The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 8 | Issue 32 | Number 6 | Article ID 3400 | Aug 09, 2010

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Toward Reconciliation: The Nishimatsu Settlements forChinese Forced Labor in World War II　　和解に向けて−−第二次世界大戦中国人強制労働をめぐる西松調停 •Chinese originalavailable

Ivy Lee

Toward Reconci l iat ion: TheNishimatsu Settlements for ChineseForced Labor in World War Two

Ivy Lee with an Introduction by WilliamUnderwood

This is Part Two of a two-part series. Part Onei s a v a i l a b l e h e r e(https://apjjf .org/-Kang-Jian/3399).

A Chinese version of this article is alsoa v a i l a b l e h e r e(http://admin.japanfocus.org/data/Ivy_Lee_Chinese_translation.pdf).

Introduction

As a recently retired sociology professor in theUnited States, Ivy Lee became actively involvedwith global efforts to redress Japanese warcrimes a few years before Kajima Co.'scontroversial settlement in 2000 with Chineseforced laborers from the notorious Hanaokaworksite. Kajima's approach to resolving theHanaoka injustice raised serious doubts aboutits corporate sincerity, but the professionalhonesty and good faith of Japanese lawyerswho provided pro bono representation for theChinese victims were also called into questionby some critics in ways that suggested the needfor careful investigation.

Lee's article below is motivated by a desire toadvance the best interests of the agingsurvivors of forced labor in wartime Japan and

their heirs, and to avoid an unnecessary repeatof such Hanaoka-type acrimony that also pittedvictims who accepted the Kajima money againstvictims who did not. She seeks to clarify thecontent of the pair of compensation pactsNishimatsu Construction Co. concluded in 2009and 2010, and in the process appraises theNishimatsu deals far more positively thanChinese attorney Kang Jian, whose sharpcritique (https://apjjf.org/-Kang-Jian/3399) ofthe set t lements Lee systemat ica l lydeconstructs.

This article also provides insight into themultibillion-dollar fund set up in Germany in2000 to compensate Nazi-era forced laborers,concluding that the path chosen by Nishimatsugenerally resembles the German precedent.Michael Bazyler, an authority on the Holocaustrestitution lawsuits of the 1990s and Germany'sforced labor fund, similarly compared theJapanese and German cases in a 2009 article(http://www.japanfocus.org/-Michael-Bazyler/3030) for The Asia-Pacific Journal. Bazyler alsocontributed to the article below.

Lee suggests the efforts of Japanese lawyerswho have long pursued reparations on behalf ofChinese, and the challenges confronting themwithin Japan, need to be fully appreciated. Infact, the progressive leaders of the Japaneselawyers group that has litigated nearly all theChinese legal claims since 1995 typically cameof age during Japan's student movements of the1960s. A number of key players have passedfrom the scene already, and younger Japanese

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attorneys engaged in the forced labor redressstruggle will be hard pressed to match theirseniors' dedication and ability. Lee calls forgreater awareness of the gap between the idealsettlement that would be attainable in a perfectworld and what can be realistically achieved inJapan today in the wake of the Japan SupremeCourt decision holding that Japan is not legallyliable for compensation to wartime forcedlaborers.

Over the longer term, the broad sweep ofglobal political, economic and social conditionsmay make the righting of historical wrongs, insome manner, nearly unavoidable. On August 6,the U.S. government for the first time sentofficial representatives to the annualcommemoration of the atomic bombing ofHiroshima. This was closely tied to the Obamaadministration's proclaimed objective ofnuclear non-proliferation and eventual nucleardisarmament, and to the extent those goalsremain important, could become a step towarda forthright American apology at some futureA-bomb memorial service.

Likewise amid the steady integration of theeconomies of Northeast Asia and shifting powerdynamics across the region, Japan may find itseconomic and political plans more and moredependent on forthrightly addressing thelegacy of World War Two. The soonercomprehensive action is taken on ripe issues(http://www.japanfocus.org/-William-Underwood/3387) such as Chinese forced labor redress,the greater is the likelihood that authenticreconciliation will result. -William Underwood

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During the Asia-Pacific War, roughly 40,000Chinese were abducted to perform hard laborat 135 sites in Japan under a 1942 Decreeissued by the wartime Japanese Cabinet. Thepostwar Japanese government has remainedobdurately mute regarding its responsibility forChinese forced labor to date. Of the 35Japanese companies that used Chinese forced

labor, about two dozen are still in operation. These companies also uniformly sought toevade their responsibility for over five decadesunti l 2000 when Kaj ima Corp. , at theexhortation of a Japanese judge, secured asettlement with the Chinese forced laborers atits Hanaoka site.

Almost a decade elapsed before anotherJapanese company, Nishimatsu ConstructionCo., Ltd., voluntarily agreed to compensateChinese forced laborers at its two wartimeworksites in Japan: Yasuno and Shinanogawa. The 2009 Yasuno agreement set up acompensation trust fund of 250 million yen (at93 yen = 1 USD, approximately $2.69 million)for 360 Chinese forced laborers; the 2010Shinanogawa settlement contributed 128million yen (approximately $1.38 million) toanother trust fund for 183 Chinese forcedlaborers. The forward momentum generatedby the two recent Nishimatsu agreementswould seem sufficient to propel the issue ofChinese forced labor toward a comprehensiveresolution. Yet criticisms abound of thesesettlements both within and outside of China. The redress movement is splintered at thispoint into two camps, creating a deeply divisiveatmosphere within the Chinese forced laborcommunity. This paper examines the opposingresponses to the recent 2010 Shinanogawasettlement and evaluates their contrastingapproaches to settlements as an instrument forredressing historical injustice. It suggests thata comprehensive resolution of the forced laborissue may best be obtained in the politicalarena and that the redress movement may wellbe advised to target the Japanese governmentas it bears prime responsibility for the use ofChinese forced labor.

Confusion and Conflict in the ChineseForced Labor Community

On April 26, 2010, Nishimatsu reached asettlement with the Chinese forced laborers(CFLs) who were abducted to perform hard

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labor under inhumane conditions at theShinanogawa site from June of 1944 to Januaryof 1945. As with the Nishimatsu Yasunoagreement in October 2009, the Shinanogawasettlement did not put to rest criticisms byredress activists in Canada, the U.S., and China(hereafter referred to as "activists"), nor did itbring about the closure Japanese attorneys andsupporters of the CFLs (hereafter referred to as"supporters") had hoped for. Instead, newcharges are now being leveled directly atNishimatsu and indirectly at the supporters.

