Training White Paper - 4 Sep Update

5/21/2018 Training White Paper - 4 Sep Update

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Training MillennialsImproving Quality in an Environment of Austerity

LCDR Gordon Judy FaulknerVFA-106 Training Officer


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Contents

Disclaimer: 1

Introduction: 1

The Genesis: 2

The Aviator: 5

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The Officer: 10

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Introduction:

The mission of VFA-106 is to provide the fleet with combat ready

Replacement Aircrew (RAC). This requires conversion of newly

winged Category One Replacement Pilots (RP) or Weapons System

Officers (RWSO) into a steely eyed warrior, fully prepared to

employ the F/A-18 in combat, rapidly assimilate into a fleet

Ready Room and assume the duties of a squadron Junior Officer.

In an environment of lengthening cruises, shrinking budgets and

reduced fleet training opportunities, the role of the Fleet

Replacement Squadron (FRS) and Training Command in producing

quality warriors is more important than ever.

Over the past two years the VFA-106 Training Department observed

an alarming two-fold trend: overhead costs soared as SODs

increased 132 percent from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 20131,

and several incidents involving poor officer-like qualities

arose, where before there were few documented issues involving

professional conduct. In the past 18 months VFA-106 conducted

11 Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Boards (FNAEB), issued four

Non-Punitive Letters of Caution (NPLOC) and eight Letters of

Instruction (LOI) addressing issues with officer-like qualities.

In the preceding 18 months, the squadron conducted only two

FNAEBs and Field Flight Performance Boards (FFPB).Surprisingly, less than 40 percent of unsatisfactory events have

been related to increasingly complex tactical skills, but have

instead been for deficiencies in core skills. This degradation

in core skills from Category One aviators has occurred over

time, insidiously, as the number of Training Command platforms

(at least for pilots) was reduced from three to two and the

number of Training Command flight hours declined over a decade

from nominally 290 at winging compared with 240 today. The

principal result is Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS) that focus

on remediating basic air work (BAW), formation, and admin,

rather than converting winged aviators into fleet warriors. Notsurprisingly, VFA-106 is also devoting an increased amount of

time to mentoring officers who have demonstrated significant

character deficiencies and integrity problems.

2

1Normalized SOD rate adjusted for students in training


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In addition to these trends, the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE)

has been pursuing several efforts to optimize training by

downloading flights to less expensive cost per hour (CPH)

platforms. The Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) has made

several requests for suggested FRS flights to download to less

costly platforms. The FRS syllabus already operates at theminimum required number of flights, introducing most concepts

only once during the course of training. Any flight time

reduction in the FRS syllabus would likely result in additional

remediation, thus negating the savings from that reduction. At

the very least decreasing flight time could tangibly reduce the

quality of the aviator going to the fleet.

A viable alternate solution is to optimize training by reducing

FRS overhead in the form of remedial flights. Each remedial

flight offered by VFA-106 is, on average, 1.3 flight hours and

$15,600 in direct costs (of note, this measure of cost per hourdoes not include the expense of valuable and limited life-cycle

time and fatigue). From fiscal year 2012 to date, VFA-106 flew

510 flights to remediate 250 failed events (not including

Carrier Qualification (CQ)). When CQ is included VFA-106 has

flown 730 remedial flights. That is $14 million dollars spent

on remediation. While it is impossible to entirely eliminate

remediation at the FRS, it is viable to target a reduction of 60

percent based on an examination of the current breakdown of

remediation. Those hours, if reallocated to the T-45, equate to

2,940 T-45 flight hours (direct cost). As the author assumes

that VFA-122 and VMFAT-101 experience similar SOD rates, theactual effects are even greater. Properly focused additional

flights in the training command could significantly reduce the

number of failed flights in the FRS and hence the costs of

remediation. In an increasingly austere operating environment,

the true gain from reducing remediation in the FRS is a savings

in service life on our valuable but aging fleet of F/A-18s.

