U-Boats in the Royal Canadian Navy 1945 to 1947 · Halifax Herald on 14 May: Under an overcast threatening sky a twelve-man boarding party of the Royal Canadian Navy, accompanied

This article was originally published in

Argonauta, Volume XXXV Number 4 Autumn 2018

Copyright © CNRS/SCRN and all original copyright holders

Re-published on For Posterity’s Sake with permission of the Canadian

Nautical Research Society and the author, Derek Waller.

U-Boats in the Royal Canadian Navy 1945 to 1947

by

Air Commodore Derek Waller RAF (Rtd)

“U-Boat U-889 in position 43.35N, 51.36W” (101951Z May 1945)

“From German U-Boat U-190 - position 42.35N, 43.05W” (111001Z May 1945) (1)

So state the entries in the Admiralty War Diary in London on 10 and 11 May 1945 when,

after the German capitulation on 8 May 1945, two Type IXC/40 740 ton U-Boats (U-190 and

U-889) surrendered at sea to units of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). The latter on 10 May

and the former on 11 May.

The RCN had made no separate arrangements for the surrender of any U-Boats in the western

North Atlantic in May 1945, preferring instead to follow the procedures set out by the

Admiralty and the Royal Navy’s Commander-in-Chief Western Approaches. The RCN had

nevertheless specified two surrender points in the waters controlled by the Commander-in-

Chief of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic area (C-in-C, CNA), one to the east of St John’s,

Newfoundland and one to the south of Halifax, Nova Scotia, as it was expected that several

of the U-Boats still at sea might head for Canada rather than either the USA or UK, a

sentiment that was reflected in a report in the Ottawa Journal on 7 May, which said:

U-Boats in the area are likely to give themselves up at eastern ports rather than make

the long trip back to Europe. (2)

In the event, neither of the two U-Boats sailed directly to either of these surrender points or to

any Canadian ports, but instead they were intercepted at sea by RCN warships.

Surrender of U-889

The first of the two to surrender was U-889, which was sighted by a Royal Canadian Air

Force (RCAF) Liberator aircraft on 10 May whilst the U-Boat was on the surface and flying

the black flag of surrender some 250 miles south-east of the Flemish Cap, an area of shallow

waters in the North Atlantic which is itself about 350 miles east of Newfoundland.

The nearly-new U-889 had sailed from Kristiansand in Norway on 5 April on its 1st wartime

patrol with orders to undertake weather reporting duties in the mid-North Atlantic and with

instructions not to make any attacks. However, the latter instructions were subsequently

changed, and the U-Boat was instead ordered to hunt and attack Allied shipping between

New York and Cape Hatteras in North Carolina, USA.

Because of difficulties with wireless transmissions in early May 1945, which also affected a

number of other surrendering U-Boats, it is unclear whether or not U-889’s CO,

Kapitänleutnant Friedrich Braeucker, ever sent his initial ‘position, course, speed’ (PCS)

surrender message especially as, according to the crew in their initial interrogation, it was not

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominion_of_Newfoundland






until 10 May that U-889 received the Allied orders which required it to surface and fly a

black flag indicating its surrender.

At 1920Z on 10 May, and after its initial sighting by the Liberator, U-889 was intercepted by

four RCN warships of the Canadian Western Local Escort Group W-6, the minesweepers

HMCS Oshawa and HMCS Rockcliffe and the corvettes HMCS Dunvegan and HMCS

Saskatoon, whilst still some 175 miles south-east of Newfoundland. Poor weather made it

impossible to board the U-Boat, so Oshawa closed to loud hailer distance and passed

instructions to the U-Boat in German, ordering it to head for Bay Bulls in Newfoundland

escorted by the four RCN warships.

However, at 2300Z on 10 May these orders were changed. Oshawa and Saskatoon were

detached for return to St John’s, and Rockcliffe and Dunvegan were instead instructed to

escort U-889 to Shelburne in south-west Nova Scotia. Later on the next day, the escort duties

were taken over by the frigates HMCS Buckingham and HMCS Inch Arran of the 28th

Escort

Group after the C-in-C, CNA had sent a message at 110310Z saying:

Relieve HMC ships Dunvegan and Rockcliffe and escort U-889 to Shelburne, NS.

Boarding party is to be put on board U-889 if weather conditions permit and all

possible precautions are to be taken to prevent scuttling. Report PCS. (1)

To which the CO of Buckingham responded at 112203Z:

My PCS at 2200Z [is] 43.53N, 57.07 W, 261 degrees, 11 knots. Escorting U-889. Not

boarded. Weather unsuitable. (1)

After a 2-day transit to Nova Scotia, U-889 was eventually boarded on 13 May, and the

formal surrender ceremony took place at the Whistle Buoy whilst the U-Boat was some seven

miles south of the entrance to Shelburne harbour, details of which were reported in the

Halifax Herald on 14 May:

Under an overcast threatening sky a twelve-man boarding party of the Royal

Canadian Navy, accompanied by Captain G R Miles, Chief of Staff to the

Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic, and a squad of RN

submarine technicians, climbed onto the defeated enemy vessel and a few seconds

later the White Ensign was hoisted at the undersea raider’s flagstaff to officially mark

the taking over of the craft. (3)

Similarly, on 14 May the Ottawa Journal reported, in the highly-charged and emotive

language of the day, that:

One of Germany’s underseas demons of destruction lay harmless in Shelburne

Harbour today. (4)

Surrender of U-190

The much older U-190 had left Kristiansand on 21 February on its 6th

wartime patrol en route

to its operational area off Nova Scotia and the east coast of the USA. On 16 April, whilst

operating close to the approaches to Halifax harbour, U-190 fired a torpedo at the

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bay_Bulls,_Newfoundland_and_Labrador

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bay_Bulls,_Newfoundland_and_Labrador

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shelburne,_Nova_Scotia








minesweeper HMCS Esquimalt, which was the last Canadian warship to be lost in the war.

The torpedo exploded on the RCN ship's starboard side causing her to sink in less than four

minutes, and there were only 26 survivors from her 60-strong crew.

On 29 April, with all its torpedoes expended, U-190 began to make its way home to Norway,

but because of wireless reception difficulties it was almost in mid-Atlantic some 500 miles

east of Newfoundland’s Cape Race before the first clear German surrender orders were

received. The U-Boat’s CO, Oberleutnant zur See Hans-Edwin Reith, responded by sending

the required PCS messages in the early hours of the morning on 11 May to the US Navy in

New York and Boston, as well as to the RCN maritime wireless station at Cape Race.

An RCAF Liberator was sent to investigate, and at 111205Z the C-in-C, CNA sent a message

to the Senior Officer of the Canadian Western Local Escort Group C-9 saying:

Detach two units forthwith to proceed [at] best speed to intercept U-190 reported in

42.35N, 43.06W about 1000Z/11th

. Report names [of] units detached. (1)

As a result, the frigate HMCS Victoriaville and the corvette HMCS Thorlock were ordered to

the scene of U-190’s surrender, and at 1805Z the C-in-C CNA sent a further message saying:

U-190 PCS 1500Z/11 43.30N, 41.35W, 300 degrees, 8.5 knots. Join and escort to Bay

Bulls. Boarding party to be put on board U-190 if weather permits, and all possible

precautions are to be taken to prevent scuttling. (1)

In response, Victoriaville reported at 2320Z that U-190 had been contacted and that the

Admiral’s instructions had been carried out. Thorlock’s boarding party, led by Lt R O

Blackford, RCNVR, went aboard U-190 at 2340Z on 11 May, and HMCS Victoriaville’s

boarding party, led by Lt F S Burbidge, RCNVR, went aboard the U-Boat an hour later at

0040Z on 12 May. After that, all except 13 members of the German crew were transferred to

the two RCN warships, and a short time later whilst on board Victoriaville the U-Boat’s CO

signed the formal surrender document in the presence of the frigate’s captain, Lt Cdr L A

Hickey, RCNR.

At that stage, the three vessels were still well to the east of Cape Race, so at 0200Z with U-

190 under the command of Lt Burbidge and flying the White Ensign they set course for Bay

Bulls with armed sentries on U-190’s bridge and in the torpedo control room, the main

control room and the engine room. It was not until two days later at 0630Z on 14 May that

they arrived at Bay Bulls, just south of St John’s on the east coast of Newfoundland where, as

recorded in the report of the Senior Naval Officer Bay Bulls, Lt Cdr E Randell, RCNR:

Lt M Wood, RNVR with Boarding Party boarded the submarine outside the entrance

and escorted by MLs [motor launches] 085 and 098 secured at the Eastern Entrance

trot buoy.

