Turkey's Iran Policy: Moving Away from Tradition?

8/9/2019 Turkey's Iran Policy: Moving Away from Tradition?

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Summary: Based on the tradition-

al framework of Turkish foreign

policy, one would have expected it

to encourage Iran to comply with

the requirements of the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and

cooperate with the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

while trying to persuade the Unit-ed States and other members of

the UN Security Council that dip-

lomatic means should be given

continued priority. But in the fnal

analysis, as a natural outcome

of its traditionally pro-Western

foreign policy orientation, Turkey

would not have led the effort to

oppose the measures that were

adopted by the Security Council.

The fact that Turkey has chosen

to cooperate with another emerg-

ing power Brazil to challengethe way the international nuclear

order operates, appears to signal

a fundamental shift in the way

policy is formulated.

Analysis

Addressing a large audience o busi-nessmen, members o the press and

academics at the Istanbul Forum inMay, urkeys Foreign Minister AhmetDavutolu outlined several goals orhis countrys oreign policy. Globalproblems, he said, had to be addressedwithin rameworks that all stake-holders had taken part in orming. Icountries were asked to comply withrules and institutional arrangementsthat had been developed without theirconsent, it would prove dicult orthem to accept them as legitimate.

Davutolu also made reerences tothe growth o the urkish economyand urkeys natural inclination todevelop mutually benecial relation-ships with countries in its region. Heemphasized that urkeys contributionto addressing regional problems were

viewed as both natural and desirableby those with whom urkey shared acommon history and culture. Finally,he reminded the audience that urkeywas pursuing a policy o zero problemswith neighbors.

Te guidelines o urkish oreignpolicy as elaborated by Davutolu hadin act evolved rom two major devel-opments during the last two decadeso the 20th century. First in 1980 camethe decision to liberalize the oreigncurrency regime, quickly leading to a

Turkeys Iran Policy:

Moving Away from Tradition?

bylter Turan

June 25, 2010

reorientation o the urkish economyrom import substitution to export-

led growth. Next came the end o theCold War and the demise o the SovietUnion, developments that redenedthe global security environment andconsequently urkeys security needs.Economic considerations began toconstitute a much greater actor inurkeys oreign policy. In terms osecurity, various regional and globalrelationships were orged while main-taining urkeys continued involve-ment in the Atlantic Alliance as a pillar

o its deense.

Tis adjustment in urkish oreignpolicy was initiated by the late IsmailCem during his tenure as oreignminister rom 1997 to 2002. urkeyassumed a new interest in the regionssurrounding it and, in particular, triedto reach out to the countries o theMiddle East with whom relations hadbeen neglected during the years othe Cold War. At the same time, thesenew developments in urkeys oreignpolicy did not aim to alter its basicpro-western orientation. urkey stillpursued its goal o joining the Euro-pean Union and its security continuedto rest upon NAO. As its economycontinued to grow in leaps and boundsto become the 16th largest economyin the world, and as its share in world

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Brussels BelgraDeankara BuCharest

O f f i c e s


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Analysis

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Analysis

trade increased, it was invited to become a member o G-20

group o countries. Tese developments, taken together, didnot point to a policy aimed at bringing about a change inthe world order. Rather, it was an attempt to become a moreactive and inuential player in the existing system.

Te policy urkey has been ollowing with regards to Iransnuclear ambitions, combined with the philosophy that ismaniest in Davutolus remarks, suggest that the basiso urkish oreign policy is being transormed. Based onthe traditional ramework o urkish oreign policy, onewould have expected it to encourage Iran to comply withthe requirements o the Nuclear Non-Prolieration reaty

(NP) and cooperate with the International Atomic En-ergy Agency (IAEA), while trying to persuade the UnitedStates and other members o the UN Security Council thatdiplomatic means should be given continued priority. Butin the nal analysis, as a natural outcome o its traditionallypro-Western oreign policy orientation, urkey would nothave led the eort to oppose the measures that were adopt-ed by the Security Council. Te act that urkey has chosento cooperate with another emerging power Brazil tochallenge the way the international nuclear order operates,appears to signal a undamental shif in the way policy isormulated.

urkeys arguments regarding its position on Irans nuclearambitions have ocused not so much on the potential risksinvolved in Irans development o nuclear weapons and itsimplications or urkeys security, but on the act that thereare other countries in the region notably Israel that al-ready possess nuclear weapons. Tereore, eorts should bedirected toward the establishment o a nuclear-ree region,within which Iran would also abandon its pursuit o nuclearweapons.