The Genesis:

The amount of information presented to aircrew in an F/A-18

cockpit has grown in complexity. Increasing amounts of

information available from onboard systems provide a deluge ofSituational Awareness (SA) for the competent aviator that can

completely overwhelm more junior aircrew. The amount of

information displayed in the cockpit and our updated tactics

provide an incredible challenge to even experienced aviators,

let alone recent training command graduates. Additionally, a

lack of these systems at the FRS leaves a graduate with a

significant amount to digest when they arrive at their first

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fleet squadron. The radar warning receiver (RWR), electronic

attack (EA), defensive countermeasures (DECM), the joint helmet

mounted cuing system (JHMCS) and advanced tactics, techniques

and procedures (ATTP) are but a few of the advanced systems and

concepts required for fleet proficiency.

Over time, this creep towards more capable weapons and

increasingly complex tactics created an increasing gap between

the FRS graduate and the trained fleet nugget. Since VFA-106

does not have the systems or resources to completely train FRS

students to fleet tactics, we must instead rely on ensuring that

the basics of book knowledge, formation, sensor and

communications are so engrained as to enable them to focus

appropriately on new and advanced tactics presented in the

fleet.

A 2011 letter from Commander Naval Air Force Atlantic indicatedthat VFA-106 was not achieving this goal.1 To the end of

improving quality, VFA-106 implemented the following critical

actions:

- Created a skill based proficiency matrix for each phase

of training.

- Validated the entire syllabus to ensure that it

efficiently contributed to achieving the proficiency

matrix goals.

- Engaged with fleet Training Officers to uncover specific

weaknesses in our graduates, syllabus and instructorcadre.

- Worked in concert with VMFAT-101 and VFA-122 to conduct a

survey of FRS instructors on the preparedness of incoming

RAC.

- Made several revisions to the Category One syllabus and

completely re-authored the Category Three syllabus.

Developed a survey for Carrier Air Wing Commanders to

track the results of changes to the Category Three

syllabus and make improvements.

- Completely revised performance review procedures,

emphasizing a TOPGUN mindset of remediating individualevents until RAC achieved the appropriate level of

proficiency, setting them up for future success in the

syllabus.

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1Source: Commander Naval Air Force Atlantic ltr. dtd. 18 Jan 2011


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- Fostered an environment of ownership by encouraging every

instructor to view VFA-106 as a brand and to ensure that

only the highest quality product matriculated to the

Fleet.

The results have been tangible:

- Graduating Department Heads, Prospective Executive

Officers and Prospective Deputy Commodores achieved

unprecedented levels of proficiency.

- A marked increase in positive feedback from fleet

Commanding Officers on the performance of nuggets. While

it is too early to draw conclusions based on hard data,

recent Commanding Officer survey results and substantial

positive feedback from Fleet Training and Commanding

Officers indicate that VFA-106 is producing high quality

aviators.1

An outgrowth of this concerted emphasis on quality was an

increase in remediation in the weakest students. Eventually

this resulted in the FNAEBs of four VFA-106 RAC with ultimate

classifications of B1. Simultaneously VFA-106 instructors were

generally dissatisfied with the bottom 25 percent of Training

Command graduates. As a result the VFA-106 Training Department,

in conjunction with VFA-122 and VMFAT-101, conducted an in depth

analysis of signal of difficulty (SOD) data as well as a survey

of all FRS instructors.

The results of those surveys spawned this project and uncovered

three distinct trends:

- The majority of instructors felt that the bottom 25

percent of RAC were only marginally prepared for FRS

training and the bottom 10 percent were not adequately

trained at all.

- Eighty-eight percent of respondents reported that

arriving RAC possessed a sense of entitlement. There

was disagreement on the overallprofessionalism of RAC

with VMFAT-101 feeling that RAC were adequately preparedon a professional level, while the data from VFA-106 and

VFA-122 showed variability with a mean of RAC being only

somewhat prepared.

- The results for RWSO preparedness showed significant

variability; however, across the board, FRS instructors

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1Source: Commanding Officers survey of F/A-18 FRS aircrew training


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felt that RWSOs were less prepared than their pilot

counterparts.

Throughout 2012, the VFA-106 Training Department participated in

several training optimization conferences. Based on information

gained at those conferences, VFA-106 recommends a twofoldapproach of increased flight time and a fundamental shift away

from the X production mindset towards a culture of ownership,

quality and mentorship. The cost of quality is not cheap, but

with focus and hard work, itcan be cheaper.

The Aviator:

Several changes have occurred in pilot training in the past 15

years. The overall pipeline is shorter, and the number of

flight hours and platforms have been reduced. The resulting

pool of aviators ranges from competent and prepared to marginal

at best. Additionally, the NAE has seen the sundown of the S-3and the F-14 as well as the impending retirement of the EA-6B.

