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Tuesday, 29 November 2011
(11.34)
MR JAY: Sir, the next witness, Mr Davies.
MR NICK DAVIES (affirmed)
Questions from MR JAY
MR JAY: First of all, make yourself comfortable, Mr Davies.
Will I need the evidence bundle that you sent me?
Q. Please, Mr Davies. Your full name, please?
Nicholas John Allen Davies.
Q. In the bundle we provided you, you should see under
tab 1 a witness statement which you kindly provided
right on the button, as it were, in terms of timing, on
27 September 2011.
57
Yes.
Q. You have provided a statement of truth at the end of
that statement. Is this your evidence to the Inquiry?
Yes.
Q. The reason, Mr Davies, we're calling you early is that
you obviously provide us with a lot of general
assistance in relation to phone hacking and about
journalistic practices in general, and the rest of the
Guardian's evidence will, as it were, come early in the
new year.
So we understand who you are, for those who don't
know, you are a freelance journalist who has been
working under a part-time contract for the Guardian for
some considerable time; is that right, Mr Davies?
Yes, since 1989, but I was a staff reporter for some
years in the early 1980s at the Guardian.
Q. Aside from working for the Guardian as a special
correspondent, what else do you do?
Occasionally I drift into making television
documentaries as an onscreen reporter and I also had a
phase when I wrote feature films and I write books. I'm
currently writing one about -- or trying to write one
about the phone hacking. It's driving me mad.
Q. Thank you. The book which all of us have read, "Flat
Earth News", that came out in 2008; is that right?
58
January 2008.
Q. You do tell us a bit about your journalistic training in
your statement, and this may be of interest to us. It
was between 1976 and --
'78.
Q. With a scheme for university graduates which was run by
the Mirror group.
Yes.
Q. Can you expand upon that just a little --
The Mirror group then owned a little group of newspapers
down in Devon and Cornwall and they had a training
scheme which was based in Plymouth. I think it was
regarded as a pretty good scheme, and they spent
a couple of months teaching us basic skills, shorthand,
typing, newspaper law, and then they sent us out to work
on these local papers and then, after whatever it was,
a couple of years, if you passed your proficiency test,
they hiked up you up to London to one of the Mirror
group's national papers to work on what they called an
attachment for a couple of months. I was very keen to
work on the Sunday People, which was in those days quite
a different creature to the paper it is now.
Specifically, they had just uncovered an intense bout of
corruption among police officers in Central London,
particularly the porn squad, which was heroic work,
59
really brilliant stuff, and I wanted to part of that.
So after that training scheme, I went to work briefly
for the Sunday People and it may or may not be relevant,
bearing in mind some of what Richard Peppiatt was just
saying, but I got bullied at the paper. It was
a particular executive who just thought -- he couldn't
tell the difference between leadership and spite and
I couldn't cope, so I fled, which is why I'm no longer
in the Mirror group.
Q. In terms of your training, you said that you covered
newspaper law, which may well have been a bit different
in the mid-1970s compared to what it is now. Did you
cover ethical issues at all?
Actually not very much, I would say. That doesn't mean
to say I'm an unethical person, but I do not remember
talking about ethics at all. This was a tabloid
training scheme.
Q. Fair enough. You're mainly interest in reporting, you
explain in your statement, long-term investigations of
social issues, including poverty in the UK, failing
schools, the criminal justice system, tax avoidance,
falsehood and distortion in the news media. So it's
quite a Catholic, eclectic agenda, as it were.
Yes.
Q. What brought you into becoming interested in the issue
60
of phone hacking?
I think a fluke. I was very interested in falsehood and
distortion in the media, which became this book, "Flat
Earth News". The research for that meant that I had to
go and talk to reporters from other newsrooms to get the
story behind stories, to understand what was going
wrong. Those reporters started talking to me about
illegal information-gathering techniques, stuff which
I just, naively, wasn't aware of, and that therefore
formed a chapter in the book about the "dark arts", as
they call them.
When the book was published in January 2008, I was
on the Radio 4 Today programme and also, up against me,
so to speak, was Stuart Kuttner, the then managing
editor of the News of the World, and when I tried to
summarise the chapter about the dark arts, he ridiculed
me. "I don't know what --" this is in summary: "I don't
know what planet Mr Davies thinks he's living on but
it's not one I recognise. This happened once at the
News of the World, the reporter was sent to prison and
that's it."
That was a statement which, I think it is fair to
say, is soundly false, and the result was that it
provoked somebody I had never heard of into getting in
touch with me and saying, "I heard Kuttner on the radio.
61
You need to know the truth."
And this person started to provide me with very
solid and detailed information about what had been going
on in the News of the World. This is back
in January/February 2008.
So you understand, the pattern of my work would be I
would usually have three or four big projects going at a
time, because they hit roadblocks. Project A can't
proceed unless I can talk to person A. He's on holiday,
so we'll proceed with projects B, C and D.
So I started to work part-time on that, gathering
bits and pieces from different places over a period
of -- actually, it turned into 18 months before I had
something that was worth printing, which was the
Gordon Taylor story in July 2009. So the short answer
to your question is I stumbled into it accidentally.
Q. No, that's very clear, Mr Davies. In terms of the
chronology of the stories, the Inquiry fully
understands. It has read a massive amount of material,
including an e-book which the Guardian has published.
I'm not sure you're aware --
Oh yes. That's just a collection of stories which the
Guardian hats published.
Q. Yes. It's a helpful summary to the not fully initiated
of the chronology. I'm not going to ask you about
62
specific sources, for quite obvious reasons, but in
relation to phone hacking, are you able to assist us at
all, or at least the nature of your sources and perhaps
the number of your sources?
Of phone hacking? Okay.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I want to know about the whole thing
in terms -- I'm sure Mr Jay will turn to it -- and in
particular I would like to know about how journalists
work on a story, how they validate what they're going to
say and how they check up on the sources that they use.
The reason I'm asking you this is because your book
contains a great deal of material which you've obtained
from other people, which a lawyer would call obvious
hearsay.
Right.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That doesn't mean to say it's wrong,
but I am keen that people understand and that I fully
understand precisely how you get to the conclusion you
reach --
Okay.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- and how solidly based that
conclusion is. I've probably summarised Mr Jay's next
15 questions.
But there's a lot in there.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: There is, and I'm happy to leave it
63
to you and him to sort it out.
If I try to start with the generality, which is what
you're asking me, I think. First of all, set aside the
kind of time-limited churnalistic activity which
I describe in the book and which Richard Peppiatt has
been talking about. If you give a reporter time, the
most essential working asset for our trade, then I would
say it works like this: that I'm looking for evidence to
discover the truth and I would expect to find that
evidence initially on two primary routes. The first is
the public domain, which I would define as everything
I'm allowed to know simply because I asked for it. And
the public domain has got much bigger in the last few
years, so this involves, for example, conventional
public records, Companies House and much more else, the
use of the Freedom of Information Act to uncover, again,
what you're allowed to know simply because you ask for
it, and of course the use of the Internet. So all
that's there in the public domain. That is, from
a reporter's point of view, low-hanging fruit.
The second primary route -- is this the right
approach? Is that what you want me to --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, definitely.
The second primary route is the most important stuff we
can do, which is human sources, and I mean, I've never
64
known an interesting story where everything you needed
to know was available on the first route, in the public
domain. It's kind of almost a definition of a good
story -- in fact, this is an old newspaper maxim. News
is what someone somewhere doesn't want you to know. So
if they're concealing it, you won't find it out there on
the public domain. You have to have human sources. The
most difficult, skilful, interesting, important stuff
that reporters do it is finding human sources and
motivating them to help. It's a terrible interesting
area from a reporter's point of view.
So that's where the mass of work goes on. If that
doesn't yield what you want, there are other secondary
routes to getting information, one of which I learnt
from Harry Evans, who was probably the best journalist
this country has produced since the war. In his memoir,
he describes how, on several occasions, he got his
journalists to persuade people to sue because he could
see that they couldn't get to the bottom of the barrel
and get evidence simply from those two primary routes,
and if there were legal actions ongoing, the judge might
order disclosure into the public court of material that
would help them to see the truth.
Learning from that lesson in this particular story
of the phone hacking, I certainly did whatever I could
65
to hook up public figures who had been -- or anybody who
had been a victim, allegedly, of hacking with the
lawyers who might take their case forward so that
eventually something would pop out in open court.
So in general terms, it's those three routes. Am
I answering your question?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes.
Then I think we went to the point about how a lot of
this is unattributable, and this comes back again to
that point. If news is what someone somewhere doesn't
want you to know, then very often at the point where you
start to motivate a human source, you run into a genuine
problem on their part. They will say, "Look, if I talk
to you and they realise I've done this, I will lose my
job or my career or I will be beaten up or I will be
arrested or some terrible thing is going to happen", and
it's a very sensitive moment. You have to make these
people safe.
The first step almost all the time is about
a guarantee of anonymity. "They won't know you've talked
to me." That's actually quite a complicated piece
because it isn't simply a question of saying, "I won't
put your name in the paper." It also means I have to
filter the material they give me because if I publish
too much it would become clear by implication as to who
66
they are.
In this particular context, if we come back to
something I mentioned briefly that Richard Peppiatt
mentioned and I know the NUJ have mentioned, it's a very
important part of this picture that there is a culture
of bullying in some Fleet Street newspapers, and so it's
not just a question of "I'll lose my job". It's nastier
than that, and the fear is real, and therefore you would
have a high proportion of these sources saying, "I will
talk to you but only on this condition of anonymity",
and I appreciate that's very difficult for the Inquiry.
It means that I've been able to look not only at the
public domain sources but to deal with the human
sources, and then, to answer a question you asked, to
see how it overlaps. If you have, say, 10 or 15
different former reporters from the News of the World
each independently sketching essentially the same
picture, it's a reasonable judgment that any human being
using common sense would come to, to say, "These people
are telling me the truth." If, in addition, you can
find other evidence from the our routes, you'll be all
the more solid.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I understand that and the
explanation, I think, is tremendously important not just
for me but for anybody who's following this Inquiry,
67
because it then goes on you to the question in relation
to the topics about which you are going to be asked, how
overlapping that information is.
Mm-hm.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I think that was one of Mr Jay's
questions. How many people are we talking about? Not
to identify them --
Understood.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- but to seek to validate the
conclusions that you've reached, as opposed to an
individual person who comes and says X and then somebody
else says, "Well, that's rubbish. It's not X."
Okay. So I think you were asking specifically about the
phone hacking story?
MR JAY: Yes.
If we start there.
MR JAY: Yes.
There's a loose assembly of about, I would think,
between 15 and 20 former News of the World journalists
who have talked, on condition of anonymity, in detail to
me or a researcher who was working for me, and they've
been a tremendously important engine driving the story
forward.
