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UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE
Ms Fiona Marshall
By e-mail
Secretary to the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee
Palais des Nations, Room S-429-4
8 – 14 Avenue de la Paix
CH-1211 GENEVA 10
Switzerland
18th November 2016
Your ref: ACCC/C/2013/107
Re: Communication to the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee concerning
compliance by Ireland with the provisions of the Convention on public
participation in decision-making in relation to the extension of the duration of 3
planning permissions for a quarry (ACCC/C/2013/107)
Dear Ms Marshall
We refer to your correspondence dated 28th October 2016 relating to questions raised
by the Compliance Committee during the discussion of the above communication at
its fifty-second meeting (Geneva, 8 – 11 March 2016). Please now find enclosed
Ireland’s response:
INTRODUCTION
1. The Communicant, Kieran Cummins, wrote to the Aarhus Convention
Compliance Committee (“ACCC”) alleging non-compliance with articles 6
and 7 of the Convention with respect to decision-making on the extension of
the duration of 3 planning permissions for a quarry, under S.42 of the
Planning and Development Act 2000.
2. On 9th April 2015, after receiving preliminary observations from the
Communicant and Ireland, the ACCC declared the Communication to be
preliminarily admissible.
3. On 27th November 2015 Ireland issued a response to the Communicant’s
written communication.
4. At the invitation of the ACCC, Ireland and the Communicant attended a
discussion of the above communication at its fifty-second meeting (Geneva, 8
– 11 March 2016).
5. During the discussion the Compliance Committee indicated that it would
send further questions for the response of both Ireland and the Communicant.
6. On the 28th October 2016 Ireland received correspondence from the ACCC
raising further questions by the Compliance Committee.
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
7. Ireland’s response is divided into two parts.
8. Part A of Ireland’s response replies to the Committee’s questions raised in its
correspondence of 28th October 2016.
9. Part B of Ireland’s response outlines additional information that was
indicated would be supplied by Ireland to the Committee following the
discussion.
10. However, at the outset Ireland expresses reservation toward responding to
the questions posed by the Committee concerning: (i) domestic remedies and
(ii) Ireland’s legal cost regime.
11. Ireland notes that these questions are not within the subject matter of the
Communicant’s initial Communication, which concerned non-compliance
with articles 6 and 7 of the Convention with respect to decision-making on the
extension of the duration of 3 planning permissions for a quarry.
12. Ireland considers that these questions risk unnecessarily engorging the scope
of the Committee’s inquiry well beyond what is relevant to the subject matter
of the communication.
13. In particular, Ireland notes that there is an ongoing ACCC communication in
respect of Ireland’s legal cost regime. Ireland emphasises that that
communication is the appropriate forum for addressing questions concerning
Ireland’s legal costs regime in the context of the Convention.1
1 ACCC/C/2014/113 Ireland. See http://www.unece.org/environmental-policy/conventions/public-participation/aarhus-convention/tfwg/envppcc/envppcccom/acccc2014113-ireland.html
14. Despite these concerns and reservations, in the interests of assisting the
Committee’s deliberations Ireland has provided responses to the questions
presented in respect of domestic remedies and legal costs.
15. Ireland does so on only on the express understanding that an inquiry into the
compatibility of Ireland’s system of legal remedies and regime for costs with
the Convention is manifestly beyond the scope of this Communication.
Part A- Response to Committee questions of 28 October 2016
RESPONSE TO QUESTION 2 AND 3
16. Ireland proposes to answer questions 2 and 3 together.
17. A member of the public cannot challenge a decision under s.42 before the
Planning Board. As emphasised in Ireland’s written response and opening
statement, the decision to extend the duration of a planning permission is not
a substantive decision which would have a significant effect on the
environment. The decision is an administrative and technical one, subject to
strict statutory criteria which severely limit a decision maker’s discretion.2
18. Given the wholly administrative and non-substantive nature of a decision
under s.42, an appeal to a Planning Board would serve no discernible
purpose. Any concerns over the legal validity of a s.42 decision can be made
through the process of judicial review before the High Court.