At first glance, the Shinanogawa settlement iseven more controversial than the Yasunoagreement. Kang Jian, the only Chinese lawyerin the team of Japanese attorneys who firstfiled suit against Nishimatsu in Japan in 1997,charged the company with going around thefive original plaintiffs when negotiation was atan impasse to persuade other CFLs and theirdescendants, who were not involved in theprotracted litigation, to settle instead. Sheargued that CFLs are once again beingabducted as they were during the Asia-PacificWar.[1] On April 27, 2010, the day after thesettlement, Kang held a press conference inBeijing in which some survivors accusedNishimatsu of an abduction-style settlementthat was rejected by all the original plaintiffs.[2] A number of websites in China featured similarheadlines.[3]

Relatives of wartime Chinese workers walktoward the Tokyo Summary Court, where

the second Nishimatsu settlement wasfinalized on April 26, 2010. In a messageaimed mainly at Japanese lawmakers, theirbanner urges a comprehensive solution tothe Chinese forced labor redress issue.( X i n h u a(http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/photo/2010-04/27/c_13268522.htm) / JiChunpeng photo)

Han Yinlin, aged 93, the only surviving CFL ofthe five original plaintiffs, told his two sons thatthe Shinanogawa settlement was somethingwith which "to coax children only."[4] As he wastoo frail to travel, his sons hurried to Beijing toexpress their opposition to the settlement inthe April 27 press conference. Descendantsand relatives of other CFLs also attended. Holding photographs of the deceased lovedones, they insisted that money could not salvethe wounds of yesteryear's atrocities. Theyechoed what attorney Kang and other criticshave said of the settlement, namely, that itcontains an apology without substance andcompensation colored by charity. For a smallsum, Nishimatsu has bought off some CFLs'right to claim, Kang declared [5]; by not settlingon these terms, however, other CFLs retaintheir right to sue, she insisted.[6] To buttressKang's words and the original plaintiffs'determination, activists announced at the sametime that a fund has been set up to support theoriginal and other plaintiffs who refused tosettle and help maintain their dignity in theircontinuing fight to claim compensation againstNishimatsu.[7]

On the same day as the Bei j ing pressconference, Fukushima Mizuho, Chair of theSocial Democratic Party of Japan and thenMinister for Consumer and Food Safety,received the descendants and representativesof the CFLs who accepted the settlement in theSenate Hall in Tokyo. She congratulated themon triumphing after years of legal struggle,vowing she would do all she could to push formore settlements of the Chinese forced labor

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cases.[8] Back in China, Lu Tangsuo, a CFL whorejected Kajima Corp.'s Hanaoka settlement in2000, observed that most of the Shinanogawasurvivors chose settlement primarily becauseNishimatsu voluntarily proposed to issue anunambiguous apology on paper. "That's whatChinese demand and live for!" Lu said.[9] Yeteven those who accepted the currentsettlement could hardly resign themselves tothe fact that signing on a piece of paper meantcompletely absolving Nishimatsu of its legalresponsibility for their enslavement.[10]

The same controversy plagues Nishimatsu's2009 settlement with CFLs from its Yasunoworksite. Tempers flared at a December 2009gathering in which disbursement of individualmoney orders in the amount of 45,366 RMB (at6.8 RMB = 1 USD, equivalent to $6,671) with acopy of the Yasuno settlement was made to thefirst group of actual survivors and widows ofthe deceased. Li Liangjie, a CFL abducted toperform hard labor for Mitsui, loudly accusedthose who settled as "traitors" who acceptedbecause of the money.[11] Shao Yicheng, thelead plaintiff of the Yasuno litigation, angrilyretorted, "(Since) you are a hero, why don't yougo and do something (for the Chinese forcedlabor redress issue)?"[12]

The roots of this conflict can be traced back tothe very first settlement in 2000 betweenKajima and the CFLs at its notorious Hanaokaworksite. The lead plaintiff, Geng Chun, signedoff initially on the settlement agreement butlater reversed his stance to become a staunchopponent. Activists also organized a fund in2004 to dispense to CFLs who refused to settlemonetary support equivalent to what theywould have received from Kajima.[13]

Thus the CFL community, once united in itsquest for justice, is now splintered into twogroups: those who accepted or approved of andthose who rejected or disapproved of thesettlements, with little chance of reconcilingtheir positions in the foreseeable future. Yet

the Nishimatsu settlements in general, and thelatest one in particular, seemingly satisfy thethree non-negotiable demands of the Chineseforced labor redress movement : 1 )Acknowledging atrocities to extend an apologyfor crimes committed; 2) Erecting a memorialto memorialize the victims and to educate thepublic; and 3) Compensating the victims.[14] What then causes these bitter recriminationsamong the former Chinese forced laborers?

The Long and Tor tuous Road t oReparations

When litigation was first initiated in the 1990sagainst the Japanese state and corporationsthat used Chinese forced labor, the focus wason the victims and their vindication in Japanesecourtrooms. As the prospect of a final courtvictory receded over the years, and when out-of-court settlement remains seemingly the onlyoption, the unity between the activists and thesupporters fractured. While CFLs are atloggerheads, their harsh words merely reflectthe divisions within and outside of China andamong Chinese activists and supporters. Aslaborers who survived under unspeakableJapanese atrocities, dispersed to toil again inpostwar China, CFLs probably know little oflegal subtleties and ramifications, mostlyviewing the settlement terms through the lensof those who are more knowledgeable in thelaw, more persuasive, or better able to exertmore pressure on them.

Supporters consisting of Japanese and Chineseresiding in Japan were the first to organizetrips to China in the mid-1980s and early 1990sto locate CFL survivors. They approachedJapanese attorneys who worked pro bono to filevarious forced labor lawsuits in Japanesecourts. After years of legal battle, the JapanSupreme Court finally ruled on April 27, 2007,that the right of individual Chinese victims tofile legal claims in Japan was extinguishedunder the 1972 Sino- Japanese Jo intCommunique. Accordingly, the supporters

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concluded that non-litigation settlements maybe the most realistic and attainable alternativeat this point. [ 1 5 ] In standing behind thesettlements, these supporters hope to see thefew remaining elderly victims derive somesolace from settling within their lifetime. Realizing time is not on the CFLs' side,supporters would accept settlement terms thatmay be less than perfect, then try to negotiatefor better terms in a future settlement.

Japanese attorney Uchida Masatoshi, a memberof the legal team responsible for both the 2009Yasuno and the 2000 Hanaoka negotiations,said as much when he pointed out that withoutthe first Hanaoka settlement, there would notbe the "more perfect" Yasuno settlement.[16]

Statements from various CFLs illustrate thatsupporters correctly assess the sentiments ofmost survivors in this respect. For example,Shao Yicheng, the lead plaintiff of the Yasunocase, said, "My heart is at ease now that I canlive until I am compensated."[17] On the day herhusband flew to Japan as a representative ofCFLs who accepted the Shinanogawasettlement, Yang Xi'en's daughter-in-law toldreporters, eyes brimming with tears, "Now myfather-in-law and fellow Chinese forcedlaborers can rest in peace ... "[18]

The first disbursement of compensationfrom Nishimatsu to workers from theYasuno site took place in December 2009.Shao Yicheng, lead plaintiff in the Yasuno

litigation in Japan, is shown holding hism o n e y o r d e r a t l e f t . ( N D D a i l y(http://gcontent.oeeee.com/3/40/340a39045c40d50d/Blog/6d7/ca5653.html) photo)