Separately, within the private investigation
industry, profession, there are some -- I suppose you
68
could call them senior investigators, who are very
worried by the activities of people they would see as
cowboys, who they see damaging the reputation of their
industry, and again, on condition of anonymity, there
are, I suppose, more like four or five or six -- I'm
finding it a little -- but around that number, but no
more than half a dozen, but who have again been
tremendously helpful, partly about the generality of how
they operate, about the skills they use, and also, I
think with all six, about work for newspapers.
So that's two big pools of people. The former
journalists, the PIs, the private investigators.
There's a third pool, which are the victims and
their legal actions, who overlap to a considerable
extent. So if a reporter says, "So-and-so was a victim
of the hacking", then I go to the public figure or their
representative and say, "Well, they're saying this.
Does this coincide with anything you know about?" And
they may say -- I mean, at the top end of the scale,
they may say, "Operation Weeting have just been on my
doorstep. It's definitely true." At the lower end of
the scale, it's: "You know, I always suspected it.
There were these occasions." And then you start this
checking and overlapping business. So those these pools
of people would be very important.
69
There are other sources which are very sensitive who
are, I would say, familiar with things that the police
have been doing, who have also been very, I think, brave
and helpful on this story. There are probably others,
but there's -- does that help you? There's a lot on the
News of the World.
Q. Yes, I think that's probably as far as you'd want to go
in terms of identifying the different categories of
sources; is that right?
Yes.
Q. In relation to chapter 7 of your book, "Flat Earth
News", the chapter entitled, "The Dark Arts", is it the
same methodology which you are applying in general
terms? Because it's clear from that that you are
talking to private investigators, you're talking to
reporters or former reporters.
Yes.
Q. Are you talking to those close to the police or within
the police?
I think "close to" would be fair.
Q. "Close to". In terms of quantity, though -- for
example, if you're talking about a particular title --
you mention a number of titles in chapter 7 -- how many
reporters are you speaking to before you have, as it
were, a critical mass which would justify he you putting
70
it in print?
I would say a dozen. In almost all cases, around about
a dozen, perhaps a little more.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's in relation to each title?
Correct, and they tend to be former rather than current.
There's public domain stuff, of course, on my first
primary route.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But it's the same sort of exercise?
In relation of each of the features of which you speak,
it's the same approach, the same sort of validation, or
is it different?
No, it's exactly the same approach that I tried to
describe at the beginning, the public domain and the
human sources. In respect of each title, we have sort
of 12 to 15 sources. That doesn't, of course, mean that
in respect of each allegation in relation to each title
you have 12 to 15 sources, but you're going to have more
than one on any allegation. It's a bit difficult to
talk about it in such general terms. Sometimes you can
have several sources very precisely saying the same
thing. On other occasions, you have a source who -- one
source is saying it very precisely, the other person is
confirming it in more general terms, and then you may
have bits and pieces of public domain or whatever.
It's worth pointing out that a book like that
71
doesn't get published without going through a specialist
media lawyer and they comb through it and produce a long
memo saying, "How can you justify this and why would you
print that?" and they won't publish -- it gets amended
as a result of that process and they won't publish
unless they feel they can justify it.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: The reason this is obviously very
important is because you are aware some people don't
entirely agree with everything you write in that
chapter.
Of course.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And to get to grips with what is the
culture, practice and ethics of the press, inevitably
I'm looking at all the material, and each editor will
come along and tell me what they want to say, but
therefore I have to get some handle on validity and
indeed weight. You know, I'm sure, that I'm concerned
about anonymous evidence and hearsay is actually a form
of anonymous evidence, so I can only test it through
you.
Yes. I accept that there is that difficulty with what
I have to tell you, and I will tell you the truth as
much as I possibly can. To the extent that I can give
you the evidence I will, but I accept that it's
frustrating for the Inquiry that so much of this has
72
come from people who are off the record.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It may be inevitable for the reasons
that you've identified.
There is going to be a gap, isn't there, between what
I know and what I can show you.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. I understand.
Right, I won't interrupt you again, Mr Jay, or at
least probably won't. Possibly won't.
MR JAY: We'll come back to this when we look at chapter 7,
but can I deal with your more general evidence about
systems at the Guardian. This is your witness
statement. At paragraph 5, you say:
"The Guardian has a particularly clear commitment to
ethical journalism."
Mm-hm.
Q. In terms it of the code of conduct of the PCC, is that
provided to all journalists, including journalists in
your position?
Yes. There's actually -- the Guardian has its own code
and the PCC is part of it as an appendix.
Q. And the NUJ code, again, is a separate code, I believe;
is that right?
Yeah. I think it's fair to say it's less often referred
to, but in terms it's more or less the same.
Q. In terms of accountability, the chain -- or the line
73
going up from you is the news editor and then, if
necessary, the editor in-chief; is that right?
Yes.
Q. That presumably is standard practice in the whole of the
industry with minor deviations?
Yes, I would think so, and I think I made the point in
there that the people who, generally speaking, are
enforcing the code aren't the PCC or the NUJ or
whatever. They're in the background. It's the news
desk, the features desk, whatever that you're working
for, who are going to say, "Hang on a minute."
Q. You say in paragraph 6 that the concept of public
interest is particularly slippery.
Mm-hm. Paragraph 6? Oh yes, I'm with you.
Q. "Slippery" can mean a number of things. What are you
seeking to convey by the use of that --
What I'm trying to say is that -- first of all, if we
all get over the first hurdle that we understand that
operating in the public interest means we're operating
in the interests of the public, trying to tell them
something that is good, that they need to know. In
operational day-to-day terms, it's terribly difficult to
know exactly where the boundary lines are, and so
sometimes this is a legal point. Section 55 of the Data
Protection Act says you have a public interest defence.
74
If I'm working on a particular story in particular
circumstances, do I or do I not have the public interest
on my side? The answer very often is: I don't have the
faintest idea because we don't know where the boundary
lines are. Not because I'm not thinking about it and
not because the Guardian aren't interested; we don't
know quite where the lines are supposed to lie. And
that problem, I think, applies across the board over and
over again to any ethical question that reporters face.
The answer tends to be: well, it would be all right if
it was in the public interest, but we're stymied because
in reality we don't -- I mean, there are some cases
where it's clear. They're so far over the boundary line
that we know that the public interest is on our side or
it isn't on our side, but very often, it isn't clear and
personally, I would like it if somebody set up, by
statute, a public interest advisory body that I or
a member of the public or a private investigator could
go to and get high-quality advice which would be
confidential, but in the event of a dispute, a criminal
prosecution or a civil action, I would be able to
produce that advice and say, "Well, look, this is what
I was told." So they'd have no prior restraint on me,
but I would have some guidance which was weighty in the
event of a dispute.
75
Q. I've received a message, Mr Davies. It's no fault of
anybody's. I think you're going slightly too fast for
our transcriber.
Sorry. I'll try to slow down.
Q. One notch only. Your evidence is coming across very
clearly, but it does have to be written down.
Okay.
Q. Can I seek to analyse what you've just said in this way.
Is the problem that in many cases you don't know where
the public interest lies because you don't know what the
truth of the story is or you don't know where your
investigations might lead, and so --
No.
Q. No?
That's not the problem. The problem is that we don't
know where the boundary line is, so ...
Well, one way of approaching it is this. Different
journalists have completely different definitions. So
people from the News of the World will tell you, in all
sincerity, that it was in the public interest that they
exposed Max Mosley's sex life. I profoundly and
sincerely disagree with them. I do not think that was
in the public interest.
Now, I understand that the courts came down, so to
speak, on my side of the argument. They still haven't
76
persuaded those other journalists that they're wrong.
They sincerely believe that the boundary line is in
a different place and there have been some cases -- for
example, the John Terry case -- where the courts
themselves have danced on both sides of the line, at
first saying the story about John Terry having an affair
is confidential and then jumping over the line and
saying, "No, actually, it's in the public interest that
this be disclosed", and if the courts aren't clear, how
am I supposed to be the clear, the hack with the
notebook?
Q. Yes.
It's not about not knowing the details of the story;
it's about not knowing what the rule is in operational
terms. Does that make sense?
Q. It does and it doesn't because you, of course, are not
writing this type of story. You're writing a different
type of story. Are you able to assist us with perhaps
even a hypothetical example or an accurate example,
sufficiently anonymised, where the moral dilemma or the
ethical dilemma is laid bear for us?
Well, we had a huge problem with the Wikileaks stuff.
Because in the middle of all this phonehacking, I went
off and persuaded Julian Assange to give all this
material to the Guardian and the New York Times and
77
Der Spiegel, and it rapidly became apparent that that
material contained information which could get people on
the ground in Afghanistan seriously hurt. They were
implicit identified as sources of information for the
coalition forces.
I raised this with Julian very early on and he said,
"If an Afghan civilian gives information to Coalition
forces, they deserve to die. They are informers. They
are collaborators." And there were huge tussles between
the journalists and him -- actually, maybe this isn't
a terrible good example because I would say emphatically
it's absolutely clear that we couldn't publish that
information and didn't, but he did. I would love to
have been able to go to a specialist advisory body and
say, "Where is the public interest here?" in order to be
able to show it to him, to persuade him.
The other example I gave in the statement was that
although the Data Protection Act has a public interest
defence, which in principle would allow me, in some
circumstances, to blag information from a bank account
or the DVLA, I've never ever used it because I wouldn't
feel safe, because I don't know where the
Information Commissioner is going to say the boundary
line is. All I know is that he said in principle he
would expect to see very strong public interest before
78
he would acknowledge the validity of that defence.
Is this making sense?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, I understand exactly what you're
saying.
There's another example I've just thought of. We have
to be a bit careful about this because this is
information that's not been published. About six years
ago, there was a senior politician in this country whose
child attempted suicide. This is a story which we have
never published and it's very, very debatable as to
whether or not we should have done. You will hear
journalists debating it because it became politically
significant for that politician's career that the child
had done this, and yet we never reported it.
Or another one: should we or should we not have
reported the fact that Prince Harry was fighting in
Afghanistan? That's probably a better example. You
remember this? Prince Harry was sent to Afghanistan.
Before he went, the army and the palace called in
newspapers and said, "This is what we're doing. We're
going to send Harry to Afghanistan. Will you please
black it out, not report it?" And newspapers agreed not
to publish it on the basis that if they did, it would
bring down extra fire on him and the other people in his
squadron and we didn't want to be responsible for that.
79
That looks pretty like good thinking. On the other
hand, it meant that we were colluding in what then
became PR story, because when the story was finally
released, the headline was "Harry the hero", but in fact
we had offered him an extra layer of protection by doing
that, and what I --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm not sure that's right, actually.
