UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN …media.mlive.com/news/detroit_impact/other/CAIR...13. Plaintiff Alaa Saade is a United States Citizen and a Muslim residing in Wayne

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UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURTEASTERNDISTRICTOFMICHIGAN

SOUTHERNDIVISIONYASEENKADURA; )NAJIABDULJABER; )ABDUSSAMADTOOTLA; ) CaseNo.ALAASAADE;and, ) Hon.AHMEDSALEHABUSALEH; ) ) Plaintiffs, ) )v. ) )ERICH.HOLDER,JR.,AttorneyGeneral )oftheUnitedStates,inhisofficialcapacity; ) )JAMESB.COMEY,DirectoroftheFederal )BureauofInvestigation,inhisofficial )capacity; ) )TIMOTHYJ.HEALY,Directorofthe )TerroristScreeningCenter; inhisofficial )capacity; ) )MATTHEWG.OLSEN,Directorofthe )NationalCounterterrorismCenter,in )hisofficialcapacity; ) )JEHJOHNSON,Directorofthe )DepartmentofHomelandSecurity,in )hisofficialcapacity; ) )R.GILKERLIKOWSKE,Commissionerof )theUnitedStatesCustomsandBorder )Protection,inhisofficialcapacity; ) )JOHNS.PISTOLE,Administratorofthe )UnitedStatesTransportationSecurity )Administration,inhisofficialcapacity;and, ) )JOHNT.MORTON,DirectorofUnitedStates )ImmigrationandCustomsEnforcement; )inhisofficialcapacity; ) ) Defendants. )

2:14-cv-13128-LVP-RSW Doc # 1 Filed 08/14/14 Pg 1 of 28 Pg ID 1

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COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,YASEENKADURA,NAJIABDULJABER,ABDUSSAMADTOOTLA,ALAA

SAADE, and AHMED SALEH ABUSALEH, through their undersigned counsel, state as

follows:

Introduction

1. This lawsuit is an expression of anger grounded in law. Our federal

governmentisimposinganinjusticeofhistoricproportionsupontheAmericanswhohave

filedthisaction,aswellasthousandsofothers.Throughextra‐judicialandsecretmeans,the

federalgovernmentisensnaringindividualsintoaninvisiblewebofconsequencesthatare

imposedindefinitelyandwithoutrecourseasaresultoftheshockinglylargefederalwatch

liststhatnowincludehundredsofthousandsofindividuals.

2. These consequences include the inability to fly on airplanes, to go through

securitywithouthavingallscreenersreceiveamessagefortheremainderofyourlifethat

you are a "known or suspected terrorist," to obtain licenses, to exercise your Second

Amendmentrighttoownafirearm,andtobefreefromtheunimaginableindignityandreal‐

life danger of having your own government communicate to hundreds of thousands of

federalagents,privatecontractors,stateandlocalpolice,thecaptainsofsea‐faringvessels,

andforeigngovernmentsallacrosstheworldthatyouareaviolentmenace.

3. Andunfortunately,thefederalgovernmenthasdesigneditsfederalwatchlist

to be accountability‐free. Persons placed on the federal watch list have no means of

removing themselves or challenging the basis for their inclusion. Indeed, people on the

federalwatch listsonly learnoftheirplacementwhentheyfeel thewebofconsequences

burdeningtheirlivesandaspirations,andtheyneverlearnwhy.


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4. Recentmediaaccountshavemadeclearthatthesecretfederalwatchlististhe

productofbigotryandmisguided,counterproductivezeal.Americansaredesignatedonto

thewatchlistwithoutbeingcharged,convicted,orinsomestomach‐churningcases,even

subjecttoanongoinginvestigation.

5. Instead, we now know—because of two recently leaked government

documentsandagovernmentalreport,whichincludetheMarch2013WatchlistingGuidance

(Exhibit1), theDirectorateofTerrorist Identities(DTI):StrategicAccomplishments2013

(Exhibit 2), and the Department of Justice'sMarch 2014 Audit of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation'sManagement of TerroristWatchlist (Exhibit 3)—that the care the federal

governmenttakesincreatingitsfederalwatchlistwouldbelaughableifnotforthetragic,

life‐alteringconsequencesthatflowfromtheseillegalactions.

6. Wenowknow thatDearborn, a city of less than100,000 and a placeArab

AmericansandMuslimAmericanshavecalledhome forgenerations, contains thesecond

highestconcentrationofAmericansonthefederalgovernment'swatchlist.Weknowthat

therehavebeenmorethan1.5millionnominationstothefederalwatchlistsince2009and

that,in2013forexample,theTerroristScreeningCenterconverted98.96percentofthose

nominationsintowatchlistplacements.

7. Evidence shows that the federal government uses guilt‐by‐association

presumptionstoplacefamilymembersandfriendsoflistedpersonsonthewatchlist.

8. Moreover,traveltoMuslimmajoritycountries—travelthatAmericanMuslims

areverylikelytoengagein—isalsoabasisforwatchlistplacement.

9. In 2009, the federal governmentmade 227,932 nominations to its federal

watchlist.In2013,thatnumbermorethandoubledto468,749.IfthisCourtdoesnottemper


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thefederalgovernment'swatchlistingobsession,by2018,Defendantsmaybenominating

morethanamillionindividualsayeartoitswatchlist.

Parties

10. Plaintiff Yaseen Kadura is a United States Citizen and aMuslim. Venue is

proper because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to his claims

occurredwithinthisdistrict.

11. PlaintiffDr.NajiAbduljaberisaUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresidingin

WashtenawCounty,Michigan,andwithinthisdistrict.

