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USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

Issue No.1112, 25 April 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama

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Issue No. 1112, 25 April 2014

Welcome to the CUWS Outreach Journal! As part of the CUWS’ mission to develop Air Force, DoD, and other USG leaders to advance the state of knowledge, policy, and practices within strategic defense issues involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, we offer the government and civilian community a source of contemporary discussions on unconventional weapons. These discussions include news articles, papers, and other information sources that address issues pertinent to the U.S. national security community. It is our hope that this information resources will help enhance the overall awareness of these important national security issues and lead to the further discussion of options for dealing with the potential use of unconventional weapons.

The following news articles, papers, and other information sources do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the Air University, U.S. Air Force, or Department of Defense. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

Outreach Journal Feedback or sign-up request: [email protected]

Return to Top U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1. Air Force Implementing Improvements in Nuclear Force 2. Exclusive: Air Force to Scrutinize Nuke Bomber Units Following Missile Scandal HOMELAND SECURITY/THE AMERICAS 1. Nuke Commander: Lessons Learned from Cheat Scandal 2. Report: Feds Sharing Less Info on Hotspot WMDs with Congress ASIA/PACIFIC 1. N.K. Slams Obama's 'Dangerous' Asia Tour 2. N. Korea 'Technically Ready' for 4th Nuclear Test: Official 3. N. Korea Vows Not to Lay Down Nuclear Weapons 4. Pyongyang ‘Seals Tunnel Ahead of Nuclear Test’, Say South Korean Officials 5. China Warns against 'Chaos' over Anticipated N. Korean Nuclear Test 6. Analyst: North Korea May Already Have Militarized Warhead EUROPE/RUSSIA 1. Russia to Build Network of Modern Naval Bases in Arctic - Putin MIDDLE EAST

FEATURE ITEM: “Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation”. Congressional Research Service; by Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Steven A. Hildreth; April 16, 2014; 14 pages. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43480.pdf

Congress has at times expressed concern regarding ballistic missile and nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea, and Syria. This report focuses primarily on unclassified and declassified U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) assessments over the past two decades. These assessments indicate that

•there is no evidence that Iran and North Korea have engaged in nuclear-related trade or cooperation with each other, although ballistic missile technology cooperation between the two is significant and meaningful, and •Syria has received ballistic missiles and related technology from North Korea and Iran and also engaged in nuclear technology cooperation with North Korea.

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http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43480.pdf

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Issue No.1112, 25 April 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies | Maxwell AFB, Alabama


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1. Iran: Row with World Powers over Arak Reactor 'Virtually Solved' 2. Iran Admits Nuclear Agency Reshuffle to Pave Way for 5+1 Talks 3. Zarif: Iran-World Powers Final Deal Facing No Unsolvable Problem 4. Syria’s Chemical Weapons Wild Card: Chlorine Gas 5. Prince Turki: Gulf States ‘Must Balance Threat from Iran’ 6. Syria Eyes End of Chemical Arms Monitoring 7. Russia Dismisses Claims of Syrian Army Poison Gas Attack INDIA/PAKISTAN 1. Country Will Test Missile Shield Next Week: DRDO 2. Pakistan Test-Fires Short Range Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile COMMENTARY 1. China Goes Ballistic 2. BERMAN: Why Iran’s Missiles Matter 3. Iran’s “Amicable” Nuclear Program: Political Pitch While Centrifuges Enrich 4. US Key to DPRK Nuclear Issue 5. A Normal, Nuclear Pakistan 6. Editorial: Japan-U.S. Alliance Must Remain Strong, Form Base for Peace in Asia Great Falls Tribune – Great Falls, MT

Air Force Implementing Improvements in Nuclear Force Written by Jenn Rowell, Tribune Staff Writer April 22, 2014

Improvements and initiatives suggested by airmen throughout the Air Force’s nuclear community are starting to be implemented.

After the cheating investigation was announced in January, the secretary of the Air Force and head of Air Force Global Strike Command implemented a force improvement program that surveyed 1,800 airmen.

The program identified about 400 recommendations, and the Air Force has identified $19 million for those of those items in this fiscal year budget, which runs through Sept. 30. Twentieth Air Force also identified an additional $3 million for quality-of-life improvements.

Those areas for repair include launch control center refurbishment and infrastructure repairs.

In the proposed budget for fiscal year 2015, which begins Oct. 1, Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James said the Air Force has requested $455 million to sustain ICBM squadrons, ICBM helicopter support and critical communication areas. The proposed budget also identified $154 million in other requirements from the force improvement program, including readiness, training and improvements to launch control facilities, among other improvements, James said.

The breakdown of how much money is going to which missile wings hasn’t been released yet, but that information is expected in the coming weeks.

In the meantime, Maj. Gen. Jack Weinstein, 20th Air Force commander, has implemented several policy changes and released memos on the new initiatives.

In one memo, Weinstein directed that all Missile Combat Crew Knowledge tests be changes from a percentage based test to pass/fail.

Previously, 90 percent was passing but officers perceived that perfect scores were necessary for promotion, according to the Air Force investigation.


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Another memo addressed airmen’s complaints of micromanagement, and Weinstein required delegation to the lowest appropriate level, according to AFGSC.

The change allows missile combat crews to give their out-briefs to their squadron commander or squadron operations officer instead of having to give them to the operations group commander. Airmen no longer have to wear their formal blue uniforms to deliver the briefs, according to the memo.

Another of Weinstein’s directives is that no launch control center will return to alert duty after a scheduled maintenance shutdown without a deep cleaning.

The cleaning will be included in the contract for those who perform the periodic maintenance, according to AFGSC.

http://www.greatfallstribune.com/article/20140422/NEWS01/304220025/Air-Force-implementing-improvements-nuclear-force

Return to Top Foreign Policy.com – Washington, D.C.

Exclusive: Air Force to Scrutinize Nuke Bomber Units Following Missile Scandal The push underscores a fundamental question: Can the nuke force police its own? BY Dan Lamothe April 23, 2014

BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, La. — The Air Force will scrutinize its units that fly dozens of bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons across the globe, the latest aftershock of an embarrassing cheating scandal in its nuclear missile force that led to the unprecedented removal of nine commanders from their jobs and the resignation of a 10th in March.

The review, which hasn't previously been reported, is the next phase of the service's nuclear "force improvement program," and will operate in a similar fashion to the ongoing assessment of the beleaguered missile units, said Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson, who oversees both forces from here as the chief of the Air Force's Global Strike Command. The general said the first review found an array of areas that needed improvement, from old equipment to poor morale, and that he hopes the new internal study will identify parts of the bomber fleet that can be fixed to avoid future problems. Global Strike Command's forces include Boeing's massive eight-engine B-52H Stratofortress bomber and Northrop Grumman's stealthy, bat-wing shaped B-2 Spirit, each of which can be equipped with conventional or nuclear weapons.

The bomber review will occur in May and June, and include interviews with hundreds of rank-and-file Air Force personnel. It comes just three months after senior Pentagon officials acknowledged that an investigation into drug use in the Air Force had uncovered widespread cheating on monthly proficiency tests among nuclear missile officers at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. About 100 officers were ensnared in the probe -- more than half of the 190 missileers at Malmstrom -- and 82 ultimately received administrative discipline ranging from letters of counseling to non-judicial punishment. Criminal cases remain open against nine officers for alleged drug activity or sharing classified information -- test answers -- on unclassified cell phones, Air Force officials said. The drugs linked to the case include ecstasy and amphetamines.

The cheating scandal exposed significant problems with morale and leadership in the force safeguarding the United States' aging arsenal of nuclear missiles, top Air Force officials say. But it also raised a fundamental question for Global Strike Command, which oversees both the nuclear bomber and missile forces: Can an organization that was founded in the wake of another crisis shake off its demons and move forward?

The command was established nearly five years ago after another scandal in which six cruise missiles loaded with nuclear warheads were mistakenly loaded onto a B-52H bomber at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., and transported without the usual strict security precautions to Barksdale, a sprawling, tree-lined installation near Shreveport along








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the Red River. That gaffe, along with other mistakes, prompted a Pentagon investigation that led then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates to fire Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley and Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne from their jobs on June 5, 2008.

Current Air Force Secretary Deborah James, Wilson, and other top service officials have promised accountability following the latest crisis. But they also appear determined to do whatever they can to avoid another one. In addition to launching the review of the bomber force, Air Force leaders say they want to restore trust with the rank-and-file troops safeguarding the nation's nuclear missiles, and are actively looking for ways to do so.

"We've got to hit singles. We've got to start showing some wins," Wilson told Foreign Policy, using sports metaphors. "And they don't have to be big wins, they just have to be wins that people see and tangibly believe that, 'Once my idea was listened to, it was acted upon,' and that will build momentum."

One high-profile proposal calls for those serving in the nuclear force to receive some form of financial incentive. It isn't yet clear who will receive additional money, but Wilson said it could come in the form of cash bonuses when personnel re-enlist to stay in the nuclear force or additional pay on days in which missileers pull overnight "alert" shifts, in which they leave their headquarters, travel dozens of miles to a missile site, and take elevators underground to man the electronic panels that control the missiles. The general said he must make recommendations on the incentives proposal to James by April 30, but declined to say what his preferences are.

In total, the so-called force improvement plan review led to more than 330 recommendations for the missile force, and all but a handful will either be adopted or receive more research in the future, said Brig. Gen. Michael Fortney, the director of operations at Global Strike Command. The ones that were cast aside typically conflicted with other recommendations. Some personnel asked to wear blue flight suits, for example, but others wanted to stay with the current green ones, so the brass tabled any change. On the flip side, Wilson said it's likely that the Air Force will soon allow troops working in the missile force to wear some kind of patch on their uniform -- a point of pride that was once allowed, but taken away several years ago.

The missile force review went far beyond scrutinizing the job of the missile launch officers, too. Its helicopters squadrons, maintenance units, and security forces all received scrutiny, giving troops in each organization a chance to air longstanding concerns. For example, the security forces who defend the 450 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles and guard nuclear warheads in missile silos near Malmstrom, Minot, and F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming want new vehicles to respond to threats to missile sites. They say the armored Humvees they use now are dangerous on many of the narrow, treacherous roads they must travel, especially in the winter. Many of the troops would rather use unarmored sport utility vehicles when possible while keeping a smaller fleet of armored vehicles to response when recently installed surveillance cameras spot a potential threat.

Global Strike Command leaders also want a seat at the table in the Pentagon's internal deliberations over its Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program, which will eventually replace the military's Humvee fleet, and are interested in wearing the Army's "Multicam" camouflage uniform pattern, rather than the distinctive "tiger stripe" camouflage the Air Force adopted in 2011, Air Force officials said. Multicam has proven itself effective in Afghanistan, and Wilson said he does not see why it would not be useful to security forces in the wooded environments around missile sites.

"It's a pretty good uniform, and it's pretty good at making sure that under different conditions -- day, night -- I can blend in, versus stand out," he said. "And it's pretty durable. I'm OK with it."

The Air Force is forging ahead with its attempts to improve the nuclear force as it continues to plan for several expensive acquisition programs that will require continued support on Capitol Hill. The plans come at a time when some analysts question whether it's necessary for the Pentagon to keep three ways to deliver nuclear weapons -- bombers, ICBMs, and missiles launched by Navy submarine -- more than 20 years after the end of the Cold War. But in a common refrain for the nuclear force, Wilson said it makes sense to keep each leg of the "triad" because they all have their strengths and the United States has not had a major world war since the United States dropped nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.






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"Now, we can say lots of things changed, but part of the change is we had a new weapon, and people said, 'Whew, this is like nothing we've ever seen before.' And since then, we haven't had great power wars between nations since 1945," Wilson said. "Are we the only reason? Absolutely not. Are we part of the reason? I would say absolutely so."

The equipment is getting old, though. The Air Force is expected to launch a contract competition this fall for a new long-range strike bomber to replace the aging B-52H, which last came off the assembly line in 1962. Air Force officials have said the new aircraft could cost $550 million per plane, and they want up to 100 of them -- putting the overall price tag at $55 billion or more. In the meantime, the Air Force also is planning a variety of upgrades to both it and the B-2 stealth bomber, first unveiled in 1989. The B-52's bomb bay is being reconfigured to carry smart weapons internally at a cost of $24.6 million and its communications equipment will get a $1.1 billion upgrade to allow it to share information with other aircraft nearby. The B-2, pictured below, will get new avionics and other equipment to ensure that it can continue to attack targets while remaining invisible on radar to enemy forces.

On the ground, the Air Force also is preparing to upgrade its Minuteman ballistic missile arsenal with a new guidance system and the launch facilities with new oxygen generation units and classified printers, said Brig. Gen. Fred Stoss, who oversees weapons requirements for Global Strike Command. At the same time, it also is preparing for new solid rocket motors in the missiles, since the propellant in them eventually loses its usefulness, and planning incremental updates to the ICBM arsenal that will eventually replace the Minuteman III with something called the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent.

"We have to make sure we have an affordable way to make the Minuteman III and its successor out as long as the nation needs the ICBM," Stoss said. "Some of our studies as we're looking at it, we're thinking 75 years or longer for the capability we're looking to do."