What you'd done was you had given him the same layer of
protection that all his colleagues had. You hadn't
added an extra layer of protection.
But the crucial words are -- you said, "I'm not sure
that you're r right."
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Oh yes, that's because I'm polite.
But I would say, without any hint of politeness, I'm not
sure, you see, what was right then. I tell you, my
initial reaction to that was that we were right to
suppress the information for the safety of those people
involved. After I'd thought about it for a few days,
I changed my mind and thought it was wrong that we did
that and the fact -- the collusion factor was part of
it. There's another example --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm happy to have more examples
because this is tremendously important, and I am going
to want to come back at the end of your evidence to talk
about the bodies that you think ought to be in place, as
80
I'm sure Mr Jay, the structures that you think ought to
be in place. But can I just say this: that you've
mentioned a story that didn't enter the public domain.
I absolutely would not want anybody to report what
you've said and then to start reinquiry as to whether
that's sensible, as to who it might be or anything.
That is not the purpose of this Inquiry and I hope that
everybody will take that point extremely seriously.
I'm sorry, I --
You're right. I also feel the same way.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Right.
MR JAY: Thank you.
Mr Davies, you deal with some other general evidence
about systems in the Guardian, which others doubtless
will give as well, but can I just touch on one issue in
paragraph 9, namely legal advice and in-house lawyer.
Mm-hm.
Q. All your stories presumably are checked?
Mm-hm.
Q. For defamation and accuracy; is that right?
By the lawyer, yeah, for contempt or any other issues.
Q. And someone forms a judgment a priori, I suppose, as to
whether a story is potentially legally contentious, in
which case the legal scrutiny is more intense, or
whether it appears more uncontroversial, in which case
81
it's -- I wouldn't say cursory, but it's less
microscopic; is that right?
Roughly speaking, yes.
Q. In paragraph 11, you deal with ethical issues in
general. The key point you're making here perhaps is
that the commercial imperatives which drive some
journalism are not as clearly in play or in play at all
in relation to this particular title.
This particular ...?
Q. Title. In other words, the Guardian?
Yes. The Guardian is a little bit different to other
newspapers because it belongs to a trust. Therefore it
doesn't have to generate lots of money to pass back to
its shareholders, and I think that that does have
a really important knock-on effect on the internal
culture of the paper. It's the corollary to what
Richard Peppiatt was talking about earlier on, that
where you have a highly competitive, commercially driven
newspaper, that will get passed down from the chief
executive and the management side to the editor, down
through the desks and to the reporters. In a way, all
this story starts with geography. You happen to have in
this country a population of 50 to 60 million people who
for decades have been within a train ride's distance --
within an overnight's train ride's distance of London
82
and Glasgow. So you've been able to publish newspapers
and reach that very, very dense, highly populated
market.
So you have a hugely competitive national newspaper
market. When you compare it to the United States,
a population, say, five times the size, scattered over
a huge geographical area, so you couldn't possibly print
a newspaper in New York, put it on a train and reach LA.
So they grew up with city papers, not national papers,
by and large, and you get one or two in each city.
I hope this is relevant, but if you look at our
national newspaper market, the first -- (a) that is very
important. I don't know whether there's a more
commercially newspaper competitive market in the world.
And within that market, the popular newspapers rely
overwhelmingly on selling the papers to earn their
income. The broadsheets, as they've always
traditionally been called, by contrast rely far more on
advertising, selling advertising space to get their
income.
So within that highly competitive market, it's the
popular newspapers that are trying to sell in the
millions where that commercial imperative is at its most
intense, and it gets passed down through the ranks, as
I think Richard was trying to describe and is often
83
reinforced which the bullying which I have a referred
to.
The broadsheets have less commercial imperative.
Still they have to sell copies to justify their
advertising income, but not as many copies. It isn't as
intense and within that less intense end of the market,
a newspaper like the Guardian that's owned by a trust is
less intense again in its commercial pressure. It is
nonetheless there -- we have to survive -- but it's
mitigated.
Does that make sense?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, certainly. Again, I'm
interrupting. I shouldn't do that. But at one stage
I'm going to want you to talk about the different
imperatives, if you can, that face broadsheets like the
Guardian, which has one type of audience, and the
mid-market or tabloid end, which has a different type of
audience, sells many, many more copies, and whether the
same considerations which you've been discussing really
apply to the different types of story that these
different newspapers promote.
But do you want me to talk about that now or --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well -- please do.
To take you up on -- because I think I've given the
answer already, which is that the commercial
84
considerations are reduced in the broadsheet paper, and
in particular the broadsheet paper owned by the trust.
What I'm arguing for is that -- journalism doesn't begin
with checking facts. There's a prior stage of selective
judgment. What subjects should we cover? Having
decided to cover this subject, what angle should we
take? What priority do we give it in the bulletin or
the paper? At what length, with what language? This is
all highly selective. How should we make those
selective judgments? Overwhelmingly, they are made on
commercial grounds. So we want the story which is quick
and cheap to do, which is why we recycle agency copy and
other people's stories. We want the story that will
sell papers, so therefore you pick the sexiest possible
way of telling it.
The problems that are associated with that I think
spread across the spectrum. I'm not exempting the
Guardian from problems. We have run stories which were
clearly false. The Jersey children's home -- do you
remember that, a couple of years ago -- where the idea
was that the police had evidence that children had been
killed and buried in the ruins of an old children's home
on the isle of Jersey. That's a classic of what Richard
was trying to describe earlier. The evidence for the
truth of that proposition is screaming its falsehood.
85
So, for example, the police said, "We have been looking
into the ruins of this building and we have found
a cellar which is exactly like the cellar which is
described by our survivor witnesses." It's "very dark".
Cellars are dark. It means nothing. Then they said,
"And in this cellar we found a bath", and it's quite
alarming, this, the sort of hints of torturing. "It's
actually bolted to the floor", as though everybody's
bath was mobile. It's silly. It doesn't make any
sense.
So then the problem that occurred on all newspapers
across the whole spectrum is it's too good a story to
knock down. So it's exactly what Richard was saying.
A reporter from any paper is sent out to Jersey to
follow up on this story. The reporter who rings up and
says, "Actually, this is crap, there's just no evidence
for this at all", they will not be thanked. It's
a great story.
I actually ran a piece in the Media Guardian,
saying, "What are we talking about?" I was speaking
about this in public meetings. I actually bet one
meeting my left finger if the story was true, but
nevertheless we carried on running it.
So it's a problem that spreads to some degree across
Fleet Street, commercial judgments.
86
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, I understand.
Okay.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Now I put the reason for my question,
because I have been -- "criticised" is not too high
a word -- for approaching the issue without tabloid
expertise, and I'm keen to understand the extent to
which the issues -- it may be the subject matter is
different, but the issues should be different whatever
title you're working for. Do you understand the point
I'm making?
Yes, okay. There are differences of degree, rather than
kind, I suppose is one way of summarising it.
MR JAY: Thank you. May I deal with the general issue in
relation to sources. This is paragraph 14 of your
statement.
Mm-hm.
Q. You make it clear that you never pay your sources for
their assistance, and in the middle of the page:
"Similarly, I have never come across the Guardian
paying police, public officials or mobile phone
companies."
Mm-hm.
Q. That's your direct experience, is it, Mr Davies?
Yes. Well, yes, it's a negative experience, isn't it,
but it is mine.
87
Q. Then you say:
"For the sake of completeness ..."
That occasionally a meal or a drink is bought, as
you might expect. The question is probably so obvious
it goes without saying, but what are the ethical
ramifications of paying for stories?
Generally speaking?
Q. Yes, and why don't you pay for stories?
I've said in the statement that I think the issue is not
primarily ethical. I'm not one of those people who says
chequebook journalism is inherently evil. I think it's
a practical question. So if you go back to my business
about the human sources on that primary route, the key
thing we have to do -- sometimes easy, sometimes
terribly difficult -- is to motivate people to talk to
us. People of -- like I have to be able to get the
12-year-old child prostitute to talk to me, and the
police officer who is trying to arrest her, and the
social worker who can't control her, and the pimp who's
taking money off her. All of them I have to persuade to
talk to me, and the way to do that with success is to
find a motivation and build a relationship. It's the
most exciting, interesting thing in reporting. If you
pay -- and this is why I say it's practical, not
ethical -- (a) there is a chance that you're giving
88
these people a motive to fabricate, to earn their money,
and (b) at best, you get a very limited amount of
co-operation.
So there have been occasions when I've been, so to
speak, competing with tabloid journalists for the same
story and they've gone in with their chequebooks. If
you could quantify it, they've got the first couple of
pages of the story but I got the whole chapter because
people decided they want to help. That, I think, is
where the problem is. You see, practical rather than
ethical.
There's a subsidiary point where clearly if you --
if a journalist or anybody else is offering to pay money
in contravention of the Bribery Act, then there's
a legal problem, clearly.
Q. As regards the specific example you've given about child
prostitution -- you cover this in detail in
paragraph 20, which is 03000. You make it clear that in
order properly to investigate that case, you were paying
no more than £20 to the children involved, which is, of
course, equivalent to the pathetically small amounts
they would obtain from those purchasing their services.
Yes, it was the only example I could think of where I'd
paid people. It isn't actually paying to motivate them.
It's paying to -- I don't know, it was partly to
89
compensate them for the money they weren't earning, but
I said in here too, I just -- I'd rather they got 20
quid from me than from some businessman doing something
horrible on his way home. I mean, these are children
we're talking about.
Q. On public interest -- you've covered this already --
paragraph 21, the bottom of the same page, you refer to
the kind of ethical mist. You've told us about the
difficulties with Section 55, although no journalist has
ever sought to rely on it.
But you do provide us with two specific or three
specific examples on the next page, 03001.
Oh yeah, I'd forgotten about these.
Q. The first of these is so famous we need not dwell on it
overmuch, but this is an internal News of the World
email which you supplied to the CMS Select Committee
in July 2009.
Yes, and the point is I redacted --
Q. You redacted the transcripts.
Yes, to protect the privacy of those involved.
Q. Then you refer, in the next example:
"The Guardian was offered a story about a former
cabinet minister whose voicemail was hacked."
You felt that that went too far in terms of a breach
of privacy?
90
Yes. The story wasn't offered to me. It was offered to
another reporter, who said, "What do you think?" And
I said I do not think we should be reproducing anything
which rebreaches this man's privacy, so let's not do it.
It's a judgment call. I don't know --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's been one of the great problems
that I've had for the last week, that I've been inviting
people to breach their own privacy by telling me about
breaches of privacy.
It is a problem, isn't it?
MR JAY: Then the third example, where the public interest,
as it were, fell the other way, is the --
Oh yes.