12. Plaintiff Abdus Samad Tootla is a permanent legal resident and a Muslim

residingOaklandCounty,Michigan,andwithinthisdistrict.

13. PlaintiffAlaaSaadeisaUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresidinginWayne

County,Michigan,andwithinthisdistrict.

14. Plaintiff Ahmed Saleh Abusaleh is a United States Citizen and a Muslim

residinginWayneCounty,Michigan,andwithindistrict.

15. Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr. is Attorney General of the United States.

DefendantHolderisbeingsuedinhisofficialcapacity,only.

16. DefendantJamesB.ComeyisDirectoroftheFederalBureauofInvestigation

(“FBI”).DefendantComeyisbeingsuedinhisofficialcapacity,only.

17. Defendant Timothy J. Healy is Director of the Terrorist Screening Center

(“TSC”).DefendantHealyisbeingsuedinhisofficialcapacity,only.

18. Defendant Matthew G. Olsen is Director of the National Counterterrorism

Center(“NCTC”).DefendantOlsenisbeingsuedinhisofficialcapacity,only.


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19. DefendantJehJohnsonisDirectorof theDepartmentofHomelandSecurity.

DefendantJohnsonisbeingsuedinhisofficialcapacity,only.

20. DefendantR.GilKerlikowskeisCommissioneroftheUnitedStatesCustoms

andBorderProtection(“CBP”).DefendantKerlikowskeisbeingsuedinhisofficialcapacity,

only.

21. DefendantJohnS.PistoleisAdministratoroftheUnitedStatesTransportation

SecurityAdministration(“TSA”).DefendantPistoleisbeingsuedinhisofficialcapacity,only.

22. Defendant JohnT.Morton isDirectorof theUnitedStates Immigrationand

CustomsEnforcement(“ICE”).DefendantMortonisbeingsuedinhisofficialcapacity,only.

JurisdictionandVenue

23. Under U.S. Const. Art. III §2, this Court has jurisdiction because the rights

soughttobeprotectedhereinaresecuredbytheUnitedStatesConstitution.Jurisdictionis

properpursuantto28U.S.C.§1331,Bivensv.SixUnknownNamedAgentsofFederalBureau

ofNarcotics, 403U.S.388 (1971),et seq., 5U.S.C. §702,5U.S.C. §706, theUnitedStates

Constitution,andfederalcommonlaw.

24. ThisactionseeksdeclaratoryreliefpursuanttotheDeclaratoryJudgmentAct,

28U.S.C.§§2201‐02,Rules57and65oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure,andpursuant

tothegeneral,legal,andequitablepowersofthisCourt.

25. Thisactionalsoseeksdamagespursuantto28U.S.C.§1343(a)(4)and28U.S.C.

§1357.

26. Asubstantialpartoftheunlawfulactsallegedhereinwerecommittedwithin

thejurisdictionoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofMichigan.


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27. Venue is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 1391(e) as to all Defendants because

DefendantsareofficersoremployeesofagenciesoftheUnitedStatessuedintheirofficial

capacity and because this judicial district is where all Plaintiffs reside and where a

substantialpartoftheeventsoromissionsgivingrisetotheclaimsoccurred.

FactualBackground

TheFederalGovernment’sTerroristWatchList

28. InSeptember,2003,AttorneyGeneralJohnAshcroftestablishedtheTerrorist

ScreeningCentertoconsolidatethegovernment’sapproachtoterrorismscreening.TheTSC,

which is administered by the FBI, develops and maintains the federal government’s

consolidatedTerrorismScreeningDatabase(the“watchlist”).TSC’sconsolidatedwatchlist

is the federal government’s master repository for suspected international and domestic

terroristrecordsusedforwatchlistrelatedscreening.

29. Thewatchlisthastwoprimarycomponents:theSelecteeListandtheNo‐Fly

List. PersonsontheSelecteeListaresystematicallysubjecttoextrascreeningatairports

andlandbordercrossings,andoftenfind“SSSS”ontheirboardingpasseswhichismarked

to indicate a passenger’s watch list status to screeners. Persons on the No‐Fly List are

preventedfromboardingflightsthatflyinto,outof,oreventhroughUnitedStatesairspace.

30. TSCsendsrecordsfromitsterroristwatchlisttoothergovernmentagencies

thatinturnusethoserecordstoidentifysuspectedterrorists.Forexample,applicableTSC

recordsareprovidedtoTSAforusebyairlinesinpre‐screeningpassengersandtoCBPfor

use inscreeningtravelersenteringtheUnitedStates. Thus,while theTSCmaintainsand

controlsthedatabaseofsuspectedterrorists,itisthefront‐lineagenciesliketheTSAthat

carryoutthescreeningfunction.Inthecontextofairtravel,whenindividualsmakeairline


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reservations and check in at airports, the front‐line screening agency, likeTSA andCBP,

conductsaname‐basedsearchoftheindividualtodeterminewhetherheorsheisonawatch

list.

31. Whileagenciesthroughoutthefederalgovernmentutilizesthefederalwatch

list to conduct screening, listed persons are subject to a comprehensive portfolio of

consequencesthatcoverlargeaspectsoftheirlives.

32. Indeed,thefederalgovernmentdisseminatesitsfederalwatchlisttostateand

localauthorities,foreigngovernments,corporations,privatecontractors,thecaptainsofsea‐

faringvessels,amongothersinordertoencouragetheseentitiestoimposeconsequenceson

thoseindividualsDefendantshavelisted.