19. The Irish High Court has confirmed that under s.42 the planning authority
has very little discretion in relation to its decision, and its role is confined to
satisfying itself as to whether the applicant has complied with the statutory
conditions for the grant of an extension of time. The Court further noted that
the relevant statutory regime makes no provision for third party participation
of any nature.3
2 See http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2013-107_Ireland/Party_s_response_to_communication/frPartyC107_response_to_communication_27.11.2015.pdf, at para. 17. and http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2013-107_Ireland/Communication_from_Party/frPartyC107_opening_statement_52_CC_meeting_09.03.2016.pdf, at para 18. 3 Lackagh Quarries Ltd -v- Galway City Council [2010] IEHC 479, at para. 61.
20. The Court observed that all of these factors tend to suggest that the role of the
planning authority on a s. 42 application is to make an administrative
decision.4
21. Ireland strongly agrees with this characterisation of the nature of s.42 and
reiterates that substantive issues are considered under a separate statutory
regime.
22. Specifically, the substantive environmental effects of a development are
considered through the proper investigation of all of the relevant matters by
the planning authority prior to the commencement of a development, and in
the course of the application for planning permission.5
23. It is this process that encompasses (i) substantive public participation and (ii)
a statutory entitlement to challenge an initial grant of planning permission
before the Planning Board.
24. This process has been utilised extensively in respect of the quarries which are
listed in the communication. As noted in Ireland’s response, of the 3 planning
applications relating to quarry development at Trammon, Rathmoylan, Co.
Meath, as listed in the communication, in the 2 most recent consent
applications members of the public exercised their rights under the Planning
& Development Act 2000, as amended, to appeal the decisions of Meath
County Council to grant permission to An Bord Pleanála (the Planning
Board).
4 In another High Court decision, it was held that “the true effect of section 42 is that the Planning Authority must therefore consider the application in that light having regard to the matters enumerated in the section and those matters only.” The court also held that a decision maker acting pursuant to s.42 “is confined to the matters specified in section 42 in reaching its decision.” See McDowell v Roscommon County Council [2004] IEHC 396, per Finnegan P. 5 Lackagh Quarries Ltd -v- Galway City Council [2010] IEHC 479, at para. 61.
25. No party chose to appeal the decision of the County Council to grant
permission for the first listed activity (reference number 97/1868).6
26. Given the wholly administrative and non-substantive nature of a decision
under s.42, an appeal to a Planning Board would serve no discernible
purpose, as the board would be confined to considering its legal validity. The
Planning Board has neither the expertise nor jurisdiction to consider same.
27. A person concerned that a legally invalid decision has been made under s.42,
i.e. that the strict and technical statutory criteria have not been adhered to, can
seek a judicial review of the decision before the High Court.
Challenging a decision before the High Court
28. A person seeking to challenge the legality of an administrative decision under
s.42 could seek a judicial review of the decision.
29. The courts have stated that given the administrative and technical nature of a
decision under s.42, its role in reviewing the decision is limited to
considerations of whether the decision maker acted reasonably and rationally
on the basis of the evidence before it.
30. The High Court has stated that its function in assessing the legality of decision
to grant an extension permission decision is to review the manner in which
the decision maker concluded that the statutory criteria of s.42 have been met.
31. This involves the court having regard to the material which was before the
decision-maker when the decision was made on the applicant’s application.7
6 http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2013-107_Ireland/Party_s_response_to_communication/frPartyC107_response_to_communication_27.11.2015.pdf. 7 Lackagh Quarries Ltd -v- Galway City Council [2010] IEHC 479, at para. 94.
32. Although Ireland maintains that a consideration of its domestic remedies is
beyond the scope of this communication, it notes that the availability of
judicial review strongly highlights that s.42 decisions are not immune from
legal scrutiny.
