Unconventional Weapons in the Middle Eas t1

8/13/2019 Unconventional Weapons in the Middle Eas t1

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Unconventional weapons in the Middle East Israel and Iran.

Abstract

The Middle-East is unstable and continuously on the verge of eruption of violent

conflicts. The states, in order to maintain their fortitude are involved in an

unconventional weapon race. The sources of these weapons are legal and illegal ones

and self-developed. International treaties have failed to decrease the arm-race.

Therefore in the near future every diplomatic move will be affected by the existence

of non-conventional weapons in each state. Two states Iran and Israel are involved

in an unconventional weapon race that fuels the endless international involvement in

the area. This paper compares the unconventional weapons of both side and its

conclusion is that both sides are more interested in deterrence than in unconventional

war. ut if diplomacy fails, Israel and Iran are prepared for doomsday war.

!eywords"

#nconventional weapon

$ontamination of environment

Missiles and missile development

$hemical warfare

%uclear arms

iological arms

The unique problems of the unconventional weapons.

&s the international arena is deeply concerned with the Iranian nuclear program, the

non-nuclear unconventional weapons pose nonetheless great dangers to the safety of

the Middle-East. &lmost each state in the Middle-East owns various types of

unconventional non-nuclear weapons, and few develop nuclear programs.


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(eth $arus observes that approximately )* distinct sub-national actors +individuals

and groups have shown concerted interest in biological agents. Eight of these )* are

nown to have acuired or developed biological weapons.'/nly five of the eight are

commonly believed to have employed them, and only two have caused significant

harm.The fall )00' anthrax-by-mail attacs should, of course, be added to this list.

1et the biological challenge is far greater than mere sub-national actors armed with

biological weapons. Terrorism is arguably the lesser-included case. 2hile Milton

3eitenberg4s assessment that 5terrorist use of a 2 +iological 2arfare agent is best

characteri6ed as an event of extremely low probability which might . . . produce high

mortality7 is arguable, his observation that the national debate on the biological threat

5is characteri6ed by gross exaggeration, hype, and abstract vulnerability assessments

instead of valid threat analysis7 is a valid criticism.)

&lthough the international forum has created a ind of defense shield against

unconventional weapons and its use, in other words - the international treaties lie the

%8T +%uclear 8roliferation Treaty, the $TT +The $omprehensive Test an Treaty,

which opened for signature in '99:, is intended to prohibit all nuclear weapon test

explosions. The $TT has achieved near universal adherence, however, &rticle ;Iurthermore, these treaties relate to states only and not to guerrilla or terrorists

groups. ?uerilla groups and freedom fighters that are not recogni6ed by the

international community as legal bodies, have not even signed those treaties.

%evertheless, they rarely use unconventional weapons as they are aware to of the


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negative public opinion this action will cause. There is a possibility that states that

possess non-conventional weapons will turn it over to terrorists groups in order to

enhance the strength of them and of the state. ut this is merely a speculation as no

evidence exists.

The uniue problems that unconventional weapon causes are"

a/ Contamination of the environment &vner $ohen, a nuclear specialist and a

participant in the comprehensive nuclear test ban committee held in '99@, said that

there is a need for inspection in the Middle-East as a nuclear clash between Ira and

Israel will create a regional catastrophe, as it will destroy the fauna and flora and

contaminate the scarce water reservoirs.

b/ The knowlede misused Aichard ?otrey, a genetic scientist claimed that

mapping the human genomes will lead to a double trac route the positive one will

open new hori6ons for efficient medicine and drugs but the negative one can be used

by terrorists by exploiting ethnic uniueness thus achieving ethnic cleansing. Bis

comments were delivered after the El-!aida attempt to obtain and buy biological

weapons.

&dvances in biotechnology thus create the potential for the misuse of peptide

Cchemicals made up of short strings of amino-acidsD bioregulators in offensive 2

programs. &dvances in the use of viral and bacterial vectors enhance the possibility

for direct delivery of a toxin or bioregulator to the human target or they could be used

to transfer the toxin or bioregulator genes to the target.

!agan discussed the potential advantages to terrorists of use of such substances-for

example, that they are not usually on anyoneFs threat list, are difficult to diagnose,

cannot be vaccinated against, and can cause massive effects over large areas via

unusual routes of dispersion.

=

Gilinas hypothesi6ed that the wor of (oviet and &um-(hirinyo would be liely to


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serve as precedents for other nations or groups that would attempt to apply advanced

biotechnology in research to perfect agents for use in biological weapons but would

depend on classical technologies.*%evertheless, Gilinas is aware that mapping the

human genome is maybe the first step in developing ethnic 2.

c/The leal liabilit! of use and distribution of unconventional means to terror

and uerilla roups The international community avoided a serious discussion and

decisions how to stop the spreading of non-conventional weapons as it ignored the

possibilities to stop the funding, assistance and responsibility for unconventional

terrorism +Hoseph . ouglass, Hr. ecember ):, )00).

In his boo,Bush at War, +)00), 2oodward cited Tennet, the head of the $I& +who

resigned during )00: due to the Ira war who admitted that in his opinion, a special

state is responsible for distributing unconventional terror, but he is not sure whether

its Aussia or Ira. (cooter 3ibby, $heneysF top aide, was septic in the wisdom of

connecting terror groups to states, as long as the #.( cannot interfere. >urthermore, he

commented that various states use unconventional means in order to achieve political

aims. The list is long and includes states lie $uba, 8A$ +8eople4s Aepublic of

$hina, Aussia and even Israel.

d/ "ack of appropriate answer to unconventional weapon - chemical and

biological weapons are very effective and countermeasures are very secretive and not

really tested for their efficiency. The &merican alleged practice and conclusions in

Ira during the first and second ?ulf 2ar is not public nowledge, so nobody can tell

for sure whether there are effective means to combat unconventional terror.

e/The storae and development due to heavy storage expenses and heavy costs of

the research ands development, mainly states possess unconventional means. (elling

these weapons is problematic, as no state is willing to expose its unconventional

abilities.


