Towards a sociology of revolutionary situations ...BIB_A59E45712CA5.P001/REF.pdf · that they are living through a revolution and are currently fighting to make it happen, to encourage

Revue française de science politique, 2012/5-6 (vol. 62)

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Towardsasociologyofrevolutionarysituations.ReflectionsontheArabuprisingsMouniaBennani-ChraïbiandOlivierFillieule

‘Uprisingshaveabodywithwhichonecanengageincombat.Revolutions,ontheotherhand,havealotincommonwithghosts’.

MetternichtoGuizot,October31st,1847

Whenwecontemplatetheapparentdomino-effectofupheavalsprecipitatedbythe

rapidandunexpectedfallofBenAlionJanuary14th,2011,thefirstimagethatcomestomind

isthatof1848’s ‘SpringtimeofthePeoples’,whenademonstrationinthestreetsofParis

prompted three days of insurrection, the restoration of the Republic and, thanks to the

telegraph,therailwaysandtherotarypress,overtendaysofuprisingsacrosscitiesasdistant

asBerlin,Munich,Vienna,MilanandVenice.

However, justaswhenconsideringtherevolutionsof1848,weshouldbewaryof

overlygeneralizing interpretations that seek todescribe theeventsof2010–2012as the

product of a unifiedwave of insurrections. Aside from the trigger provided byBenAli’s

downfall, the trajectory, and consequently the shape, taken by the Egyptian, Moroccan,

Bahraini,Libyan,Yemeni,andSyrianuprisingswereallverydifferent.Itisonlyifwedonot

understandtheirrespectivecontextsorifweareblindedbyawell-meaningenthusiasmthat

wemaycollectivelyrefertothemasthe‘Arabrevolutions’.Itistoosoontotellifanyofthese

movements canbe labelledas revolutionary. Suchaquestion canonlybeansweredwith

hindsight, in light of the results produced. Therefore, this is outside the scope of our

investigation.Wewillinsteadfocuson‘uprisings’—avaguetermwhichhasthemeritofnot

judging what particularly complex processes may be produced in the end. We are

nonethelessawarethatcertainTunisians,Egyptians,Libyans,YemenisandSyriansbelieve

that theyare livingthrougharevolutionandarecurrently fightingtomake ithappen, to

encourageorprotect it. Likewise, although thedescriptive term ‘Arab’hasmany implicit

connotationsandpossiblemisunderstandings,wehaveneverthelessdecidedtouse it for

easeofreference.


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In the fields of political science, sociology and history, countlesspages have been

devotedtothestudyofrevolutions.Thefrequencyofpublicationsregardingrecentevents

hasbeenparticularlyhigh.Whatwouldbetherationale, therefore,behindsubjectingour

readerstoyetanotherofthesestudies?Twowell-foundedreasonsjustifyourendeavor.On

the one hand, although social scientists are prolix on the causes and consequences of

revolutions,theyaremuchlessloquaciousregardingrevolutionarysituationsspecifically,

includingtheircharacteristicsandtheprocessesthatleadtothem.Aswewillshowinthis

introduction,recentpublicationshaveoftenfallenintothistrap.Ontheotherhand,allofthe

contributionsmadebyinthisvolumestemfromfieldsurveyscarriedoutattheveryheart

oftheactionandwhichseektounderstandhowindividualandcollectiveactors‘caught’in

revolutionary momentum perceive situations and adapt their behavior — an approach

whichisstillrareintheexistingliterature.

In this introduction,weshallreturntoour justification for this two-foldapproach.

However, we shall begin with a critical, albeit non-exhaustive, review of the existing

literature.Thenweshall explaina certainnumberofour theoretical andmethodological

propositions,chieflyrelyinguponempiricallydocumentedexperiments.

THEPAUCITYOFREVOLUTIONARYSOCIOLOGY ‘Tolookforfalsetroublesonegetsrealmisery’.

DanielDesbiens,MyContemporaryMaxims

CausalityandtheNomologicalDrive

Revolutionaryeventsalwaysstriketheircontemporariesasradicallynew,subjectto

rapidupheavalsandfullofuncertaintyregardingthefuture.Undersuchconditions,itisnot

surprisingthatfewpeoplehavebeenableto‘facetherevolutionwithone’smindmadeup’1,

likeMarat,ortoclaimtohavepredictedthefalloftheSovietUnion.2

Pierre Favre has astutely discussed the issue of the unpredictability of the social

order.3Letushererecallthreeofhisconclusions.Firstly,‘withregardtothefuture,weare

1Jean-PaulMarat,Leschaînesdel'esclavage,1774,<http://www.uqac.uquebec.ca/zone30/Classiques_des_sciences_sociales/index.html>.2Randall Collins, ‘The Future Decline of the Russian Empire’, inWeberian Sociological Theory, New York,CambridgeUniversityPress,1986,p.186–209.3PierreFavre,Comprendrelemondepourlechanger,Paris,PressesdeSciencesPo,2005.


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faced with an unfinished, on-going process, about which we can naturally only have

incompleteknowledge.Predictionsarethereforeimpossible’.4Secondly,‘thereexistperiods

whereapoliticalregimepossessesanextremestructuralvulnerability,andcrumbleswhen

confrontedwithaprotestthatrevealsitslackofconsistency’.5Thirdly,unpredictabilitydoes

notmeanthat‘allpredictionsareimpossibleandwillultimatelybedisproven.Predictions,

whichinrealitywecannotdowithout,areonlyconditional,orinotherwordsprobabilistic’.6

Among researchers who study the history and the sociology of revolutionary

phenomena, an increasingly number have subscribed to this pointof view and begun to

reject any general theory of revolutions.7 In this regard, it is helpful to recall the two

conferences organized by the American Sociological Association at the beginning of the

1990s to better understandwhy the events of 1989were so surprising.8Although some

articlespublishedinthosetwojournalissuesstilldefendcertaintypesofpredictability,they

are overcome by an increasing suspicion, as Charles Kurzman explains in his

straightforwardlytitledwork,TheUnthinkableRevolutioninIran.9Hecriticizesscholarship’s

never-ending quest to retrospectively reconstruct the causal elements of revolutionary

phenomenainordertodeterminethefactorsbehindtheiremergence.Rejectingallcausality,

Kurzman proposes an ‘anti-explanation’ which abandons all attempts at retrospective

prediction and instead focuses on the lived experiences contained within revolutionary

situations.Inotherwords,evenifonecannotdoubtthatwhatreallyhappensisbyitsvery

natureddetermined,10onemustsimultaneouslyrecognizetheimmensedifficultyinvolvedin

identifyingthisrealitybasedonastudyofitsoftendistantcauses.11Suchissueshintatthree

4P.Favre,ibid.,p.61.5P.Favre,ibid.,p.171–173;seealsop.195.6P.Favre,ibid.,p.198.7In addition to CharlesTilly’s numerous publications, onwhichwe shall comment below, some examplesinclude:NikkiKeddie, ‘CanRevolutionsBePredicted?’, in IranandtheMuslimWorld,NewYork,NewYorkUniversityPress,1995,p.13–33;JeffGoodwin,NoOtherWayOut,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2001; François Chazel, ‘La place de la mobilisation dans une révolution inattendue. L’effondrement del’Allemagnedel’Est’,inDupouvoiràlacontestation,Paris,LGDJ,2003,p.163–192.8TheproceedingsofthefirstconferencearepublishedinTheoryandSociety,23(2),1993.ThoseofthesecondconferencecanbefoundintheAmericanJournalofSociology,100(6),May1995. 9CharlesKurzman,TheUnthinkableRevolutioninIran,Harvard,HarvardUniversityPress,2nded.2005,p.5–6andp.166.10 To echo Pierre Favre, methodological determinism thus involves the opposite of causality: P. Favre,Comprendrelemonde,op.cit.,p.54andp.67–79.11SeealsoCharlesTilly,‘ToExplainPoliticalProcesses’,AmericanJournalofSociology,100(6),1995,p.1594–1610,herep.1601;Jean-ClaudePasseron,Leraisonnementsociologique,Paris,Nathan,1991,p.367.


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weakpoints in theexistingresearch:anetiological illusion,12anomologicaldriveandthe

absenceofatheoryofagencyandrationalchoice.13

Theetiologicalillusionharkensbacktooneofrevolutionarysociology’smostserious

dead-ends. 14 Having primarily focused on why rebellions emerge, the discipline has

generallystucktofindingdistantandremotecauses.Thesecausesareoftenattributedtothe

disruptiveeffectsofsocialchangeortheadventofnewopportunities.Thefocusplacedon

these factors comes at the expense of considerations on the robustness of the means

implemented by the various protagonistsor on ‘possible causalmediations between the

suggested“causes”andthecharacteristicsoftheirallegedoutcomes’.15Hencethenecessity

ofclearlydifferentiating,likeCharlesTillyandRodAyahavedone,betweenrevolutionary

intentions, outcomes and situations, 16 especially as the latter tend to transcend the

conditions of their creation and their outcomes do not allow us to retrospectively

comprehendthem.17

The nomological drive — or how to explain historical sequences insofar as an

explanationrequireslawslinkingcauseandeffect,lawswhichhistorydoesnotpossess—

leadstoatwo-foldreductionismofthemodel.Ontheonehand,explanatorymatricesare

oftendevelopedbasedonaspecifichistoricalexample;extrapolation is thuscompulsory.

ThiscanbeseeninCraneBrinton’smodelbasedonthephasesoftheFrenchRevolution,18

orThedaSkocpol’sidentificationof1789,1917and1949asgenuinesocialrevolutionsled

by the peasantry.19On the other hand, becausegeneral theories are by definition on the

lookout for recurring causal patterns, they significantly reduce the complexity of

12MichelDobry,Sociologiedescrisespolitiques,Paris,PressesdeSciencesPo,1986.13 Rod Aya, ‘The Third Man; or Agency in History; or, Rationality in Revolution’,History and Theory, 40,December2001,p.143–152.14Asamatterof fact, this illusionis lesswidespreadamonghistorians. It isclearlycondemnedbyFrançoisFuret,PenserlaRévolutionfrançaise,Paris,Gallimard,2009(1sted.:1978),p.40,39and44.15MichelDobry,‘Cedontsontfaitesleslogiquesdesituation’,inPierreFavre,OlivierFillieule,FabienJobard(ed.),L'atelierdupolitiste,Paris,LaDécouverte,2007,p.119–148,herep.131.16Charles Tilly defines the revolutionary situation based on the concept of Trotsky’s ‘dual power’, as anysituationinwhichthestate’ssovereigntyissubjecttomultiple,competingclaimssupportedbyasignificantportionofthepopulation,andwheretheaforementionedstatepowercannotnotordoesnotwishtocrushtheoppositionalcoalition(CharlesTilly,FromMobilizationtoRevolution,Reading,Addison-Wesley,1978,p.189–222).17RodAya,RethinkingRevolutionsandCollectiveViolence,Amsterdam,HetSpinhuis,1990,p.20.18CraneBrinton,TheAnatomyofRevolution,London,JonathanCape,1953.19ThedaSkocpol,StatesandSocialRevolutions.AComparativeAnalysisofFrance,Russia,andChina,NewYork,CambridgeUniversityPress,1979.


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phenomena:atbesttostylizedversionsofthemselves,atworsttoaquestforsolecauses.

This is notably true in the case of Robert Palmer and JacquesGodechot,20but alsomore

generallyinthefieldofculturalstudies,wherePatriceHigonnet’sworkoveremphasizesthe

impactoftheProtestantreligionandtheroleofthe‘Anglo-Saxonconsensus’.21

Theabsenceofatheoryofagencybecomesapparentwhenwetrytolinktogether

microandmacrophenomena.Howcanweexplainasocialphenomenonwhenallwehaveto

relyonistheobservationofindividualactions?Theexistingliteratureanswersthisquestion

withthreedifferenttools:structuralconditions(politicalopportunitystructures,thedensity

ofhorizontalnetworksandlinkstotheelite,thesuddenlyimposedgrievances,etc.),cultural

idioms (cultural frames, Weltanschauung, traditions, etc.) and mobilization structures

(leadership, material and organizational resources). 22 In this tripartite configuration,

structures,cultureandtheavailabilityofresourcesdictatethecourseofevents;conversely,

theseeventscanalsoprovokechangesinexistingstructures,culturesandresources.And

yet,inthisframework,‘structure(withanassistfromculture)constrainsagencytomakethe

events—byviolence;andtheeventsconstrainagencytochangethestructure—againby

violence.Agency is theThirdManbetweenstructureandeventwhodoes thekillingand

coercing.Hemakestheactionhappen.’23

In reality, very few works have avoided falling for the etiological illusion and

developingareductionistmodel,andmosthavelikewisefailedtoadoptanexplicittheoryof

agency.24This no doubt explains the unfortunate fact that studies in this domain, while

relatively numerous, have not built upon the findings of their predecessors in order to

globallyadvanceresearchinthefield.

20RobertRoswellPalmer,TheAgeoftheDemocraticRevolution,Princeton,PrincetonUniversityPress,1959and1964;JacquesGodechot,Lesrévolutions(1770–1799),Paris,PUF,1963.21PatriceHigonnet,SistersRepublics.TheOriginsofFrenchandAmericanRepublicanism,Cambridge,HarvardUniversityPress,1988.22Foranillustrationofthissortoftripartiteexplanation,seeThedaSkocpol,SocialRevolutionsintheModernWorld,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,1994.23R.Aya,‘TheThirdMan’,art.cit.,p.144.24Wewouldnevertheless liketotakeamomenttomentionseveralstudieswhichdoavoidthesescholarlypitfalls. For example,Wayne Te Brake’s Shaping History. Ordinary People in European Politics, 1500–1700,Berkeley,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1998),whoseaccountofthepoliticizationprocessesofrevolutionarygroups and the constant gap between initial intentions and subsequent actions in situational logics isremarkable.


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Whereeverythingisineverything,andvice-versa

Hotoff thepresses,recentstudiesonthe ‘Arabuprisings’arenoexceptiontothis

trend.Theunpredictablenatureof theevents inquestionservesasanalmostobligatory

introduction to the proposed explanatory frameworks.25After having spent a long time

investigatingthe‘causalitiesbehindthelack’ofdemocracy,26itisnowtimetoexaminewhy

theeventsof2010–2012havesoundedthedeath-knelloftheArabworld’s‘exceptionality’27

andheraldedanewthresholdregardingtheuniversalizationofrevolutionaryaction.28And

yet,thisdevelopmentalsoconverselymeansthatthesesame‘flaws’andeven‘anomalies’,29

hithertohighlightedassomanyobstaclestodemocratization,ultimatelybecomethecauses

ofsuccessfulrevolutionarymovements,thankstotheemergenceofhistory.