In todays Navy, 85 percent of tailhook aviators will end up in

some variant of the F/A-18. Diminishing resources and a focus

on efficiency have resulted in a production system (and Navy)

that is strained to the ragged edge. Over time, this lack of

resources and focus on efficiency created a pervasive mindset of

production vice quality. While the NAE has a responsibility to

efficiently achieve production goals, VFA-106 questions whether

the pendulum has swung too far towards cheap and fast and away

from quality. As in business, it follows that when faced with

the production goals of inexpensive, fast, and good, historydictates that only two of the three are realistically

attainable.

Changes in Training:

Comparing the authors background to todays average Category

One pilot illustrates the point. The author graduated flight

school after flying 291 hours in T-34, T-2 and T-45.1 Todays

average Category One pilot receives 240 hours in a primary

flight trainer and the T-45.2 The loss of the third platform

materially detracts from the adaptability and flexibility

inherent in having to learn three platforms vice two. Coupledwith the loss of 50 hours of flight time, the effect is

significant. Fifty additional flight hours represents an

6

1The author completed advanced flight training in October of 2001, tracking

through the Training Command at a representative pace, with no failed events

or remedial events.

2IFS data not available.


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increase of 20 percent in total SNA experience. That equates to

50 more hours of formation flying, 50 more hours of air sense

and situational awareness, at least 50 more rendezvous and at

least 50 more landings. Sixty percent of FRS remediation comes

from deficiencies related to formation and the administrative

portion of flight, not advanced tactics. If the TrainingCommand utilized increased flight time to focus on the

development of fundamentals in a task saturated environment, the

FRS would see a significant reduction in remedial flight time.

Not all aircrew develop at the same pace. The loss of the F-14,

the S-3 and eventually the EA-6B significantly reduced the

number of platforms available to TACAIR Student Naval Aviators

(SNA) and Flight Officers (SNFO). Fifteen years ago, a full 70

percent of Navy TACAIR SNAs were assigned to the EA-6B, S-3,

F-14 or E-2/C-2s. Today roughly 85 percent end up flying some

variant of the F/A-18. Where at one point the system could playto aircrews strengths, now platform selection is relatively

homogenous. The only way to achieve a relatively homogenous

result in both the Training Command and the FRS is through the

amount of remediation offered. In order to standardize output,

the Training Command and FRS must tailor its training to the

individual. There is no one size fits all solution.

The results of VFA-106s FRS instructor aircrew survey captured

this concept:

- The average FRS instructor feels that the top 25 percentof RAC are prepared for the FRS syllabus.

- The middle 50 percent of RAC are partially prepared.

- The bottom 25 percent of RAC are marginally prepared.

- The bottom five to ten percent of RAC are unsatisfactory.

This correlates to studies of SOD data, which show that 70

percent of SODs are concentrated on 33 percent of RAC. As the

number of SODs per student increases, the remediation required

increases as well. Approximately 20 percent of RAC account for

70 percent of remedial flights.1 Additionally, a fiscal year

2012 study showed 66 percent of SODs occur in students who werebelow average in the Training Command. While this is not

surprising, a better prepared and more homogenous Training

Command product will result in a reduction in remediation at the

FRS. Put simply, top Training Command graduates fare well in

the FRS. There is no requirement to raise the quality of top

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1CQ SODs not included due to the unique nature of the phase.


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graduates; instead the bar needs to be raised for below average

Training Command students.

VFA-106 SOD data shows that 60 percent of all SODs are

attributable to administrative or formation related items. In

later phases, the percentage of SODs for formation increases asaircrew are tasked with additional cockpit workload. This

indicates that the bandwidth of those students who struggle is

perhaps sufficient during low intensity operations, but when

faced with more demanding environments requiring multi-tasking

they are not up to the challenge. The Training Command should

use this data to focus the efforts of additional training. With

the eventual advent of the Virtual Mission Training System

(VMTS), it will be possible for the Training Command to more

adequately train to formation flying in task saturated

environments. This should identify problem aviators earlier in

the system and allow for remediation in less expensiveplatforms.

Recent Changes:

Data from VFA-106 shows a disturbing uptick in early stage SODs.

