APPLIED ETHICS – SOME TIPS BEFORE WE START…

When thinking about issues in applied ethics, it is easy to slip out of doing good philosophy into thinking in more ‘everyday’ ways. Here are some tips to help keep your thinking philosophical:

1. While the facts about the practical issue, e.g. stealing or lying, are important, just talking about the facts is not philosophy. Nor is repeating what people generally say or feel about these cases. Doing applied ethics is not doing social science, but discussing justifications for certain decisions.

2. Whether an action is right or wrong can depend on the facts, but we may not know all the facts. So philosophical arguments are often ‘conditional’. It is not just acceptable, but good, to make your points conditional and say ‘if it turns out like this, then this follows (the action is right/wrong)’. For example, you might say ‘if simulated killing produces more pleasure than harm, then it is right’ (if you are defending utilitarianism). If you spend all your time thinking about whether an action does maximise happiness, and very little time about whether the utilitarian justification is correct, you’ve slipped out of doing applied ethics philosophically.

3. Avoid oversimplification wherever possible. Practical moral issues are very complex. In particular, if you are evaluating a theory, e.g. virtue ethics, by its success in practical cases, the complexity is crucial to being fair. Consider whether applied ethics ‘ought’ to be easy or not. Can we expect clear rules and algorithmic decision procedures in life? Aristotle’s theory suggests not.

4. Likewise, try to avoid objections that just point out our ignorance. For example, ‘who knows what consequences follow from a lie?’ is not helpful. This move is simply a refusal to do philosophy. A utilitarian will quickly reply that we must simply do our best to work out the consequences. The same with ‘who is to say what is right?’ You as a philosopher are to say what is right, as you see it and to the best of your ability (this is not arrogance, but the contribution of a rational human being to a rational debate).

5. Make a distinction between morality and legality. Whether a practice, such as eating animals, should be legal or illegal is a separate debate from whether it is morally acceptable.

6. The premise of applied ethics is usually that we are searching for the (or a) right thing to do. If you want to question whether morality is objective or not into discussions of applied ethics, you will need to think just as philosophically, and just as hard. There are no easy answers to be had just by assuming that there is no objectively right answer!

Animals

Utilitarianism

Act and Rule utilitarianismIn addressing the question of what makes animals morally relevant, Bentham famously said:

‘The question is not, can they reason? Nor, can they talk? But, can they suffer?’

So for the utilitarian, what entitles animals to serious moral consideration is simply their capacity for pain and pleasure, because that means they’re covered by the principle of utility, which tells us to maximise pleasure and minimise pain – never mind whose, or what species they belong to (Utilitarianism simply says that happiness / pleasure is good, it does not specify human happiness / pleasure). To Bentham (and Mill), humans and animals are in the same moral category and Utilitarianism therefore grants animals equal moral consideration to humans.

However, Bentham and Mill were careful to point out that this does not mean that animals and humans must always be treated in the same way. There are factual differences between them that often will justify differences in treatment. Animals, for example, have no political motivations and therefore would not gain pleasure from being able to vote whereas humans presumably do. However, we still have a strict moral duty to take animals’ welfare into account, and their suffering counts equally with any similar suffering experienced by a human.

Preference utilitarianism

Peter Singer: Equal Consideration of Interests

Singer, a preference utilitarian, interprets the classic utilitarian principle ‘each should count for one and no one for more than one’ as telling us to give equal weight to everybody’s preferences; and ‘everybody’ includes animals. Preference utilitarianism looks to preferences, but only because they express interests. The fact that animals can’t verbalise their preferences doesn’t really matter as long as we can understand what their interests actually are.

Singer acknowledges that you can only have equal consideration of interests where there are comparable interests on both sides and that the principle doesn’t apply where this isn’t the case. For example, as in the example above, humans have an interest in voting, whereas animals don’t. Since there is no similarity of interest, we do not need to treat animals and humans the same in this case. But, where there’s a similarity of interest, this crosses the species barrier, and both humans and animals should be treated in the same way.

Singer thinks there is one clear interest that we can observe in both humans and animals:

Avoidance of pain / pursuit of pleasure

In other words if a being can suffer there is no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration.

Speciesism

Just as racists violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of their own race so speciesists violate the same principle by giving greater weight to the interests of members of their own species, i.e. by arguing that human pain is somehow worse or more important than animal pain.

We may object to this view by saying that with different races, there is no difference in those important capacities – reason, the use of language, the depth of our emotional experience, our self-awareness, our ability to distinguish right and wrong – that make a being a person. But there is a difference between human beings and animals with all of these.

Singer responds that these differences are not relevant when it comes to the important capacity that human beings and animals share, namely sentience, the basic consciousness needed to experience pleasure and pain. For a utilitarian, an act is wrong if it produces more suffering than an alternative (this is true for Singer as well as he believes the main preference of animals is to avoid suffering). Who is suffering is irrelevant. When it comes to suffering, animals should be treated as equal to people.

Singer sees speciesism in practice when we use animals for food, where a relatively minor interest (the pleasure of eating meat) must be balanced against a major interest (the lives and welfare of the animals involved).

His conclusion is that the principle of equal consideration of interests does not allow major interests (animal suffering) to be sacrificed for minor interests (eating meat). Singer therefore concludes we should become vegetarians.

Objections to Singer’s position

1. Animals eat each other so why don’t we eat them?

But, most animals would not survive otherwise, whereas humans can survive without meat. Moreover, non-human animals are not capable of considering the alternatives that are open to them or of reflecting on the ethics of their diet.

2. Ethics is a contract between people for mutual benefits. (On this view animals cannot reciprocate and are therefore outside the limits of the ethical contract.)

However, this view of ethics can be challenged – what would our attitude be towards poor nations and future generations if only those who can reciprocate are within the ethical contract? Not only animals would be excluded from moral concern.

3. Human beings are overwhelmingly superior to animals and the principle of equality does not apply. (E.g. we can reason, appreciate and create beauty, write music, use language and technology, and make moral decisions.)