[The] Prisoners of War on HMCS Victoriaville and HMCS Thorlock and on U-190

were transferred to HMCS Prestonian, which sailed for Canada [at] 1200Z on 14th

.

When prisoners were removed the U-190 was moved and secured to two buoys off

Boom Defence Jetty and Lt Wood with his party commenced examination and






overhaul. A guard was supplied from St John’s with Lt Sweeney in charge. De-storing

was carried on during the time U-190 was at the buoys. On the 23rd

U-190 was

removed and secured to the Naval Jetty. (5)

Almost immediately after U-190’s arrival at Bay Bulls, the inevitable post-war bureaucrats

began to exercise their craft. First, on 17 May the National Secretary for Customs wrote to

the CO of the Central Victualling Depot at HM Dockyard, St John’s wanting to know what

the RCN had done with the liquor removed from U-190, viz:

The Collector of Customs at Bay Bulls informs us that certain liquors were

transferred from the German U-Boat recently brought into Bay Bulls by the Royal

Canadian Navy. Permission was granted for this to be done but the goods were

transferred to St John’s before a list could be taken and I would be very grateful,

therefore, if you could supply me with a detailed list of the liquors obtained from the

U-Boat and transferred to your Headquarters. (5)

Second, on 18 May the Base Naval Health Officer at St John’s, who had inspected U-190 on

16 May, complained that contrary to International Quarantine Regulations he had not been

able to examine the POWs as a precautionary measure against the possible introduction of

diseases such as typhus fever and smallpox. His report said that:

In so far as could be ascertained from this survey there was no visible evidence of

infestation. The ship, however, was found to be in a definitely unsanitary state,

presumably due in some measure to an exceptionally long period at sea, of which time

she probably remained submerged for many days before her capture. (5)

What did the man expect? Perhaps he had forgotten that only 10 days previously his country

had been at war with Germany.

The Surgeon Lt. Cdr’s report went on to say:

In order to prevent the spread of any possible infection, the following precautionary

measures are now being carried out:

(a) Bacteriological analysis of the submarine’s fresh water supply.

(b) Disinfestation of the ship’s galley and all living quarters.

(c) Precautionary delousing treatment of clothing stores by the use of DDT

insecticide. (5)

The third element of hassle related to the loss of kit and personal items from the U-Boat and

its crew which caused the crew of Victoriaville to be searched by shore patrol officers on

three separate occasions, all with negative results. This was the cause of considerable concern

to the frigate’s CO and, after Victoriaville arrived in St John, NB, he sent a memo to the

Naval Officer in Charge on 23 May in which he suggested that, instead, the latter should

perhaps search the crews of the other vessels involved, Thorlock and Prestonian, as well as

the various shore authorities involved in the surrender of U-190 stating that:






It is requested that Naval Service Headquarters be informed of the circumstances

surrounding [the] loss of articles from U-190. The feeling in this ship is that

unnecessary reflection has been put on us due to the fact that:

(1) Our boarding party was mustered on the quarterdeck of HMCS Prestonian

and searched by shore authorities before returning on board from U-190.

(2) They were subjected to a second search after arrival in St John’s

Newfoundland at the request of Captain (D): both with negative results.

(3) On arrival at Saint John, NB, we were boarded by shore patrol officers and

ratings with orders from Naval Service Headquarters to search the entire ship

and ship’s company. This third search was carried out with negative results.

In view of the fact that considerable gear is missing from U-190 and our ship has

been subjected to three searches with negative results it is suggested that the shore

Authorities connected with U-190 be similarly subjected to an intensive search. (5)

Transfer of U-190 and U-889 to Halifax

The two Type XIC/40 U-Boats were in very different states of maintenance when they

arrived at their surrender ports. U-190 had been commissioned in September 1942, and was

very war-weary at the end of its 6th

patrol, whilst U-889 had been commissioned in August

1944 and was only just over a month into its 1st patrol. Also, the latter was equipped with the

most up-to-date German U-Boat technology, including the latest acoustic torpedo system and

a ‘Zwiebel’ experimental hydrophone array, as well as carrying six intact T-5 GNAT

(German Navy Acoustic Torpedo) torpedoes which were designed to home-in onto a target’s

noise signature.

The RCN was naturally very keen to take early advantage of its unexpected possession of the

two U-Boats. To this end, U-190 was commissioned (back-dated to 14 May) at the end of

May as HMC S/M U-190, and U-889 was commissioned (again back-dated to 14 May) at the

end of June as HMC S/M U-889, initially with joint Canadian and British crews, as the RCN

did not at that stage have its own Submarine Branch.

U-889 was transferred from Shelburne to the RCN’s major naval base at Halifax on 23 May,

with Lt B Collins, RN, as its CO, where it was handed over to the Naval Research

Establishment (NRE) for detailed inspection, testing and trials.

After its surrender, U-190 was deemed to be too unseaworthy for early transfer to Halifax and

instead, with Lt M Wood as its CO, it was moved the short distance from Bay Bulls to the

RCN naval base at St John’s on 3 June. The transfer was however no covert affair, with the

U-Boat, under its own power, being escorted by the minesweeper HMCS Red Deer, six

Fairmile motor launches and the Royal Navy rescue tug HMS Tenacity.

The purpose of the move was to facilitate essential initial repairs, as well as the cleaning and

repainting of U-190. The U-Boat was quickly taken in hand by the staff at St John’s and it

was ready for surface sea trials on 12 June. It was then made available for visits by US Army

personnel on 13 June, by RCAF personnel on 14 June and by Canadian Army personnel on

15 June. There was no time to allow the general public or even any RCN personnel to go






onboard so, as a compromise, U-190 was moved to Harvey’s No. 2 Wharf in St John’s

harbour and the public were allowed onto the wharf during the afternoon of Sunday 17 June

to view the U-Boat. After these visits were complete, the (by then) HMC S/M U-190 was

transferred to Halifax on 21 June, this time escorted by the frigate HMCS Hallowell, where it

arrived on 23 June, exactly one month later than U-889.

Despite their transfer to the main RCN naval base at Halifax, the futures of both U-Boats

were in doubt because the three wartime Allies (UK, USA and USSR) were determined to

ensure that all elements of the German Navy were eliminated just as soon as possible after the

end of the war, and especially that all the surviving U-Boats should be sunk. Nevertheless,

whilst awaiting the Allied decisions about the future of the U-Boats that had surrendered, the

RCN was determined to take advantage of what, at that stage, was very much its temporary

ownership of U-190 and U-889.

Initial NRE Trials with U-889

Of the two Type IXC/40 U-Boats, as U-889 was in the best condition and equipped with the

latest German technology, it was the focus of most Canadian interest and attention from the

very beginning of the post-war period and, under the aegis of the NRE, a series of trials were

undertaken in the Halifax area over a period of seven weeks from 1 June to 27 July 1945. The

RCN lost no time whatsoever in making the necessary arrangements for these trials, with a

request from the C-in-C, CNA to the Air Officer Commanding- in-Chief, Eastern Air

Command on 23 May saying:

Ex German submarine U-889 is being brought to Halifax on 23 May in order that

certain trials may be carried out by the Naval Research Establishment. Your co-

operation is requested in these trials which will require the use of aircraft. (6)

However even then there was a recognition that the use of U-889 was likely to be temporary

as, when the Canadian Naval Service Headquarters formally agreed on 26 June that U-889

should be commissioned, it was with the caveat that it should be for the period of the trials

only.

The purposes of the various trials are set out in NRE Report PHx-59 dated 7 November 1945,

being to determine the following points:

a. The diving qualities of the U-Boat

b. The operation of the schnorkel

c. Speed and turning trials

d. The anti-radar qualities of the coating on the schnorkel

e. The performance of the GSR [German Search Radar] and the Tunis Radar Detection

gear

f. The performance of the German Hohentweil Radar

g. The H.E. of the submarine when schnorkeling

h. The performance of the Balkon and the Zweibel listening gear (7)

The hydrophone (listening gear) trials were conducted in conjunction with U-190 in mid-July

after its mini-refit, as both U-Boats were fitted with the standard but older, ‘Balkon’ listening

apparatus with its 48 hydrophones, whereas U-889 was also fitted with a ‘Zwiebel’ array,






with its 15 hydrophones, which was a trial fit designed for use in the more modern U-Boats

whilst they were underway when either using their schnorkel or when just submerged. (8)

The NRE trials did not however take place without a certain amount of excitement, as is

described in the informal history of the Research Establishment, viz:

The new Captain [Lt B Collins, RN] and crew of U-889 were eager to dive her so that

trials of her unusual equipment could be carried out. After learning the handling of

the controls, they did a series of practice dives in the shallow waters of Eastern

Passage, where they felt they could not get into too much trouble. First attempts

demonstrated great difficulty in maintaining a horizontal position, and the wide, flat

deck of the U-Boat made her much harder to handle than her rounded British

counterparts. First the screws and then the bow appeared above water as the crew

struggled for control, which they finally achieved.