Out of the last nine classes to start VFA-106, the first six

classes experienced a SOD rate of 3.5 SODs per class in the

Transition phase of training. The most recent three classes to

start training have experienced a SOD rate of 6.3 SODs per

class, an 81 percent increase.1 In an effort to rule out an

artificial bias or shift in standards, VFA-106 conducted an in

depth review of a sample of failed and completed events and sawno significant shifts in standards in either the grades or the

instructors comments. The standard for a SOD has not shifted,

but the performance of the below average Category One pilot has,

for the worse.

There are potential external and internal causes for the noted

shift in Transition Phase performance. Internally, VFA-106

continues to experience continuity of training problems created

by a lack of sufficient resources. Too few ready for production

(RFP) aircraft2and various strains on simulator resources create

an environment where training aid supply fails to meet syllabusdemand. In this scenario, scheduling becomes overly restrictive

and only the highest priority classes get scheduled. These

constraints result in a hurry up and wait effect. This

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1Data normalized for class size.

2Source: VFA-106 fiscal year 2013 NAPP data


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materially affects SOD rates; however, due to the recent nature

of the shift, there is insufficient data to prove this. Trying

to achieve more with less has consequences. What may be saved

in the short term, is lost in additional remediation or quality;

what is gained by utilizing fewer Sailors, is lost in

maintenance programs, safety and the morale of those Sailors whowork harder to turn fewer aircraft more quickly and more

frequently than planned.1 The bottom line is that production

squadrons must be properly resourced in order to achieve the

results that are expected of them.

Externally a recent shift to the MPTS grading system in the

Training Command created difficulty in properly evaluating

student naval aviators (SNAs), resulting in lower quality

students matriculating from the Training Command. Anecdotally

there appears to be significant confusion and frustration among

Training Command instructors about the grading system andattrition process. Effective evaluation systems should

prioritize an instructors experience and expert opinion of an

SNAs performance vice a complicated attempt at objectivity

which results in confusion and inconsistency in grading. The

grading system is so convoluted that it has been the butt of

jokes on Junior Officer Facebook blogs. While there are

attempts to objectively quantify each graded item on a flight,

it is nearly impossible for an instructor to achieve the

fidelity of memory required by MPTS; however, all instructors

should be capable of determining whether or not a student meets

the level of proficiency required to advance to the next flightor stage of training. The author recommends significant further

study of the accuracy of the MPTS grading system and its effects

on the overall evaluation of Training Command students.

Cultural Concerns:

An overarching and continuing concern is a Training Command

culture that prioritizes event completion (X generation) over

quality. Recently VFA-106 requested that the Training Command

explore refreshing select SNAs instrument qualifications prior

to leaving for the FRS to ensure currency through the initial

phases of F/A-18 training. A Training Command StandardizationOfficer responded that this had been explored before, and the

reason it was not supported was because everything we do with

SNA's (sic) is/should be X generating oriented. Ignoring the

validity of the request itself, this comment captures an

important aspect of Training Command culture. Everything we do

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1Source: VFA-106 fiscal year 2014 PPF submission


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with SNAs is/should be X generating oriented. The Training

Command and FRS should be focused on producing high quality

officers and aviators who are geared for success in the fleet,

while maintaining a keen focus on efficiency.

Upper level leadership encourages this production firstmindset through awards which focus on achieving production

goals, not capturing the quality of matriculating aviators. The

criteria for the Ellyson award is as follows: A CNO-appointed

awards committee will select five squadrons which demonstrate

the greatest efficiency in meeting the fleet requirement for

pilots and naval flight officers within the CNO-approved

syllabus. There is no mention of quality in this award, only

efficiency.

The effect of this is best illustrated in a comparison of

attrition rates. In fiscal year 2012, VFA-106 attrited five

percent of our Category One RAC for performance. In the pastthree years, only two VFA-106 graduates received fleet FNAEBs

for performance. Both finished in the bottom ten percent of

their training command classes. Today both would have been

better identified by VFA-106s performance review system and

remediated or attrited. Anecdotally, the Training Wing One

Commodore indicated in 2012 that total Training Wing One

Intermediate and Advanced Strike Fighter attrites for all

reasons numbered three. Comparing expected production rates,

Training Wing One rates of attrition are significantly lower

than current FRS levels. The Commodore also indicated there

were zero attrites for Training Wing One CQ during the same timeperiod.