Wilson said Global Strike Command is not "going to walk by any problem," and is trying to be as open and transparent as it can to change the culture in the nuclear force going forward. Following the bomber review, he plans a third assessment phase that will analyze headquarters units the same way.

"We're not trying to hide anything. This was... I didn't see it coming," he said, searching for words to describe the cheating scandal. "I wish it hadn't happened, but I can also tell you that because it has happened now, we're going to use this. There's this Robert Frost quote: 'The only way out is through.' And we're going to get through this, and we're ultimately going to be better and stronger as the result of our efforts here."

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/23/exclusive_air_force_to_scrutinize_nuke_bomber_units_following_missile_scandal

Return to Top Tribune Eagle – Cheyenne, Wyoming

Nuke Commander: Lessons Learned from Cheat Scandal By Trevor Brown, Wyoming Tribune Eagle Friday, April 18, 2014

CHEYENNE -- The commander of the nation's land-based nuclear arsenal said lessons can be learned in the wake of a test-cheating scandal that has shaken the confidence of the embattled intercontinental ballistic missile force.

"If you can look in the mirror after you had a crisis to realize you can get better, it can become a good thing," Maj. Gen. Jack Weinstein, who leads the Cheyenne-headquartered 20th Air Force, said Friday in an interview with the Wyoming Tribune Eagle.

"It may be a tough pill to swallow, but I really believe that with everything that has happened, good is going to come out of this and make us stronger."








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The 20th Air Force is responsible for the 450 Minuteman III nuclear missiles that are operated and maintained by Cheyenne’s F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Montana’s Malmstrom Air Force Base and North Dakota’s Minot Air Force Base.

The ICBM force has come under fire in recent months after it was discovered that 96 missileers at Malmstrom cheated on their monthly proficiency exams.

In addition, an unpublished report obtained by The Associated Press last year cited that many ICBM launch officers are feeling “burnout” because of the stress and unrewarding nature of the job. It also claimed that misconduct and behavioral problems among the ICBM forces were higher than the Air Force as a whole.

Top Air Force leaders fired several senior leaders at Malmstrom last month and ordered a review of operations at all three bases following the test-cheating revelations. Weinstein said a number of reforms are already underway at F.E. Warren and the other bases.

This includes moving to a pass/fail testing process that he hopes will relieve pressure for airmen to score “perfectly” on the exams.

Weinstein said airmen needed to score a 90 percent or above on the tests in the past to keep their certification up to date.

But he said there was an implied belief or perception by many that the missileers had to score perfectly to avoid being reprimanded or having their career advancement threatened.

Because of the importance and sensitivity of the nuclear mission, Weinstein said the American people should demand perfection from the ICBM force.

But he said he is trying to change how being “perfect” is defined.

“You don’t have to be perfect in testing, and you don’t have to be perfect in training,” he said.

“But you do have to be perfect when you are doing the mission.”

Weinstein said he is also pushing “cultural” changes that seek to empower junior-level officers and others to take on more responsibilities, instead of waiting for orders from senior officers.

He said this is one of the problems he noticed immediately upon taking command of the 20th Air Force last year.

“All of a sudden, you have lieutenants who are not making decisions, and what happens when they become captains and they have never made a decision in their life?” he asked. “That is a huge problem. “

The 20th Air Force recently completed a “bottom-up” study that largely asked the junior officers and enlisted airmen what changes they would like to see.

Weinstein said 350 recommendations were received, and he and other top officials ended up agreeing with almost all of them.

Weinstein added that just in the past few months, he has noticed morale improving as a result of some of these changes.

He additionally said he still sees the ICBM force as an “enduring mission” that will survive despite the pressure from some to consolidate or shrink the country’s nuclear arsenal.

The ICBM force is part of the so-called “nuclear triad” that also includes Ohio-class Trident ballistic-missile submarines and B-2 and B-52 bombers.

Some have suggested that the ICBM force is the most likely leg to be eliminated as either a cost-saving measure or a way to comply with missile-reduction treaties.

But Weinstein said there is little to no talk in military circles about eliminating the land-based force.






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“The ICBM force is the only 24/7, 365 alert capability that our nation has,” he said. “The only existential threat to the United States is nuclear weapons.

“Therefore, an adversary will really have to think twice about attacking the United States, because if you wanted to disable the ICBM arsenal, it will take an awful lot of weapons.”

Weinstein also applauded a recent announcement that the U.S. Department of Defense plans to reduce the number of deployed ICBMs in silos from 450 to 400 by 2018 to meet an arms-reduction treaty with Russia.

Weinstein said he supports the plan because the military intends to pull the missiles from active alert but will keep the silos in “warm status.”

This means that the 400 missiles can be cycled through any of the 450 silos, since they will remain operational.

Weinstein said this will give the bases more flexibility in maintaining the silos and missiles. And he said it will not result in any personnel cuts.

“We still have to maintain 45 launch control centers, we still have to maintain the three wings, and we still need the same amount of maintenance people,” he said.

“And we still are going to need to protect the launch facilities, since they’re a critical asset.”

The decision to keep the silos in warm status was also backed by Wyoming’s congressional delegation.

“I’m pleased the administration recognizes the importance of allowing Wyoming and other missile states to keep and maintain our unused silos in a reserve status,” said U.S. Sen. John Barrasso, R-Wyo., in a statement.

“Maintaining these silos is another critical deterrent against countries that are seeking to expand their nuclear programs.”

http://www.wyomingnews.com/articles/2014/04/19/news/20local_04-19-14.txt#.U1e84yzjhDy

Return to Top Global Security Newswire – Washington, D.C.

Report: Feds Sharing Less Info on Hotspot WMDs with Congress By Rachel Oswald, Global Security Newswire April 22, 2014

The U.S. government lately is sharing less information with Congress about weapons-of-mass-destruction proliferation concerns, a new Capitol Hill study finds.

"The number of unclassified reports to Congress on WMD-related issues has decreased considerably in recent years," concludes an April 16 report by the Congressional Research Service, the internal research arm of the legislative branch.

Congress requires that the government report on the nuclear and missile programs of Iran, North Korea and Syria. Members of select House and Senate panels -- such as the intelligence and armed-services committees, as well as the appropriations subpanels on defense -- have access to some classified findings on weapons of mass destruction-related topics.

Lawmakers not on those panels can request closed-door briefings from administration officials on specific concerns, according to Steven Aftergood, who directs the Federation of American Scientists' Project on Government Secrecy.

But Congress actually has moved to reduce reporting requirements on unconventional weapon concerns, according to the CRS report. Under the fiscal 2013 Intelligence Authorization Act, a mandate for the intelligence community to provide a yearly unclassified report on the "Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions" was lifted.



http://www.wyomingnews.com/articles/2014/04/19/news/20local_04-19-14.txt#.U1e84yzjhDy




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The report did not offer specifics on the number of classified and unclassified reports and briefings given to Congress over the years.

"There is an annual threat briefing from the [director of National Intelligence] before the House and Senate intelligence committees, but if you look for other open hearings on the subject, they're not there," Aftergood said. "There used to be more."

The longtime transparency advocate said that in the past, there were also more "questions for the record" -- written inquiries by lawmakers that drew officials' responses -- viewable by the public.

"Those also seem to have vanished," Aftergood said. "So there is just less out there and the public has less information at its disposal."

John Isaacs, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, said lawmakers' access to official assessments on WMD matters could help them make informed decisions in votes on proliferation-related issues, such as sanctions bills, military- and intelligence-spending proposals, and annual defense-authorization legislation.

Still, Isaacs said providing lawmakers with more information would offer no guarantee they would make reasoned voting decisions.

"Congress should get more facts [about weapons of mass destruction], but that wouldn't necessarily say much," he said. "Members of Congress with or without complete information ... tend to vote on ideology and not facts."

For Aftergood, the issue is also a matter of public awareness about proliferation, an issue he says has "a reduced profile" due to the decrease in unclassified reports and hearings.

The CRS report suggests that Congress "consider requiring additional reporting from the executive branch on WMD proliferation."

"Congress has it in its power to change the situation," Aftergood said. "They can say, as they did in the past, we want an unclassified [hearing and report]. It's a decision that's in their hands."

http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/report-feds-sharing-less-info-wmd-related-issues/

Return to Top The Korea Herald – Seoul, South Korea

N.K. Slams Obama's 'Dangerous' Asia Tour Agence France-Presse (AFP) April 21, 2014

North Korea warned Monday that an upcoming Asian tour by US President Barack Obama could escalate military tensions, as South Korean media cited intelligence reports of increased activity at the North's main nuclear test site.

Obama's April 23-29 tour includes visits to Japan and South Korea, the two main US military allies in Asia and key partners in the effort to curb Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programme.

A North Korean foreign ministry spokesman said the "reactionary and dangerous" trip would only serve to "escalate confrontation and bring dark clouds of a nuclear arms race" over the Korean peninsula.

In a statement carried by the North's official KCNA news agency, the spokesman said recent Asia visits by the US Secretaries of State and Defence had sought to demonise the North's nuclear and missile programmes and justify a growing US military presence in the region.

"It is as clear as noonday that Obama will trumpet the same thing," he said.



http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/report-feds-sharing-less-info-wmd-related-issues/




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The last two months have been a period of elevated tensions on the Korean peninsula, as South Korea and the United States conducted annual, large-scale military exercises.

North Korea protested by test-firing dozens of short-range missiles and conducting its first mid-range missile tests for nearly four years.

On Monday, the South's Yonhap news agency, citing unidentified military sources, said increased activity had been observed at the North's underground Punggye-ri site where its three nuclear tests were carried out in 2006, 2009 and 2013.

"South Korean and US forces have been closely monitoring the latest development to detect signs of another test," one source told Yonhap.

At the end of last month, North Korea said it would not rule out a "new form" of nuclear test after the UN Security Council condemned its latest medium-range missile launches.

Experts saw this as a possible reference to testing a uranium-based device or a miniaturised warhead small enough to fit on a ballistic missile.

http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140421001410

Return to Top Yonhap News Agency – Seoul, South Korea

N. Korea 'Technically Ready' for 4th Nuclear Test: Official April 23, 2014 By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, April 23 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has made all necessary preparations to conduct its fourth nuclear test, only leaving the decision to use its "open ticket," a senior South Korean military official said Wednesday.

Seoul and Washington have been preparing for a possible nuclear test by Pyongyang as the allies have recently detected increased activities at the North's Punggye-ri site in the northeastern tip of the peninsula.

The latest move fueled media speculation that the communist state may stage the test ahead of U.S. President Barack Obama's planned visit to South Korea later this week, following his stop in Japan, to draw international attention.

"North Korea is technically ready for a nuclear test at any time, and has made all preparations as a matter of fact," a senior defense ministry official said on condition of anonymity. "The current situation is like having an open plane ticket. (The North) is ready to get on the plane at any time."

Addressing conflicting analysis by a U.S. institute that questioned the imminence of a test, the official said South Korean and U.S. officials are on the same page regarding the latest developments taking place at the Punggye-ri site.

On Tuesday, 38 North, a website run the U.S.-Korea institute at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, wrote that recent satellite imagery indicates that a North Korean nuclear test is not imminent.

"That may be possible but appears unlikely based on the limited commercial satellite imagery available and observations of past North Korean nuclear tests," the report wrote. "Recent operations at Punggye-ri have not reached the high level of intensity -- in terms of vehicle, personnel and equipment movement -- that occurred in the weeks prior to past detonations."

Concerns over a fourth nuclear test by North Korea have risen after it threatened to conduct a "new form of nuclear test" to bolster its nuclear deterrence.







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Seoul officials have said the North has prepared one of the tunnels at the Punggye-ri site for another test since last year, though the timing depends on political considerations by leader Kim Jong-un.

North Korea is believed to have used plutonium in its first two tests in 2006 and 2009. After the North's last underground test in February 2013, analysts failed to determine whether the device used highly-enriched uranium or plutonium.

Experts said Pyongyang has gradually made progresses in making a powerful, smaller warhead, but has yet to master the technology to make a small warhead that fits a long-range missile.

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/04/23/18/0401000000AEN20140423008600315F.html

Return to Top Global Post – Boston, MA

N. Korea Vows Not to Lay Down Nuclear Weapons Yonhap News Agency April 23, 2014

SEOUL, April 23 (Yonhap) -- North Korea pledged Wednesday not to lay down its nuclear weapons as it called on South Korea to stop annual joint military drills with the United States.

The North vowed last year to develop its economy and nuclear arsenal in tandem, a dual-track policy South Korea and the U.S. have warned is a dead end for the communist country.

The North has called its nuclear programs a "treasured sword" against what it claims is Washington's policy of hostility.

South Korea "should not even dream that we will be coaxed into laying down our nuclear" programs by sweet talk, the North's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea said in comments carried by the country's official Korean Central News Agency.

The committee, which handles inter-Korean affairs, was referring to South Korean President Park Geun-hye's initiative toward North Korea.

Park called for the bolstering of exchanges with the North as a first step toward building trust between the sides to lay the groundwork for unification of the two Koreas. She unveiled the proposal, called the Dresden Declaration, during her trip to the former East German city of Dresden last month.