In order to test the directional qualities of the [Zwiebel] array it was necessary that

the bow be submerged, while in order to maintain communication we wanted the

control tower above the water surface and open. This arrangement required a

delicate balancing operation in the ship’s trim. On the first attempt, something went

wrong and she settled to the bottom of Bedford Basin. Immediate attempts to return to

the surface, blowing the tanks and even using the engines, were fruitless – we were

stuck in the mud. We relaxed for half an hour and tried again. This time the ship came

loose and we popped to the surface. On the next attempt, the ship was provided with

the required trim, and we carried on with our measurements.

Shortly after this, a message was received from the Flag Officer Submarines [stating]

that under no circumstances were these submarines to be dived. (9)

The latter instruction was perhaps not unexpected as, on 18 June the NRE had been asked to

explain (in writing) by Halifax Dockyard’s clearly very wary Captain (D) just why any diving

trials were thought to be necessary. The response from NRE on 19 June was that:

With reference to your [query] re diving trials of U-889, it is submitted that the

following submerged trials are necessary to complete the information required

relative to this ship.

1. Practice diving on schnorkel in preparation for anti-radar trials and general

report on schnorkeling.

2. Listening trials with hydrophone in bow of submarine, requiring submarine to do

a static bottom dive.

3. Anti-radar trials on periscope and schnorkel.

4. Trials of submarine’s own radar equipment on schnorkel.

5. Turning trials when submerged to determine turning radius of submarine. (6)






There was also a plan for U-889 to undertake trials with the GNAT acoustic torpedoes which

it had been carrying when it surrendered, but these were postponed until later in the year,

albeit that they were expected to be complete by the end of November.

Public Exhibition Tours

Almost immediately after the war was over, and before the ink was hardly dry on the formal

surrender documents of U-190 and U-889, there was groundswell of public interest in the two

U-Boats amongst the general population in the maritime cities and ports in eastern Canada,

which had obviously been heightened by the sensational newspaper headlines at the time of

their surrender as well as the surrenders elsewhere. Indeed, pressure to exhibit one or both of

the two U-Boats actually began as early as 14 May with the receipt of a letter by the RCN’s

Chief of Naval Staff from Mr R C Stevenson of Montréal, who was the Co-Coordinator of

Sea Cadet Activities for the Naval Services, saying that:

In confirmation of our conversation, I would like to suggest that a captured German

submarine be brought up the St Lawrence River, through to the Great Lakes, being

put on exhibition at various ports, starting with Quebec, Three Rivers and Montreal,

and carrying on to other suitable ports. I understand from newspaper reports that a

precedent has been set in England by the exhibition of a German submarine.

I would further suggest that the submarine be accompanied by an escort of one or two

corvettes, preferably those ships and crews who have been responsible for the sinking

of submarines. (10)

It was quite true that similar tours were either taking place or being planned in both the UK

and the USA, where a small number of the surrendered U-Boats would be sailed to the cities,

ports and harbours which had been involved in the war against the U-Boats, and where the

local populations were keen to see examples of the (hated) German weapon that had put their

countries under such pressure for the previous five years.

Unfortunately Mr Stevenson’s suggestion initially fell on stony ground, with a pessimistic

response from the RCN on 24 May saying:

I should like to explain to you just what the present position is regarding captured

German submarines for exhibition purposes.

Both in the United Kingdom and the United States, the circumstances making possible

the immediate availability of such vessels for public inspection are much more

favourable by reason of the fact that many more of them are held in their ports than is

the case in Canada. They are in a position to withhold a requisite number for

experimental purposes and release others for exhibition, while in this country the

opposite is the case.

The one or two U-Boats in the custody of the Canadian authorities are required for

study and trials by the Royal Canadian Navy and arrangements in this respect are

rapidly being carried out. How long it will take to complete this most necessary

programme, it is impossible at this moment to say. (10)






Nevertheless, whilst the need for trials was clearly paramount for valid operational reasons,

the RCN relented in late June and it was decided that both U-190 and U-889 would undertake

exhibition cruises after the completion of the initial technical inspections and any urgent

trials, with the Minutes of the 297th

Naval Staff Meeting on 3 July recording that:

In a submission dated 25 June, C-in-C CNA requests consideration of a proposed

tour schedule for U-190 and U-889. The object of the proposed tour is to permit the

general public to see an enemy submarine and a typical anti-submarine ship of the

Royal Canadian Navy.

It was pointed out that the RN has established a precedent for such a tour by putting

captured German U-Boats on display in England. (10)

The official object of the tours was to permit the general public to see an enemy submarine

together with a typical anti-submarine ship of the RCN, the two opponents in the Battle of the

Atlantic. It was envisaged that at each port the two ships would to be secured separately

alongside a convenient jetty where the public could be admitted to view them both but, if

only one berth was available, the submarine would be berthed on the inside in order to make

access easier.

Thus, after Ministerial approval, and with the proviso that approximately 10 days would be

required for the NRE-led torpedo trials at Halifax after its exhibition tour was complete, U-

889 was selected to visit a number of cities and towns on the north, west and south coasts of

western Nova Scotia in the second half of August. Now with Lt E A D Holmes, RNVR, as

her CO, the U-Boat’s tour began in Halifax on 10 August, and after 4 days there, where it

was visited by over 10,000 people, and escorted by the frigate HMCS Joliette, U-889 visited

Saint John and St Andrews in New Brunswick, as well as Digby, Cornwallis, Yarmouth,

Shelburne, Liverpool and Lunenburg in Nova Scotia, before returning to Halifax on 5

September. (11)

There is no doubt that the tour was very successful and that U-889 and Joliette were well

received everywhere they visited. There was however one sour note when, on 10 September

the Minister of National Defence received a letter from a resident of St.Eustache sur le Lac,

Québec, saying:

I have to give you notice that my wife, whilst visiting captured German submarine U-

889 in the harbour at St Andrews, NB, on Monday 3 September 1945, fell on board as

a result of a dangerous step between two compartments not being protected by

lighting or personal guard to give warning of any kind.

As a result of this fall my wife has sustained a crack of the right scapula and severe

abrasions and bruises, one of which on the left thigh, covers an area at this date of

sixteen inches in length and nine inches in width.

We feel that these injuries are due directly and entirely to the lack of protection at a

very dangerous point and that the Crown should be liable for all expenses and

damage incurred, particulars of which will be submitted to you in due course, when

the full result of the injury is known and the needed treatment completed. (12)






Clearly, today’s world-wide mania for litigation has long-dated roots, but there is no evidence

in the LAC’s surviving RCN files as to what then transpired.

Similarly, after spending time in the naval dockyard at Halifax on a mini-refit between 23

June and 18 July and then conducting some limited trials U-190, escorted by the frigate

HMCS Thetford Mines, and now with Lt D N Pope, RNR, as her CO, undertook an

exhibition tour of the ports and communities along the St Lawrence River and in the Gulf of

St Lawrence, arriving at Montréal on 27 July for an extended visit which attracted some

30,000 visitors, and then making short visits to Three Rivers (now Trois Riviéres), Québec

City, Gaspé, Campbellton, Chatham and Charlottetown (on Prince Edward Island), as well as

Pictou and Sydney in Nova Scotia, before arriving back in Halifax on 7 September. (13)

Despite the general success of U-190’s tour, there was one incident which put Lt Pope under

a certain amount of personal pressure. This occurred after he had organised some minor local

repairs to his U-Boat whilst it was berthed at Three Rivers on 11 August and then needed the

work to be paid for, an unusual situation that was not well received by the naval staff in

Halifax. The problem came to light on 12 August, when U-190’s CO advised Captain (D)

that:

The enclosed bills of Messers Germaine and Frere Ltd cover a small repair to a

fairing plate on the waterline amidships. This plate became loose whilst underway, its

holding down bolts shearing off, thus becoming buckled by the pressure of the sea

water exerted on the inner side. The repairs carried out were to straighten one

quarter inch plate about 5 feet square and weld [it] back into position. (6)

The initial reaction from the Fleet Engineering Officer (FEO) was not good, with him saying:

This is definitely not approved practice. Suggest asking the CO if approval for this

work was obtained from any local NOIC and if not, if repairs were of such an urgent

nature that it could not wait until arrival at a Naval Dockyard. Otherwise CO will get

stung for the bill unless Capt (D) can recommend payment. Bill with recommendation

one way or the other should go to [the] C-in-C. (6)

Fortunately in the end common sense prevailed, and after the FEO had said that he

considered the CO to have acted in the best interests of the Service, Captain (D) wrote to the

C-in-C advising:

Submitted herewith is [a] bill covering repair of steel plate in HMC S/M U-190 at

Three Rivers, PQ, on 11 August 1945. It is considered that the action of the

Commanding Officer in having [the] work carried out without the consent of a Naval

Authority was justified, and payment is therefore recommended. (6)

RCN Plans for the U-Boats

Even before the two public exhibition tours had been completed and any decisions had been

taken by the Allies concerning the future of all the U-Boats that had surrendered, the RCN’s

thoughts about the future location and possible use of U-190 and U-889 began to develop,






with Captain A F Peers, RCN, the CO of the NRE advising the C-in-C, CNA on 1 September

that:

U-889 will be required here for acoustic torpedo running until about the end of

October, dependent considerably on weather conditions, as these trials will have to be

carried out at night in Halifax Approaches.