Q. -- piece you wrote along with a colleague, Amelia Hill,
in the Guardian on 4 July 2011, breaking the story about
the hacking of Milly Dowler's voicemail.
Yes.
Q. We have that, I'm sure everybody has seen it, under our
tab 3.
Mm-hm. There the question was whether or not we were
digging up the grief of the family again by publishing
this story.
Q. We know what the outcome of the balancing exercise was,
but why, in a nutshell, did you come down in favour of
publication?
91
This is tricky stuff, but -- so I think first, what we
were disclosing was so important that we needed to find
some way of getting it into the public domain. On the
other hand, you know, the family have been through hell.
I really was worried about digging it up. So the step
that we took to try to reduce the impact for the family
was that via Surrey Police we sent a detailed message
saying, "Look, here's what we are preparing by way of
the story. This is just to alert you to the fact that
we're expecting to publish this within the next 48
hours."
I think they were actually on holiday but they came
back, I think, in time to get that message. So that was
the best we could do in the circumstances. I think it
was absolutely was right to get it into the public
domain, and I think Mrs Dowler gave evidence about this,
that she was upset by the story, which is -- you know,
I wish she hadn't been upset and we did what we could to
soften the impact by sending that detailed warning.
Q. You refer on the second page of this article --
What's the tab number?
Q. Tab 3 of the bundle we've prepared. Level with the
upper hole punch, Mr Davies.
Yes.
Q. The deletion of the messages. You say, four lines down:
92
"According to one source, this had a devastating
effect."
We heard about that directly from the Dowlers.
Yes.
Q. You're not going to tell us who that source is, so
I won't even ask you, but --
It's better not to.
Q. Thank you. A bit later down, you refer to a senior
source familiar with the Surrey Police investigation.
Yes.
Q. Can I ask you this question, without naming anybody: do
you happen to know who it was who hacked into
Milly Dowler's voicemails?
There's two stages to this. The facilitator was
Glenn Mulcaire. There's a misunderstanding, I think,
around the way that he operates. He doesn't actually,
on the whole, do the listening to the messages himself.
Most of that is done by the journalist themselves.
Mulcaire's job was to enable them to do that where there
was some problem, because he's a brilliant blagger, so
he could get information, data, from the mobile phone
company. And occasionally I think he did special
projects. I think perhaps the royal household would be
an example.
So if you ask who hacked Milly's voicemail, the
93
answer is that Mulcaire facilitated the hacking by one
or more News of the World journalists and our
understanding of the facts is that it was one or more of
the News of the World journalists who then had to delete
the messages in order to enable more to come through.
Q. That's helpful. I think that's as far as we can
properly take it but it explains one or two statements
which have been put in the public domain at the time
that the Dowlers' evidence was given to this Inquiry.
Before I come to the dark arts and your book, may
I deal with a couple of points in relation to the PCC.
Under tab 2, you'll find, I hope, some evidence you gave
to the Select Committee on 21 April 2009, together with
Professor Greenslade. You were, as it were, a double
act on that day and I think he's in the room today. We
can read that carefully for ourselves. Indeed, some of
us have done beforehand.
Just alight upon something you've said. At page 131
at the top right-hand side, Mr Davies.
Mm-hm. 131 the top right, yes.
Q. Professor Greenslade talks about the McCanns.
Are you sort of there in the middle of that column?
Q. Yes.
The McCanns were a classic case?
Q. Yes. Just noting that and we'll skim-read that, but
94
that may or may not chime with evidence we heard last
week. Indeed it probably does. But at the bottom of
the page, question 434, you were asked:
"How effective do you think the PCC is in upholding
standards?"
Without reading this out, Mr Davies, what in summary
did you say to this Inquiry about the effectiveness of
the PCC?
In relation to the McCanns specifically?
Q. More generally, I think.
I think that the history of the PCC's performance
undermines the whole concept of self-regulation.
Re-reading this evidence, because you sent it to me at
the end of last week, I noticed that I was speaking up
for self-regulation, but I wouldn't any more. I don't
think this is an industry that is interested in or
capable of self-regulation.
I think probably at this point I was at the edge of
that conclusion, but hadn't quite come to it. I think
I felt that perhaps the problems which I'd seen in the
PCC, particularly with handling the original outbreak of
phone hacking in 2006/7, the McCann case and the
Max Mosley case, might have been the result of the
particular chair and the particular director, and for me
there was a turning point in -- this is April '09. We
95
published the Gordon Taylor story in July, and
in November, the PCC published the second report on
phone hacking. Different personnel, different chair.
The former -- well, I think the same director, but the
man who is now director was involved in the production
of that report, Stephen Abell, who I regard as a good
man.
But the report was terrible. Just an awful piece of
work. You know, my editor resigned from the code
committee in protest. He went on the radio and said,
"This is worse than useless", which I think was an
understatement. And that shifted me across the line.
I just think -- I do not trust this industry to regulate
itself. I say this as I love reporting. I want us to
be free. You have a huge intellectual puzzle in front
of you. How do you regulate a free press? But it
obviously doesn't work. We're kidding ourselves if we
think it would, because it hasn't.
Q. This is the report, which is no longer on the PCC
website, which referred to, I paraphrase, some of the
Guardian's more dramatic claims not being borne out by
the evidence or words to that effect?
Yes, and along the way there was some slippery
behaviour, slippery handling of evidence.
Q. Now may I come to Flat Earth News.
96
Mm-hm.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just before you start, it's not just
an intellectual puzzle, Mr Davies, because it has to
work and it has to work for everybody. It has to work
for the press and it has to work for the public.
Yes.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So it has some real practical issues.
Yes. I think the point you've just made there is
terribly important, that in the past what has tended to
happen is that whatever debate may have occurred -- for
example, in the Calcutt commissions, the model that has
emerged has been dominated by the needs and thinking of
Fleet Street, and no system that is designed within that
shape is going to succeed and be stable. It has to take
account of the victims of the media. That's the crucial
first step. We have to stop only thinking about the
freedom of the press and build in satisfactory ways for
those people to get remedy.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, I hope that that thinking has
started, and I was impressed by some of the
contributions in that regard that were made at the
seminars.
Mm-hm.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Because it's something that your
business has to think about and help me work out.
97
Mm. We're going to come to this later, did you say?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I think we are, yes.
All right.
MR JAY: I have it in mind as sort of the -- not the coda to
your evidence, but at a later stage early in the
afternoon.
Okay.
Q. Sorry, but before I come to Flat Earth News, may I just
ask you a couple of questions about one piece, which is
under tab 5 in the bundle, Mr Davies.
Yes.
Q. It's a piece you wrote on 27 January 2011 in the
Guardian.
Hang on, there's lots of pieces in this tab.
Q. Yes.
What's it about?
Q. It's called "News of the World phone hacking, Nick
Davies' email to MPs". It's about a dozen pages into
tab 5?
I've found it.
Q. It's a six-page piece. I think what you're doing
here -- but correct me if I'm wrong and it's clear that
this is what you're doing. You sent some information to
the Select Committee and you're just publishing it in an
article in the Guardian; is that right?
98
Yes. This is a memo that I wrote for the Select
Committee that wasn't published and then they
eventually, months later, put it on their website and at
some moment, the Guardian ran it on the Guardian's
website.
Q. Can I just ask you about the third page, please?
Third page. Yes.
Q. Just to understand the source of your information, in
general terms to the extent to which you can assist, but
if there are sensitivities here, please tell me -- you
say at the top that:
"Paperwork held by the CPS shows that police began
their investigation in January 2006 by analysing data
held by phone companies. This revealed a vast number of
victims, indicated a vast array of offending behaviour,
but the prosecutors and police agreed not to investigate
all the available leads."
How do you know that?
Because a good human source showed me that paperwork.
Q. Fair enough. The same presumably applies to the next
paragraph:
"In addition, the CPS paperwork shows that
prosecutors were persuaded by the police to adopt
a policy of ringfencing evidence so that even within the
scope of the limited investigation, there would be
99
a further limit on the public use of evidence in order
to ensure that sensitive victims would not be named in
court."
So --
Same source.
Q. That's the same source?
Yes.
Q. Then the next paragraph it's clear that the Guardian
made use of the Freedom of Information Act some
considerable time later, in January 2010, and that
demonstrated that at that stage there were 4,332 names
or partial names of people and in whom the men had an
interest.
The "men" you're referring to are Goodman, Mulcaire
and then generically one other man who has not been
charged; is that right?
Yeah. In August 8, 2006, the police arrested
Glenn Mulcaire, Clive Goodman and one other person,
whose identity I know but he's never been named in the
public domain. They seized material from those three.
Q. Indeed.
And my freedom of information request was a request for
a statistical summary of what was in that seized
material from those three people. And I put the
application in way back and Scotland Yard breached the
100
statutory requirement to reply within 20 working days.
That's why it didn't come through until January.
Q. We can guess what the primary source of the information
was. It was Mr Mulcaire's notebook, presumably, was it?
Yes, I think it would be. There's a little bit of
Goodman and a little bit of the third guy, but it's
going to be mostly Mulcaire.
Q. And so we understand your methods, if I can so describe
it, and you've told us about this earlier, the Freedom
of Information Act is a tool at your disposal. How
often, approximately, have you used it in order to
obtain information in the context of the phone hacking
issue?
Oh, on the phone hacking? Only two or three times. And
it got very complicated because they were being blocked
and knocked back and I seemed to get reviews and I had
to take an appeal to the ICO. I would think it's
a maximum of three different applications, but it may
have been that they started as only one or two and split
as different blockages occurred in the route. You see
what I mean? One went all the way to the
Information Commissioner's office before they gave in.
Q. Flat Earth News.
Mm-hm.
Q. Chapter 7.
101
Yes.
Q. We've photocopied relevant pages. I think they have
been provided to the technician, but if not, we'll
manage without them. At page 257 --
257? That's before. Hang on, 257? Are you sure?
Q. Between, sorry, it's between 256 and 259, doesn't
actually have a 257 at the bottom, but it's part 4
"Inside Story", "The Dark Arts" starts at 259.
Right.
Q. You caption it with a quote from Alastair Campbell, who
will explain what he meant by that in more detail
tomorrow.
Okay.
Q. 259, "The Dark Arts". You start off with a review of
the Information Commissioner's work, the raids in
relation to Mr Whittamore, as I was summarising to the
Inquiry when I opened the formal part of this Inquiry on
14 November.
Do I have this right, Mr Davies, that quite a lot of
this is material in the public domain, but it was
boosted or bolstered and substantiated by Freedom of
Information Act requests which you made of the
Information Commissioner's office?
Not quite right. So you have the two reports on
Operation Motorman that were published in 2006, freedom
102
of information applications that were made by
Michael Ashcroft, Lord Ashcroft, which then went into
the public domain when they were replied to, so they're
not mine, they were Lord Ashcroft's, and thirdly, direct
contact between myself and a member of the Whittamore
network. Possibly two members.