The bottom line is that production squadrons have to achieve

production goals but also have a responsibility to ensure

quality. In order to achieve that goal, production squadrons

need to be properly resourced and rewarded for the quality of

the warrior they produce as well as the efficiency with which

they produce that warrior. While the current system emphasizes

that Commanding Officers have the ability to attrite subpar

aviators, the system is also set up to incentivize those same

Commanding Officers to achieve production over quality. Theresult is an FRS which conducts FNAEBs at a higher rate than the

Training Command attrites poor performers. Attrition rates

should be lower in every phase of training and almost zero in

the FRS. If Fleet Replacement Squadrons hold the bar where it

should be, attrition for performance based problems should be

zero in the fleet. Not only does this make sense from a

standpoint of pride in mission, it makes sense financially. The

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sooner substandard performers are identified, the sooner they

can be remediated or attrited at significantly lower cost.

The Officer:

Four careers almost ruined in their infancy. Four young

aviators, two pilots and two WSOs, briefed, conducted apreflight on two BLU-111 500 pound bombs hanging from their

airplanes and manned up their $60 million dollar F/A-18Fs for a

seminal moment in their budding careers. Like so many before

them, they transited to the range, made a cold pass and then

rolled in hot for the first time. So far, so good. What

follows is a transcript of the inter-cockpit comm on that day:

18:07.59

RP: So the second one is all you.

RWSO: Im too chickenshit.RP: Say what?

RWSO: Im too chickenshit to do it.

RP: Youre not going to do it?!

RWSO: Ok, Ill do it.

RP: Might not get another shot at it.

RWSO: I know.

RP: I think its the left hand controller.

RWSO: Yep (pause) are your tapes on right now?

RP: Uh yeah, but whatever.

RWSO: (giggling)

18:15.20

RP: Alright, you got it

18:15.32

RWSO: Ugh, I dont know.

18:15.45

RP: Did you get on the pickle, er?

RWSO: I dont know (unintelligible) I didnt want to.

RP: Ok, Ill take the next one then.

18:15.57RP: No biggy.

18:16.04

RP: It will be our little secret.

18:16.11

RWSO: (unintelligible) [do you think theyll look] at the

tapes?

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RP: Probably not.

During tape review (with the volume turned down), an instructor

notices that one of the pilots seems nervous; then, an off

comment from the WSO; now, suspicion on the instructors part.

Following this event, the instructors carefully reviewed the

tapes a second time and discovered the pilots attempts to

convince his RWSO to release live ordinance from the aft

cockpit. This action is not trained to and in fact is expressly

forbidden in VFA-106 instructions. When confronted, the RP

fabricated a story to cover up the no drop. When pressed

further, the RP stood behind his intentional efforts to cover up

attempts to release from the back seat. Only when confronted

with direct evidence of the attempt did he finally yield and

admit to the attempts.

This is not the only example of a demonstrated lack of

professionalism by RAC. Here is another example:

- Another RP (someone with noted attitude issues prior to

this event) flies one of the last events of the syllabus.

During an extremely dynamic Air to Air flight, this RP

drives himself below BINGO fuel state. After landing,

when queried about on deck fuel, he responds that he

landed with SOP minimum fuel. When pressed, he holds to

his tale. After being confronted with data from his

flight recorder, he breaks down crying and admits tolanding well below SOP minimum fuel.

These are only a few examples of several issues with officer-

like qualities. There are several potential internal and

external reasons for these noted deficiencies.

Internal possibilities:

VFA-106s most recent four FNAEBs suggested that Command Climate

may have contributed to the violation of standards because our

RAC might not be comfortable approaching instructors. In a

recent survey of RAC, very few expressed concern that VFA-106instructors were not approachable. Additionally RAC

consistently rate VFA-106 instructors as more professional than

their Training Command counterparts. However, the command takes

the concerns of even a small portion of RAC seriously and is

making adjustments to the instructor cadre via ongoing

instructor training, standardization checks and a continuous

feedback loop.

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In the case of the aircrew who attempted to release from the aft

cockpit, the RAC were well aware that their actions were not

above board, as evidenced by the transcripts of their cockpit

communications. Why worry if youre tapes will be reviewed

unless you already understand that your actions areinappropriate? Why lie to cover your trail unless you were

aware of your own wrongdoing? These RAC violated standards

knowingly and lied to cover it up because they knew they were in

the wrong.