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f/#rms race third world states are developing or buying unconventional weapons

in order to stand up against the nuclear ability of the great states. The biological and

chemical weapons are some ind of response, designed to retaliate and deter stronger

states.

Even though those states that have signed the treaty banning unconventional weapons

till )0'), I am doubtful, they will fulfill their commitment as no better and cheaper

deterrence exists.

The future poses new dangers"

Technical problems-

a/The development of biotechnology and genetics can produce a new inds of toxins,

hard to detect therefore hard to tae countermeasures..

b/ $ombination of biological and chemical compounds will mae it difficult to

develop anti-dot and antibody.

c/The progress in technologies and the powers to launch strategic cruise missiles with

unconventional war-heads is great.

$olitical and international problems-

a/ (tates under embargo and sanctions, lie Iran will try to be in possession of

nowledge and depend less on import.

b/ (tates will pledge to international treaties meanwhile convert the chemical and

biological industry into military needs.

c/The brain lea from the former (oviet #nion, %orth !orea and 8aistan will

continue.

d/(tates will reali6e the undeveloped potential in granting unconventional weapons to

terrorists groups.

The international trend in missiles development


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The efficiency on the unconventional weapons depends more on the method of

dispersing and launching than on the weapon itself. (tates concluded that in order to

increase the capacity, the chemical or biological substance ought to be launched by a

missile. Missile range categories are short-range ballistic missiles +(AMJless than

',000mK medium-range ballistic missile +MAMJ',000-,000mK intermediate-

range ballistic missile +IAMJ,000-*,*00mK and intercontinental ballistic missile

+I$M J greater than *,*00m.

The international community is trying to curb the missile development and to

supervise missiles productive states. ut till )00) only )) states signed and ratified

the MT$A treaty +Missile Technology $ontrol Aegime. (ince then, 90 more states

Loined the pact, including Israel and 8A$.

The situation in the international arena is a mixed one"

y '9@=, %orth !orea was building its own (cud-s and developed two new

versions, the (cud-$ and (cud-. It has since developed a medium-range missile, the

%odong, and a long-range missile based on (cud technology, the Taepodong.The

%odong could deliver conventional and 2M warheads throughout most of Hapan

+including several #.(. military bases. Bowever, given the missile4s relative

inaccuracy, the %odong is more useful as a 5terror weapon7 against population centers

than as a significant military systemJunless it is armed with a nuclear warhead. The

%odong is estimated to have a circular error probable +$E8 of )-= ilometers +m,

which means half of the %odongs fired would fall outside a circle of that radius. :In

Huly )00: it test-fired a modification to the Taepodong, called the Taepodong-),

which experts say could have a range of up to :,000m +,*00 miles. The missile

failed shortly after launch.


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(ince '999 %orth !orea halted the long range missile tests, after achieving *000 m

range. It even agreed to stop the missile plans in return for western aid for its satellite

plans.

&fter long negotiations with the #.(, in )00 %orth !orea abandoned its nuclear

program in exchange for western and &merican aid.

Middle East and (outh &sian thining about M +allistic Missile efense also is

preliminary because for all intents and purposes, ballistic missiles today remain

invulnerable to local defenses. The defensive systems that do existJsuch as the

&merican 8atriot and the Aussian (&-00 air defense system touted by Moscow to

have anti-ballistic missile capabilitiesJare not readily available and their

effectiveness is debatable. The 8atriot missile system was hailed for its effectiveness

in countering Irai ballistic missiles in the midst of the ?ulf 2ar, but post-war

analysis has called into uestion the 8atriot4s battlefield performanceK assessments of

the 8atriot4s success rate range from =0 to @0 percent. @

The intended point of interception is another way of distinguishing M. There are

generally three intercept pointsK in initial boost-phase, in midcourse, and the terminal

or end of the missile4s traLectory. The ush administration is leaning toward on the

deployment of an %M system to destroy enemy warheads in the midcourse phase,

the point after an Intercontinental allistic Missile +I$M has burned its fuel and

released the warheads but before the warhead reenters the atmosphere. Intercepting

ballistic missiles in the earlier and powered phase of traLectory has several advantages

over the midcourse intercept, however. Interception in the boost-phase would destroy

the entire missile payload including submunitions, decoys, and warheads and be easier

to detect because the burning missile is brighter, larger, slower-moving, and more

fragile than the warhead. & boost-phase defense, furthermore, could cover a much

larger area than a midcourse defense.9


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$ruise missiles pose a significant security threat, both alone and in conLunction with

ballistic missiles. ?ormley attributed the recent proliferation of cruise missile

programs to three factors"

#ccess to speciali%ed knowlede.Most of the emerging programs are being carried

out with the help of outsiders, such as technicians from Aussia with nowledge of

systems engineering and systems integration. IranFs cruise missile programs depend

on foreign-trained engineers who developed their sills in >rance, ?ermany, Aussia,

$hina, and %orth !orea.

# shift in the narrative on the reasons for acquirin the missiles.(tates have come

to the conclusion that cruise missiles can penetrate an enemyFs defenses more easily

than ballistic missiles +which have more predictable traLectories and, in theory, are

more vulnerable to interception. uring the Ira war in )00, five crude Irai cruise

missiles managed to evade #.(. 8atriot missile defenses. >ormer 8aistani 8resident

8erve6 Musharraf touted his countryFs new cruise missiles as incapable of being

intercepted.