The committee's comments came as North Korea has increased movements of vehicles and troops at its main nuclear test site, an possible indication that Pyongyang will conduct another nuclear test as U.S. President Barack Obama visits Asia.

North Korea conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 and February 2013, drawing international condemnation and tougher U.N. sanctions.

The North has threatened to carry out a "new form" of nuclear test in anger over the U.N.'s condemnation of its ballistic missile launches into the sea off its east coast.

The committee pressed South Korea to halt its annual military drills with the U.S., which Pyongyang condemns as a rehearsal for invasion.

It also called on South Korea to lift its sanctions imposed on Pyongyang nearly four years ago.

Those economic sanctions were imposed on the North in May 2010 in retaliation for the sinking of a warship near their disputed western sea border in March that year that killed 46 South Korean sailors.

Under the sanctions, South Korea has suspended inter-Korean projects and banned new investment in the North, except for their joint factory park in the North's western city of Kaesong.



http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/04/23/18/0401000000AEN20140423008600315F.html




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South Korea has called for, among other things, the North's admission of its involvement in the sinking in return for lifting the sanctions, though Pyongyang has refused to take responsibility for the deadly attack.

The North's committee asked if Park is willing to carry out agreements reached at two previous inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007.

The first summit paved the way for the two Koreas to ease military tensions and begin economic cooperation after decades of hostilities.

In 2007, the leaders of the two Koreas produced a deal calling for massive South Korean investment in the North's key industrial sectors, including shipbuilding.

The deals have been in limbo as tensions persist on the divided peninsula over the North's missile and nuclear programs.

Inter-Korean relations "depend on Park's attitude," the committee said.

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/140423/n-korea-vows-not-lay-down-nuclear-weapons

Return to Top South China Morning Post.com – Hong Kong, China

Pyongyang ‘Seals Tunnel Ahead of Nuclear Test’, Say South Korean Officials South Korean defence officials say Punggye-ri site has been readied for underground blast to coincide with Barack Obama's visit to Seoul By Andrew Salmon in Seoul Thursday, 24 April, 2014

North Korea has apparently sealed the tunnel to its nuclear test site, a significant sign that it may carry out its fourth nuclear test imminently, according to defence officials in Seoul.

The move came as US President Barack Obama was due to arrive in Seoul today and follows warnings from Pyongyang over military drills carried out by US and South Korean forces.

A South Korean official said North Korea had placed fissile materials and related equipment in a tunnel at its underground nuclear test site at Punggye-ri, and sealed the tunnel entrance.

The sealing is crucial. According to the official, any country that seals nuclear material in an underground facility must carry out a detonation "within seven to 14 days" or unseal the tunnel and remove the materials.

"This is a technical issue," explained Shim Chang-hoon of Seoul think tank the Asan Institute. "If they want to conduct a nuclear-weapons test and have put the facilities inside, they cannot keep them there for longer than 15 days."

The official declined to say when the tunnel was sealed, but South Korea's Defence Ministry had announced activity at Punggye-ri on Tuesday.

If that activity included the tunnel sealing, a test will take place by May 6. South Korean officials had previously said a detonation awaited only a "political decision" from Pyongyang.

But not everyone agrees with Seoul's analysis. Influential website 38 North, citing satellite images, said it did not anticipate a test, given the apparent lack of communications gear at the site.

And South Korean officials have also said that the activity could be a bluff.

Punggye-ri, in the country's desolate northeast, is the site of 2006, 2009 and 2012 nuclear tests.








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Today, Obama arrives in Seoul for the Korean leg of his Asian tour, of which Pyongyang media have been critical. South Korean and the US will also finish joint air-force exercises today.

"If you really want to send a message and express displeasure, what better time?" asked Dan Pinkstone of the International Crisis Group.

"It would be consistent with the regime's past behaviour."

Pyongyang has tested missiles and nuclear devices on sensitive or symbolic dates.

In 2006, North Korea detonated its first nuclear device while Shinzo Abe, during his first stint as Japan's prime minister, was visiting then South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun in Seoul. In 2009, it launched missiles on the US national holiday, July 4. And it test-fired two medium-range missiles on March 25 - the day that Obama hosted a summit with Abe and South Korean President Park Geun-hye.

"A nuclear test is an important card - like a joker - in power games," said Shim. "If North Korea believes that it has a bullying effect on the outside world, the dates of the visit would be one opportunity."

http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1496205/pyongyang-seals-tunnel-ahead-nuclear-test-say-south-korean-officials

Return to Top The Korea Herald – Seoul, South Korea

China Warns against 'Chaos' over Anticipated N. Korean Nuclear Test April 24, 2014

BEIJING, April 24 (Yonhap) -- China said Thursday it will not permit chaos on its doorstep, in another thinly veiled warning to its wayward ally North Korea amid indications that the North is technically ready to conduct a fresh nuclear test.

"Peace and stability is in the immediate interests of China. We will by no means allow war or chaos to occur on our doorstep," China's foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang told reporters, when asked about the possibility of a fourth nuclear test by North Korea.

The comments by Qin echo those of Chinese leaders, but were the strongest yet by the Chinese foreign ministry in response to recent reports that North Korea appears to have completed technical preparations for a nuclear test.

In Tokyo, U.S. President Barack Obama, who is set to arrive in South Korea on Friday, urged China to do more to rein in North Korea, describing China's role in getting North Korea to abandon its nuclear program as "critical."

Asked about the remarks by Obama in Tokyo, Qin said, "We have been encouraging all relevant parties to peacefully resolve relevant issues through dialogue and consultation."

"We hope that all other parties concerned can bear in mind the larger interests and make joint efforts with China to realize denuclearization, peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula," Qin said.

North Korea, which conducted three nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013, threatened last month that it would not rule out "a new form" of nuclear test after the United Nations Security Council condemned Pyongyang for test-firing ballistic missiles into the sea. Outside experts believe that a fourth nuclear test by North Korea may be based on enriched uranium.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a 40-minute telephone conversation on Wednesday during which Park asked Xi to help persuade North Korea not to carry out a fourth nuclear test.

Asked whether China is making efforts to avert a nuclear test by North Korea, Qin replied, "We are in communication and coordination with all parties concerned."








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"We call on other parties concerned to cooperate with our efforts. We set the platform, and we hope that others will not ruin our efforts," Qin said. (Yonhap)


Return to Top Voice of America

Analyst: North Korea May Already Have Militarized Warhead Baik Sungwon April 24, 2014

As concern grows that North Korea may be preparing for another underground nuclear weapons test, a leading nuclear scientist says Pyongyang already may have acquired a device small enough to fit atop a missile.

David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, explained that the North does not need another nuclear test to acquire a militarized warhead.

“I think it is a mistake to think that they require this testing in order to design a militarized warhead. I think they may have gotten one from Pakistan or China," said Albright.

But Albright, who also worked as an inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog, said that doesn't rule out another North Korea test.

"But what they can't get without testing is reliability. So the testing is invaluable to make sure everything works," he said.

The assessment came amid wide speculation about the North’s nuclear capability, triggered by the North’s warning that it could conduct a “new form” of nuclear test.

Nick Hansen, an analyst at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and 38 North, says the point of future tests will be focused on increasing Pyongyang's ability to weaponize its warheads.

“The only reason they are doing this in developing a warhead or a nuclear bomb is to put it on a missile," said Hansen.

He added that he thinks North Korea may be preparing for multiple, simultaneous tests.

"So one of the things you could think of is a new form of testing, is to test two bombs simultaneously or as close as they can get it. Pakistan did that by the way. And if you do that, you don't catch as much flack from the international community as you would if you test one off and then two months later test another one off," he said.

Despite growing concern in Seoul, a U.S. research group this week said there is "little evidence" North Korea will conduct a nuclear test during President Barack Obama's upcoming visit to Seoul.

South Korea said this week it detected increased activity at the North's Punggye-ri nuclear test site, suggesting an underground test could be imminent.

This report was produced in collaboration with the VOA Korean service.

http://www.voanews.com/content/analyst-north-korea-may-already-have-militarized-warhead/1900592.html

Return to Top RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Russia to Build Network of Modern Naval Bases in Arctic - Putin 22 April 2014




http://www.voanews.com/content/analyst-north-korea-may-already-have-militarized-warhead/1900592.html




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MOSCOW, April 22 (RIA Novosti) – Russia will build a unified network of naval facilities on its Arctic territories to host advanced warships and submarines as part of a plan to boost protection of the country’s interests and borders in the region, President Vladimir Putin said Tuesday.

“We need to strengthen our military infrastructure. In particular, to create in our part of the Arctic a unified network of naval facilities for new-generation ships and submarines,” the president said at a meeting of Russia’s Security Council.

He said that Russia should boost security at its Arctic borders.

Putin ordered the military in December to boost its presence in the Arctic and complete the development of military infrastructure in the region in 2014.

The Defense Ministry has already announced plans to reopen airfields and ports on the New Siberian Islands and the Franz Josef Land archipelago, as well as at least seven airstrips on the continental part of the Arctic Circle that were mothballed in 1993.

The military is also planning to form a new strategic military command in the Arctic, dubbed the Northern Fleet-Unified Strategic Command, by the end of 2014.

Putin reiterated that Russia is actively developing this promising region and should have all means for protection of its security and economic interests there.

“The oil and gas production facilities, loading stations and pipelines must be well protected from terrorists and other potential threats,” Putin said.

The Russian president called on experts to defend Russia’s territorial claims to the Arctic shelf, just like they did during this year’s successful claim to 52,000-square-kilometer area in the Sea of Okhotsk off Japan.

“Our experts must act similarly, for bilateral as well as multilateral consultations with Arctic countries’ governments, and safeguard each parcel of the continental shelf in the Russian part of the Arctic, and marine areas,” Putin said.

Moscow filed its claim to a part of the Artic continental shelf including the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges in 2011, but the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf said that it needed further scientific backing.

Scientists have to prove that the underwater ridges are extensions of the Eurasian continent, thus linked to Russia’s territory. The shelf, which is believed to hold some five million tons of hydrocarbon reserves, is a lucrative resource-rich zone.

In line with these territorial ambitions, Putin believes it is necessary to create a separate public body for the implementation of the Russian policy in the Arctic.

“We do not need a cumbersome bureaucratic body, but a flexible operationally working structure that will help better coordinate ministries and departments’ activities, regions and business,” Putin said.

The president tasked the government with ensuring that Russia’s goals in the Arctic are being solved and receive due financing.

“We are going to continue to invest serious funds in the Arctic, to solve tasks needed for social and economic investment of the Arctic regions, to strengthen security as demanded by our long-term national interests,” he said.

http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20140422/189313169/Russia-to-Build-Network-of-Modern-Naval-Bases-in-Arctic---Putin.html

Return to Top Jerusalem Post – Jerusalem, Israel

Iran: Row with World Powers over Arak Reactor 'Virtually Solved'








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Islamic Republic's nuclear chief says P5+1 has accepted Iranian proposal to "make certain changes" at unfinished heavy-water reactor. By JPOST.COM Staff, Reuters 19 April 2014

Iran and six world powers have “virtually solved” a dispute over the Arak heavy-water reactor, which the West is worried could produce bomb-grade material, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear chief was quoted as saying on Saturday.

Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said the P5+1 powers had agreed to a proposal presented by Iran to alter the course of production at the plant, AFP reported.

“Iran has made a proposal to the P5+1 to make certain changes in Arak and they have accepted. This question is virtually resolved,” Salehi told the Arabic-language Al-Alam television channel.

The fate of the heavy-water plant, which has not yet been completed, is one of the central issues in negotiations between Iran and the world powers, aimed at reaching a long-term deal on Tehran’s nuclear program by a July 20 deadline.

Iran and the United States, France, Germany, Britain, Russia and China ended their last round of negotiation in Vienna on Wednesday and said they would start drafting an agreement at their next meeting there on May 13. But officials said significant gaps needed to be bridged.

Following the latest round of talks, Salehi announced that Iran had made the proposal that would significantly lower highly radioactive plutonium production at the Arak research reactor, signaling flexibility on a key issue in talks to end the nuclear dispute.

The comment was the latest sign that a compromise may be possible over the reactor, which the West fears could yield weapons-usable plutonium.

The website of Iran’s English-language state television Press TV, citing Salehi late on Wednesday, said Iran had offered a “scientific and logical proposal to clear up any ambiguities” over the Arak reactor.

“In our plan, we explained that we would redesign the heart of the Arak reactor, so that its production of plutonium will decrease drastically,” Salehi said.

The Islamic Republic has said that the 40-megawatt reactor is intended to produce isotopes for cancer and other medical treatments. It agreed to halt installation work at Arak under a six-month interim accord struck on November 24, which was designed to buy time for negotiations on a comprehensive deal.

Russia’s chief negotiator suggested after the April 8-9 talks that progress had been achieved on Arak. “The possibility of a compromise on this issue has grown,” the Russian Interfax news agency quoted Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov as saying.

Heavy-water reactors such as Arak, fueled by natural uranium, are seen as especially suitable for yielding plutonium.