Tough not spelled out in such specic terms, the logic othe urkish position on Iranian weapons ows somewhat asollows: Te current non-prolieration regime gives inherentadvantages to the several countries that possessed atomicweapons when the regime was initially established in 1968with the advent o the NP. Tose that were in possessiono nuclear weapons rom the beginning have not abided bytheir commitment to disarm completely. New countries,on the other hand, were added to the list o states pos-sessing nuclear weapons afer the treaty went into eect.

Some newcomers to the nuclear club have also been able to

develop nuclear weapons by staying out o the NP system.All newcomers have enjoyed, at one time or another, thediscreet cooperation and support o some o those alreadypossessing weapons. On many occasions, major powershave turned a blind eye to those who have violated the sys-tem. Consequently, the non-prolieration system has ailedto prevent the spread o nuclear weapons. It has insteadallowed the major world powers to sometimes permit andat other times ail to deter countries rom developing theirown arsenals. Te regime gives a monopoly o nuclearweapons to those that already have them, placing them ata permanent advantage without a meaningul program o

total nuclear disarmament. It is thereore not justied toexpect countries to observe a set o rules that were devel-oped without their participation or give their consent toan arrangement that accords undue privileges to a selectgroup o countries. Tis is all the more important since thepossession o nuclear weapons provides a country with ashield that protects it against conventional attacks by otherpowers.

Tis approach naturally means that deep dierences remainbetween the United States and urkey regarding UN Secu-rity Council Resolution 1929, which imposes sanctions on

Iran in order to compel it to cooperate with the IAEA, andthe American governments reusal to accept as sucientthe agreement that Brazil and urkey were able to brokerwith the Iranian government. urkey notes that Iran prom-ised to exchange 1,200 kilograms o its low grade uraniumor 120 kilograms o enriched uranium that is to be used ormedical purposes, and that urkey would serve as the de-pository o the uel until the exchange is completed, addingthat this is precisely what the United States had asked or.Te United States meanwhile argues that other conditionsthat it had asked or were not ully met and that the amounto uranium Iran possesses has actually increased, leaving inits hands enough uel to make a bomb. Furthermore, Iranhas not abandoned its eorts to enrich the uranium in itspossession.

urkeys gentler approach may be explained by several ac-tors. urkish leaders enjoy recounting that urkey and Iran(and their predecessor states) have been at peace since 1639and that they are unwilling to commit signicantly hostileacts toward Iran that might compromise that relationship.


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Analysis

Analysis

urkeys trade with Iran is robust and growing. urkey

aspires to serve as an energy corridor to Western marketsor Iranian gas and oil. And nally, political leaders callattention to the act that the negative eects o an embargoare not elt equally. During the oil embargo against SaddamHusseins Iraq, a disproportionate burden was placed uponurkey without adequate compensation rom the inter-national community. Clearly, these are sucient reasonsto account or urkeys reluctance to support an embargoagainst Iran. But the desire or a new international orderthat is in greater harmony with the emerging distribution oglobal power also appears to constitute a more comprehen-sive ramework that better explains urkish oreign policy

actions in general, not just with regard to Iran.

Where do things stand now? urkey has announced thatit will abide by the UNSC decision, despite voting againstit. Te United States, or its part, has encouraged urkey tocontinue its eorts to extract an agreement rom Iran thatully satises American concerns. As much as urkey mightwant to change the world, and the United States maintainthe status quo, both countries, it appears, have too manyinterests in common to risk a rupture in their relations.

lter Turan, Professor, Bilgi University

lter Turan is currently a proessor o political science at Istanbuls Bilgi

University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001. His

previous employment included proessorships at Ko University (1993-

1998) and Istanbul University (1964-1993), where he also served as the

chair o the International Relations Department (1987-1993), and the

director o the Center or the Study o the Balkans and the Middle East

(1985-1993). Dr. Turan is the past president o the Turkish Political

Science Association and has been a member o the Executive Commit-

tee and a vice president o the International Political Science Associa-

tion (2000-2006). He has served as the program chair o the 21st World

Congress o Political Science in Santiago, Chile, July 12-16, 2009. He is

board chair o the Health and Education Foundation and serves on the

board o several oundations and corporations. He is widely published

in English and Turkish on comparative politics, Turkish politics, and

oreign policy. His most recent writings have been on the domestic and

international politics o water, the Turkish parliament and its members,

and Turkish political parties. He is a requent commentator on Turkish

politics on TV and newspapers.

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Turkey's Iran Policy: Moving Away from Tradition?