Recommended that U-889 be allocated to Canada for experimental purposes with a

view to eventual scrapping. When all running trials are completed, we would like to

take out all her special equipment such as listening gear, radar, etc, before she is

disposed of.

U-190 is an older boat, built in 1942, and would not be much good as an operational

boat. Recommended that she be made available for transfer to any other Navy, or

alternatively that she be scrapped in Canada after removal of any special fittings that

we wish to keep for experimental or reference purposes. (12)

Shortly after this, on 20 September, and once the two public exhibition tours had been

completed, it had become obvious that U-190 was in such a poor state that it was unlikely to

be of much further use to the RCN. Captain E F Adams, the CO of HMCS Stadacona, the

shore base at Halifax, therefore spelt out his instructions for the administration of the two U-

Boats:

The following arrangements for the administration of HMC ex-German submarines

U-889 and U-190 are to go into effect as from 21 September 1945, consequent upon

the reduction of U-190 to Care and Maintenance status.

Lieutenant E A D Holmes, RNVR, Commanding Officer HMC S/M U-889 will assume

the duties of Senior Submarine Officer [S S/MO] of the flotilla, and be in general

charge.

A Duty Submarine Officer of the Day will be detailed by the S S/M O in rotation from

flotilla officers, and will be responsible to him for both boats during non-working

hours. Rounds are to be carried out by the Duty Submarine Officer during silent

hours at sufficiently frequent times to ensure the safety of the boats.

Duty watches are to be detailed by individual boats, U-889 making up any

deficiencies for U-190. These will be detailed for 24 hour periods, and are to sleep on

board at night.

During working hours, each crew will normally work in their own boats, but for

special work beyond U-190’s capacity, U-889 is to provide the necessary additional

hands, subject to her own requirements.

The Senior Submarine Officer is to issue such additional orders as may be required to

put these orders into effect, and as may be required for administration of the flotilla,

forwarding copies to the Captain, Stadacona, and the Officer in Charge, Naval

Research Establishment for information. (6)






The October 1945 Engineering Review

The RCN then conducted a comprehensive engineering study of the two U-Boats and on 20

October 1945 the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast (COAC), Commodore C R H Taylor,

RCN, submitted a report to the Naval Board in the Department of National Defence in

Ottawa setting out his views about the status and future disposition of U-190 and U-889, viz:

The present status of these submarines is as follows:

(a) U-889. In good operational condition except for the auxiliary diesel air

compressor. The main electric air compressor still being in good shape. Manned

with three RCNVR s/m-trained officers, 7 RCN ratings, 16 RCNVR ratings and 7

RN ratings. The RCN and RCNVR ratings are now sufficiently trained to operate

the boat on the surface for Torpedo Trials purposes.

(b) U-190. Due to a bad earth on her starboard main motor, this boat is not in

operational condition, as it cannot be used. She is an old boat (1942) and, with

other defects present, would take considerable work to bring into operational

state. Manned with one RNVR s/m-trained officer, 2 RCN and 8 RCNVR ratings

on a maintenance basis. (14)

However, not only were the futures of the two U-Boats dependent on their serviceability

status, but they were also dependent on the forthcoming Allied decisions about their future,

on the availability of trained crews, as well as the RCN’s desire to undertake the planned

trials with the German acoustic torpedoes which had been captured on board U-889.

As far as the crews were concerned, there was a great deal of pressure, not only to demobilise

the RCN wartime volunteers who, after 4 to 5 years’ service, were understandably keen to

return to their civilian occupations and careers, but also the Royal Navy officers and ratings

on secondment to the RCN wanted to return to the UK as soon as possible. This was therefore

a major factor to be taken into account in the decision about the RCN’s use of the two U-

Boats.

Initial Acoustic Torpedo Trials

Despite the on-going uncertainty about the long-term future of both U-Boats, especially

doubts about the retention of U-889 and U-190’s serviceability the RCN, having acquired the

former’s acoustic torpedoes, was loath to forgo the opportunity to conduct trials and

evaluation work likely to assist with the RCN’s ongoing development of appropriate

countermeasures, called Canadian Anti-Acoustic Torpedo (CAT) gear, which had started in

1943. This was a noise-maker towed behind warships to act as a decoy for the acoustic

torpedoes, and which might be needed for possible use in any future expansion of the RCN’s

submarine fleet.

Unfortunately two of U-889’s six GNAT torpedoes had been lost in a huge ammunition

explosion on the North and South jetties of the naval magazine at the Bedford Basin in

Halifax Harbour on 18/19 July 1945. This was the second time that Halifax had experienced a

major naval-related explosion. The first had occurred in WW1 when, on the morning of 6

December 1917 two ships collided in The Narrows between the Inner and Outer Harbour, one






of which was loaded with TNT and other volatile cargo. The resulting explosion flattened one

and a half square miles of Halifax, almost 2,000 people were killed and 9,000 people were

injured. This second explosion was caused by a fire which started on the South jetty at 1840

on the evening of 18 July which quickly spread to the North jetty, both of which were

overloaded with badly-stored surplus ammunition and other explosives which had been

hastily off-loaded from naval vessels which were being de-commissioned either temporarily

or permanently. However, on this occasion, there was only one fatality, as well as far less

damage to Halifax itself. The two U-Boats were moored in Bedford Basin at the time and,

though they were unaffected by the explosion itself, the incident was recorded in U-190’s

Deck Log for 18 July:

1842: Violent explosion in Bedford Basin

2000: All ships ordered to slip and proceed to Outer Harbour

2115: Slipped and proceeding to anchorage

2322: Anchored Georges Island (15)

Luckily, the four remaining GNAT torpedoes were undamaged and thus available for the

NRE trials after the explosive had been steamed-out and the warheads had been instrumented

for running and other investigations. However, whilst the torpedo trials had always been

expected to take place during the second half of September and that U-889 would not

therefore be required after they had been completed, the Bedford Magazine explosion caused

a two month delay in getting the warheads steamed out and fitted for the running trials. This

was therefore the cause of considerable concern as to whether or not the necessary

engineering work would be complete before the onset of poor winter weather, possibly

leading to the trials having to be postponed until May 1946. This was because the trials,

which needed to be completed at night, would require calm weather and at least 2 miles’

visibility.

In the light of this new situation, the CO of the NRE, Captain Peers, wrote a comprehensive

review on 18 October which revealed that either U-889 needed to be retained by the RCN for

an extended period or that the planned CAT trials would need to be completed by the US

Navy. Captain Peers’ opinion was that, in view of the work already completed, the full scale

trials should still go ahead, but that they should be postponed until the spring of 1946 when

all four of the re-worked torpedo heads would be available and when maximum use could be

made of nights suitable for the running trials. In particular, his report recommended that:

Bearing in mind that at present the RCN is in the lead of both the RN and the USN in

respect to knowledge of the acoustic torpedo and possible counter-measures:

a. U-889 be retained in commission as at present in order to complete the acoustic

torpedo trials.

b. The USN be informed of the latest developments in acoustic torpedo investigation,

and if possible the trials be done at a suitable USN port, east coast ports’ winter

weather being unsuitable.






c. Alternatively postpone trials until next spring at Halifax. (16)

Future Possible RCN Use of U-190 and U-889

In view of the state of the two U-Boats, Commodore Taylor’s almost simultaneous

engineering report to the Naval Board on 20 October, which had been written before it

became clear that U-889 was unlikely to remain in RCN custody much after the end of 1945,

had also included a number of detailed recommendations about their future use, saying:

It is recommended that U-190, being unfit for further service, be disposed of at an

early date, after removal of certain equipment required by [the] Naval Research

Establishment.