To do so, however, a spent fuel preprocessing plant would be needed to extract it. Iran is not known to have any such plant.

If operating optimally, Arak – located about 250 km. southwest of Tehran – could produce about 9 kg. of plutonium annually, the US Institute for Science and International Security says.

Any deal must lower that amount, Western experts say.

A week ago, Princeton University experts said that annual plutonium production could be cut to less than a kilogram – well below the roughly 8 kg. needed for an atomic bomb – if Iran altered the way Arak is fueled and lowered its power capacity.






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http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Iran-Row-with-world-powers-over-Arak-reactor-virtually-solved-349909

Return to Top Reuters – U.S.

Iran Admits Nuclear Agency Reshuffle to Pave Way for 5+1 Talks By Mehrdad Balali Monday, April 21, 2014

DUBAI (Reuters) - President Hassan Rouhani's government confirmed rumors on Monday it had reshuffled the leadership of Iran's atomic agency to sideline nuclear experts opposed to talks on its atomic program with the West.

Rouhani and his negotiators have been under intense pressure from Islamic hardliners opposed to the talks with the United States and five other powers seeking greater transparency in the program in return for an end to sanctions against Iran.

As the talks move toward a possible deal by late July, the hardliners, many of them hold-outs from the administration of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have stepped up their campaign, accusing Rouhani of capitulating to the West on a question of national pride and revolutionary identity.

Among rumors circulating for weeks was the alleged expulsion of several nuclear scientists from Iran's Atomic Energy Organisation in connection with the 5+1 talks.

After long evading the sensitive issue, a spokesman for the agency finally offered an answer on Monday.

"Only a limited number of people were concerned and they were neither scientists nor were they fired," said Behruz Kamalvandi, a liaison between the nuclear agency and national parliament. His comments, made to radical Islamic students in a Tehran University, was carried by the official news agency IRNA.

"If a boss doesn't have the authority to shuffle around a few among his 15,000-strong personnel, he shouldn't be called a boss," he added, accusing hardliners of exploiting the nuclear issue for "political gains and to win seats in parliament."

"Why do you politicize the issue? Let's stop nagging and avoid destroying each other so we can reach our goals on the international arena," said Kamalvandi, charging that "some people are taking the lead from the supreme leader," Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on the nuclear issue.

COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT

Khamenei, who wields unmatched power in Iran's Islamic system, has cautiously endorsed the talks, but insisted Tehran keeps rights to uranium enrichment for scientific research.

Earlier on Monday, Kamalvandi said Iran was drafting a comprehensive account of its nuclear activities, but did not clarify if it would be published or deal with the talks underway to resolve the decade-old nuclear dispute.

The project, however, could meet Western demands for greater openness in Iran's atomic operations to allay concerns about its possible military nature.

"There are various files on our atomic program, but we're lacking a comprehensive document, which we are writing now," he said. "This is time-consuming, as we need to coordinate with other government bodies, but we hope to have it finished in eight months."

This timeframe would take the report past the July 20 deadline for the conclusion of the talks between Iran and six world powers - the United States, France, Germany, Britain, China and Russia.





http://www.reuters.com/places/iran?lc=int_mb_1001




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Iran says the program is solely for civilian purposes such as electricity generation. However, Western powers note that some elements of the program have been concealed in contravention of international agreements.

These include the Fordow plant, built inside a mountain, whose existence was only disclosed in 2009 after Western spy services detected it.

After four rounds of talks, Iran and the major powers are due to meet again at expert level in New York on May 5-9 to start writing the final draft of a nuclear deal.

Reporting by Mehrdad Balali, Editing by William Maclean and Tom Heneghan

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/21/us-iran-nuclear-idUSBREA3K0MK20140421

Return to Top FARS News Agency – Tehran, Iran Tuesday, April 22, 2014

Zarif: Iran-World Powers Final Deal Facing No Unsolvable Problem TEHRAN (FNA) - Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif underlined that the ongoing negotiations with the six major world powers over the nuclear issue face no insurmountable barrier.

The top Iranian diplomat wrote in his essay published in the Foreign Affairs Magazine that in Iran’s view, the crisis over Tehran's peaceful nuclear program is wholly manufactured and therefore reversible.

"That is why Rouhani wasted no time in breaking the impasse and engaging in negotiations with the Group5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany) to find common ground and reach an agreement that will ensure nonproliferation, preserve Iran’s scientific accomplishments, honor Iran’s inalienable national rights under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and end the unjust sanctions that have been imposed by outside powers," Zarif underlined.

He reiterated that Iran has no interest in nuclear weapons and is convinced that such weapons would not enhance its security.

Zarif added that the Iranian government believes that even a perception that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons is detrimental to the country’s security and to its regional role, since attempts by Iran to gain strategic superiority in the Persian Gulf would inevitably provoke responses that would diminish Iran’s conventional military advantage.

On Sunday, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for legal and international affairs Seyed Abbas Araqchi confirmed that Iran and the G5+1 plan to hold an expert-level meeting in New York early in May.

Araqchi, who is also senior Iranian negotiator in talks with the Sextet, said negotiations will be held from May 5-9 on the sidelines of a session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

The Iranian official said the talks will take place a few days ahead of the new round of high-level negotiations between Tehran and the six countries, which is scheduled to be held in the Austrian city of Vienna on May 13.

Deputy chief negotiators from Iran and the six world powers wrapped up their second day of talks in Vienna on April 9.

The talks were headed by Araqchi and EU foreign policy deputy chief Helga Schmidt.

The talks started on April 8 by a session presided by EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif at the UN headquarters in Vienna, and continued by a meeting among the deputy chief negotiators of the seven nations.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry in a statement on April 8 reiterated that its team of negotiators would not discuss any topic but the country's nuclear standoff with the West in its talks with the six world powers, including the present round in Vienna.



http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/21/us-iran-nuclear-idUSBREA3K0MK20140421




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The talks between Tehran and the six world powers are part of efforts to seal a final deal on Iran’s nuclear energy program.

Iran and the Group 5+1 representatives had several sessions of talks in Vienna on March 18-19.

On November 24, Iran and the Group 5+1 sealed a six-month Joint Plan of Action to lay the groundwork for the full resolution of the West’s decade-old dispute with Iran over the latter's nuclear energy program.

In exchange for Tehran’s confidence-building bid to limit certain aspects of its nuclear activities, the Sextet of the world powers agreed to lift some of the existing sanctions against Tehran and impose no nuclear-related sanctions on Iran during the six-month period.

http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930202001209

Return to Top Arab News – Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

Syria’s Chemical Weapons Wild Card: Chlorine Gas Tuesday, 22 April 2014

Chlorine gas attacks in Syria this month, if proven, expose a major loophole in an international deal to remove chemical weapons from the war-torn country and suggest chemical warfare could persist after the removal operation has finished.

President Bashar al-Assad agreed with the United States and Russia to dispose of his chemical weapons - an arsenal that Damascus had never previously formally acknowledged - after hundreds of people were killed in a sarin gas attack on the outskirts of the capital last August.

Washington and its Western allies said it was Assad's forces who unleashed the nerve agent, in the world's worst chemical attack in a quarter-century. The government blamed the rebel side in Syria's civil war, which is now in its fourth year.

Syria has vowed to hand over or destroy its entire arsenal by the end of this week, but still has roughly 14 percent of the chemicals it declared to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

In addition, chlorine gas that was never included on the list submitted to the OPCW is now allegedly being used on the battlefield, leading some countries to consider requesting an investigation, possibly through the United Nations.

Attacks this month in several areas of the country share characteristics that have led analysts to believe that there is a coordinated chlorine campaign, with growing evidence that it is the government side dropping the bombs.

The U.S. State Department, which is examining the allegations, said on Tuesday that if the Syrian government used chlorine with the intent to kill or harm this would violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which it joined as part of last September's Geneva agreement to give up its chemical weapons.

"The use of any toxic chemical with the intent to cause death or harm is a clear violation of the convention," said State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki.

YELLOW CANISTERS

In the rebel-held village of Kfar Zeita in the central province of Hama, 125 miles north of Damascus, opposition activists uploaded video of people choking and being fed oxygen following what they said were bombs dropped from helicopters on April 11 and 12.

Reuters could not verify the authenticity of the videos, and activists regularly make similar claims, but further footage of canisters provided an indication of what had happened.



http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930202001209

http://www.reuters.com/places/syria?lc=int_mb_1001




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One of the canisters had only partially exploded, and the marking CL2 was written along its side. CL2 is the symbol for chlorine gas. Also visible was "Norinco" - China's biggest arms maker.

Repeated calls to China North Industries Group Corporation, or Norinco, went unanswered.

Canisters pictured in three separate areas were all painted yellow - complying with international standards on industrial gas color codes indicating chlorine.

Since April 11, there have been repeated attacks on Kfar Zeita and also on the town of Al-Tamana'a in north west Idlib on Friday that shared the same characteristics.

Activists said helicopters dropped improvised barrel bombs with a chlorine canister enclosed, which led to casualties.

If inhaled, chlorine gas - a deadly agent widely used in World War One - turns to hydrochloric acid in the lungs, which can lead to internal burning and drowning through a reactionary release of water in the lungs.

Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, head of British-based chemical biological radiological and nuclear consultancy firm Secure Bio, said he was "reasonably satisfied that chlorine has been used".

"The evidence is pretty compelling," he said.

DOMESTIC CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

Amy Smithson, a leading American chemical weapons expert at the Monterey Institute, said that unless tests are run, it is not certain that chlorine was used or some similar agent.

"Once the Syrian government gets the remainder of the declared chemicals out, pressure should mount for Syria to revise its declaration again, to cough up the remainder of their offensive chemical program," she said, questioning whether Syria had weaponized its domestic chemical industry.

Chlorine, a so-called dual-use chemical that has industrial uses, is not on the list of chemical weapons submitted to the OPCW but was produced in Syria before the war. It should have been declared if the government has it, an OPCW spokesman said.

On Monday, opposition groups reported a further attack, this time 20 miles northeast of Kfar Zeita in the town of Telminnes. Video footage was posted on YouTube by several opposition groups of men, women and children being treated in a field hospital.

Many appeared to have trouble breathing and medics held them down. One boy who looked less than 10 years old shook as a medic poured a liquid on his eyes and in his mouth.

A Reuters photograph of another young boy who had been transferred to a hospital closer to the Turkish border showed him lying dead on a stretcher with blood around his mouth. Medics said he had been exposed to chlorine gas at Telminnes.

Videos from the site of Monday's bombing showed the same yellow canisters, this time twisted from an explosion.

Eliot Higgins, a British-based researcher who trawls daily through online videos of Syria's civil war to verify weapons in them, said that these "chlorine bombs" have similar features to improvised barrel bombs the army has used in the war.

He said one bomb from Kafr Zeita shows metal rods, consistent with other large government barrel bomb designs, to hold the impact fuse plate in place.

Another video of an exploded barrel bomb shows a canister inside the barrel, which has fins on the back and what appear to be explosives around the top of the canister with a detonation cord.

"The interesting thing about these new videos is that there's the same blue det cord you see in other DIY barrel bombs," Higgins said.






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Hundreds of videos confirm barrel bombs have been dropped from helicopters. Rebels have access to large rockets and missiles but there has never been a case reported of the opposition using air-dropped munitions nor commandeering a helicopter.

GREY AREA

A United Nations inquiry found in December that chemical weapons were likely used in five attacks in 2013, though it did not apportion blame. The nerve agent sarin was likely used in four of the five attacks, the inquiry found.

The OPCW mission to extract Assad's chemicals has been beset by delays and inconsistencies. On Thursday, Reuters reported that Syria had submitted a "more specific" list of its chemical weapons to the OPCW after discrepancies were reported by inspectors on the ground, officials said.

Although it's not public, officials have said the list includes more than 500 metric tons of highly toxic chemical weapons, such as sulfur mustard and precursors for sarin, as well as more than 700 metric tons of bulk industrial chemicals.

The OPCW, which is overseeing the destruction with the United Nations, has taken an inventory of the chemicals and facilities Syria reported to the joint mission, but has not looked into whether the list may have been incomplete.

"Chlorine has a host of commercial uses. Actually, it's not very toxic. Sarin is probably 2,000 to 3,000 times more toxic. You and I can buy chlorine in a shop," chemical weapons specialist De Bretton-Gordon said.

This makes it a grey area, he said, as industrial-use chlorine in canisters - which is what these bombs appear to be - is not strictly a chemical weapon until it is used as one.

Nevertheless, he says, "the OPCW and others have been frankly naive."

http://www.arabnews.com/news/559641

Return to Top Arab News – Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

Prince Turki: Gulf States ‘Must Balance Threat from Iran’ Reuters Thursday, 24 April 2014

MANAMA: Prince Turki Al-Faisal, a former intelligence chief, said Gulf states should work on acquiring nuclear knowhow to balance any threat from Iran.

He also told a security conference in Manama that the Gulf states should be prepared for any possible outcome from Iran’s nuclear talks with world powers.

“We do not hold any hostility to Iran and do not wish any harm to it or to its people, who are Muslim neighbors,” he said in a speech.