33. Becausethefederalgovernmentdisseminatesitsfederalwatchlisttoforeign

governments,listedpersonsareoftennotallowedtoenterothernations.Thisisbecausethe

UnitedStatesistellingothernations,withoutanymodicumofdueprocess,thatthousands

ofitsowncitizensare“knownorsuspectedterrorists.”

34. Thefederalgovernmentdisseminatesitsfederalwatchlisttostateandlocal

policeofficers,whichallowsthoseofficerstoquerythenamesofpersons,ifforexample,the

listedindividualispulledoverforroutinetrafficviolations.

35. Disseminatingthefederalwatchlisttostateandlocalpoliceofficerscreatesa

dangeroussituationinsofarasthefederalwatchlisteffectivelydirectstateandlocalofficers

totreatthousandsofAmericanschargedorconvictedwithnocrimeyetlistedasa“known

orsuspectedterrorist”andasextremelydangerous.


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36. Withtheadventanddeploymentofautomaticlicenseplatereadersbypolice

departmentsacrossthecountry,beinglistedonthefederalwatchlistcanbethebasisofa

trafficstop.

37. Beingonthefederalwatchlistcanpreventlistedpersonsfrompurchasinga

gun.Forexample,NewJerseypassedalawin2013thatbannedpersonsonthefederalwatch

listfromowningguns.

38. Because the federal government conducts a security risk assessment that

includesqueryingthefederalwatchlistpriortoissuingalicensetocommercialdriversto

transporthazardousmaterials,beingonthe federalwatch listcanprevent listedpersons

fromobtainingorrenewingtheirHazmatlicense.

39. Being on the federal watch list can also prevent listed persons from

accompanying minors or passengers with disabilities to their gate, from working at an

airport,orworkingforanairlineinsofaraslistedpersonsarenotallowedtoenterso‐called

“sterileareas”ofairports.

40. AlthoughTSA,CBP,andotheragenciesmayusetherecordsprovidedbythe

TSC,itistheTSCthatmaintainsandcontrolsthedatabaseofsuspectedterrorists.

41. Two government entities are primarily responsible for “nominating”

individualsforinclusionintheterroristwatchlist—theNCTCandtheFBI.TheNCTC,which

ismanagedbytheOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence,reliesoninformationfrom

otherfederaldepartmentsandagencieswhenincludingknownorsuspectedinternational

terrorists in itsTerrorist IdentitiesDatamartEnvironment (“TIDE”)database. TheNCTC

reviewsTIDEentriesandrecommendsspecificentriestotheTSCforinclusioninthewatch


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list.TIDEisthemainsourceofallinternationalterroristinformationincludedinthewatch

list.

42. The FBI, in turn, nominates to the watch list individuals with what it

characterizes as suspected ties to domestic terrorism. TSCmakes the final decision on

whether anominated individualmeets theminimumrequirements for inclusion into the

watchlistasaknownorsuspectedterrorist.TSCalsodecideswhichscreeningsystemswill

receivetheinformationaboutthatindividual.

43. DefendantHealyhastestifiedthatinevaluatingwhetheranindividualmeets

the criteria for inclusionon the consolidatedwatch list, theTSCdetermineswhether the

nominated individual is “reasonably suspected” of having possible links to terrorism.

AccordingtotheTSC,“reasonablesuspicionrequiresarticulablefactswhich,takentogether

withrationalinferences,reasonablywarrantthedeterminationthatanindividualisknown

orsuspectedtobeorhasbeenengagedinconductconstituting,inpreparationfor,inandof

orrelatedtoterrorismandterroristactivities.”

44. Defendantshavenotstatedpubliclywhatstandardsorcriteriaareappliedto

determinewhetheranindividualontheconsolidatedwatchlistwillbeplacedontheNo‐Fly

List,SelecteeList(“SSSS”)orotherlistthatisdistributedtotheTSA,CBPorotherscreening

agencies.

45. The standards for watch list inclusion do not evince even internal logic.

Defendantsdefinea“suspectedterrorist”asan“individualwhoisreasonablysuspectedto

be,orhavebeen,engagedinconductconstituting,inpreparationfor,inaidof,orrelatedto

terrorismandterroristactivitiesbasedonarticulableandreasonablesuspicion.”Inother

words, Defendants place individuals on the federalwatch list based upon a “reasonable


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suspicion” that they are “reasonably suspected” of nefarious activities. This “reasonable

suspicion”basedona“reasonablesuspicion”standarddoesnotevencontaininternallogic.

46. Thefederalgovernmentutilizesguilt‐by‐associationasabasisforwatchlist

inclusion.Forexample,theimmediaterelativeoflistedpersonscanbelistedwithoutany

derogatory information—other than the bonds of family. Nonetheless, such designation

suggeststhattheimmediaterelativeishimorherselfengagedinnefariousactivities.

47. Being a known associate—a friend, colleague, fellow community member,

etc.—ofalistedindividualcanalsoprovideabasisforwatchlistinclusion.

48. Even ifan individual isacquittedof terrorismchargesor thosechargesare

otherwisedismissed,thefederalgovernmentretainsforitselftheauthoritytocontinueto

includetheminthewatchlist.

49. Forreasonsunknown,Defendantsalsoplacewhattheycall“non‐investigatory

subjects”onthefederalwatchlist,peoplethattheyhavechosennottoinvestigate.

50. Under these practices and standards, the number of records in the

consolidatedwatchlisthasswelled.Over1.5millionnominationstothewatchlisthavebeen

submittedbyfederalagenciessincefiscal2009.