# chane in the norms of state behavior reardin missile proliferation. espite

some recent attempts to strengthen legal conventions regarding cruise missile

proliferation, many nations do not regard the issue with the same sense of urgency as

ballistic missile proliferation, ?ormley said. (tates such as India, (outh !orea, and

Hapan have expressed a right to use cruise missiles in preemptive Nfirst strieN attacs

against foes. The #nited (tates has allowed allies such as (outh !orea and Taiwan to

develop cruise missile programs, and Taiwanese military analysts, too, have been

taling about the right to Npreventive self-defenseN using cruise missiles.

?ormley said the increasing tendency to lin land-attac cruise missiles to preemptive

strie doctrines has been fueling regional arms races and promoting instability in


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areas such as (outh &sia, where both India and 8aistan have been developing cruise

missiles that could be used in a war over the disputed !ashmir region.

3ooing to the future, ?ormley argues that it is time to end the second-class treatment

of cruise missiles in nonproliferation policies. Be cites the Bague $ode of $onduct

&gainst allistic Missile 8roliferation, adopted in )00) and subscribed to by ')@

nations so far. The $ode does not discuss cruise missiles. ?ormley also calls for more

emphasis under the Missile Technology $ontrol Aegime on monitoring illicit

activities by silled engineers who can transfer invaluable nowledge to those seeing

to acuire cruise missiles. Taing a more evenhanded approach to spending on

ballistic and cruise missile defense programs also would help alleviate the second-

class treatment of the cruise missile threat.'0

The #.( and Israel reached a mutual understanding that the #.( will assist Israel in a

case of long range missile attac. The two states agreed upon technological

cooperation in missiles research and development. Even though, during )00-@ Israel

has developed the Hericho missile, about the range of =000 m, in order to retaliate

against Iran. The #.(, Israel and Taiwan cooperated in defense missiles testing.

%orth !orea eeps selling missile technology and (cuds to Iran, 8aistan Egypt,

(yria,


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(pecial $ommission, inspectors had destroyed @,* filled and unfilled chemical

munitions, :90 metric tons of $2 agents, more than ,)* metric tons of precursor

chemicals, over =)* pieces of ey production euipment and ')* pieces of analytical

instruments.'*

In %ovember )00), following a period of escalating pressure on Ira, #%M/


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a/The memory of the holocaust secured the policy of 5never again7 and en-?urionFs

policy of an isolated state between hostile neighbors.

b/ The hostile neighborhood that declined for years to negotiate with Israel and

initiated wars, conflicts and hostility.

c/The continuously changing rules of the game in an overwhelmingly &rab coalition

reuired a doomsday weapon.

&llegedly, to Aussian reports, Israel has nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

'uclear

Israel has the most advanced nuclear weapons program in the Middle East. avid en

?urion, IsraelFs first prime minister, clandestinely established the agenda in the late

'9*0s to meet the perceived existential threat to the nascent state. '@ The program

allegedly is centered at the %egev %uclear Aesearch $enter, outside of imona.

ased on estimates of the plutonium production capacity of the imona reactor, Israel

has approximately '00-)00 nuclear explosive devices.'9/fficially, Israel has declared

that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle EastK however,

it has not signed the Treaty on the %on-8roliferation of %uclear 2eapons +%8T.

IsraelFs possession of nuclear weapons and its policy of declaratory ambiguity have

led to increase tensions in current Middle East peace discussions and arms control

negotiations.

The Israeli policy has not changed ever - during the first ?ulf 2ar, Ira used

conventional warheads assembled on its (cuds against Israel, after a cost-effective

series of battles against Iran. Israel did not react, in order not to disassemble the

&merican led coalition against Ira. &s Thomas Mc%augher pointed out, the missile

stries had great impact on the Iranian moral, and the use of these missiles led to the

conclusion of the Iran-Ira war, as Iran agreed to sign the #% $ease->ire Aesolution

%o. *9@.)0


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In Huly )00=, however, Israel accepted a visit from International &tomic Energy

&gency director Mohamed El-aradei. Israeli officials continue to assert that they

will address disarmament only after a comprehensive Middle Eastern peace is

obtained, and to deny international inspection of the imona nuclear complex.

Mordechai


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Chemical

2hile there are allegations that Israel has an advanced chemical weapons +$2

program, no confirmed evidence of production or stocpiling exists. (ome reports

have suggested an offensive $2 program is located at the Israel Institute for

iological Aesearch in %es Giona.)=In /ctober '99), an El &l airliner carrying a

cargo of approximately *0 gallons of dimethyl methylphosphonate +a widely used

stimulant for defensive research but also a possible precursor of sarin nerve agent

destined for the Institute crashed in &msterdam. )*Israel stated that this material was

being imported to test gas mass. Israel has signed but not ratified the $hemical

2eapons $onvention +$2$.):

Missile

IsraelFs missile program began in the '9:0s. Israel has a varied missile industry,

having developed ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as missile defense systems and

unmanned aerial vehicles +#&


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Iran Unconventional weapons and policy

IranFs chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, and possibly its nuclear weapon

program and biological warfare capabilities, are meant to deter opponents and to

increase influence in the 8ersian ?ulf and $aspian (ea regions. Iran under the

&yatollah regime aims to achieve regional supremacy and the leadership of the

Muslim 2orld. /n the other hand, the acuisition and creation of these various

weapon systems can also be seen as a response to IranFs own experience as a victim of

chemical and missile attacs during the Iran-Ira 2ar.