A more likely explanation of the issue that applies to both the

Training Command and FRS is a lack of ownership on the part of

our instructors, Department Heads and perhaps even Commanding

Officers. In both the Training Command and FRS, most officer

development takes a backseat to aviation training. Interviewed

RAC frequently commented that their only instructor interactionthroughout the Training Command was during their briefs, flights

and debriefs. This flies in the face of the most basic officer

training. Naval Aviators are officers first. While VFA-106

encourages off-duty interaction during regular detachments, the

days of telling sea stories in the Officers Club are few and

far between. Those off-duty interactions were vital

opportunities for RAC, Junior Officers and NAE leadership to rub

shoulders and further personal relationships. Now those

personal relationships are delayed until RAC arrive in the

fleet. It is not that there is a need to get more intrusive,

which smacks of micromanagement; there is a need to get to knoweach other better. Healthy class advisor programs focused on

mentorship are a viable solution to this critical area of

concern. Too often these programs take a back seat to

production, again driven by the X generation mindset and not a

quality driven model.

With that being said, other reasons instructors do not spend

substantial off-duty time with RAC include heavy tasking at

work, a high percentage who are married with children and many

who have recently been deployed. The solution is a concerted

effort to properly resource production squadrons so that shoreduty is actually shore duty and for squadron leadership to

encourage healthy class advisor programs from the top down.

Additionally, when on detachment the FRS and Training Command

should encourage appropriate off-duty interaction.

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Generational Influences:

The current generation of Training Command students and F/A-18

aircrew grew up in a very different environment than even their

instructors, potentially contributing to noted shifts in

professionalism. There is substantial academic research

suggesting shifts in personality traits which are fundamental tosuccess as a military officer. Here are a few examples of those

shifts.

Narcissism and Self Assessment:

American culture has shifted to emphasize the rights of the

self as more important than duty...the social rules for

behavior so prized in Milgrams early 1960s have declined

(Twenge and Im, 2007) replaced by an assertiveness (Twenge,

2001) and self-focus so strong it has veered into

narcissism (Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman,2008). (Twenge J. M., 2009)

A recent RP represents an excellent example of this. The RP

struggled early in his FRS training. In order to address these

concerns the VFA-106 Training Department conducted a HFB and

identified preflight preparation as a deficiency. The board

offered several suggestions and provided a mentor. During his

HFB, the RP admitted to throttling back the amount of effort he

put into preparationbecause he erroneously felt comfortable

that he was doing okay. Subsequent to the HFB the RPs

performance improved dramatically, highlighted by his strikeperformance as one of the top five in the last 100 in training

at VFA-106. As he entered the next phase of training feeling

confident, he dropped his pack again. Upon arriving in Key West

for a fighter weapons detachment he initiated a relationship

with a local female. This resulted in a loss of valuable

preparation time. Not only did this marginalize the RP, it left

his classmates in the lurch, picking up the slack for the

weakest link. An end of phase review of training trends by his

class advisor revealed average flight performance but noted a

trend of poor preflight preparation. Fourteen grade sheets

mentioned deficient preflight preparation, and the RP failed twoflights for preflight preparation. The RP is now repeating a

portion of the Fighter Weapons phase as remedial training to

ensure that he can demonstrate the level of preparation and

dedication required of a fleet nugget.

This is not the only example of a RACs perception of their

performance being out of sync with reality. Several HFBs have

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demonstrated that RAC have an over inflated sense of their

performance, indicating an inability to accurately self assess

and a potential rise in narcissistic traits. One RP, after

being medically disqualified from flying F/A-18s posted a

picture of himself in front of the jet to Facebook with the

comment, my other ride is an F-18.

The following research addresses self assessment specifically:

Compared to previous generations, more American college

students now rate themselves as above average on attributes

such as academic ability, drive to achieve, leadership

ability, public speaking ability, self-confidence, and

writing ability (based on a nationally representative

sample collected 19662009; N=6.5 million)Trends in

positive self-views are correlated with grade inflation

(which increased d=0.81), but are not explained by changesin objective performance (e.g., SAT scores have declined,

d=70.22) or effort (time spent studying is down, d=70.31).