Singer’s response – marginal cases

The argument from marginal cases appeals to the fact that there are millions of ‘marginal’ humans, such as people with irreparable brain damage, PVS, severe Alzheimer’s, and so on, who don’t possess or have the potential to possess any of the features mentioned above.

If Singer’s opponents are seriously arguing that animals can be killed, eaten, and experimented on because they don’t have these features, then the argument from marginal cases seems to indicate that it is morally permissible to kill, eat, and experiment on the most vulnerable humans. This is morally very counter-intuitive.

Objection to Singer

These ‘marginal’ humans are still considered superior to all animals, and therefore safe from being eaten and experimented on, because, unlike animals, they’re the ‘kind of thing’ that possesses these superior features, even though many of the higher mammals are higher functioning than these ‘marginal’ humans.

Singer’s response

The above response is blatant speciesism, because basing the protection of ‘marginal’ humans on the fact that they’re ‘the kind of thing’ that has superior qualities is as absurd and morally irrelevant as the racist appeal to the white colour of one’s skin as grounds for preferential treatment over blacks.

It’s worth making it clear that Singer is not advocating downgrading ‘marginal’ humans to the level of animals, but is rather advocating the upgrading of animals to the protected moral status currently accorded to marginal humans. If we’re not prepared to kill, eat, and experiment on ‘marginal’ humans, we shouldn’t do these things to animals.

DeontologyKant holds that we have duties only to other rational agents so, because they aren’t rational, animals have no rights and no moral status of their own, and this means we can use them as we see fit; they aren’t ends in themselves, but only means to our ends. It is man who is an “end in himself.” Other beings have value only as means, to serve that end. For Kant, we have no direct duties to animals whatsoever:

“But so far as animals are concerned,” he says, “we have no direct duties. Animals are there merely as means to an end. That end is man.”

By a “direct duty” Kant meant a duty based on a concern for the animal’s own welfare. We may indeed have indirect duties that involve animals, but the reason behind these duties will always refer to a human interest, rather than to the animal’s own interests.

For example, Kant held that,

i) If the animal belongs to someone, then it’s wrong to hurt it because this is damage to property.

ii) If treating an animal cruelly has a bad effect on your character, which will lead you to treat other human beings cruelly too, then you do wrong.

Kant’s core argument regarding animal rights

P1: The categorical imperative says one shouldn’t act irrationally by willing contradictory universalized maxims, or by treating people, i.e. rational, moral agents, as mere means instead of as ends.

P2: Animals are not rational, moral agents.

P3: A universalized maxim of killing animals is not a contradiction in conception because such a world is easily imaginable, and it doesn’t involve reason killing reason.

P4: And it’s not a contradiction in will, because there’s no way you’d ever turn into an animal and end up on the ‘wrong’ end of you maxim (as in Kant’s example of the man who wouldn’t help others) so rational beings shouldn’t have an issue willing it.

P5: Since animals are not rational, they are also not ends in themselves and can therefore be treated as a means to our ends.

IC: So killing animals and using them as means to our ends is morally permissible, because maxims to this effect pass the categorical imperative. We have no direct duties to animals, only to humans.

P6: Since we have duties only to humans, the only time it’s wrong to damage to kill an animal is either when it’s owned by someone, in which case it’s wrong only because it constitutes damage to property and is a breach of our duty to the owner; or if its harsh treatment by us makes us more likely to be cruel to other people, in which case it will lead to a breach of our duty to treat other people as ends not as means.

MC: Therefore, we can treat animals any way we like as long as it neither damages other people’s property nor leads to our being cruel to humans.

Objections to Kant’s position

Animals as property

What Kant’s theory brutally boils down to is that, were you to poison your neighbour’s cat with weed-killer, so that it dies in agony, this is no worse, morally speaking, than pouring weed-killer on his lawn and ruining the grass, because these are equally his property, and painful consequences are not morally relevant.

The issue with this…

The suffering of the animal in itself is completely irrelevant, whereas most people see this as the heart of the matter. On this issue Kant’s theory is strongly and fatally counter-intuitive, and a related intuition is also violated, namely the instinctive feeling that a cat’s welfare matters more than grass or the paint job on a car, yet Kant treats them all the same. Kant is right about the action being wrong but he is wrong about the reason that it’s wrong, his theory focusing on a relatively trivial side issue of property rights, instead of the cat as the proper moral focus.

Cruelty to animals as bad-habit forming

Kant admits that we should not torture animals pointlessly, but the reason, he insists, is only that,

“He who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men.”

If the cat belongs to nobody, or if it’s yours, it’s still wrong to get sadistic fun out of harming it, again, not because you’ve done any wrong to the cat itself but because you have duties to the rest of humanity, and your cat-bashing habit is likely to transfer from cats to other humans. Kant argues that this is what makes it wrong to hit the cat, not the hitting of the cat itself. For example, the more often you take a baseball bat to your own or a stray cat, the more likely you are to take one to your neighbour, and you owe it to your neighbour, not to the stray cat, not to beat it to pulp. The cat’s pain is of no consequence morally speaking.

The issue with this…

Kant’s argument rests on there being an empirical connection which shows that being cruel to animals makes a person less likely to treat others with moral respect. Whilst there is some evidence for this it’s unclear whether this evidence shows that harming animals causes people to be cruel to humans, or just that people who do it are more likely to do both. It is even plausible to suggest that the very opposite might be true, that is, that ‘taking it out on’ the cat might make you less, not more, violent to other human beings – in which case we have the moral absurdity of Kant having to say that kicking the cat was not only permissible but actually a moral obligation based on our duty to other people.

Kant’s position also implies that, if you don’t happen to be the kind of person whose animal-torturing habits tempt them to torture humans, then the categorical imperative has no problem with you blow-torching as many cats as your heart desires, so long as they’re yours or have no owner. This is so counter-intuitive it hardly needs further refutation.

Conclusion

So, Kant’s theory doesn’t offer animals enough protection because it doesn’t give them sufficient recognition, seriously underplaying their moral status. We can therefore conclude that Kant’s moral theory, in permitting counter-intuitive and cruel actions towards animals, should be rejected as a moral guide in this area.