51. In2013,DefendantTSCaccepted98.96percentofallnominationsmade.

52. Becauseoftheseloosestandardsandpractices,thefederalwatchlist’srateof

growthhasincreased.Infiscal2009,therewere227,932nominationstothewatchlist.In

fiscal2013,therewere468,749nominations.

53. In 2001, therewere 16 peoplewho the federal government systematically

preventedfromflying.In2013,thatnumberincreasedto47,000.


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54. Onceanindividualhasbeenplacedonthewatchlist,theindividualremains

onthelistuntiltheagencythatsuppliedtheinitialinformationinsupportofthenomination

determinestheindividualshouldberemoved.

55. A2007GAOreportfoundthatTSCrejectsonlyapproximatelyonepercentof

allnominationstothewatchlist.1Assuch,thewatchlistisgrowingatarateofapproximately

20,000entriesperyear.

56. AtaMarch10,2010SenateHomelandSecurityCommitteehearing,RusselE.

Travers,DeputyDirectoroftheNationalCounterterrorismCenter,statedthat“[t]heentire

federalgovernmentisleaningveryfarforwardonputtingpeopleonlist,”andthatthewatch

listis“gettingbigger,anditwillgetevenbigger.”

57. ThefederalwatchlistalsodisproportionatelytargetsAmericanMuslims.

58. Defendantshaveutilizedthewatchlist,notasatooltoenhanceaviationand

bordersecurity,butasabludgeontocoerceAmericanMuslimsintobecominginformantsor

forgoingtheexerciseoftheirrights,suchastherighttohaveanattorneypresentduringlaw

enforcementquestioning.

59. Publicexamplesof thisphenomenonabound. SeeLatifv.Holder,2014U.S.

Dist.LEXIS85450,*19(D.Or.June24,2014)(anFBIagenttoldStevenWashburnthathe

“wouldhelpremoveWashburn'snamefromtheNo‐FlyListifheagreedtospeaktotheFBI”);

Id.at*21‐22(FBIagentstoldIbraheimMashalthat“hisnamewouldberemovedfromthe

No‐Fly List and he would receive compensation if he helped the FBI by serving as an

informant.”):Idat*22‐23(FBIagentsofferedAmirMeshal“theopportunitytoserveasa

1 See United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters entitled Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes, and Expand Use of the List, GAO‐08‐110, October 2007, at 22.


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government informant in exchange for assistance in removinghisname from theNo‐Fly

List.”). SeealsoFikrev.FBI,2014U.S.Dist. LEXIS73174 (D.Or.May29,2014) (Emirati

officialstoldYonasFikrethathe“couldnottraveltotheUnitedStatesbyairbecauseheison

theNo‐FlyList”andanFBIagenttoldFikrethat“theFBIcouldtakestepstoremove[him]

fromtheNo‐FlyListifheagreedtobeaninformant.”);Tanveerv.Holder,et.al.,No.13‐cv‐

6951,Dkt.15(April22,2014)(NaveedShinwari “declinedtoactasan informant for the

FederalBureauofInvestigationandtospyon[his]ownAmericanMuslimcommunitiesand

otherinnocentpeople.”).

60. AlmostallpubliclyknowninstancesofAmericansbeingplacedonthewatch

listregardMuslimsorpersonswhocouldbemistakenforMuslims.

61. Additionally,governmentrecordsshowthatDearborn,Michigan—whichis40

percentArab—isdisproportionatelyrepresentedonthefederalwatchlist.Infact,Dearborn

isamongthetopfivecitiesinthecountry,alongsideChicago,Houston,NewYork,andSan

Diego,representedonthefederalwatchlist.

62. Defendants’ 2013WatchlistingGuidancealso indicates that “[t]ravel forno

knownlawfulorlegitimatepurposetoalocusofterroristactivity”canbeabasisforbeing

listed.Whilea“locusofTerroristActivity”isnotdefinedbythedocument,uponinformation

andbelief,itlikelyincludesanyplacewheremanyMuslimsreside.

InadequacyoftheDHSTravelerRedressInquiryProgramProcess

63. The government entities and individuals involved in the creation,

maintenance, support, modification and enforcement of the federal watch list, including

Defendants,havenotprovidedtravelerswithafairandeffectivemechanismthroughwhich

theycanchallengetheTSC’sdecisiontoplacethemontheterroristwatchlist.


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64. Anindividualwhohasbeenpreventedorhinderedfromtravelbybeingplaced

on the federalwatch list has no clear avenue for redress, becauseno single government

entityisresponsibleforremovinganindividualfromthelist.TheTSC,whichisadministered

bytheFBI,doesnotacceptredressinquiriesfromthepublic,nordoesitdirectlyprovide

final disposition letters to individualswho have submitted redress inquiries. TheNCTC

whichmanagestheTIDElistdoesnotacceptredressinquiriesfromthegeneralpublic.

65. Individualswhoseekredressafterhavingbeenincludedintheterroristwatch

list must submit an inquiry through the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (“DHS

TRIP”).DHSTRIPprovidesindividualswitha“RedressControlNumber.”

66. DHSTRIPistheonlyredress“process”availabletoindividualsincludedonthe

terroristwatchlist.

67. DHSTRIPsubmitstravelercomplaintstotheTSC,whichdetermineswhether

anyactionshouldbetaken. TheTSChasnotprovidedanypubliclyavailableinformation

abouthowitmakesthatdecision. TheTSC is the finalarbiterofwhetheran individual’s

nameisretainedonorremovedfromthewatchlist.