It is truethat thenomologicalstudiesnolongerproposemono-causalmodels,but

instead now prefer so-called ‘combinatorial’ approaches. 30 But such multi-faceted

approachesareoftenlittlemorethanthejuxtapositionofvariouscauses,factorsanddecisive

elements, which allegedly present an account, at different levels and moments of

observation,ofrevolutionaryintentions,situationsandoutcomes.31

Wedonothavethespaceheretoanalyzeindetailthisrashofexplanatoryattempts;

the reader may, however, refer to the thematic bibliography at the end of this volume.

Instead,wewouldliketoofferamorefree-formhistoryandeducationalclassificationofthe

main theories of revolution: Marxist-leaning interpretations, structuralist paradigms,

theoriesofrelativefrustrationandmodernizationandculturalanddiffusionistapproaches.

25TheeditorsoftheissuepublishedbythejournalMouvementstracetheintensityofthissurprisebacktoavagueorientalismwhichseestheArabworldasfixedandunchanging(AgnèsDeboulet,DimitriNicolaïdis,‘Leshirondellesfont-ellesleprintemps?’,Mouvements,66,2011,p.7–10).26GhassanSalamé,‘Surlacausalitéd’unmanque:pourquoilemondearaben’est-ildoncpasdémocratique?,Revuefrançaisedesciencepolitique,41(3),June1991,p.307–341.27 Sarah Ben Néfissa, ‘Mobilisations et révolutions dans les pays de la Méditerranée arabe à l’heure de“l’hybridation”dupolitique:Égypte,Liban,Maroc,Tunisie’,RevueTiersMonde,specialissue,2011,p.5–24.28Forexample,HamitBozarslan, ‘Dequoi la révolutionest-elle lenom?Post-scriptumpourpoursuivre laréflexion’,inHamitBozarslan,GillesBataillon,ChristopheJaffrelot,Passionsrévolutionnaires,Paris,Éditionsdel'EHESS,2011,p.169–182.29F.GregoryGauseIII,‘WhyMiddleEastStudiesMissedtheArabSpring?TheMythofAuthoritarianStability’,ForeignAffairs,90(4),2011,p.81–90.30 Adam Hanieh, ‘Egypt’s Uprising. Not Just a Question of Transition’, The Bullet, 462, 2011,<http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/462.php>.31 For example, Jack Goldstone, ‘Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory’, Annual Review ofPoliticalScience,4,2001,p.139–187.


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First and foremost, events in the region have given new life to interpretations of

Marxistoriginthaterectthecrisisofglobalcapitalismasitsmainexplanatoryvariable.In

thisframework,theauthoritarianismofregimesintheArabworldisonly‘thepoliticalform

ofcapitalism’intheregion,32‘cronycapitalism’33notbeingan‘aberrationofthesystem’but

ratheranormal featureof theprocessesofcapitalistaccumulationthroughouttheworld.

From this perspective, the Egyptian uprising marked the culmination of thirty years of

neoliberalreforms imposedby international financial institutionsandwhichexacerbated

thecountry’svulnerabilitytotheglobalcrisisbyconcentratingthevastmajorityofwealth

inthehandsofatinyminorityandcontributingtothegrowingclassdivide.34Suchareading

cantakedifferentforms.FortheeditorsofGlobalizations’specialissue,theArabuprisings

areafacetofthe‘globalrevolution’againsttheprevailingliberaleconomicsystem,against

the exclusions and contradictions produced by this world-system. 35 In this light, the

uprisingsaresomanygrass-rootsattemptstocreateanalternativeworld‘fromthebottom

up’.36Fromareviseddependencyperspective,theeventsof2010–2012canbeinterpreted

as a new attempt for countries like Egypt to rise up against their ‘current status as a

dominated region’ and against the ‘demands of globalized economic liberalism’.37These

approacheshavethemeritofnotfocusingontheregion’s‘exceptionality’andofproposing

anuancedreadingofglobalization.Nevertheless,ashasalreadybeenobservedcountless

times before, such paradigms suffer from their emphasis on the economic: everything

automatically stems from what is played out on the economic field, including relations

betweennations,thestateitself,socialclasses,socialmovements,etc.

Conversely,anumberofotherstudiessubordinateeconomicdeterminationtothe

primacy of politics. From a structuralist perspective like that adopted by Skocpol,38the

32 Adam Hanieh, ‘Egypt’s Uprising. Not Just a Question of Transition’, The Bullet, 462, 2011,<http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/462.php>.33TouseNaderFergany’sexpressionintheArabHumanDevelopmentReport(2002–2005).34LinNoueihed,AlexWarren,TheBattlefortheArabSpring.Revolution,NewHaven,YaleUniversityPress,2012,p.112.35AnnaM.Agathangelou,NevzatSoguk, ‘RockingtheKasbah.InsurrectionalPolitics, the“ArabStreets”,andGlobalRevolutioninthe21stCentury’,Globalizations,8(5),2011,p.551–558.36JackieSmith,‘GlobalizationsForumonMiddleEastProtests.Commentary’,Globalizations,8(5),2011,p.655–659. 37SamirAmin,‘2011:leprintempsarabe?’,Mouvements,67,2011,p.135–156,herep.139.38AccordingtoThedaSkocpol,threeelementsplayanessentialrole:theinternationalcontext,thefinancialcrisisandthedivisionoftheelites,andpeasantrebellions(T.Skocpol,StatesandSocialRevolutions,op.cit.).


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autonomy of the State is posited as a basic condition; its determining factors, crisis or

downfall are at the heart of the analysis. Extending this approach, some authors have

attemptedtoilluminatethecontrastbetweentheoverthrowoftheTunisianandEgyptian

presidentsandtheresilienceofotherregimesintheregion(inparticularLibyaandSyria).

Suchauthors identify ‘true’ and ‘false’nation-states, ‘moderate’ and inclusivemonarchies

versusrepublics,fragmentedorhomogenoussocieties,oilprofits,apastmarkedbyviolence,

etc.39Revolutionsarethusseentowashup‘regimesthatweretooopenandtooclosed,too

modern and too anachronistic, too rational and too “insane”,’40frommedieval garbage.

Placing political conflict at the center of everything, some authors have examined the

structuralcausesofthe‘Arabuprisings’undertheduallensoftheglobaleconomiccrisisand

thespreadofthecrisiswithinthestate’ssphere.

First of all, in this line of thought and contrary to third-wave democratization

processes,therecent‘Arabuprisings’owenothingtoWesterndemocraticstruggles.Quite

the opposite: these rebellions have emerged despite the ‘exceptional’ treatment of

authoritarianregimesbymajorworldpowers,obsessedwiththe‘Islamistspecter’,41careful

to preserve the status quo in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and eager tomaintain their

influenceoveroilresources.Thetoneusedisparticularlycaustic42—somehaveevengone

so far as to point out the means used byWesterners to prevent revolutions.43Decisive

international factors would apparently pertain to the economic realm, in such an

interpretation. Some argue that the global rise in food and energy prices prompted the

emergence of revolts; 2007’s financial crisiswas ‘the straw (or the bale) that broke the

camel’sback’.44Thespreadofthecrisisthroughouttheregionwasthenlinkedtoadropin

39Forexample,GeorgesCorm, ‘Premièreapproched’unecontextualisationdes révoltespopulairesarabes’,ConfluenceMéditerranée,79,2011,p.93–111.40HamitBozarslan,‘Réflexionssurlesconfigurationsrévolutionnairestunisienneetégyptienne’,Mouvements,66,2011,p.11–21,herep.16.41LuisMartinez,‘Leprintempsarabe,unesurprisepourl’Europe’,Projet,322,2011,p.5–12.42SeethecritiqueoftheworkeditedbyForeignAffairs,TheNewArabRevolt,NewYork,CouncilonForeignRelations,2011,byRaymondWilliamBaker,‘UnderstandingEgypt’sWorldlyMiracles’,TheMiddleEastJournal,66(1),2012,p.163–170,herep.165–167.43JeremySalt,‘Containingthe“ArabSpring”’,Interface,4(1),2012,p.54–66.44Jean-FrançoisDaguzan,‘Delacriseéconomiqueàlarévolutionarabe’,Maghreb-Machrek,206,2011,p.9–15.


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exports,areductioninfinancialflowstowardsnon-oilbasedeconomies,acreditcrunchand

thedefundingofnationaldevelopmentprogramsanddevelopmentalaid.45

Secondly,ratherthanallowingforthesocialfoundationofnonoil-basedregimesto

berenewed,thesereformswouldallegedlyhaveincreasedthenumberofmalcontents,46the

state’swithdrawalleadingtothebreakdownof‘socialcontracts’hithertoconsideredasone

of the main reasons for authoritarianism’s resilience. 47 The rise in corruption and the

predationonnationaleconomiesby‘cliques’madeupofindividualswithclosetiestothe

headsofstatewouldlikewisehavefrustratedthemarginalizedeliteaswellasthearmy,in

Egypt’scase.48Politicallyspeaking,‘deliberalization’49wouldhavetranslatedintothespread

ofrepression50beyondIslamistsaloneandtheopposition’slimitedaccesstotheinstitutional

politicalsphere.InEgypt,theconstitutionalamendmentsleadinguptotheNovemberand

December 2010 elections— a key step in preparing GamalMubarak’s rise to power—

provoked a large voting boycott; the number of opposition members in the parliament

droppedbelow2005levels.Asaccesstoinstitutionalpoliticallifewasblocked,takingtothe

streetsbecametheonlyviablealternative.51

Such interpretations are useful for reintroducing the state into the equation and

focusing on relations between social groups, between these groups and the state and

between different states. Nevertheless, they are vulnerable to the same criticisms as

structuralist interpretations: that is tosay, themarginalizationofculturaland ideological

dimensions, the lackof attentionpaid to theuprisings themselvesandmoregenerally, a

certainnegligencewithregardtoprocess.

In another realm of scholarship, analyzing the recent wave of protests has led a

numberofauthorstoemploythemechanismsofrelativefrustration.Asthesymbolofthe

45Forexample,ElMouhoubMouhoud,‘Economiepolitiquedesrévolutionsarabes:analyseetperspectives’,Maghreb-Machrek,210,2011–2012,p.35–47.46F.G.GauseIII,‘WhyMiddleEastStudiesMissedtheArabSpring?’,art.cit.,p.8647Forexample,BéatriceHibou,‘Économiepolitiqueetmoraled’unmouvementsocial’,Politiqueafricaine,121,2011,p.5–22.48Forexample,VincentGeisser,AbirKrefa, ‘L’uniformenefaitpluslerégime, lesmilitairesarabesfaceaux“révolutions”’,Revueinternationaleetstratégique,83,2011,p.93–102.49EberhardKienle,AGrandDelusion.DemocracyandEconomicReforminEgypt,London,Tauris,2000.50GeorgeJoffé,‘TheArabSpringinNorthAfrica.OriginsandProspects’,TheJournalofNorthAfricanStudies,16(4),2011,p.507–532.51L.Noueihed,A.Warren,TheBattle,op.cit.,p.106.


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Tunisian uprising, Mohamed Bouazizi was first portrayed as an ‘unemployed college

graduate’.Thispieceofinformation—nomatterhowfalseitwas—promptedawholeslew

ofinterpretationsthatemphasizedthelossofsocialstatusandfeelingsofhumiliationand

injustice.52Themediaabundantlymadereferencetosuchinterpretations,interactivegraphs

and charts in hand: The Economist Online even published ‘The Shoe-Thrower’s Index’,53

developedonthebasisofagroupofstatisticalindicators.

Aswealreadyremarkedtenyearsago,frustrationapproaches‘takeseveraldifferent

forms:aneconomiccrisis,“alienation”causedbytherapidtransformationsexperiencedby

MaghrebiandMiddleEasternsocieties,beitruralexodusesandacceleratedurbanizationor

“demographicruptures”provokedbythemassiveinfluxofpost-independencegenerations

on the job market, the housing market, etc.; the failure of the “imitated State” or the

“importedState”[...];ariseinfeelingsofbeingexcludedbyglobalization’.54Likewise,since

the1980s,Arabyouthhasbeenobserved‘throughtheprismofthecrisis’andunemployment

amongcollegegraduateshasbeentoutedasthemainargumentusedtoexplainawholehost

ofphenomena:populationpressure,55difficultieswithworkplaceintegrationandfeelingsof

socialdegradation,aswellashousing,marriage,economicandpoliticalcrises.56

Theseinterpretationssingleoutempiricallyobservableandquantifiablephenomena.

However,theyalsoelicitthesameobjectionsasinterpretationsthatrelyonthetheoryof

relativefrustration:the‘volcanic’natureofthemodel,thepredominanceofapsychological,

rather than sociological, point of view, a vague description of the connection between

objective conditions and tautologically-deduced perceptions, a weak justification of the

52Foracritiqueofthesetypesofinterpretations,pleaseseeinparticularAminAllal,YoussefEl-Chazli,‘Figuresdudéclassementetpassageaupolitiquedanslessituationsrévolutionnaireségyptienneettunisienne’,inIvanSainsaulieu,MurielSurdez(ed.),Senspolitiquesdutravail,Paris,ArmandColin,2012,p.321–336.53 ‘Arab Unrest Index. The Shoe-Thrower’s Index’, The Economist Online, February 9, 2011,<http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/02/daily_chart_arab_unrest_index>.54MouniaBennani-Chraïbi,OlivierFillieule,‘Appeld’air(e)’,inMouniaBennani-Chraïbi,OlivierFillieule(ed.),Résistancesetprotestationsdanslessociétésmusulmanes,Paris,PressesdeSciencesPo,2003,p.17–42,herep.34.55 Emmanuel Todd, Allah n’y est pour rien ! Sur les révolutions arabes et quelques autres, Loubiana,Arretsurimages.net, 2011; Emmanuel Todd, YoussefCourbage,Le rendez-vous des civilisations,Paris, Seuil,2007.56 Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi, Iman Farag, ‘Constitution de la jeunesse dans les sociétés arabes : figures,catégoriesetanalyseurs’,inMouniaBennani-Chraïbi,ImanFarag(ed.),Jeunessesdessociétésarabes,Paris,Auxlieuxd’être,2007,p.11–47,herep.18ff.


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transitionfromrelativedeprivationtomobilization,etc.57Nottomentionthefactthatthis

notion has traditionally been quite popular in studies of Maghrebi and Middle Eastern

societies, whether the latter have sought to explain Islamist movements, urban riots or

suicideattacks.