A second group of later arrivals to the CFLredress fight, mostly ethnic Chinese activists inthe U.S. and Canada, as well as attorney Kangand others in China, have also workedceaselessly on different unresolved legacies ofthe Japanese invasion since the mid-1990s. They are not against settlements per se butwould rather fight on until they secure one inwhich the defendant company acknowledgeslegal responsibility and pays out an adequateamount of compensation which would notcompromise the dignity of CFLs who settle. Asa model for Chinese forced labor settlements,they look to Germany's solution embodied inthe Remembrance, Responsibility and theFuture Foundation. They also point to theUS$20,000 the American government, in itslandmark 1988 legislation, awarded eachJapanese American internee for internmentduring WWII. This camp has subtly hinted thatthe CFLs might have been misled by theirJapanese attorneys, tapping into a pervasivemistrust, understandable in light of the Sino-Japanese war. Kang wrote in 2009:

The case of Chinese laborers enslaved at theYasuno worksite was represented exclusivelyby lawyers and a support group in Japan, withno participation from Chinese lawyers. Whilewe should trust the integrity and sincerity ofthese Japanese lawyers and supporters inhelping the Chinese victims, can we expect thevictims to fully and accurately understand theterms of the settlement and their implications,given the fact they were represented bylawyers who were foreigners to them? I havesome reservations about this.[19]

With their latest call for overseas ethnicChinese to unite behind them in supporting allCFLs who have not settled and to oppose dealssimilar to the Nishimatsu agreements, activists

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in Canada and the U.S. seem prepared to carryon the fight for their version of settlement foras long as necessary.[20] They scored publicrelations victories in Japan and internationallyin describing how insulting to Chinese dignitythese "so-called" settlements are. Asnewspapers and websites in China carry theireye-catching headlines, they are impactingpublic opinion there as well. Supporters of theNishimatsu approach, on the other hand, aremore reticent, refraining from open criticism ofthe other side, working step by step to achievetheir goal and hoping their strategy will finallybe vindicated by the results. They rely on theirpersonal ties to the CFLs and the latter's trustand appreciation of their support and effortsdeveloped over the long years of litigation. Wang Xuan, a supporter who works primarilywith victims of Japan's biochemical warfare inChina, questioned the strategy of not settling:"What could the Chinese gain if they don'taccept the settlements? ... Do we want them(CFLs) to go to their graves with a grudginghatred in their hearts? ... Where is the hope? Japanese attorneys who support litigation andJapanese peace supporters over the decadesnot only spend enormous sums of money, butare growing old and dying off ..."[21]

Calls within China to respect the wishes of theCFLs, as to whether they desire to settle or not,went unheeded.[22] In fact, the actual wishes ofthe survivors before the sound and fury beganmay never be known. To the quest for justicefrom the Japanese state and corporations isnow added an ideological dimension of conflict,a dimension that is no longer about the CFLsbut, sadly, is fought through them.

Quibbling over Words

Activists' objections to the Shinanogawasettlement are a repeat of those against theearlier Yasuno agreement. To frame theprovisions which follow, the preamble to thesettlement quotes a passage from the 2007Japan Supreme Court decision where the Court

concludes that the individual right to claim waswaived by China in the 1972 Sino-JapaneseJoint Communique. However, due to theimmense suffering of the CFLs, and thereimbursements Nishimatsu received from thegovernment after the war, the Court goes on tourge all (both) sides to work toward providingrelief to the plaintiffs.[23] Activists claim that"the liability for damages caused by suchsevere violation of human rights is distorted byNishimatsu into an act of providing ‘charitablerelief.'"[24]

Expecting challenges to be made, as in the firstNishimatsu settlement debate, regarding theuse of the word "relief (救済)", an allusion thatis unavoidable when quoting from the JapanSupreme Court ruling, the translator of theChinese version of the settlement offersexplanatory notes to clarify its meaning. Thenotes point out that "Chinese may have theimpression that (the word) relief means‘charity' and ‘benefaction' but (the phrase)‘provide relief to victims' in the settlementprovision does not have either meaning."[25]Rather, in legal language, when used inreference to an individual's rights, it means torestore his/her rights and when used in relationto victims, it signifies compensation to thevictims for injuries/damages sustained. Thenotes conclude: "‘Provide relief to victims' inthe settlement's provision has the lattermeaning."[26]

The notes' explanation is not unique. Anysearch of online Chinese or English legaldictionaries will yield the same definition forrelief as given above. More interestingly, as "relief" also appeared in some Japanesenewspapers' discussion of the controversysurrounding the 2000 Hanaoka settlement, anarticle, in a 2002 published collection of worksin Chinese entitled, Abduction, Litigation, andSettlement, delves into its meaning and usageat some length. The author, Lin Xin, of the LawResearch Center, College of China SociologicalStudies, affirms that "relief" in the context of

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settlements has no connotation of charity; hefurther distinguishes "charitable relief" whichis voluntary from "legal relief" which ismandatory.[27]

Another settlement term attorney Kangconsiders problematic is "compensation (償い金)", which she claims is not used in Japaneselegal documents. As used in everydayl a n g u a g e , i t e m b r a c e s a r a n g e o finterpretations including repayment for what isowed. However, it does not, according toKang, denote compensation for crimescommitted.[28] The notes to the Chinese versionof the settlement contradict Kang's contention. Not only does the term signify compensation,but its meaning is so broad as to encompass inits fold, shades of "repayment, compensation,money for atonement and so on."[29]

Kang further links the use of this term"compensation" to the Asian Women Fund(AWF), 1995-2007, set up for compensating theso-called Comfort Women, and to Japaneseofficialdom in its frequent communicationsregarding the AWF. The eventual failure ofthe AWF coupled with the Japanese officials'willingness to use this word, she reasons, is anindication that the word simply means "help" or"support" and not actual compensation.[30] Suchreasoning constitutes an argument byassociation, and although illogical, has strongemotional appeal with an implicit suggestionthat the Nishimatsu approach cannot producemeaningful reconciliation.

More importantly, Kang's allegation trivializesthe debate surrounding the AWF. Rather thandwelling on the details of the AWF controversyhere, suffice it to say that while the Japanesegovernment was the only culprit in setting up asystem of sexual slavery during the war, themoney for compensation came from citizendonations with the government contributingfunds to cover administrative costs only. Inother words, the AWF failed because mostComfort Women refused to accept money from

the Fund when the Japanese governmentrefused at the time and still refuses toacknowledge its responsibility.

Evasion of Legal Responsibility and Waiverof Right to Claim in Settlements

Activists also castigate Nishimatsu for itsdenial of legal responsibility in both the Yasunoand Shinanogawa settlements. They eitheroverlook or regard as irrelevant that on April27, 2007, Japan's Supreme Court ruled the1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqueeffectively extinguished Chinese victims' rightto claim. The Chinese Foreign Ministryresponded to the ruling two days later. OnApril 29, it declared that although under theCommunique, China had renounced warreparations in the interest of "friendly relationsbetween the two peoples," it was stronglyopposed to "the unbridled interpretation on thisclause by the Supreme Court of Japanregardless of China's repeated solemnrepresentations."[31] The Ministry concludedthat the Japan Supreme Court's interpretationof the 1972 Communique was "illegal andnull."[32]

Nonetheless, Japanese courts are not bound bythe Chinese government's interpretation. Instead, in Japan under Japanese law asannounced by Japan's Supreme Court, neitherNishimatsu nor other companies have any legalresponsibility toward the CFLs.