68. TheTSCmakesadeterminationregardingaparticularindividual’sstatuson

thewatchlist,theDHSrespondstotheindividualwithastandardformletterthatneither

confirms nor denies the existence of any terrorist watch list records relating to the

individual.Thelettersdonotsetforthanybasisforinclusioninaterroristwatchlist,donot

statewhetherthegovernmenthasresolvedthecomplaintatissue.

69. The government does not provide the individual with any opportunity to

confront,ortorebut,thegroundsforhisorherpossibleinclusiononthewatchlist.Assuch,

DHSTRIPoffersnomeaningfulreviewofthewatchlistdesignationandineffectshieldsthe


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TSC’s actionswith respect to the individual nominations or classes of nominations from

meaningfulreviewbyanyindependentauthority.

70. Moreover,thegovernment’sowninternalauditsofthesystempointtoserious

flaws.Forexample,aMarch2008DOJOfficeoftheInspectorGeneralreportentitledAudit

oftheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeTerrorismWatchlistNominationProcessesfoundsignificant

problemswiththenominationandremovalprocess.

71. Thus,theonly“process”availabletosuchindividualsistosubmittheirnames

andotheridentifyinginformationtoagovernmententitythathasnoauthoritytoprovide

redressandtohopethatanunspecifiedgovernmentagencycorrectsanerrororchangesits

mind.

72. Asallegedbelow,eachofthePlaintiffsaredesignatedonthewatchlistand

havemadeatleastoneredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.EachPlaintiffreceivedaletteras

describedinparagraph68above.

PlaintiffYaseenKadura

73. On September 22, 2012, Mr. Yaseen Kadura was referred to secondary

inspection and detained by CBP at the border stop in Port Huron, Michigan, when he

attemptedtore‐entertheUnitedStatesafterabrieftriptoCanada.

74. CBPofficersconfiscatedhisphoneand informedMr.Kadurathathisphone

wasbeingforwardedtoICEandwouldbereturnedtohimin24to48hours.

75. OnOctober22,2012,Mr.KaduraappearedatChicagoO’Hare International

Airport,inordertotraveltoLibya.


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76. Mr. Kadura had previously purchased a plane ticket for a Turkish Airlines

flight to Istanbul, andhewas to then fly toLibya from IstanbulonTurkishAirlines. Mr.

KadurapresentedhimselfattheTurkishAirlinesticketcounterhoursbeforehisflight.

77. TurkishAirlinespersonnelwereunabletocheckMr.Kadurainforhisflight

anddidnotissuehimaboardingpass.

78. ThepersonnelinformedMr.KadurathathewasontheNo‐FlyListandthathe

couldnotboardaplane.

79. BeforeMr.Kadurawasdenied theability toboardhis flightonOctober22,

2012,hedidnotreceiveanynotice,fromagovernmentagencyoranyoneelse,thathewould

beunabletoboardhisflightorthathisnamewasplacedontheNo‐FlyList.Mr.Kadurahad

beenablepreviouslytoboardflightsintheUnitedStateswithoutdifficulty.

80. OnoraboutNovember14,2012,SpecialAgentArkinFout,HomelandSecurity

Investigations (“HSI”), Immigration and Customs Enforcement, directly contacted Mr.

Kaduraandharassedand intimidatedhim inanattempt tocoercehim intoarrangingan

“informalmeeting”atanundisclosedlocation.

81. Special Agent Fout proceeded to pressure Mr. Kadura into becoming an

informantinLibya,presumablybycommittingespionageinthatcountry.

82. SpecialAgentFoutindicatedthatifMr.Kadurawantedtoremovehisname

fromtheNo‐FlyList,itwouldbenearlyimpossibleforhimtodosounlessheagreedtowork

asaninformantinLibya.

83. OnNovember30,2012,Mr.KadurafiledacomplaintthroughDHSTRIPand

hewassubsequentlyassignedaRedressControlNumber.


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84. OnMay8,2013,Mr.Kadurareceiveda letterasdescribed inparagraph68

above.

85. Mr.KadurafiledatimelyDHSTRIPappealonJune5,2013.

86. Asofthisdate,Mr.Kadurahasnotreceivedaresponsetohisappeal,described

inparagraph85above.

87. Asofthisdate,Mr.KaduraremainsontheNo‐FlyList.

88. AtnotimewasMr.Kaduragivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement

onthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontest

hisdesignation.

PlaintiffDr.NajiAbduljaber

89. On July 8, 2007, Dr. Naji Abduljaberwas referred to secondary inspection,

handcuffed and detained by CBP at the border stop in the Ambassador Bridge, Detroit,

Michigan,whenheattemptedtore‐entertheUnitedStatesafterabriefvacationinCanada.

90. CBPofficers confiscatedhisUnited Statespassport, and subjectedhim to a

prolongeddetentionandquestioningforapproximatelyfourhours.

91. OnDecember13,2010,Dr.AbduljaberappearedattheDetroitMetropolitan

Airport,inordertoboardacommercialflighttoAmman,Jordan.

92. Dr.Abduljaber’sboardingpasswasstampedwiththe“SSSS”designation.He

wasunabletoprinthisboardingpass.

93. He referred to secondary inspection by CBP, and once again subjected to

prolongedsearches,detentionandquestioning.

94. Dr. Abduljaber filed a redress request through DHS TRIP and was

subsequentlyassignedaRedressControlNumber


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95. OnJanuary5,2012,Dr.Abduljaberreceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph

68above.