Asthecentralplayerinthe‘Arabuprisings’,Arabyouthisnolongersolelyportrayed

bythefigureoftheunemployedcollegegraduate,butalsobythemoreglamorousimageof

theyoung,educatedmanorwomanwholovesmodernity,democracyanddigitaltechnology

—inpartbecausethisimageismuchmoreattractivetoWesterncommentators.Thanksto

thisiconicfigure,theparadigmofmodernizationhasresurfacedinnewgarb.58Accordingto

suchinterpretations,becauseitisprogressiveandbecauseitisopentoWesterndemocratic

culture, notably via its cultural products and its access to more and more information,

controlledwithincreasingdifficulty,the‘globalized’youthofArabsocietieswouldinevitably

produceademocraticawakening.59Thisrefrain isnotnew. Ifweexcludetheparenthesis

markingthe‘endofthegreatdevelopmentalistnarrative’,whenthesesameyouthsbecome

‘Islamists’,‘fanatics’,‘terrorists’,wearenotfarfromtheaftermathofnationalindependence,

when‘theyouth’wasconsideredtobe‘themotorofsocialandpoliticalchange,embodying

thevaluesofmodernity’.60Theonlynewelementspresentin2011’srhetoricareahandful

of adjectives: thisyouth is ‘connected’ and ‘globalized’.Thanks to its creativity, the ‘Arab

public’ has now been put forth as an example for all disenfranchised peoples, 61

demonstratingthat‘politicalinnovationcanemergefromtheoutskirtsofsociety’.62

57PhilippeCorcuff,‘Frustrationsrelatives’,andIsabelleSommier,‘Privationrelative’,inOlivierFillieule,LilianMathieu,CécilePéchu(ed.),Dictionnairedesmouvementssociaux,Paris,PressesdeSciencesPo,2009,p.242–248andp.441–448respectively.58ForSamuelHuntington,revolutionsareacomponentofmodernization.Theyarearesponsetoanoverlyrapidandpoorlycontrolledprocessofmodernization, forexamplewhenthereareimportantdiscrepanciesbetweensectors’differentratesofmodernizationand,morespecifically,whenthedevelopmentofpoliticalinstitutionslagsbehindsocialandeconomicchange(SamuelHuntington,PoliticalOrderinChangingSocieties,NewHaven,YaleUniversityPress,1968).59See, forexample,theenthusiasmdisplayedforthe ‘Wired,EducatedandShrewd,YoungEgyptians[who]GuideRevolt’titlefromTheNewYorkTimes,February10,2011,p.1.SeealsoFarhadKhosrokhavar,TheNewArabRevolutionsthatShooktheWorld,Boulder,ParadigmPublishers,2012.60F.Khosrokhavar,ibid.,p.17. 61GeorgesCorm,‘QuandlaruearabesertdemodèleauNord’,LeMonde,February11,2011.62YvesGonzalez-Quijano,‘Les“originesculturellesnumériques”desrévolutionsarabes’,March23,2011,p.4,<http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org/archive/2011/mars/dossier/art_ygq.pdf>.


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IntheseattemptstodecipherrecenteventsintheArabworld,technologyhasbeen

presentedas theactiverevolutionaryagent.Hereagain, the idea isnotnew.Theoristsof

modernization already granted a central role to technology with regard to the

implementation of social change. But with the development of new information and

communications technologies (NICTs), the frequency of publications on the subject has

continuedtorise;thisfervorismoreoverperiodicallyrekindledbyspecificevents,suchas

the Zapatista insurrection in 1994, various anti-globalization movements, the coalition

againsttheIraqwarin2003andofcourse,theIranianandMoldavianrebellionsof2009,

hastilytermed‘Twitterrevolutions’.63Thankstothemediahypesurrounding2011’scalls

formobilizationonFacebook,theexpressions‘FacebookRevolution’,‘Revolution2.0’and,in

Tunisia’s case, ‘Wikileaks Revolution’ gained traction. In the minds of ‘cyberphiles’ and

‘cyber-utopians’,thenewinformationandcommunicationstechnologieswoulddemocratize

informationproductionandallowforanalmostinstantaneousdiffusionoftexts,imagesand

videos within national spheres and beyond, thus sidestepping the monopoly held by

traditionalmediaoutlets.Moreover,thesetechnologicaldevelopmentswouldallowformost

oftheproblemslinkedtomobilizationinrepressiveenvironmentstobesolved:‘Thisnew

technologyrepresents,ifnottheend,atleastthedeaththroesofLenin’sWhatistobedone?.

Whenasimpleclickallowsindividualstogetintouchandproteststobeorchestrated,the

role of organization disappears’. 64 As for arguments against ‘cyber-utopianism’, they

downplay the role played byNICTswith regard to instigating and organizing rebellions,

demystifythepoweroftheInternet,65remindusthatthepublicvirtualcounter-spacecan

alsobe‘yetanotherruseoftheOrwellianregime’66andfinally,thattechnologydoesnota

revolutionmake.67

63 References can be found in the thematic bibliography at the end of this volume. For a comprehensiveapproachtotherelationsbetweenthemediaandmobilizations,seeÉrikNeveu,‘Médias,mouvementssociaux,espacespublics’,Réseaux,17(98),1999,p.17–86;andmorespecificallyconcerningNICTs:DominiqueCardon,FabienGranjon,Médiactivistes,Paris,PressesdeSciencesPo,2010.64BertrandBadie,‘Printempsarabe:uncommencement’,Études,415(7–8),2011,p.7–18,herep.15.65EvgenyMorozov,TheNetDelusion.TheDarkSideofInternetFreedom,NewYork,PublicAffairs,2010.66RoshanakShaery-Eisenlohr‘FromSubjectstoCitizens?CivilSocietyandtheInternetinSyria’,MiddleEastCritique,20(2),2011,p.127–138,herep.137.Ontheargumentspresentedby‘cyberphiles’and‘cyberskeptics’,see,forexample,JamesL.Gelvin,TheArabUprisings.WhatEveryoneNeedstoKnow,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2012,p.50ff.67Forexample,SaharKhamis,PaulB.Gold,KatherineVaughn, ‘BeyondEgypt’s “FacebookRevolution”andSyria’s“YouTubeUprising”’,ArabMedia&Society,15,2012,


13

Thedoubleemphasisplacedbyscholarlyandmediadiscourseon‘globalized’youth

andtheideaof‘Revolution2.0’revivedacertaincondemnationoftheconceptofunilinear,

teleologicalchangeandprogress;italsorenewedthedebatesurroundingneo-Orientalism.

Consequently, for Rabab El-Mahdi, the very fact of describing uprisings as ‘young’ and

‘nonviolent’andofestablishingsocialmediaasthe‘champion’ofrebellionbetraysa‘binary’

OrientalistreadingwhichseekstoconfirmtheWest’ssupremacybycontrastingtradition—

associated with obscurantism, violence and all sorts of obstacles to progress — with

‘imported’,liberatingmodernity.68

Theepistemeofmodernitycanalsopartlybefoundininterpretationsthatfocuson

culturalfactors‘whichalsoallowforaradicalbreaktobeenvisionedanddesired’,69orwhich

dealwithchangesin the formsofobedienceandtheculturesofresistancethatengender

rebellion. Comparing the ‘cultural origins’ of the French and English Revolutions, Roger

Chartier analyzes five different factors previously identified by Lawrence Stone70 : the

transformationofattitudestowardsreligion;theimportanceoflegalreferences;a‘cultural

ideal’markedbytheexclusionofthecourtandthecapital;astateofmindcharacterizedby

the gradual erosion of the family, the state and the church’s authority; and intellectual

frustration tied to ‘the excessive development of education’. Recent studies have often

implicitlyrelieduponthisfive-partanalysis.

Theepithetsusedinsuchreadingsimmediatelyrevealthecapitalimportanceplaced

onvaluesandideas:revolutionsarecharacterizedas‘modern’,‘democratic’,‘citizen’,‘post-

modern’ or ‘post-Islamist’, for example.71 In a radical departure from previous political

generations,whichwerenationalistandIslamist,thecurrentprotestorswouldthusbethe

standard-bearersofaculturalandintellectualrevolution.72Thesenewmenandwomenhave

allegedly forged ‘a new relationship to the self, a new relationshipwithothers,with the

<http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=791>.68 Rabab El-Mahdi, ‘Orientalising the Egyptian Uprising’, Jadaliyya, April 2011,<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1214/orientalising-the-egyptian-uprising>. See also Greg Burris,‘Lawrence of E-rabia. Facebook and the New Arab Revolt’, Jadaliyya, October 2011,<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2884/lawrence-ofe-rabia_facebook-and-the-new-arab-revo>.69RogerChartier,LesoriginesculturellesdelaRévolutionfrançaise,Paris,Seuil,1990,p.247.70LawrenceStone,TheCausesoftheEnglishRevolution,1529–1642,London,ArkPaperbacks,1972.71OlivierRoy,‘Desrévolutionspost-islamistes’,LeMonde,February12,2011.72Jeffrey C. Alexander,Performative Revolution in Egypt. An Essay in Cultural Power, London, BloomsburyAcademic,2011,p.18.


14

world and in particularwith theWest’,73aswell aswith political, religious and familial

authorities.74Nowisthetimefortheindividualtotriumphoverdenominational,sectarian,

or tribal allegiances. This ‘democratization of minds’ 75 allegedly has its roots in the

elaborationof anArabpublic sphere, in largepart thanks toAl Jazeera, the latterhaving

helped to mold ‘a new Arab public’, 76 to circumvent official demands and to promote

unprecedentedmediapluralismgrantingspaceto‘opinions...andotheropinions’(ar-ra’ywa

ar-ra’yal-akhar).77Inthesamevein,somestudieshaveemphasizedtheroleplayedbythe

off-stagediscourseofsubordinategroups78—rumors,anecdotes—andbyamultitudeof

culturalobjects—videoclips,films,TVseries,essays,novels,79plays,blogs,etc.—inthe

disseminationofliberalvaluesandthedelegitimizationofexistingauthoritiesbymeansof

thecritiqueofauthoritarianismandcorruption.The‘leader’sdisgrace’wouldthusanticipate

hisdownfall.80

Readingslikethesehighlighttheimpactofideasandvalues,otherwisemarginalized

byalargenumberofstudies.Wemuststill,however,‘updatetheirdynamicsandbecareful

nottooverlooktheirroleattheheartoftheaction,thatistosay,their ‘effectiveness’.[...]

‘Rhetoricallogic’isnotthesamethingas‘areasonforacting’.81

Weshallconcludethisrapidoverviewoftheexistingliteratureon‘Arabuprisings’by

invokingaleitmotivintributetoDwightEisenhower.ThefallofHosniMubarakfourweeks

after that of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali instigated a flood of colorful expressions, such as

‘dominoeffect’,‘contagion’,‘tsunami’,‘breakingwave’,‘snowballing’,etc.Regardlessofthe

73F.Khosrokhavar,TheNewArabRevolutions,op.cit.,p.10.74Y.Gonzalez-Quijano,‘Lesoriginesculturelles’,art.cit.,p.10.Onthesubjectofthedemocratizationofreligiousmatters,seeDaleF.Eickelman,JamesP.Piscatori,MuslimPolitics,Princeton,PrincetonUniversityPress,1996.75MohamedNanabhay,RoxaneFarmanfarmaian,‘FromSpectacletoSpectacular.HowPhysicalSpace,SocialMediaandMainstreamBroadcastAmplifiedthePublicSphereinEgypt’s“Revolution”’,TheJournalofNorthAfricanStudies,16(4),2011,p.573–603.76MilesHugh,AlJazeera,London,Abacus,2005.77Claire-GabrielleTalon, ‘Al Jazeera,unobjetmédiatiqueoriginal.Unecritiquedesnormes journalistiquesoccidentales’,LesTempsmodernes,664,2011,p.55–62,herep.59.SeealsoYvesGonzalez-Quijano,TouryaGuaaybess,LesArabesparlentauxArabes,Arles,Sindbad/ActesSud,2009;MarcLynch,VoicesoftheNewArabPublic,NewYork,CambridgeUniversityPress,2006. 78JamesC.Scott,DominationandtheArtsofResistance,NewHaven,YaleUniversityPress,1990.79AlaaElAswany,L’immeubleYacoubian,Arles,ActesSud,2006.80Onthissubject,seeMichelCamau’sgroundbreakingarticle,‘Ladisgrâceduchef.Mobilisationspopulairesarabesetcriseduleadership’,Mouvements,66,2011,p.22–29.81FrançoisChazel,‘Lesrupturesrévolutionnaires.Problèmesdedéfinition’,inMadeleineGrawitz,JeanLeca(ed.),Traitédesciencepolitique,Paris,PUF,vol.2,1985,p.635–646,herep.652.


15

causal links evoked, these expressions always referred to the notions of diffusion and

dissemination. Here we can make a specific point that departs from the usual debates

surroundingthisquestion.Theunitinginfluenceof ‘Arab’or‘Islamic’causeshasoftenled

scholarstoposit theexistenceof ‘an“AraborMuslimpublic”,an“AraborMuslimvoice”,

readytomobilizeandriseupasanuniformentity,withasinglesharedmotivation,modeof

action, and understanding of the stakes’. 82 While criticizing the illusory homogeneity

conveyedbytheuseoftheadjective‘Arab’todescribethe‘uprisings’,thesescholarshave

nevertheless argued that an ‘imagined Arab community’ 83 has been fashioned. This

communityhaspurportedlybeenconstructedthankstoadialogueencouragedbyashared

languageandcivilization,aswellassimilarhistoricalexperiences;ithasbeensolidifiedby

pilgrimages, travel, labormigration and themedia. From this point of view, Al Jazeera’s

satellite channel is the vehicle for a new grassroots pan-Arabism constructed by

individuals,84whereGamalAbdelNasser’sradiostation‘VoiceoftheArabs’,createdin1953,

hadbeenthesymbolofArabnationalismsupportedbyArabstates.