Virtue EthicsAristotle

Perhaps a better approach to our treatment of animals would be to look for the mean between the extremes, of the overly callous cruelty of Kant on the one hand, and the overly sensitive line taken by Singer on the other. Perhaps virtue ethics can occupy this position in the middle ground.

The first step is for modern virtue theory to distance itself from its founder. According to Aristotle, we aim at eudaimonia, the good for a human life. It is often translated as ‘happiness’ but Aristotle says it is ‘living well and faring well’. Virtues are traits that help us achieve this. However, animals have no share in eudaimonia, Aristotle argues, because they are incapable of either practical or theoretical reason. Our primary concern with eudaimonia has little place, therefore, for the consideration of animals. Aristotle demonstrated some of the traits of speciesism mentioned above.

Modern Virtue Ethics

Rosalind Hursthouse begins her modern defence of animal rights by stating that most other ethical theories start with the wrong question, namely “What is the moral status of animals?” This is a problem because all animals are different (in characteristics and roles) so trying to ascribe a blanket ‘moral status’ to all of them, and then work out how they should be treated based on this, achieves nothing. There are many different ways animals can be grouped (wild animals, farm animals, working animals, animals bred for food etc.) each of which attracts an associated set of responsibilities, duties and other virtues, going for a ‘one size fits all’ approach will not work.

Instead she argues we should be concerned with how we act towards animals on a case by case basis, and how we respond to their treatment. This is because how we act and respond in regards to our responsibilities will demonstrate which virtues we have developed, and which vices we are unfortunately practicing.

In her paper she gives the example of factory farming to illustrate this point:

Factory Farming

Every day millions of chickens are kept in darkness. They have been selectively bred to the point where many grow so quickly that they cannot stand. The conditions are cramped so that many cannot move. After 40 days of existence (chickens normally live for 7 years) the chickens are killed for their meat.

Hursthouse asks: ‘Can we deny these practices are cruel, or that they are callous?’ and the straightforward answer is: ‘No, we can’t deny that.’ Yet it is highly likely you eat chicken, and it is also highly likely you don’t need chicken (or any factory-farmed meat) in order to survive; you eat it because it’s convenient, cheap and you like it. In which case, you are failing to exhibit

compassion; and you are also failing to be temperate (as Hursthouse points out, temperance requires that we do not pursue pleasure while ignoring the claims of other virtues). It’s also difficult to identify any virtues that would support us eating factory-farmed meat.

According to Hursthouse, this shows our attitude in regards to factory-farming is wrong. We are not following the virtues (Do X) instead we are falling prey to the vices (Avoid Y). Therefore, we should stop supporting this practice.

Counter Response – Is some factory farming necessary?

If we can show that some factory farming is necessary (because it has produced a result that has allowed people to universally work towards Eudaimonia?) then we can make a valid case for saying it was the most virtuous thing to do. We could perhaps argue that the development of factory farming has allowed society to flourish (as we are less concerned with food) and therefore approach Eudaimonia. We could also argue that the cheap price of meat produced by factory farming has allowed people to get the nutrition they need, and therefore allow them to continue towards Eudaimonia.

Both of these arguments however, seem relatively weak in the face of the cruelty of factory farming. Especially if we make the case that the price increase if we switched to regular farming (that seems to be less cruel) would not be so ridiculous that it would price people out of buying meat entirely.

Normal Farming

Whilst Hursthouse uses the example of factory farming to illustrate why she thinks we treat animals wrongly she does not extend the discussion to regular or free range farming. Is it possible they could be OK according to Virtue Ethics? If so, this would give us an option for eating meat whilst avoiding the cruelty associated with factory farming.

The question we have to ask to work this out is whether or not we demonstrate cruelty / vices in farming animals full stop. Unfortunately there does not seem to be straightforward answer to this question:

- We might say that in free range or regular farming, farmers often raise the animals by hand and look after them as much as possible (as they are their income) demonstrating care and compassion in the process. The animals have a relatively good life and suffer none of the problems associated with factory farming. For these reasons we may say that regular farming is a relatively virtuous approach to producing animal products.

- On the other hand, the fact that many animals in farms are still slaughtered at a young age and are born / grown primarily as a source of food could easily still be linked to the vices. After all, if we have other options available to us that don’t rely on us killing animals surely it is cruel and greedy to continue to do so? If this is the case, then virtue ethicists may argue against animal farming full stop and in favour of vegetarianism or veganism

Applying virtue ethics to whether we should eat animals

To disregard the suffering and distress of e.g. battery hens, would be callously cruel, and to delight in it would be sadistically cruel, neither of which vices belong to a virtuous person.

While avoiding these vices, the virtuous person would exhibit the virtues of compassion and kindness – compassion in the sense of feeling distressed for the animals’ plight and wanting to alleviate it, and kindness as the desire to help the animal.

APPLIED ETHICS – STEALING

StealingTo steal is to take someone else’s property with no intention of returning it and without their permission (or without the legal right to do so). To own property involves a system of rights. I own my books, for instance. This means that I am free to use them (read them, keep them where I want, etc.), but no one else is free to use them unless I say so. And so because property involves individual rights, whether or not we may steal is a matter of justice, of what each person is ‘due’. I am ‘owed’ what I own, e.g. it should be returned to me if borrowed, and so to deprive me of my property through stealing or refusing to return it looks like a violation of justice. We start from the presumption that stealing is wrong, but arguments might overturn that presumption. What do our three theories say?

UtilitarianismAct utilitarianism, in its simplest form, says that an action is right if it maximises happiness, and wrong if it does not. So it does not phrase the rightness or wrongness of an action in terms of justice. If stealing, on some occasion, creates greater happiness than not stealing, then it is morally right on that occasion. Otherwise, it is morally wrong. It may well be that stealing usually leads to more unhappiness in the world, on balance, so it is usually wrong.

But we also recognise that it can be morally permissible to steal in certain situations. For instance, we might say that it is okay to steal in order to save a life or when we are in dire need, and especially if we steal from someone wealthy and so won’t be significantly harmed by the loss of their property. Or again, we may think that it is okay to steal from the wealthy where property is unjustly distributed, especially if we intend to benefit the poor – a ‘Robin Hood’ kind of stealing. Furthermore, we may argue that it would be right to steal something that the owner intended to use for harm, e.g. stealing a gun from someone planning a murder. Act utilitarianism can argue that it recognises these intuitions – these are all occasions on which stealing would lead to greater happiness than not doing so.

