Universal Learner as an EmbryoUniversal Learner as an Embryo of Computational ConsciousnessAlexei V. SamsonovichKrasnow Institute for Advanced Study George Mason UniversityStudy, George Mason University4400 University Drive MS 2A1, Fairfax, VA 22030-4444asamsono@gmu.edu

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Computational consciousness1

• can be defined as a fully functional computer-based implementation of features and principles that constitute the essence of human consciousness as we know it

bj ti l i l disubjectively, including ▫ the self and its basic mental states, ▫ awareness of self and understanding of other minds,▫ mechanisms of voluntary actionmechanisms of voluntary action, ▫ the four kinds of memory (working, semantic, episodic and

procedural), ▫ commonsense knowledge and the general ability to learn,

t f l d l▫ a system of values and goals, ▫ self-awareness and self-consistency over time, all integrated in one embodied cognitive architecture.

1This consideration is based on a functionalist approach. The problem of subjective experiences is addressed in Appendix.

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A universal learner considered hereA universal learner considered here • is a cognitive agent (an electronic student) that can

i bit k l d f itacquire arbitrary new knowledge from its own experience with the help of an instructor.

• The agent should be able to use acquired knowledge in g q gfurther learning, with no a priori limitations on its bootstrapped cognitive growth abilities.

• The hypothesis is that there is a ‘critical mass’: i e a• The hypothesis is that there is a critical mass : i.e., a minimal, relatively small set of cognitive abilities that, when implemented in the agent, together enable

li i d lf i d i i h f hunlimited, self-sustained cognitive growth of the agent.• The path from a core cognitive architecture to a

computational consciousness does not require acomputational consciousness does not require a programmer intervention in the middle. In this sense, computational consciousness is emergent. 3

The path implies a learning environment and a curriculum for the agent to study. Snapshots below show a high-school physics Microworld with a Harry-Potter-style interface. The task is to solve the pulley problem.

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Another scenario of bootstrapped learning / cognitive growth(th l i t d li th b t R f C)(the goal is to deliver the box to Roof C)

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The core cognitive architecture is theThe core cognitive architecture is the starting point for the cognitive growth

• The architecture has eight components (Fig. 1)

• Internal representations are schemas (Fig.2 A,B) that fill

tisemantic memory

• Instances of schemas are grouped into mental states ingrouped into mental states in working and episodic memory systems (Fig. 2 D) Figure 1

• Memories are indexed by the cognitive map (Fig. 2 C)

g

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Figure 2 Building blocks of the architectureFigure 2. Building blocks of the architecture.

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A

B

C

Figure 3. Snapshots of GMU BICA dynamics. A: Indoor virtual environment in which the robot (red dot) performs spatial learning and an object search tasks. B: Dynamics of the cognitive map. C: A snapshot of semantic, working and input-output memories of the agent.

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Architecture dynamics in imaginary situationsArchitecture dynamics in imaginary situations

D E

D: A theoretical snapshot of the architecture engaged in sensory perception with shared attention E: a snapshot of a virtual environment and architecture components in a socialattention. E: a snapshot of a virtual environment and architecture components in a social interaction paradigm in virtual urban settings.

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I l t ti f th S lf i tImplementation of the Self in our system means implementation of the following building blocks:

• Axioms of the Self (Samsonovich & Nadel, 2005):▫ beliefs implemented as semantic constraints on

all possible representations in the system• A mental state:

▫ is a set of instances of schemas attributed to one instance of a Self (one moment of time, one mental perspective) labeled I-Now, I-Next, etc.

• Mental state lattice:▫ is a system of mental states that co-exist in

working memory• Working scenario:

▫ is the evolving main sequence of mental states

-“I exist”

-“I experience”

-“I control my body” g q(the stream of consciousness)

• Working and episodic memories:▫ present, past and imaginary experiences of the

Self

- I control my body

-“I own my memory”

-“I am consistent with • Cognitive map, serving as:

▫ a system of values, a model of emotional qualia, an index of contexts and concepts, and more

myself over time”

-“I am self-aware” 10

Conclusions:

• A functional human-like computational consciousness can be achieved via guided gbootstrapped cognitive growth in a microworld.

• The starting point for this cognitive growth is a core cognitive architecture incorporating a ‘critical mass’ of the key features of the human

i d i l di th ti f th S lfmind, including the notion of the Self.• A criterion for a genuine consciousness in a

cognitive system is possible based on the newcognitive system is possible based on the new science of subjective experiences (Appendix).

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Appendix: The (“Hard”) problemAppendix: The ( Hard ) problemof consciousness does make sense:• Our attribution of subjective experiences to people based

on observations and physical measurements is arbitrary d bj i I i i l h i l iand subjective. In principle, their actual experiences

could be different, or not present, or present in 50% of all cases, etc., with no consequences for any physical q y p ymeasurement or behavioral observation.

• Therefore, questions “how does an object (e.g., a brain) look to a researcher” and “how does it feel itself” are inlook to a researcher and how does it feel itself are in principle not reducible to each other.

• The phrase “brain produces experiences” sounds empty, because we cannot identify the mechanism of production.

• Subjective experience is not a subject of natural science. 12

The (“Hard”) problem ofThe ( Hard ) problem of consciousness is solvable:• Empirical science accepts for granted that there are

material objects and phenomena, because this beliefgives us an account of our experiences of the world.▫ Then it appears that those experiences provide us with a

means of observation that allow us to develop naturalmeans of observation that allow us to develop natural science using experiments, logic and parsimony.

• In exact analogy, future science will accept that there are (irreducible) subjective experiences because this belief(irreducible) subjective experiences, because this beliefgives us an account of our experiences of experiences.▫ Then it appears that those experiences provide us with a

means of observation that allow us to develop natural science using experiments, logic and parsimony. 13

This logic opens a computationalThis logic opens a computational cognitive science perspective on h bl f ithe problem of consciousness

• One critical technical issue is the metric system for subjective experiences:▫ here we can use a semantic cognitive map derived

from natural language (Samsonovich & Ascoli 2007)from natural language (Samsonovich & Ascoli, 2007).• Another critical technical issue is a measuring device for

subjective experiences.▫ This device should be itself subjective: one can think of

it as an introspection technique built by training in the researcher’s mind.researcher s mind.

• The same approach can be used for future robots and will serve as a criterion for human-like consciousness. 14

Acknowledgmentsg• I am grateful to the members of our GMU BICA team: Dr. Kenneth

A .De Jong, Dr. Giorgio A. Ascoli, Mr. Mark A. Coletti, Mr. Robert Lakatos and Mr. Deepankar Sharma.

• I am grateful to colleagues from the College of Education and Human Development at George Mason University: Drs. Nada

bb h i i lbfl i h d iDabbagh, Anastasia Kitsantas, M. Layne Kalbfleisch, and Erin E. Peters, who helped me to design scenarios of using the GMU BICA architecture in authentic educational settings.Th k i i i ll d b DARPA IPTO BICA G “A• The work was initially supported by a DARPA IPTO BICA Grant “An Integrated Self-Aware Cognitive Architecture”.

• I am grateful to Dr. Kenneth A. De Jong for suggestions how to i th t ti th t h ld b f ll i l t dimprove the presentation that should be fully implemented elsewhere.

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