If, until now, the transnational character of revolts throughout the region has

primarilybeenunderstoodthroughthelensofAl-QaedaandIslamistmovements,85today

emphasis is instead placed on the role of transnational networks and that of Western

foundationsandorganizationswithregardtothedisseminationofdemocraticideas.Ifwe

acceptthisvision,wedonothavefartogobeforeerectingtheAmericanscholarandactivist

GeneSharpastheinstigatoroftheArabrevolts—astepthatmanyhavealreadytaken.86

According to Sharp’s followers, Egyptians and Tunisianswere introduced to non-violent

protests thanks to his famous manual, From Dictatorship to Democracy, as well as any

trainingtheymayhavereceivedattheCentreforAppliedNonViolentActionsandStrategies

(CANVAS)foundedinBelgradebytheOtpor!movement,oratQatar’sAcademyforChange.87

82MouniaBennani-Chraïbi,‘LesconflitsduMoyen-Orientaumiroirdescommunautésimaginées:laruearabeexiste-t-elle?CasduMaroc’,AContrario,5(2),2008,p.147–156.83BenedictAnderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on theOrigin and Spread ofNationalism, London,Verso,1991.84Forexample,BicharaKhader,‘Le“printempsarabe”:unpremierbilan’,AlternativesSud,19,2012,p.7–39.85Forexample,OlivierRoy,GlobalizedIslam.TheSearchforaNewUmmah,NewYork,CambridgeUniversityPress,2004.86Forexample,DavidD.Kirkpatrick,DavidE.Sanger,‘ATunisian-EgyptianLinkThatShookArabHistory’,TheNewYorkTimes,February13,2011.87Thecommunitiesdirectlyaffecteddidnotwaitlongerbeforeretaliatingwithahumorouscounter-offensive


16

Thisdoesnotmeanthatwerejectoutofhandalldiffusionistinterpretations.Quite

onthecontrary,wewouldliketorevivethedebatewithotherresearcherswhohaverejected

causality aswell as themacro-sociological perspective. In reality, it would be fruitful to

connectthestudyofcognitiveprocesseswithnetworkanalysisandthesequentialanalysis

ofactivisttrajectories,inordertobetterreconstructthe‘livedexperiencesofdiffusion’,or

howideas,causesandperformancesareadaptedandtransformed.88

Whattoconcludefromthisincompleteandsummaryliteraturereview?Firstofall,

the scientific community’s responsiveness should be commended, especiallywhen it has

beenfacedwithmajoreventsthathavethreatenedmanyatheoryornow-shakythesis.We

shouldalsohighlightthestimulatingnatureofsomeoftheworkscited.However,wehave

nochoicebuttoadmitthatalmostnoneoftheimpassesdescribedabovehavetrulybeen

resolved.Moststudiesarestillplaguedbyretrospectivepredictionandthehuntformacro-

sociologicalcausation.Severalcausesarementionedandoften‘everythingisineverything’,

withoutanundeniablecausalorderingbeingveritablydemonstrated.Itremainstobeseen

ifthishasbeencausedbytheweightofrespectiveresearchtraditionsor,moregenerally,to

useoneofPierreFavre’sexpressions,bytheevaporationofevidenceinsociology.Inanother

respect, theanalysisofrevolutionary situations— in the senseof the clarificationof the

internal processes and sequencing of these situations — remains largely unexplored:

individualsareeverywherepresent,butmerelyasshadowpuppets.What,then,shouldbe

done?Wearguethatresearchersshouldabandonthesearchforcausesandinsteadfocus

their attention on situations and individual actions in said situations, and subsequently

attempttodelineatethetypicalprocessesthatleadtothem.

on Twitter, under the name of ‘GeneSharpTaughtMe’. See Ould Mohamedou Mohammad-Mahmoud, ‘Ladémocratiearabeauregarddunéo-orientalisme’,Revueinternationaleetstratégique,83,2011,p.85–91,herep.86.88IsabelleSommier,‘Diffusionetcirculationdesmouvementssociaux’,inOlivierFillieule,ÉricAgrikoliansky,Isabelle Sommier (ed.), Penser les mouvements sociaux. Conflits sociaux et contestation dans les sociétéscontemporaines,Paris,LaDécouverte,2010,p.101–120,herep.115.


17

PERFORMANCESANDPROCESSES‘Itisthedetailsthattheoriesinhistoryhavetograspiftheyaretobeanygood’.89

This volume analyzes revolutionary situations, understood as instances of dual

power,90inordertoidentifythesequencesofaction—definedhereasperformances,i.e.,the

cumulativewholeofinteractionsbetweenalltheactorsparticipatinginaconflict—thatlead

to them. The concept of performance (also borrowed fromCharles Tilly91) signifies that

participantsrelyonengrainedformsbutalsore-interpretthem,sometimessubvertingor

abandoningthementirely,dependingontheirreasoning,whosedecisivefactorsaretobe

foundinsituationallogics.Weproposethattheobservationofmicroaswellasmesolevel

interactionsmustallowustoidentifyprocesses,whichwedefineasaseriesofeventscapable

of altering the relationships between given groups of elements, in a similar or identical

manner,inavarietyofdifferentcontexts.Theseprocessesmayberelational(atthemeso

level of relations between individuals and groups) or cognitive (at the micro level of

individual perception). 92 Studying performances thus amounts to conserving the most

noteworthyfeaturesofcertainsequences,orsignificantdifferencesbetweensequences,and

explainingthembyidentifyingrobustprocessesofrelativelygeneralscopeatworkwithin

these sequences. More specifically, beyond establishing the original (i.e. the context)

conditions,wemustattempttoidentifyanddescribetheprocesseswhichlead(ornot)toa

revolutionarysituation—assaidsituationcannotstemdirectlyfromitsoriginalconditions.

ThistypeofclassificationisinkeepingwiththeambitiousprojectlaunchedbyDoug

McAdam,SidneyTarrowandCharlesTillywhichseekstorestructurethepoliticalprocess

modelaroundthestudyofmechanismsspecifictodifferentkindsofepisodes.93Althoughwe

89ArthurL.Stinchcombe,TheoreticalMethodsinSocialHistory,NewYork,AcademicPress,1978,p.124.90SeeCharlesTilly’sdefinitiongiveninfootnote9,p.769.91CharlesTilly,ContentiousPerformances,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2008.92 We borrow here the distinction introduced by Arthur Stinchcombe in his discussion of the concept ofmechanisms, inTheLogicofSocialResearch,Chicago,ChicagoUniversityPress,2005.Headds the levelofenvironmentalmechanisms,whichweseeasreferringtolong-termprocessespertainingtodifferentregimesofplasticity(touseageologicalmetaphor).Therefore,environmentalmechanismssuchasthenationalizationofpoliticalspheresorde-differentiationarelong-termprocessesand,inthecaseofrevolutionarysituations,shouldbeviewedasconduciveelements(touseSmelser’sterm)existingoutsideofthetemporalframeworkofacrisis.Thusdefined,thistermalsoincludesindividualprocesses(forexample,assurancegames)andmesosociologicalmechanisms.Wewilldemonstratethisbelow.93DougMcAdam, Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow,Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge, Cambridge University


18

sharetheirdesireforadynamicapproach,itneverthelessseemstousthat,itsambiguities

aside,94thismodelremainsovertlycausalistandstructuralist.

Moreover,ourapproachreliesonthreepostulateswhichdivergesignificantlyfrom

theassumptionsmade inDynamicsofContention. Firstof all,webelieve that inorder to

identify themake-upofrevolutionarysituationsandconsequently, toobserveanddefine

theirprocesses,wemustbaseouranalysisonwhatactorsare,doandsayinsitu.Macro-

social facts are nothing more than the emergent consequences of individual actions,

accordingtoanultimatelyWeberianreasoning.95

Ontheotherhand,ingoingagainstastrongtrendprevalentinthesociologyofsocial

movements that seeks to limit analysis to protest movements, protestors and their

relationshiptothestate,96webelievethatprocessesandperformancesarebuiltrelationally

andrequirethatwetakeintoaccountalltheactorspresentinthespaceofagivenconflict.97

Finally,abandoningthesearchforcauseshasledustoconsider,likePierreFavre,that‘the

workofscienceconsistsinstudyingtwodifferentandsuccessivestatesofasystem,isolating

thepertinenttraitsofeachandarrivingattherulesgoverningthetransformationbetween

Press,2001;andalso‘MethodsforMeasuringMechanismsofContention’,QualitativeSociology,31,2008,p.307–331.Inaddition,ourdefinitionofprocessesborrowsfromTilly’sdefinitionofmechanisms(CharlesTilly,‘L’analysehistoriquedesprocessuspolitiques’,inPascaleLaborier,DannyTrom(ed.),Historicitésdel’actionpublique,Paris,PUF,2003,p.23–57,herep.27).94Inparticular,thedistinctionbetween‘episodes’,‘processes’and‘mechanisms’isnotconsistent,asseveralcriticshavepointedout.Seespecifically thecritiquesgrouped together inMobilization,8,2003and in thesymposiumon‘MeasuringMechanismsofContention’inQualitativeSociology,31,2008.95R.Aya,‘TheThirdMan’,artcit.;WilliamH.SewellJr.,‘ThreeTemporalities:TowardanEventfulSociology’,inTerrenceJ.McDonald(ed.),TheHistoricTurnintheHumanSciences,AnnArbor,MichiganUniversityPress,1996,p.245–280.In‘MethodsforMeasuringMechanismsofContention’(art.cit.),D.McAdam,S.TarrowandCh.Tillyestablishalistofthedifferentmeansofidentifyingmechanisms(forthem)orprocesses(forus)whichemphasizes the anthropological observation of conflict but also includes ‘protest events analysis’ and thestatisticalmethodofindirectmeasurement—whichimpliesonceagainacertaintheoreticalinconsistency.96SeeVertaTaylor,‘Plusçachange,plusc’estlamêmechose’,Mobilization,8,2003,p.122–126,andOlivierFillieule, ‘De l’objet de la définition à la définition de l’objet. De quoi traite finalement la sociologie desmouvementssociaux?’,PolitiqueetSociétés,28(1),2009,p.15–36,foramorenuancedcriticismofthisaspectof‘contentiouspolitics’.97Consideringconflictbetweenthedifferentprotagonistsinabalancedwayisattheheartofseveralstudieswhich,startingwithresearchonhowpublicorderismaintained(OlivierFillieule,DonatellaDellaPorta(ed.),Policeetmanifestants,Paris,PressesdeSciencesPo,2006),havenowspread tootheraspectsof thesocialworld.Onthissubject,seetheambitiousresearchprojectevokedbyJamesJasperin‘AStrategicApproachtoCollectiveAction.LookingforAgencyinSocial-MovementChoices’,Mobilization,9(1),2004,p.1–16,elaboratedinGettingyourWay.StrategicDilemmasintheRealWorld,Chicago,TheUniversityofChicagoPress,2006,andimplemented in JanW.Duyvendak, JamesM. Jasper (eds),Players andArenas. The InteractiveDynamics ofProtest,forthcoming.Fromanotherperspective,seealsoNeilFligstein,DougMcAdam,ATheoryofFields,NewYork,OxfordUniversityPress,2012.


19

these two states’.98Each sequence of actions ismodified by processeswhich lead to its

results(newstatesofequilibrium),whichinturnhelptodefinetheenvironmental,relational

and cognitive elements that influence the calculations of the following sequence. In this

cumulativeperspective—whichsharessomecharacteristicswithPaulVeyne’sconceptof

narrative and intrigue99 — previous choices force subsequent choices, as in a game of

chess.100

Inwhatfollows,brieflyrecallingsomeofthepropertiesofrevolutionarysituations

will allow us to determine the role played by agency. We will then focus on the most

emphasized dimension of this volume: performances. This trajectory will allow us to

concludethatacertainnumberofprocessesexistthatimplyrulesgoverningtransformation

betweenstates,andwhicharelikelytoleadtorevolutionarysituations.

Thespreadofmobilizationsandhowcoalitionsareformed

Revolutionarysituationsdependonachallengetoexistingpowerstructureswhich

spreads to a significant percentage of the population and the subsequent breakdown

betweentraditionallymoreorlessairtightdivisionsbetweensocialspaces.Themajorityof

casestudiespinpointasmallnumberofpropertiessharedbyallrevolutionarysituations:

divisionsordefectionswithinthecentralbodiesofthestate;divisionsordefectionswithin

security forces; thecreationof large inter-classcoalitionswhich leadtothespreadof the

protestmovement;andfinally,themodularityoftheshapingofconflicts(thatistosay,how

situationsareframedaswellastacticalrepertoires).

M.Dobryhasproposedformalizingseveralofthesepropertiesaroundtheconcepts

ofmulti-sectorialmobilizationandpoliticalfluidity.101Situationsofpoliticalcrisisarethus

viewedasthespreadofagivenmobilizationtodifferentsectorsofsociety,tosuchadegree

thatthelatter’sdailyfunctioningisdisrupted.Thenawindowofpoliticalfluidityopensup,

98P.Favre,Comprendrelemonde,op.cit.,p.72.99PaulVeyne,Commentonécrit l’histoire,Paris,PointsSeuil,1971,p.51–53.Oncumulativecausation, seeArthurL.Stinchcombe,TheoreticalMethodsinSocialHistory,NewYork,AcademicPress,1978,p.61–63,andR.Aya,‘TheThirdMan’,art.cit.,p.147–148.100 For an implementation of this concept of multi-level analysis and causation inspired by symbolicinteractionism,seeOlivierFillieule, ‘DisengagementfromRadicalOrganizations.AProcessandMulti-LevelModel of Analysis’, in Bert Klandermans, Cornelius Van Stralen (eds),Movements in Times of Transition,Minnesota,MinnesotaUniversityPress,forthcoming.101M.Dobry,Sociologiedescrisespolitiques,op.cit.


20

duringwhichsectorsnolongerfunctionaccordingtotheirusuallogic:theybecomemuch

moreinterdependentanduncertaintyprevails,insofarastheusualrulesofthegameareno

longerrespected.

Merelydescribingthepropertiesofrevolutionarysituationsisnotsufficient.Wemust

alsotrytounderstandthecontexts thatencouragethemandtheprocesseswhich leadto

them.ThisispreciselywhatMisaghParsaendeavorstodowhenhesuggeststhatattention

shouldfirstbepaidtowhatallowsforthecreationofcoalitionsacrossclasslines.102Starting

with a study of the strategies employed by students,members of the clergy, blue-collar

workersandbusinessownersduringtheIranian,NicaraguanandFilipinorevolutions,Parsa

identifiesboththefavorablestructuralfactorslinkedtotheformofthestate(moreorless

interventionist,more or less exclusive) and the shape of the class conflict (more or less

polarizing).Healsopinpointsthefactorsthatrelatedirectlytotheaction’smomentum,since

oncetheconflictisinstigated,thesituation’slogicmaytranscendthedecisiveelementsthat

producedit.Forexample,dependingontheformthatittakes,theuseofrepressiveforce

may speed up or slow down the creation of large coalitions and thus the spread of

mobilizations.103

All the contributionsgatheredhereunderscore the importanceof groups that are

normallyseparatedfromeachothermomentarilycomingtogether:Islamistsandleft-and

extreme left-wing activists; urban, educated youths and ‘slum-dwelling, street-smart

dropouts’;thedownward-trendingmiddleclasses,butalsobusinessownersandintellectual

professionals excluded from power’s inner sanctum. Even in Bahrain, the rebellion was

poisedtosurpasstheSunni/Shiitedivide—whichoverlapswithsignificantsocio-economic

102MisaghParsa,States, Ideologies,&SocialRevolutions.AComparativeAnalysisof Iran,Nicaragua,andthePhilippines, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000 (see a review of this book below, p. 920–923).CharlesTillycomestothesameconclusionwhenheanalyzesalliancesbetweendifferentclassesduringthe1830and1848revolutionsinFrance(FromMobilization,op.cit.). 103ThiswasthecasewiththeChinesestudents’uprisingin1989.Authoritiesblockedinter-classsympathiesbytreatingstudentsandworkersdifferently.Thelatterweregenerallypunishedmoreharshlyandattimeswereforciblytrappedwithintheirfactoriesduringprotestactivities.Towhichshouldalsobeaddedthestudents’lackofappetiteforacommunalstruggle.SeeElizabethJ.Perry,‘IntellectualsandTiananmen.HistoricalPerspectiveonanAbortedRevolution’,inDanielChirot(ed.),TheCrisisofLeninismandtheDeclineoftheLeft.TheRevolutionsof1989,Seattle,UniversityofWashingtonPress,1991,p.129–146.Ontheambivalenteffectsofrepressionwithregardtodissentinggroupsaswellasindividuals,seeHélèneCombes,OlivierFillieule,‘Repressionandprotest.StructuralmodelsandstrategicinteractionsRevuefrançaisedesciencepolitique(English),61(6),December2011,p.1-24.