Disposal of U-889 is contingent upon policy considerations whether the RCN should

carry out the complete trials to establish acoustic torpedo performance against a

CAT, or turn the preliminary information over to [the] RN and USN for the final

running trials. In any case, on completion of the confirming Bedford Basin trials [the]

RN and USN should be informed of this new development.

It is considered improbable that the running trials can be completed at Halifax before

unfavourable weather conditions set in and, to complete them before [the]

demobilisation of the RCNVR ratings will require that they be carried out at a US

base, say New London or Bermuda.

It is therefore recommended that, unless prestige considerations require [the] RCN to

complete these trials, that U-889 be reduced to C&M at Halifax. The RCNVR officers

and ratings can then be demobilised and RN ratings returned to UK. In the event that

it is found necessary to carry out running trials next spring, she could then be re-

commissioned. (14)

Allied Tripartite Naval Commission Proposals

Meanwhile intensive talks had been underway at Potsdam in the outskirts of Berlin between

the three wartime Allies concerning the future of the surviving German naval vessels,

including the 150 or so U-Boats that had surrendered.

The result of these high-level political discussions had been the production of the

Proceedings (Minutes) of the Potsdam Heads of State Conference [codenamed Terminal]

which took place between 17 July and 2 August 1945. In respect of the U-Boats, the

Proceedings said that the UK, the USA and the USSR had concluded that:

The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty

submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the USSR, UK and USA

for experimental and technical purposes. (17)

It was also decided at the Potsdam Conference that a Tripartite Naval Commission (TNC)

should be established in Berlin charged with deciding, amongst other things, just which of the

surviving U-Boats should be allocated to the three Allies (10 each). Thus, at face value, the






chances of the RCN being allowed to retain either of the two U-Boats that had surrendered in

Canada were very slim indeed.

One of the TNC’s first actions was to inspect each of the U-Boats which had surrendered, and

as part of that process a team was sent to North America to inspect the five U-Boats which

had surrendered in the USA, the two that had surrendered in Argentina and the two which

had surrendered in Canada. The seven U-Boats that had surrendered in the USA and Canada

were inspected in early September 1945, with the two in Canada being inspected on 12

September and, significantly, the only one of the seven to be assessed as operational (both on

the surface and submerged) was U-889. In comparison, the TNC team assessed that U-190

would need at least one month’s repair work to bring it to an operational condition. (18)

Once all the assessments had been made, the TNC then turned its attention to deciding which

U-Boats should be retained and, of these, which should be allocated to each of the three

Allies. At that stage the RCN was fairly relaxed about the future of the two U-Boats in its

temporary custody. It was expected that the CAT trials with U-889 would be complete by the

end of September, and it was already clear from the state of U-190 that there was no pressing

need for its retention. The initial allocation lists were announced by the TNC on 10 October

1945, but with the proviso that there should be some flexibility and that bi-lateral exchanges

could be made subject to formal TNC approval. Of the two U-Boats located in Canada, U-

889 was, not unexpectedly, allocated to the USA, and U-190 did not feature in any of the

allocation lists and was therefore scheduled for sinking not later than mid-February 1946.

However the situation changed dramatically in the latter half of October when it became

apparent to the RCN that the CAT trials were bound to be delayed and, because of this, in

November the Canadian Government sought British support for the retention of the two U-

Boats in Canada. To this end, the Admiralty in London was keen to do all it could to ensure

that both U-190 and U-889 were amongst the U-Boats to be retained, and on 16 November

Admiral Sir Geoffrey Miles, the senior UK member of the TNC, wrote to his US and Russian

colleagues stating that:

The British Admiralty are … desirous of exchanging two of their [allocation of]

submarines for two [U-190 and U-889] now in Canada. (18)

In response, Admiral Robert Ghormley, the senior US member of the TNC, wrote on 29

November saying:

U-889 and U-190, former German submarines, are located in Canada. I have been

advised that the United States Navy Department desires to retain former German

submarine U-889 in the United States allocation, but [has] no objection to the

exchange of the former German submarine U-190. (18)

The UK therefore dropped its proposal concerning U-889, which remained in the US

allocation, meaning that sometime prior to mid-February 1946 it would have to be transferred

from the RCN to the US Navy (USN), which was keen to acquire this Type IXC/40 U-Boat,

especially because of its apparently excellent condition as assessed by the TNC inspection

team in September 1945. However, the decision relating to U-889 meant that, despite its poor

condition, the RCN needed to retain U-190 after all.






The TNC’s Final Report was issued on 6 December 1945 but U-190 was still not included in

the UK’s allocation. Thus a formal change was required so that the previously unallocated U-

190 could be allocated to the UK, with one of the U-Boats which had already been allocated

to the UK being added to the list of those to be sunk. This change was a follow-up to the

request made in November by Admiral Miles in relation to U-190 and U-889, when both

Admiral Ghormley and Admiral Gordei Levchenko, the senior Russian member of the TNC,

had said they would have no objection to the UK retaining U-190.

The need for U-190 to remain in Canadian custody was therefore reinforced in a message on

22 December from the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Ottawa to the Foreign Office

in London saying:

We are advised that submarine U-889 has been allocated to the United States

Government. The Canadian Government therefore wishes to retain submarine U-190

in order to complete experiments originally undertaken on U-889.

Request that Tripartite Commission be asked to leave Canadian Government in

possession of U-190 for a period not exceeding one year with the understanding that

on completion of experiments U-190 is to be sunk. (19)

In fact, the TNC had no authority whatsoever to allocate any of the surrendered U-Boats to

Canada, the only authorized recipients being the UK, the USA and the USSR. So, to

overcome this hurdle, it was necessary to persuade the TNC to agree that U-190 should be

allocated to the UK for ‘experimental and technical purposes’, and then for the UK to make

its own arrangements with Canada. As a result, the Foreign Office in London advised on 5

February that:

It has been arranged with the Tripartite Naval Commission that U-190 should be

substituted for a submarine of the original British allocated. The latter will be sunk at

once in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement and the trials planned for her by the

Admiralty will be transferred to U-190 and postponed for a year.

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom are, therefore, agreeable to U-190

remaining in the possession of His Majesty’s Government in Canada for one year on

the understanding that she is available to the Admiralty at the end of that period. (19)

The formal change to the TNC paperwork was implemented at the end of January 1946, and

after that U-190 was quickly loaned to Canada by the Royal Navy for a year. Thus, as one of

the 30 U-Boats authorised for retention by the Allies, it was allowed to remain in Canada in

the temporary custody of the RCN.

Extended Acoustic Torpedo Trials

Whilst these discussions were taking place in Potsdam, the RCN nevertheless still remained

keen to take every possible advantage of their temporary charges, particularly as they wished

to initiate the CAT trials with the four remaining GNAT torpedoes. Thus it was decided to

continue with the NRE torpedo trials with U-889 for as long as possible, and a number of

such trials took place between 23 September and 30 October 1945 in and around Halifax






harbour before it too was reduced to Care and Maintenance status on 12 November 1945

before the torpedo trials programme had been completed.

However, whilst U-889 was being put to good use by the RCN in the latter part of 1945, the

same could not be said of U-190. Whilst it was still based at Halifax, and despite all the high-

level staff work that had taken place in Berlin to ensure that it could be retained in Canada,

U-190 was by that time deemed to be of little further use to the RCN. It was generally

moored alongside U-889, and it was clearly deteriorating fast. Nevertheless, winter was

approaching, and the situation was complicated by the need to transfer U-889 to the USN

despite the fact that the RCN’s CAT trials with the four now-instrumented GNAT torpedoes

remained unfinished. Thus there was a very real probability that, despite its poor state, U-190

might now be needed to take over the torpedo trials work in the spring of 1946 rather than

being subject to early disposal.

Transfer of U-889 to the US Navy

At the end of 1945, and in accordance with the TNC recommendations U-889 could no

longer remain in Canada. The U-Boat was therefore delivered to the USA by its RCN crew,

but escorted by the US Navy tug ATR-7, arriving at Portsmouth Navy Yard (PNY), New

Hampshire, on 12 January 1946. However, whereas when U-889 had been inspected by the

TNC in Canada in September 1945 and found to be in the best condition of all the U-Boats

that had surrendered from sea in the Western Hemisphere, it was in a non-operational

condition when transferred to the US Navy.