However, a society in which people stealing was permitted whenever it increased happiness could indirectly lead to greater unhappiness. People would become afraid that others will steal from them whenever the thief convinced himself that it would bring about greater happiness. In such a society, people would cease to trust each other, and so overall, the act utilitarian approach to stealing would diminish happiness.

John Stuart Mill recognises the importance of property rights and the importance of rights to feeling secure. Having and respecting property rights contributes most to happiness in the long term, and Mill comments that justice is ‘most sacred and binding part of all morality’. This suggests that we should never violate someone’s rights for some other purpose, e.g. maximising happiness on this occasion, and so we should never steal. But the examples given above, of Robin Hood or stealing in dire need, indicate that such a strict rule is counterintuitive. There need to be exceptions.

How would rule utilitarianism deal with this? Rule utilitarianism says that an action is right if, and only if, it complies with those rules which, if everybody followed them, would lead to the greatest happiness (compared to any other set of rules). It seems, rather obviously, that the rule ‘Do not steal’ would create more happiness than a rule that allows stealing freely, as the latter would completely undermine our trust in one another. Unfortunately though, as we have seen there are exceptional circumstances in which we may wish to argue that stealing is morally acceptable. Is there a better rule then regarding stealing, one that allows exceptions? Like Mill, rule utilitarians look at the long term consequences, and following a clear, simple rule will probably lead to better consequences overall than trying to build in lots of exceptions. Although the simple rule won’t lead to the best consequences in every case, exception clauses may tempt people to think that their situation is ‘exceptional’ and lead them to steal when they should not – and so a rule with exceptions won’t, in practice, lead to the best consequences in every case either, because people won’t follow it.

One solution for rule utilitarianism is to keep the simple rule against stealing, but add another, ‘general purpose’ rule: ‘in circumstances in which not doing something will lead to significant and immediate harm, then do that thing even if that means breaking some other rule’. This would allow stealing to prevent significant and immediate harm.

As for preference utilitarianism, well that seems the most obvious. People generally prefer not to have their possessions stolen, so according to preference UT we should generally never steal. There are a few potential exceptions (i.e. we may prefer someone steal money from us rather than starve to death) but they are few and far between.

Kantian DeontologyKant argues that we should ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ – his ‘Categorical Imperative’. Acting on the maxim ‘To steal something I want if I can’t afford it’ leads to a contradiction when universalised. Stealing can only be the right thing to do if everyone could do it. However, if we could all just help ourselves to whatever we wanted, the idea of ‘owning’ things would disappear. Now, by definition, you can’t steal something unless it belongs to someone else. Stealing presupposes that people own things. But people can only own things if they don’t all go around helping themselves whenever they want. So it is logically impossible for everyone to steal things. In other words, it is inconceivable – a contradiction in conception – for everyone to steal things. We can’t conceive of the maxim ‘To steal something I want if I can’t afford it’ being a universal law, so we can’t rationally will it to be a universal law. And so stealing (at least stealing just because one wants something) is wrong. (As argued above, the objection that a world without property involves no contradiction in conception or will is irrelevant.)

However, does this apply to all stealing? For instance, the maxim ‘To steal in order to save a life’ would not, if universalised, lead to the end of property, because it is rare that anyone would need to steal for this purpose.

However, it is unlikely that Kant would agree with this amendment. Our maxim is still ‘To steal’, and it is this that causes the contradiction in conception, so perhaps the purpose for stealing isn’t relevant. Stealing to save a life is still stealing, it is the

same kind of action as stealing because one wants something.

Actually, this last claim can be challenged. Perhaps the maxim of stealing to save a life is actually ‘To save a life, even if by stealing’.

Kant’s Categorical Imperative obviously allows that we should pursue good ends, such as saving lives; indeed, it is a contradiction

in will not to help others. But the whole idea of justice and rights is that there are constraints on how we pursue good ends. Kant agrees – the duties of justice are more stringent than the duties of virtue (doing good). So we should not steal.

Kant gives a second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, known as the Formula of Humanity: ‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end’. This provides another argument that rules out stealing. To steal from someone involves not allowing them to make an informed choice. Why not just ask them to give you what you want? Of course, that is preferable. But what if they refuse? Is it always wrong to steal from someone who, in refusing to help, doing something that is morally wrong?

If we disagree with the answers Kant’s theory gives us, we can use example of stealing to object to the theory. For instance, we can object that in morally bad circumstances, where someone will die or we live in a repressive and unjust regime, stealing is justified, but because Kant’s theory doesn’t recognise this, it gives us the wrong answers.

Aristotelian Virtue EthicsAristotle’s account of justice is largely deontological. The virtue of justice is defined primarily in terms of doing just actions. Although Aristotle does not understand justice in terms of rights (the concept was invented later by the Romans) or as constraints on what we may do, he comments in the Nicomachean Ethics that there are some actions that are never in the mean, but always wrong, and he includes stealing among them. Stealing is always a matter of injustice, of depriving someone of their ‘due’ or ‘fair share’.

What about stealing in an unjust situation, where some people have more than is fair while others are poor? There are two possible responses Aristotle might offer, depending on how the situation came about. Aristotle distinguishes unjust states of affairs from unjust actions. In the first scenario, an unjust state of affairs has come about through no one’s action. This is unfortunate. However, to deliberately choose to do an unjust act, such as stealing, is worse, and so can’t be justified just by appealing to an unjust state of affairs. In the second scenario, the unjust state of affairs has come about through people’s actions, e.g. the rich are deliberately exercising their power to keep the poor poor. This situation demands justice in rectification, to make equal what has been made unequal. Stealing is not normally an act of justice in this sense, but if it were (Robin Hood again?), then it could be justified.