33. For the purposes of this Communication Ireland agrees with the High Court’s
construal of s.42 as a technical decision, characterised by the strictly defined
and limited discretion it vests in a local planning authority.
Costs
34. The highly abstract nature of the question makes it difficult for Ireland to
respond. The question posed involves consideration of a large number of
hypotheticals. Any answer will therefore necessarily be arbitrary in the
absence of a concrete set of circumstances on which to base an assessment.
35. Broadly speaking, the hypothetical level of costs likely to be incurred in a
judicial review of a s.42 decision will vary considerably depending on: (i)
whether it is determined that the challenge involves certain environmental
matters; and, (ii) the litigants’ own choices relating to the conduct of litigation
and the level of legal representation chosen.
36. Under Irish law, if a judicial review is considered to concern certain
environmental matters, then the procedure for awarding costs is governed by
the special costs rules governing environmental litigation.
37. Conversely, if a judicial review application is not considered to concern an
environmental matter, then normal costs rules apply.
38. There has not been any judicial determination of whether any particular
proceedings for judicial review of a specific s.42 decision is governed by the
special costs rules for environmental litigation or by the normal cost rules for
judicial review.
39. Consequently, at this juncture Ireland strongly emphasises that it does not
wish to speculate on which costs rules would apply.
40. Ireland therefore expresses reservation at the exceedingly hypothetical nature
of the question, and concern that the submission of the observer on the 13
September represents an irrelevant and unfounded collateral attack on the
State’s environmental legal costs regime, and reiterates that same are not
within the subject matter of the communicant’s Communication.
41. Despite these concerns and reservations, in the interests of (i) assisting the
Committee’s deliberations, and (ii) rebutting the inaccurate and irrelevant
contentions of the observer submitted on 13 September 2016, Ireland will
briefly outline a basic overview of each cost regime.
42. However, Ireland does so on only on the express understanding that a
consideration of Ireland’s legal regime for costs is manifestly beyond the
scope of this Communication.
Special costs regime for judicial review proceedings involving environmental
matters
43. Prior to ratification of the Aarhus Convention Ireland introduced radical
changes to the manner in which costs are applied in environmental litigation
by creating a special statutory costs regime.
44. The special statutory costs regime for environmental proceedings consists of
Section 50B(1) Planning & Development Act 2000 (“PDA 2000”), and in Part 2
of the Environment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011 (“E(MP)A 2011”).
45. Section 7 of Environment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011 provides that a
party to such environmental proceedings can apply to the Court at any time
before or during the proceedings for the application of the special cost rules.
46. As no EIA is required for a s.42 decision, the S50B cost rules will not apply.
Although no judicial determination has been reached on the applicability of
Part 2 of the E(MP)A 2011, if the section is found to apply then any applicant
seeking to challenge the extension of a time limit on the consent in question
can seek the considerable protection offered by the rules.
47. Part 2 of the Environment (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act 2011 introduced a
special costs regime for environmental civil proceedings. The special costs
rules mean that no costs are imposed in Ireland upon an applicant in
environmental litigation. Rather, an unsuccessful applicant will bear his own
legal costs if he chooses to use legal representation, and if the legal
representative is not doing so on a conditional fee (“no-foal, no-fee”) basis. A
successful applicant may be awarded his legal costs. Applicants in such
proceedings are also absolved from applicable court filing costs.
48. Further, any analysis of the costs provisions provided by domestic law must
be carried out in light of the judicial notice the domestic Court is required to
take of the Aarhus Convention under section 8 Environment (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 2011 and those provisions of the Aarhus Convention
implemented by directly applicable European Union law. Therefore, any
award of costs that may be made must ensure that those costs are not
prohibitive.
49. There is therefore a complete disparity of treatment between applicants and
respondents in respect of certain environmental matters. Respondents will
normally never obtain their costs if they win - whereas applicants can litigate
in the knowledge that they will normally obtain their costs if they win. If they
lose they are (bar rare circumstances due to their own conduct) protected
from the making of a cost award against them.