21

cleavages—whenitsspreadwasstoppedbySaudiArabia’smilitaryintervention.

Defectioncanbeobservedatmanydifferentlevels.Firstofall,manyanalystshave

elaboratedhypothesesregardingtheattitudeof‘thearmy’inTunisia,Egypt,LibyaandSyria.

Four salient factors have emerged: the army’s relationship to the government; its

involvement inbusinessaffairs; its levelof training; and finally, itsopenness toWestern

armies.104Nonetheless,adetailedanalysisstillneedstobeconductedinordertoaccountfor

the heterogeneity of institutions, hitherto considered as ‘monolithic apparatuses of

repression’, 105 in order to decode, sequence by sequence, the processes which have

underpinned calculations at the different stages and different hierarchical levels of

revolutionary phenomena. Secondly, researchers have examined dissension within

dominantparties,thecrumblingoftheirclientelistnetworksandhowformersupportersof

theregimemaybeswayedtothesideoftheinsurgency(inparticular,seethetwopapers

aboutTunisia in this issue).106Otherregimes in the regionmayhave learnt lessons from

observingtheseevents,inthehopesofpreventinginternaldivisionsandmilitarydefection.

Such strategieswould thus amount to ‘complex,multilevel games’.107In such situations,

regimestrytobuysocialpeace:theycreateapublicdiscoursethat‘aim[s]toinfluencethe

strategiccalculusofcitizens’byhighlightingtherisksofdeepsocialunrest(fitna).Theyalso

organize pro-government demonstrations to stem the tide of activist movements; they

condemnthesectariannatureoftheseprotestsandsuggesttheirmanipulationbytheWest;

theyobservediplomaticstrategiesdeployedintheregionandadaptaccordingly.InMorocco,

for example, in addition to the aforementioned strategies, the government has offered

reformsthatarelikelytolurecitizensled‘astray’backtoinstitutionalpolitics.Furthermore,

theMoroccanregimehasincreasedofficialandunofficialnegotiations,aswellasexerting

104Jean-FrançoisCoustillière,‘Lesforcesarméesdanslesrévoltesarabes’,ConfluenceMéditerranée,11,2011,p.67–80.105V.Geisser,A.Krefa,‘L’uniformenefaitpluslerégime.’,art.cit.,p.94.SeealsoAnneAlexander,‘Brothers-in-Arms?TheEgyptianMilitary,theIkhwanandtheRevolutionsof1952and2011’,TheJournalofNorthAfricanStudies,16,2011,p.533–554.106Forexample,SarahBenNéfissa,‘Ces18joursquiontchangél’Égypte.Révolutioncivileetpolitique’,RevueTiersMonde,specialissue2011,p.227–236,herep.231.Onthesubjectofhowlocalelitesaretransformedintocounter-elites,seealsoGuilainDenoeux,UrbanUnrestintheMiddleEast,Albany,StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1993.107 Steven Heydemann, Reinoud Leenders, ‘Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: RegimeResponsestothe“ArabAwakening”’,Globalizations,85),2011,p.647–653,herep.648.


22

moreindividualandcollectivepressure;ithasrevivednetworksoflocalelectedofficials;it

hasmodifieditsrepressiveactionsfromonesequenceofprotestmovementstoanother,all

thewhileadaptingtoperceivedregionalandinternationalpressures(M.Bennani-Chraïbi,

M.Jeghllaly).InYemen,thecurrentregimehasattemptedtocompensateforearlydefections

byestablishingnewinternalsupportandrallyingitstraditionalforeignallies—albeitnot

withoutbrandishingthefearofasecuritythreat(L.Bonnefoy,M.Poirier).

The concept of ‘modularity’ also allows us to highlight one of the properties

associated with the spread of mobilizations. 108 This term designates the diffusion of

conceptualframeworksandmodesofactionthroughoutanationalsphereandpotentially—

asinthecaseofthe‘Arabuprisings’—fromonecountrytoanother.Modularityisofcourse

encouragedbyemulation; that is tosay,when thesuccessofoneparticularperformance

leads others to believe that it would obtain similar success elsewhere. But a certain

‘attributionofsimilarity’isstillnecessary.109Thisidentificationisproducedbyinstitutional

orculturalcharacteristicsthataresharedorbelievedtobeshared,asY.ElChazlihasshown

inhiscontributionregardingthecalltoprotestonJanuary25th,inthewakeofBenAli’srapid

downfall;however,asimilarformofidentificationalsooccurredwhentheregion’sdictators

learntfromtheirneighbors’successesanderrorswhenattemptingtorestorethepeace.

The case of the ‘Arab uprisings’ has revealed how the attribution of similarity is

largelytheproductofthesidelining,atleasttemporarily,ofdifferencesregardingmethods

and objectives and political footwork on the part of courtiers involved in unifying

perceptions—footworkwhich isaidedbytheshapeof the ‘encampment’,whichwewill

addressbelow,and the circulationof sloganswithinTunis’Kasbah110andEgypt’sTahrir

Square (Y. El Chazli). In the streets of Casablanca, observing the morphology of the

demonstrations revealed a great deal of work regarding unification: coordination

committeestodecideonslogans,communicationandlogistics—includingofcoursepublic

address systems — and marshalling organization (M. Bennani-Chraïbi, M. Jeghllaly).

108SidneyTarrow,DemocracyandDisorder,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1989.109DougMcAdam,‘Pourdépasserl'analysestructuraledel'engagementmilitant’,inOlivierFillieule(ed.),Ledésengagementmilitant,Paris,Belin,2005,p.49-–4.Themechanismoftheattributionofsimilaritymeansthatinformationalonedoesnotsufficetoadoptanewideaorpractice.Inorderfordiffusionandthusimitationtooccur,potentialimitatorsmustatleastpartiallyidentifywiththeoriginalactors. 110ChoukriHmed,‘“Silepeupleunjouraspireàvivre,ledestinsedoitderépondre”’,LesTempsmodernes,664,2011,p.4–20.


23

Likewise,inYemeneffortsweredeployedtokeepobjectivesbroadandvague,thusallowing

all kinds ofmeaning to be attributed to the protests and strong, visible identities to be

preserved (L. Bonnefoy, M. Poirier). The work of political unification is nowhere more

apparent thanwhen it fallsapart, likewhenasmallnumberof IslamiststudentsinTunis

chantedlailahaillaAllahtocountertheleft-wingslogansonJanuary14th(A.Allal),orwhen,

forexample,afterMubarakwasousted,theMuslimBrotherhoodandtheSalafistspartnered

upwiththemilitary.TahrirSquarethenbecameasiteofconfrontationbetweensecularand

‘religious’ groups, between ‘moderate’ revolutionarieswho sought a return to peace and

‘radical’ revolutionaries who wanted to force the army to retreat into its barracks. 111

Nonetheless, recognizing thework of political unification does not necessarily lead to a

strategicbias;withregardtoTunisia,M.BéchirAyariemphasizesthatreducingthenumber

ofgrievancestoalowestcommondenominator—‘dignity’or‘getout!’—wasnotmerely

‘intentional’, but also relates to the country’s much longer history of socio-political

conflicts.112

TheThirdMan

Notwithoutirony,RodAyaunderscoreshowalthoughthesociologyofrevolutions

consistently condemns rational choice theory, it does not propose a general alternative

theoryofhumanaction;eveninthemoststructuralistofrevolutionarymodels,individuals

areatonepointoranothercalledupontoexplain‘thetransitionfromwordtodeed’,thus

surreptitiouslyreintroducingtherejectedtheoriesthroughthebackdoor.113

Itisthusnotsurprisingthatundersuchconditions,theexistingliteratureceaselessly

swingsbetweenratherunconvincingbinaryoppositions:thespontaneityofthemassesand

emotionalcontagion,versusthecalculatedandmanipulativeactionsofgroupleaders;114the

111KhaledDawoud, ‘Tahrir Countershowof Force’,AlAhramWeekly, August 11–17, 2011, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1060/fr1.htm>.112MichaëlBéchirAyari,‘Desmauxdelamisèreauxmotsdela“dignité”‘,RevueTiersMonde,specialissue2011,p.209–218,herep.216.113R.Aya,‘TheThirdMan’,art.cit.114Onapproachesregardingemotionalcontagion,seethecriticalsynthesiselaboratedbySusannaBarrows,Miroirsdéformants.RéflexionssurlafouleenFranceàlafindu19esiècle,Paris,Aubier,1990.Ontheoppositionbetweenmanipulatedmasses andmanipulative leaders, in particularwith regard to police reasoning, seeOlivierFillieule,Stratégiesdelarue.LesmanifestationsenFrance,Paris,PressesdeSciencesPo,1997.


24

prevalence of tactical choices and innovation versus reliance on engrained forms and

cognitiveshortcutsduringsituationsofstructuraluncertainty.115

This systematic ambiguity is fostered by both the difficulty of perceiving the

structurednatureofcrowdbehavior116andtheambivalenceexhibited in thediscourseof

witnessesandactorsthemselves.117InherreadingoftheCivilRightsMovement’s‘sit-ins’at

thebeginningofthe1960s,F.Pollettagivesusastrikingexampleofthisphenomenon,actors

oscillating between a feeling of spontaneity and unpredictability, and the simultaneous

recognitionofthecrucialroleplayedbythemovement’sleadersandtheirpreparations.118

Likewise,the‘Arabuprisings’provideuswithaplethoraofexamples,whethertheytakethe

formof participant interviews or journalistic reports, filmed and broadcast byArab and

internationalmedia.119

M.Dobry’sconceptof‘calculationevaporation’,whichishalfwaybetweentheinertia

ofsystemsofdisposition(i.e.habitus)andtheintelligibilitybreak,seemstousquiteuseful

here.By relyingonGoffman’snotionof ‘mutual anticipation’,Dobry suggests thatduring

periodsofbroaddesectorization,wherestructuraluncertaintyprevails,participantsbase

theirdecisionstocommitornotontheinformationtheygatherfromtheattitudesofother

actors—allof thisoccurring ina structurallydeterminedbutmalfunctioningnormative

frameworkwhich is about to partially or completely collapse.120‘From this perspective,

115MichelDobryhasemphasizedhowthe‘heroicillusion’wasembeddedinworksoncrisissituations,aswellasthedead-endstowhichitled.Suchcriticismcanextendtoacertainnumberofinterpretationsoftheeventas a ‘break in intelligibility’, opening upa situation inwhich inventiondominates and frees itself fromallstructuraldetermination.Forexample,AlbanBensa,ÉricFassin, ‘Lessciencessociales faceà l’événement’,Terrain,38,2002,p.5–20.116ClarkMcPhail,TheMyth of theMaddingCrowd, NewYork, Aldine/DeGruyter, 1991, p. 158–84;OlivierFillieule, ‘The Independent Psychological Effects of Participation in Demonstrations’, Mobilization. AnInternationalJournal,17(3),2012,p.489–502.117 We refer of course to Immanuel Kant’s reflections on revolutionary enthusiasm in The Conflict of theFaculties(11thsection).SpecificallyonthesubjectoftheFrenchRevolution,seealsotheactors’declarationsreproducedandanalyzed inMichelVovelle,Lamentalité révolutionnaire,Paris,Messidor/Éditionssociales,1985,andalsothepagesdevotedbyTimothyTacketttothenightofAugust4th,1789,markedby ‘autterlyunanticipatedspiritofenthusiasmandself-sacrifice’,inBecomingaRevolutionary.TheDeputiesoftheFrenchNationalAssemblyandtheEmergenceofaRevolutionaryCulture(1789–1790),Princeton,PrincetonUniversityPress,1996,p.167. 118FrancescaPolletta,‘“ItwasLikeaFever...”.NarrativeandIdentityinSocialProtest’,SocialProblems,45(2),May1998,p.137–159.119Forexample,StephanoSavona’sbeautiful film(Tahrir,2011)and theeyewitnessaccountspublished inHatemRushdy,18daysinTahrir.StoriesfromEgypt’sRevolution,HongKong,HavenBooks,2011.120Inhisbookon‘collectiveabdications’,IvanErmakoffoffersasimilaranalysisofdecision-makingprocessesinthesesituationsofpoliticalfluidity.Hebaseshimselfongametheory,andthusdoesnotlinktogetherthe


25

invention is neither the pure and simple replica of what has been internalized, nor the

suddenandmysteriouseruption,exnihilo,ofinnovation’.121

Admittingthisalsomeansthatrationalchoicetheoriesshouldnotbedismissedso

quickly.Infact,theyshouldbegivencreditforhavingdeterminedthatindividualactionsare

thecombinedresultofrationalchoice(whichdoesnot,nevertheless,explainwhatmotivates

suchchoices)andthehopeofsuccess(whichdoesnotpresupposethe‘reasonable’natureof

said choices).122Startingwith these twopremises,whichwewholeheartedlyaccept, it is

possibletoproceedtoareflectiononthemicro-foundationsofrevolutionaryactionandon

aggregationmechanismsinsituationsofuncertainty.

Those studieswhich adhere to rational choice theoryoutline a certain number of

processesspecifictorevolutionarysituationsthatcanhelpus,inanideal-typicalmanner,to

understandhowactorscalculatetheirmoves.Wereferspecificallytocriticalmasstheory,

which predicts that one’s decision to get involved in an event depends on the expected

participation of a sufficiently large number of people, 123 and is linked to several other

results,124inparticulartopropositionsonthegapbetweenprivateandpublicpreferences

in authoritarian states, a discrepancy which is bolstered by fear of repression.125 As a

consequence, when a revolutionary situation is triggered and individuals feel like their

privatepreferencesregardingaregimechangearesharedbymanyothers,theymay,oncea

cognitive explanationwith his contextual analysis. In particular, he develops the idea that, in high-stakessituationswheretheoutcomeisuncertainuntiltheveryend,theprocessesofalignmentamongparticipantsconstitute a decisive explanatory factor. See Ivan Ermakoff, Ruling Oneself Out. A Theory of CollectiveAbdications,Durham,DukeUniversityPress,2008(cf.belowforareviewofthisbook,p.923–926).121M.Dobry,Sociologiedescrisespolitiques,op.cit.,p.260.122R.Aya,‘TheThirdMan’,art.cit.,p.148.ThankstotheworkofEvansPritchard,wenowknowthedegreetowhich the rationality of actions is always relative to cognitive frames of reference. See Evans Pritchard,Witchcraft,OraclesandMagicamongtheAzande,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1937.123GerardMarwell, PamelaOliver,TheCriticalMass inCollective Action.AMicro-Social Theory, Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,1993.This theoryargues theexactoppositeof theOlsonianparadoxwithout,nevertheless,invalidatingit,asitonlypertainstosituationsofgreatuncertainty.124 See Mark I. Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995, for a verythoroughcritique.125TimurKuran,Private Truths, Public Lies. The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification, Cambridge,HarvardUniversityPress,1995.