Q. Thank you.
And also I pestered the Information Commissioner's
office until they were blue in the face for bits and
pieces.
Q. And they --
Gave me bits and pieces, but not as much as I wanted,
which is why the pestering went on. So it's that
overlap thing again.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's what journalists do.
MR JAY: You'll understand, Mr Davies, that on Thursday
we're going to be covering all of this with Mr Thomas.
Yes.
Q. Including Freedom of Information Act requests and an
analysis of the 13,343 requests you refer to at
page 260, so we're going into it all in considerable
detail.
Yes.
Q. It may not be necessary to cover all the ground with
you.
103
I'm asked to point out this to you, though. At the
bottom of page 262, if you just bear with me. You say
that the judge, who is His Honour Judge Samuels QC,
asked a highly relevant question. This is when the case
reached the --
Blackfriars Crown Court.
Q. -- Crown Court at Blackfriars, and the question was
words to the effect:
"Where are the journalists?"
Mm-hm.
Q. You say at the bottom of the page:
"The prosecutor could not explain."
Yes.
Q. But I'm asked to put to you that the prosecutor could
and did explain that some journalists had been
interviewed and the decision was taken that there was
insufficient evidence to prosecute. Were you aware of
that?
I am aware that journalists were interviewed. That's
a statement of the fact; it isn't an explanation as to
why neither they nor the newspapers were prosecuted. Do
you see?
Q. Yes.
So that the prosecutor is simply restating the fact that
this hasn't happened. The question is: Why? That's one
104
of the things I was pestering the Information
Commissioner's office about and this is one of the
things this they did help me on. They explained, which
did not come out in court -- and correct me if I've got
this wrong, but I'm pretty sure that I'm right -- that
when they were looking at this prosecution, they said to
themselves, "If we prosecute the Fleet Street
newspapers, first, they will hire very expensive QCs and
we will have to do the same; secondly, they're going to
tie us up in endless pre-trial argument, which again is
going to be very expensive. We simply don't have the
legal budget to do this."
So that explanation, which was given to me by the
ICO subsequently, was not given, as I understand it, in
court. The explanation, do you see, as against the --
somebody's shaking their head behind you. I don't know
whether it's --
Q. Whether they are or not, I'm concentrating on what
you're saying.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Don't you worry about anybody else.
Oh, sorry.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: They'll make their views clear at
some stage.
What I'm giving you is an accurate summary of what the
ICO told me, and in answer to your question, the
105
explanation for the fact of the non-prosecution of the
newspapers, I believe, was not expressed in court.
MR JAY: Are you able to tell us -- but if you can't, please
confirm it -- who it was at the Information
Commissioner's office who give you that explanation.
You know the truth is I cannot remember whether I spoke
to them on the basis that I wouldn't name them or not,
but it was an authoritative figure who knew what they
were talking about. I could check with the ICO and come
back to you. I think it's probably all right, but
I don't want to break the terms of the conversation.
I simply can't remember. Do you want me to follow up on
it?
Q. Not at this stage, Mr Davies. It's something that I can
take up with the relevant people on Thursday.
Okay.
Q. I'm just making a note on the transcript so that it
doesn't fall within any gaps, in case I don't remember
to.
You deal generally with the issue of journalists
over the next few pages to the top of page 265.
Yes.
Q. Presumably, Mr Davies, you, amongst others, would invite
the Inquiry to take this up with the former Information
Commissioner when he gives evidence on Thursday?
106
The specific issue being: why didn't you prosecute the
newspapers?
Q. Yes.
Yes. Have you -- am I allowed to ask, have you had
access to the raw material that the ICO obtained from
the Whittamore network?
Q. I don't normally answer questions.
I'm sorry.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It works the other way around here.
What I'm trying to say is I did have access to that, as
you can tell from some of the stories I wrote on all of
it two years ago, and I'm not a lawyer, I'm
a journalist, but it seemed to me surprising that there
hadn't been a prosecution of the newspapers as well as
the PIs.
Q. The Inquiry has had access and the core participants
have seen it to material provided by the Information
Commissioner's Office which has not been made available
for (inaudible).
Okay.
Q. May I bring you forward, but possibly back in time, to
page 266 of "The Dark Arts" --
Yes.
Q. -- where you embark upon a review of, really, the next
20 pages or so of a range of matters which, if you look
107
at page 266, about a third of the way down, you say
this:
"It's never easy to look back from the midst of the
epidemic and see how the germ first started to spread.
There has always been a little dirty play, a little
illegal stuff going on in the shadows of Fleet Street."
And what you undertake here, do I have this right,
Mr Davies, is a sort of historical review which brings
a narrative forward, starting perhaps from the 1970s
when the Commissioner at Scotland Yard, of course, was
Sir Robert Mark, when he carried out a massive clean-up
operation, as we all know, and you bring the story
forward to more or less the present day; is that right?
That's what I was trying to do, yes.
Q. So I can understand the position then, when you mention
Z, at page 267 --
Yes?
Q. -- at about what point in time are we talking about? Is
this the 1980s or some different time period?
The timeframe of Z's activities on the behalf of
Fleet Street?
Q. Yes.
Begins in the early 1980s, I think 1982, but early
1980s, and stretches forward into the very recent past.
My belief is that he was still active at the time that
108
I was researching and writing the book.
Q. The nature of your information in relation to Z, can
I ask you this question: is there anything here in the
book which derives directly from Z himself? If you
don't want to answer that, just say so.
No, it doesn't come from Z himself. It's a combination
of exactly those two primary routes: public domain and
human. So, yeah.
Q. In terms of quantity, the number of human sources, are
we talking the same sort of numbers as you've mentioned
previously, about a dozen, or are we talking some
different number?
Okay. First of all, this guy is very well-known, so
I covered -- when he was originally tried for police
corruption, I covered his trial. His activity for
newspapers is something I already knew about, just
because I'm a reporter and was aware of him. So that's
a slightly unusual aspect of it, that I'd already come
across him.
Sources? Gosh. I would think you have five or six
individuals who I spoke to during the research of the
book about his activity, and -- I think it's all right
to say this -- one of the things that happened was
after -- I told you how I stumbled into this, people
started talking about him: "Christ, I remember him". So
109
I then contacted Scotland Yard and asked somebody I know
there who is reasonably senior, "Will you brief me on
this?" I think one of the things that had emerged --
I have to be careful not to identify -- along the way
there had been an operation by Scotland Yard to
prosecute this individual, Z, to stop him acting as
a go-between between newspapers and corrupt officers,
and therefore that was a clear signal that there were
people in Scotland Yard who were aware of his activities
and trying to stop him. So I tried to get into that
part of the Yard and somebody senior came and met me in
a hotel lobby and spent several hours helping me out
with the history of this man's activity as they knew it.
So it's the sort of four, five, six reporters during
the research, the Yard briefing, various public domain
sources, there are two trials here -- one of which
I covered, the other which I wrote about; the second
trial comes from the attempt to stop him -- and then my
own background knowledge.
Q. Page 269, you mention a particular private investigator.
Yes. Right up the top?
Q. Yes.
Yeah, gotcha.
Q. The Inquiry doesn't really wish to go into the detail of
this at this stage, although it's right to say that this
110
particular individual has been the subject of Panorama
programmes, certainly one programme, I've seen it.
You're not the only one -- not to diminish what you're
saying -- who covers him as well.
No.
Q. Can I ask you though, please, about 271, the second
paragraph. When you say that these two were merely the
brand leaders:
"By the mid-1990s, Fleet Street was employing
several dozen different agents to break the law on its
behalf. Most were private investigators, a few were
ordinary civilians who developed the knack of blagging
confidential official out of banks and phone companies."
Then you refer to someone in Ruislip who was
regularly conning ex-directory numbers and itemised
phone bills out of BT.
Again, please, so that we understand the evidential
strength of this, the sources of your information?
Okay. So there you've got reporters from a lot of
different newspapers talking about their use of private
investigators, you've got some of the investigators who
I referred to, the kind of senior members of the
profession, helping me out, and you have some public
domain material. So the person from Ruislip was
convicted in the public domain and there were records of
111
that trial occurring.
I'm pretty sure that there was background in the ICO
as well. I don't know whether it was in the Motorman
reports or one of the other -- I think it might be in
the first Motorman report, there was quite a lot of
useful background on scale. This is from memory.
Q. There are four examples given, which correlate with what
you're just saying.
-- I haven't read it.
Q. At the start of the --
Okay.
Q. Fair enough. The activities of these private
investigators, have I understood this paragraph
correctly, that in essence they were carrying out the
same sort of activities as Mr Whittamore and his team?
Or were they doing something different?
I think there's a possible -- at least five different
possible activities. So number one, blagging
information out of confidential databases. Two, there
are hints of voicemail hacking coming out. There are
hints of email hacking coming out. There are hints of
burglary coming out. And what's the other one? Oh,
corruption of police officers.
Q. Ransacking bins?
No, corruption of police officers is coming through
112
quite strong, and -- well, the bins is a rather quirky
thing on the side with a quirky bloke, but those five
activities are being talked about by reporters. If
we're talking just at that basic level of what people
are telling me, what the PIs are telling me, what the
reporters are telling me, they're covering those five
kinds of activities.
Q. Thank you. The relevance of Z bears particularly on the
issue of police corruption, I think; is that right?
Correct.
Q. We're perhaps in the realm of another module of this
Inquiry, but if I could be forgiven for asking you one
question about it -- or perhaps not just one, maybe more
than one -- are you able to give us any sense of the
scale of this activity?
Z's activity?
Q. In relation to the police.
It's very difficult to quantify it. I mean, I'm not
quite sure how cautious we're being about identifying
him, but when Scotland Yard attempted to stop him, they
mounted a prosecution, there was a trial. The trial did
not convict him; it acquitted him. There was some
coverage at that time where, for example, it was
suggested that every crime reporter in Fleet Street will
be drinking champagne tonight and there were crime
113
reporters being quoted saying, "This is a great day for
the freedom of the press." If you set this against what
reporters and PIs and Scotland Yard themselves are
saying about the man's activities, I think it's fair to
say that he was involved over a number of years in quite
casual activity, carrying cash from newspapers to
corrupt police officers, and that was particularly clear
from the police point of view, who I think felt really
frustrated and angry about what was going on. Because
this is not just about breach of privacy. There were
examples -- I can't remember whether I've given them in
the book, I can remember one of them which I was given,
but where active inquiries were impeded by the sale of
this information.
Q. Towards the top of page 272, you refer to a particular
title.
Mm-hm.
Q. You understand that there is a sensitivity about that?
Mm-hm.