50. Consequently, save in extreme circumstances, applicants are even absolved
from the award of reasonable costs, which goes far beyond the Convention
requirement that such costs not be prohibitively expensive.
Regulation of own legal costs
51. Indeed, if the special costs regime is found to apply, the level of costs a person
would incur on a judicial review of a s.42 decision is entirely contingent on
the choices of the litigant.
52. In this scenario, a person would not be obliged to engage any legal
representation for a judicial review of a s.42 permission. Unlike many legal
systems, the Irish courts permit individuals to represent themselves, thus
eliminating own costs altogether.
53. Should litigants choose to have legal representation, they need only be
represented by a single practising solicitor, who has full rights of audience
before the Irish courts. Solicitors are trained in advocacy, and many across the
country have specialist knowledge of environmental law and litigation.
54. Barristers, a specialist body of court advocates, are not required to be retained
at any time by a client: still less are senior counsel (senior barristers
recognised for their expertise in advocacy).
55. If a litigant chooses to engage legal representation, section 150 of the Legal
Services Regulation Act 2015 requires all legal practitioners to provide an
estimate of fees upon receiving instructions. Should any emergent factor later
arise which would significantly add to estimated costs, a new notice will be
required. Both the client and the legal practitioner can arrive at an agreement
which sets out the amount and manner of payment of all or part of the legal
costs and no other amount shall be chargeable in respect of legal services
provided save as otherwise provided in the agreement.
56. The legal practitioner is further required to provide an itemised bill of costs as
well as a summary of the legal services provided and where time is a factor in
the calculation of legal costs, the time spent in dealing with the matter. The
legal practitioner shall provide to the client (together with the bill of costs) an
explanation in writing of the procedure available to the client should the
client wish to dispute any aspect of the bill of costs, which shall contain
information such as the fact that the client may have a dispute referred to
mediation and/or adjudication.
57. Section 154 of the Legal Services Regulation Act provides that a person can
refer a dispute in relation to their own costs to the Office of the Legal Costs
Adjudicator. This provides a fair, transparent and independent adjudicatory
body for a litigant to take a complaint in respect of legal costs charged by a
representative.
58. Many litigants who do engage legal practitioners can obtain pro bono legal
representation or engage such representation on a conditional fee
arrangement. Both of these practices are common in Ireland, with cases being
taken in many areas of the law on the basis of either a pro bono or a
conditional fee arrangement.
59. The choice whether to retain any lawyer, and the choice as to the numbers
and type of lawyers, are, therefore, entirely for each party.
60. As a result, any attempt to offer a “typical figure” for a judicial review under
the special costs regime would be arbitrary and wholly speculative.
61. Ireland, however, notes that its special costs regime goes far beyond what is
required by the Aarhus Convention. They facilitate and enable access to
justice by both any member of the public and any NGO.
62. Although Ireland is not in a position to speculate on a “typical figure”, it notes
that if a judicial review of a decision under s.42 is determined to fall under the
special costs regime for environmental litigation, the operation of this
statutory regime ensures that a litigant would not be precluded from
environmental litigation by reason of prohibitively expensive costs.
Judicial review when not covered by the special costs regime
63. At this juncture Ireland observes that scrutiny of the cost regime for standard
judicial review applications is both: (i) beyond the scope of the within
Communication; and, (ii) beyond the scope of the Aarhus Convention.
However, Ireland will briefly outline the regime to assist the Committee.
64. In Ireland, pursuant to Order 99 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, costs are
generally awarded to the winner of the proceedings: this is known as “costs
following the event”.
65. The level of costs incurred by a litigant in a standard judicial review will vary
considerably based on a number of factors and variables, including:
(i) whether the litigant is successful at trial;
(ii) the length of trial and complexity of the legal issues and facts involved;
(iii) the number of parties involved;
(iv) the litigant’s self-regulation of costs and the amount of legal
representation he/she chooses to engage.