'uclear

y early Hune )00*, the E#- +>rance, ?reat ritain, and ?ermany had not yet

submitted their plan to Iran outlining future nuclear negotiations. The E#- reuested

a postponement in dialogues, but Tehran reLected the delay and publicly announced it

would resume peaceful nuclear research activities.)9&t issue was IranFs insistence that

right to peaceful nuclear research be included in any proposal, a position the #(

adamantly opposed. &ttempts were made to persuade Iran to give up its fuel cycle

ambitions and accept nuclear fuel from abroad, but Tehran made it clear that any

proposal that did not guarantee IranFs access to peaceful nuclear technology would

lead to the brea of all nuclear related negotiations with the E#-. In addition,

members of the Iranian MaLlis, scientists, scholars, and students were protesting and

holding rallies to support the administration to lift the moratorium on uranium

enrichment and to not succumb to foreign +#.(. pressure. /ne wee later, Iran once

again agreed to temporarily free6e its nuclear program until the end of Huly when the

E# agreed it would put forward an offer for the next round of discussions.

In Hune, I&E& eputy irector, 8ierre ?oldschmidt, stated that Iran admitted to

providing incorrect information about past experiments involving plutonium. Tehran


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claimed all such researches ceased in '99, but results from recent tests showed that

experiments too a place as late as '99* and '[email protected] early Huly, Iran ased the

I&E& if it could brea #% seals and test nuclear-related euipment, stating the testing

would not violate TehranFs voluntary suspension of nuclear activities. &t the end of

Huly, an official letter was submitted to the I&E& stating that the seals at the Isfahan

#ranium $onversion >acility +#$> would be removed. The I&E& reuested that it

be yielded '0 days to install the necessary surveillance euipment. /n ' &ugust, Iran

reminded the E#- that &ugust would be the last opportunity for a recommendation

to be presented to continue discussions. & few days later, the European #nion

submitted the >ramewor for aLong-term Agreementproposal to Iran.'The proposal

specifically called on Iran to exclude fuel-cycle related activity. Tehran immediately

reLected the suggestion as a negation of its inalienable rights. /n @ &ugust, nuclear

activities resumed at the Isfahan #$> and two days later, I&E& seals were removed

from the remaining parts of the system lines with I&E& inspectors present.

In the days leading up to IranFs resumption of nuclear activities, several countries

called on Iran to cooperate with the I&E& and to re-establish full suspension of all

enrichments4 related activities. &dditionally, some European countries and the #nited

(tates threatened to refer Iran to the #% (ecurity $ouncil. /nce again, Iran reLected

any proposal related to the suspension of conversion activities, but stated they were

ready to continue negotiations. Tehran did not believe there was any legal basis for

referral to the #% (ecurity council and believed it was only a political move. Iran also

threatened to stop all negotiations, prevent any further inspections at all its nuclear

facilities, suspend the application of the &dditional 8rotocol, and withdraw from the

%uclear %onproliferation Treaty +%8T, if it was referred to the #% (ecurity

$ouncil.

)


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In &ugust )00*, the I&E& announced that most of the highly enriched uranium

+BE# particle contamination traced at various locations in Iran was found to be of

foreign origin. The I&E& concluded much of the BE# found on centrifuge parts were

from imported 8aistani euipment, rather than from any enrichment activities

conducted by Iran.

In late &ugust, Iran began announcing it would be resuming nuclear activities in

%atan6 and that Tehran would be willing to negotiate as long as there were no

conditions. In &ugust, Iran refused to comply with a resolution from the I&E& to halt

its nuclear program, stating that maing nuclear fuel was its right as a member of the

%8T. The European #nion believed that although Iran did have a right to nuclear

energy under &rticle = of the %8T, it had lost that right because it violated &rticle ) of

the %8T - Nnot to see or receive any help in the manufacture of nuclear related

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.N /n )= (eptember )00*, the I&E& found

Iran in non-compliance of the %8T. The ruling passed with )' votes of agreement, ')

abstentions, and one opposing vote. Aussia and $hina were among those that

abstained from voting and ebruary, )00:. /n = >ebruary,

the *-nation board of the I&E& voted to 5report7 Iran to the (ecurity $ouncil over its

finding published in Hanuary, to restart nuclear research. Iran has reLected the above

resolution calling it, 5illegal, illogical and politically motivated7 and has decided to

scrap the 5containment and surveillance measures7 as defined under the '99

&dditional 8rotocol. Iran has also resumed small scale enrichment activities at its


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%atan6 facility as of ': >ebruary. In a parallel diplomatic process Aussia continues to

pursue negotiations with Iran that would allow Aussia to host IranFs uranium

enrichment program leaving only the uranium conversion to be carried out on Iranian

soil. The international community is still trying to avoid the end of the Iranian nuclear

enrichment program.

&s of 'th%ovember )00@, 99*: g of #>: had been fed into the cascades since >ebruary

)00, and a total of @9 g of low enriched #>: had been produced. The results also showed

that the enrichment level of this low enriched #>:product verified by the &gency was .=9O

#-)*. Iran has estimated that, between '@ %ovember )00@ and ' Hanuary )009, it produced

an additional '' g of low enriched #>:. The nuclear material at >E8 +including the feed,

product and tails, as well as all installed cascades, remain under &gency containment and

surveillance.

/n )9 (eptember )00@, the &gency conducted a 8I< at the 8ilot >uel Enrichment 8lant

+8>E8, the results of which confirm the physical inventory as declared by Iran, within the

measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility. etween )9 /ctober )00@

and '* Hanuary )009, Iran fed a total of approximately *0 g of #>: into the )0-machine IA-'

cascade, the '0-machine IA-) cascade and the single IA-', IA-) and IA- centrifuges. The

nuclear material at 8>E8, as well as the cascade area, remains under &gency containment and

surveillance.Iran has transferred a few ilograms of low enriched #>:produced at 8>E8 to

the Habr Ibn Bayan Multipurpose 3aboratories at the Tehran %uclear Aesearch $entre for

research and development purposes.