96. Asofthisdate,Dr.Abduljabercontinuestobesubjectedtoprolongedsearches,

detentionandquestioningwhenre‐enteringtheUnitedStatesattheUnitedStates‐Canada

border.

97. As of this date, Dr. Abduljaber continues to be designated as “SSSS,” and

subjectedtoprolongedsearches,detentionandquestioning,everytimehetravelsbyair.

98. At no time was Dr. Abduljaber given notice of the factual basis for his

placementonthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunity

tocontesthisdesignation.

PlaintiffAbdusSamadTootla

99. On March 18, 2008, Mr. Abdus Samad Tootla appeared at the Detroit

MetropolitanAirport,inordertoboardacommercialflighttoSouthAfrica.

100. Mr.Tootla’sboardingpasswasstampedwiththe“SSSS”designation.Hewas

unabletoprinthisboardingpassandreferredtosecondaryinspectionbyCBP.

101. Subsequent to thatdate,Mr.Tootlawas repeatedly subjected toprolonged

searches,detentionandquestioningeverytimehetraveledbyair.

102. Moreover, Mr. Tootla’s boarding pass was stamped with the “SSSS”

designationeverytimehetraveledbyair.

103. Mr.Tootla filedaredressrequest throughDHSTRIPandwassubsequently

assignedaRedressControlNumber.

104. OnJanuary10,2013,Mr.Tootlareceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph68

above.


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105. OnNovember12,2013,Mr.TootlaboardedacommercialflighttotheUnited

StatesandarrivedattheMiamiInternationalAirport.

106. Althoughhisboardingpass,forthefirsttimesinceMarch18,2008,wasnot

stampedwiththe“SSSS”designation,hefacedsubstantiallysimilartreatment.

107. HewasdetainedbyCBPofficerswhoconfiscatedhisUnitedStatespassport

andheldhiminaroomforquestioning.

108. Mr.TootlaoverheardCBPofficersdescribehimas“anO3.”

109. Asofthisdate,Mr.Tootlacontinuestobesubjectedtosimilartreatmenttothe

treatmenthereceivedwhiledesignatedas“SSSS”everytimehetravelsbyair.

110. Upon information and belief,Mr. Tootla continues to be designated on the

federalwatchlist.

111. AtnotimewasMr.Tootlagivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacementon

thefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontesthis

designation.

PlaintiffAlaaSaade

112. On or about the summer of 2012, Mr. Alaa Saade appeared the Detroit

MetropolitanAirportinordertoboardacommercialflighttoAmman,Jordan.

113. HisboardingpasswasstampedwiththeSSSSdesignation.Hewasunableto

printhisboardingpassandwasreferred tosecondaryscreening forprolongedsearches,

detentionandquestioning.

114. Mr.SaadefiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIPandhewassubsequently



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115. OnOctober28,2013,Mr.Saadereceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph68

above.

116. OnJuly29,2013,Mr.SaadewasdetainedforapproximatelysixhoursbyCBP

attheAmbassadorBridgeinDetroit,Michigan,whenheattemptedtore‐entertheUnited

StatesafterabrieftriptoCanada.

117. Uponswipinghispassport,analarmwasactivatedandCBPreferredMr.Saade

tosecondaryscreeningforprolongedsearches,detentionandquestioning.

118. OnoraboutMay6,2013,Mr.SaadeboardedacommercialflighttotheUnited

StatesandarrivedattheDetroitMetropolitanAirport.ACBPofficerescortedMr.Saadefrom

the gate and took him to secondary inspection for prolonged searches, detention and

questioning.

119. ACBPofficerinformedMr.SaadethathewasorderedtoinvestigateMr.Saade.

120. Asof thisdate,Mr. Saadecontinues tobe subjected toprolongedsearches,

detentionandquestioningwhenre‐enteringtheUnitedStatesattheUnitedStates‐Canada

border.

121. Mr.Saadecontinuestobedesignatedas“SSSS,”andsubjectedtoprolonged

searches,detentionandquestioning,everytimehetravelsbyair.

122. Moreover,CBPofficersconfiscatehisphoneanddownloadthedatafromhis

phoneevery timehe re‐enters theUnitedStates at theUnitedStates‐Canadaborder and

everytimehetravelsbyair.

123. AtnotimewasMr.Saadegivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacementon

thefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontesthis

designation.


20

PlaintiffAhmedSalehAbusaleh

124. On February 11, 2004,Mr. Abusaleh appeared at the DetroitMetropolitan

Airport,inordertoboardacommercialflighttoYemen.

125. Dr.Abusaleh’sboardingpasswasstampedwiththe“SSSS”designation. He

wasunabletoprinthisboardingpass.

126. HewasreferredtosecondaryinspectionbyCBPandsubjectedtoprolonged

searches,detentionandquestioning.

127. Subsequenttothatdate,Mr.Abusalehwasrepeatedlysubjectedtoprolonged

searches,detentionandquestioningeverytimehetraveledbyair.

128. Moreover, Mr. Abusaleh’s boarding pass was stamped with the “SSSS”

designationeverytimehetraveledbyair.

129. Mr.AbusalehfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIPandwassubsequently


130. OnDecember3,2012,Mr.Abusalehreceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph

68above.

131. On November 23, 2013, Mr. Abusaleh boarded a commercial flight to the

UnitedStatesandarrivedattheAtlantaInternationalAirport,afterabriefvacationinYemen.

132. Althoughhisboardingpass,forthefirsttimesinceFebruary11,2004,wasnot

stampedwiththe“SSSS”designation,hefacedsubstantiallysimilartreatment.