66. As a consequence, any figure proffered in abstraction is necessarily arbitrary.
QUESTION 4
67. Time limits for applications for judicial review are governed by s.50 of the
Planning and Development Act 2000 (as amended).8
68. The Planning Act provides that an application for judicial review to question
the validity of any decision made by a planning authority shall be made
within the period of 8 weeks beginning on the date of the decision of the
planning authority.9
69. The High Court may extend this period only if it is satisfied that (a) there is
good and sufficient reason for doing so, and (b) the circumstances that
resulted in the failure to make the application for leave within the 8-week
period were outside the control of the applicant for the extension.10
70. The communicant did not seek to challenge the extension permission within
the 8-week period, nor at a later stage. The communicant has given no
satisfactory account of why he could not have done so.
71. Ireland therefore does not speculate on whether the communicant’s
circumstances would constitute “good and sufficient reason” for delaying
seeking judicial review.
72. Ireland notes that providing statutory timelines requiring planning decisions
to be challenged within a prescribed time-period is standard practice in
international and national law.
8 As substituted by Planning and Development (Strategic Infrastructure) Act 2006 (27/2006), s. 13, S.I. No. 525 of 2006. 9 Ibid. 10 ibid. Jargon free information in relation to judicial review and the procedures governing its time limits is available for perusal by the public free of charge, on an easily accessible citizens’ information website managed by the Citizens Information Board.
73. The provision of reasonable temporal limitations for legal challenges is
essential to enable public authorities to make binding decisions.
74. If any decision was open to challenge without temporal limitation it would
create an untenable climate of great uncertainty for all actors involved in the
planning process, including individual citizens, developers, businesses, public
authorities.
QUESTION 5
Domestic procedures
75. The decisions to grant extension permissions under s.42 were not challenged
by the communicant or any other person.
76. The time limit for availing of domestic remedies has long expired.
77. Ireland has dealt with the question of costs in its response to questions 1 and
2.
QUESTION 6
78. As noted in Ireland’s response and opening statement, each of the original
decisions of the planning authorities to grant planning permissions in respect
of Trammon Quarry followed substantive consideration of the various
development applications. These included EIAs and a statutory public
consultation process.11
79. The details of the 3 relevant planning consent applications were published by
the applicant in a national or local newspaper and a site notice erected at the
entrance to the development site, both of which described the nature and
extent of the development and the fact that an EIS had been prepared and was
available for inspection at the offices of the planning authority.12
80. In the 2004 and 2010 applications, the notices included a public invitation to
examine the planning application documents and drawings and the
Environmental Impact Statement and to make a written submission to the
county council on the application.
81. Section 130 of the Planning and Development Act 2000 also provides for
public participation in an appeal to An Bórd Pleanála of a decision by a
planning authority in relation to a planning application, including power for
the Board to hold an oral hearing into the appeal in which inter alia persons
who made submissions and observations on the appeal may participate.
82. These provisions applied in the case of the decision-making processes for the
permission granted for the quarry in 2004 and 2010, as evidenced by the level
of actual public participation in those cases, as set out in Appendix 1 to
Ireland’s letter of 27 November 2015 to the Committee.
11 See Ireland’s Opening Statement, at para 17. 12 As per the provisions of the Planning & Development Regulations 2001, as amended, or its predecessor.
83. Ireland notes that it is not possible for a planning application to specify the
duration of any additional period by which the permission, if granted, might
be extended in the future.
84. This is because the extension of duration process applies only where, for
unforeseen reasons, the permitted development cannot be completed within
the permitted appropriate period, and an application for such an extension
can be made only within one year before the expiration of the appropriate
period.
85. By definition, the necessity for an extension of the duration of a planning
permission cannot be anticipated at the time a planning application is made.