In particular, the condition of the battery was very poor and, on attempting to put a charge

onto it, it was found that serious problems existed which would have been expensive to

correct. Indeed the expense of returning the battery to a satisfactory condition did not appear

to be justified in view of the plans that the US Navy had for U-889’s future use. Fortunately

by that time the USN was already conducting trials on another Type IXC/40 U-Boat, U-858,

which it had renovated, and it had no need for a second example to be included in its trials

programme, even for any GNAT torpedo trials. The US Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)

therefore granted PNY permission to de-activate U-889, and the U-Boat remained moored at

PNY as a potential source of spares until the USN’s Bureau of Ships advised the CNO on 27

September 1946 that all the necessary cannibalisation action was complete and that U-889

was ready for disposal.

The USN was in no hurry to dispose of those of its U-Boats which were by now of no further

use, and it was not until November 1947 that U-889 was finally scheduled for use as a target

in torpedo trials. Along with three other surplus U-Boats, U-889 was first towed to

Provincetown Harbour near Cape Cod, and then to a torpedo firing area 40 miles north-east

of the Cape by the US Navy submarine rescue ship USS Tringa and the yard tug YTB 366.

There it was sunk on the afternoon of 20 November by a torpedo fired from the submarine

USS Flying Fish.






Re-Activation of U-190

The result of the transfer of U-889 to the USN left the RCN with just U-190, which had been

reduced to Care and Maintenance status in September 1945. Despite this, and despite the fact

that in October 1945 COAC’s report to the Naval Board had recommended that U-190, being

unfit for further service, should be disposed of at an early date, by mid-March 1946 the

situation had been reviewed and it had been decided that the U-Boat should be retained in

commission with a reduced complement and as the firing platform in support of the NRE’s

remaining CAT trials. However, other than taking part in these torpedo trials at various times

between May and the autumn of 1946, U-190 was involved in no other RCN-related

activities.

This was not surprising, as on 2 August 1946 U-190’s CO, who was now Lt J L Johnston,

RCNVR, had advised in a report headed “Steaming Capabilities and General Conditions of

U-190” that:

At present U-190 is in such a condition as to warrant a major refit before she could

be considered in a satisfactory sea-going condition.

The submarine is not capable of diving, due to lack of personnel for maintenance of

main vents, hydroplanes, underwater valves, Diesel Air Compressor, Diesel engine

exhaust blowing system and the overall watertightness of the ship.

There are a number of defects that have arisen in the last few months which indicate

the state of deterioration of the ship. The port main motor has developed a full earth,

making independent manoeuvring impossible. The galley electric range is

unserviceable and is lacking spare parts. The forward bilge pump has defective

wiring circuits. No. 8 main ballast tank has developed a leak into number 3 torpedo

tube.

Many of the navigational aids on board are unserviceable. The Echo Sounder and the

Radar Set are defective, and were found unreliable at their best. The low frequency

transmitter and receiver are not working.

In my opinion U-190 is not capable of leaving Halifax harbour, and it appears that

more defects will arise unless she is soon docked for a well deserved refit. (20)

Thus, other than the intermittent NRE torpedo trials, the same pattern of general inactivity

continued into autumn 1946.

Preliminary Arrangements for the Demise of U-190

The approaching completion of the NRE’s acoustic torpedo trials marked the end of U-190’s

already limited usefulness to the RCN and meant that a decision could be sought about the

future disposal of the shortly to be surplus-to-requirements U-190, the loan period for which

was due to expire in February 1947.

This process started in mid-September, and on 26 September the Director of Naval Plans and

Intelligence in Ottawa wrote to the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff saying:






After the surrender of the German submarine fleet the RCN acquired U-889 and U-

190, and the former was subsequently used for experiments with her acoustic torpedo

gear and special hydrophone system.

The Tripartite Naval Commission sitting in Berlin in November 1945 agreed that 30

German submarines only should be retained and divided equally between the USSR,

the USA and the UK. The 10 allocated to the United States included U-889.

Following this decision the RCN requested that the Tripartite Commission might

authorise the retention by Canada of U-190 until acoustic torpedo trials were

completed after which she would be sunk.

In January 1946 however it was arranged that U-190 should be substituted for one of

the 10 submarines allotted to Britain. The latter was then sunk and it was agreed

[with the UK, not the TNC] that U-190 should be retained by Canada for one year

after which she should be made available to the Admiralty.

It is anticipated that the acoustic experiments will be completed early in October and

there will then be no further requirement for U-190. Should the Admiralty require her

return to the United Kingdom however the boat is not at present in a sufficiently

seaworthy condition to make and Atlantic passage and a refit will be necessary.

It is therefore recommended that the Admiralty should now be informed of the

condition of U-190 and a decision on her disposal requested. (19)

In January 1947, the CO of the NRE formally confirmed that the weather conditions in

Halifax had become so bad as to make it impossible to carry out any further GNAT trials

with U-190, and he recommended that the torpedo trials should cease. As a result, on 24

January 1947 the C-in-C, CNA advised that:

Further acoustic torpedo trials are to be abandoned. Torpedoes [are] to be landed

and stored. U-190 is to be reduced to Care and Maintenance status. (13)

This was then followed by advice from the Canadian Naval Mission in London on 21 March

saying that:

The Admiralty has no further requirement for this U-Boat and are enquiring whether

the RCN would wish to retain her as a war relic. If not, the Admiralty would be

grateful if the RCN would dispose of her by scrapping or sinking in deep water. It is

suggested that the disposal of the submarine might provide valuable data on the

damaging power of weapons, or the resisting power of the ship’s structure, and the

Admiralty Ship Target Trials Committee would be glad to advice the RCN on

experiments that might be arranged.

The Admiralty point out that the circumstances under which this submarine was

acquired make it inadvisable to transfer her to a third party before she is reduced to

scrap. (19)






This debate was finally completed on 16 April, when the Chief of Naval Staff wrote to the

Minister of Defence saying that the Admiralty had no requirement for U-190 and had

requested that the U-Boat should be disposed of by one of the following three methods:

a. Retention as a war relic. This would be of little value to the RCN and would

involve the expense of care and maintenance.

b. Scrap. As the Admiralty specify that U-190 is not to be transferred to a third party

for scrapping, this would entail the expense of the work being done by the RCN.

c. Sinking in deep water. (19)

The CNS’ memorandum went on to say that neither of the first two alternatives was

considered to be desirable, and that as there was no further requirement for U-190 she should

be sunk after the removal of any equipment required by the RCN. The CNS recommended

that, in order to derive the greatest benefit, U-190 should be sunk by being used as a target for

ship and aircraft practice, and asked the Minister for his agreement to this course of action,

which was readily given.

The result of all this staff work was that on 23 April 1947 the formal decision was taken to

sink U-190 after the removal of any equipment that might be of further interest. In June it was

forecast that the de-storing activity would be completed by 5 July, and that the submarine

would then be ready for disposal. This was followed by a recommendation on 19 July that U-

190 should be paid-off at an early date and be placed in reserve pending disposal. Approval

for the latter was granted on 21 July, and the U-Boat was formally paid-off on 24 July 1947.

(13)

On the same day, COAC issued instructions concerning the care of U-190 until such time as

it was sunk, saying:

When U-190 is berthed at a jetty where electrical power is not available, the power is

to be obtained from the ship’s main batteries which will last approximately 10 more

days, at which time the ship will be in darkness and the bilge pump and ventilation

fans being electrical, will be unserviceable. It will be noted that the batteries when

dead will no longer give off oxygen gas and there will be no danger of explosion.

However, in order to ensure that all danger is avoided, the ventilation fans are to be

run for one-half hour twice daily for one week after the batteries are dead.

A 50 ton portable pump is to be made available for pumping the bilges.

It will be noted that No. 3 torpedo tube is flooded by a leak from No. 8 main ballast

tank and there is reason to believe that a similar leak might develop into No. 4

torpedo tube from No. 8 tank: care is to be taken accordingly.

All underwater connections to the sea are shut off and the ship is taking a negligible

amount of water into the engine room and motor room bilges. As the ship has not

been on the dry dock since being taken over by the RCN the condition of these

underwater valves and sea connections is highly questionable.






Every possible care is to be taken to ensure that HMC S/M U-190 is kept in an

adequate condition in order to prevent sinking. (14)

‘Exercise Scuttled’

The only remaining question then was how to dispose of the unwanted U-Boat and, as was

the case with most matters relating to U-190, that too took several months to answer. The

initial proposals for sinking the U-Boat were discussed at a staff meeting on 27 May, and

these were formalised in a memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff on 6 June

which recommended that:

a. Date of sinking to be about 22 October 1947 in order that as many RCN ships as

possible be available to take part in the exercise, and to allow air squadrons to

participate.

b. Position of sinking to be about 50 miles SE off Halifax (over 100 fathoms).

c. Ships and aircraft to carry out rocket firings, gunnery, A/S weapon firings and

bombings during the exercise. (19)

This proposal to sink U-190 in some style was endorsed at the 308th

Naval Staff Meeting

which was held on 21 July and, during a visit to Halifax later in the month, the Minister of

National Defence confirmed that U-190 would be destroyed by the RCN ‘with explosives’.

