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1. NECESSITY OF A TRANSCENDENTAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SITUATIONS OF BEING The first section consists of a long demonstration. It is a matter of forcing thought to accept that every situation of being—every ‘world’—far from being reduced to the pure multiple (which is nonetheless its being as such) contains a transcendental organization. The meaning of this expression will transpire from the demonstration itself. As in Kant, we are trying to resolve a problem of possibility. Not however ‘how is science possible’ or ‘how are synthetic judgments a priori possible’ but: how is it possible that the neutrality, inconsistency and indifferent dissemination of being-qua-being comes to consist as beingthere? Or: how can the essential unbinding of multiple-being give itself as a local binding and, in the end, as the stability of worlds? Why and how are there worlds rather than chaos? As we know, for Kant the transcendental is a subjectivated construction. With good reason, we speak of a transcendental subject, which in some sense invests the cognitive power of empirical subjects. Ever since Descartes, this is the essential trait of an idealist philosophy: that it calls upon the subject not as a problem but as the solution to the aporias of the One (the world is nothing but formless multiplicity, but there exists a unified Dasein of this world). The materialist thrust of my own thought (but also paradoxically of Hegel’s, as Lenin remarked in his Notebooks) derives from the fact that within it the subject is a late and problematic construction, and in no way the place of the solution to a problem of possibility or unity (possibility of intuitive certainty for Descartes, of synthetic judgments a priori for Kant). The transcendental that is at stake in this book is altogether anterior to every subjective constitution, for it is an immanent given of any situation whatever. As we shall see, it is what imposes upon every situated multiplicity the constraint of a logic, which is also the law of its appearing, or the rule in accordance with which the ‘there’ of being-there allows the multiple to come forth as essentially bound. That every world possesses a singular transcendental organization means that, since the thinking of being cannot on its own account for the world’s manifestation, the intelligibility of this manifestation must be made possible by immanent operations. ‘Transcendental’ is the name for these operations. The final maxim can be stated as follows: with regard to the inconsistency of being, ‘logic’ and ‘appearing’ are one and the same thing. 101 GREATER LOGIC, 1. THE TRANSCENDENTAL 10:57:11:03:09 Page 102 Page 102 However, it does not follow, as in Kant, that being-in-itself is unknowable. On the contrary, it is absolutely knowable, or even known (historically-existing mathematics). But this knowledge of being (ontology) does not entail that of appearing (onto-logy). It is this disjunction which the arguments in this section attempt to force. The stages which develop this parameter have as their point of departure the impossibility of determining a being of the Whole, and finally the thesis according to which there is no Whole. Contrary to a Heideggerian proposition, it is irrational to evoke ‘beings-as-a-whole’. It follows that every singular being [étant] is only manifested in its being [être] locally: the appearing of the being of beings [l’être de l’étant] is being-there. It is this necessity of the ‘there’ which, for a being thought in its multiple-being, entails a transcendental constitution (without subject). This constitution authorizes us to think the being as localized, to include the ‘there’ in the thinking of being—something that the mathematical (ontological) theory of the pure multiple,

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1. NECESSITY OF A TRANSCENDENTAL ORGANIZATIONOF THE SITUATIONS OF BEINGThe first section consists of a long demonstration. It is a matter of forcingthought to accept that every situation of beingevery worldfar frombeing reduced to the pure multiple (which is nonetheless its being as such)contains a transcendental organization.The meaning of this expression will transpire from the demonstrationitself. As in Kant, we are trying to resolve a problem of possibility. Nothowever how is science possible or how are synthetic judgments apriori possible but: how is it possible that the neutrality, inconsistency andindifferent dissemination of being-qua-being comes to consist as beingthere?Or: how can the essential unbinding of multiple-being give itself as alocal binding and, in the end, as the stability of worlds? Why and how arethere worlds rather than chaos?As we know, for Kant the transcendental is a subjectivated construction.With good reason, we speak of a transcendental subject, which in somesense invests the cognitive power of empirical subjects. Ever since Descartes,this is the essential trait of an idealist philosophy: that it calls uponthe subject not as a problem but as the solution to the aporias of the One(the world is nothing but formless multiplicity, but there exists a unifiedDasein of this world). The materialist thrust of my own thought (but alsoparadoxically of Hegels, as Lenin remarked in his Notebooks) derives fromthe fact that within it the subject is a late and problematic construction, andin no way the place of the solution to a problem of possibility or unity(possibility of intuitive certainty for Descartes, of synthetic judgments apriori for Kant).The transcendental that is at stake in this book is altogether anterior toevery subjective constitution, for it is an immanent given of any situationwhatever. As we shall see, it is what imposes upon every situated multiplicitythe constraint of a logic, which is also the law of its appearing, orthe rule in accordance with which the there of being-there allows themultiple to come forth as essentially bound. That every world possesses asingular transcendental organization means that, since the thinking ofbeing cannot on its own account for the worlds manifestation, theintelligibility of this manifestation must be made possible by immanentoperations. Transcendental is the name for these operations. The finalmaxim can be stated as follows: with regard to the inconsistency of being,logic and appearing are one and the same thing.101GREATER LOGIC, 1. THE TRANSCENDENTAL10:57:11:03:09Page 102Page 102However, it does not follow, as in Kant, that being-in-itself is unknowable.On the contrary, it is absolutely knowable, or even known(historically-existing mathematics). But this knowledge of being (ontology)does not entail that of appearing (onto-logy). It is this disjunctionwhich the arguments in this section attempt to force. The stages whichdevelop this parameter have as their point of departure the impossibility ofdetermining a being of the Whole, and finally the thesis according to whichthere is no Whole. Contrary to a Heideggerian proposition, it is irrationalto evoke beings-as-a-whole. It follows that every singular being [tant] isonly manifested in its being [tre] locally: the appearing of the being ofbeings [ltre de ltant] is being-there. It is this necessity of the therewhich, for a being thought in its multiple-being, entails a transcendentalconstitution (without subject). This constitution authorizes us to think thebeing as localized, to include the there in the thinking of beingsomethingthat the mathematical (ontological) theory of the pure multiple,despite conveying the whole being of the being, does not allow. In whatfollows, we will call universe the (empty) concept of a being of the Whole.We will call world a complete situation of being (this will be graduallyelucidated). Obviously, since we show that there is no universe, it belongsto the essence of the world that there are several worlds, since if there wereonly one it would be the universe.2. EXPOSITION OF THE TRANSCENDENTALExposition of the transcendental signifies the description of the logicaloperators capable of lending coherence to appearing in one of the worldsin which multiples come to be.I write in a world (in quotation marks) to indicate that we are dealingwith a metaphor for the localization of multiples. As a situation of being, aworld is not an empty placeakin to Newtons spacewhich multiplebeings would come to inhabit. For a world is nothing but a logic ofbeing-there, and it is identified with the singularity of this logic. A worldarticulates the cohesion of multiples around a structured operator (thetranscendental).At the core of transcendental questions lies the evaluation of the degreesof identity or difference between a multiple and itself, or between a beingthereand other beings. The transcendental must therefore make possiblethe more and the less. There must exist values of identity which indicate,102LOGICS OF WORLDS10:57:11:03:09Page 103Page 103for