26

certain threshold is crossed,126 very rapidly and in large numbers join the cause: thus

providinganexplanationtothe‘revolutionarybandwagon’phenomenon.127

Numerouspersonalaccountsillustratethisphenomenon.ForA.ElAswany,January

25thwasadaylikeanyother—untilaboutmid-day.Turningonhistelevision,thenovelist

saw thata ‘miracle’hadhappened, thatEgyptianshadmassivelygathered toprotest the

currentregime.128HeimmediatelygotdressedtojointheprotestersonTahrirSquare.Inhis

contributiontothisstudy,Y.ElChazlishowsthatthediscrepancybetweenthesizeofthe

January 25th protests and the intimacy of the usual sit-ins observed by ‘novices’ had a

galvanizingeffect.C.HmednotesthatinSidiBouzid,BenAli’sJanuary13thspeechhadmore

ofamotivatingthandemotivatingeffectonthepopulation,preciselyduetothisfeelingof

anticipation.Likewise,inMorocco,manypeopleralliedtotheenthusiasmdrummedupby

the pioneers of the February 20Movement and the earlier leaders of the ‘Arab Spring’

movement, once preliminary successes were witnessed. On the contrary, however, the

ebbingofthemovementcoincidedwithasortof‘counter-bandwagoneffect’:thefeelingthat

themovementhadlostthefightandthathistorywasslowingdowncontributingtogeneral

demotivation.

Beyondthemechanismsthatitoutlinesinastylizedmanner,however,rationalchoice

theoryisoflittlehelpwhenattemptingtoreconstructhowactorsmakecalculationsinsitu.

Firstofall,rationalchoicetheoryisprimarilyinterestedinpredictingcommitment,based

ontheidentificationofpre-existingpreferences.Forourpurposeshere,allthedepthand

particularityofeventsisnotaccountedforinsuchananalysis.129Ineffect,individualsadjust

their calculations based on cost/benefit analyses which are indexed on highly volatile

circumstances: this is precisely what wemust address. In this vein, T. Tackett offers a

considerably more convincing approach to calculations in revolutionary situations. He

126 Mark Granovetter, Roland Soong, ‘Threshold Models of Diffusion and Collective Behavior’, Journal ofMathematicalSociology,9,1983,p.165–179;ThomasC.Schelling,‘HockeyHelmets,ConcealedWeaponsandDaylightSaving’,JournalofConflictResolution,17(3),1973,p.381–428.127Ontheconceptsof‘bandwagon’,‘assurancegames’and‘de-assurancegames’,seeDennisChong,CollectiveActionand theCivilRightsMovement,Chicago,TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1991, andRasmaKarklins,RogerPetersen, ‘DecisionCalculusofProtestersandRegimes:EasternEurope1989’,TheJournalofPolitics,55(3),August1993,p.588–614.128AlaaElAswany,ChroniquesdelaRévolutionégyptienne,Arles,ActesSud,2011,p.13.129CharlesKurzman, ‘CanUnderstandingUndermineExplanation?TheConfusedExperienceofRevolution’,PhilosophyoftheSocialSciences,34(3),September2004,p.328–351.


27

meticulouslyreconstructsthemeansbywhichmembersofparliamentorgeneralassemblies

graduallybecomerevolutionaries.Thisinvolvedstudyingthetransformationoftheirvalues

andmodesofthinkinginallaspectsoftheirlives,fromtheoreticalideastofinancialworries,

oftenexpressedintheirpersonalcorrespondence.130Y.ElChazlihassimilarlyshownhow

TahrirSquarewitnessedthegradualbirthofarevolutionarypsychologyandculture.

Secondly, the anthropological foundations of rational choice theory often

circumscribe it within the confines of cognitivism, even when attempts are made to

‘contextualize’ the explanatorymodels.We are therefore still very far fromobtaining an

adequateaccountofactors’socio-culturalanchors,beitconcerningthenatureandstrength

ofpre-existingties,oftheopportunitiesandobligationsthatthelatterengender,oroftheir

spatialanchoringincost/benefitmatrices.131Furthermore,andhereweareinlinewiththe

first line of critique, a very large number of historians have demonstrated how the

momentumofriotsorrebellionsalsosignificantlycontributestotheredefiningofsocialties

and forms of inter-individual attachment, thus making it futile to try to reconstruct

cost/benefitstructuresbymeansofstatic,one-dimensionalmodels.132

By seeking to describe as accurately as possible the practical dilemmas faced by

actorsateverymomentintimeandbyattemptingtoreconstructtheirmotivationsbyclosely

followingindividualactionsandthoughts,wecanhopetoreplacethemissing‘thirdman’133

atthecenterofeveryexplanationwithanactorwhoactsfor‘goodreasons’(whetherthese

seemrationalornotintheeyesoftheresearcherandtheworld,andeveniftheyareonly

looselylinkedwith,ifnotdownrightcontraryto,thecausestheyserve).

130T. Tackett,Becoming aRevolutionary, op. cit.; in a completely different context, see also ChristopherR.Browning,OrdinaryMen.ReservePoliceBattalion101andtheFinalSolutioninPoland,NewYork,HarperCollins,1992. 131Roger V. Gould, Insurgent Identities. Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune,Chicago, The University of ChicagoPress, 1995; Karl Dieter Opp, Peter Voss, Christiane Gern,Origins of aSpontaneous Revolution, Ann Arbor,Michigan University Press, 1995; Steven Pfaff, ‘Collective Identity andInformalGroupsinRevolutionaryMobilization.EastGermanyin1989’,SocialForces,75(1),1996,p.91–118.132Forexample,WilliamM.Reddy,‘TheTextileTradeandtheLanguageoftheCrowdatRouen,1752–1871’,PastandPresent,74(1),1977,p.62–89,herep.82–83;CynthiaA.Bouton,TheFlourWar.Gender,Class,andCommunityinLateAncienRégimeFrenchSociety,Philadelphia,PennStatePress,1993,chap.5.133R.Aya,‘TheThirdMan’,art.cit.


28

Revolutionaryperformances

Undertheguiseofunpredictabilityandcollectiveeffervescence,eventsparadoxically

fall within prescribed norms and are fostered by modes of action drawn from select

repertoires,whichweshallattempttodescribeasthoroughlyaspossible.Thisisnottodeny

the potentially transformative nature of certain characteristic elements of revolutionary

situations.Quitetheopposite:itseemstousthatwecanbestunderstandtherulesgoverning

the plasticity of structureswhenwe recognize their ‘sensitivity tomobilizations, actors’

tacticalactivityandtheblowsexchanged’.134Fromourpointofview,althoughrevolutionary

situations do amount to exchanges governed by interactional logic, attention must

nevertheless be paid to the manner in which observable behaviors are historically

established,sincethesocialnormsinvolvedthereinareandhavebeentheobjectofgradual,

multipleandsimultaneousdevelopments.135

Thesecommentscallforacloseobservationofrevolutionaryperformances,which

aresubjecttotwocompetingrationales.Ontheonehand,actors—bothprotestersandthe

forcesoflawandorder—oftenparticipateinstructurallyregulatedinteractionsequences;

theseattesttotheexistenceofasharedunderstandingofthesituation,andthusofexplicit

and implicit rulesof thegame (legal frameworks, socialmores)bolsteredby localpolice

cultureandprotesthistory,withalltheirattendanttacticsandpredictablemoves.136Onthe

otherhand,themultiplicityofactorspresentandthecomplexityofthefightsformeaning

thatoccurduringinteractionsandinterpretationsintroducelargemarginsofuncertainty.In

otherwords, only a blow-by-blow contextualized analysis of a situation can allow us to

understandhowprotestdramaturgycanactivateandorientarevolutionarysituation—so

134 Michel Dobry. ‘Le politique dans ses états critiques. Retour sur quelques aspects de l’hypothèse decontinuité’, inMarcBessin, ClaireBidart,Michel Grossetti (ed.),Bifurcations. Les sciences sociales face auxrupturesetàl’événement,Paris,LaDécouverte,2010,p.64–88,herep.79–80.Ontherelationshipsbetweenstructuresandevents,seealsoMarshallSahlins,How‘Natives’Think.AboutCaptainCook,forExample,Chicago,The University of Chicago Press, 1995; William H. Sewell Jr., Logics in History. Social Theory and SocialTransformation, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2005. More recently, see Stéphane Latté, ‘La force del’“événement”est-elleunartefact?’,Revuefrançaisedesciencepolitique,62(3),June2012,p.409–432.135ErvingGoffman,Behavior in Public Places,Glencoe, Free Press, 1963, p. 12; C.McPhail,TheMyth of theMaddingCrowd,op.cit.,p.158–184;NicolasMariot,‘DoesAcclamationEqualAgreement?RethinkingCollectiveEffervescenceThroughtheCaseofthePresidential“TourdeFrance”duringthe20thCentury’,Theory&Society,40(2),March2010,p.191–221;OlivierFillieule,DanielleTartakowsky,Demonstrations,Winnipeg,FernwoodPublishing,2013.136O.Fillieule,Stratégiesdelarue,op.cit.


29

longaswetakeintoaccounttheactionsofdemonstrators,theauthoritiesbeingchallenged

andtheforcesoforder.

SpecialistsinNorthernAfricanandMiddleEasternsocialmovementshaveremarked

howtheobservablebehaviorsofdemonstrationsarehistoricallyestablishedandhowthe

social norms displayed therein are borrowed from the knowledge of previous struggles,

either directly reused by activists or indirectly transmitted to younger generations. 137

WhetherinTunisia,Egypt,MoroccoorYemen,theturnbeingtakenbyprotestmovements

mustbelinkedtopreviousdemonstrations:actionssupporting‘Arabic’or‘Islamic’causes;

unprecedentedprotests inRedeyef andGafsa in2008and inBenGuerdane in2010; the

growingwaveoflaborstrikesinEgypt,startingin2004;protestsagainstthehighcostof

living,suchasthoseoccurringinMoroccountil2009;andthedevelopmentofgroupswhich

transcend ideological cleavages (such as Kifaya, the April 6th group and the National

Association for Change in Egypt, as well as various human rights organizations across

different countries). These protests have allowed for the partial overlap between actors

belongingtocompetingsocio-politicalnetworks(seetheinsightscontributedbyM.Bennani-

ChraïbiandM.Jeghllaly,C.HmedandY.ElChazli).Theyhavelikewiseencouragedmillions

ofpeopletolearnhowtoengageincollectivemobilization;inaddition,suchprotestsalso

allow hardened activists to learn from their previous mistakes, to innovate in order to

surprise the forces of law and order (see. C. Hmed; Y. El Chazli;M. Bennani-Chraïbi,M.

Jeghllaly). In addition, we should not overlook the know-how acquired or the informal

networksconstructedbythe footballclubs’Ultras,ormoregenerally, throughoutsitesof

urbandissidence(seeA.Allal).138Finally,wemusttakeintoaccounteverythingthatcanbe

gleanedandadaptedfromonemovementtoanother—includingtransnationally—forboth

protestorsandsecurityforces.

Butactors’behaviorsdonot,however, solely stem from learnt forms— theyalso

depend on situational logic,marked by a profusion of criticalmoments.We can see this

137MouniaBennani-Chraïbi,OlivierFillieule(ed.),Résistancesetprotestationsdanslemondemusulman,Paris,PressesdeSciencesPo,2003;JoelBeinin,FrédéricVairel(eds),SocialMovements,MobilizationandContestationintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,Stanford,StanfordUniversityPress,2011.Thesamegoesfortheforcesoflawandorder,whichhavealsoacquiredknow-howfrompastconflicts.138AshrafEl-Sherif,‘TheUltras’PoliticsofFunConfrontTyranny’,Jadaliyya,February2012,<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4243/the-ultras-politics-of-fun-confront-tyranny>.


30

clearly in the ambivalent effects of repression, which can radicalize opponents by

establishingbinarystructures139thatacceleratethecrumblingofauthoritarianlegitimacy;

thismayconsequentlydriveparticipantstogofarbeyondtheirinitialgoals(seeA.Allaland

C. Hmed), even though for the authorities in power, indiscriminate violence and savage

repressionsoughttoreducethestrengthandnumberofprotests.

This phenomenon was especially evident throughout a whole series of cathartic

eventsthatactedas‘turningpoints’(likeEgypt’s‘FridayofAnger’,onJanuary28th,2011,see

Y.ElChazli),markedbythedisappearanceofsecurityforces,theambiguousroleofthearmy

andtheestablishmentofneighborhoodself-defensecommittees.140InYemen,onMarch18th,

2011,the‘FridayofDignity’sawsecurityforcesintervenetooustprotestorsfromTaghyir

Squareandmorethanfiftyindividualswereassassinatedbyisolatedgunmen,thusspurring

on themovement and speeding up the rate of defections. InManama, although the first

protests on January 14th in 2011 only numbered a few hundred, the repression they

provokedplayedasignificantpartinincitingrevolt.Theinstallationofanencampmentat

thePearlRoundaboutanditssubsequentrepressiontransformedthenatureoftheprotest

injusttwodays.Firstofall,demandsbecameincreasinglyradical,movingfromrequestsfor

reformtocalls foraregimechange.Secondly,havingpreviouslybeenconfinedtohuman

rightsactivists, theprotestmovementspreadto students, engineers,professors, lawyers,

and evenmembers of the opposition: trade union activists, Shiite religious leaders. This

demonstratedthatthespiritofrebellionhadpermeatedthroughoutmanydifferentsocial

classesandenvironments.Thishandfulofexamplesillustratestheself-propellingdynamics

of transformativeevents.Theverystrengthofevents leadsparticipants togo farbeyond

whattheyhadinitiallyenvisioned,letalonedreamtof(A.Allal,C.Hmed,Y.ElChazli).And

although the protestors of Sidi Bouzid, Tunis’s Kasbah, Tahrir Square and Deraa are

remarkablyawareof thehistoricalsignificanceof theiractions, theyarenonethelessstill

unableofexplaining it, as thesituation’s logicsurpassestheir individualcalculationsand

expectations.

139C.Alexander,PerformativeRevolutioninEgypt,op.cit.,p.3.140J.Gelvin,TheArabUprisings,op.cit.,p.46;H.Rushdy,18daysinTahrir,op.cit.


