944, in meeti Ill: the de-mand fOl' Illl'e,'aft accessories, it is safe to assume th at. II decl ie in It; rCl'aftotl tpu t wou Idbring a resultant decline in the derived demandfor machine guns, ammunition, radios, ere" foraircraft use. Thllrefol' c, bombing of both ail' ,UNlet accessories and aircraft would not benecessary to bring abouta reduction on Japa-nese ail ' streng! h. A,nother instance I)f the de-rived demand aspect of IIl arge par t o f ordnance1)1'0 d ue t ion is tile case of lar ge caliber navalguns for primary fleet units,

En view of the small tall nage specificallyaimed at war production targets , other than air.craft, th.e physical damage done was impres-sive, In the merchant and naval shipyards 25percent of t he total floorspa.ce was des tl'oYQd ,Since damage to actual buUding ways and dry.docks was not he.avy, however, i t i s e st imatedthat total pl'oductive capacity of the shipyardswas reducad from 10 to 15 percent by bombh1g,Naval ordnanee plants producing linishedgoodslost 28 pe rcen t of their produ cth'e capaciythl'Ougb. bombing, with the heaviest casualtybeing the radio and eJect ri ca.1 indust ry, Pro-dueersof finishad armyordnance lost 30 per.cent of their over-all capacity, and the roostdecis ive effects were Celt by the aircraft arma-ment, radio, radar, and other eomrnunleatlonequipment and artil lery producers , Loss Ofca.pacit.l' by the thl."(!C producers of finishedmotor vehicles was negHgible, but about 70percent of the ~lIacity of theil' subcontractorswas borobed out, To a certain exten t the bomb-ing effects described in this paragraph wereincidental. to attacks on other industries andt.o attaiks on urban areas. This latter waspar~icularly true of the radio and electricalindustry, which was h ighly concentrated in theTokyoal'ea.Loss of productive capaci ty Is not, in itself,

an accurate index of the e.'Jeet of bombing onjll'oduction, In 1945, Jack of raw mater ialslack of local transportation, dispersal , absentce~i'.m"Rlld other factors were rcducing preduc-uon, Loss of capacity through bombing to II

I lI r~ extent duplicated the effect.s ot nil theseother factol's except dispersal . Dispersal was

Attributing the difference in the drop inprcductlon from 1944 to 1945 between thehealrJ!y bombed and other yards to bomb dam.age, 20.8 percent of tile 1944 production of theheavily bombed vards was lo.st from this cause,This amounts to 10.S percent of what 1945producdon in the whole industry would havebeen, had all yards produced at the r ate at-tained by the unbombed yards,rt is, net legitimate, however, to attribut et~e whole difference bel1\l'cen the productionbll ;tory of bombed and unbombed plants. tobomb damage, because of two counwraetingf ac to ts . F Jl 's t, it i s possible to shift mat erialslabor, and semi.Jinished work from bombed t~~nbombed plants aft.er bombin,g-thus i.umeas.!Ilg the divergence between output of the two,On the other hand, indirect effects of ai r attackare felt by the unbombad establishments andtend to make the ir p roduct ion go down, -Desp ite

14

II'"H Ow decis ive r 'Jctor ill the IIt'eliul' in IIUt11111in 1945,Relative indices of bombed and unbombodestablishments were not worked out eovcrlnumonthly production of naval vessels in 1945,but, in gcnenll ,conclusionsa:s to the effectivt'-

ness of bombing on merchant shipping are ap-plicable here as well . The abruptdrop in con-atruction rates was primarily due to Iactorsother than direct bomb damage to yarda, Thesame is true of Navy ordnance preduetlon, except that the. drop in production of raclio andelecn-ieal equipment was principally due tobomb damage t, a plants, which destroyed " , j Opercent of the indus try's capacity.In summary, direct bomb damage to plants

and equip'ment was a s ignificant factor in re-ducing the' level of Japanese war productionin 1945., And other effeets of air attack, suchas dispersal , interdiction of shipping lanes ,and rail transporta t ion tie-u ps allecntributedto and h1t ensified the near-collapse of Japanesewal' production in the last months of tile war.