The concept of legal responsibility bearsfurther examination since CFLs who acceptedthe settlements take issue likewise withNishimatsu 's re fusa l to admit legalresponsibility. To CFLs who are not schooledin legal intricacies, the company's refusal isprobably equated with a repudiation of theirhaving wronged the victims. Such sentimentsare reinforced by activists' assertions thatNishimatsu has "whitewashed" its "extremeviolation of human rights ... into a moralobligation."[33]

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Legal liability, however, is ascribed not only toheinous crimes; it also follows from variousminor and inadvertent legal violations. A driverinadvertently running into another car andcausing damage is legally liable for the damagebut may not be morally culpable. Further, thecultivation of a sense of moral obligation tohumanity is essential when the goal is toprevent a recurrence of genocides andatrocities and to ensure future peace. In fact, itmay be preferable to have an individual orentity refrain from committing an offense out ofa sense of moral obligation than to have theindividual or entity be punished (held legallyresponsible) after the fact. The activists arenot doing the redress or peace movement aservice in downgrading moral obligation incomparison to legal responsibility.

Out of a total of 183 forced laborers at theShinanogawa worksite, 60 survivors ortheir descendants had been located by lastMay 6, when they attended a meeting inChina explaining the details of thes e t t l e m e n t . ( h b g r b . n e t(http://www.hbgrb.net/news/SHXW/2010/56/1056222812KB8273J68JIHIE6E6DJD.html) photo)

As noted above, legal responsibility has becomeimmaterial to the discussion of Chinese forcedlabor settlements in Japan ever since the 2007Japan Supreme Court ruling. But the conceptassumes a central role in settlement disputessince criticisms of various other aspects of thesettlements are ultimately linked to it. For

example, the first provision of the Hanaokasettlement reaffirms a 1990 Joint Statementissued by the CFLs and Kajima Corp. in whichthe latter admits to responsibility for abductingCFLs to work under tremendous hardships atthe Hanaoka site based on a 1942 Decree fromthe wartime Japanese Cabinet. A similarstatement also appears in both Nishimatsusettlements. Activists stoutly denounce thisdescription as a "dilution of historical facts"aimed at escaping legal responsibility.[34]

However, the wartime Cabinet did issue aDecree for forced labor. More importantly,without the Decree, the companies that usedforced labor could never have proceeded toabduct, with the central involvement of theJapanese Army, peasants from China'scountryside. The fact that industries andcompanies facing a labor shortage might havefirst approached the state for such an order[35]

is inconsequential. If responsibility were to beassigned to the root cause of Chinese forcedlabor, the Japanese government shouldshoulder the bulk of the blame since it started awar which led to the labor shortage in the firstplace. Debating whether use of the phrase"based on" dilutes one's responsibility leadsnowhere; there is enough blame to go aroundfor both the government and industriesconcerned.

Further, although activists embrace workingtoward a negotiated settlement, they decryprovisions in the Kajima and both Nishimatsuagreements that deny the victims the right tomake further claims within and outside ofJapan. Companies, however, do not settle outof a sense of guilt or altruism so much as to putan end to lawsuits and legal hassles. Kajimaentered into a settlement at the urging of theTokyo High Court which stated: "This Court ...took account of the serious sufferingsexperienced by the appellants . . . andconsidered it appropriate to aim at an overallsolution on the basis of the Statement (the1990 Joint Statement between CFLs and Kajima

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Corp.). Thus, on September 10, 1999, theCourt recommended a compromise exofficio."[36] Nishimatsu approached the CFLs'attorneys when its channeling of illegal fundsto politicians through dummy organizationscame to light in March of 2009, hoping that aresolution with the CFLs would restore itstarnished reputation.[37] It would be foolhardyfor any corporation regardless of its motivationto leave the door ajar for future claims aftersettling.

Activists not only seem to have missed thecentral point of the defendant's having asettlement, but also fail to comprehend that thedenial of the right to claim and the denial oflegal liability are two sides of the same coin. After all , a settlement is a negotiatedcompromise to resolve all issues usuallyinvolving "waiver of any right to reopen orappeal the matter from both sides, ... mutualrelease of any further claim by each party, astatement that neither side is admitting fault..."[38] Therefore, had Kajima and Nishimatsuexplicitly acknowledged legal responsibility andnot required a waiver of right to claim, it woulddefeat their purpose in having a settlement. And wi th respect to the Nish imatsuagreements, whether such provisions areincluded in the settlements is irrelevant asJapan's Supreme Court already ruled the CFLs'right to claim to be non-existent.

Thus, despite Nishimatsu's expression in thesettlements of an "apology for crimescommitted," a literal translation of theJapanese/Chinese characters (謝罪), activistsbemoan its lack of sincerity when comparingt h e s e s e t t l e m e n t s t o t h e G e r m a nRemembrance, Responsibility and Future Fund,where the latter "squarely faced history andexplicitly assumed responsibility, comfortingthe hearts of victims."[39] Had the activistsdelved into the motivation for and the history ofthe German negotiations, they would havefound striking similarities between the Germanand Japanese responses to forced labor claims.

The German Model for Reconciliation

The issue of legal responsibility that roils theChinese activists and the CFL community wasseldom raised in the lead-up to the negotiationsfor the Remembrance, Responsibility andFuture (RR&F) Fund. Instead, survivors of theslave labor as well as those of the Holocaustwere more consumed with the question ofmoral accountability. Many objected totranslating a quest for justice into a tangibleprocess of claims and compensations for theyfeared moral issues were being obscured. Opponents of compensation held a hugedemonstration outside the Knesset whenlegislators gathered to discuss the issue ofclaims in 1952.[40] Eventually, however, mostslave labor survivors, accepted compensationsas a symbolic form of justice.

German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer'smemorable 1951 speech refers to Germany'smoral and restitutive responsibility only:"Unspeakable crimes were perpetrated in thename of the German people which impose uponthem the obligation to make moral and materialamends ..." [41 ] When the agreement wasreached on the capped amount for the RR&FFund on December 17, 1999, German PresidentJohannes Rau read from a statement whichagain contains no admission of legalresponsibility: "... both government andbusiness accept the shared responsibility andmoral duty arising from the injustices of thepast."[42] It is therefore "worth emphasizing,"wrote Michael Bazyler, a leading authority onNazi-era settlements, "that Germany neveradmitted any legal l iability and, uponsettlement, insisted that its only liability ismoral and not legal."[43]

Activists repeatedly question why Japanesecorporations have not followed the path laiddown by the German industries in establishingthe RR&F Fund together with the Germangovernment. Yet the German corporations toohad the same overriding concern with legal

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immunity as Kajima and Nishimatsu.[44] NaziGermany's slave and forced labor workers wereobtained by the German police and army underthe then-existing racist laws. Much of thatworkforce was employed by the Third Reich'spublic sector including schools and hospitals. After the war when reparations were beingcontemplated for various Nazi-era crimes,German companies insisted any payments forslave and forced laborers should come from thestate since they had to use them in support ofNazi Germany's wartime economy. [45] Ascompensation for these were eventuallyexcluded from any postwar reparationsGermany made, the German firms too wantedto put a decisive end to the flurry of legalclaims that came after the first slave laborlawsuit against Ford and its German subsidiarywas filed in March of 1998 in Newark, NewJersey. They feared the damage that was beingdone to their reputation in the U.S. where theyhad considerable business dealings.