A third response is to disagree with Aristotle that stealing is an act that is never in the mean. We could generalise the argument just made to say that stealing can be justified if it does not involve depriving someone of their ‘due’ or ‘fair share’. When this is so will require practical wisdom, but we should not assume that just because someone owns something that they own it ‘fairly’. Or again, we may argue that even if stealing does (appear to) violate justice, it may be justified by appealing to some other virtue, such as kindness in saving someone’s life. Conflicts between virtues must be resolved by practical wisdom.

A Final Thought

To steal something from someone, that person must own it, i.e. their property rights over it must be legitimate. If someone steals your phone, you aren’t stealing if you take it back without their permission. If, in the tales of Robin Hood, the rich did not own their wealth because they had literally stolen it from the poor, then we could say that Robin Hood didn’t steal from the rich at all. He simply returned to the poor what was stolen from them. But perhaps a better description is that the rich did not own their wealth according to just laws of ownership, e.g. the taxes that it came from were clearly exploitative and so unjust. Robin Hood did steal from them, but if their ownership was unjust, then perhaps his stealing was no violation of justice, and so not wrong.

Lying

Utilitarianism

As should be familiar by now, for an act utilitarian, the end justifies the means. So lying is completely morally acceptable if it maximises happiness/minimises harm. In fact, in such instances not only would lying be morally acceptable, but it is the right thing to do – we ought to lie (remember though that it is general happiness that is to be maximised, and not just your own).

However some claim that telling the truth (as well as keeping promises) comes with its own moral obligation, regardless of the consequence. Some lies, such as lying about your age by one year to someone you will never meet again, seem to have no negative consequences, and yet we may still feel that there is something inherently wrong with lying in these situations. A utilitarian would naturally disagree, but would note that lying and breaking promises are highly likely to cause upset in many/most cases, as, in general:

People don’t like being lied to People don’t like been accused of lying People want to be trusted and lying undermines this Lying frequently causes hurt when discovered Lying often causes stress to the liar (having to remember lies and the thought

of being discovered, etc.) Lying weakens people’s general faith in humanity, and so lowers happiness.

For these reasons alone, lying comes with an inbuilt negative outcome, so the benefits of the lie clearly need to outweigh this too. So for the act utilitarian it is often going to be wrong to lie and break promises. It is also hard to predict what the outcome of a lie may be, so that even when we judge that lying may have an overall more positive outcome there may be factors we aren’t taking into account, and the lie may lead to a lot of stress. Again, this uncertainty makes the default position of truth-telling much stronger. So, although an act utilitarian would deny there is anything inherently good about truth-telling, they would acknowledge that truth-telling, in general, should be the default position.

John Stuart Mill’s takes a similar approach in his brief discussion of lying in Utilitarianism. He demonstrates that his version of utilitarianism does not evaluate actions just in terms of immediate or obvious consequences, but places them within a bigger picture. A person’s being truthful is of great benefit to people’s happiness generally, and our being able to trust what others say is not only the basis of social well-being but also a foundation of civilisation and virtue more generally. Weakening either our tendency to be truthful or other people’s trust is, therefore, severely damaging to happiness. To tell a lie just for the sake of convenience is therefore morally wrong.

That said, Mill also allows that lying is sometimes permissible; e.g. when it is the only way we can withhold information from someone who intends to do harm. We need to carefully consider which situations permit lying by weighing up the conflicting utilities involved. Mill discusses an example from Kant’s ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives’. Suppose someone comes to your house to seek refuge from someone who wants to murder them. Soon after they have hidden, the would-be murderer arrives and asks you where they are. In this case, says Mill, the harm done by lying is outweighed by the good done by saving a life, and lying is permissible.

Rule UtilitarianismAbove we saw the argument that lying has a default position of being wrong. This way of thinking leads naturally into rule utilitarianism. We can conclude from these considerations that, in general, lying will cause more harm than good. The rule ‘Tell the truth’ is one that will maximise utility. So, for a strong rule utilitarian, it is always wrong to tell a lie (as it breaks the rule that maximises happiness).

However, we can object, with Mill, that never lying will lead to harm in certain situations. We need a rule that allows for exceptions. It may be very difficult to put such a rule into words, since the situations in which telling the truth will lead to more harm than good are quite varied. We might lie to prevent someone from doing harm to others; or from doing harm to themselves; or because the truth would hurt (e.g. in cases of terminal illness or sexual infidelity); or because the truth would be damaging to some long-term good (e.g. in politics); or … It is hard to know what the right ‘rule’ for lying should be.

Preference UtilitarianismA final mention should go to preference utilitarianism. Rather than focusing on whether a lie would bring more happiness, the theory suggests we should focus on whether a lie would satisfy more preferences. This is significant as most people have a preference to be told the truth, which further justifies the default position of truth-telling. However, there are times (Does this suit look nice? Did my speech go well? Is my partner cheating on me?) when a person may legitimately prefer to be lied to, in which case, lying may be morally good.

The position of the preference utilitarian is also different as someone’s preference to be told the truth is frustrated when a lie is told, and this does not rely on whether the person finds out they are being lied to or not. Whereas for act / rule utilitarianism some lies may only become wrong when the lie is discovered, as this is when the upset is caused.

Putting It Into PracticeIn examples where there is a very clear pleasure gain, such a secret affair, an act utilitarian may argue that the affair should be pursued. It certainly seems as if pleasure would be gained in the short term. However the longer term is harder to judge: guilt, mistrust and disillusionment may follow. Also, the pleasures they are pursuing are fleeting and high risk. These are difficult factors to work out. This is why act utilitarianism is not a good method of deliberation, as there are too many unknowns.

Rule utilitarians may have different answers to this kind of scenario, depending on the different rules that they think would generally maximise happiness. Would the world be a happier place if no affairs ever occurred? Or is it happier for having affairs?

A preference utilitarian may have a slightly different take, as people usually have a preference for their partners being faithful. In which case, the affair goes against this preference and so this needs to be added into the equation from the start.

SO, from a traditional utilitarian perspective, if the affair is not discovered and pleasure is gained then the act is a good thing. The displeasure of the partner is only relevant to the moral value of the act if they find out. From a preference utilitarian perspective, it is irrelevant to the moral value whether or not he finds out, as his preference is not being satisfied from the outset.