1 1 5


11/14

APPENDIX BAPPJ,NDI A. .. p d cliop by Cnfcgor.y,of Yen of japanese :MUnitions to \I r A ~ 1 I t " Munlb 1 1 '\ . .. .. . F 1 o !J ( 'A l y~r=101Jl

1 9 4 1 -4 5 , b y Fiscal Year Value o f J3p ll ne.~e Mun it ions P roduc ti on in Mil li on s o f Yen, by Category in 1945 Pri ces , 1941 -45lndex of V,lue in r .l il liol lFiscal X c a r 1941

1941 110II 121.1 1.010.109.,0 SiH.410'.8 M1.fi&t.y 1.011..8::IT.& "o:!.&60.1i dlA

10 "1",rut.. . 61,.9~\f111r ordn fl nl :~ ,..... 60.1Nn'inl ordnnnr e . , .. 'n. llN l\ y JI I I . 1 lh 1u Jl : _ _ 8 1 1 . 1 1~h!!rehllnt.ilhtIiH .h.,.. : 3 . r i . - . o I .MOl -O r"e hlr :l o .. .. .. .. .. . " 7

n!.187.0818-1.11 1 1 .4~8.'

110 .Q811.1811.8:82.'3 " 1 . 'U.8

10.2: "12.JGS..~ j"3.0'1.1 11.1 7 1.482..~ 87.:t.U:.2 3J.I.s.li- 61.4

92.4IIIt.184.'8U31.173...

10.(, 17.6 84.3 1 )2 ' . . . .1M 71.1 '18.8 8M111 It.' 1.2 77.'$8.! 8 .r i.0I 8 1 82.,131.0 tt.8 'I.~ 'I.S... S M.' 68.0 1


12/14

IT ED ST AT E STRATEG1C BOMBINGL IS T O F R .I1 PO RT S

UIWEY

The f o! 1ow:i n) t is " b ib lio jt rn ph . o r ~ epod s ,-e sultingf rom Ibe SUITe .' s ALud,o s o f th~ Eu" ,~, ,, , n nr l P "" iAowar a. Ce rt ain o f t he se r epor ts nUl) be purehused (romrhc S1Jp~r[nt!ot. or el l" 'c rk e A G (B~ !W)' ~ !u ni eh ,Gormnny19 H""seJ'"1 Flu=otoren~l'ke, K~_I, Germn"y

LI~,I" Mem I Orand.' . ' . 0 " h I MoMIs lI u! " , tr y Ia rt 1, illumi n " !n..,g G )Pn,. t H, Mngne-""",.,I'f ~ rn ln"Y '-. k H tld I '21 Vc..,ini~e De"tsoh e Mot"llwcr _ e , ,_ 1 es mim,

G'erma n . l '22 ~!.tn II, II~!l""se! Iseh n It G m b H, Loi l. zi g, Ger .Innnl' , 1'1 ,t N 9 B '"23 Ahluliniunl\verk G rn b H, Oil . 0 ., ~J - !"tor-.fold, Germa "~I' .., '2 4 G eb ru l> Cl cr Giuli"i G In b H, Ludwlg~ho'fen, GoP-nInny P ,_", h25 Luft. 50hmbnu Zeppeli n c : In b 1 ", ' n e .. ..r !c hs , n f" "on B cdcnsee, GC~ 'n ' an~r26 lVi eln nd WetH e A G, U lm , Ge rmony27 nu'dol ph R,," t< mbach LelchmetalIgiesscl"i! len, Solin.g ' e n , G e rr n nn l f

28 Lippewerke Vercinigtc Aluminiumwerke A G,Lunen, GermBn~29 Verei ni gt e Deutsche Metnl lwO' .ke' . H ,cddernhcim,

GUn1nnY~O D" erener lIrcl

48 Ge r" ,n n E IeQb Branch54 Machine Tool. & Machinery as Capit al E 'qui p" ,(>n l66 1II110 h i"c T ool In d u llt ry in. 'Ge~",any66 Ket 'n ,, ,, , X olb Co" Cologn e' , Ge, 'mn'n,l'5 '1 Coll et 1\ nd Enge lh .n r d, Of fe n b ach, Gee"""ny!l8 N" xo. U " ' ;0 n , F '. " n lt ro rt on Mai n , Germany

Mo!nt Vcbid", and 'Tank. D...neh77 G ermn n !>Iotor Veh ~ dcs Indu oWy RcWr't78 Tank IndUstry Bcpore'10 Daimlor Ben" A G, Onterturkheim, C"rmany80 Rcnnult i\ fo to r V eh ic le s P ln nt, B il lo ncou rl , Pni881 Adn ", Opel , R ua .s el .h cJm, Ge rmany82 D,nimlo.' B'enz.Gn,ggcnnu \Vo rk8 , Goggennu , G cr -

nInny __83 ~rIl""hi!lenr"br;k Augsburg-Nurnberg, Nu.mlH! , r g ,Ge'rrnnny8~, Auto Unicn A G', Chemnltz and Zw!elmu, Ger-many8li HonlliChcl & Sehn, Kassel , Germ~",)'86 Mn:yhac.h ~[otor Works, Friedrich"hnIen, Go.,-

mUIlY87 Voig tlnnder, U"schi.ne nlnbr ik A G, Plnuen, Ger-

maniY88, V"lkl;w~rke A G, HambUrg , Gennany99 Sulrmarlne A".emb ly Sheller ', Fa"! :,,, Germa ny100 Bremer Vulkan, Vegesn, ek ,G"l 'mnny