Q. Can I understand, first of all, though, approximately
when did the events you describe at this point on
page 272 occur?
Hang on. I just have to read it so that I can catch up
with you.
Okay. I think we're here in the early and
114
mid-1990s.
Q. Possibly a bit earlier, I'm told, because the Mail's
offices moved to Kensington in 1989, and therefore if
there's drinking at the Wine Press in Fleet Street, it
must have been before then. Is that possible?
You've just identified the title. No, that doesn't make
any sense at all, does it? The Wine Press are an
innocent party in this. They're not responsible for
what goes on in their bar, but Wine Press was
a long-established watering hole for Fleet Street,
particularly for Fleet Street crime reporters and police
officers, and the fact that one particular newspaper
moved several miles to the west doesn't change the fact
that that's the pond where the fish are and the reporter
from that newspaper is going to go back. Everybody's
not going to follow them down the road. I'm confident
this is post '89. In fact, I'm confident this is early
and mid-1990s, as I described.
Q. I'm just putting a point to you. You have given the
answer and that's fine, Mr Davies.
How many reporters at the Mail gave you the
information you refer to, namely handing over quite
substantial amounts of cash?
Do you remember I said there are different layers of
detail, but there were three in particular who helped me
115
on that aspect of it. These are former Mail reporters.
Q. Was it known where the money was going?
Absolutely clearly. This is where it gets terribly
difficult because, for example, there was quite a lot of
specific detail with this particular story. This is how
we got the information. There was a clear indication of
who the recipient detective was, so who it is that Z is
passing the money to, how much was passed, but that's
what I was saying earlier on; it's not just a question
of concealing the identity of the journalist. If you
disclose the precise detail, then by implication you
identify the source.
I think it's fair to say that the Mail, who we've
identified now, are absolutely not alone here in their
relationship with Z. I think it was, as I say, casual
and widespread.
Q. Page 273. You deal with one particular matter, namely
access to a government database.
Mm-hm.
Q. The source you refer to with access to a government
database, who was that person? I'm not asking you to
identify the person, but give us some idea as to the
modus operandi here. Can you help us?
As to who's talking to me?
Q. Yes.
116
It says: a reporter who has now left the Mail. Again,
it's one of these things where you have a lot of
different reporters who have worked there talk about the
blagging of confidential data and then different
individuals go into different elements of detail on it.
Q. Presumably then -- is this right, Mr Davies -- towards
the bottom of page 273, it's the same point in relation
to the Sunday Times; is that right?
The point being?
Q. That it's probably former Sunday Times reporters who are
providing you with the information?
Yes. Again, you have about a dozen or 15 former
reporters who are talking and overlapping to different
degrees on different subjects.
Q. We note what you say at the top of page 274 about the
routine use of private investigators?
Mm-hm.
Q. One expert blagger told you -- have I understood it
correctly -- that he was working for the Sunday Times?
Yes. He's going back a bit.
Q. Back to about when?
I reckon late 80s, that particular person. He's one of
your kind of senior figures who doesn't like the way it
all took off.
Q. Then you refer, towards the bottom of page 274, to
117
a former reporter of the Times who then brought
proceedings against an employment tribunal. That's
Mr David Connett, is it?
This is the Sunday Times. Correct, and I sat in on that
Tribunal hearing and covered the evidence that came out.
So that's public domain again.
Q. Yes, and the ruling of the employment tribunal again is
a document in the public domain and we'll be looking at
it in due course.
You deal with someone else, this time the Sunday
Telegraph, at page 276. This is in relation to Dr David
Kelly.
Mm-hm.
Q. Then at 277, you point out that the -- or one of the
reporters at the Times used Steve Whittamore.
Mm-hm.
Q. I think it's clear from the table which is on the second
of the two Information Commissioner's reports, "What
price privacy now?"
Mm-hm.
Q. Although the Times only features --
Marginally.
Q. -- in those single figures. Can I ask you about
a specific question I'm invited to put to you. 277,
two-thirds this of the way down, you say:
118
"Lord Ashcroft and another peer, Lord Levy, both had
their tax records blagged by somebody who appears to
have been working for the Sunday Times."
Then to look at Lord Levy in particular:
"Bogus calls were made to the Inland Revenue by
somebody posing as Lord Levy before the Sunday Times
wrote about his tax payments in June 2000 ..."
What happened there, I think, is that the Sunday
Times put this story to Lord Levy and Lord Levy applied
for an injunction to restrain publication. Were you
aware of that?
Sounds familiar. I'm not sure, but it sounds possible.
Q. Although in the end, the injunction was refused by
a High Court judge on public interest grounds.
It may well be.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that a convenient moment, Mr Jay?
MR JAY: Sir, it is. We are on track in terms of the
overall timetable. I may need to conclude Mr Davies by
about quarter to 3.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Very good. I just want to remind
everybody that although we're obviously looking at these
title by title, it is no part of this part of the
Inquiry to make decisions of fact about who did what to
whom, and I repeat that at various points so that nobody
should misunderstand the significance of what we're
119
doing.
MR JAY: Thank you.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much. 2 o'clock.
pm)
(The luncheon adjournment)
1
2 (2.00 pm)
3 MR JAY: Mr Davies, we're still on "The Dark Arts".
We're
4 now onto Trojan horses, bottom of page 277. We
heard
5 evidence about this yesterday from Mr Hunter, as
you're
6 probably aware.
7 A. Hurst.
8 Q. Hurst. Pardon me. Can I ask you there about the
9 example you give in the middle of page 278, the
mirror
10 wall device. That was used by a businessman, not
11 a journalist?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Relating to the tax affairs of Dame Shirley Porter.
14 A. I can't remember this bit at all. Keep going. Oh,
15 I see. It was not a journalist but a business --
yes.
16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: When you're talking about a
mirror
17 wall, you're not talking about a title?
18 MR JAY: No. This presumably is in the public domain
since
19 the person involved, Mr Stanford, who you name, was
20 fined for an offence under the Interception of
21 Communications Act?
22 A. Correct, so my source are the reports of that
public
23 domain trial.
24 Q. Certainly, and there's not a public interest
offence, as
25 it happens, to a breach of section 1 of that
statute.
1
A. As I understand it, correct.
Q. Although you point out that there may have been a public
interest in the underlying story, don't you?
A. I can't remember, but maybe.
Q. Can we move on to the art or craft of binnology, which
you cover at on a page 279. There's some examples where
this might have been done in the public interest. For
example, page 281, you give the Jonathan Aitken example,
don't you?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. This information in relation to the activities of
Mr Pell, again, in general terms, where does it come
from?
A. The best single source is a book who was written by
a journalist whose first name was Mark and I'm
embarrassed to say I can't remember his second --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Watts?
A. Could be. I think that sounds right.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I got it from your book.
A. Right, so a reliable source! Yes, so he wrote an entire
book about Benjamin Pell, which is hugely detailed. So
that would be one. Then there were news reports at the
time of his activities and there are also reporters in
the background talking about him.
MR JAY: You give us another example which you describe as
2
"little gems" at the bottom of page 281.
A. I can't see it.
Q. Memos between the then Prime Minister and the late
Philip Gould --
A. Yes.
Q. -- published in the Sunday Times, the Times and the Sun.
So we have a series of examples which you provide in
"The Dark Arts". Then at 282 and following, you
consider the wider public interest issues?
A. Yes.
Q. And some of the exchanges between the then
Information Commissioner and the then chairman of the
PCC, all of which we're going to hear about in much more
detail, at least from one side of the horse's mouth, on
Thursday. So if you don't mind, I'll leave off those.
But I think we get a sufficient flavour of the sort of
material which you bring together to distill and to
buttress these writings; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. I'm asked to put to you some questions,
Mr Davies, and to the extent to which I haven't already,
I will deal with them specifically. The first general
question, and I can put it quite generally: do you agree
that you did not put any of your criticisms, whether it
be of the Sunday Times, the Times or the
3
Associated Newspapers titles, to any of the individuals
concerned or to the papers concerned before you
published this book?
A. Emphatically not to the newspapers concerned. The
underlying thought -- if you look at the codes of
conduct -- there's a popular belief that they say you
always have to go to the subject of your story. None of
them say that. And it's -- I mean, I've been doing this
so long I now lecture young reporters in how to do this,
and what I say is it's crucial that you don't behave
like a robot. Story by story, case by case. You must
remember you're here to try to tell the truth about
important things. Will you be assisted or obstructed in
that basic simple task if you go to the other side and
tell them what you're working on and ask them for
a comment?
If you just look at it numerically, more often than
not, the answer will be: well, it's going to help you to
go to the other side. But there are a significant
number of occasions when the answer is no. Sometimes
that's for legal reasons, sometimes it's for ethical
reasons and sometimes for practical reasons.
In the case of these newspapers, it was practical.
I believed then and believe now that if I had tipped
them off about what I was doing, they would have gone
4
straight to the Guardian and applied all sorts of
pressure of various kinds to try to persuade the
Guardian to stop me doing that. And I didn't want the
Guardian put in the firing line. I'm a freelance, I'm
writing my own book, I didn't want them brought into it
and I also didn't want to be told to stop. I feel that
there was a real jeopardy to the success of the
operation, and so for that reason, I made the deliberate
choice not to go to them.
Sorry, did you want to say something?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: (shakes head)
A. The underlying thing is that if you go back to the
process I'm trying to follow -- the public domain
sources, the human sources, the early material -- what
you're trying to do is to get yourself to a point where
you can say, "Right, that's true, this statement is
true, that statement is true", and then to put it out
there, and if you've got to that point, and you can see
that going to the subject of the story puts you in
jeopardy, puts your ability to tell the truth in
jeopardy, then you wouldn't take that extra step, or
there might be ethical reasons for not going to the
other side, or there might be legal problems.
MR JAY: You've covered just the practical probables or
prudential problems. What sort of matters would fall
5
under the categories of ethical problems on the one hand
and legal problems on the other hand?
A. There are other practical problems that occur as well.
Ethical, I think the classic case is you're covering its
trial of a paedophile and he is accused of raping and
abducting and murdering children and you're preparing
the background story that's going to be published or
broadcast once the trial is over. Do you really want me
to go and ask this man what he says about his abduction
and rape and murder of children? And I think the answer
is you don't want me to do that. There's an ethical
problem there. Do you ask Hitler what he thinks about
concentration camps?
For example, the BBC code of conduct, which is
a particularly intensely thought-out, good one, uses
precisely that expression, "overriding ethical or legal
reasons".
So that's a relatively unusual block, but it's
there. If you follow me, anyway. I take that view.
Legal is two categories. One, which I would come
across from time to time, which is where I have obtained
information which could be deemed to be confidential.