Indeed, to this end, it had already been announced by the Director of Naval Information in a

Press Release on 15 July that:

Naval authorities have indicated that this [the sinking of U-190] will probably take

place in the early fall, and that it is possible that both surface craft and aircraft will

pay a part in sending the one time sea raider to its last account in a realistic anti-

submarine exercise. (21)

This announcement nevertheless caused a complication in that it motivated the Managing

Director of Halifax Shipyards Ltd to write to the Head of the RCN’s Naval Administration

and Supply Department on 21 July saying:

I notice by a press report recently that the German submarine U-190 is to be taken

out to sea and sunk. This seems to me to be a pity. Here are the steel mills in our

country crying for scrap. There is a definite shortage and this submarine could well

be used for that purpose. (19)

Unfortunately Rear Admiral H W T Grant’s response on 24 July was somewhat equivocal. It

did not make clear that the Admiralty in London had specifically ruled out scrapping by a

third party, and it left the door open for a further review. Thus the inevitable happened and

the Managing Director of Halifax Shipyards Ltd wrote yet again, this time to the Deputy

Minister of Defence on 30 September when final arrangements for U-190’s sinking were well

advanced. As a result, the matter had to be taken to the Defence Minister himself, who then

accepted that there was a need to follow the Admiralty’s request.






Additionally, in July the Chief of Naval Staff had personally invited the Chief of the

Canadian Air Staff (CAS) to consider whether or not he would like the RCAF to participate

in the arrangements for sinking U-190 but, somewhat surprisingly, the CAS declined the

invitation, saying:

Your invitation to participate in this exercise would have been speedily accepted were

it not for the fact that the aircraft and personnel which would normally participate

are fully engaged on prior commitments, My staff have endeavoured to arrange for

the fitting out of other aircraft for this exercise, but I feel that any makeshift

arrangements would be unwise. (19)

Reading between the lines, it is clear that the RCAF were just not interested in participating

what seemed very likely to turn into a publicity stunt.

As forecast in his earlier Press Release, and after a dummy run of the exercise on 14 October,

the Director of Naval Information gave further information of the RCN’s intentions on 18

October, saying:

Preliminary arrangements have been completed for the destruction by ships and

aircraft of the Royal Canadian Navy of the former German submarine U-190 off

Halifax on Trafalgar Day, October 21.

The U-Boat, which surrendered to ships of the RCN in May 1945, will be sent to the

bottom not far from where she torpedoed and sank the minesweeper HMCS Esquimalt

on 16 April 1945. (22)

The scenario that was invented for the exercise, and thus the purpose of the RCN’s joint air

and sea attacks, was that:

U-190 is assumed to have been damaged during an attack carried out by a ship on

patrol in the Halifax approaches. The patrol vessel having been sunk by GNAT, U-

190 is attempting to escape on the surface. (20)

The formal RCN orders for this highly publicised event, which went by the somewhat dull

and very un-original code name of ‘Exercise Scuppered’, indicted that it was due to take

place on 21 October, that it was expected to take approximately 90 minutes to complete, that

it would be located approximately 50 miles south-east of Halifax, and that the redundant U-

Boat would be towed into position by the dockyard tug Riverton.

A considerable amount of trouble was taken to ensure that U-190 would be ready for the

event and would not simply sink under its own devices when towed out of Halifax prior to

the planned exercise. The detailed preparations included:

(a) The bridge and all uprights were painted with one coat of yellow paint. A strip 2.5

feet wide on the outboard side of the upper deck was painted yellow, while a strip

on the upper deck 3 feet wide was painted red.

(b) All sea valves were checked closed. All bilge lines, cross connection valves and

bulkhead valves were closed.






(c) The ventilation system was checked, and all vents and compartment isolation

valves were closed.

(d) Ballast tanks were blown and ship trimmed on even keel.

(e) The rudder was lashed in the mid-ships position. Forward Hydroplanes were

given 10 degrees of elevation and After Hydroplanes were fixed in a horizontal

position.

(f) All watertight doors were hammered up secure, and Conning Tower hatch dogged

down.

(g) The periscope was plugged with a wooden plus, and the holes in the H/F, D/F

Stands, caused by removal of same, were plugged with wooden plugs. (14)

The RCN forces involved in ‘Exercise Scuppered’ were the destroyers HMCS Nootka and

HMCS Haida, the minesweeper HMCS New Liskeard, as well as aircraft of the 18th

Canadian Carrier Air Group (comprising eight Seafires from No.833 Sqn, eight Fireflys from

No.826 Sqn, two Ansons and two Swordfish).

The expected sequence of events was set out in the Exercise Order:

1. Two Swordfish acting as reconnaissance aircraft will report the presence of

the submarine, which will be presumed to have been damaged prior to the

exercise.

2. Fireflys armed with rockets will attack in formation.

3. The destroyers will attack with 4.7-inch gunfire, opening fire at approximately

4,000 yards range.

4. Seafire aircraft armed with bombs will attack from a height of about 5,000

feet.

5. HMCS New Liskeard will close the target as it sinks – either following the

above mentioned attacks or at any stage in the exercise should the U-Boat sink

earlier – and deliver the final attack with ‘Hedgehog’. (23)

The event was given maximum publicity, and it was covered by press, radio and newsreel,

with 24 reporters, commentators and photographers on-board the RCN ships, and one

reporter was even able to view the exercise from the air whilst flying in one of the Anson

aircraft.

However, despite all the careful planning, the whole event eventually went off like a damp

squib because, after the initial rocket attacks by the Fireflys, U-190 started to settle slowly by

its stern. Nootka then opened fire with her guns, but was able to fire only two salvoes, both of

which missed the target, before the U-Boat suddenly up-ended and sank from sight less than

19 minutes after the start of the exercise.






Nevertheless the Director of Naval Information sought to give the affair the best possible

positive gloss, stressing that it was solely an exercise designed to give ships’ crews and the

RCN aircraft crews training in combined air-sea operations, and saying in his somewhat

emotive Press Release on 29 October that:

The former German submarine U-190 made its last descent to the cold depths of the

Atlantic on Trafalgar Day, October 21.

The once deadly sea raider came to a swift and ignominious end when, as a target for

ships and aircraft of the Royal Canadian Navy, it was sunk in less than 19 minutes in

the same waters in which it torpedoed HMCS Esquimalt in April 1945. (24)

Inevitably, on the evening of 21 October 1947 there was a certain amount of typical informal

celebration in the Wardroom of the Naval Air Station in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia about the

fact that U-190 had been successfully sunk by the air attacks before the RCN’s surface ships

had been able to make any effective contribution to the U-Boat’s final demise. A little bit of

inter-Service rivalry was not unsurprising.

Details of the event were forwarded to Naval Service Headquarters by COAC, (now) Rear

Admiral C R H Taylor, RCN, and his Exercise Report dated 22 December 1947 concluded

with the somewhat low-key words:

The fact that U-190 was eventually sunk in the required position and without accident

is considered to be the most important factor.

Although all phases of the proposed exercise were not carried out as a result of the

effectiveness of the rockets, it is still considered that the sequence of attack was the

best from the point of view of training to be obtained and the cooperation required

between Air and surface ships.

It is also felt that ‘Exercise Scuppered’ provided very good publicity for the Royal

Canadian Navy and gave the press an opportunity to understand more fully the duties

of Naval officers and men.

In general I consider that great benefit was derived from the sinking of the U-190 by

the Royal Canadian Navy. (20)

The last words about the demise of U-190 after its time in the RCN were written by the Naval

Secretary in his equally low-key and belated response to Rear Admiral Taylor on 23 January

1948, viz:

Your report has been noted with interest by the Department.

The administration for the exercise and the detail of the orders were admirably

prepared, and reflect great credit on those who took part in the planning.

The air attacks speak for themselves, but it was a disappointment that sufficient of

U-190 was not left for Captain (D) to dispose of. (20)






Finally, a physical link with U-190 still exists even today in that, some 70 years after its

sinking, the U-Boat’s periscope is one of the many historical naval artifacts displayed in the

Crow’s Nest Officers Club in St John’s, Newfoundland. It was removed from U-190 before

‘Exercise Scuppered’ and after it became of no further interest to the NRE and the RCN, it

was initially on display in the Maritime Naval Museum in Halifax before being transferred to

St John’s for safe keeping in 1963.