Oednaaee B","cn101 Or< lnan ce I ndustry Re jlcrt102 Ii"riedrich Krupp Gru.o nwer lm A G , Magdcbuxl l,lOll Boehunier Verein fuer Guastahlfabrikntio.n A G"

B""h um, Cc: rmn n)'1 04 8~n sche l & :Sohn, Kassel, Germany105 Rhc inme taU.Bc .r l! if i, D us se ld or f, G etmany106 Hermann Goeri ng Worke , BrnuDschweig. Rollen_dod,Germany1O' i Hn ,u novu is ch e 1 I1ns ch in enbau, 1 (a no "e r, G ermany108 Gu ss tn hlt ab vikFr ie dr ic h E ru ]) 1I . ES8en , G erm.) !! y

OfL DN1SION109 0i1 Divis ion, F il la l Rel 'r t1 10 Oil Division, Final Report, Append i>:I II P owd o r, E x] )lc siv ,e a, , Sp "" i 0 1 Rocke ts IInd J,ot Pro-

p el I " nts , \\ ' a rG n50S nnd S",ok .. .A c;d (hii iate.,I "i al R epor t # 1)112 U ndc rg l"Ou nd nnd D ispc l" S! l. I P Innts i n. Gr ea terGe~nlDnyUS The Genuan Oil Industry., !llinilltru-inl ReportT el ln ! 7 ,8114 nli ni st er ia l Rep., . e lt Chemknl l!

19

MILITARY AN;I.J.YSIS mVISION~9 Tbc D.,reat of the Genuun Ail' POL""60 V-Weapons (Cr ossbow) Campaign61 Air For co Rntc of Ol'el;O,tion62 W""ther Factors in C-ombat Bombardment Oper-a ti ons i n t he Eu, .opCll n 'Thea tre63 Bembin g Acour nc.) ', 1! JSAAP Henvy and Med.ium

Bombers in. the E.TOG d DeI;Cri "t io ll o f R 'AF Bombing6lORALE DIVISIONG~b The 11 "" ", ts o f Sn.nt eg i' e Bombing Ql)GerIHnnMO l' nl e ( V O l. 1 & :1 1 )

I>fctli"".1 D""n~h06 T ho Effect o f B om bin g on Health a nd M ed ic ~1Cue in Gernllln"

MUNITIONS DIV[SIONH 1 . ' 1 \V)" lndllS'I(.y Branch

M The Cokillg Illduah')' Report Oil Get..,,,,,,y61 Cokillfi Plant Rcpo.1J No, I, Sections A, B, C,&D68 GutellhQlfnungshuette, Ohcehausen, Germpny6 9 Friedrich-Alir ed Hu ette, Rheinho.usnn, Germa nY' 1 0 N e u nk i, , ,h e n Eis",,"'erke A G, Neonkil"ilen, Ger-Gel'nlany71 lh iehswer ke Hermonll Goering A G, Hnlle "dorl,Germnny72 August '1'h;,"s o" Huette A G, Eiomba," " . Gc,rmanynFried.ich K, 'upp A G, BOl'beck Pin lit, Essen,Germony'14 Dor~n\und Hoard", HlIettc,nvercin, A C, Dort-

mu nd j. G et 'm . o. ny~6 H"""ch A G, Dortmund, GCVlllQny7 n 130chunler Vcre;n f uer ,Gu""tahiruhrikatio" A G,Bool lum, Ge~mnny


13/14

OI[ [I",no/,1 [5 Amrn onillkwork e Mor"cb" .." G m b n, [.en.w,Germ ~!OJ'-:! > ' 1 . ppelld Ices116 B,.,ou"koh le Benz in ,:\. G, Zeit" nnd Bo hlen, Ge ...

many IVin~"eshn I'l AG , Luc t. ke n do. ."!. Gm'mn ny1I'1 Ludwig.holOll10PI'BU WOt~~ of IG "",roonin'dU8~t ic A G,. Lud\\~brshnfM, Ge. :mnny118 RUh ro cl I ly dt oll "' nn ti o" n P ln nt, Bo tir ap -Boy , G~". .mn !OJ '. V ol I , V ol 1 1119 Rhenanta O!l .mg Minarnloclw ke A G, Hnrbu'1!',Rdnoly, Han,burg, Gennnny12 U nhcnoni . . Os.1"n t, E ll io lsbnch , Ger .