“But preserving our regional security requires that we, as a Gulf grouping, work to create a real balance of forces with it, including in nuclear knowhow, and to be ready for any possibility in relation to the Iranian nuclear file. Any violation of this balance will allow the Iranian leadership to exploit all holes to do harm to us.”

The US, France, Germany, Britain, China and Russia have agreed a July 20 deadline with Iran to clinch a long-term deal that would allow a gradual lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions imposed on Iran over its atomic program.

The prince said Gulf states were concerned by Iran’s nuclear ambitions despite the talks and by its meddling in the internal affairs of its Gulf neighbors.







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“The lack of trust in the Iranian leadership which arises from its double-talk and the duality of its policies prevents us from believing what it says,” he told the Bahrain conference.

“At the time when we hope that the ongoing nuclear talks between (Iran) and world powers reach the desired aim by halting its nuclear ambitions with definite guarantees, we have to be careful until this is a firm reality,” he said.

Prince Turki also said that a rift within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was the biggest threat facing them despite an agreement last week to end a security dispute with Qatar.

He expressed concern that regional enemies could exploit the rift to destabilize the Middle East.


Return to Top Global Times – Beijing, China

Syria Eyes End of Chemical Arms Monitoring By Reuters April 25, 2014

Syria declared on Wednesday that it was looking ahead to the dismantling of the international mission overseeing the destruction of the country's chemical arsenal, though Western officials said they want the team to keep working.

The statement came after Sigrid Kaag, who is the head of the joint mission of the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), told the Security Council that the Syrian government should be able to meet an April 27 deadline to hand over all declared chemical agents.

Inside the council chamber, however, US and European delegations told Kaag they were concerned about new allegations that Syria's government had deployed chlorine gas and expressed their view that a full investigation was necessary, diplomats said.

After the closed-door session, in which Kaag participated via video link, Syria's UN Ambassador Bashar Ja'afari was asked what should happen to the UN-OPCW mission once declared materials linked to Syrian chemical weapons had been shipped out of the country and at the same time all installations were shut down.

"Once this mission is finished, you will hear about a final report submitted by Mrs. Kaag to the council and to the executive board of the OPCW, and that will be the end of everything," Ja'afari said.

British Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant said in an interview that he sees the UN-OPCW mission remaining in place for the foreseeable future due to concerns about the completeness of Syria's disclosure of its chemical arsenal.

"Our view is that there is a continuing role for the joint mission well beyond the removal of the chemicals, which could happen quite quickly now, and there's a number of tasks that are still to be carried out, including verification of the destruction of production facilities," Lyall Grant said.

"That means that the joint mission should continue," he added, noting that the Security Council decision to establish the mission did not give a deadline for its termination.

Russia would therefore be unable to shut down the mission, even if it wanted to, Lyall Grant said.

"Further review and verification of Syria's declaration of its chemical weapons program is required in order for there to be international confidence that the program has been completely eliminated," a US official said.

Western diplomats in New York have said a diplomatic battle is looming between Syria and Russia on the one hand and the West on the other over the continued role of the UN-OPCW mission in Syria once the declared chemicals are gone. Russia has been the Syrian government's protector on the Security Council.

http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/856720/Syria-eyes-end-of-chemical-arms-monitoring.aspx




http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/856720/Syria-eyes-end-of-chemical-arms-monitoring.aspx




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Return to Top RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Russia Dismisses Claims of Syrian Army Poison Gas Attack 25 April 2014

MOSCOW, April 25 (RIA Novosti) – Russia has reliable information that accusations the Syrian army recently used poison gas are false, the Russian Foreign Ministry said Friday.

“Accusations that the Syrian Army allegedly used poisonous chemical gases continue to be fabricated. According to reliable information the Russian side has, such allegations are false,” the ministry said.

Media reports have claimed that at least two people were killed and about a hundred injured in a chlorine attack on the militant-held village of Kafr Zeita in Syria’s Hama province in mid-April.

The Syrian government implicated an al-Qaeda-affiliated rebel group, al-Nusra Front, in the attack. Opposition groups claimed, however, that government planes had bombed the town with explosive barrels that produced thick smoke that, causing suffocation and poisoning.

Bashar Jafari, the Syrian envoy to the UN, earlier this week said reports accusing the Syrian government of a chemical weapons attack are aimed at disrupting the planned elections in the country, due on June 3.

"As far as the Syrian government is concerned, according to the government information, the chlorine gas was not used by the Syrian army. We don't use this kind of stuff," he said. "If it was used it would be used by the terrorist groups."

The reported chlorine attack was discussed at a closed session of the UN Security Council Wednesday.

The civil war in Syria broke out following unrest that swept the Arab world three years ago, called the Arab Spring. According to United Nations’ estimates, over 130,000 people have died in the conflict, which has seen fierce battles between the Syrian army and Islamist militants, including foreign mercenaries and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups.

http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140425/189366688/Russia-Dismisses-Claims-of-Syrian-Army-Poison-Gas-Attack.html

Return to Top Times of India – Mumbai, Delhi, India

Country Will Test Missile Shield Next Week: DRDO By Ashok Pradhan,Tamil News Network (TNN) April 20, 2014

BHUBANESWAR: In a boost to the defence sector, the country is all set to test its anti-ballistic missile defence system for long range (beyond 100 km) off Odisha coast for the first time next week. This will be followed by trial of cruise missile Nirbhay (whose maiden test had failed last year) and air-to-air missile Astra next month, Avinash Chander, scientific adviser to defence minister, said here on Saturday.

During an informal chat with mediapersons, Chander, who is also director general (DG), Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), said the indigenously-built unnamed missile interceptor will be tested from Wheeler Island. DRDO successfully tested interceptors at least six times earlier, but the range was between 20 and 30 km.

"It is a system to intercept enemy missiles with a range of 2,000 km. The missiles will get intercepted at range of more than 100 km away so that damage to our cities can be prevented," the DG said. Chander was here to address convocation of Siksha 'O' Anusandhan University.



http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140425/189366688/Russia-Dismisses-Claims-of-Syrian-Army-Poison-Gas-Attack.html




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Official sources said the DRDO will fire a missile, mimicking an enemy weapon, from a naval warship, while the interceptor missile will be launched from launching complex-IV. The interceptor will destroy the warhead of the 'enemy' missile midair. The entire process will be fully automated.

Chander said DRDO is also preparing to test Nirbhay, a sub-sonic cruise missile which flunked maiden test in March last year, early next month off Odisa coast. Nirbhay (which means fearless) is India's equivalent to America's Tomahawk and Pakistan's Babur. DRDO will also test-fire Astra, the beyond visual range air-to-air single stage and solid-fuelled missile, from an aircraft. The 3.8-metre Astra is the smallest DRDO-developed missile.

"Both are having unique capabilities. Astra will be tested for the first time from an Su-30 aircraft. These two tests will be carried out between Chandipur and Wheeler Island in next 15 to 20 days", Chander said. Sources said if Astra is successfully fired, India will break into elite group of nations, including the US, France, Russia and Israel, possessing such missiles. The missiles are capable of engaging ultra-modern supersonic fighter jets. Astra can carry a 15-kg high-explosive warhead.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Country-will-test-missile-shield-next-week-DRDO/articleshow/33991171.cms

Return to Top Xinhua News – Beijing, China

Pakistan Test-Fires Short Range Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile April 22, 2014

ISLAMABAD, April 22 (Xinhua) -- Pakistan successfully test- fired a nuclear-capable ballistic missile on Tuesday, the military said.

Pakistan's Short Range Surface to Surface Ballistic Missile Hatf III (Ghaznavi) can carry nuclear and conventional warheads to a range of 290 km, an army statement said.

"The successful launch concluded the Field Training Exercise of Strategic Missile Group of Army Strategic Forces Command," the statement from the Inter-Services Public Relations said.

The army said the successful test has been warmly appreciated by the president and prime minister of Pakistan who congratulated the participating troops, scientists and engineers on their outstanding achievement.

The missile can hit some areas in neighboring India, which also routinely conducts nuclear-capable missile tests and some such missiles can reach any part in Pakistan.

Pakistan conducted tit-for-tat nuclear tests in 1998 after India carried out nuclear tests. Both also have different series of missiles. The two countries have fought three wars, two over the Kashmir dispute, since their independence in 1947.

The army said Tuesday's missile test was witnessed by top military officials including the chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Rashad Mahmood.

Addressing the troops in the exercise area, the chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee commended the troops on achieving technical and operational excellence in operating the state of the art weapon system.

He expressed his satisfaction over the training goals achieved during the exercise and expected that the officers and soldiers entrusted with the task of deterring aggression would continue to maintain professional excellence.

Rashad Mahmood also congratulated all the scientists and engineers for the successful launch of Ghaznavi Missile, hailing it as another mile stone which has further strengthened the defense potential of Pakistan besides assuring peace in the region.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2014-04/22/c_133281158.htm





http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2014-04/22/c_133281158.htm




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Return to Top The National Interest.com OPINION/Article

China Goes Ballistic By Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase April 22, 2014

CHINA IS INCREASINGLY A FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH, not only economically but also militarily. Its aggressive stance toward some of its neighbors, along with Asia’s growing economic importance and the need to assure U.S. allies that Washington will increase its attention to the region despite budgetary challenges and fractious domestic politics, prompted the Obama administration to announce a “rebalance” toward Asia. Now Beijing’s relations with Japan—which has been indulging in what China sees as alarming spasms of nationalism, including a recent visit by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the Yasukuni shrine—have deteriorated to their lowest level in many years. In addition, China’s efforts to undermine Japan’s administrative control over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are raising the possibility of a crisis that could draw in the United States by challenging the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. To deter negative Chinese actions in this vital but volatile region while avoiding dangerous escalation, Washington must better understand the ultimate instrument of Chinese deterrence: the People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force (PLASAF), which controls the country’s land-based nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles and its ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles.

Possessing the world’s second-largest economy and a growing defense budget has enabled China to deploy more formidable military capabilities, such as the world’s first antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) and largest substrategic missile force. Wielding such conventional capabilities, it seeks to increase its leverage in disputes regarding island and maritime claims in the East and South China Seas and to deter or if necessary counter U.S. military intervention in the event of a conflict with one of its neighbors. Meanwhile, continued development of its nuclear forces—with a new mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) reportedly capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) under development and its first effective nuclear ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) going on a deterrent patrol this year—indicates China’s determination to further improve its position at the great-power table and force the United States to respect its vital interests.

Like its home nation, the PLASAF is itself increasingly a formidable force. Thanks to top-tier industrial capabilities and long-term strategic prioritization, it boasts what the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) calls the world’s “most active and diverse ballistic missile development program,” with both types and numbers expanding; longer-range, more accurate, improved-payload missiles being tested and introduced, even as older systems are upgraded; and new units being formed. China’s missile force has deployed a variety of systems, including short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite Taiwan; mobile, conventionally armed medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) for regional deterrence and conventional-strike operations; and new mobile, nuclear-armed ICBMs for strategic deterrence.

From its establishment in the late 1960s until the late 1980s, the missile force was responsible only for a small, outdated and potentially vulnerable arsenal of nuclear missiles, but since the early 1990s it has added a conventional-strike mission and improved its nuclear capabilities. In sharp contrast to its relatively humble beginnings, it now controls a more sophisticated and survivable force of nuclear missiles capable of reaching the United States and regional targets as well as what has emerged as the world’s premier conventional ballistic- and cruise-missile force. The latter now includes not only the SRBMs it began introducing in the 1990s, but also conventional MRBMs capable of striking regional air bases and ASBMs designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers. Underscoring the Second Artillery Force’s growing importance to China’s national defense, in a December 2012 meeting with PLASAF officers, Chinese leader Xi Jinping described the force as “the core strength of China’s strategic deterrence, the strategic support for the country’s status as a major power, and an important cornerstone safeguarding national security.”






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CHINA HAS BEEN TAKING OTHER MEASURES AS WELL. To increase its influence over disputed territorial and maritime claims around its contested periphery in peacetime and—if necessary—through wartime operations, China has developed and deployed the world’s foremost force of theater ballistic missiles. It has fielded a large, diverse array of increasingly capable SRBMs, particularly within range of Taiwan. Following a period of rapid growth in the last decade, the total number of SRBMs seems to be holding relatively steady over the past few years, but China continues to enhance or improve the force in other ways (for example, by swapping in newer missiles with better range, accuracy and warhead types). By December 2012, China’s inventory of SRBMs stood at more than 1,100. The PLASAF also fields the ground-launched variant of the DH-10/CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile, with a range of up to 2,000 km. The vast majority of China’s many other cruise missiles are controlled by the service on whose platforms they are deployed.