DeontologyIt would seem that you cannot universalise a maxim of telling lies. The whole concept of lying relies on the concept of truth-telling and being deceived. If everyone lied, then everyone would also know the truth is not being told and lies would not deceive. The wrongness of lying can also be clearly seen using the humanity formulation. Even where lying doesn’t cause obvious harm to the deceived person, you are undermining their ability to pursue their own ends. In telling the truth, we allow people to pursue their own ends, make up their own minds. In lying, we prevent this.

The Kantian emphasis on truth-telling as a moral duty seems intuitive in many cases. In the example of lying to your partner so that you can have the secret affair, your partner has no choice as to whether to consent to the affair or not. Lying undermines their autonomy and ability to make rational choices about which goals to pursue.

However Kant runs into problems with his own example of the axe-man at the door. Kant claimed that you have a duty to tell the truth in this scenario, but most people would disagree. Arguing that lying in such a situation is the right action. But perhaps Kant is wrong about your maxim in this case. Your maxim may be more specific than lying whenever one wants. For instance, you may adopt the maxim ‘to lie when it is necessary to save a life’. Arguably, this can be universalised. Because in most situations, no lives are at stake, if everyone acted on this maxim, people would still believe each other most of the time. This would mean that in Kant’s example of the would-be murderer who asks you where his victim is, it would be permissible to lie.

There is a question why Kant didn’t simply take this approach when discussing the issue. Why does he argue that even in this case, lying to the would-be murderer is morally wrong? Perhaps Kant might reply if everyone lies when it is necessary to save a life, then the would-be murderer knows this. So they won’t believe us when we answer their question about where their victim is hiding. So we can’t deceive them. The maxim ‘to lie when it is necessary to save a life’ isn’t universalisable after all.

In fact, in his essay on lying, Kant adds a further argument against lying. We don’t know what consequences will follow from our lying. Suppose we lie about the person hiding in our house, saying they ran down the street. Suppose that, unknown to us, they did exactly that. They left their hiding place and ran off. And so our lie sends the murderer straight to where the person is. We would be responsible, Kant claims, for this consequence. Yet, if we had told the truth and the murderer had killed our friend, we would not be morally responsible as we did what was right. It is the murderer’s

fault if he uses the information gained to do something morally reprehensible. If we are tempted to lie because we think the consequences will be better than if we told the truth, it is possible that we may be mistaken and it would be our fault were any bad consequences to arise. We will have failed to do our duty, achieved nothing, and be responsible for the results. It is better to do our duty.

Universal law formulationMany philosophers suggested that the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative does not require you to tell the truth at all times. It seems perfectly possible to rationally will that everyone should follow maxims such as ‘I will always tell the truth, except if in telling the truth I put someone’s life at risk’, or ‘I will always lie to a would-be murderer’. These do not seem to lead to any contradictions, as I would be happy to be lied to in these circumstances. Furthermore, we have an imperfect duty to help others, so not only is lying morally permissible, it may also be the right thing to do. So, according to this interpretation, Kant is wrong in applying his own theory, and lying in some circumstances is morally permissible.

Humanity formulationThe situation seems less flexible when we look at the humanity formulation. When we lie to someone, we are overriding that person’s ability to make rational choices. But sometimes we need to protect ourselves (and others) from the wrong actions of others, and lying may be the only means of doing so. If the action someone intends to do would treat me as a means to an end, then we can, by lying, prevent this result. Kant himself recognises this in his Lectures on Ethics: ‘if I cannot save myself by maintaining silence, then my lie is a weapon of defence’. This for Kant seems to be the only acceptable use of lying.

Virtue EthicsAll forms of virtue ethics, especially its Aristotelian form, require us to develop an honest character. It is by being honest that we as individuals will ultimately flourish, people will trust us, and people will look to us for information and advice. Also it is by being honest together that we as a society will also be able to flourish. Our success depends upon the success of our communication, which itself depends on our trust in the information exchanged, the promises made, the judgements cast, etc.

Peter Geach argues that the virtue of honesty enables us to develop our practical wisdom; or rather that the vice of dishonesty undermines our practical wisdom. Honesty, like all virtues, is developed through habituation and dishonesty (even the telling of small lies, or white lies) is also a habit. Dishonesty is a habit that enables us to escape from difficult situations: when you haven't done your homework, when you are being interviewed for a job, when your teacher asks you awkward questions about homework or revision... a lie can free us from further efforts. But the habit of lying means that we don't work hard to find alternative solutions to those tricky situations, i.e. we don't use our practical wisdom, which means that we are not genuinely equipping ourselves for further tricky situations. Difficult situations don't go away in life, and lying is no permanent solution to them - you simply get a reputation as a liar.

But Geach argues that there is a difference between being dishonest by lying, and avoiding being honest by deception. Geach gives the example of Saint Athanasius who was escaping in a boat from his persecutors when they rowed past in the opposite direction. As they passed, the persecutors asked 'Where is that traitor Athanasius?', to which Athanasius replied 'Not far away'. Geach argues that Athanasius was clever enough to avoid telling the truth (to deceive) without actually lying, and so no damage was done to his honest disposition.

As we have seen throughout this discussion, real moral dilemmas are messy, complex affairs, and virtue ethicists believe their theory is well placed to deal with this complexity as the theory offers no simple answers. It will always consider the range of motives involved, what virtues or vices are potentially being exhibited, and the impact of the action on everyone concerned, in particular the impact on people's characters (as it is this impact that will affect their choices, virtuous or vicious, in the future). The axe-murder dilemma brings out the importance of two particular virtues: loyalty and honesty.

For other types of ethical theory, the two virtues seem to compete, and this may present a problem, but an Aristotelian virtue ethicist, one who takes things on a case-by-case basis, may argue that we need to apply the virtues that are the right thing to do in this situation. If you are someone who is generally honest, then deceiving someone in a one-off (life-or-death) situation isn't going to undermine your tendency and inclination to be honest. An axe murderer at your door is just such a situation. We have seen that our relationships with other people can bring with them special demands: our partners, friends and families require loyalty that goes beyond our loyalty to strangers in our community. So you do have a special loyalty to your friend not to betray him, and to keep him safe from harm. This loyalty lays claim on you in a way that easily outweighs the claim that 'being honest to a stranger (with an axe)' has, and so in this case a virtue ethicist may conclude that although you haven't told a lie you are still being dishonest, but that dishonesty is the appropriate response here.