J'f1YSICII"L DAMAGIl J)JV.ISION-(c,,,.)195 Roundhouse i n M" , ,. I IL , lI .l n g Yard, U lm, ,Germa.ny1'9 0 I G Fa .bl) nd u str ie, l.ev,c r k u sell, Gor"lll"ny197 Chemi sche Wcrko , Hue ls , G em"" ,y108 Gl "emberg Mauhn lli ng " Ynrd, Gl "e rn b" .g , G el 'm nnyJ9D Locomotive Shops and B.l"i'dges ut Harnm, Ge ...

mO'ny

ECONOMIC STUDIIlSA'ir.::rafl Dlvlslnn

15 The Junm'csc Ai. ,: , ft Industry16 MItsub is il i RnaV}' rndu~ tr ic ., Ltd,Co rpora: am, Ropor! No .. 1

(l>li l. lrubishi Jukolzyo KK)(Aid",m"" I> < Enll;in"s)

17 Nnka Jlm a Ai rc ra ft C ompany . Ltd.C o rp ., .. t im 1 R ~p o rt N o . /I(Nukajimu Hil


14/14

KCONOI'UC sruDlF.5-(Co.m'.)"'imol' D,,';"u,,-(Con,,)2tI Nil 'p"11 Airplane Company

Cor"",..,I"'" R ~P OTI N o, X II'(Nippon mkc~i KK)(A irCrnm",,)al l Ky".h u Ai '.phme Con>plln~'

GO'""" . . .. . lio l l n.porl No, ,\'1'(Kyu.hu Hikoki KK)(Airirnmes)31 Shod .. En~inel'ing Con']>IIn)'CI>rp,,"otion R"Nrt No . Xl'l(Shod.. So;'a.kujol(Com]lnu ts,)3 2 Mit ,, .k n A itt ra it J ndusLr ic 8

Corporalion. Rtporl No" XVll(l\ Ii tBkn Kol;; . Kogoyo Knbushiki Knisho)(Campoa.nts)

a$ N'issan Automobile Comp"n~'CO"l'oNJIi_ Rft1HJrl Xl'l1l(N;"""n Jid'' '8.h~ KK)(Engines)

31 A""y A ir A " "e nB .1 &; N..~, Air D ..pot~Co"! 'O""n

Try.n~,~Jfnuiui'i)j, i.s inn54 The \Vnr A ll nin st J.nl,nneIIC 'l '1.'n."~I)orb)tlon. 1D41~

19'1~

~1II .t tA UVS1'UD rES~H]it:a. ." A n l l . l : , 1 S i s DjvhioIi

O l J lil " Por ,. c. A l li ed w i ll i the Ullitttl Statcl!S,in the\Va. Agai " , [ Inpnn

6l! J"pa nose A i" PowerG:I , J~lmne.e. Air WeapOns. nnd Tactics6~ The Effect.. of A iI' Action 0n Japau e se G roundA rm y L < > g i. ti cstiS Enlplo,)'lIlent of Furees Undor the South'""~t

Pael r ," Cmmand66 The Slrntcgio Air Operations of Very Heavy

B'ombardment in t ile Wal' Ae n 1 1 1 a t J",,1m(Twenti eth A ir For ce )67 Air Operlltions . in Chinn. BUrma, Indin-Wor ldW ar JJGS, The A ir T 'r un spor t ' Comnmnd in th e Wat Agll in st,Japan69, The Thirtccnt il Ai, Force in the War Agai".tJnpnn70 Tho Se venth a nd Eleven th Air Forces in fhe WarAenl"",! .Jnpnn11 The ,Fif tb Air Fol 'CO i n th c' Wa~ A g " in st . J! lJ !I ln

N C l ' Y a l Analy.sis D i\ l . i 5 : i o n72 The Int elTOgati ons Q f Japan""" Offioials (Vol. Innd II)?a Campnigns of the Paclr, e W nrN The R

(II Rapol i. On Eight C it iu )91 The Eff~l" "t the Ten Tho"""nd. Pound. Bomb onJa P B"esc Tal'g,et. (n Report on Ni e Inc id~IIt.s)92 Effe

Documents

USSBS Report 43, Japanese War Production Industries