&ccording to I&E& report dated =thMarch )009, that contrary to the decisions of the (ecurity

$ouncil, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its wor on heavy water-

related proLects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor, IA-

=0, and the production of fuel for that reactor.=


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/n 'st>ebruary )009, 9: centrifuges were being fed with #>:K '=: centrifuges

were installed and under vacuum, and an additional ')* centrifuges were installed but

not under vacuum.*

In the beginning of the /bama 8residency, in )009, the #.( adopted the two edged

diplomacy - to start negotiating with Iran in order to halt the nuclear program or

otherwise #.( will impose sanctions on her.

Iranian intentions to achieve nuclear ability are not contained to Iran only, as Iran is

more than willing to assist each state that would alter the fragile nuclear balance. Its

assistance to &lger can be viewed as a strategy to threat the E# but also as a resort to

continue its nuclear plant outside Iran, in a case that Israel or the #( will attac its

nuclear plants.

/n %ovember )*, )00:, &lgerian Minister of Energy and Mineral Aesources (haib

!halil announced that &lgeria would launch a nuclear energy program in order to

exploit the country4s substantial uranium deposits.:Three days later on %ovember

)@, !halil visited Tehran, where Iranian 8resident Mahmoud &hmadineLad offered to

provide assistance to &lgeria4s new nuclear undertaing, stating that Iran was willing

5to share its expertise in different fields with &lgeria, including peaceful nuclear

technology.7!halil was uoted as replying that &lgeria 5is very interested in Iranian

expertise in various fields, especially in oil, gas, and nuclear energy7 and that it 5is

prepared to establish relations with Iran based on common interests.7@

$oncerns about &lgerian intentions could be heightened by the suspicions &lgeria

raised in the early '990s, before it Loined the nuclear %onproliferation Treaty +%8T,

that it was seeing the capability to produce nuclear arms.

In discussions with the International &tomic Energy &gency +I&E& several wees

prior to the %ovember )* announcement of &lgeria4s new nuclear plans, !halil stated

that &lgeria4s goal was the 5integrated development of the entire nuclear sector and its


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applications" seawater desalini6ation, industry, agriculture, medicine, the environment

and, in particular, electricity.79In the late '990s, &lgeria4s exploitable deposits of

uranium were thought to be limited and to pose an obstacle to the country4s

development of a self-sufficient nuclear energy program.

&lgeria abstained in two ey votes at the I&E&, which, respectively, found Tehran to

be in noncompliance with its I&E& inspection agreement and referred the Iran case to

the #% for further action.=0

$lose nuclear ties between &lgeria and Iran could complicate international

nonproliferation efforts in a number of ways. /f particular concern is that Iran might

clandestinely assist &lgeria in developing a uranium enrichment capability.='Even if

&lgeria were to claim it had developed this capability indigenously and placed it

under I&E& safeguards, however, the result would still be the emergence of an

additional state possessing at least the latent capability to manufacture nuclear

weapons and nown to have regional leadership ambitions. &t a time when the #nited

(tates and many other nations are seeing to slow the further spread of this sensitive

technology, such a development would be a setbac to international nonproliferation

efforts, even if &lgeria never misused this capability. =)$oncerns about the potential

for misuse, however, could arise given &lgeria4s nuclear history. In '99', prior to

Loining the %8T, &lgeria secretly acuired a '*-megawatt research reactor from

$hina, raising suspicions about the possible development of nuclear weapons.=These

suspicions were significantly eased when &lgeria agreed to place the reactor under

I&E& inspections and, in '99*, Loined the %8T. %onetheless, as recently as )00=,

rumors circulated that &lgeria was engaged in nuclear activities with military

overtones.==

In the meantime, some analysts have suggested that &hmadineLad is seeing &lgeria4s

aid in serving as a mediator with the 2est on the Iranian nuclear controversy. They


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speculate that &hmadineLad sees &lgiers, having recently built closer ties with

2ashington, as an intermediary that both sides trust.=*2ith the #% (ecurity $ouncil

having imposed sanctions on Iran and &hmadineLad refusing to slow Iran4s uranium

enrichment and plutonium production activities, it remains to be seen whether &lgeria

will step into this role and what it might accomplish, if it does so.

(ioloical

There is very little publicly available information to determine whether Iran is

pursuing a biological weapon program. &lthough Iran acceded to the ?eneva 8rotocol

in '9)9 and ratified the iological and Toxin 2eapons $onvention +2$ in '9,

the #.(. government believes Iran began biological weapon efforts in the early to

mid-'9@0s, and that it continues to pursue an offensive biological weapon program

lined to its civilian biotechnology activities.=:The #nited (tates alleges that Iran

may have started to develop small uantities of agent, possibly including mycotoxins,

ricin, and the smallpox virus.=Iran strongly denies acuiring or producing biological

weapons.=@

$hemical Iran suffered severe losses from the use of Irai chemical weapons over the

period '9@) to '9@@. &s a conseuence Iran has a great deal of experiences of the

effects of chemical warfare +$2. Iran has continued to maintain a significant

defensive $2 capability since the end of the ?ulf 2ar in '9@@. The most important

incentive for this effort was probably a concern that Ira continued to possess

chemical weapons. Iran ratified the $hemical 2eapons $onvention +$2$ in

%ovember '99 and has been an active participant in the wor of the /rgani6ation for

the 8rohibition of $hemical 2eapons +/8$2. Iran has publicly acnowledged the

existence of a chemical weapons program enhanced during the latter stages of the

'9@0-'9@@ war with Ira.