Conventional DF-21C (CSS-5) MRBMs, which have a range of at least 1,750 km, and DF-21D ASBMs, with a range of at least 1,500 km, represent an important strategic deterrent and a growing long-range conventional precision-strike capability. China currently deploys fewer than thirty launchers of the former and an unknown but growing small quantity of the latter (multiple missiles can use a single launcher). China has developed—and fielded since 2010 in limited numbers—the world’s first ASBM. Future developments will include longer-range conventional-strike capabilities, such as conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). Indeed, NASIC assesses that “the PLA is developing conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) at a steady pace, to increase its capability for near-precision strike out to the second island chain.” The PLASAF’s capabilities for long-range conventional missile strikes are particularly critical given the nascent or limited long-range conventional-strike capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). According to NASIC, “China’s emerging missile strategy will be marked by increased shooter survivability, enhanced operational flexibility, and significantly greater reach and precision.”

At the theater level, China’s missile force is capable of supporting a variety of types of campaigns against Taiwan. According to the Department of Defense, while “China today probably could not enforce a full military blockade, particularly if a major naval power intervened,” its “ability to do so will improve significantly over the next five to ten years.” China’s missile force could also strike key targets on Taiwan with short-range missiles or participate in operations against other potential regional adversaries, such as Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines.

AFTER RELYING ON A SMALL, relatively unsophisticated and potentially vulnerable nuclear force for several decades, China is now well on the way to a more credible nuclear retaliatory capability, mostly because of the PLASAF’s deployment of more survivable mobile ICBMs. Importantly, Beijing continues to adhere to a “no first use” policy, though there have been debates about the circumstances under which it would apply, and some Chinese military publications indicate that the PLASAF’s nuclear capabilities could help to deter conventional strategic attacks against China.

How quickly is China moving? Some caution is in order here. China is not “racing to parity” with the United States and Russia, as some observers in the two nuclear superpowers have suggested, but it is enhancing its nuclear capabilities by increasing the size and sophistication of its strategic missile force to respond to what it sees as threats to the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Specifically, Beijing is modernizing its nuclear force to enhance its survivability, increase its striking power and counter missile-defense developments. In addition, China is enhancing its nuclear command and control. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, “The PLA has deployed new command, control, and communications capabilities to its nuclear forces. These capabilities improve the Second Artillery’s ability to command and control multiple units in the field.”

Under way for decades, Chinese nuclear modernization can be traced back to concerns about the viability of China’s traditional strategic posture that were highlighted in Chinese military publications released in the 1980s. In particular, Beijing became concerned about what it perceived as potentially threatening advances in adversary intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, conventional precision strike and missile-defense capabilities. While China’s overall approach to nuclear weapons may not have changed, its nuclear force is becoming larger and more advanced. The transition to a somewhat larger, much more modern nuclear force that includes road-mobile ICBMs and SSBNs, the latter controlled by the PLAN, is providing China with a more survivable—and therefore more






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credible—nuclear deterrent. This is in keeping with official documents like China’s biannual defense white papers, in which China has underscored its determination to deploy the “lean and effective” nuclear force it views as necessary to meet its national-security requirements.

Most nongovernmental experts believe that China currently has several hundred nuclear warheads. For example, in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris estimate that China has roughly 250 nuclear weapons. China possesses MRBMs and IRBMs for regional deterrence missions, and silo-based and road-mobile ICBMs capable of striking targets anywhere in the world. NASIC projects that China’s ballistic-missile force will continue to grow by size and type, and that “the number of Chinese ICBM nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States could expand to well over 100 within the next 15 years.”

For regional nuclear-deterrence missions, China currently fields five to ten launchers for the limited-mobility single-stage liquid-propellant DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBM, which has a range of at least 3,000 km, and fewer than fifty launchers each for the DF-21 and DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 1 and 2) MRBMs. Many observers expect that these older DF-3 missiles will likely be retired from service in the near future, as China has been transitioning to a more survivable, road-mobile theater nuclear force composed of DF-21 and DF-21A MRBMs, both of which are solid-propellant road-mobile missiles with ranges of at least 1,750 km.

The Defense Department states that China currently has fifty to seventy-five ICBMs. The liquid-propellant, two-stage, silo-based DF-5 (CSS-4 Mod 1) ICBM served as the mainstay of China’s intercontinental nuclear-deterrence force for more than two decades after its initial deployment in 1981 and remains an important component of that force even today. China currently deploys about twenty silo-based DF-5 ICBMs, which have a range of at least 13,000 km, sufficient to strike targets throughout the continental United States. Moreover, according to the director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, China is “enhancing its silo-based systems” as part of the modernization of its nuclear-missile force. In addition, China also retains some of its older, liquid-fueled, two-stage DF-4 (CSS-3) ICBMs with a relatively limited range of at least 5,500 km. In 2013, NASIC stated that China retains about ten to fifteen CSS-3 launchers, but many observers anticipate that China will soon decommission this older system.

After lengthy development programs, the PLASAF has deployed two three-stage road-mobile ICBMs: five to ten launchers for the DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1), which has a range of at least 7,200 km, and more than fifteen launchers for the DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2). This represents an important development because road-mobile ICBMs are more difficult for an enemy to locate and therefore more survivable than their silo-based counterparts. The DF-31’s range is sufficient to reach U.S. missile-defense sites in Alaska, U.S. forces in the Pacific and parts of the western United States. After a protracted development history that began in the 1980s, China conducted the first developmental flight test of the DF-31 in August 1999, and the DF-31 was finally deployed in 2006. The DF-31A has a maximum range of more than 11,200 km, which allows it to reach targets throughout most of the continental United States. China reportedly began deploying the DF-31A road-mobile ICBM in 2007; the Pentagon estimates that its force will increase by 2015, and be joined by enhanced DF-5 ICBMs. Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris estimate that China has deployed a total of about twenty to forty road-mobile ICBMs.

WHAT THIS ONGOING quantitative and qualitative modernization portends for the future of China’s nuclear force is a subject of growing attention in the United States, Russia, India and other countries. Over the next decade, China is likely to continue increasing the size of its nuclear stockpile while concentrating on further enhancing its ability to survive a first strike and overwhelm adversary missile-defense systems, steps which Chinese strategists appear to regard as critical to maintaining the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent.

As part of a broader effort to counter U.S. and allied ballistic-missile defenses, the PLASAF could employ MIRVs and hypersonic capabilities. In addition, the Pentagon noted, it could deploy “decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons,” as well as other countermeasures.

Even as China’s nuclear force continues to increase in quality and quantity, however, Beijing is highly unlikely to achieve numerical parity with the United States and Russia, unless the numbers of nuclear weapons in those countries’ arsenals decline dramatically. According to General Jing Zhiyuan (who served as PLASAF commander






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from 2003 to 2012), China’s “limited development” of nuclear weapons “will not compete in quantity” with the nuclear superpowers, but as many Chinese scholars have written, it will be sufficient to protect China’s national security. China does not believe it needs to match the United States or Russia to protect its national security or to cement its status as a major power, but it will continue to deploy the larger and more capable nuclear force it appears to see as essential to guaranteeing an assured-retaliation capability and a credible nuclear deterrent. In particular, China is reportedly developing and testing the DF-41, a road-mobile ICBM capable of carrying MIRVs. The principal motivation for developing MIRV technology appears to be increasing the number of warheads China could deliver against targets such as major cities and large military installations as a means of overwhelming U.S. missile-defense capabilities. In NASIC’s assessment, “Mobile missiles carrying MIRVs are intended to ensure the viability of China’s strategic deterrence. MIRVs provide operational flexibility that a single warhead does not.” For China, the key advantages of MIRVs include “simultaneously increasing their ability to engage desired targets while holding a greater number of weapons in reserve.” Additionally, from an organizational perspective, when the DF-41 is deployed, it will very likely ensure that the PLASAF maintains its status as the cornerstone of China’s strategic nuclear deterrent even after the PLAN’s Jin-class SSBNs begin conducting deterrence patrols later this year.

AS WITH THE REST OF THE PLA, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent given the extreme gravity of its mission, PLASAF software in the form of personnel and training has long lagged behind hardware. That is now changing as recent Chinese leaders, and Xi in particular, have charged the PLA with enhancing training realism. While the PLASAF lacks real combat experience, authoritative sources such as its official newspaper, Rocket Forces News, and the PLA’s Liberation Army Daily document extensively that it is implementing more realistic and rigorous training. Particular emphasis is placed on preparing the PLASAF to conduct future joint operations and operate under what are known as “informatized” conditions. Specifically, the PLASAF’s latest known volume, China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia, emphasizes the importance of a “mobile command post” and “minimum communication support.” As a “necessity of high-tech localized warfare,” the “New Three Defenses” are likewise stressed to protect the PLASAF against precision attack, electronic interference and reconnaissance. Initiated in 2001 by an editorial committee led by PLASAF commanders, the tome endeavors to support the PLASAF’s development by offering detailed entries in such areas as doctrine, operations, command and control, logistics, management and history.

Meanwhile, hardware to support such efforts is being improved still further, in the form of capabilities such as the integrated command platform. China is improving command and control over its nuclear arsenal. Over the past decade, a wide range of demanding technical standards have been promulgated and implemented. Technical talents are being recruited through such pipelines as the Defense Student Program, China’s version of ROTC, to ensure that the PLASAF is able to operate and maintain its increasingly sophisticated equipment effectively.

As part of his rapid, vigorous consolidation of leadership, Xi has emphasized the importance of developing reliable war-fighting capabilities. Along with the development and deployment of a more modern, survivable nuclear deterrent, China also seems to be improving the readiness of its strategic forces. Scholars have long thought that all of China’s nuclear weapons were kept in centralized storage facilities and that its nuclear-missile forces were kept at an extremely low level of readiness, especially in contrast to those of the United States and Russia. Indeed, at least one Chinese scholar has suggested that China might not have any nuclear weapons that would be considered operationally deployed by U.S. and Russian standards. Yet passages in recent Chinese missile-force publications indicate that even in peacetime China stores at least a small number of nuclear warheads at missile bases and suggest that some PLASAF units maintain a higher level of readiness than others.

These sources indicate that China has been increasing the readiness of its forces, which is consistent with its transition to a strategic deterrent that will be composed largely of mobile missiles and SSBNs. Indeed, China’s most recent national-defense white paper indicated that the PLASAF “keeps an appropriate level of readiness in peacetime,” and “has formed a complete system for combat readiness and set up an integrated, functional, agile and efficient operational duty system to ensure rapid and effective responses to war threats and emergencies.” Moreover, the white paper states:

If China comes under a nuclear threat, the nuclear missile force will act upon the orders of the [Central Military Commission], go into a higher level of readiness, and get ready for a nuclear counterattack to deter the enemy






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from using nuclear weapons against China. If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the PLASAF will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack either independently or together with the nuclear forces of other services. The conventional missile force is able to shift instantly from peacetime to wartime readiness, and conduct conventional medium- and long-range precision strikes.

AS A RESULT OF THE PLASAF’S GROWING CAPABILITIES for nuclear deterrence, rapidly improving long-range conventional-strike capabilities, increasingly sophisticated command-and-control systems, and more rigorous and realistic training, China’s strategic missile force poses an increasingly serious set of strategic, operational and tactical challenges for the United States and its regional allies and partners. Likewise, China’s conventional missile force poses an increasingly serious threat to regional bases and may also enable China to target U.S. aircraft carriers. As for the modernization of the PLASAF’s nuclear forces, China continues to derive considerable advantages from adhering to its current nuclear policy, but a larger and more diverse nuclear missile force may also give Chinese leaders a broader range of policy and strategy options. China’s growing nuclear capabilities could create fresh challenges for U.S. regional extended deterrence, particularly with respect to Japan. Moreover, the United States will need to continue developing and refining new operational concepts and capabilities, and work even more closely with its allies and partners to respond to the challenges posed by China’s growing conventional missile-force capabilities. If it chooses not to do so, then it will discover that this, too, is a choice with potentially dire implications for American security.

Andrew S. Erickson is an associate professor at the Naval War College and an associate in research at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Michael S. Chase is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. The ideas expressed here are those of the authors alone and do not represent the views of any of their employers.

http://nationalinterest.org/article/china-goes-ballistic-10309

Return to Top The Washington Times – Washington, D.C. OPINION/Commentary

BERMAN: Why Iran’s Missiles Matter A delivery system is key to the regime’s global threat By Ilan Berman Wednesday, April 23, 2014

In the current debate over the Iranian bomb, the White House is staying quiet about its concerns over the regime’s progress on missile development. It’s the dog that isn’t barking.

Since last Fall, Washington and European capitals have been embroiled in a protracted bout of nuclear diplomacy with Iran. In Washington, as elsewhere, hopes still run high that this effort will help curb the threat posed by Tehran’s atomic ambitions.

To do so, however, any diplomatic deal will need not only to limit Iran’s capability to make nuclear weapons, but also its ability to deliver them. On that score, Tehran is most definitely not cooperating with the West.

On April 16, Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan publicly ruled out the possibility that his government would ever put its ballistic-missile arsenal on the global negotiating table. “Iran’s missiles are not up for discussion under any circumstances,” Mr. Dehghan told the country’s official Fars news agency. “Iran’s missiles are only our concern … . We don’t accept any intervention from anybody on this issue.”

Mr. Dehghan’s comments were a broadside aimed squarely at the U.S. State Department, which had tentatively raised the issue of delivery systems in its recent diplomatic discussions with Tehran.