31

Givenacertain limitedsetofcircumstances, thechoiceofone formofactionover

anotherstems fromboth tactical and strategic concerns, and fromanattemptat framing

undertaken by protestors in order to givemeaning to theirmovement. During the Arab

uprisings, heterogeneous modes of action have been observed: general strikes, mass

protests,political funerals,manifestations,riotsandevenguerrillaactions.Thisvariety is

tiedtotheactors’politicization,theirpre-existingnetworks,theplacestheyinhabitandthe

timing they chose for protest movements. The Tunisian examples in this volume

demonstratethisclearly.The‘débrouillard’(orstreet-smart)youthscoordinatethanksto

neighborly, friendlyor familial relations; they tend to engage (usually at night) in urban

guerrillaactionsagainstthepoliceonthestreetsoftheirneighborhoods.Unionleadersand

membersofthepoliticalopposition,ontheotherhand,mobilizethroughtheirpre-existing

activistnetworksandorganize(daytime)eventsinspiredbythelessonsofthepast:general

strikes,sit-ins,solidaritycaravansandprotestsalongmajorcitystreets.Nevertheless,this

varietydoesnotpreventsomeamountofoverlapfromoccurring.

For example, in the case of the Tunisian, Egyptian, Bahraini, Libyan and Yemeni

uprisings,alloftheeventsconvergedaroundthephysicalpresenceofencampments.This

allowsusto interpret thismodeofactionasaneffectivemeans for thespreadofprotest

movements. 141 Tahrir Square in Cairo is the most evocative illustration of this

phenomenon:142the ‘EgyptianRevolution’symbolically tookshapethereand its fatenow

seemscompletelyintertwinedwiththesquare’slife.143Thisphenomenon—andthesame

sentiment — could also be observed in Tunis’ Kasbah, Sanaa’s Taghyeer Square and

Manama’sPearlRoundabout,butalsoinBenghazi’sAl-ShajaraSquare,inTripoli’sMartyrs’

Square,etc.144Innon-democraticcontextswhereparticipatinginastreetdemonstrationcan

141SeetheconclusiontoOlivierFillieuleandDanielleTartakowsky’sDemonstrations,op.cit.142This formofaction is soprevalentandwidespread that ishasoftencausedother formsof revolt tobeoverlooked,bothintheeyesofoutsidecommentatorsaswellasofparticipants.Itisjustaslikelythatattentionwasveryquicklyconcentratedoncapitalcities,neglectingthecontributionofothercitiestothemomentumofprotests.143Intheeyewitnessaccountscollectedin18daysinTahrir,thepersonsinterviewedwerefirmlyconvincedthateverythingwasstakedonTahrirSquare,andthatnowhereelseinEgypthadmuchimportance.144ThisformofactionwasnotinventedinTunis’KasbahoronTahrirSquareandthusmeritsanexplanation.ThefirstexamplethatcomestomindisthatofTiananmenSquarein1989,butwecanalsorecallmorerecentmovementslikeLosIndignadosandOccupyinEurope,theUSandIsrael.Moreover,thesespacesdidnotbecomeepicentersofrebellionovernight:likeCairo’sTahrirSquareorCasablanca’sMohammedVSquare(LahmamPlaza),theyhadveryoftenbeenconstruedassymbolicsitesofactivismwellbefore2011.


32

beveryriskyforoneselfandone’slovedones,occupyingapublicspaceisagesturethatis

bothsymbolicallydisruptiveandparticularlyadaptedtothelimitsimposedbyarepressive

regime(seeinparticularthecasesofEgyptandYemen).Firstofall,encampmentsallowfor

theestablishmentof ‘liberated’spacesthathelptoovercomefearandanchortheprotest

overtime(somewhatliketheoldertechniqueofthebarricade).145Encampmentsarealsoa

way to construct aunified image for themovement, supportedbyamass—and largely

peaceful—uprisingofallsectionsofsocietyagainstanillegitimateregime.146Finally,asY.

El Chazli, L. Bonnefoy and M. Poirier have shown in this volume, encampments are a

powerfultooltostokerevolutionaryenthusiasm,particularlybystrengtheningan‘espritde

corps’insmallgroups.147Twoelementsarecrucialhere.

First of all, due to its longer timeframe and the nature of the relationships it

establishes, camping out in a protest site is likely to have a greater effect than sporadic

participationinstreetdemonstrations,nomatterhowviolentorengagedthesemaybe.This

isattestedtobyanumberofdifferentelements,includingfirstandforemostFacebookposts

andTwitter feedsupdated intheheatof themoment.Exceptingwhateverobstaclesmay

prevent us from collecting such testimonials and analyzing them, thesemessages are an

exceptionalopportunitytorecreatethehour-by-hourdevelopmentofparticipants’spirits,

perceptions,anddecisions:inotherwords,‘theemergenceofasituationalnorm’.148

On the other hand, the intensifying of interpersonal connections, contradictory

debatesanddiscussionsaswellasthe‘liberationofpoliticalspeech’149echotheobservations

notedbyhistoriansoftheFrenchRevolutionwhenanalyzingthatrevolutionarymindset.150

IntheKasbahandonTahrirSquare,justlikeinthePalaisRoyalin1790sParis,individuals

canbecomeimpromptuorators,rantingatpassers-by,androundtablediscussions(halaqat

145Onthenatureandthemeaningofthebarricade,seeAlainCorbin,Jean-MarieMayeur(ed.),LaBarricade,Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1997;Mark Traugott,The Insurgent Barricade, Berkeley, University ofCaliforniaPress,2010.Foranoverview,seeMichelOfferlé,‘Thebarricade’,inDavidA.Snow,DonatellaDellaPorta, Bert Klandermans, Doug McAdam (eds), The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and PoliticalMovements,Oxford,JohnWiley,forthcoming2013.146Here,whatJ.Jaspercalls‘thepowerofnegativethinking’isfullyengaged(TheArtofMoralProtest,Chicago,TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1997,p.362). 147O.Fillieule,‘TheIndependentPsychologicalEffects’,art.cit.148RalphH.Turner,LewisM.Killian,CollectiveBehavior,EnglewoodCliff,PrenticeHall,1957. 149C.Kurzman,TheUnthinkableRevolutioninIran,op.cit.150M.Vovelle,Lamentalitérévolutionnaire,op.cit.


33

niqashiyya)areimprovisedbasedonpre-existingnetworks,towhichsmallgroupsmaythen

adhere. Saturatedwithpoliticalsymbols— flags, signs, graffiti— this is alsoa space for

singing and dancing, for sharing food and having fun (Y. El Chazli).151The occupation of

popular sites and the protests that rhythm their daily existence allow demonstrators to

‘witnessorparticipateinthebirthofnewpractices,ofnewgoalsandofanewconceptual

framework,whichrevealamoreorlessradicaltransformationofhabitsandcustomsand

thuscontributetothecreationofanewidentity’.152Initiationtogroupknow-howtakesplace

in a few different ways. Organizers from the lower-middle class may transmit their

experiencesto‘novices’; likewise, ‘upper-middleclassmembersmaychoosetoslumit,to

openupinawholenewwaytourbanyouthculture,thelatterteachingthemhowtoprotect

themselves and how to procure rare items’. 153 These observations underscore the

importanceofthespatialdimensionwhenanalyzingsocialmovements;asbotharesource

and one of the elements at stake, 154 space can potentially provoke sociability and

politicization(seeC.HmedandA.Allal).155

*

* *

Inthisessay,wehaveputforthanapproachwhichrefutesallcausalityandfocuses

on revolutionary situations, instead of searching for decisive factors and instigating

elements,orreflectingupontheconsequencesandoutcomesofthesesituations.Thisisnot

tosuggestthatidentifyingcontextualfactorstounderstandthedynamicsofemergenceis

151See also Iman Farag, ‘Enmarge de la révolution égyptienne : écrire l’histoire ou sauver lamémoire?’,Mouvements,66,2011,p.42–47;ImanMersal,‘RevolutionaryHumor’,Globalizations,8(5),2011,p.669–674;LilaAbu-Lughod,‘Livingthe“Revolution”inanEgyptianVillage.MoralActioninaNationalSpace’,andReemSaad,‘TheEgyptianRevolution.ATriumphofPoetry’,AmericanEthnologist,39(1),2012,p.21–25andp.63–66.152AnnieJourdan,LaRévolution,uneexceptionfrançaise?,Paris,Flammarion,2004,p.142.153AccountgivenbythepoliticalscientistDinaEl-Khawagaandcollectedbytheauthors. 154Forexample,ChoukriHmed, ‘Espacegéographiqueetmouvementssociaux’,inO.Fillieule,L.Mathieu,C.Péchu(ed.),Dictionnairedesmouvementssociaux,op.cit.,p.220–227.155AsefBayat,StreetPolitics.PoorPeople’sMovementsinIran,NewYork,CambridgeUniversityPress,1997.


34

superfluous,156northatconsideringtheoutcomesofrevolutionarysituationsispointless.157

However,thelion’sshareofresearchhashithertobeenfocusedonthesetwoaspects,and

hasthusneglectedthestudyofrevolutionarysituationsthemselves.Thesummaryliterature

reviewwehaveprovidedabovehasconfirmedthatthisisnotmerelyaviewofourmind.

This sea change has been accompanied by another, equally important shift in

scholarlyresearch.Studiesonrevolutionarysituations,ormorebroadlyoncrisissituations,

firstandforemostattempttoexamineanddefinetheresultingpropertiesofthesesituations.

Desectorization,thecreationofinter-classcoalitions,internaldivisionsordefectionswithin

thecentralbodiesofthestateand‘calculationevaporation’areallresultsoftheopeningup

ofarevolutionarysituation.Wethereforeproposeexaminingthesequencesofactions—

defined as series of complex but observable interactions—which lead (or not) to these

results.Twodifferentavenuesarepossiblehere.Onemayreconstructthevariousstepsof

theconflictbetweenalltheparticipantsinagivenrevolutionarysituation,inordertoisolate

themostimportantelementsandoutlinetheirmomentum.Thisistheapproachadoptedby

thepaperswewillreadfurtheron.158Ontheotherhand,onemayalsoidentifyaseriesof

relationalandcognitiveprocessesofgeneralscopeoperatingwithintheperformancesthat

leadtorevolutionarysituations(thiswithoutconsideringtheirsuccessorfailure).Indoing

so,themodesoftransformationfromonestatetoanotherwhicharetypicalofrevolutionary

situationsmaybegleaned.Aswehavenotedabove,suchanobjectiveisnotfarfromthat

which drives mechanistic approaches. Nevertheless, it differs due to its methodological

determinism and its subsequent rejection of causality, both in terms of the scales of

observation used and its focus on themicro-foundations of action. Hence our emphasis

156Foracriticalanalysisoftheissueofemergence,andofthecombinationofimportantexternalandinternalfactorsatthesametimeasmicro-events,seeStéphaneCadiou,StéphanieDechezelles,‘Laproblématiquedel’émergence pour l’étude des mobilisations collectives : pistes et repères’, in Stéphane Cadiou, StéphanieDechezelles,AntoineRoger(ed.),Passeràl’action:lesmobilisationsémergentes,Paris,L'Harmattan,2007,p.11–48.157Studiesontheoutcomesofprotestmovementsareindeedfascinating,whethertheyareconductedatthelevelofheavymacro-levelsocialvariables(forexample,culturalchanges),theorientationofpublicpolicy,oreventhebiographicalconsequencesofinvolvement.Forareviewoftheexistingliteratureonthissubject,see,DidierChabanet,MarcoGiugni,‘Lesconséquencesdesmouvementsociaux’,inO.Fillieule,É.Agrikoliansky,I.Sommier(ed.),Penserlesmouvementssociaux,op.cit.,p.145–162.158Thisisalsotheapproachadoptedbytheauthorsofaforthcomingvolumewhich,likethistext,willcollectvarious works stemming from eyewitness observations on the ground: Amin Allal, Thomas Pierret (ed.),Devenirrévolutionnaires.Aucœurdesrévoltesarabes,Paris,ArmandColin,forthcoming2013.


35

aboveonactorsandtheirdecision-makingprocessesinsitu,aswellasconflictsandtheir

potential saliency. The following chart shows the breakdown of the aforementioned

elements,dividedintotwocategories.

First of all, we choose to distinguish between conducive elements, processes and

revolutionary situations. This diachronic distinction between three different classes of

elements is naturally porous and requires a case-by-case evaluation. Firstly, because the

processesthatleadtorevolutionarysituationscancontinuetooperatethereinasthelatter

develop; and secondly, because the distinction between starting conditions and the

componentsofchangebetweenstatesaredifficulttopindown.Thisisaclassicproblemfor

neuroscientistsandbiologists,bothofwhomultimatelymakedecisionsbasedonpragmatic

considerations.159 To stick to an example, what is important here is to separate, at the

environmentallevel,themoreorlessexclusiveandinterventionistcharacterofthestate160

orthepredominantformsofsocialsegmentation161.Thoseelementscontributetoframe,at

themicroandmesolevels,theincidence,theformandscopeofprocessesofemulationand

attribution of similarity. Hence generating, among other results, modularity, or the

heightenedtransferabilityofmodesofactionandrecognizableframeworksacrossspaceand

time,orthespreadofproteststoasignificantportionofthepopulation.Secondly,asimilarly

difficult distinction must also be made between the three scales of analysis used. For

example,theprocessoftheattributionofsimilarity(thestrategicidentificationofpotential

imitators with original instigators) observable at the relational level is linked, at the

cognitivelevel,toemulation(i.e.,hopeforsuccess).However,thisdistinctionseemsuseful

forthepurposeofisolatingdifferentlevelsofobservationoftheseprocesses,someofwhich

cannotbeeasilyreducedtocognitiveprocesses(e.g.,brokerage).162

159CarlF.Craver,‘MechanismsandNaturalKinds’,PhilosophicalPsychology,22(5),2009,p.575–594.160M.Parsa,States,Ideologies,op.cit. 161AnthonyOberschall,SocialConflictandSocialMovements,EnglewoodCliffs,PrenticeHall,1973.162TuliaG.Falleti,JuliaLynch,‘FromProcesstoMechanism.VarietiesofDisaggregation’,QualitativeSociology,31(3),2008,p.333–339.


36

SomeModesofTransformationofStatesSpecifictoRevolutionarySituations

ConduciveElements(presentoutsideofthecrisis’temporalframework)

Processes(howconflictdevelopsstep-by-stepbetweenindividualandcollectiveactors)

RevolutionarySituation(dual-powersituation)

ScaleoftheAnalysis

StructuralFormoftheState(+/-interventionist,exclusive)Formoftheclassconflict(+/-polarized)Vertical/horizontalsegmentationTypeofinternationalsupportfortheregimeDe-differentiationShort-termChangeinsupporttotheregimeMilitarydefeatCoupd’état,‘palacecoup’Neighboringrevolutionarysituation,etc.