There's a risk that if I let the other side know, I'm
going to get myself injuncted and I did a story --
I might have referred to it in the statement,
6
actually -- where I spent months digging into the tax
affairs of a particularly wealthy man in order to
exemplify the way in which very wealthy people don't
have to pay tax because they hire clever lawyers and
accountants to find their way through the law or they
just break the law.
When it came time to legal that, to get it into the
paper, they had seven different lawyers working on it
because of the fear of what this man could do to us in
the court. On one side, there were defamation
specialists, who were saying, "You have to go to him and
put this stuff to him", and then there were very
experienced lawyers on the confidentiality side, one of
whom's now become a judge, saying, "Don't go near him.
If you go near him, this story will never see the light
of day." And in the end I had to go to him and have
very carefully choreographed conversations where I was
checking facts without him knowing quite what the story
was about. It was an uneasy compromise.
So confidentiality is one problem for us and the
other is privacy, which I personally don't come up
against so often, but insofar as the Human Rights Act
now has Article 8 and Article 10 there, it can be
problematic. There was an example where the Sunday
Mirror did a kiss-and-tell job on a well-known public
7
figure and they had bought up the woman's story. They'd
got her letters and photographs. There was no doubting
the truth, the accuracy of what she was saying about the
public figure, but at 4 o'clock on the Saturday
afternoon they went to the public figure and asked for a
quote. In my book, this is a reporter operating like a
robot who hasn't seen the danger and within an hour or
two, the Sunday Mirror was injuncted and eventually they
lifted the injunction. But by that time they had lost
several editions, hundreds of thousands of pounds worth
of income.
Now, I have my own reservations about doing those
kinds of stories, but what I'm trying to point to is the
danger of automatically going to the other side. So
legal, ethical, practical.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Of course, everything turns on facts.
A. Yes.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And you will doubtless have seen in
the press, if you didn't otherwise hear about it, of the
evidence that we had from Mr Mosley about the need to
check stories because once the cat is out of the bag, it
can never be put back in.
A. Yes, and I think you have a powerful point, even more on
privacy than accuracy.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Oh, there's no question, no question.
8
Yes, but for him there's a twin question, isn't there,
because there was --
A. The Nazi element of the story.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Correct. But how does that play into
your analysis of the circumstances in which you go to
a particular target?
A. I think -- first, I don't think the Max Mosley story
should have been printed, but if I were the reporter
trying to get that story into the public domain, I would
understand that if I go near Max Mosley, he's going to
get an injunction on breach of privacy grounds and it's
an interesting contradiction, actually, because the
official story from the News of the World is: "Oh, well,
we've got Article 10 on side here. This is in the
public interest. This is our freedom of expression."
But the underlying fear would be that that's not going
to be the way the court sees it and that they are going
to injunct. So I don't approve of the story, but I can
understand why they didn't go near him. Have I answered
your question?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, you have, and I also understand
why they didn't go near him.
A. I think that's all they're saying. It's tricky -- you
see, on the confidentiality thing, which is something we
deal with more often, we did a long, complicated and
9
probably deeply tedious series a few years ago about
corporate tax avoidance. It was a very noble thing to
do. I don't know whether anybody read it. It went on
the for days.
Now, towards the end of that, we were contacted by
somebody who gave us internal paperwork from Barclays
Bank which described tax shelters which Barclays was
providing to corporate clients. We thought there were
two reasons why it was in the public interest to publish
this: (a) this is about the avoidance of tax, the
frustration of the Parliamentary will as to what tax
should be paid, (b) this was at a time where Barclays
was in negotiation -- ultimately fruitless ones, but
were in negotiation about taking taxpayers' money to
bail them out of the credit crisis, and therefore the
fact that they were it is selling tax shelters was
particularly in the public interest.
So we put those documents on our website with
a story, and that went up late one evening. Alan
Rusbridger will tell you the story in more detail but by
1 or 2 o'clock in the morning, there were powerful
lawyers onto us and onto a judge, arguing that these
were confidential and they got the injunction and that
was it. We had to remove the documents. We were not
able to publish that story. It comes back to this point
10
about the difficulty of making these judgments about
what's in the public interest. We felt very
aggrieved --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I hope you've not just broken the
terms of that injunction.
A. No, no, I haven't given you the detailed contents of the
paperwork.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Your lawyer tells you you haven't.
A. Thank you. Just this once. No, but you see -- that
again, you see -- the lesson from that incident for
a reporter is the danger of a court interpreting the law
of confidence in such a way as it to frustrate what you
genuinely consider to be your legitimate function.
MR JAY: Thank you.
A. Can I just add, you know I said "practical"? Apart from
the kind of intimidation question, the big problem is
PR. If you go to the subject of a story and that
subject has professional PR advice, if you give them the
time to manoeuvre, they'll put the story out on their
own terms. So they'll change the angle, and so to
speak, scoop you, and -- Alastair Campbell, for example,
who I know he's giving evidence, was brilliant at doing
this if newspapers went to him too early.
So more often than not you will want to go to the
other side. You want to go to the other side in case
11
there's some killer fact you haven't thought of and you
want to go to the other side if you want to use the
Reynolds defence. So I can't quantify it, but more
often than not you will, but it has to be story by
story, a judgment taking those factors into
consideration.
Q. Thank you. A series of questions now from someone else,
Mr Davies. Between which dates did you carry out your
research for Flat Earth News, approximately?
A. Calendar years 2005/6 and fragmentary research in the
first three months of '07. I finished writing it at the
end of March '07.
Q. Would you agree to disclose your sources regarding
comments about the Daily Mail so that your allegations
can be properly investigated?
A. I can disclose those sources if the sources will agree
to be disclosed.
Q. But not otherwise?
A. Really not, and I think the Mail would feel the same way
about their own sources.
Q. I'm asked to point out, and so I will, that the Mail or
Associated Newspapers generally wishes it to be made
clear it strongly refutes the allegations that the
Daily Mail had a policy of bribing policemen and civil
servants in order to obtain stories as you allege. They
12
also wish to make it clear that they refute generally
the allegations you make against them in the book, which
are incapable of specific refutation because they lack
any meaningful detail. Do you follow that?
A. Mm.
Q. Do you understand also the difficulty they have, and to
the extent that we have, that without you giving us your
sources -- and we fully understand why you can't -- that
which substantiates your book cannot be tested
evidentially. Would you accept that?
A. That's true of some but not all. I mean, for example,
where you look at the Motorman material, we know as
a matter of public domain fact that the Mail came out
top of the league table which the ICO published
in December 2006. I was at the Select Committee hearing
in September 2009 where the new Commissioner,
Christopher Graham, said that the ICO had made it clear
to newspapers that if they wanted to examine that
material, they could, and he's then said in his evidence
that no newspaper has come to the ICO to ask whether
they can examine the material which we seized from Steve
Whittamore. It seems to me that if the Mail want to
discover whether there was law-breaking in that
material, that was something they could this done/is
something they can do. It may be that they have now --
13
I can't obviously say -- but certainly at that stage, if
Christopher Graham is to be believed, that hadn't
happened and that route is open to them without having
to tangle with the confidential sources.
There's a second possibility where Z is concerned
about internal accounting. I just don't know what their
internal accounting systems are like, so -- the payments
that I was particularly being told about were cash, so
it may simply be that you draw the cash and it leaves no
specific footprint as to why it was being drawn, in
which case that isn't going to help us. But if there is
anything in the accounting system that actually shows
a payment going from the paper to Z, then that would
help the Mail to get to the bottom of the truth without
running up against the problem of off-the-record
sources. I mean, it's a pretty fine investigative
paper. I think they can get quite a long way without
me.
There's also the whole business of what
Scotland Yard has on that source. Again, it's in the
public domain that Scotland Yard mounted a surveillance
on him. I don't know what they came up with but it
would be interesting to ask.
So I do accept that there are real difficulties with
the Mail dealing with some of the things I've been
14
telling you, and it's frustrating, I accept that, but
I think there's an area where they could try and see
what they can find.
Q. In terms, generally, of the incidents of corruption
which you list, I think from your evidence already we
have some sense of the timescale.
A. Yes.
Q. We go back to the 1970s, Z is in the 1980s. The
information gathered, page 272 -- this is surrounding
The Wine Press in Fleet Street. You give the date for
that, probably in the early 1990s; is that right?
A. I'm saying mid, up to about 1996/1997 I'm talking about
there.
Q. Then page 279, which is the activities of Mr Benjamin
Pell.
A. It's not really corruption, is it?
Q. No?
A. Can I just interrupt you, before you go on, while we're
on corruption. My understanding of the position with Z
is that he goes right back to the early 80s, kind of
'82/'83, but comes a long way forward. My understanding
is he was still active when I was researching the book,
so that's a long span of activity of that kind.
On the police corruption side, there's the
investigator who you pointed me to at the top of
15
page 269, who we haven't actually named in this session.
That is materially about corrupting police officers.
There's a lot of detail which has emerged about that.
It involves three newspapers, not the Mail, but that's
the period, late 80s through to '99, where he goes to
prison, and then again, he's out and active from about
2005, although I don't know that there's evidence of
police corruption in that second period. But there's
that long initial period.
Q. I've already put the point to you about whether you put
your allegations to Associated Newspapers and you've
explained generally why you didn't. I think I've
covered that.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. I'm invited to ask you to comment your view, really, of
your fellow Guardian journalist Mr David Leigh.
A. Yeah.
Q. Apparently there are three instances that are given to
me. The first, he procured House of Commons notepaper,
using it in order to claim he was acting on behalf of
Jonathan Aitken MP and faxing it to the Ritz hotel in
Paris in order to obtain a copy of Mr Aitken's hotel
bill. First of all, as a matter of fact, are you aware
that Mr Leigh did that?
A. I think that's probably factually wrong. There was this
16
famous incident -- it's referred to as the "cod fax".
I think David was working at "World in Action" at that
time and wasn't part of it. There was a senior
executive at the Guardian who I believe was responsible
for the cod fax and if you want to get to the issue
rather than the individual -- I think you're wrong in
putting David in the story, but is it the issue you're
interesting in? Was that a bad thing to do?
Q. I think there are two layers to this. There's a factual
layer, which you've addressed, but then there's a more
general one, a conceptual one, I suppose, that even if
it's true, which you say it isn't, would you approve of
it?
A. I don't want to dodge the question. I think it's not
true of David, but I think it is true of the Guardian.
The Guardian did what you describe but I'm pretty sure
David Leigh wasn't working for the paper at the time.