=9

/n ratifying the $2$ Iran opened its facilities to

international inspection and claimed that all offensive $2 activities had been


22/34

terminated and the facilities destroyed. %evertheless, the #nited (tates has continued

to claim that Iran continues an active program of promotion and production of

chemical weapons. This production reportedly includes the production of sarin,

mustard, phosgene, and hydrocyanic acid. The #.(. government estimates that Iran

can manufacture ',000 metric tons of agents per year and may have a stocpile of at

least several thousand metric tons of weaponi6ed and bul agent. /pen-sources do not

provide unambiguous support to these accusations. Iran strongly denies producing or

possessing chemical weapons. To date the #nited (tates has not pursued possibilities

available to it under international law to convincingly demonstrate Iranian

noncompliance with the $2$.*0

Iran is committed to the development of its civilian and military industries and this

has involved an ongoing process of moderni6ation and expansion in the chemical

industry aimed at reducing dependence on foreign suppliers of materials and

technology. ue to #.(. claims of ongoing chemical weapons production Iran

encounters regular difficulties with chemical industry related imports that are

restricted by members of the &ustralia ?roup.

Missile

Iran possesses one of the largest missile inventories in the Middle East and has

acuired complete missile systems and developed an infrastructure to build missiles

indigenously. It has purchased %orth !orean (cud-s, (cud-$s, and %odong ballistic

missiles. Meanwhile, Iran has also developed short-range artillery rocets and is

producing the (cud- and the (cud-$Jcalled the (hehab-'*'and (hehab-),

respectively. Iran recently flight-tested the ',00 m-range (hehab-, which is based

on the %orth !orean %odong. The (hehab- is capable of reaching Israel. >ollowing


23/34

this most recent flight-test, the (hehab- was placed in service and revolutionary

guard units were officially armed with the missiles. *)There are conflicting reports

about the development of even longer-ranged missiles, such as the (hehab-= and the

!osar intercontinental ballistic missile +I$M. #( intelligence agencies assess that

barring acuisition of a complete system or maLor subsystem from %orth !orea, Iran

is unliely to launch an I$M or satellite launch vehicle +(3


24/34

The states in the Middle-East invest huge amounts of resources in order to develop, produce and maintain the

unconventional deterrence, as the area is in an arm race. The contradicting religions, ideologies and heterogeneity

of the states, together with inferiority feelings mae peace process almost impossible.

The international treaties lac ability to prevent unconventional weaponi6ation either by states or guerilla groups.

The lac of international definition of 5Terror (tate7 prevents any possibility of international resistance and action.

Therefore, the only remaining solution is local activity against states armed with unconventional weapons.


25/34

#ppendi)

'uclear (ioloic Chemical

#liers research research developmentP

E!pt research developmentP >easible +'9:,

'9:

Iran development development feasible +'9@=-

'9@9

Iraq feasibleP feasibleP feasible +'9@,

'9@-'9@@

Israel feasible production production

"ib!a research developmentP feasible

*audi #rabia -P - -P*!ria research developmentP production

Turke! research - -

+emen - - -P


26/34


27/34

'Toward a National Biodefense Strategy Challenges and Opportunities&pril )00, $enter for $ounterproliferation

Aesearch, %ational efense #niversity, >ort 3esley H. Mc%air 2ashington, $.

2. (eth $arus,Bioterrorism and Biocrimes The !llicit "se of Biological Agents Since #$%%, woring

paper +2ashington, $" $enter for $ounterproliferation Aesearch, %ational efense #niversity, >ebruary )00'. (ee also

Honathan . Tucer, ed., To&ic Terror Assessing Terrorist "se of Chemical and Biological Weapons'+$ambridge, M&"

MIT 8ress, )000K Hoshua 3ederberg, ed.,Biological Weapons Limiting the Threat +$ambridge, M&" MIT 8ress, '999.

)Milton 3eitenberg, 5&n &ssessment of the iological 2eapons Threat to the #nited (tates,7 The

(ournal of )omeland Security, Hanuary )00'.

Malcolm ando, N(cientific and technological change and the future of the $2$" the problem of non-lethal

weapons,N,*isarmament +orum,


28/34

%orth !orea tested a Taepodong-' in &ugust '99@, firing a missile over northern Hapan.

It brings #( bases on /inawa within %orth !oreaFs reach.

ut the missile must be fired from a fixed location and has a long preparation time, meaning that potential launches could

be detected.

& land-based missile, the Taepodong-;, is also said to be under development but has not yet been tested.

ased on a (oviet submarine-launched ballistic missile, it is thought to have a range of up to =,000 m, reaching #( bases

on ?uam. #nlie the Taepodong-', it could be fired from mobile launch systems hidden from view.

The Taepodong-) long-range missile is estimated to have a range of between *,000 and :,000 m, putting &lasa, Bawaii

and parts of the west coast of the #( within range.

ut the first launch of the missile, in Huly )00:, appeared to be a failure after it crashed within seconds of launch - according

to #( sources.

If the missile was successfully launched, it is not thought to be particularly accurate or to be able to carry a large warhead.

3ie the Taepodong-', it reuires a fixed launch site.