The German industries then called on thenewly-elected Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder toassist them with their legal troubles. To itscredit, the German government stepped up toshoulder its share of the responsibility. However, even then, its motivation was "tocounter lawsuits, particularly class actionlawsuits, and to remove the basis of thecampaign being led against German industryand our country . " [ 4 6 ] In agree ing tocompensation, German corporations wanted inreturn "legal peace", a term which entails anend to all existing and future claims in U.S.courts. Accordingly, early in 1999, Schroedersought to resolve the issue on a state-to-statebasis with the U.S. Together, American andGerman negotiators devised a solution thatwould address the issues of moral andhistorical responsibility while ensuring alasting and all-embracing "legal peace" forGerman companies in the U.S.[47]

The solution was the creation of a nationalfoundation, the sole forum outside of the

courts, for resolving all claims, including slaveand forced labor, arising out of the Nazi-era. The Berlin Accords, a set of agreementsratifying the compromises arrived at in thenegotiations, consisted of a Joint Statement ofPrinciples signed by the U.S., Germany andother governments who had an interest andparticipated in the talks, as well as anExecutive Agreement between U.S. andGermany promising "legal peace." Pursuant tothese Agreements, the German Bundestagenacted legislation to establish the RR&FFoundation endowed with 10 billion DM, halffunded by the industries and half by thegovernment.[48] In 2001 when the Bundestagascertained "legal peace" was sufficientlyachieved, funds were released to be distributedto the victims.[49]

Thus it can be seen that in practical terms, thesituation of the German companies does notgreatly differ from that of Kajima andNishimatsu. Their concern with legal peace isequivalent to the waivers of right to claimKajima and Nishimatsu stipulated in thesettlements; the insistence that theirresponsibility extends to the moral andhistorical but not the legal realm is identical. Since CFLs know little of the German solutionother than from the activists' high praise, theirbelief that Kajima and Nishimatsu should notbe allowed to evade their legal responsibilitypersists even among many of those whoaccepted the settlements.

Further, it should be noted that Germancompanies' initial insistence that it was thestate which bears prime responsibility for theuse of slave and forced labor is no differentfrom the Japanese companies' . Theirmotivation for coming to the bargaining table isalso the same. German companies may havehad a more sincere desire to do the right thingbut this, being an intangible factor, is difficultto ascertain and substantiate.

A significant difference does exist, however,

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between the German government's readyacceptance of responsibility and the Japanesegovernment's steady denial. With theinvolvement of the German government, thesolution arrived at is on a state-to-state basis,able to guarantee an enduring legal peace. Yeteven the German government admitted no legalrespons ib i l i ty , and though ready tocompensa te , re fused to cons ider acomprehensive out-of-court settlement as asolution, as it implied the slave and forcedlabor survivors might have a legal basis forpursuing their claims. As to keeping its end ofthe bargain within a framework of separation ofpowers, the U.S. Department of Justice had tofile numerous Statements of Interest to pressfor dismissal of all claims against Germancompanies in U.S. courts. Eventually almost 70such lawsuits were dismissed.[50] In 2003 theU.S. Supreme Court upheld President Clinton'spower to enter into the Executive Agreement ofthe Berlin Accords, a decision which had thesame effect as the Japan Supreme Court'sdismissal of the CFLs' right to claim. The doorto filing claims in U.S. courts was effectivelyclosed from then on.

Without the government's participation inJapan, the Japanese companies have been leftto their own devices to resolve the legacy offorced labor claims on a piecemeal andindividual basis. A questionable stipulationfound in all three of the Japanese corporatesettlements might have been included for thevery purpose of ensuring legal peace. Thisprovision asks those who accepted thesettlement either to prevent other CFLs fromsuing Kajima, or to resolve the matter amongthemselves so Nishimatsu would not bear theburden of claims again. [51] Whatever therationale for its inclusion, the provision may notbe enforceable when challenged in court as itsexecution involves stripping other CFLs whohad not participated in the settlement of theirright to sue. Viewed in the context of theGerman negotiations, the provision may beseen as the two companies' solution to the

quest for legal peace. In the eyes of theactivists, however, the provision enablesNishimatsu to lure and buy off "accessories"with a paltry sum.[52] Unfortunately, with thisaccusation the integrity of the Japaneseattorneys who negotiated for, and CFLs whoaccepted, the settlements is also called intoquestion.

Setting a Price for True Remorse

Supporters and activists alike realize that noamount of money could ever compensate theCFLs for their horrendous suffering, and loss ofhealth or life. Their efforts are directed atobtaining validation for the enslavement CFLsendured and delayed justice for the crimescommitted against them. But money doesmatter as a signal that they have achieved theirgoal. So the CFL redress movement is notabout - yet at the same time is also about - themoney CFLs should receive in restitution.

Under the RR&F Fund the slave laborers ofGermany, i.e., those who were taken fromconcentration camps to be worked to death,were paid $7,500, and the forced laborers werepaid $2,500, unless they endured extremehardships (as the CFLs in Japan routinely did),in which case they were entitled to the sameamount as the slave laborers.[53] Few slave andforced labor survivors and descendants weresatisfied with their compensation, but mostaccepted it eventually as symbolic and the bestthey could do under the circumstances.[54] In1999 German President Rau correctly assessedtheir sentiments in these words, "What theywant is for their suffering to be recognized assuffering and for the injustice done to them tobe named injustice ... we will not forget theirsuffering."[55]

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Last May 8 the first meeting of theAdministrative Committee of theShinanogawa Peace Fund was held by theChina Human Rights DevelopmentFoundation, the Beijing organizationentrusted with making disbursements.( h u m a n r i g h t s . c o m . c n(http://founder.china.cn/human/human/2010-05/10/content_3504418.htm) photo)

Beginning in June of this year, the CFLs ortheir descendants in the Shinanogawasettlement will be receiving approximately50,000 RMB (at 6.8 RMB=1 USD, roughlyequivalent to $7,352) in compensation [56]; theCFLs or their descendants in the Yasunosettlement started receiving 45,366 RMB (at6.8 RMB= 1 USD, roughly equivalent to$6,671) in December of 2009.[57] PresidentRau's words mentioned above express CFLs'sentiments as well. Perhaps Liu Huanxin,almost 70 years old, whose father wasabducted, best captured the complex andconflicting attitudes CFLs have towardcompensation. Liu could not hold back histears when he returned home on April 27,2010, after learning of the settlement, saying"Half a decade - the day we waited for finallyarrived ... this settlement gives us comfort andyet it's hard to accept because what we want isdignity, not money; the tragic experience ofabduction can never be wiped out by money."[58]