Broad cultural trends toward greater individualism and

positive self-views (such as parents, teachers, and media

encouraging higher self-esteem among young people) could

result in younger generations embracing increasingly

positive self-viewsEventually, these cultural messages

encouraged people to not just think positively of

themselves, but to consider themselves better than they

actually were (e.g., Everyone is special). (Twenge &

Campbell, 2011)

The best example of this personality trait negatively affecting

an RP follows below:

- VFA-106 recently received a Category One RP who came from

the Training Command with several emails offering

apologies and trying to explain that after many attempts

to attrite said aviator, he ultimately remained in the

system and matriculated due to perceived pressure from

the squadrons Commanding Officer. This was confirmed in

conversations between the author and the units ExecutiveOfficer. This RP continually argued with his instructors

and even took a confrontational tone on several

occasions. His lackluster performance as an officer

continued at VFA-106. Eventually his attitude landed him

at a Human Factors Board (HFB) and with a LOI for

officer-like qualities. In light of our mission to train

not only sound aviators but also good officers, VFA-106

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elected to remediate this young man rather than send him

to a FNAEB. His remediation was the pilot of a new

VFA-106 mentorship program aimed at remediating the worst

of the worst. His mentor uncovered a systemic inability

to accurately self assess and self esteem bordering on

narcissism. While he was eventually successfullyremediated and matriculated to the fleet as a well

prepared officer and aviator, the costs of remediation

were substantial. Whether or not they were worth it

remains to be seen.

Self assessment is critical to success as a Naval Officer.

Imagine a new Department Head or Commanding Office unable to

accurately assess the condition of their department, squadron or

ship. Accurate self reporting is critical to building a picture

of readiness. There is little worse to imagine than a Navy

whose leaders over inflate a picture of their own performance orreadiness, especially in an environment of financial austerity.

The path to a hollow force is paved with financial austerity and

inaccurate self assessment.

Causal Demeanor:

Technology has enabled relationships to be easy, and

according to recent research, Millennials see this as

defining their generation (Pew Research Center, 2010). The

ease with which Millennials establish relationships and theopen and casual nature of many of those relationships, is

likely to carry over to the work-place. This may be true

even with managers and supervisors, who in previous

generations commanded respect simply by the virtue of their

position.(Thompson & Gregory, 2012)

Eighty-eight percent of instructors noted that they believed RAC

lacked professionalism in the brief and debrief, with one

instructor commenting, I am shocked at the lack of

professionalism in the Brief and Debrief My impression is 95%

of the students think it is a privilege for Naval Aviation tohave them, not a privilege for them to be a part of Naval

Aviation.

Disobedience:

While the jury is still out, substantial academic research

suggests that disobedience is on the rise in the Millennial

generation [generally defined as people born between 1980 and

26


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the late 1990s] (Twenge, 2009). 90 percent more men disobeyed

the experimenter in 2006 than did in 1962 (Twenge J. M., 2009).

When viewed in concert with the conduct of RAC who flagrantly

violated flight standards and subsequently lied about it, we

must ask ourselves: are we in for more of the same? How can we

effectively train this disobedience out of our young officers?

Sense of Entitlement:

Among the instructors surveyed, 88 percent feel there is a

perception of a sense of entitlement in RAC.

Millennials grew up with unprecedented levels of positive

reinforcement and positive attention. Parents, and in some

cases society at large, have moved toward rewarding

children for participation, rather than performance

leading some to refer to this generation as trophy

kids. (Thompson & Gregory, 2012)

Interviews with several RAC revealed that they perceived a

substantial difference between themselves and their training

command instructors. After winging, they expected to be

welcomed to the club, unaware that the really hard work of being

a professional officer and aviator was just beginning. The

results vary from a casual attitude with instructors to a

distinct air of entitlement and a disregard for established

norms. Interestingly, the data from VMFAT-101 suggests fewer

issues with professionalism among Marines, perhaps due to

service culture and training pipeline differences.