Washington’s concerns are certainly well-placed. In recent years, in tandem with its nuclear advances, the Islamic republic has carried out significant, sustained work on its ballistic-missile arsenal. According to U.S. intelligence



http://nationalinterest.org/article/china-goes-ballistic-10309




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assessments, Iran is already the most formidable missile power in the Middle East, and ballistic missiles would be its delivery system of choice if it were to field a nuclear weapon.

The mainstay of Iran’s arsenal is the Shahab-3, a medium-range missile unveiled publicly more than a decade ago. When inducted into service, the Shahab-3 was a liquid-fuel missile with an estimated range of about 750 miles. However, in recent years, the Iranian regime has expanded the range, accuracy and payload of the Shahab and its variants.

Today, the Shahab class of missiles is estimated to be nuclear-capable and have a range of between 900 and 1,200 miles — putting all of Israel, the north of India and parts of Eastern Europe within striking distance of the Islamic republic.

These capabilities are just part of the larger picture. In 2005, Iran became the first space-faring nation in the Muslim world when it successfully launched a surveillance satellite into orbit from the missile base in Plesetsk, Russia. Since then, the Iranian regime has racked up a number of additional successful launches, demonstrating that it has a sustained — and successful — space program.

While these efforts appear to be civilian in nature, the potential military applications can’t be ignored. The same rocket booster used to place a payload into low-earth orbit can be married to a two-stage ballistic missile to create one of intercontinental range. Iran, in other words, is building the capability to transition rapidly from being a regional missile power to being a global one with the capability to hold at risk Western Europe — and beyond.

Moreover, it could do so very, very soon. Last year, a study of global missile threats by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center assessed that Iran “could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015.”

All this means that ballistic missiles need to be part of any serious discussion about limiting Iran’s strategic capabilities. That’s precisely the conversation Iranian officials are hoping to avoid, because they understand full well that their country’s global status is inexorably linked not only to its nuclear capabilities, but also to maintaining the means to deliver them.

The Obama administration, flush with optimism about the prospect of a nuclear deal, appears inclined to let them. “If we are successful in assuring ourselves and the world community that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon … then them not having a nuclear weapon makes delivery systems almost — not entirely, but almost — irrelevant,” Wendy Sherman, the State Department’s chief Iran negotiator, recently told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

That’s a potentially catastrophic error. Given the maturity of Iran’s ballistic-missile effort, the United States and its fellow members in the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council — U.S., Russia, China, United Kingdom and France — plus Germany) need to insist — and insist now — that limitations on delivery systems be an essential part of any deal that helps Tehran come in from the cold.

Otherwise, in the not-too-distant future, they are liable to find that in the process of trying to prevent Iran from going nuclear, they permitted it to become a global missile power.

Ilan Berman is vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council.

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/apr/23/berman-why-irans-missiles-matter/?page=all#pagebreak

Return to Top Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) – Washington, D.C. OPINION/PONI (Project on Nuclear Issues) Forum

Iran’s “Amicable” Nuclear Program: Political Pitch While Centrifuges Enrich By Bennett Seftel



http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/apr/23/berman-why-irans-missiles-matter/?page=all#pagebreak




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April 23, 2014

During a March 2014 speech to Iran’s Defense Ministry, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani asserted, “We are not after weapons of mass destruction. That’s our red line. If Iran was after weapons of mass destruction, it would build chemical weapons. Those are easier to make. It would build biological arms, which are even easier than making chemical weapons.” Rouhani’s recent statement represents yet another one of the defiant repudiations that have come to epitomize Iranian foreign policy. For much of the last decade, Iranian leaders have outwardly insisted that their country’s nuclear ventures are aimed at generating an efficient energy source, but the opaque and clandestine details surrounding Iran’s nuclear program suggest a different story. Although Iranian officials publicly allege that their country is committed to benign nuclear ambitions, Iranian centrifuges have progressively enriched uranium to levels far beyond the threshold necessary for civilian nuclear energy. In essence, the Iranian leadership has formulated a “political pitch while centrifuges enrich” pattern leading many to suspect that its denials are a bureaucratic front for Iran’s surreptitious development of weapons-grade uranium and dangerous nuclear capabilities.

The origins of Iran’s nuclear program can be traced back to 1953 when U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged to share peaceful nuclear technologies with countries around the world as part of the Atoms for Peace initiative. Four years later, the United States signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran, a deal largely attributed to Iran’s status as an instrumental U.S. ally during the Cold War. By 1970, the United States had supplied the Tehran Nuclear Research Center with a reactor fueled by highly enriched uranium and Iran had ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), subjecting the country to inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Throughout the 1970s, Iran’s nuclear aptitude expanded, but the country endured a period of nuclear stasis in the early 1980s as it focused its attention on the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Following this brief hiatus, Iran revamped its nuclear drive in the late 1980s and early 1990s, signing cooperation pacts with Pakistan, China, and Russia. In 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran - a coalition of Iranian democratic organizations and political opposition parties based in Paris - exposed the construction of unannounced nuclear facilities in Arak and Natanz, and revealed Iran’s intent to create an increasingly sophisticated nuclear infrastructure.

Since 2002, Iran’s nuclear path has faced intense scrutiny. Due to mounting international pressure, Iran submitted its formerly discreet nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections starting in December 2003 and agreed to suspend all of its nuclear activities via the 2003 IAEA Additional Protocol. However, during the IAEA inspections, Iranian officials concealed various documents and blueprints pertaining to Iran’s acquisition of P-2 centrifuges - machines that expedite the process of enriching uranium. All the while, the Iranian government stressed that the country’s scientists were working towards cultivating a peaceful energy source as opposed to a nuclear arsenal. As justification, Iranian officials pointed to a supposed fatwa issued by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei in 2003, which declared the construction of nuclear weapons as contradictory to Islam. Interestingly, Khamenei’s fatwa lacks an original written form, causing many to question the authenticity of the controversial and unsubstantiated Islamic decree.

Skepticism over Iran’s nonviolent nuclear aspirations heightened in 2004 when a “walk-in” source provided the CIA with numerous documents demonstrating that Iran was adapting its Shahab-3 mid-range ballistic missile to a carry nuclear warhead. Further concerns arose in February 2006 when Iran reneged on the 2003 IAEA Additional Protocol and was referred to the United Nations Security Council for repercussions. Consequently, in July 2006, the Security Council passed Resolution 1696, which demanded that Iran postpone all uranium enrichment. The first international sanctions against Iran were implemented in December 2006 through Resolution 1737. Defying the sanctions and advocating for Tehran’s right to enrich uranium under the NPT, Iranian politicians sustained the country’s nuclear progress.

At a February 2010 rally to commemorate the thirty-first anniversary of the Iranian Revolution, then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran possessed a stockpile of uranium enriched up to 20%. For comparative purposes, standard light water nuclear reactors are fueled by 3-5% enriched uranium. Uranium enriched up to 20% is known as highly enriched uranium and is already 9/10 of the course towards developing the






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weapons-grade ingredients used in nuclear bombs. The next phase for Iran to achieve weapons-grade uranium would be to feed its 20% uranium “through existing, additional cascades” - a step much faster than the earlier ones. A May 2012 IAEA report disclosed that environmental samples taken at Iran’s Qom nuclear plant evidenced that the facility maintained uranium enriched up to 27%, a uranium composition even closer to weapons-grade purity. Moreover, by October 2013, Iran had amassed approximately 200kg of highly enriched uranium, a figure just short of the 250kg required to produce a nuclear bomb. Adding to the anxiety, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry recently acknowledged Iran’s ability to convert its supply of highly enriched uranium into a quantity of fissile material sufficient for one nuclear bomb within a two month time frame.

Despite these alarming facts, Iranian leaders continue their political façade. As president, Ahmadinejad repeatedly claimed that Iran does “not need an atomic bomb.” This sentiment was echoed in February 2011 by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei who remarked, “The Iranian nation has never pursued and will never pursue nuclear weapons.” In September 2013, newly elected Iranian President Hassan Rouhani again reaffirmed Iran’s peaceful nuclear intentions during a speech at the UN General Assembly stating, “Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran's security and defense doctrine, and contradict our fundamental religious and ethical convictions.”

Some contend that Iran’s manufacture of highly enriched uranium is critical for use as fuel to power Tehran’s medical research reactor. Yet, such a position should be regarded with caution. Iran could obtain highly enriched uranium to fuel its medical research reactor via alternative avenues, such as the international market, warranting Iran’s domestic production of highly enriched uranium as extraneous. However, the highly enriched uranium imported by Iran would be monitored in accordance with international safeguards - oversight the Iranian government has deemed undesirable.

Crippling sanctions and a devastated economy have finally forced Iranian officials to negotiate over the country’s nuclear pursuits, but Iran’s expressed willingness to come to the table should be taken with a grain of salt. Iranian leaders have acted the part, agreeing in principle to cut 75% of the country’s reserve of highly enriched uranium, but the IAEA noted that Iran announced a six month delay in the construction of a nuclear facility designated to convert half of Iran’s enriched uranium into a less-hazardous oxide powder. The negotiations have also failed to limit the activity of Iranian centrifuges. Iranian centrifuges continue to enrich uranium to levels beyond the 3-5% threshold required for civilian nuclear energy, precipitating the belief that the current round of negotiations may serve as a smokescreen for Iran’s imminent nuclear unveiling

Irrespective of the assurances offered by Iranian officials, Iran’s nuclear program should be viewed as a threat to international security. History resides on the side of the doubter as Iran’s strategy has drawn parallels to North Korea’s “two-faced” nuclear route of using negotiations as a ploy for lifting sanctions and biding time for the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Iran’s pronounced disdain for U.S. hegemony and U.S. regional allies, namely Israel and Saudi Arabia, combined with Iran’s lack of transparency, stirs questions about the motives behind Iran’s nuclear endeavors. Thus, Iranian leaders may insist that their country’s nuclear program is peaceful, but policy-makers must recognize that Iran’s procurement of weapons-grade uranium may actually not be so far off on the horizon.

Bennett Seftel is a research intern with the Project on Nuclear Issues. The views expressed above are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Strategic and International Studies or the Project on Nuclear Issues.

http://poniforum.csis.org/blog/iran-s-amicable-nuclear-program-political-pitch-while-centrifuges

Return to Top China Daily – Beijing, China OPINION/Op-Ed Contributors

US Key to DPRK Nuclear Issue April 24, 2014



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By Hu Mingyuan (China Daily)

On Wednesday the President of the Republic of Korea Park Geun-hye asked Chinese President Xi Jinping to persuade the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea not to conduct a fourth nuclear test when US President Barack Obama visits the ROK.

Concern has grown in the ROK that the DPRK “could spark an arms race and a nuclear domino effect that could change the security landscape in Northeast Asia”.

China and the ROK have entered the era of the best-ever relationship, and the DPRK’s nuclear tests pose a threat not only to the ROK, but also China’s border security.

The United States has been urging China to press the DPRK on one hand while encouraging Japan to provoke China on the other.

In written remarks published by Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun, Obama said “The policy of the United States is clear — the Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan and therefore fall within the scope of Article 5 of the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. And we oppose any unilateral attempts to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.”

But Uncle Sam is really a business man who wants to gain without pain. The US is pouring fuel on the flames, so the DPRK will be angered and pushed into conducting a fourth nuclear test, which will undermine China’s security and drive a wedge between China and the DPRK. Moreover, the US can fully make use of the DPRK’s nuclear threat to strengthen US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation, and eventually form a “mini NATO” in Asia to contain China and Russia.

In fact, the ball is in the US’ court. If it truly wants to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue, it has to abandon the schemes to contain Russia and China with the DPRK nuclear card.

In his effort to build the momentum for Obama’s visit to Asia, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Danny Russel came up with some impractical suggestions. For instance, addressing a conference organized by Asia Society on April 1, he said China could help reduce US military deployments in East Asia by using its “influence” over the DPRK to guide it to the right path. By saying the US would reduce troops in East Asia if China made the DPRK abandon its nuclear program, Russel has wrongly assumed that Beijing has the power to control Pyongyang. Besides, his statement implies that if China doesn’t do so, the US will continue consolidating its forces in East Asia in order to protect its Asian allies, especially the ROK and Japan.

Perhaps Russel does not know that the military might cannot resolve the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and the best way of resolving it is for the US to withdraw troops from the ROK and sign a peace agreement with the DPRK.

China’s efforts to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue and ease tensions on the Peninsula have yielded results, and the international community acknowledges that. But some countries with ulterior motives say that China has not exerted enough pressure on the DPRK to make it abandon its nuclear program. They also say that China’s trade with and humanitarian aid to the DPRK have seriously undermined the impact of the UN sanctions on the country and helped it to develop nuclear weapons.

Nothing could be further from the truth. By portraying the DPRK as a military threat, the US and its Asian allies aim to realize their own strategic goals. The Peninsula nuclear issue has become the best excuse for the US to push forward its “pivot to Asia” policy and strengthen its military ties with its Asian allies. The development of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and the evolution of America’s DPRK policy show that Washington has been exaggerating Beijing’s influence on Pyongyang.