SpreadofproteststoasignificantportionofthepopulationBlurringofboundariesbetweensocialspacesLargeinter-classcoalitionsModularityofmodesofactionandframing

Macro(environmental)

Collectiveactors’levelofresources(organizational,leadership,ideological,etc.)BrokerageabilityCollectivememoryofpaststruggles

AttributionofsimilarityConstructionofstrategicidentitiesCooptationConcessionsDivisionsTargeted/discriminatoryrepression

Division/defectionswithinthestateorrepressiveapparatusFramesimplificationandunificationofmodesofaction

Meso(relational)

IndividualmemoryofpaststrugglesSocialization/politicizationSocialstatusGrowingconfusionanduncertaintywithregardtoexpectations

ShiftinthebalancebetweenpublicandprivatepreferencesEmulation(evaluationofone’schancesforsuccess)Assurance/de-assurancegamesBandwagoneffectandcounter-effectCriticalmass/freerider

Calculationevaporation Micro(cognitive)

T1...T2...T3...T4...T5...etc.Tx

Sequencesofactionthatcanleadtotheinstaurationofarevolutionarysituation


37

Thelistofelementsaboveistentativeandnon-definitive;itshouldbecompletedby

further research. In addition, the distinction between events and processes should be

refined.Ifprocessesaredefinedasthesuccessionofmovesmadebyindividualandcollective

actors,thentheyarecomposedof,butnotreducibleto,events.Initscurrentstate,thechart

abovedoesnotspecifywhatwemeanbyrepressionasaprocess(thatis,astrategyemployed

withaspecificaimandwhich isbasedonpredictingthemovesofadversariesaswellas

allies)andrepressiveeventsasmovesmadeatagiventime.

Finally, it is clear that processes develop in different ways depending on their

preliminary conditions; it is likewise possible that they are not all equally central to the

emergenceofarevolutionarysituation.Mostimportantly,however,processesacquiretheir

power by combiningwith each other both synchronically anddiachronically—with the

result that aprocess,by itself,explains nothing. Aswe know, the authorsofDynamics of

Contention facedcriticismfor inconsistentlyshiftingbetweentheproductionofhistorical

narrativesandtheidentificationofmechanismsasexplanatoryvariables.163Webelievethat

studying sequences of actions and thus the combination of processes activated and

experienced by the involved parties will allow us to unravel the successive stages that

potentially lead, here and there, to revolutionary situations. In this fashion, we avoid

establishingboththelawsgoverningthedevelopmentofrevolutionarysituationsandthe

uniqueandcircumstantialnarrativeofanyparticularrevolutionarytrajectory.

Forexample,atthebeginningof2011similarprocesseswereatworkinbothEgypt

andMorocco.Andyet,theseprocessesdidnotproducesimilarresults:intheformercase,

they led to a revolutionary situation, while in the latter they opened up ‘reformist’

possibilities.Bothcountrieswitnessedtheattributionofsimilarityandtheconstructionof

strategicidentities,whichtranslatedintothecreationofcoalitionstranscendingpre-existing

cleavages and polarizations. On the other hand, the modalities of crisis management

combined differently. In Egypt’s case, concessions came too late following lengthy and

indiscriminate repression. In Morocco, however, the rapid proposals for reform,

163PamelaOliverdescribesthistensionwellwhensheremarksthat‘ageneralizingstrategyfocusedononeprocess can neverexplain a historical episode, and should not try to. But conversely, a research programfocused on explaining particular historical events cannot yield a general understanding of any process’(‘MechanismsofContention’,Mobilization,8(1),2003,p.119–122,herep.121).SeealsoRuudKoopmans,‘AFailedRevolution–butaWorthyCause’,Mobilization,8(1),2003,p.116–119,herep.117.


38

redistribution capacity building— in part thanks to international aid— and the use of

selectiveandtimelyrepressioncombinedtoresultintheimplementationbyprotestorsof

organizationaltoolsallowingthemto‘controlthestreets’andpreventthekindof‘spillage’

which in Egypt led to instigators being overrun by their followers. In other words, in

Morocco, the protestors’ self-limitation helped to prolong themobilization’smomentum;

unlikeinEgypt,thepointofnoreturnwasneverreached,andthusagradualpathtowards

changeremainedpossible.

Inconclusion,wewould liketobrieflyreturntothequestionofhowbest tostudy

sequencesofaction.Webelievethatitisnecessarytosystematicallyconnectthedescription

ofphenomenawiththemeaningthatactorsattributetotheactionstheytake,whentheytake

them. This is the only manner in which researchers can avoid imputing motivations to

individualsbasedsolelyon theobservationof their acts.AsR.Ayasarcasticallyremarks,

withoutmeaning that actors attribute to the different steps of a process, the analysis of

situationscannotberootedinevidenceorfactsbut‘gratuitousassumption—usuallysome

sociological cliché’. 164 The issue is thus how to record explanatory clues: that is,

‘circumstantialevidenceforhopeofsuccess’.165Webelievethattheauthorscontainedinthis

volumehavecontributedseveralanswersandopenedupatleasttwodifferentavenuesfor

futureresearch.

First of all, in order to avoid imputing wild meanings and making homogenous

classifications,aswellasthegroundlessguessesofpragmaticsociology,wemustattemptto

elaborateaprecisesociographyofparticipantsinalltheirdiversity,byputtingtheiractions

and perceptions back into a personal and familial historical perspective. This involves

focusingonthemainprinciplesofpoliticalsocializationandconnectingtheinvestigationon

personaldispositionstowardsactingwiththewayinwhichactivistexperiencesandevents

transformindividuals.166Inotherwords,accordingtoaperspectivethatisneither‘causal’

164R.Aya, ‘TheThirdMan’,art. cit. J.Bohstedtdirects this samecriticismatE.P.Thompsonregarding theconceptof‘moraleconomy’whichhedeemstobearomanticnotion,eventhoughgreaterattentionpaidtotheriotswouldhaveallowedhimtobetterunderstandtheroleofmoralityanddecorumattheheartofactors’calculations—bothriotersandrepresentativesoflawandorder(JohnBohstedt,‘TheMoralEconomyandtheDisciplineofHistoricalContext’,JournalofSocialHistory,26(2),Winter1992,p.265–284).165R.Aya,‘TheThirdMan’,art.cit.,p.151. 166Olivier Fillieule, ‘Socializationand SocialMovements’, inD. A. Snow,D.DellaPorta,B. Klandermans,D.McAdam(eds),TheWiley-BlackwellEncyclopediaofSocialandPoliticalMovementsOxford,op.cit.


39

nor ‘linear’, one should measure how ‘commitment generates or modifies dispositions

towards acting, thinking and perceiving— including self-perception— in continuity or

breakingwiththepreviousproductsofsocialization’.167Todothis,longitudinalstudiesare

necessary.Wewillofcoursehavetowaitseveralyearsbeforebeingabletoanswerthese

questions,butifwehopetoaddressthembymeansoflongitudinalratherthanretrospective

studies,wemustbegintoday.

Secondly, having recourse to the sociology of revolutionary situations requires

instrumentsandmethodsofobservationthatallowforthestudyofsequencesofactionin

thewholeoftheireventfulness.Fromthisperspective,thevisualmaterialsaccessibleonthe

Internet168,eitherproducedbyresearchersorcollectedinsitu,areprecious,169inparticular

insituationswhereartisticproduction(caricatures,graffiti,photography,videos)playedan

important role in the protests.170Butmost of all, as scholars have increasingly realized,

ethnographicmethods171arewithoutadoubtthebestsuitedtoreconstructthecomplexity

167CatherineLeclercq,JuliePagis,‘Lesincidencesbiographiquesdel’engagement’,Sociétéscontemporaines,84,2011,p.5–23,herep.5.168A plethora of resources areavailable online. Social networks link to awealth of imagesand videos onYouTube,whilecollectivenationalblogsdisseminatetracts,callstoaction,photos,videos,graffiti(forexample,<https://www.facebook.com/GraffitiEgypt/photos>), caricatures, interactivemaps of protest sites, opinionpieces(forexample,Nawaat.orgcreatedinTunisiain2004andMamfakkinch.comlaunchedinMoroccoonFebruary17th,2011, in relation to theFebruary20Movement). In turn,bloggers’networkssuchasGlobalVoices, a foundation created in 2004, select, translate and publish articles in 25 different languages. Thenumber of political analysis blog aggregators is growing (for example, <http://www.arabist.net/>). Theinternationalmediahasalsochosentoputdocumentariesonline.Veryrapidly,individualorgroupinitiativesforarchivingweretaken,bothactivistandacademic(forexample,<http://www.tahrirdocuments.org/>).Anopen letter was even posted on Facebook asking for the network to open up part of its archives(<http://europe-liberte-securite-justice.org/2011/01/27/lettre-ouverte-a-facebook-sidibouzid/>). WithregardtoTunisianevents,theBibliothèquenationaledeFranceandtheBibliothèqueduCongrèscollaboratedwith the American non-profit Internet Archive to archive traditional media sites, information portals,journalists’ and individuals’ blogs, activists’ Facebook pages, etc. In terms of Egypt, these same partnerscollaboratedwithStanfordUniversity,theAmericanUniversityinCairo,theBritishLibraryandtheAlexandriaLibrary.Moreover,asearlyasMarch28th,2011,theCommitteeforDocumentingtheRevolutionwasfoundedbytheEgyptianNationalLibraryandArchives:<http://www.aucegypt.edu/newsatauc/Pages/story.aspx?eid=640;http://blog.bnf.fr/lecteurs/index.php/2012/07/02/la-revolution-du-jasmin-sur-la-toile/;http://www.archive-it.org/public/collection.html?id=2323>).169AlexandreLambelet,‘Analyserlesrassemblementsaumoyendephotographiesoudefilms.Pistesetenjeux’,ethnographiques.org, 21, 2010, <http://www.ethnographiques.org/2010/Lambelet>; Alex Philipps, ‘VisualProtestMaterialasEmpiricalData’,VisualCommunication,11(3),2012,p.3–21.170Amongothers,seeAnahiAlviso-Marino,‘Artetrévolution:engagementdesartistesdanslamobilisationcontestataireauYémen’,forthcoming;CécileBoëx,‘L’engagementdesacteurs,descinéastesetdescomédiensdanslarévolteenSyrie’,inA.Allal,T.Pierret(ed.),Devenirrévolutionnaires,op.cit.171Forexample,SuzanneStaggenborg, ‘SeeingMechanisms inAction’,QualitativeSociology,31(4),2008,p.341–344;O.Fillieule,É.Agrikoliansky,I.Sommier(ed.),Penserlesmouvementssociaux,op.cit.;HélèneCombes


40

of conflicts and calculations at every step of a sequence of action. And yet, the existing

literature on the sociology of revolutions, and more generally on the sociology of

mobilizations,isparticularlysilentinthisdepartment.Itisunfortunatethatthepossibilities

forresearchopenedupbyauthorsasdiverseasD.SnowandL.Anderson,B.Roy,A.Peterson

andofcourseP.LichtermanandJ.Auyero172havenotpromptedawidespreadmovetowards

anethnographicapproachtothesociologyofsocialmovementsandrevolutions,barringa

fewrarebutnotableexceptions.173

Finally, when faced with such an overabundance of sources, it is evident that

dissectingthesequencesofactionthatleadtorevolutionarysituationsisbeyondthecapacity

ofasoleresearcher:thisobjectiveinsteadrequiresthecreationofmultidisciplinaryresearch

teams,endowedwithlinguisticandITskills,174butalsowithadeepunderstandingofthe

historical nature of the areas studied. We hope that the essays which follow will fully

demonstrate this need. From this point of view, we must stress that focusing our

observationsonrevolutionarysituationsdoesnotmeanneglectinganunderstandingofthe

socio-historyofpracticesandthesociologyofactivistcareers.

WhenaskedforhisopinionontheFrenchRevolutionin1789,ZhouEnlaiissaidto

havecleverlyrespondedthatitwastoosoontotell.Asweconcludethisintroductiontothe

currentandon-goingArabuprisingswiththiswiseanecdote,wemust thereforeconcede

thatweareonlynowinthefirststagesofthisjourney.175

etal.,‘Observerlesmobilisations’,Politix,93,2011,p.7–27.172DavidA.Snow,LeonAnderson,DownonTheirLuck.AStudyofHomelessStreetPeople,Berkeley,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1993,onprotestsregardingtheissueofAustin’shomelesspopulation;PaulLichterman,TheSearchforPoliticalCommunity.AmericanActivistsReinventingCommitment,NewYork,CambridgeUniversityPress,1996,oncommunityactivisminCalifornia;AnnaL.Peterson,MartyrdomandthePoliticsofReligion.Progressive Catholicism in El Salvador's Civil War, Albany, SUNY Press, 1997, on progressive CatholicmovementsinElSalvador;JavierAuyero,ContentiousLives.TwoArgentineWomen,TwoProtests,andtheQuestforRecognition,Durham,DukeUniversityPress,2003,onthepoliticizationprocessesoftwoArgentinewomen.173In particular, Elisabeth JeanWood, Insurgent Collective Action and CivilWar in El Salvador, New York,Cambridge University Press, 2003; Ann Mische, Partisan Publics. Communication and Contention AcrossBrazilianYouthActivistNetworks,Princeton,PrincetonUniversityPress,2008.174Forexample,ifsociologistsstudyingmobilizationsandrevolutionshopetoengagewiththevirtualrealm,theywillneedtofacenewtechnicalandmethodologicalproblems,regardingaccesstosourcesandtheabilityofcollectingthem,butalsothedifferentwaysoftreating‘bigdata’.Agroupofresearchersfromthe‘DigitalHumanities’ department of Lausanne University is currently addressing some of these issues(<http://www3.unil.ch/wpmu/digitalera/>). 175Theauthorswould like to thank thefollowingindividuals for their inspiringandproductivecomments:PhilipBalsiger,DinaEl-Khawaga,PierreFavre,ChoukriHmedandthereviewboardoftheRFSP.Thesignaturesofthispaperappearinalphabeticalorder.


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_________MouniaBennani-ChraïbiandOlivierFillieule_______________________________

MouniaBennani-ChraïbiisanassociateprofessorofcomparativepoliticsandthesociologyofmobilizationsinNorthernAfricaandtheMiddleEastattheInstitutd’étudespolitiquesetinternationalesdel’UniversitédeLausanne(InstituteofPoliticalandInternationalStudiesatLausanneUniversity)andamemberofCRAPUL(Centrederecherchesurl’actionpolitiquedel’UniversitédeLausanne-CenterforResearchonPoliticalActionatLausanneUniversity).AlistofherresearchinterestsandpublicationsisavailableontheUNIL’swebsite:http://www.unil.ch/unisciences/MouniaBennani-Chraibi(UniversitédeLausanne,IEPI,Géopolis,1015Lausanne,Switzerland<[email protected]>).AresearchdirectorattheCNRS,OlivierFillieuleisatenuredprofessorofpoliticalsociologyatthel’Institutd’étudespolitiquesetinternationalesdel’UniversitédeLausanneandamemberofCRAPUL(Centrederecherchesurl’actionpolitiquedel’UniversitédeLausanne).Alistofhisresearchinterestsandpublicationsisavailableonhispersonalwebsite:http://people.unil.ch/olivierfillieule/(UniversitédeLausanne,IEPI,Géopolis,1015Lausanne,Switzerland<[email protected]>).

Documents

Towards a sociology of revolutionary situations ...BIB_A59E45712CA5.P001/REF.pdf · that they are living through a revolution and are currently fighting to make it happen, to encourage