It is precisely because this necessity cannot be anticipated that statutory forms
of site and newspaper notices in relation to a planning application and related
environment impact statement do not include reference to the possibility that
an extension of duration of any permission granted on foot of the application
may be sought in strictly limited circumstances in the year before expiry of
the permission.
86. However, Ireland emphasises that at the time planning permission was
granted in 1998, statutory provision for an administrative extension of the
duration of a planning permission in certain circumstances had been a part of
Irish planning law for a number of decades.
87. Provision for extension was made in section 29 of the Local Government
(Planning and Development) Act 1976 and revised provisions for that
purpose were made in section 4 of the Local Government (Planning and
Development) Act, 1982.
88. At the time the original planning permission was granted in 1998, S.42 of the
Planning Act 2000 had not yet been enacted. However, its immediate
statutory predecessor, s.4(1) of the Local Government Act 1982, was in force.13
89. The two provisions are substantively very similar. The High Court has
described s.42 of the PDA 2000 as s.4(1) of the Local Government Act “restated
with minor amendments”.14 Whilst section 42 was amended in 2010, the
provisions at issue in the present Communication are the same as section 4(1).
90. The High Court described the effects of s.4(1) as follows: “If the conditions set
out in section 4(1) are complied with the Planning Authority must extend the
duration of the permission and consideration of matters other than the conditions set
out there is precluded.”15
91. It was therefore entirely within the discretion of an interested person to make
a submission to the planning authority or the Board at the time the original
planning application or appeal was being considered, raising concerns about
the possibility of an extension of permission.
92. Moreover, and as previously indicated to the Committee, an extension of the
duration of a planning permission does not permit any development to be
carried out over and above what is covered by the permission concerned.
13 Available at Appendix One of this Submission. 14 McDowell v Roscommon County Council [2004] IEHC 396, per Finnegan P. 15 McDowell v Roscommon County Council [2004] IEHC 396, per Finnegan P.
QUESTION 7
93. As noted in Ireland’s response and opening statement, each of the decisions
relating to the developments referenced by the communicant were the subject
of comprehensive public participation as provided for under the provisions of
the Planning & Development Act 2000, as amended, or, with reference to the
first listed activity (reference number 97/1868) under the 2000 Act’s
predecessor (the Local Government (Planning & Development) Act 1963, as
amended).16
94. The decisions to grant planning or retention permissions in respect of the
developments at Trammon Quarry followed substantive consideration of the
various development applications. These included EIAs and a statutory
public consultation process.17
95. As already outlined in Ireland’s response to question 6, the details of the 3
relevant planning consent applications were published by the applicant in a
national or local newspaper and a site notice erected at the entrance to the
development site.18
96. The notices described the nature and extent of the development and the fact
that an EIS had been prepared and was available for inspection at the offices
of the planning authority. Ireland notes that a number of members of the
public chose to make submissions in relation to Keegan Quarry’s 1997
application for planning permission.19
16 http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2013-107_Ireland/Party_s_response_to_communication/frPartyC107_response_to_communication_27.11.2015.pdf, at para. 5 and http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2013-107_Ireland/Communication_from_Party/frPartyC107_opening_statement_52_CC_meeting_09.03.2016.pdf, at para.17. 17 See Ireland’s Opening Statement, at para 17. 18 As per the provisions of the Planning & Development Regulations 2001, as amended, or its predecessor. 19 See http://www.eplanning.ie/MeathCC/AppFileRefDetails/971868/0.
97. With reference to the 3 planning applications relating to quarry development
at Trammon, Rathmoylan, Co. Meath, as listed in the communication, in the
course of the 2 most recent relevant consent applications, members of the
public exercised their rights under the Planning & Development Act 2000, as
amended, to appeal the decisions of Meath County Council to grant
permission to An Bord Pleanála.20
98. At the time the original planning permission was granted in 1998, section 4(1)
of the Local Government (Planning and Development) Act 1982 had been in
force for 16 years.
99. It was therefore entirely within the discretion of an interested person to make
a submission on the planning application, raising concerns about the
possibility of an extension of permission.