Simulated Killing(within computer games, plays, films)

Violence in films, in plays and on television has become a common source of public outrage. Since the 1980s the outrage has been increasingly focused on video games, particularly those that place the ability to violently kill in the hands of the player. No one is being hurt when playing these games and no rights seem to be infringed, yet the games have produced moral outrage. Some feel that gaining pleasure in this way is morally dubious; others believe that the games may have negative effects on the player, and, in turn, on society.

UtilitarianismFor a utilitarian, there is something paradoxical in the ‘pleasure’ gained from watching people being killed. On the one hand there is the pleasure, and on the other the portrayal of pain and death.

All pleasures are equal for the act utilitarian (not quite for Mill though). The pleasure of watching a fake killing is of the same worth as that gained from listening to opera or that gained from watching a real killing. The pleasure counts for the same in each case; what determines whether it is a good or bad thing overall, is whether the sum total of pleasure outweighs the pain, or whether pleasure is maximised.

For the utilitarian there is no question of such entertainments being intrinsically wrong, as wrong is defined entirely by ends (pain or less happiness), not the means. So the key question for the utilitarian is whether watching deaths on stage, screen or in a video game, overall produces more happiness than it does harm. They will also be interested in whether alternatives could be produced that are more pleasurable, with less harm caused.

On the positive side (happiness) are the following considerations:

These entertainments produce a lot of pleasure. They are very popular. There are often secondary pleasures gained from engaging with a part of

a specific culture – chatting with friends about games, conventions, etc. They are also part of successful industries that supply jobs, create wealth

and also advance technology. Video games can have beneficial effects in terms of motor skills. In the last 20 years violent crime has decreased in the UK and in other

western countries too, and this is at the same time that violent video games and films have boomed. This suggests that any causal link between video games and violence cannot be strong.

An on the negative side (harm):

Violent video films, and in particular video games, have been linked to increased anti-social behaviour in the short and longer terms (however, there is also evidence that shows there is very little link).

Too much time spent on video games can have harmful effects on health (in terms of sedentary lifestyle).

People disapprove of these activities and this causes some sadness.

It would be very hard to argue that such entertainments cause more harm than good. Rock climbing, horse riding and even football cause far more average harm per hour to the player. And football is also associated with a level of violence in and around stadiums.

Higher / Lower distinction

However for Mill, the sorts of pleasure produced by violent films and video games may well be the wrong sorts of pleasure. These entertainments may be classed as lower pleasures, which, though still good, are of lower worth. A ‘competent judge’ may prefer other sorts of higher pleasures and Mill thought that we should prioritise these.

Mill may argue that the pleasures gained from simulated killing appeal to our baser, animal side and not to our progressive, intellectual side. Although they are pleasurable, maximising such pleasures is not as morally good as enjoying the less ‘pleasant’ higher pleasures of, say, reading Dostoevsky, or this handout.

Holding a higher/lower qualitative distinction may alter the result of the utilitarian calculus on simulated killing entertainments. By how much is not clear: do we halve the pleasure total on the ‘gained’ column? The fact that there is no easy answer to this question is a criticism of having such a distinction in the first place. Also, it is questionable as to whether such entertainments are, in fact, lower pleasures. There are also a huge number of games and violent films that have come out in recent years that have been hailed as masterpieces in their field. Surely they could be seen a higher pleasures in comparison to say, binge drinking gin?

The question of the competent judge is an interesting one too. Mill never played video games; he may have taken to Grand Theft Auto like a duck to water. There are many competent judges that can appreciate both video games and Dostoevsky, and prefer the former. So the higher/lower distinction is itself questionable and, furthermore, it does not necessarily downgrade the status of the pleasure gained from these entertainments, as they are not clearly lower pleasures.

Liberty

Many people are offended by the existence of violent video games. A utilitarian might argue that their displeasure (or their preferences) should be taken into account in the utility calculator. Also, it could be argued that the same amount of pleasure could be gained by alternative methods of entertainment that offer less offence/harm. If so, it could be argued that playing violent games may not be so good.

However the problem with taking into account the offence of others is that this approach places too much power in the moral sentiments of the majority. Perhaps all things that the majority find unpleasant or offensive should be considered immoral?

Mill argued passionately that the secondary principle (or rule) of liberty should play a central role in utilitarianism. We should all be free to pursue our own pleasures as long as we do not harm others (the extent to which offence counts as harm has to be fairly minimal). A society committed to liberty, to freedom of expression and the pursuit of different goals will be happier in the long run. And this is a society that doesn’t allow the moral sentiments of some to dictate the non-harmful pursuits of others. So, for Mill, allowing people to play video games is a good thing, as this follows the rule of liberty, which is the rule that will maximise utility.

In summary:

For a utilitarian simulated killing is morally good as long as the pleasure outweighs the harm

The distinction between higher and lower pleasures is ambiguous, both in general, and in its specific application to the case in question.

Mill would also claim that pursuing pleasures that are not harmful to others is, in general, a good thing.

Simulated killing is a clear source of happiness for millions; for a utilitarian, such things are morally good.

DeontologyKant’s morality is based around following rules that we can rationally will everyone to follow, and acting in ways that respect other people’s autonomy. This usually requires working out if we have a duty to behave in a certain way, which in turn can be equated to whether you or other people have rights. (Having a right, say to free speech, creates a duty in others, in this case to not censor me. Duties are the ‘flip side’ of rights). For Kant the moral value (right or wrong) of watching/playing simulated killing is not dependent on the consequences of such activities, but on whether it is possible to consistently will that you should watch them, and whether watching them is consistent with treating others as rational autonomous beings.

Not surprisingly Kant wrote literally nothing about the morality of video games or violent films. So it is up to other commentators to work out what an appropriate Kantian position might be.