133. Onthatday,Mr.AbusalehwasdetainedbyCBPofficerswhoconfiscatedhis

United States passport,marked itwith a red tag, and held him in a room for secondary

questioning.


21

134. WhileMr.Abusalehwasheld forquestioning,aCBPofficeraskedhim ifhe

wouldagreetofurtherquestioning,presumablybyFBIagents,athishome.

135. Asofthisdate,Mr.Abusalehcontinuestobesubjectedtosimilartreatmentto

thetreatmenthereceivedwhiledesignatedas“SSSS”everytimehetravelsbyair.

136. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Abusalehcontinuestobedesignatedonthe

federalwatchlist.

137. AtnotimewasMr.Abusalehgivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement

onthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontest

hisdesignation.

COUNTIFAILURETOPROVIDEPOST‐DEPRIVATIONNOTICEANDHEARINGINVIOLATIONOF

THEFIFTHAMENDMENTRIGHTTOPROCEDURALDUEPROCESS(Jurisdictionunder28U.S.C.§1331and5U.S.C.§702)

138. EachofthePlaintiffslearnedthatheorshewasplacedonthefederalwatch

list subsequent to being added on the federal watch list and sought to challenge such

placement.

139. Defendants’actionsasdescribedaboveinrefusingtoprovidePlaintiffswith

anyreasonorbasisfortheirplacementonthefederalwatchlistandinrefusingtoprovide

Plaintiffswithameaningfulopportunitytochallengetheircontinuedinclusiononthefederal

watchlistdeprivePlaintiffsofconstitutionallyprotectedlibertyinterests.

140. Plaintiffshavealibertyinterestintravelingfreefromunreasonableburdens

within,to,andfromtheUnitedStates,throughlandbordercrossingsandoverU.S.airspace.

141. Plaintiffs have a right to be free from false government stigmatization as

individualswhoare“knownorsuspectedtobe”terrorists,orwhoareotherwiseassociated


22

withterroristactivity,whensuchharmarisesinconjunctionwiththedeprivationoftheir

righttotravelonthesametermsasothertravelersand/orthedeprivationoftheirliberty

interestundertheFifthAmendmentintravelfreefromunreasonableburdens.

142. Plaintiffshavealibertyinterestinnonattainder(ie:theinterestagainstbeing

singledoutforpunishmentwithouttrial).Defendants’actionshavesingledoutPlaintiffsfor

punishmentsthatinclude,butarenotlimitedto,inabilitytotravelbyairandunreasonable

burdensplacedupontravelingbyairtoandfromtheUnitedStates,overU.S.airspaceand

at land border crossings, and false association with a list of individuals suspected of

terrorism.

143. Plaintiffs,havingbeenburdenedorpreventedfromboardingoncommercial

flightsorenteringtheUnitedStatesatlandbordercrossings,andhavingsoughttochallenge

theirplacementonthe federalwatch list,areentitledtoaconstitutionallyadequate legal

mechanism thataffords themnoticeof the reasonsandbases for theirplacementon the

federalwatchlistandameaningfulopportunitytocontesttheircontinuedinclusiononthe

federalwatchlist.

144. By failing to provide Plaintiffs with such a constitutionally adequate legal

mechanism, Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs of their protected liberty interests,

including but not limited to their liberty interests in traveling, freedom from false

stigmatization,andnonattainder,and thushavingviolatedPlaintiffs’ constitutional rights

without affording them due process of law andwill continue to do so into the future if

Plaintiffsarenotaffordedthereliefdemandedbelow.


23

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and

injunctivereliefintheformdescribedinthePrayerforReliefbelow,plusallsuchotherrelief

thisCourtdeemsjustandproperincludingcostsandattorneys’feesincurredinthisaction.

COUNTIIDEPRIVATIONOFPROTECTEDLIBERTIESINVIOLATIONOFFIFTHAMENDMENT

RIGHTTOSUBSTANTIVEDUEPROCESS(Jurisdictionunder28U.S.C.§1331and5U.S.C.§702)

145. Plaintiffsherebyreallegeandincorporatebyreferencetheforegoing

paragraphsofthisComplaintasiffullysetforthherein.

146. Because Plaintiffs do not present a security threat to commercial aviation,

Defendants’ actions as described above in including Plaintiffs on a watch list that

unreasonablyburdensorpreventsthemfromboardingcommercialflightsorenteringthe

UnitedStatesatlandbordercrossings,arearbitrary,lackevenarationalrelationshiptoany

legitimate government interest, and have unreasonably deprived Plaintiffs of

constitutionally protected rights, including their liberty interests in travel, freedom from

falsestigmatization,andnonattainder.

147. By placing Plaintiffs on the federal watch list, Defendants have placed an

undueburdenontheirfundamentalrightofmovement.

148. Defendants’watchlistlackacompellinginterestinsofarastheirtruepurpose

is to provide law enforcement with a tool to coerce American Muslims into becoming

informants.

149. Defendants’watch list are alsonotnarrowly tailored insofar as the federal

watchlistareentirelyanddemonstrablyineffectualandobviousalternativesexist.


24

150. Defendants have thus violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights without

affordingthemdueprocessoflawandwillcontinuetodosointothefutureifPlaintiffsare

notaffordedthereliefdemandedbelow.




COUNTIIIUNLAWFULAGENCYACTIONINVIOLATIONOFTHEADMNIISTRATIVEPROCEDURE

ACT,5U.S.C.§§702,706(Jurisdictionunder28U.S.C.§1331and5U.S.C.§702)

151. Plaintiffs hereby reallege and incorporate by reference the foregoing


152. Defendants’actionsdescribedhereinwereandarearbitrary, capricious,an

abuseofdiscretion,otherwisenot inaccordancewith law,andcontrary toconstitutional

rights,power,privilege,orimmunity,andshouldbesetasideasunlawfulpursuantto5U.S.C.