20 The independent National Planning Appeals Board.
QUESTION 8
100. Ireland adopts the same response to this question as with question 7.
101. However, Ireland contends that its submissions apply with greater force in
the context of the 2010 permission, given that at the time permission was
granted the possibility that it might be extended, if it met the requisite strict
statutory criteria, had been a significant part of the Irish planning regime for
an even longer period of time.
QUESTION 9
102. The volume of rock extraction permitted in the three planning permissions for
the quarry, in accordance with the particulars specified in the relevant
Environmental Impact Statement, was as follows:
1998 planning permission 2.5 million tonnes
2004 planning permission 2.5 million tonnes
2010 planning permission 1.33 million tonnes
Part B- Material relating to Committee questions raised during discussion in
Geneva, 8 – 11 March 2016
103. This part of Ireland’s response outlines additional information that was
indicated would be supplied to the Committee at the discussion.
Breakdown of Quarry Size
104. At the discussion Ireland stated that it would supply information in relation
to how the area of the site breaks down and that how quarry and its ancillary
developments are within 25 Hectares.
105. The attached map and aerial photograph show the area of the permitted
quarry (as per the 3 relevant planning permissions), which Meath County
Council (the local planning authority) has measured at 18.48 hectares.
106. This quarry area does not include the manufacturing structure to the north of
the quarry area (Meath Reg. Ref. TA/00408) and the adjacent block yard (Reg.
Ref. 00/2075) as visible in the maps/photos, because these developments do
not comprise a ‘quarry’ and are not the subject of the extension of duration
applications applicable to the 3 relevant quarry planning permissions.
Is a separate mining licence required?
107. Ireland also indicated that it would provide information on whether a
separate mining licence was required for the site.
108. According to the Planning Board Inspector’s report into one of the appeals
concerned, the quarry is a limestone quarry.21 As a matter of Irish law and
administration, mining licences are not required for such quarries.
Whether Ireland considers that change of time constitutes a change of operating
activity and a “change or extension” within the meaning of paragraph 22 of Annex
1?
109. Extension decisions under Section 42 of the Planning and Development Act
2000 are not decisions which require to be subject to an EIA. Ireland considers
that paragraph 22 of Annex 1 of the EIA Directive to refer to the
physical/spatial extent of the development, as distinct from an extension of
time.
110. As noted in Ireland’s opening statement, under Irish law, which is fully
consistent with the requirements of the EIA directive, a decision to extend the
duration of an existing planning permission does not alter the previous
permission wherein the area and volume of extraction were identified and
which substantively considered the development application and the
significance of its environmental impact.
111. Properly construed, a decision under S.42 is therefore not a decision to permit
an activity in the sense envisaged by Article 6(1)(a) or 6(1)(b) of the
Convention.
112. Indeed, this Committee has previously noted that decisions subsequent to the
principal permission which are of minor or peripheral importance, or of
21 Planning Application: ta130399, Meath County Council, see: http://www.eplanning.ie/MeathCC/AppFileRefDetails/ta130399/0
limited environmental relevance, do not merit full scale public participation
procedure.22
113. There is no analysis or environmental assessment to be carried out by the
consenting authority in extending the permitted duration. This additional
time is given strictly within the parameters of permitted development and
environmental impact established in the original substantive planning
consultation and consents stage.
114. No changes whatsoever may be made to the nature and extent of works
which were permitted through the substantive public consultation consent
process.
115. Moreover, and as Ireland asserted in its opening statement, the extension of
the original planning permission is, and has been at all material times, a
fundamental part of the statutory scheme, and the inherent basis of any
permission granting development consent.23
116. As Ireland also noted in its opening statement to the Committee, this is not
the same situation considered by Article 6(10) of the Convention.24
117. Ireland reiterates that in circumstances where an extension of time is
mandatory upon fulfilment of statutory criteria, and there are no assessments
to be carried out other than the remaining time required to complete the
works, no conditions can be attached, apart from a requirement for security for
the satisfactory completion of the development. Simply put, there is no
substantive reconsideration of operating conditions whatsoever.