The Nishimatsu CFLs are, or will be, receiving

compensation comparable to Germany's slaveand forced laborers. Activists object to nationaldignity being compromised at this amountwhile more reasonable voices in China urgethat CFLs not be burdened with a fight fornational dignity when they had fought so hardsimply to survive under unspeakable Japaneseatrocities during the war.[59] Attorney Kangconsiders Nishimatsu's compensation tootrifling a sum to indicate true remorse or agenuine desire for reconcil iation. [ 6 0 ] Apparently, in compensation amount, activistsdesist from using the German model forcomparison. Instead, they turn to $20,000, thesum the U.S. government paid to each ethnicJapanese person it interned during the SecondWorld War.[61]

Admittedly, Nishimatsu's compensation, likethe compensation the German fund paid out, istoo little and comes too late, but it does have asymbolic value beyond its monetary one. Themoney CFLs received from funds ethnicChinese activists set up to support them afterthey rejected either the Kajima or theNishimatsu settlements (See Endnotes 7 and13) simply did not deliver the same emotionalpayload. Consequently most of the locatedSh inanogawa v ic t ims accepted thecompensation from Nishimatsu in spite of thepress conference attorney Kang held tomobilize public opinion in China against thesettlement. The activists could afford to waitfor compensation amounts that would"demonstrate" true remorse. Surviving CFLs intheir late 80s and 90s cannot, a considerationthe Japanese attorneys and their supporters arekeenly aware of when they urge settlement asan option.

Progress Made from the Hanaoka to theShinanogawa Settlements

The splintering of the forced labor redressmovement created so much confusion that ithas tended to obscure the most significantachievement the movement produced to date.

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Through initiating legal proceedings in the1990s, supporters and Japanese attorneys havesuccessfully used the legal system in Japan toestablish on record the historical facts of andthe moral responsibility for Chinese forcedlabor on the part of both the Japanesegovernment and companies during the Asia-Pacific War.

Rather than recognizing this achievement andfocusing on the future, activists rehash insteadthe legal minutia of past agreements. Theyeither deny or downplay supporters' claim thatimprovements have been made in the terms ofthe agreements from Hanaoka to Yasuno andShinanogawa; they question the possibility ofprogress when all three settlements are builton the twin "false" premises of victims' waiverof right to claim and the companies' non-admission of legal liability. To evaluate theseassertions and counter-assertions, an analysiswill be made of the extent to which thesesettlements meet the three non-negotiabledemands of the Chinese forced labor redressmovement: 1) Acknowledging atrocities toextend an apology for crimes committed; 2)Erecting a memorial to memorialize the victimsa n d t o e d u c a t e t h e p u b l i c ; a n d 3 )Compensating the victims.

Apology (for crimes committed): The Hanaokasettlement does not contain an expression ofapology in the agreement itself. Instead itsfirst provision reaffirms the Joint StatementKajima and the CFLs issued in 1990, in whichKajima acknowledges historical responsibilityand extends its apology. Both Nishimatsusettlements explicitly acknowledge historicalresponsibility and proffer a sincere apology inthe documents themselves.

The first Hanaoka provision ends with a jarringand abrupt sentence to the effect that the CFLsnote Kajima admits no legal liability.[62] Incontrast, both Nishimatsu settlements do notclaim the company has no legal liability,probably because it is unnecessary after the

2007 Supreme Court ruling.

Erecting a Memorial and Educating the Public. In addition to the apology, the Shinanogawaagreement provides for a "Shinanogawa PeaceFund" to be set up for compensating the CFLs,memorial services for the deceased, research tolocate the rest of the 183 Shinanogawa CFLsand other matters.[63] Sufficient funds to build amemorial exist if the victims so desire, althoughthe settlement itself does not explicitly mentiona memorial. Erecting a memorial is explicitlyincluded in Yasuno, the first Nishimatsusettlement.[64] On the other hand, the "HanaokaPeace and Goodwill Foundation" Kajimaestablished only provided for "memorialservices for the victims, the self-help effortsand care of the victims and their families, andeducation of their children."[65] No stipulationexists to provide for erecting a Hanaokamemorial.

Compensation: The money the victims receivedfrom the "Hanaoka Peace and GoodwillFoundation" is for their "care" and othermatters as quoted above; i t is not forcompensation, or at least not explicitly namedas such.[66] In the Nishimatsu settlements, theamount the victims have received or willreceive is called "compensation," although, aspreviously discussed, activists claim otherwisein their semantic critique of the Shinanogawaagreement. Further, in the Yasuno settlementfunds to be used for compensation arespecifically referred to as "reconciliationmoney".[67]

By September of 2001, the Hanaoka Peace andGoodwill Foundation had disbursed funds to 21Chinese forced laborers, each of whomreceived 250,000 yen.[68] The exchange rate asof September 15, 2001, was 117.35 yen = 1USD; the amount worked out to slightly morethan $2,000 per victim. As noted above,Nishimatsu began its first disbursement of theYasuno Friendship Fund at US$6,671 pervictim in December of 2009 while the

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Shinanogawa victims are expected to receiveUS$7,352 starting mid-2010.

The above analysis shows that, in addition tothe overall success in establishing historicaland moral responsibility, Japanese attorneysand supporters secured progressively bettersettlement terms from the Hanaoka to theShinanogawa agreements. Activists' demandfor an admission of legal liability and retentionof CFLs' right to claim goes beyond what couldbe accommodated within the framework of anegotiated settlement. It bears repeating thatGerman companies never admitted legall iabi l i ty and the act iv ists ' model forreconciliation, the RR&F Foundation, wasfounded partly on President Clinton's promiseof "legal peace."

Japanese attorneys worked pro bono and longand hard on behalf of the victims. The separateteams o f a t t o rneys f o r Yasuno andShinanogawa, in response to the critique thatthe Hanaoka settlement compromises the rightto sue of CFLs who refuse to settle, negotiateda "conf irmation statement" in whichNishimatsu explicitly affirms this right is notextinguished. The Shinanogawa team ofJapanese attorneys negotiated for moreconcessions in a settlement that is only sixmonths apart from the earlier Yasunosettlement. Not only is the compensationamount increased for a shorter duration ofenslavement in Japan, but the compensationfund is, for the first time, deposited with aChinese organization which is responsible forits administration, thus demonstrating theJapanese attorneys' responsiveness to thewishes of the activists and Chinese public.[69]

There is , o f course, a lways room forimprovement. In future negotiations, theJapanese attorneys could aim to remove theprovision which foists on the victims and theorganization holding the compensation fund theresponsibility to relieve the settling Japanesecompany of further claims.

Activists make little allowance for pressuresthat might be exerted by other Japanesecompanies and historical revisionists onNishimatsu for its readiness to settle, nor dothey show any understanding of factors thatlimit the concessions the company could makein the final agreement. They might have won ashort-term, public-relations victory byproclaiming the Shinanogawa settlement to beone "without the original plaintiffs." Theymight even have set themselves up to be thesole arbiter of Nishimatsu's sincerity and depthof remorse. Yet whether Nishimatsu is sincereand adequately remorseful are intangibles,subject to interpretation and thereforeirrelevant. What is relevant, however, is theexample Nishimatsu sets in its willingness toreconcile even though the Japan SupremeCourt had extinguished the CFLs' legal right toclaim in 2007. Hopefully other companies willfollow this example in the near future.