When I watch a film, or play a game, on the face of it, I do not seem to be reneging on anyone’s rights. The actors were free agents who chose to be in the film/stage. The pixels on the video screen are not real people. Other people may claim to have rights to not be offended by such sights, but as long as such films are not shown in outdoor places, where they cannot be avoided, then those who may be offended are not having their freedom curtailed.

However, it may be that I have a duty to myself to not be entertained by simulated killing. An argument along these lines can be constructed from the work of Kant. Kant argued that morally we can treat non-human animals as a mere means to our ends, as animals lack the rationality required to be ends in themselves. However, he does not think this gives us a license to be cruel to animals:

“…for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men’. – Kant

Kant’s argument relies on there being an empirical connection which shows that being cruel to animals makes a person less likely to treat others with moral respect. Whether this is true or not is a matter of debate.

This argument can be translated fairly easily to the issues of simulated killing. It could be suggested that watching people violently die on films, or killing them violently in video games, makes us less compassionate towards others. Such entertainment may encourage us to see other people as means to an end, as

cannon fodder, without ends of their own. If this were so, then we have a duty not to watch these films or play these games.

Again, this would seem to be an empirical matter and rely on there being a causal connection between simulated death as entertainment and being less compassionate to humans.

There is some evidence pointing to this, however there is also evidence pointing against it. There is also the problem that showing a link doesn’t always have a causal link. Although society has become less violent in the last 20 years, studies have shown that general empathy levels have decreased during this time. The cause of this is not clear and commentators are keener to suggest that wider societal changes such as capitalism and parenting have had a much greater impact than films/video games.

In summary:

So Kant’s position on simulated killing is not fully clear. On the one hand, engaging in such activities is not treating others as a means

to an end. However, it can be argued that it diminishes our ability to treat people as

autonomous ends in themselves. If it is shown that this is the case then we have a duty not to do such things,

and acting on the maxim of watching video games for pleasure can be blameworthy (but not always).

If there is no causal connection between such activities and the diminishing of our compassion, then entertaining ourselves in this way is morally permissible, but not morally good, which utilitarians may claim.

Virtue EthicsVideo games

In his seminal paper, ‘Is it wrong to play violent video games?’, Matt McCormick examines the response to this question from a utilitarian, Kantian and virtue ethics perspective.

A utilitarian and Kantian approach may emphasise that impact the game has on real people in the real world after the game has finished, but McCormick concludes that, of all moral theories, virtue ethics is best able to articulate why it may be wrong to play violent video games, whatever their impact. He draws this conclusion on the following grounds:

First, that our moral intuitions tell us that there is ‘something morally objectionable’ with people playing a game that graphically mimics the murder of children – even if nobody is affected.

Secondly, that neither utilitarianism, nor Kantian ethics, can provide compelling reasons for why playing the game itself (not the eventual effect that the act may have on other people) is wrong.

Only virtue ethics, is able to articulate what is objectionable about taking part in the virtual murder of video games, and that is that:

‘engaging in simulated immoral acts erodes one’s character and makes it more difficult for one to live a fulfilled eudaimonic life’.

So, Aristotelian virtue ethics does have something to say about virtual murder, even if the action does not affect other people. As you know, virtue ethics is agent-centred and not act-centred, but acts are still important to Aristotelian virtue ethics: actions contribute to habituation, which contributes to our character, which in turn contributes to how we will be inclined to behave in the future. Building a virtuous character does not come easily, but requires careful cultivation. McCormick argues that by indulging in the excessive, indulgent and wrongful acts of games we are ‘cultivating the wrong sort of character’.

McCormick may not need empirical evidence as to whether cruel or callous behaviour in the virtual world is actually converted (however unconsciously) into cruel or callous behaviour in the real world for his argument to work. After all, time spent performing actions that don’t contribute to habituation of the virtues still could be spent doing something more valuable. Even if video games are harmless virtue wise, the time spent playing them could instead be spent on reinforcing actual virtuous dispositions (like volunteering in the community, or developing friendships, or contributing to the daily chores of any household).

Film & Theatre

Aristotle wrote extensively on theatre in his work the Poetics, focusing in particular on tragedy. The virtue ethicist can use Aristotle’s theory of tragedy and how it effects the audiences emotions, to understand the effects on our character of watching murderous acts in film and theatre.

The key elements for Aristotle on tragedy are the journey of the hero, who is a great man (and for Aristotle it usually was a male protagonist), towards some sort of crisis, usually as a result of an error or flaw, which then leads to the finale, catharsis and the resolution of the crisis. As the hero approaches the finale, the audience’s anxieties intensify until the emotion is given a cathartic release and purged as the drama is resolved, the hero dies, or defeats the beast, or finds out that his wife is his mother, etc. So for Aristotle, theatre, and tragedy in particular, has a purifying effect on the audience – through this cathartic process – enabling them to be better able to cope with tragedy in their own life. Theatre, then, even in its most tragic form, can restore us to psychological health.

In nearly all Greek tragedies the horrific violence only takes place off-stage, described by the chorus rather than shown to the audience. The experience of modern theatre audiences and cinema goers, who flock to see violent films and plays may still however be a cathartic experience. Audiences may still find relief – after all, the negative emotions essential to catharsis (pity and fear) are triggered every day by horrific news stories from around the world. Aristotle believed that without the cathartic effect of theatre we are liable to become ‘possessed’ by these emotions, damaging the balance in our souls. We are thrilled by fear, but we don’t want to be afraid in real life, so watching it on stage or film enables us to indulge in the thrill of fear and to purge that desire.

But the point made by McCormick above could apply here: a virtue ethicist might be worried about the dispositions being developed. Seeing a one-off film or play should not worry the virtue ethicist too much; but watching it over and over again raises the point McCormick made, that this habitual indulgence in simulated killing potentially creates the wrong sorts of emotions.

In summary:

A virtue ethicist may conclude that violent gaming at best fails to develop any virtues, and at worst encourages vices, neither of which leads to flourishing.

However, simulated killing in plays, films and on TV may provide a cathartic release of emotion making it easier for audiences to cope with these feelings.

In all cases habituation must be taken into account. Watching simulated killing repeatedly may lead to the development of vices, and could waste time that could be spent on developing the virtues