Why can’t the US and its allies understand that the DPRK is a sovereign country, and the pressure put by another country or UN sanctions alone will not make it abandon its nuclear program?

After the DPRK conducted its third nuclear test, the US strengthened its strategic presence in East Asia by deploying more advanced weapons on the Peninsula and carrying out more elaborate joint drills with the ROK.






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Ironically, what the US though would act as deterrence against the DPRK could have deterred the progress of efforts to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue.

The year began with some positive signs, with the DPRK and the ROK holding high-level talks and organizing a reunion of separated families. Unfortunately, the good momentum was broken by the annual US-ROK military drills — “Key Resolve” and “Foal Eagle 2014”. Washington and Seoul then carried out their biggest joint amphibious-landing and air-combat drills. Reacting to them, Pyongyang fired dozens of short-range missiles over the sea off its eastern coast and hundreds of artillery shells in the waters near the disputed DPRK-ROK maritime border. It also threatened to conduct another nuclear test if the US stuck to its hostile policy.

Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is in the interest of not only the DPRK, the US and the ROK, but also all the countries in the region and beyond; it is their responsibility too. Therefore, during his visit to the ROK, Obama should use his diplomatic and political powers to restore and peace stability on the Peninsula. But for that, the US has to renounce its containment policy toward the DPRK, reduce the number of or even cancel joint military exercises with the ROK, lower the threshold for resuming the Six-Party Talks and strengthen cooperation with countries in East Asia. The US should realize that it can help resolve the Peninsula nuclear issue only through peaceful talks, not by flexing its military muscle.

The author is an associate researcher at the Center for Northeast Asian Studies, a research institute in Jilin province.

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-04/24/content_17464150.htm

Return to Top ArmsControlWonk.com OPINION/Commentary

A Normal, Nuclear Pakistan By Michael Krepon 24 April 2014

Mark Fitzpatrick is a highly respected, careful chronicler of nuclear proliferation. His monograph of A.Q. Khan’s activities is required reading. So, too, is his latest, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers, in which he recommends that Pakistan be treated as a normal nuclear state if it facilitates the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and helps reinforce other nuclear norms. Mark correctly identifies an intensified nuclear competition on the subcontinent as a grave danger. He reasons that by bringing India and Pakistan into the existing nuclear order, dangers might be averted. He’s right. But will inducements succeed in persuading Pakistan (and India) to accept the limits inherent in signing up to the CTBT and FMCT?

Pakistan’s official narrative is that of a reluctant, unwilling party to a nuclear competition with India. In reality, Pakistani leaders, civil as well as military, have viewed the Bomb as absolutely essential to maintain national sovereignty and territorial integrity. They rightly predicted that New Delhi would develop nuclear weapons and gain conventional military advantages, and countered by engaging in “anticipatory” proliferation.

As Mark writes, “Pakistan assumed the worst about India’s intentions and spared no effort in preparing a nuclear counterpunch.” Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s set the wheels in motion to acquire a nuclear deterrent two years before India’s first test of a nuclear device. Pakistan produced a deliverable nuclear warhead and possessed confidence in its reliability before India’s second round of tests. Today, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal compares favorably to that of a neighbor whose economy is eight times bigger.

Mark is tackling a significant problem that hasn’t climbed anywhere near the top of the New Delhi’s, Islamabad’s or Washington’s agenda. His book is timely because nuclear dangers will grow on the subcontinent as New Delhi applies itself far more seriously to nuclear matters in the years ahead. But I doubt that his inducements will look attractive to Pakistan — or India, for that matter. Sure, Pakistan would like to be re-branded as a normal nuclear state. But unless Pakistan’s anticipatory proliferation reflex changes, and unless its leaders demonstrate a



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sustained national commitment to reclaim the writ of the state against violent extremists, nuclear normalcy will elude Pakistan.

New Delhi hasn’t shown much interest in helping Pakistan become a normal, nuclear state. Negotiations over confidence-building and nuclear risk reductions measures have been desultory, easily interrupted, and long delayed. Indian and Pakistani interlocutors do not view these measures as having intrinsic value. Instead, they are chips to be played for something more important. Pakistan won’t sign the CTBT and join an FMCT without India. New Delhi has already gained the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s seal of approval without having to sign the CTBT or suspend production of bomb-making material. Why would India help usher Pakistan into the club of responsible states possessing nuclear weapons if this means curtailing capabilities against a rising China?

Defusing an arms competition requires choreographed efforts from the top-down as well as from the bottom up. Pakistan measures itself against India, while India measures itself against China. India will compete with China regardless of what Pakistan does. So, as long as Pakistan pegs its nuclear needs to what it anticipates India wants, inducements in return for treaties are unlikely to be successful. The FMCT may take years to materialize even after Pakistan lifts its veto on negotiations because both countries aren’t sure how big an arsenal they need. And the scenario providing the quickest path to the CTBT on the subcontinent (India resumes testing, followed by Pakistan, followed by signatures) would ratchet up the competition.

India’s nuclear requirements haven’t diminished after being re-branded as a normal, responsible state possessing advanced nuclear technologies via the US-India civil-nuclear deal. This deal has not yet yielded the profits for US nuclear power companies or the geopolitical gains anticipated by its backers. US arms sales to India are up, which would be the case with or without the deal. New Delhi has remained on Moscow’s good side, as evident by India’s UN vote on Russia’s seizure of the Crimea, and will avoid choosing sides between Washington and China unless Beijing becomes belligerent. US-India ties should improve under a new Indian government, but the predicted benefits of re-branding India have so far been illusory.

The arguments by backers of the civil-nuclear deal that it would be good for nonproliferation were fatuous. The deal enabled India to purchase uranium on global markets while refusing to place safeguards on no less than eight power plants as well as breeder programs. Pakistan’s anticipatory proliferation impulse kicked in once again, building a fourth plutonium production reactor and moving forward on other nuclear infrastructure projects. The dangers of deterrence and arms race stability on the subcontinent pre-dated the deal, but were compounded by it.

A civil-nuclear deal for Pakistan isn’t in the cards for many reasons, including Pakistan’s inability to pay for nuclear power plants except at the concessionary prices offered by China. Would some other way to designate Pakistan as a normal state possessing nuclear weapons produce better results that the deal given to India?

Many have tried to provide Pakistani leaders with inducements to take actions that were not perceived to be in their national security or political interests – and many have failed. If Rawalpindi were to conclude that it has sufficient nuclear capabilities to deter India, inducements might help — but they could also backfire, because those accepting favors will be accused of doing Washington’s bidding. Conversely, if Rawalpindi isn’t inclined to relax nuclear requirements, inducements will be wasted. The stewards of Pakistan’s nuclear program tell visitors that they intend to utilize sunk costs to implement planned requirements, perhaps through 2020. But this plateau could be a mirage, as requirements could continue to grow if stimulated by Indian ballistic missile defense programs or other technical advances.

Pakistan’s leaders have a choice to make: they can seek normal, neighborly ties with India or continue to engage in a nuclear competition while accommodating extremist groups that target India. Pakistan cannot become a normal state that possesses nuclear weapons unless it has good neighborly relations, and Pakistan cannot become strong without a strong economy. Until Pakistan gets its house in order, economic growth will be constrained.

These conclusions point in the direction of reclaiming the writ of the state against violent, extremist groups, vastly increasing cross-border trade, and seriously pursuing confidence-building and nuclear risk reduction measures with India. Pakistan cannot be at peace with India until it is at peace with itself. No nation can be considered normal when internal security threats grow alongside its nuclear arsenal. Here too, inducements won’t help; help can only






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come after Pakistani authorities make wise decisions. For Pakistan, nuclear normality begins at home; it’s not something that can be meaningfully bestowed by others.

Michael Krepon is Co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and the author or editor of thirteen books and over 350 articles. Prior to co-founding the Stimson Center, Krepon worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, and in the US House of Representatives, assisting Congressman Norm Dicks.

http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4125/a-normal-nuclear-pakistan

Return to Top Mainichi Daily News – Mainichi, Japan OPINION/Editorial

Editorial: Japan-U.S. Alliance Must Remain Strong, Form Base for Peace in Asia April 25, 2014

U.S. President Barack Obama, who kicked off a four-nation Asian tour with a visit to Japan, is on a mission: To reassure nervous regional allies that the United States' strategic "rebalancing" of economic and security policy toward Asia is in fact happening.

During Obama's few days in Japan with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, he became the first U.S. president to declare explicitly that the Senkaku Islands -- controlled by Japan and claimed by China -- are covered by Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty obliging the United States to defend Japanese territory. In a clear reference to China's increasing assertiveness in its many high-seas territorial disputes, both leaders stated that they would oppose any attempt to alter the regional status quo by force. They also said the Japan-U.S. alliance is the "foundation" of Asia-Pacific regional security.

China is building up its military strength, while at the same time being more aggressive in pressing its territorial claims in the East and South China seas, the former of which includes the uninhabited Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture. The reaffirmation that the Japan-U.S. alliance covers those islands is welcome news, and we applaud the move. But the bilateral commitment to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region cannot end with mere words on a page. Both Japan and the United States now have a responsibility to do everything in their power to realize that stability.

The timing of Obama's visit to Japan -- preceding his trips to South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines -- was indeed important. The president's policy toward the civil war in Syria appears aimless, while the U.S. has also failed to prevent the Russian annexation of Crimea in Ukraine. That the world's most powerful country has proven so ineffectual in these cases has been a major blow to American dignity.

We are also forced to wonder if Obama can respond effectively to China's power plays and North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons programs. For example, could the Obama administration be relied upon to step in should China use the unspoken threat of brute force to unilaterally expand its territory, as Russia has done in Crimea? That is the question making not just Japan but the countries of Southeast Asia nervous.

U.S. strategy for Asian stability is based on trilateral cooperation with its two closest regional allies: Japan and South Korea. Prime Minister Abe's views on history, however, have complicated the linchpin Japan-U.S. alliance and apparently cast improved Japanese relations with South Korea over the horizon for the foreseeable future.

Meanwhile, China has forwarded the idea of a "new great power relationship" that would see the world divided broadly into Chinese and American spheres. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and other American officials even included the idea in recent comments, drawing the ire of Japan.



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From the perspective of Japan, the response of its U.S. ally to Chinese provocations around the Senkakus did not measure up to expectations. There were even whispered worries that the Japan-U.S. alliance was adrift, making the recent reaffirmation of rigorous bilateral cooperation on China policy a significant move. Indeed, with Obama making a firm commitment to protect the Senkaku Islands, Japan could be said to have gotten everything it was looking for on the security front. We could also say that the Obama administration did not want to make the same mistakes on China as it has over Syria and Ukraine.

Even so, this does not guarantee that the U.S. can be counted on to protect Japan should an incident occur around the Senkakus. When Obama was asked at a news conference about the chances of a U.S. military intervention should China invade the Senkaku Islands, the president answered that "obviously, there isn't a red line that I'm drawing."

Instead, Obama emphasized that the U.S. is seeking a close cooperative relationship with China, and called on both Japan and China to avoid escalating the Senkaku dispute and find a peaceful solution. He then promised the U.S.'s full diplomatic support to help realize this goal.

The Obama administration's vision for U.S. and Japanese policy on China -- and by extension on regional peace and stability as a whole -- appears to be built on the principles of military restraint and diplomatic engagement.

The Japan-U.S. alliance must be strengthened and Chinese provocations checked. That, however, is not enough. Diplomatic efforts to avoid unexpected and potentially disastrous confrontations between Japan and China are absolutely essential. Unfortunately, we have to say that Prime Minister Abe's foreign and security policies are a little heavy on military might and a little light on diplomacy. This is highlighted by the Abe government's apparent inability to build mutual trust with either South Korea or China, while at the same time pressing forward with reinterpreting the Constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense.

Regarding collective self-defense, Obama expressed his support for Abe's initiative. With worsening government finances pushing down military spending, American power is undeniably slipping, making a larger military role for Japan very attractive to the U.S. That said, Abe should not assume he has unconditional American support for his collective self-defense policy. The United States believes firmly that Abe must form a consensus among the Japanese people, and carefully weigh both the effects on Japan's neighbors and the timing of implementing such a policy.

At the same time, Abe has not managed to quell concerns in the Obama administration about the prime minister's historical views. When asked by a U.S. reporter about his December 2013 visit to Yasukuni Shrine, Abe replied that he was avowedly anti-war, adding, "I will continue to explain my position in hopes of gaining understanding" -- essentially repeating the content of a statement he released right after his visit. This is very unlikely to reassure the United States.

The strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance must not only be about China, but must rather have at its core a big-picture vision for the efforts needed to guarantee stability in East Asia. Japan and the U.S. must cooperate thoroughly to deepen U.S. understanding of Asia, and to make sure the superpower doesn't put a foot wrong -- in either word or action -- in this vital region. This must never be forgotten.

http://mainichi.jp/english/english/perspectives/news/20140425p2a00m0na004000c.html

Return to Top ABOUT THE USAF CUWS

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an



http://mainichi.jp/english/english/perspectives/news/20140425p2a00m0na004000c.html




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information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation .

The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence.

In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards.

The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation - counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.

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