§706.

153. Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiffs, who had been unreasonably

burdenedordeniedboardingoncommercialflightsorenteringtheUnitedStatesacrossthe

border and sought to challenge their placement on the federal watch list, with a

constitutionallyadequatemechanismthataffordsthemnoticeofthereasonsandbasesfor

their placement on the federalwatch list and ameaningful opportunity to contest their

continuedinclusiononthefederalwatchlistisarbitrary,capricious,anabuseofdiscretion,

otherwisenotinaccordancewithlaw,andcontrarytoconstitutionalrights,power,privilege,

orimmunity,andshouldbesetasideasunlawfulpursuantto5U.S.C.§706.


25

154. Because Plaintiffs do not present a security threat to commercial aviation,

Defendants’actionsasdescribedaboveinincludingPlaintiffsonthefederalwatchlistthat

unreasonablyburdensorpreventsthemfromboardingcommercialflightsorenteringthe

UnitedStatesacrosstheborder,arearbitrary,capricious,anabuseofdiscretion,otherwise

not in accordance with law, and contrary to constitutional rights, power, privilege, or

immunity,andshouldbesetasideasunlawfulpursuantto5U.S.C.§706.




COUNTIVVIOLATIONOFTHEFIFTHAMENDMENTTOTHEUNITEDSTATESCONSTITUTION

(Jurisdictionunder28U.S.C.§1331and5U.S.C.§702)(EqualProtection)



156. Defendants’above‐describedactions,policies,courseofconduct,orpatternof

practice that mandate or permit the above‐described treatment of Plaintiffs are

discriminatory and constitute an action that targets religious conduct for distinctive

treatment.


practicethatmandateorpermittheabove‐describedtreatmenthavehadadiscriminatory

effectuponandhavedisparatelyimpactedMuslimAmericantravelers,andnottravelersof

otherfaiths.


26


practicethatmandateorpermittheabove‐describedtreatmentdoesnotserveacompelling

stateinterestoralegitimateorpublicpurpose,noraretheynarrowlytailoredtoachieveany

suchinterest.




COUNTVVIOLATIONOFTHEFIRSTAMENDMENTTOTHEUNITEDSTATESCONSTITUTION

(Jurisdictionunder28U.S.C.§1331and5U.S.C.§702)(Retaliation)



160. Defendants’ above-described actions, policies, course of conduct, or pattern of

practice were substantially prompted by and taken in retaliation for Plaintiffs’ religious exercise.

161. Defendants’ above-described actions have deprived and continue to deprive

Plaintiffs’ rights to be free from religious discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment of

the United States Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act because Defendants have

failed to providePlaintiffs,whohadbeenunreasonablyburdenedordeniedboardingon

commercial flights or entering the United States at land border crossings and sought to

challenge their placement on the federal watch list, with a constitutionally adequate

mechanism thataffords themnoticeof the reasonsandbases for theirplacementon the


27

federalwatchlistandameaningfulopportunitytocontesttheircontinuedinclusiononthe

federalwatchlist.

162. Defendants’ above-described actions constitute a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’

rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Administrative

Procedure Act, an adverse action against Plaintiffs motivated by Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs and

practices, and an action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment.

163. Plaintiffs’ inclusion on the federal watch list does not serve a legitimate, public or

valid law enforcement purpose or a compelling state interest.

164. Even assuming the Defendants’ actions does further a compelling government

interest, Plaintiffs’ inclusion on the federal watch list is not narrowly tailored to achieve any such

interest.

165. Defendants’ motive in including Plaintiffs on the federal watch list is both

discriminatory and retaliatory.




PrayerforRelief

WHEREFORE,Plaintiffsrespectfullyrequest:

1. AdeclaratoryjudgmentthatDefendants’policies,practices,andcustomsviolate

theFifthAmendment to theUnited StatesConstitutionand theAdministrative

ProcedureAct;


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2. Aninjunctionthat:

a. RequiresDefendantstoremedytheconstitutionalandstatutoryviolations

identifiedabove,includingtheremovalofPlaintiffsfromanywatchlistor

databasethatburdensorpreventsthemfromflyingorenteringtheUnited

Statesacrosstheborder;

b. requires Defendants to provide individuals designated on the federal

watchlistwithalegalmechanismthataffordsthemnoticeofthereasons

andbasesfortheirplacementonthefederalwatchlistandameaningful

opportunitytocontesttheircontinuedinclusiononthefederalwatchlist;

3. Anawardofattorneys’fees,costs,andexpensesofalllitigation,pursuantto28

U.S.C.§2412;and,

4. SuchotherandfurtherreliefastheCourtmaydeemjustandproper.

JURY DEMAND

NOW COME Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel, and hereby demand

trial by jury of the above-referenced causes of action.

Respectfullysubmitted,COUNCILONAMERICAN‐ISLAMICRELATIONS,MICHIGAN /s/LenaMasri__________________ LENAF.MASRI(P73461)

AttorneyforPlaintiffs21700NorthwesternHwy,Ste.815Southfield,MI48075Phone:(248)559‐2247

[email protected]:August14,2014


Documents

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN …media.mlive.com/news/detroit_impact/other/CAIR...13. Plaintiff Alaa Saade is a United States Citizen and a Muslim residing in Wayne