22 See para 41 of European Community ACCC/C/2006/17, ECE/MP.PP/2008/5/Add.10, 2 May 2008. 23 At para 15. 24Wherein: “Each Party shall ensure that, when a public authority reconsiders or updates the operating conditions for an activity referred to in paragraph 1, the provisions of paragraphs 2 to 9 of this article are applied mutatis mutandis, and where appropriate”.
Whether Ireland had further comments in relation to the Communicant’s
submissions on “Appropriate Assessment”?
118. As noted in Ireland’s response25, the Planning Board carried out screening for
Appropriate Assessment pursuant to the Habitats and Birds Directives in its
2012 decision under section 261A of the Planning and Development Act 2000
relating to the entire quarry area (Reference Number: 17.QV.0217) and found
that Appropriate Assessment was not required.
Please contact the undersigned if you require any further information.
_____________________________
Aoife Joyce
National Focal Point – Aarhus
Appendix One-
25 At para 45-48.
Section 4(1) of the Local Government Act 1986
4.—(1) On an application being
made to them in that behalf, a
planning authority shall, as regards a
particular permission, extend the
appropriate period, by such
additional period as the authority
consider requisite to enable the
development to which the permission
relates to be completed, if, and only
if, each of the following requirements
is complied with:
(a) the application is in accordance with
such regulations under this Act as
apply to it,
(b) any requirements of, or made under,
such regulations are complied with
as regards the application, and
(c) the authority are satisfied in relation to
the permission that—
(i) the development to which such
permission relates commenced
before the expiration of the
appropriate period sought to be
extended, and
(ii) substantial works were carried
out pursuant to such permission
during such period, and
(iii) the development will be
completed within a reasonable
time.
(2) Where—
(a) an application is duly made under this
section to a planning authority,
(b) any requirements of, or made under,
regulations under section 11 of this
Act are complied with as regards the
application, and
(c) the planning authority do not give
notice to the applicant of their
decision as regards the application
within the period of two months
beginning on—
(i) in case all of the aforesaid
requirements referred to
in paragraph (b) of this subsection
are complied with on or before
the day of receipt by the
planning authority of the
application, that day, and
(ii) in any other case, the day on
which all of the said
requirements stand complied
with,
subject to section 10 (2) of this Act, a decision
by the planning authority to extend, or to
further extend, as may be appropriate, the
period, which in relation to the relevant
permission is the appropriate period, by such
additional period as is specified in the
application shall be regarded as having been
given by the planning authority on the last
day of the said two month period.
(3) (a) Where a decision to extend an
appropriate period is given
under subsection (1) of this section,
or, pursuant to subsection (2) of this
section, such a decision is to be
regarded as having been given, the
planning authority shall not further
extend the appropriate period,
unless each of the following
requirements is complied with:
(i) an application in that behalf is
made to them in accordance with
such regulations under this Act
as apply to it,
(ii) any requirements of, or made
under, such regulations are
complied with as regards the
application, and
(iii) the authority are satisfied that the
relevant development has not
been completed due to
circumstances beyond the
control of the person carrying
out the development.
(b) An appropriate period shall be
further extended under this
subsection only for such period as
the relevant planning authority
consider requisite to enable the
relevant development to be
completed.
(4) Particulars of any application made to a
planning authority under this section and of
the decision of the planning authority in
respect of such application shall be recorded
on the relevant entry in the register.
(5) Where a decision to extend, or to further
extend, is given under this section, or,
pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, such a
decision is to be regarded as having been
given, section 2 of this Act shall, in relation to
the permission to which the decision relates,
be construed and have effect subject to and in
accordance with the terms of the decision.
(6) This section shall not be construed as
precluding the extension, or the further
extension, of an appropriate period by reason
of the fact that the period has expired.