The Taepodong-) test too place from the Musudan-ri complex on the East coast of the !orean peninsula. &nalysis of

satellite images of the area appears to show a range of missile fabrication, fuelling, testing and control facilities.

http"QQnews.bbc.co.uQ)QhiQasia-pacificQ)*:=)='.stm

8&laa Issa, 5The rivers ehind Missile 8roliferation,7 $enter for %onproliferation (tudies, Monterey Institute of

International (tudies and Mountbatten $enter for International (tudies, #niversity of (outhampton, /ccasional 8aper %o. ,

,issile 1roliferation and *efenses 1roblems and 1rospects, May )00', p. =. The controversial article at the vanguard of

studies calling into uestion the 8atriot4s performance during the ?ulf 2ar is Theodore &. 8ostol, 53essons of the ?ulf 2ar

Experience with 8atriot,7!nternational Security, Winter'99'9), pp. ''9''.

9$harles 3. ?laser and (teve >etter, 5%ational Missile efense and the >uture of #.(. %uclear 2eapons 8olicy,7

!nternational Security, (ummer )00', pp. =9, *)*.

'0 ennis M. ?ormley +)00@.,issile contagion Cruise missile proliferation and the threat to international security. %.1"

8raeger.

''%TI.org +%uclear Threat Initiative founded in the #(& by Turner and (enator %unn in )00'.

')any (hoham,NThe Evolution of $hemical and iological 2eapons in Egypt,N &$8A 8olicy 8aper %o. =:,

http"QQwww.acpr.org.ilQpublicationsQpolicy-papersQpp0=:-xs.html,'99@K 2olume # The .ise of CB Weapons The 1roblem

of Chemical and Biological Warfare3(tocholm International 8eace Aesearch Institute, +(tocholm" &lmvist 2isell,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2564241.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2564241.stmhttp://www.acpr.org.il/publications/policy-papers/pp046-xs.htmlhttp://www.acpr.org.il/publications/policy-papers/pp046-xs.htmlhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2564241.stmhttp://www.acpr.org.il/publications/policy-papers/pp046-xs.html


29/34

'9', p. ':0.

'!bid, p.=9'

'=?regory >. ?iles,!ranian Approaches to Chemical Warfare, '* ecember '99, p. *K &nthony $ordesman, N$reating

2eapons of Mass estruction,Armed +orces (ournal !nternational #45 +>ebruary '9@9, p. *=. &ccording to the

Mosta6afan and Hanba6an +oundation of Iran, over '00,000 were exposed to chemical agents. (ee also


30/34

)=Ephraim !at6ir, NThe eginning of efense Aesearch" en ?urion and the BEMEN +in Bebrew, in%a#id Ben-Gurion

and the %e#elo!ment of &cience in srael (Je"us'le5: 6s"'el N')ion'l c'de5y of Science, 1989, p. 37. uny'

'"do", "A'A() (#el i: inis)"y of efense *u-lic')ion, 1981, pp. 3$44, 78$79, 10;$04.

)*&t that time, it was not illegal for states to develop such capabilitiesK establishing national $2 programs was not at odds

with international norms. &ll three maLor 2estern +and %&T/ powersJthe #nited (tates, the #nited !ingdom, and

>ranceJhad significant $2 programs. ergmann was well aware of the activities of those programs. 2hile the ?eneva

protocol of '9)* prohibited first use of $2, it said nothing about developing, producing, or even using of those weapons

in strict retaliatory fashion.

): NIsraeli (ee $hemical /ption &gainst Ira,NNew 6or7 Times, 28 July 1990.

u")he" "e'dins: %e"'ld S)ein-e",


31/34

&dditional 8rotocol is a voluntary agreement signed by each country with the I&E&, which allows for more intrusive

inspections to be conducted by the I&E& inspectors. The inspectors may reuest and the state must grant access to any place

on a nuclear site or to any other facility, declared or not, where the I&E& suspects a nuclear activity.

?lobal (ecurity %ewswire, NIran (igns &dditional 8rotocol,N '@ ecember )00,

http"QQwww.nti.orgQdRnewswireQissuesQ)00R')R'@.htmlW$@:&@:.

NIran (igns &dditional 8rotocol on %uclear (afeguards,N I&E&, '@ ecember )00, http"QQwww.iaea.orgQ.

NImplementation of the %8T (afeguards &greement in the Islamic Aepublic of Iran, Aesolution adopted by the oard on '@

Hune )00=,N I&E&, '@ Hune )00=, http"QQwww.iaea.orgQ8ublicationsQocumentsQoardQ)00=Qgov)00=-=9.pdfQ.

NImplementation of the %8T (afeguards &greement in the Islamic Aepublic of Iran, Aeport by the irector ?eneral,N

I&E&, ' Hune )00=, http"QQwww.iaea.orgQ8ublicationsQocumentsQoardQ)00=Qgov)00=-=.pdfQ.

32 3ouis $harbonneau, NEl aradei wary of taing Iran to (ecurity $ouncil,N Aeuters, @ Huly )00=,

http"QQwww.iranexpert.comQ.

N(anctions against Iran FunacceptableF, Aussian minister,N &>8, ' %ovember )00, http"QQwww.iranexpert.comQK &rnaud de

orchgrave, NIran in bombsightsPN Washington Times, * Huly )00=.

I&E& report, ?/or more detail on the configuration of >E8, see ?/irst ?lobal (elect, 5&lgeria Bolds 8reliminary iscussions with I&E& on %uclear 8ower,7

%ovember ):, )00:, original source"Le (eune !ndependantwebsite, &lgiers, in >rench, %ovember :, )00:,

http"QQwww.firstglobalselect.comQscriptsQcgiip.wscQglobaloneQhtmQnewsRarticle.rPvcnews-idV=')9'9.
http://www.firstglobalselect.com/scripts/cgiip.wsc/globalone/htm/news_article.r?vcnews-id=437972http://www.firstglobalselect.com/scripts/cgiip.wsc/globalone/htm/news_article.r?vcnews-id=412919http://www.firstglobalselect.com/scripts/cgiip.wsc/globalone/htm/news_article.r?vcnews-id=437972http://www.firstglobalselect.com/scripts/cgiip.wsc/globalone/htm/news_article.r?vcnews-id=412919


32/34

=0(ee 5%on-&ligned Aealigning to $onfront Iran,7 W,* !nsights, March )00: issue,

http"QQwww.wmdinsights.comQIQ?)R?lobalRIran.htm.