Q. Fair enough.
A. This is blagging, really, isn't it?
Q. Yes.
A. Section 55 of the Data Protection Act. Do you have
public interest on your side when you do this? In this
murky area, I think top of everybody's league table of
what is in the public interest is the exposure of
serious crime, and at the end of this long saga
17
involving Jonathan Aitken, the Guardian eventually
published this story which disclosed that as our
Minister of Defence dealing with establishing arms
deals, he was lining himself up to receive enormous
bribes, and when the Guardian eventually got that into
the public domain -- I'm not libelling anybody here;
this is all already written -- they said that if there
had been a more serious example of political corruption
since 1945, they would like to be told what it was.
So I would say you are top of the scale public
interest on that piece of blagging.
Q. That's page 281 of your book.
A. Oh, is it?
Q. "If there's a more serious act of corruption in post-war
British politics, we would be interested to know of it."
A. Not a bad memory.
Q. The second example that's put to me I think it's better
if I just ask it directly of Mr Leigh when he comes next
week?
A. Okay.
Q. The third one, that he apparently accepted information
from Benjamin Pell that Pell had acquired from other
people's dustbins. Is that something you know about?
A. I wrote about it a bit in the book. He was very --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Page 281.
18
A. Yes. He was very clever about it. David's a fantastic
reporter and the good reporters -- the Martha Gellhorns,
the James Camerons, the David Leighs -- have a kind of
artful dodger about them, and he could see the exciting
potential of this extraordinary man who was digging
material out of significant people's dustbins, but he
could also see that the Guardian were never going to pay
for it. Out of a mixture, I think I said in the book,
of poverty and principle, it wasn't going to happen. So
he very cleverly passed Benjamin on to somebody else who
could deal with him and this somebody else was a friend
who was highly likely to tell him if anything
interesting emerged from the bin.
So I think he got himself very close to the line and
just stayed on the right side of it. I thought it was
clever of him. This is exactly the sort of thing I'm
talking about. Is that in the public interest or not?
Who knows where the line is? Really, really tricky
judgments that many could up. He took a call on it.
Q. Could we look, please, to the future and press
regulation generally.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. The matter which was, as it were, parked before lunch
but which we promised or threatened that we would come
back to.
19
Could you give us some thought to that now and tell
us your views?
A. First of all, it's really difficult. I think that as
two starting thoughts -- we said the first one, that we
have to consider the needs of media victims as well as
media organisations.
The second one is that just as an intellectual
exercise, I wouldn't start with what we've got. We've
got this horrible concoction of common law and statute
and regulation and it's a mess. I think that it's
helpful to start with a blank sheet of paper and you
could conceptually draw a line down the middle of that
piece of paper and say really there are two different
kinds of problem. The most important problem is
falsehood and distortion, within which there is
defamatory falsehood and distortion, and on the other
side of this line you put unethical behaviour, within
which the worst is probably the invasion of privacy.
So if you take the first of those, if you start with
a blank sheet of paper and say, "What should we do about
falsehood, distortion and defamation?" I don't think
you'd come up with anything like the law we have. You
wouldn't invent, for example, the concept that damages
should be paid to somebody whose reputation has been
hurt by a publication. Surely you would say, "If that
20
happens, if I publish something which falsely damages
somebody's reputation, what they deserve is a correction
of equal prominence. Not the PCC's weasel words, 'due
prominence'; equal prominence to what I published."
That's a complete balance, and I think the same
applies generally to falsehood and distortion. This is
the thing that most upsets people about what we do, and
so having crossed this line and abandoned the idea of
self-regulation, I want somebody to pass a law that
says: if you publish, in newspapers, magazines, books,
wherever, and you make a statement which is demonstrably
false, you have to correct it with equal prominence.
First of all, this is good for the freedom of the
press. The worst burden, I think it's fair to say, we
suffer under is libel law. It constantly prevents us
telling the truth about important things. It has
a terrible, chilling effect, and I bet you every editor
in Fleet Street, from Rusbridger to Dacre, would be
happy to see the back of defamation law. There's a few
learned friends here who might not be happy but it would
be an enormous advantage to the freedom of the press.
And yet we can satisfy the needs of victims, but I would
do that not through the courts but through some sort of
simple --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm not sure that's not a bit
21
simplistic because those who have been defamed obviously
want to get the defamation corrected, but in the
meantime they've been put through the grinder for the
time it takes to get it corrected.
A. Yes, but --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: They are entitled to some redress for
that, and in our system, the only redress we have is the
commodity called money.
A. But I wouldn't push this through the courts. I want an
arbitration system that's quick. I would put statutory
deadlines on it. If a newspaper publishes a statement
of fact, they should already know whether or not it's
true and be in a position to justify it pretty quickly.
I would say if someone makes a complaint about a
statement I have made -- you might think this is bonkers
but within four weeks we ought to have a hearing. And
that hearing shouldn't be in court; it should be in some
sort of arbitration system. That system would make
a finding of fact and it could be appealed to the courts
only on point of law.
You have a system rather like this in maritime law,
where they have specialist lawyers who act as
arbitrators. I've been researching it a little bit and
it works. You see as a starting point -- if you start
with a blank sheet of paper and just think it logically
22
through, you don't run into the contradiction between
the freedom of press and the need for regulation. You
can actually make something happen which increases the
freedom of the press and gives media victims a quick,
effective reply.
I know it's simple what I'm saying and it's
a complicated argument. I'm trying to provide
a starting point.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, no, I'm very grateful. Indeed,
the idea of having some sort of arbitral system you may
have heard that I've suggested to a number of people
over the course of the last two weeks.
A. Mm-hm.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But whether one removes the law of
libel entirely is perhaps something rather different,
and it would be a rather odd consequence, wouldn't it,
of all the problems that have caused this Inquiry to say
we should have even a greater licence for the press to
print whatever they want?
A. No, because -- you take the McCann case, the horrific
falsehoods being published about those people. They
don't have to sue and go through that long, drawn-out
process, expensive, exhausting process. They trigger
the complaint. Within four weeks, they get an
arbitration decision. Surely the newspapers are not in
23
a position to justify the factual statements that were
made about them. All those newspapers who have made
them have to publish corrections with equal prominence.
The Daily Express has to put it on their front page,
where the allegation was. They get justice, fairness,
truth, much, much quicker. They don't get damages.
I don't think they wanted damages.
And on the other side is my -- all the business of
ethical behaviour, in particular breach of privacy at
the core. Over and over again, you come back to that
business: "It's all right if it's in the public
interesting."
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So you want the arbitral system also
to provide you --
A. No, they're what I'm after --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm very content with a system that
is professionally based that takes work away from the
court. I'm not in the business of trying to get more
work into court.
A. What I'm after there with the public interest is
a beginning, some sort of advisory set up. It might be
part-time specialists with whom I can communicate.
I send them an email and say, "Here's the situation.
Here's what I'm planning to do. Will you, in
confidence, give me a guide? Am I or am I not operating
24
with public interest on my side?" And then I have that
and I then proceed, and if there is then a civil dispute
or a criminal prosecution, that's disclosable. Up until
that point, it's secret. Yes? And if it turns out that
I've ignored that advice, that's going to weigh heavily
against me.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Or not taken it.
A. Yes, or not even asked for it in the first place.
That's a bit like refusing to do a Breathalyser. The
presumption is that you've got something to hide.
You see, I think Max Mosley has a point about it
being too late to deal with the privacy problem after
the story's published, after those horrific videos
flashed around the world of his naked body. But his
proposed remedy is too severe. It involves prior
restraint, and all of us are allergic to that. So I'm
trying to set up a system where the signal would be sent
to us very clearly before publication that if Max sues,
we're going to lose, so we know -- and furthermore when
that's disclosed, it's going to make us look
particularly bad.
But there's another case -- I think it's all right
to say that this -- which is the Blunkett case. The
tabloids went after David Blunkett and said, "You're
having an affair." That, to me, was prurient and
25
unjustified intrusion into that man's private life.
However, as they dug deeper into his private life, they
found a bit of public interest. They said, "Ah, this
woman's nanny has had her Visa application fast-tracked
by Blunkett", and he had to resign. That's the counter
case against Max's argument, that if you'd gone to
Blunkett before publication, he would and should have
got the injunction on the basis of what we know. If you
give us the freedom to continue making the decision,
then you leave it open to us to say, "Even though
they've warned us against this, we've going to publish
because we think we can get to the bottom of the pile."
So I don't think it's such a bad idea.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, I'm not --
A. I don't know any other journalist who agrees with me,
I'll confess.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's an interesting fact too.
A. We're very old-fashioned people.
MR JAY: In the example of Mr Blunkett that you gave, the
chance ascertainment of a public interest nugget, as it
were, was a wholly adventitious by-product of a story
whose initial basis, you say, was without a public
interest justification; is that correct?
A. Yes, but there's something to be said for that maxim
about publish and be damned. If there's a really
26
difficult question underlying this, who should decide
what we should publish? Should it be the court or
politicians or journalists? And kind of at the end of
the day, I think there is something in publish and be
damned. Let those journalists make their judgement.
MR JAY: We can hear you very well but you're going too
fast. The good news is --
A. I'm nearly finished. I'm not sure quite sure what's
happening now. Are we finished?
Q. I think you should complete the answer you were giving
to your satisfaction and then maybe we will have
finished?
A. About publish and being damned. So if the Blunkett
story at first sight looks like a breach of his privacy,
we should nevertheless have the freedom to carry on and
make the mistake and take the risk and then if we can
find the public interest gem beneath the pile, then we
can justify it. I think it gets very difficult if you
get into the area of prior restraint. I really do.
I think that that's not -- that shouldn't be part of the
solution.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Of course, one of the problems about
getting advice requires you to make a value judgment
about the facts. I'm not commenting one way or the
other, but if you go back to the example concerning
27
Mr Mosley, the News of the World argued that the facts
were A, and Mr Mosley was saying most emphatically it
was not A.
A. Okay. I think my system can cope with that because
if -- this is the Nazi theme?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes.
A. That's all right to say that? That's all public
knowledge?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's comparatively public knowledge.
A. So if, when I send my email in confidence to the privacy
advisory folk, I say, "In this video which we secretly
shot, he is acting out some sort of Nazi fantasy", and
on that basis they say, "Okay, you've probably got some
public interest", if then subsequently it's shown that
we never even translated what was on it and we are
wrong -- let's just say we were wrong in simple terms
about that fact. That's going to weigh very heavily
against us because that email is going to be produced.
So if we've given the advisory group false facts, we're
in trouble. So there is an incentive to be honest with
the advisory people.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I understand.
MR JAY: Mr Davies, thank you very much for assisting the
Inquiry.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much. Before you go,
28
is there anything that you feel you've not had the
opportunity to say on a topic which you've obviously
thought about very deeply?
A. No, I think --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much indeed.
A. Thank you.
MR JAY: Mr Barr is taking the next witness.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you, Mr Jay. Just give
everybody a moment to move around, Mr Barr.
Right.