The Way Forward

T h e m a i n o b s t a c l e t o a c h i e v i n g acomprehensive redress of the Chinese forcedlabor issue is the Japanese government'sunyielding intransigence in denyingresponsibility. If all the Japanese companiesthat used Chinese forced labor were to enterinto individual compensation agreements, theresolution of the issue is still incompletewithout holding the Japanese governmentresponsible. On the other hand, if the Japanesegovernment were to accept responsibility, showrepentance and provide the necessaryrestitution, other Japanese companies wouldsurely follow suit. Therefore, having effectivelyutilized the Japanese legal system to establishhistorical and moral responsibility, the CFLredress movement may well be advised to moveonto the political arena, training its sights onthe Japanese government.

In the last decade China's phenomenaleconomic growth has been likened by some to arising tide that lifts all boats of the other

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nations in Asia, including Japan. China becamethe largest trading partner of Japan in 2009,putting it ahead of the U.S., its share being arecord 20.5 percent of Japan's total trade.[70] Ifthe Chinese government were to become morevocal in its support of the CFLs [71] and/orJapanese companies were to exert pressure onits own government in the interest of retainingthe goodwill of Chinese consumers and theiralready established market positions in China,then the Japanese government might bebrought around to the bargaining table. Acomprehensive resolution of the Chinese forcedlabor issue is therefore not necessarily out ofreach. Indeed, voices urging the Japanesegovernment to take action can be heard fromJapan to China.[72] With time and the gatheringmomentum of the Nishimatsu settlements,these voices will hopefully grow too loud andinsistent to be ignored.

Ivy Lee is a Professor Emeritus of Sociology atCalifornia State University, Sacramento. Since her retirement in 1997, she has worked towardand written on redressing Japanese atrocitiescommitted in the Asia-Pacific War. She was theco-leader of a nationwide coalition of ethnicChinese and American POWs who pushed forlegislation to declassify Japanese war crimesdocuments held in the U.S. In December of2000, after a two-year drive, the legislation wassigned into law by President Clinton, under the"Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Actof 2000," Title VIII of Public Law 106-567. Leewas the 2001-2002 president of Global Alliancefor Preserving the History of WW II in Asia, andan appointed member of the CaliforniaTaskforce on Holocaust, Genocide, HumanRights, and Tolerance Education, created byAssembly Bill (AB) 2002 in 2003 and extendedby AB 1175 through 2007.

Editor's Note: This article does not necessarilyrepresent the views of the current leadership ofthe Global Alliance for Preserving the History

of WW II in Asia.

William Underwood researches ongoingreparations movements for forced labor inwartime Japan. The author of numerous articleson the subject in The Asia-Pacific Journal, hewrote this introduction for The Journal. He is acoordinator for The Asia-Pacific Journal: JapanF o c u s a n d c a n b e r e a c h e d a tk y u s h u b i l l @ y a h o o . c o m(https://apjjf.org/mailto:kyushubill@yahoo.com)

Michael Bazyler, Professor of Law at ChapmanUniversity, contributed to this article. Aleading authority on the use of American andEuropean courts to redress genocide and otherhistorical wrongs, Bazyler wrote the book,Holocaust Justice: The Battle for Restitution inAmerica's Courts (New York University Press,2003), which was cited by the U.S. SupremeCourt and reviewed, among others, in theHarvard Law Review, and Financial Times(London). Bazyler is currently serving on thelegal team that filed the first case in the U.S.for the return of religious/cultural objectsarising out of the Armenian genocide. Hiswebsite is http://www.michaelbazyler.com.

Recommended citation: Ivy Lee, "TowardReconciliation: The Nishimatsu Settlements forChinese Forced Labor in World War Two," TheAsia-Pacific Journal, 32-6-10, August 9, 2010.

ENDNOTES

[ 1 ]http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqcj/zxqxb/2010-04-29/content_236115.html, accessed4/29/2010

[ 2 ]http://bjyouth.ynet.com/article.jsp?oid=65155321, accessed 4/29/2010

[ 3 ]http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqcj/zxqxb/2010-

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04-29/content_236115.html;

http://bj.yzdsb.com.cn/system/2010/04/27/010462988.shtml

http://intl.ce.cn/zgysj/201004/29/t20100429_21341426.shtml, accessed 4/29/2010

[ 4 ]http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqcj/zxqxb/2010-04-29/content_236115.html

[ 5 ]http://bjyouth.ynet.com/article.jsp?oid=65155321

[6] Ibid.

[ 7 ]http://newnews.ca/?action-viewnews-itemid-51076,

http://www.anpopo.com/show-35637-1.html,accessed 4/30/2010

On April 26, 2010, in a press release sent to theChinese media in Canada, Canada ALPHAannounced that together with Wai MingCharitable Foundation Fund, Ltd. of HongKong, they will solicit money from overseasethnic Chinese to found a fund in support ofChinese forced laborers to continue theirstruggle for obtaining historical justice. Inaddition, Canada ALPHA and Wai Ming willeach contribute 350,000 RMB (at 6.8 RMB = 1USD, equivalent to $51,470 each) toward thefounding of this fund. The five originalplaintiffs and two other CFLs who haveindicated they will reject the settlement, willreceive 50,000 RMB, the same amount as thosewho settled, from this fund.

[ 8 ]http://news.163.com/10/0428/10/65BOH53I000146BD.html, accessed 4/30/2010

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[ 1 1 ]http://gcontent.nddaily.com/3/40/340a39045c40d50d/Blog/6d7/ca5653.html, accessed5/1/2010

[12] Ibid.

[13] The Global Alliance for Preserving theHistory of WW II in Asia announced that theorganization, together with concernedindividuals in China, founded a Subsidy toVictims Rejecting Kajima's Hanaoka SettlementFund in December of 2004. Money had alreadybeen raised from GA affiliates, with BritishColumbia chapter of Association for Learningand Preserving the History of WW II in Asia,British Columbia (BC ALPHA), and TorontoALPHA contributing 25,000 RMB each, amember of another San Francisco GA affiliatecontributing 100,000 RMB and variousindividuals in China contributing a total of6,200 RMB. The Fund would solicit donationsfrom all overseas ethnic Chinese toward thegoal of a fund total of 225,000 RMB. It startedits first distribution toward the end of 2004 of25,000 RMB (at 8.28 RMB = 1 USD onDecember 15, 2004, equivalent to $3,048) toeach Hanaoka victim who rejected thesettlement.

[ 1 4 ]http://news.sohu.com/20091103/n267921800.shtml, accessed 5/1/2010. The three non-negotiable demands are described by Prof. LiuBao Chen, a researcher at the Forced LaborResearch Center, Hebei University, who wasfirst approached by Chinese residing in Japanto locate the Hanaoka survivors and whoparticipated throughout the whole course ofthe Yasuno litigation and negotiations.