The POW’s from U-190 and U-889

Whilst the crews of the two U-Boats played no significant part in the RCN’s exploitation of

either U-Boat, they nevertheless all spent about a year in Canada as Prisoners of War (POWs)

before being transferred to camps in England in 1946 after the Canadians began to close their

POW camps.

Shortly after its arrival at Shelburne in Nova Scotia on 13 May, the 55-man German crew of

U-889 was disembarked and taken to Halifax for interrogation. Similarly, after its arrival at

Bay Bulls in Newfoundland, U-190’s 54-man crew was transferred to the frigate Prestonian,

which sailed for Halifax on 14 May. After their interrogation they were all then handed over

to the Canadian Army and despatched by rail to POW camps in Ontario and Québec,

although the CO of U-889 and five of his colleagues remained in Halifax until 22 May whilst

they assisted the RCN with the U-Boat’s initial engine running trials.

The five officers from U-190 and three of the six officers from U-889 were taken to Camp 20

at Gravenhurst, Ontario, two of the officers from U-889, including the U-boat’s CO Fritz

Braeucker, were taken to Camp 40 at Farnham, Québec, and the remaining one was taken to

Camp 44 at Grande Ligne, Québec. (25)

Whilst U-190’s officers were at Gravenhurst, a somewhat distasteful event occurred which

did not reflect well on the integrity of the Kriegsmarine. During U-190’s last two patrols the

relationship between the U-Boat’s CO, Hans-Edwin Reith, and his four colleagues had

seriously deteriorated due to his pomposity as well as his indecisiveness and inability to

control difficult situations. Thus soon after their arrival at Camp 20, the other officers from

U-190 petitioned the camp’s German senior officer to dissolve the command relationship

between Reith and themselves because they had lost respect for him and found it distasteful

even to have to salute him. A Board of Inquiry resulted in the granting of this request, with an

option to re-open the matter of Reith’s behaviour if there should ever be an opportunity

within any future post-war German Navy. (26)

The non-commissioned crewmen from both U-Boats were transported to Camp 33 at

Petawawa, Ontario, where they arrived on 18 May. Most of them were later transferred to

Camp 100 at Neys, Ontario, on the north shore of Lake Superior on 20 January 1946 from

where, after just two months, they were moved to Halifax and embarked on the troopship SS

Aquitania which departed for England on 26 March 1946. (17) They were then held in

various English POW camps before being returned to Germany in 1947 and 1948.

It was the turn of U-190’s and U-889’s officers to be transferred from Gravenhurst to

Southampton in England via Halifax on the Aquitania in June 1946 (18), where they too

were held in a variety of POW camps for up to a further two years before finally being taken






to Germany for release. For instance, U-190’s Werner Hirschmann was not released until

August 1947, and Fritz Braeucker, the CO of U-889, was not released until December 1948,

more than three years after he surrendered his U-Boat in the North Atlantic off the east coast

of Canada in May 1945.

Summary

In summary, two Type IXC/40 U-Boats surrendered to Canadian naval forces in May 1945.

First, U-889 on 10 May and, second, U-190 on 11 May. Both were commissioned into the

RCN, and both were evaluated, tested and trialed by the Naval Research Establishment at

Halifax during their short time in Canadian hands. Also, both took part in public exhibition

tours of coastal towns and cities in eastern Canada in August 1945.

U-889 was transferred to the US Navy in January 1946 in accordance with Allied decisions

concerning the allocation of the small number of U-Boats that were allowed to survive post-

war. However, when received by the USN it was found to be non-operational and it was

therefore never used for any purpose other than for cannibalisation of its spares and

equipment for use in other USN U-Boats. It was sunk as a torpedo target off Cape Cod on 20

November 1947.

U-190 was formally allocated to the Royal Navy in early 1946, but then immediately loaned

to the RCN. It was nevertheless in a poor state of maintenance and proved to be of very little

use to the RCN after the end of 1945 other than as a floating firing platform during the NRE’s

CAT-related torpedo trials. This is contrary to the views of several authors who have

suggested – quite wrongly – that the U-Boat was used by the RCN for anti-submarine warfare

training during 1946 and 1947. Its final demise was planned to be a spectacular and highly

publicized event off Halifax on Trafalgar Day, 21 October 1947, but in the end U-190 had the

last laugh, disappearing beneath the waves only 19 minutes after the start of what was

supposed to be a 90-minute anti-submarine exercise conducted jointly by RCN aircraft and

ships.

Special Acknowledgement and Thanks

I must refer to the invaluable assistance that I have received from Michael Whitby, the Senior

Naval Historian at the Department of National Defence’s Directorate of History and

Heritage (DHH) in Ottawa, and from Owen Cooke, a now retired former Chief Archivist at

the DHH.

Without Michael’s information and encouragement, and Owen’s expert research in the

Library and Archive of Canada (LAC) in Ottawa, the production of this article would not

have been possible, especially by someone who lives some 3,000 miles offshore on the other

side of the North Atlantic.

I am therefore most grateful to both of them for their hard work and personal interest, for

sharing with me their deep knowledge of Royal Canadian Navy affairs, and especially for all

their patience in searching for the answers to the many questions which I kept asking. It has

been a pleasure to work with such wonderful colleagues.






Specific Sources:

1. TNA Kew, ADM 199/2317 – Admiralty War Diary – May 1945

2. Ottawa Journal – 7 May 1945

3. Halifax Herald – 14 May 1945

4. Ottawa Journal – 14 May 1945

5. Library and Archive of Canada (LAC) Ottawa. RG 24, Series D-12, Vol.11935, File

8000-U-190: General Information U-190

6. LAC Ottawa. RG 24, Series D-10, Vol.11565, File D20-35-3: HMCS U-889

7. LAC Ottawa. RG 24, Series D-10, Vol. 11116, File 66-1-1: Canadian NRE Report

PHx-59 dated 7 November 1945: “Report on ex-German Submarine U-889, with

Appendix on ex-German Submarine U-190”

8. TNA Kew, ADM 213/308. Canadian NRE Report PHx-56 dated 28 September 1945:

“Listening Gear in U-889 and U-190”

9. “Knots, Volts and Decibels: An Informal History of the Naval Research

Establishment, 1940-1967” - John R Longard (1993). Chapter IV: NRE’s Submarines

10. LAC Ottawa. Series D-1-c, Vol. 8043, File 1206-12: Exhibitions and Displays –

Captured German Submarines

11. Canadian Department of Heritage and History (DHH). Ship’s Movements Cards, U-

889, DHH File No. 2010/15, Box 7, and LAC Ottawa RG 24, Series D-2, Vol.7962: U-889

Deck Log - 28 August to 1 December 1945

12. LAC Ottawa. RG 24, Series D-10, Vol. 11116, File 66-1-1: RCN Submarines –

General (ex-German Submarines)

13. DHH. Ship’s Movements Cards, U-190, DHH File No. 2010/15, Box 7, and LAC Ottawa,

RG 24, Series D-2, Vol.7962: U-190 Deck Logs - 31 May to 27 August and 28 August to 1

December 1945

14. LAC Ottawa. RG24, Series D-10, Vol.11601, File SCH8000 – 476/2: General

Information HMCS U-190

15. LAC Ottawa. RG 24, Series D-2, Vol. 7962: U-190 Deck Log - 31 May to 27 August 1945

16. LAC Ottawa. Series D-10, Vol. 11117, File 66-1-4: RCN Submarines (Disposition of

German Submarines)

17. Documents on British Policy Overseas, “The Conference at Potsdam 1945”






18. NARA Washington, RG 333.4 – Records of the US Navy Element of the TNC

19. LAC Ottawa. RG 24, Series D-1-c, Vol. 6730, File NS8000 – 476/2: General

Information HMCS U-190

20. LAC Ottawa. RG24, Series D-10, Vol.11536, File AC8000 – 476/2: General

Information U-190

21. RCN Press Release No. 445 - 15 July 1947 - DHH File No. 81/520, Box 88, HMCS U-

190

22. RCN Press Release No. 562 – 18 October 1947 - DHH File No. 81/520, Box 88, HMCS

U-190

23. RCN Operation Order, Sinking of Former German Submarine U-190 – 21 October

1947 - DHH File No. 81/520, Box 88, HMCS U-190

24. RCN Press Release No. 589 – 29 October 1947 - DHH File No. 81/520, Box 88, HMCS

U-190

25. Private correspondence with Michael O’Hagan, PhD candidate at Western University,

London, Ontario, Canada - PhD topic: “The History of German POWs in Canada in

WW2”

26. “Another Place, Another Time: A U-Boat Officer’s Wartime Album” – Werner

Hirschmann and Donald Graves (2004). Chapter 12 – “Prisoner of War: May 1945 to

October 1947”