='/vert Iranian assistance in this area would not be feasible, because, under (ecurity $ouncil Aesolution ', all #%

member states are currently prohibited from procuring enrichment technology from Iran. (ee #% (ecurity $ouncil

Aesolution ', http"QQwww.un.orgQ%ewsQ8ressQdocsQ)00:Qsc@9)@.doc.htm.

=)The 2hite Bouse, 58resident &nnounces %ew Measures to $ounter the Threat of 2M,7 >ebruary '', )00=,

http"QQwww.whitehouse.govQnewsQreleasesQ)00=Q0)Q)00=0)''-=.html.

=>ederation of &merican (cientists, 5&lgeria (pecial 2eapons 8rogram,7 /ctober )*, )00:,

http"QQwww.fas.orgQnewsQalgeriaK aniel 8inston, 5&lgeria (ees %uclear $ooperation with (outh !orea as (eoul 8repares

%ew %uclear 8lans,7 W,* !nsights, Hune )00:, http"QQwww.wmdinsights.comQI:QI:R&>)R&lgeria(ees.htm.

==$ Monitoring Middle East - 8olitical March , )00=, 5&lgeria" #.(. 8ressure /ver $ountry4s %uclear $apabilities,7

Libert=website, &lgiers, in >rench March , )00=, http"QQwww.globalsecurity.orgQorgQnewsQ)00=Q0=00-algeria-

nuclear.htm. >or additional bacground, see M. ?on6ale6 and H.M. 3arraya, 5(panish Intelligence 2arns of &lgerian

%uclear 8otential,7;l 1ais, &ugust ), '99@, in >ederation of &merican (cientists, http"QQwww.fas.orgQnewsQalgeriaQfbis-

tac-9@-)*.htmK avid &lbright and $orey Binderstein, 5&lgeria" ig eal in the esertP7Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

+MayQHune )00' Chttp"QQwww.thebulletin.orgQarticle.phpPartRofnVmL0'albrightD.

=*

!halid Bilal, N&lgeria announces plans for expanded nuclear energy programK Iran offers to help.N

WMD Insights, February, 2007, Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies,

http"QQwww.wmdinsights.comQI')QI')R&>'RIran&lgeria/ffer.htm.

=: N$urrent and 8roLected %ational (ecurity Threats to the #nited (tates and its Interests &broad,N $entral Intelligence

&gency, written responses to uestions before the (elect $ommittee on Intelligence of the #nited (tates (enate, Bearing

'0=-*'0, h))p:??.f's.o"?i"p?con"ess?1994@h"?s940222c.h)5.

?regory >. ?iles +)000, NThe Islamic Aepublic of Iran and %uclear, iological, and $hemical 2eapons,N in 8eter A.

3avoy, (cott . (agan, and Hames H. 2irt6, eds., Planning The 1nthinka2le: $ow New Powers ill 1se Nuclear,

Biological, and +hemical ea!ons.6)h'c': o"nell Anie"si)y *"ess, p. 8;.

=&nthony $ordesman, N2eapons of Mass estruction in Iran, $(I(,

h))p:??.csis.o"?5ide's)?"epo")s?Win6"'n;$28$98.h)5l.


33/34

arbara (tarr, NIran Bas


34/34

NeiLingFs efense Establishment" (olving the &rms-Export Enigma,N!nternational Security, (pring '99', pp. @-'09. The

>-'*QM-9 was reported to have first been tested during Hune '9@@, and was expected to begin production the summer of

'990. (ee avid . /ttaway, N$hina (ale Aeport $oncerns #.(.,N Washington 1ost, ) Hune '9@@, p. &K and Michael A.

?ordon, NeiLing &voids %ew Missile (ales &ssurances,NNew 6or7 Times, 0 March '990, p. &.

The (hahab-= has variously been reported as being as having a range of ),000-),=00m with a ',000g warhead and being

a derivative of the 8A!Fs %odong or AussiaFs A-') +((-= (&%&3. This later reference comes from sources that state

that the (hahab-= is powered by the A-)'= engine, which was originally used in the A-'). These engines were supplied by

the Energomash (cience and 8roduction &ssociation in !himy, Aussia. (teve Aodan, NIsrael iffers 2ith $I& on Iran

Missiles,N,iddle ;ast Newsline, )) ecember )000K N$I& Aeport on Iran I(K

Martin (ieff, NIranFs 3ong-range Missile 8lans 2orry %etanyahu,N Washington Times, ' /ctober '99@K ill ?ert6, N3onger

Aange on Iranian Missile (hehab-= $ould Bit $entral Europe,N Washington Times, )9 Huly '99@, p. &')K ?ideon &lon,

N(yria, Iran X(tocing #p &rmsF,N)a?aret>, ) Hune '99@K ill ?ert6, NAussia, $hina and IranFs missile program,N

Washington Times, '0 (eptember '99, p. &'K and ill ?ert6, NAussia (ells Iran Missile Metals $ontract $ontrary to

/fficial enials,N Washington Times, )0 /ctober '99, p. &'.

9:*' 2ords in the article, including endnotes.

Documents

Unconventional Weapons in the Middle Eas t1