[ 1 5 ]http://big5.china.com.cn/international/txt/2009-11/03/content_18819279_2.htm, accessed5/27/2010

[ 1 6 ]http://gcontent.nddaily.com/3/40/340a39045c4

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0d50d/Blog/6d7/ca5653.html

[ 1 7 ]http://news.sohu.com/20091103/n267921800.shtml,

[ 1 8 ]http://www.longevitys.com/n489992c26.aspx,accessed 4/28/2010

[19] Kang Jian, Arimitsu Ken and WilliamUnderwood, "Assessing the NishimatsuCorporate Approach to Redressing ChineseForced Labor in Wartime Japan," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 47-1-09, November 23, 2009;

[ 2 0 ]http://www.anpopo.com/show-35637-1.html,http://newnews.ca/?action-viewnews-itemid-51076

[ 2 1 ]http://www.ccvic.com/guoji/redianpinglun/20100427/144264.shtml, accessed 4/29/2010

[ 2 2 ]http://www.chinaqll.com/Html/qyjm/14_187.htm, accessed 4/20/2010

[ 2 3 ]http://www.china918.cn/news/suopei/xisonghj/2010/0510/497.html, accessed 5/14/2010

[ 2 4 ]http://www.stopracism.ca/content/nishimatsu-construction-co-ltd-slave-labour-settlement,accessed 4/30/2010

[ 2 5 ]http://www.china918.cn/news/suopei/xisonghj/2010/0510/497.html

[26] Ibid.

[27] Lin Yin, "The Legal Meaning of theHanaoka Compensation Case Settlement andRelated Questions," in Abduction, Litigation,and Settlement, edited by Luo Wei-Long(Academy Press, China, 2002) 164-165

[ 2 8 ]http://www.china918.cn/news/suopei/xisonghj/2010/0513/498.html, accessed 5/15/2010

[ 2 9 ]http://www.china918.cn/news/suopei/xisonghj/2010/0510/497.html

[ 3 0 ]http://www.china918.cn/news/suopei/xisonghj/2010/0513/498.html

[ 3 1 ]http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t315036.htm, accessed 5/26/2010. LiuJianchao's statement clearly implies China hasnot given up the individual citizens' right toclaim although i t has renounced warreparations between the two states in the JointCommunique.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Kang Jian et al, (November 23, 2009)

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[ 3 6 ]http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/hanaoka02.html, accessed 5/25/2010

[ 3 7 ]http://www.66law.cn/archive/news/2010-05-10/38678_1.aspx, accessed 5/24/2010

[ 3 8 ]http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=750, accessed 5/2/2010

[39] Kang Jian et al, (November 23, 2009)

[40] Gideon Taylor, "Where Morality MeetsMoney," in Holocaust Restitution edited byMichael Bazyler and Roger Alford (New York:New York University Press, 2006) 163-169

[41] http://www.claimscon.org/?url=history,

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accessed 5/27/2010

[42] Gideon Taylor (2006), 163-169

[43] Michael Bazyler, "Japan Should Follow theInternational Trend and Face Its History ofWorld War II Forced Labor" The Asia-PacificJournal, Vol. 5-3-09, January 29, 2009. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Michael-Bazyler/3030

[44] Michael Bazyler, Holocaust Justice: TheBattle for Restitution in American's Courts (NY:New York University Press, 2003), 83

[45] Ibid., 61

[46] Roger Cohen, "German Companies Set UpFund for Slave Laborers under Nazis." NewYork Times, February 17, 1999, A1. Quoted inBazyler (2003) 83

[47] Michael Bazyler (November 23, 2003),83-88

[48] Ibid., 79-83

[49] Ibid., 89-92

[50] Roger Witten, "How Swiss Banks andGerman Companies Came to Terms with theWrenching Legacies of the Holocaust andWorld War II," Holocaust Restitution edited byMichael Bazyler and Roger Alford (NY":NewYork University Press, 2006) 88

[ 5 1 ]http://www.china918.cn/news/suopei/xisonghj/2010/0510/497.html

[ 5 2 ]http://www.china918.cn/news/suopei/xisonghj/2010/0513/498.html

[53] Michael Bazyler (2003), 81

[54] Ibid., 101-105

[55] Gideon Taylor (2006), 166

[ 5 6 ]http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-04/26/c_1257467.htm, accessed 5/24/2010

[ 5 7 ]http://gcontent.nddaily.com/3/40/340a39045c40d50d/Blog/6d7/ca5653.html

[ 5 8 ]http://www.longevitys.com/n489992c26.aspx

[ 5 9 ]http://www.chinaqll.com/Html/qyjm/14_187.htm

[ 6 0 ]http://www.china918.cn/news/suopei/xisonghj/2010/0513/498.html

[61] Ibid.

[ 6 2 ]http://www.jca.apc.org/hanaokajiken/eng%20provisions.htm, accessed 5/1/2010

[ 6 3 ]http://www.china918.cn/news/suopei/xisonghj/2010/0510/497.html

[ 6 4 ]http://www.china918.cn/news/suopei/2009/1023/322.html, accessed 5/1/2010

[ 6 5 ]http://www.jca.apc.org/hanaokajiken/eng%20provisions.htm

[66] Ibid.

[ 6 7 ]http://www.china918.cn/news/suopei/2009/1023/322.html

[68] Miki Y. Ishikida, Toward Peace: WarResponsibility, Postwar Compensation, andPeace Movements and Education in Japan (NE:Center for US-Japan Comparative SocialStudies, 2005) 43

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[ 6 9 ]http://www.hr-china.org/human/2010-05/10/content_3504418.htm, accessed 5/24/2010

[ 7 0 ]http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/news/releases/20100217809-news, accessed 5/30/2010

[ 7 1 ]http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t315036.htm

On occasions when queried about the Chineseforced labor issue, the Chinese ForeignMinistry has spoken out and asked Japan toface squarely its unresolved war legacy. Forexample, when responding to the JapanSupreme Court's 2007 ruling, the Ministryspokesperson said on April 29, 2007, "Theconscription of the forced and enslaved labouris a grave crime committed by Japanesemilitarism against the Chinese people. It is alsoan existing major human rights issue yet to beproperly addressed. China has requested Japanto properly handle relevant issues in anattitude responsible for history."

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t628660.htm

The same words were repeated again onNovember 23, 2009, when the spokespersonwas asked about another verdict on Chineseforced labor at Sakata port, Yamagataprefecture.

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t335373.htm

The Ministry has also remarked on Japan'sother unresolved war legacies. Regarding theissue of Comfort Women, for example, theMinistry spokesperson said on June 30, 2007,"The position of China on the "comfort women"issue is consistent and clear-cut. Theconscription of "comfort women" is one of thegrave crimes committed by the Japanesemilitarism against the people of the invadedcountries including China during the SecondWorld War. We request the Japanesegovernment to listen to the just appeal of theinternational community, properly andearnestly handle the issue left over from historyin an attitude responsible for history."

[ 7 2 ]http://www.japanfocus.org/-Arimitsu-Ken/3256

Ken Arimitsu wrote in the companion piece inKang Jian et al., (November 23, 2009), that"Clarifying Japan's national responsibility andsecuring the necessary redress funding will bea sure step towards an age of trust and peace-building."

http://news.163.com/10/0428/10/65BOH53I000146BD.html

Recognizing that the path to litigation is closed,Deng Jianguo, the head of the AttorneysAssociation for Forced Labor Issues is quotedas having remarked "We feel it is time for theJapanese Government to speak up," noting theonly way to resolve the problem now is throughpolitics.