The effects of these shifts are potentially devastating to

character development. Because participation was rewarded vice

performance, character developing failures were likely few and

far between. Although the author does not have data on current

Training Command flights, training should be structured to

expose aviators to stress and failure in a controlled

environment in order to prepare them to deal with stress when it

matters most: in combat. Meridian simulator instructors Jack

Douglas, Burt Zoeller and others were famous for subjecting SNAs

to famously painful simulators rife with yelling and artificialstress. Anecdotes from recent Training Command graduates

suggest that has changed substantially in recent years. Where

before the system utilized artificial stress, distraction and

failure to test character early on, now perhaps there is too

much concern for peoples feelings. How well are we preparing

young officers if the first real stress they experience is

behind the boat, or worse, in combat?

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Developing Millennial officers requires a concerted leadership

approach. Officers cannot lead in the ways that they believed

worked for their generation. They must study, adapt and lead in

the way that their Sailors require them to. Leaders must adjust

their approach to their Sailors, not the other way around.1

The Solution:

1) Ownership. Raise the bar fleet wide. Always prepare people

for the next level, not the current one. Remind students that

their wings are just the beginning! Emphasize being humble,

approachable and credible while instilling confidence,

aggressiveness and calculated risk. Think of each squadron as a

brand. High quality leadership and instruction does not require

sending #1s to the training command. It requires the fleet to

raise the bar for their mid-grade performers. Better #1 Must

Promotes are better instructors than we have now.

2) Ensure that mentorship is emphasized during all phases of

training. Getting to know Sailors and Officers is the most

fundamental aspect of success as leaders.

3) Do not cut the FRS syllabus. Increase resources to

Production Planning Factor (PPF) recommended levels or cut

production accordingly. Give squadrons the flexibility to

adequately schedule with continuity of training. Supply must

exceed peak demand at almost all times. Otherwise, demand is

shifted left and right, creating a push-pull effect throughoutthe syllabus. The result is poor continuity of training and

increased remediation costs.

4) Increase flight time in the Training Command through re-

flys. Adopt the TOPGUN mindset. Test students ability to

compartmentalize. Introduce advanced TACFORM, necessitating

mission cross check with high cockpit task loading. The top 25

percent are prepared. Apply flight time where it is required

through targeted re-flys. Trust the opinion of instructors. Do

not allow aircrew to move on to the next phase until they have

mastered the current one. The current evaluation system issetup for that, but the standard is too low! Proper application

28

2A conversation with Jean Twenge, a PHD from San Diego State

University and the author of the majority of the research

contained herein, corroborates the information presented in this

section of the paper.


21/23

should result in less remediation at the FRS. This will save

valuable service life where it is needed most: in the fleet.

5) Train, remediate, mentor and attrite when necessary. Create

an environment of spirited competition to excel, not a

lackluster environment of survival. Ensure a syllabus thatchallenges people enough to develop character. Failure should

be a part of the game. Michael Jordan said it best, I've

failed over and over and over again in my life and that is why I

succeed. Test character in a controlled environment before

sending aircrew into combat. Empower those who thrive in

stressful situations. Remediate or find other lines of work for

those who do not.

6) Consider specific approaches for the current generation.

Millenials, who may be more defiant could require more character

development to encourage integrity and obedience. Provideconsistent feedback that emphasizes goods as much as it does

others. Put the focus back where it needs to be: officer first,

then aviator.

7) At the earliest stages of training, ask if the Navy is

recruiting and retaining the right people for Naval Aviation and

setting them up for success. Examine the effects that allowing

pilots with eye surgery has on the quality of SNFOs. Explore

radical changes in Primary flight training to encourage

competition. All eligible candidates could start as

Replacement Aircrew and select pilot or flight officer after aperiod of initial training. This would allow for competition

and quality spread between designators. Offer opportunities to

convert from NFO to pilot without damaging a career. Reexamine

changes to the Aviation Selection Test Battery and the

personality type that Naval Aviation seeks to acquire.

Conclusion:

Right now, Naval Aviation is expending valuable money to

remediate performance at the most expensive level.

Additionally, fleet tactics continue to grow more complex,widening the gap between the FRS graduate and the fleet nugget.

Without a fundamental change in the way we do business, this gap

will continue to increase FRS remediation, straining the system

further. Targeted additional flight time is needed in the

Training Command along with a renewed focus on quality. While

this may require more Training Command flight hours, the overall

effect will be a savings in FRS overhead and valuable fatigue

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life on our most valuable airframes. The NAE can no longer

attempt to do more with less. It is time we focused on doing it

better.

2:


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Works Cited

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Training White Paper - 4 Sep Update